Kruger

Un-Packing Pakenham

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I’ve just finished reading Thomas Pakenham’s ‘The Boer War’ … AGAIN, this is my 7th time. Pakenham was the first book I read on the Boer War in the early 80’s and it has been my go-to, it’s easy and it reads like a novel, section 1 sets up a ‘gold-bug’ conspiracy complete with political intrigue, and it becomes a page turner after that.

As I’ve matured as a history lover and commentator, and even lately mapping out my own historical papers for academic scrutiny, I’ve become more astute on challenging material. I’ve learned that the closer you are to archive material and source documents the better – and this is where references and sources become critical to history books.

Doing ‘history’ on a 19th Century topic in the 21st Century is interesting, as in between there are all the 20th Century historians – and sometimes what they have penned as ‘truism’ seems to hold and is simply taken by the 21st Century historian chaps as a grounded fact and then they expounded and expanded on it without really challenging its origins, and whole historical misunderstandings are easily created.

The interesting bit is when you hit an archive and discover the 20th Century historian has not grounded the fact properly, and what has come after him is pure hyperbole – and that unfortunately is the case with Pakenham … and here’s how.

The Boer War and Race

One of the most relevant issues and topics when looking at the South African War 1899 -1902 a.k.a. Boer War 2, in the 21st Century is the topic of ‘race’ and the related topics of ‘franchise’ and ’emancipation’. To really understand how ‘race’ is viewed and acted upon in the war within the context of its time and then what role subsequent historians and commentators during the Apartheid period took to dismiss it from the narrative or side-line it as irrelevant in what has been essentially pitched as ‘white man’s war’ between two ‘white’ antagonists – the black man is a but a part player merely along for the ride. 

Even in ‘white’ communities in modern South Africa today, the ‘Boer War’ is a war from which the ‘Black’ man is excluded at the beginning and excluded at the end. They sincerely believe that. So much so, that academic attempts to re-brand the war on its official name “The South African War (1899-1902)” to incorporate the full scope and all the belligerents (black and white – British, Boer, Tswana, Swazi etc.) – still goes completely unnoticed in ‘white’ Afrikaans communities especially – and they still call it the “2nd War for Independence” (whose independence was at stake is anyone’s guess) or the “Anglo-Boer War” (Brits and Boers only thanks).

This perception starts to really take shape with historians writing on the Boer War during Apartheid, and here Pakenham in section one of his ’The Boer War’ book sets it up perfectly. From the get-go, as the good travel writer and journalist he is (he was not a qualified historian and the “The Boer War” by T Pakenham is his first real attempt at a history book), Pakenham decides on who is a villain and who is a hero, like any good novel – very important if you’re going to set up a ‘page-turner’ and reinvigorate a tired old boring subject with some flare and creative license.

Creating a Villain

Been an Irish Republican himself, Pakenham is almost predisposed to vilifying British Imperialists. To build Alfred Milner as his villain, Pakenham uses two key meetings – one meeting with Joseph Chamberlain on 22nd November 1898 where Milner gets ‘his orders’ so to speak and one meeting with Percy Fitzpatrick from the Reform Committee (the Uitlanders) on the 31st March 1899 where he gives the ‘Uitlanders’ some advice to how to advance their cause and declares his own commitment to their cause. Seems legit right? Let’s focus on each and see how Pakenham ‘interpreted’ these meetings.

On the meeting in London with Chamberlain – Milner outlines that a “crisis” is developing over the Uitlander franchise as Kruger is simply unbending and is showing no signs of compromising. Chamberlain is of the opinion that “time” will resolve the crisis, leave Kruger to his unreasonable demands and simple democracy, civil pressure and process will see in inevitable change (in other words give Kruger enough rope and he’ll eventually hang himself). To quote, Chamberlain tells Milner to do two things 1. That a peaceful settlement is the only settlement the “British Public” i.e. Parliament will accept and 2. Keep things moving “forrarder” in South Africa (old English – ‘Forrarder’ means ‘forward’). 

Joseph Chamberlain (left) and Alfred Milner (right)

Milner also agrees with Chamberlain that he will “screw” Kruger – now before you jump to a 21st Century conclusion, “screw” in Victorian times comes from word used to describe a prison official and the ‘screw’ was a pressure machine prisoners aimlessly turned as a punitive measure – to ‘screw’ means to “increase pressure” on Kruger politically (and not to “screw” him out of his country as would be a ‘literal’ 21st century translation and one that it is so often misquoted by Afrikaner Boer War enthusiasts).

Those are Milner’s orders – from his boss. Straightforward enough.

In a modern context Chamberlain is telling his civil servant in the colonial office in South Africa to conclude an acceptable peace without using violence and keep up the good work, keep going and keep pushing. 

But this is not Pakenham’s’ take on the meeting at all, Pakenham sets up the meeting as Milner intentions on artificially ‘working up a crises’ to urge Chamberlain to agree a pathway to war – that no such ‘pathway’ is even mentioned nor is one discussed matter not a jot to Pakenham. Thomas Pakenham then uses the phase of “moving things ‘forrander’ locally” and declares it a “hint” to Milner to continue with an aggressive ‘forward’ policy to annex the Transvaal Republic. That there is absolutely nothing backing Pakenham up in his assertion that Chamberlain is “hinting” to Milner to continue creating conditions for a war and the annexation of a Republic does not deter Pakenham at all – with no proof whatsoever he keeps up his vilification of Milner (and Chamberlain). It gets worse.

The meeting between Percy Fitzpatrick and Alfred Milner is Pakenham’s next focus. So, what happens here? – Fitzpatrick as a Reform Committee leader (and Uitlander in the Transvaal) meets with Milner to put the case of the Uitlanders, to outline their beef with Kruger as a crisis and put their franchise issue front forward. 

Percy Fitzpatrick (left) and Alfred Milner (right)

Milner sympathises with Fitzpatrick and says his “heart and soul” are with the miners and their predicament. He indicates to Fitzpatrick that their case is not strong enough with the British public, and this is borne out by Parliament (and by default Chamberlain) who are unmoved – he suggests the next step is for the Uitlanders to strengthen their case to the ‘British Public” is a concerted focus on British “media” (the very partisan British press) – he however distances himself personally from involvement in this media campaign and indicates the Uitlanders have to go it alone (as he does not want to be seen as partisan and he’s toeing the line his ‘boss’ Chamberlain is demanding of him). 

That’s it – in modern context, he sympathises with their cause, and he suggests they tighten up their PR and do a media blitz to strengthen their case, only he cannot be seen to be partisan to such a media campaign –  Straightforward enough.

But that’s not Pakenham’s take, instead Pakenham sees this as collusion, purposefully building a crisis for the purposes of strengthening a case for war. He concludes that Milner’s avoiding of the proposed media campaign as duplicitous behaviour – covering his tracks as he’s breaking with his Boss’ instructions and fanning a war, and Pakenham does this again with absolutely no grounded fact whatsoever. It gets even worse.

Pakenham concludes all this with, and I’ll quote Pakenham directly. 

“His (Milner’s) plan was to annex the Transvaal. He would rule it as a crown colony much as his old chief, Cromer, ruled Egypt”.

Pakenham goes on and states

“these were the dreams of Milner’s life and he saw no reason to abandon them because of one obstinate (and obsolete) old man in South Africa (editor – implying Kruger). But how to prevent Chamberlain “wobbling” and ruining everything by compromise? A delicate plan, whose object had to be kept as secret from Chamberlain as from Kruger, was taking shape in Milner’s mind.”

Wow! I mean … wow … a plan for annexation, a secret conspiracy, dreams of grandeur – a Napoleon in the guise of a British bureaucrat and who knew? …Where did Pakenham get all this information from? There must be a source, a reference of some kind, Milner must have betrayed his thoughts to a friend in a letter or similar, he’s drafted an annexation plan surely … and luckily there is a reference, Pakenham’s given it all a notation – number “25”.

Now I want to see this – it’s the entire crux of Pakenham’s argument, it’s the moment of truth, so over to No. 25 under Chapter 6 and it reads … “The evidence that Milner wanted a war is circumstantial.” Huh! … say what! There is no evidence – it’s all circumstantial – and this ‘truth’ is hidden in a notation at the back of the book! What’s going on?

Telling Porkies 

In London cockney rhyming slang if you “tell a pork pie” it’s a “lie”. Telling ‘Porkies’ is to shield or be ‘sparing’ with the truth. One clear way of telling a porkie is to tell a ‘half-truth’ its sounds legit enough and has enough gravitas on which you can base an entire argument. 

When it comes to Pakenham and ‘The Boer War’ on the issue of race and the British franchise demands outside of the ‘white’ uitlander issue i.e. the Coloured Franchise and the recognition of the rights of an urbanising Black African population drawn to mines and industry for labour – this bit of purposeful manipulation becomes masterful – as in one stroke Pakenham paints Milner as a rabid racist and he relegates the entire ‘Coloured’ franchise issue to a secondary status, citing Britain’s lip service to it because in his view deep down they are as racist and segregationist as the Boers – and he uses Milner to ‘deflect’ this rather thorny subject away from the ZAR Republic’s very racist ‘Grondwet’ and its institutionalised racism as reflected in Articles 31 and 32 (applicable to ‘white’ “non-Boers” and “coloured”, “Indians” and “blacks”) of the ZAR constitution.

What this does is relegate this issue of race to a ‘secondary’ status and builds the war as a white only affair for white rights. It goes against the another ‘narrative’ the modern black historians and academics point out – the ‘winds of war’ actually starts in earnest when Edmund Fraser meets Jan Smuts on the 23rd December 1898 and he warns the Republic that their treatment of their ‘Blacks’ is reaching unacceptable levels, he warns Smuts that issues like universal franchise and rights are the type of things the British public like to get behind because they are concepts the average Briton understands – and these easily understood equity and franchise concepts – like slavery – are issues the British government tends to go into a legitimate and justified war over. 

This meeting leaves Smuts utterly gobsmacked and under the impression that the coming war is inevitable … it’s not just about the ‘white’ miners and their rights after all … it’s much bigger than that and the British are not going to stop at insisting on the 5 year franchise for the ‘whites’ only, next is the issue of Black rights. The British also don’t let go of this – throughout the war the ‘Coloured franchise’ and ‘Black’ protectorate and recognition issues are front and forward – it’s a ‘term’ for peace when the first peace negotiations are opened up with Louis Botha in February 1901 in Middleburg and it’s still a ‘term’ for peace when the Vereeniging Peace proposals are put forward in May 1902 …. It is Smuts’ skill as a lawyer and negotiator that its ‘kicked into the long grass’ to be dealt with a ‘future and independent’ union (a move Milner very rightly and prophetically clocks as future problem). 

It’s a key part of the Boer War as the Boers continue with an entire guerrilla phase with the absolute devastation to their family and farm constructs precisely because they absolutely refuse to change their ‘grondwet’ (constitution) on franchise – and especially the coloured franchise. This is NOT what the Apartheid era politicians want taught about the war, to them it’s a whites only affair, it’s a result of a long standing feud dating back to the Voortrekkers … the ‘black’ issue is incidental and the Brits are not that serious about it anyway.

To put this very critical ‘part of the Boer War .. the entire ‘Black’ part of the war on the rump and kick it into the long grass – and in so to fall in line with the Republican narrative (and Apartheid philosophy of Boer victimisation) we need the villain to give the ‘black’ issue the old heave-ho … and Pakenham turns to Milner, his warmongering “Cromer”, so here’s the quote he users – it’s from a letter Milner writes to a friend. 

“You have only to sacrifice ‘the nigger’ and the game is easy”.

Wow, what a powerful and condemning quote – proof positive, the ‘Black’ man is the sacrificial lamb, nothing more – the British will happily deflect the black issue, they’re a pawn in their greater ‘game’ to annex the Transvaal, the British aren’t serious about the ‘black emancipation’ – it’s just a scapegoat – and Milner is a vile racist and bigot to boot! 

Ah … small problem. It’s a half truth, in fact it’s a complete misquote – and by misquoting it Pakenham is setting up an entire preconceived bias, on purpose he is guiding historic opinion and creating fiction not fact – he’s telling porkies … here’s the quote in full and when you’re done reading it you’ll realise the injustice and the depth of the problem, as Pakenham purposefully leaves this bit out, he’s character assassinating and he’s guiding an preconceived agenda – here is Milner’s quote in full:

“If I did not have some conscience about the treatment of blacks I personally could win over the Dutch in the Colony and indeed all the South African dominion without offending the English. You have only to sacrifice ‘the nigger’ and the game is easy. Any attempt to secure fair play for them makes the Dutch fractious and almost unmanageable”.

Hang on a tick, that quote is completely different … hold the horses … Milner is NOT a racist, he cares about the plight of Black South Africans, and he’s frustrated at the Republics treatment of them and their lack of resolve or plain reason to even open the subject of black emancipation and deal with it. The ‘sacrifice’ bit and even the ‘nigger’ bit is a throwaway line referring to simply leaving out the subject altogether when dealing with the Boers as it would make life easier, and it’s something (by his own consciousness) he is simply not prepared to do.

… so that’s a bit different, now you have to ask yourself – what is Pakenham trying to do why is he been deceptive – for what purpose?

Lord Milner (left) and President Kruger (right)

Where Pakenham fails to peruse the ‘Black’ angle of the Boer War, the esteemed and renowned British historian Andrew Roberts FRSL FRHistS has a sharply different take to Pakenham’s argument and would fall back on Leo Amery and the entire black and white franchise argument in this statement of his:

“Although the Boer War has long been denounced by historians as the British Empire’s Vietnam, and characterised as being fought for gold and diamonds, and trumped up by greedy, jingoistic British politicians keen to bully the two small, brave South African republics, the truth was very different. Far from fighting for their own freedom, the Boers were really struggling for the right to oppress others, principally their black servant-slaves, but also the large non-Afrikaans white Uitlander (‘foreigner’) population of the Transvaal who worked their mines, paid 80% of the taxes, and yet had no vote. The American colonists had fought under James Otis’ cry that ‘Taxation without representation is tyranny’ in 1776, yet when Britain tried to apply that same rule to Britons in South Africa, she was accused of vicious interference’.”

Now, if we think this is all unsubstantiated character assassination so far, it gets worse again, Pakenham carries his now artificially grounded warmongering, scheming, conspiracist and racist ogre that is his Milner into the next chapters which he brands ‘Milner’s war’ and we start with the Bloemfontein conference with Kruger.

For Suzerainty Sakes

Most people have the impression that the Bloemfontein conference in June 1899 was all about Milner unbudging and arrogant and Kruger pleading and declaring all Britain wants is his country – greedy and after the gold, Pakenham highlighting Kruger’s tearful cry at the conclusion of Milner’s browbeating arrogance when the poor simple farmer stands up to leave and cries “it is our country you want” a statement which in actuality startled Krugers’ own negotiating team members like Smuts who saw it for what it was – melodrama, but not Pakenham – a whole chapter in his book is named after this statement of Kruger’s and he holds it up as proof positive of Milner’s intentions as a warmonger.

This perception of a callous British bureaucrat intent on war is carefully built by Pakenham as he very carefully omits ‘the British case’ and focuses primarily on ‘the Boer case’, and the proof is in the pudding … what if I said the whole franchise negotiation centred around the Transvaal’s Suzerainty status – and had nothing to do with ‘stealing’ the Transvaal’s gold. “Huh!”, the universal cry … what’s a Suzerainty? And here’s exactly the problem, the ‘British case’ is entirely misunderstood, and its largely thanks to Pakenham – historians prior to Pakenham, like Leo Amery extensively cover the complex issue of the Suzerainty – it’s a critical part of the Casus Belli … Packenham on the other hand merely gives it lip service and glances over it.

If you want to really understand the ‘road to war’ and the real underpinning issues which caused the war, you have to understand the Suzerainty, the ‘vassal state’ or ‘client state’ status of the Transvaal (Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek – ZAR) – as it was by no means, not in a month of Sunday’s, a “Sovereign” or a “fully independent” Republic. On the franchise issue, Britain was “meddling” in its own Suzerain and not in some independent state, something it regarded as perfectly legal in the spirit of the “Conventions” of 1881 and 1884.

Reitz (left) and Kruger (right)

Yup, sorry to burst the bubble on this one but the ZAR was never legally “fully independent” – lots of politicians on both sides gave it lip service, promises of respect for each other’s so called “independence”, but the hard truth is that legal treaties existed, The Pretoria Convention of 1881 and the London Convention of 1884 which allowed the ZAR no foreign policy whatsoever, they had to defer all of it to Britain – for all their foreign relations and even matters pertaining to trade and trading tariffs (affecting movement of “goods” and even labour) and even their borders (their expansion plans and claims to other territories and ‘old’ Republics like Natalia, Winburg and Stellaland were clipped)– the ZAR had no legal rights in external dealings with any other country other than the Orange Free State – neither foreign treaties or even foreign trade tariff deals could be struck legally without Britain’s consent – none whatsoever. The ZAR remained a British vassal state from the day it stopped being a British colony on the 23rd March 1881 to the date the ZAR “Raad’ and Kruger declared war on their Imperial Suzerain – Great Britain, on 11th Oct 1899 – that’s a fact (and a surprise to many I’m sure). 

Now, you can start to see the complexity that was the backwards and forwards between Milner and Kruger. This is such a complex issue that I will be publishing an Observation Post on it called “For Suzerainty Sakes” in future, so readers have a better understanding of the causes of Boer War 2 (and Boer War 1 as the Suzerainty is a critical component of the 1st Boer War or Transvaal War 1880-1881).  Churchill when captive and been shipped to Pretoria as a POW during Boer War 2, passed Majuba mountain and lamented in his historical account on the “disgraceful peace” which resulted from Boer War 1 and the true cause of Boer War 2 – and here he is referring the “Suzerainty” and not “gold” – and he is a commentator “from the time” – a first hand account and not a later commentator “of the time” like Pakenham – a second hand account.  

Suffice to say Pakenham does not cover this issue of the ZAR’s true sovereignty in depth at all, the ‘British historians’ do, Pakenham doesn’t – choosing a rather concocted and completely unsubstantiated “conspiracy” of greedy capitalists in cohorts with Milner instead … and as a net result just about everyone in South Africa has no true understanding of what caused the war in the first place.  

Long and Short to get a better understanding, Kruger opens his negotiations with the proposal that he will only consider a 5-year franchise for the “Uitlanders” if Britain drops all Suzerainty regulations governing the ZAR. Kruger lists 12 points he wants resolved before he will consider dropping the 15 year ‘franchise’ for Uitlanders to 5 years – which would bring it in line with all the bordering states’ franchise and labour movements regulated for ‘whites’ (this includes the Orange Free State, Natal, Rhodesia, Botswana and the Cape Colony).

In fact 9 of Kruger’s points are directly related to the ZAR’s Suzerainty restrictions. If the Suzerainty regulations are dropped this would mean the ZAR could change the power balance and threaten Britain’s paramountcy and power balance in the entire region – from the Zambezi all the way to Cape Point, enabling the ZAR to go into military treaties and trade alignments with other aspirational colonial powers like Imperial Germany thereby threatening Britain’s paramountcy in favour of a Boer one. That is a WHOLE lot more to it than mere “miners rights” and their greedy “gold” magnates on the reef as it put all of Britain’s colonies and the protectorates in the whole of southern Africa in a precarious position (3 full blown colonies and 3 colonial protectorates – 6 countries in all), and bottom line, the British (the Parliament and Chamberlain) and their ‘man’ on the ground – Milner, turn round to Kruger and simply say … “No”.

What follows is a four month long cat and mouse game with the Franchise period gradually dropping to 7 years with “conditions”‘ attached, its rejected by all (especially the Reform Committee) – thereafter desperate negotiations between Jan Smuts (for the ZAR) and W. Conyngham Greene (for Britain) continue and they settle on the final offer on 19th August 1899 – it is a 5 year franchise, the ZAR agree Milner’s original term and that there will be nothing “contrary to the Convention” (the ‘Convention is the 1884 version of the Suzerainty and by this it means the Suzerainty remains in place) – the agreement is outlined in a urgent telegram from Greene to Milner, everyone is relieved as war is now avoided, job done …. not yet … Francis Reitz, the ZAR State Secretary sends the ‘formal’ offer on the 21st August 1899 – in which he outlines the 5 year franchise – all good, on the PROVISO that Britain drops the Suzerainty completely, and he is very specific so as to clear up any ambiguity Smuts may have caused – not good. This is what Reitz writes:

The proposals of this Government (ZAR) regarding question of franchise and representation contained in that despatch must be regarded as expressly conditional on Her Majesty’s Government consenting to the points set forth in paragraph 5 of the despatch, viz. :

  • (a) In future not to interfere in internal affairs of the South African Republic.
  • (b) Not to insist further on its assertion of existence of suzerainty.
  • (c) To agree to arbitration.

In Amery’s historical account, he notes at this stage it was “quite impossible for the British government to accept” Reitz’ final offer and that for the British they come to realise the ZAR has no intention to deal with the franchise issue – and this would lead subsequent historians like Paul Ludi to correctly conclude that all the subsequent Greene-Smuts talks were merely a delay tactic by Smuts to ready the two Afrikaner republics for their declaration of war against Britain.

Smuts (left) and Greene (right)

As historians go, both Leopold Amery (then) and Professor Bill Nasson (now) and Andrew Roberts (now) claim the Suzerainty (not gold and diamonds or ‘Cape to Cairo’ British Imperialism) is the Casus Belli of the 2nd Boer War. Bet you did not learn that in your Christian Nationalism School textbook … nor do you get that conclusion from Pakenham.

In Conclusion

This is NOT say that Milner is a saint – not by any stretch, he’s a hard headed British Imperialist whose expressed desire is a Federation of States in Southern Africa, all under the oversight of the British “family” of nations – and he’s no different to just about every Federalist before and after him, men like Sir Henry Barkly. Milner is also no different to the “Afrikaner” federalists who see some form of Federation between all the states – men like Smuts, Botha, de la Rey and Hofmeyr – only they see it under an Afrikaner paramountcy and not a British one. 

The Boer war is a clash of ideologies and paramountcy for complete regional oversight – and this is where Pakenham falls hopelessly flat – not only is he sparing with truths, sparing with “quotes” and sparing with ‘context’ – he blatantly sets up unsubstantiated conspiracy theory in favour of creative story telling and setting up a “good yarn” and ignores and/or manipulates the hard historical facts like the coloured and white franchise issues and the complexities surrounding the ZAR’s suzerainty – all in favour of complete fables surrounding the “gold conspiracy” and painting Milner as a “warmonger”.

The net result is “revisionist” history, a complete change in the historical narrative, and one which is so skewed to the Afrikaner Nationalist and Republicanism cause that it even had Eugène Terre’Blanche, the rabid white supremacist and leader of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging radical far right “terrorist” group stand up and state that Thomas Pakenham’s “The Boer War” was the definitive work and final say on the Boer War – no need to read anything else!

Now, if the erstwhile “ET” said it, then you must know there is a tremendous bias – unfortunately as I’ve outlined here, this bias undermines the entire integrity of Pakenham’s work. There is merit in a lot of Pakenham’s work if you put his entire Section 1 aside, problem is Section 1 is so flawed and has so many holes in it, it can almost be classified as fiction – and here Pakenham is in effect using fiction to set up all the non-fiction in his subsequent sections – it almost stands in the same category as James A Michener’s The Covenant and Leon Uris’ Exodus. The BIG problem is subsequent Apartheid period “Afrikaner” historians and academics ensconced in institutions like the University of Pretoria, the Rand Afrikaans University (now RAU) and the University of Stellenbosch have taken Pakenham as their lead – and that now calls into the question the integrity of all their work in addition.

That is exactly why you should read the works of other authors on the Boer war, both the “original” old ones like Leo Amery’s The Times History of the South African War (Volumes 1 to 7), Deneys Reitz’ Commando and Churchill’s and Smuts’ definitive works of their involvement in the war – all the way to Rayne Kruger’s Goodbye Dolly Gray. Then we need to focus on the “new” ones like Dr Garth Benneyworth and his 2023 work on “Black” concentration camps and even his ground-breaking insights on battles like Magersfontein, or Dr Elizabeth van Heyningen’s ground-breaking work on the concentration camps and disease, or even the ‘British’ historians like Andrew Roberts FRSL FRHistS and his history of the English-speaking peoples and dare I say it Chris Ash BSc FRGS FRHistS and his book Kruger’s War.

The truly difficult thing for me is the realisation that my much-loved Pakenham’s ‘The Boer War’ is so flawed it now needs to make way for more definitive, revived, and new perspective on the subject – and luckily in un-packing Pakenham and packing him away – on the up-side, what Pakenham has done is a favour for all of us history lovers – as it now keeps a dusty old war alive as a subject – his work out of necessity and relevance now has to be counterbalanced and more critically scrutinised. For in truth, the last word on the Boer War has yet to be written.

Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

References:

Leopold Charles Maurice Stennett Amery (1873-1955) “The Second Boer War – The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902” – Volumes 1 to 7.

The Battle of Magersfontein – Victory and Defeat on the South African Veld, 10-12 December 1899. Published 2023. By Dr. Garth Benneyworth. 

The Boer War: By Thomas Pakenham – re-published illustrated version, 1st October 1991.

The Boer War: By Thomas Pakenham – Abacas Edition, 1st October 1979.

The War for South Africa: The Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) Published February 9, 2011 by Bill Nasson

My Early Life. A Roving Commission. Author: Churchill, Winston S, published October 1930.

Salisbury: Victorian Titan: By Andrew Roberts – January 2000 

The planned Boer invasion of Rhodesia

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What! Smoking your socks again Mr Dickens! Well, here’s some really inconvenient hidden history, the ZAR Republic (Transvaal) planned to invade Southern Rhodesia, amassed thousands of their troops on the Limpopo River border in 1891, and when they sent in an advance party, the incursion into British territory was challenged by Starr Jameson and The British South African Police and the Boer leaders arrested – and all this took place BEFORE the Jameson Raid (1895 -1896) and BEFORE the South African War (1899-1902) a.k.a. The Boer War.

But, But, But … it was Jameson and the British who invaded the Transvaal Republic, not the other way round! The British are guilty of expansionism, imperialism, land grabbing and stealing minerals .. not the Boers! Afraid not – the Boers are as guilty of expansionism using military means in Southern Africa as the British, and this episode is one in many.

President Paul Kruger

But .. Rhodesia, the Boere wanted nothing to do with Rhodesia, this was not in my school history book! Well, if you a student of Rhodesian history this incident was emblazoned into the birth of Rhodesia, if you were taught a South African Christian Nationalist history, chances are you’ve never heard of it, and for good reason – it simply does not fit with Afrikaner Nationalist rhetoric surrounding the origins of Boer War 2 (1899-1902) and its just strait-forward inconvenient.

Now, I’ll make a statement, the planned Boer invasion of Rhodesia was so important to the history of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek or Transvaal Republic (ZAR), it nearly cost Oom Paul Kruger his third Presidency. It’s so important that in his memoir Paul Kruger cites this specific incident as one of the key reasons hampering his second Presidency, his relationship with Britain and his aspirations to hold into Swaziland, he uses it to initially outline Rhodes’ duplicicity in the entire South African region and paint him as a scoundrel – in fact Kruger outlines this entire incident as the epicentre for Rhodes’ desire for Transvaal gold – albeit unsubstantiated and a little fantastic. This incident is that important to Kruger and the ZAR – so why do we know nothing about it?

So here’s a little inconvenient history:

1887 – Boer and British Imperial claims to modern day Zimbabwe

So, what’s the beef over Rhodesia? Well, it starts in 1887, Paul Kruger attests that although relations with the Matabele (controlling what is modern Zimbabwe) and the Boers had initially been strained, Boers hunting in their region gradually improved relations and the leader of the Matabele, Chief Lobengula, sent an envoy to Pretoria to request the ZAR take over his Chiefdom (comprising Mashonaland and Matabeleland) as a ZAR Protectorate. The ZAR in return responded by sending their envoy, Piet Grobler with a draft treaty of ZAR annexation to see Chief Lobengula in Bulawayo (Kruger himself drafted the treaty). The treaty was read to Chief Lobengula who requested time to consult the terms of the treaty with his indunas. Then, in mysterious circumstances, Grobler was murdered before the treaty could be signed.

Chief Lobengula

Chief Lobengula seems to be a rather duplicitous man, because the other side of the story is somewhat different. Around the same time, a British team in 1888 consisting of Francis Thompson, Charles Rudd and Rochfort Maguire approach Chief Lobengula for mining rights in his Chiefdom. Chief Lobengula is wary of them but goes along because he trusts Dr Starr Jameson (who as a medical Doctor also treated him for gout). He concludes a treaty with the British which gives their company – the British South Africa Company (BSAC) the sole mining and settlement rights in Matabeleland and Mashonaland in return for weapons and money, the treaty also specifically prohibits the Boers (ZAR) and the Portuguese from settling in his territory or gaining any concessions of any kind. 

Paul Kruger would claim the loss of his Matabeleland and Mashonaland Protectorates along with ZAR mining and hunting rights there, squarely solely on the shoulders Cecil John Rhodes, who he accused of being “one of the most unscrupulous characters that have ever existed”. Kruger then goes on to conclude, without an ounce of any evidence, that Rhodes and his cronies arranged the murder of his ZAR envoy to the Matabele – Piet Grobler.

In his claim to Rhodesia, President Kruger would also completely ignore the 1884 London Convention which specified that the ZAR was not permitted to expand its borders in exchange for more concession’s on the ZAR’s British Suzerainty status, the Suzerainty issue (the ZAR was a British Vassal state and not fully independent) is a primary source of discontent between Boer and Brit, British commentators at the time make note that although the London Convention did not mention Suzerainty in its pre-amble it by no means meant that the 1881 Pretoria Convention which specified Suzerainty fell away (had that been the case it would have been stated in the new agreement) and Kruger had been both deceitful and duplicitous in informing the ZAR Raad that it had. In any event, the ZAR had repeatedly breached both the Pretoria and London conventions and this was causing significant tension (The Times History of the South African War 1899-1902). For more on this see, Stealing Republics, gold, diamonds and other myths!

Not only does the ZAR have ‘buyers regret’ of its British Suzerainty, even our man Chief Lobengula has ‘buyers regret’ feeling he’s been duped when he says “Did you ever see a chameleon catch a fly? The chameleon gets behind the fly and remains motionless for some time, then he advances very slowly and gently, first putting forward one leg and then the other. At last, when well within reach, he darts his tongue, and the fly disappears. England is the chameleon, and I am that fly.” 

So, we are off to a very contentious start between the Matabele, Brit and Boer over what was to become Rhodesia – nobody happy, and no, Kruger and his Boer supporters are not just content with only farming in the confines of the Transvaal with no plans of northward expansion, the truth is they never have been. Kruger himself makes it clear when he says Rhodes used his concession “to obtain a firm footing in Matabeleland, with the intention of preventing the extension of the South African Republic in this direction.”

To secure the area as ‘British’, Cecil John Rhodes then presented this concession to British Government and obtained a Royal Charter for The British South Africa Company (BSAC) over Matabeleland and its subject state Mashonaland. The area was designated as ‘Zambesia’ and he also determined mining rights extending from the Limpopo River to Lake Tanganyika (For clarity, as ‘Zambesia’ is a relatively unknown entity as it’s so short lived, ‘Zambesia’ would officially become ‘Rhodesia’ in 1895 named after … you guessed it … Rhodes, and it was eventually spit it into ‘Northern Rhodesia’ – now Zambia and ‘Southern Rhodesia’ – now Zimbabwe in 1898). 

British South Africa Company flag

Wary of ZAR expansionism to the north of their border, the British try and clear up the matter in 1890 when a conference takes place between the Governor of Cape Colony and High Commissioner for Southern Africa – Sir Henry Loch, and President Kruger to decide on several disputed questions, especially those relating to the Boer encroachments upon the independence of the Kingdom of Swaziland. A convention was ratified in August 1890 by which, the ZAR takes over the administration of Swaziland on the condition that the ZAR makes no further concessions or treaties with indigenous chiefs to the north or north-west (i.e., anywhere in Matabeleland and Mashonaland).

The Invasion Plan

On the back of the Convention with Sir Henry Lock and President Kruger, Paul Kruger had difficulty selling it to the ZAR Volks Raad, the Raad expressed its dissatisfaction with the terms of the convention, and no sooner was it ratified than an attempt was made to violate it. 

General Piet Joubert

Despite agreements, the ZAR never takes it eyes off Matabeleland and Mashonaland, they believe they have first rights to the territory and have been thwarted by the British plotting against them, so they plan to take the region by force. The planned invasion becomes known as the Banyailand Trek, the plotters are General Piet Joubert – The Commandant General of the Transvaal, Barend Vorster, and Louis Adendorff.

Their plan calls for some 2,000 armed Boers (some sources also point to 2,000 odd Black helpers in addition) to cross the Limpopo at the Middle Drift and then trek northwards into British ‘Zambesia’, overcome relatively small British South Africa Company ‘Police’ forces present and British ‘Pioneer Settler columns’ and occupy the region for the Boers before the British can really take hold of it. The main Boer component of the trek would be drawn from the ZAR’s Zoutpansberg region.

After annexation the trekkers were to form themselves into an independent Republic and would hold a conference with delegates from Portuguese East Africa for the partition with them of the whole of Mashonaland. The prospectus went on to state that Doctors of Medicine, Ministers of Religion, Journalists and all other professions were to be represented in the expedition. After crossing the Limpopo River the trekkers would proclaim the “Republic of the North”; a provisional Government would be organised, and a constitution drawn up on the principles of the old Transvaal Grondwet of 1858.

Kruger however was a little nervous given the convention held with Sir Henry Lock and the hold he desired over Swaziland, so he needed more solid concessions to warrant an invasion, a stronger casus belli, so he opted to delay the Banyailand trek. Essentially kicked into the long grass, and it was a mistake by Kruger to do it, as if they had invaded in 1890 they stood a chance as British occupation was thin on the ground and various ‘treatise’ and rights to the area under contention, when the invasion was revisited again a year later in 1891 they had lost their initiative – Rhodes had tightened down the mining ‘concessions’, the Royal Charter and all the various treatise needed with the local inhabitants. By the 13th September 1890 the Rhodesian Pioneer Column had reached Fort Salisbury and the occupation of Mashonaland by the BSAC was now a fait accompli.   

The Adendorff Concessions

So, the ZAR needed more concrete reasons for invading to counteract all the treatise and concessions been written up by Rhodes. They would find these in Louis Adendorff (which is why this planned invasion, the Banyailand Trek is sometimes also known as the Adendorff Trek). 

Cecil John Rhodes

In March 1891 Louis Adendorff and Klein Barend Vorster rather dubiously claimed they had a Banyailand concession given by Chief Chibi to a party of 4 Transvaalers, led by Adendorff, for an area of 200 miles by 100 miles. They in turn offered the concessions to Rhodes to purchase. Rhodes concluded the concessions illegal, the plot as nothing more than blackmail and refused. Adendorff would then use this as a casus belli for an armed invasion.

So, the Zoutpansberg Boers, now led by Kommandant Ignatius Ferreira and encouraged by General Piet Joubert – the Kommandant General of the ZAR, decided to push on ahead with their plans. This reinvigorated push to invade almost immediately became known to the British Foreign Office and they took to military countermeasures to repel the Boer invasion and diplomacy. 

So, how does the plan fare?

Frederick Selous

Initially not well, the British had already got wind of the plan in early 1890. Captain Frederick Selous (for whom the famous Rhodesian Special Forces Regiment the ‘Selous Scouts’ is named) is in the employ of the British South Africa Company and pioneering Zambesia. He is in the Zoutpansberg area of the Northern Transvaal in February 1890 and comes to hear of the Boer’s plan. Selous immediately informs his good friend … none other than Cecil John Rhodes, of the details – the ZAR had planned for the invasion to take place during the approaching winter months and form themselves into an independent ‘Northern’ Boer Republic in cahoots with the Portuguese. The British react in two ways to the news – militarily and diplomatically.

On the military front, General Sir Frederick Carrington was placed in command of the area from Mafeking down the Limpopo River to the Indian Ocean with Capt. Sir John Willoughby in command of the Limpopo drifts, the British South Africa (Company) Police (BSAP) would be deployed to do this. The Bechuanaland Border Police (BBP) were used for guarding the drifts from the Transvaal to Khama’s country (present-day Botswana). Furthermore, Lt Col. Pennefather was dispatched to Fort Tuli in early May 1891 to make defensive preparations.

Sir John Christopher Willoughby

On the diplomatic front, in May 1891 the British then sent Captain Sir John Christopher Willoughby and Rhodes’ right hand man, none other than Dr Starr Jameson, to meet with Paul Kruger and to dissuade the ZAR from entering their territory or face war, not just with the British South Africa Company’s private police detachments, but against the might of a British Imperial Force if need be (the British army proper). Kruger is initially adamant and takes a very belligerent position, he responds to Willoughby with a he’ll do his best to discourage the Banyailand Trek, but in the event he’s not able to “what must be, must be” and when threatened with the might of the British Imperial Army he responded  with bravado “I have dealt with the British Army before” (Referring to the stunning British defeat at Majuba in 1881 at the hands of the Boer forces). 

He is however a little shaken by Willoughby and Britain’s threat, he is aware of his agreement over the ZAR annexation of Swaziland and any venture north would put that agreement into jeopardy too.

Kommandant Ignatius Ferreira

Kmdt Ignatius Philip Ferreira

Let’s turn to Commandant Ignatius Ferreira for a minute as he is a most interesting character. Some sources point to this being Ignatius Philip Ferreira and one is never exactly sure on which side his loyalties lay – Republican or Colonial. He was born in the Cape Colony in Grahamstown as a British citizen, becomes a diamond prospector in Kimberley. His military career starts with the Cape Colony as part of the Cape Mounted Police. He makes his way into the ZAR as a gold and diamond prospector, becomes a Field Cornet in a ZAR Kommando under Schalk Burger and takes part in various ‘Bantu’ wars fighting for the ZAR. He then establishes Ferreira’s Horse (a Cavalry unit) whilst Britain takes control of the ZAR from 1877-1881 and fights alongside the British in their various ‘Bantu’ wars. 

All in all, he a bit of a combination between raconteur, military officer, entrepreneur, miner, policeman and mercenary. He is also the chap who really established Johannesburg in 1886. The town literally sprung up around his camp, known as Ferreira’s Camp – and it now considered the original Johannesburg settlement. Ferreira also becomes a gold mining magnate in his own right. The ZAR had also been re-established under Boer authority by this stage (from 1881) and Ignatius Ferreira now finds himself in Republican Forces again as a Colonel (Kommandant) about to invade what was to become Rhodesia and wage war against the British in 1891.  Such is the rich tapestry of individuals and the history of the ZAR.

Assembly at the ‘start line’

With the invasion plan encouraged by General Piet Joubert going ahead, Louis Adendorff appealed for “five thousand armed Afrikaners, including the best fighting men South Africa could produce, the Zoutpansberg Boers”, to assemble at the Limpopo River’s main drift by 1st June 1891.

In response to Adendorff’s call, approximately a thousand Boers, with 400 wagons, under the military leadership of Commandant Ignatius Ferreira, mostly stemming from the Waterberg and the Zoutpansberg areas, began to assemble on the Limpopo River start line near ‘Rhodes’ Drift. This posed a significant threat; these numbers could easily overwhelm the small British Company Police detachments opposing them.

The British High Commissioner proclaimed that any attempt to enter the territories under Her Majesty’s protection would be met by force and the British South Africa Company immediately looked to its defences. Trenches and bunkers were dug to command the various drifts across the Limpopo and small detachments of the Bechuanaland Border Police and the British South Africa Company’s Police manned them.

Further in-land, at the Naka Pass, north of the Lundi river, The British South Africa Police D Troop and F Troop (Artillery) build Maxim gun defences dominating the Pioneer Column Road through the Naka Pass, the only real access for a trekking column to get to Bulawayo. 

1890 BSAP Troop with Maxim Guns

Paul Kruger, now highly pressurised to stop the Louis Adendorff’s trek and Kmdt Ferreira lest the ZAR face full blown war with Britain and realising the ZAR had no real appetite to become embroiled in a Central African adventure with Britain, acted decisively. Kruger issued a proclamation denouncing the Adendorff trek on behalf of the ZAR government and threatened confiscation of the lands of any Boer who took part in the trek.

Kruger’s announcement discouraged some from taking part and the numbers at the Limpopo River start line started to dwindle somewhat – however it did not stop a number of Boers digging in their heels, including their leader – Kmdt Ferreira, and continuing in their invasion plan and tooling up for it. They strongly retorted to President Kruger ‘s proclamation with a declaration of rights, in which they declared that the occupation of the lands to the north of the Transvaal by a “foreign” government was monstrous and unconstitutional. To quote their own words, “the right to decide the policy and fate of the South African Continent belongs exclusively to the South African (ZAR) nation, and any assumption of that right is illegal, unconstitutional, and an insult to the natural freedom of the South African (ZAR) nation.”

Proposed advance over the Limpopo main drift

Incursion and Arrest

Dr Starr Jameson arrived at Fort Tuli, the BSAP base in Southern Matabeleland on the border of Bechuanaland and the ZAR on 3rd June. On 20th June he left the Fort to make a tour of the Limpopo drifts and billeted near the Main drift. Suddenly things started to heat up, when on 24th June a party of 112 armed and mounted Boers appeared at the Main Drift on the ZAR side of the Limpopo – and 5 fully armed Boers including Kommandant Ferreira, crossed at the drift into the British territory on the other side.

Whether this party of 5 was a leadership detachment scouting the drift and British defences ahead of their invasion force or whether they were simply on a parley mission with the British remains unclear to history – there are two sides to this story, what is clear and known to history is that it constituted an armed incursion, and they were all arrested by a rather surprised BSAP trooper and taken into custody by the only officer at the drift, Surgeon-Lieutenant E. Goody.

By all accounts of the arrest, Kmdt Ferreira submitted quietly, but one of his companions, a robust Boer with a red tie did not submit quietly, but eventually calmed down. Dr Starr Jameson was then called in.

Captain A.G. Leonard commanding E Troop of the BSAP who were given the task of defending the major drifts, then recalls the rest of the incident in his account “Jameson then taking an interpreter and (Kmdt) Ferreira with him, went over to the Boer outspan. On arrival there, he informed them that they would not be allowed to cross the river and advised them to appoint a deputation, to whom he would be only too happy to grant an interview and having again warned them not to make any hostile attempt to invade our territory, he returned to the camp.”

“The next morning the Boers sent Messrs Senekal, David Malan and Pete Marais to represent them, who intimated to Jameson that it was their intention to occupy Banyailand by virtue of a concession which they had in their possession and on the strength of which they refused point-blank to sign any document or comply with any rules or regulations of the Chartered Company.” 

Despite this bravado and postering, the Boers realised they did not really have any backing from their government and realising the British were deadly serious, decided to negotiate peacefully. Jameson welcomed any Boers entering the territory if they obeyed the Company’s laws and would offer them the same opportunities for land and business as the British Pioneer column settlers. 

The trekkers then dispersed, although some with an eye to business began selling meal, tobacco and horses to the troopers. Others applied for permission to hunt and said they would sign any documents required by the Company, others even asked if they could join the British South African Police. If anyone is wondering where all the Afrikaners who peacefully settled in Rhodesia and became Rhodesian citizens came from – a lot of it points to this episode.

The Jameson Raid

Now consider just how diplomatically that incident was settled by Dr Jameson, and then consider – that just 6 years later in 1896, the tables had turned, as Ferreira had lead a private armed expedition without the ZAR government’s official backing into Rhodesia with the idea of disposing its British government in 1891 – Starr Jameson was leading a private armed expedition without the British government’s official backing into the ZAR with the idea of disposing its Boer government. 

The outcome is that the Boers would not be so diplomatically inclined in their dealings with Starr Jameson, whom many wanted to see executed after his arrest. The Boers would also turn to the Jameson Raid as their leading casus belli for the South African War 1899-1902 – whereas their territorial ambitions in places like Rhodesia in 1891 and their aggressive policies in the region before the Jameson Raid are flat ignored.

In Conclusion

The British historians account of the Boer War fundamentally differs from the Boer historians account – and it differs on primarily on the subjects of Imperialism and victimhood.  The old Afrikaner Nationalists and their sponsored historians painted the Boers as peaceful, just wanting to farm in their place in the sun – and the British with Imperial ambition and greedy warmongers bent on destroying the Boer culture. However, anyone whose actually read a proper history book, will know that this rhetoric is nothing more than just that – the Boers were as Imperially minded as the British and as aggressive and deadly in the way they went about expanding their states in a very warmongering way.

To see this in action, consider Leo Amery in The Times History of the South African War 1899-1902 written at the time would conclude this period of the ZAR’s history, i..e. the Banyai Trek (or Adendorff Trek) from the British perspective and if you are cognisant of the ZAR as an expansionist and Imperialist nation in its own right, his conclusion rings rather prophetically true, Amery said:

“Kruger was now ” shut up in a kraal,” to use his own phrase, and his only hope of carrying out his (expansionist) policy lay in increasing his military resources, in strengthening himself by foreign alliances, and in recovering the influence he had lost in the Free State and Cape Colony, till he should be strong enough to reconquer by force from Great Britain the territories of which he considered himself unjustly robbed.”

Consider the position Kruger was in by 1896 – his entire border was hemmed in by the British, with absolutely no means of expansion and the ZAR’s British Suzerainty agreements prevented them from any international ambitions. The territories Amery specifically referred to are Bechuanaland and specifically Kruger’s ‘lost’ United States of Stellaland i.e. Kimberley (1882-1885), his ‘lost’ protectorates of Matabeleland and Mashonaland (i.e. Southern Rhodesia) in 1890, the ‘maintenance’ of the ZAR protectorate status of Swaziland and the old Klien Vrystaat Republic (1876-1891) ensuring it was not ‘lost’ to the British, his ‘lost’ Natalia Republic (1839-1843) and The Republic of Klip River i.e. Ladysmith (1847-1848), the ‘lost’ New Republic (1884-1888) and parts of Zululand he laid claim to – opening a frontier to a seaport for the ZAR (his outlined target – St Lucia and Kosi Bay). 

These are all Kruger’s ambitions going into The South African War (1899-1902), and once armed to the hilt (the ZAR goes on a massive arms buying spree with taxes obtained from Gold Mining) he follows these claims almost exactly in the Boer Republic’s invasion plans. Where they invade British territory in October 1899 is not a function of overcoming British military positions, where they invade is by design, they initially invade exactly those regions that they feel are ‘theirs’ in the first place, the regions in which they believe they have rights, concessions and treatise which pre-date the British – the invasions need to be justified and hold up to international scrutiny and make no bones – Kruger is well aware of that. It’s also reflected in the way the invasions are conducted, the invading forces very interested in immediately declaring their territorial gains (for which they had been ‘robbed’), bit by bit, as part of the ZAR Republic.

The ZAR would also not forget to attack Rhodesia during Boer War 2, on the 2nd November 1899 when 2000 Boers under the joint command of Commandants Van Rensberg and Grobbelaar did enter Rhodesia over Rhodes Drift and captured a small convoy of wagons at Bryce’s Store. A simultaneous attack on the squadron of the Rhodesian regiment under the command of Colonel Jack Spreckley holding Rhodes’ Drift was less successful. The Rhodesians held off the Boer invaders until nightfall before withdrawing in good order to Fort Tuli, unsure how to progress and a little shaken by the Rhodesian battle order the Boers entrenched their forces at Bryce’s Store and played no further action in invading Rhodesia.

Oct 1899 – Dec 1899 Boer invasions

The idea that some pre-and post Apartheid Afrikaner historians and commentators have that Kruger was merely conducting a ‘pre-emptive’ strike into British territory to counteract a mystical British invasion in Oct 1899 is not only laughable its completely unsupported by a stack of historical fact that show otherwise – it’ also wholly flies against both Kruger’s character and his actual polices.

This is not “Boer Bashing” in any way shape or form, I personally admire many things about the Boer nation, I buy into their desire for national pride, their fierce bravery, desire for independence and ambitions to gain wealth and upliftment – all whilst operating in a very hostile environment. The clash of Boer and Brit is an ideological clash on whose influence and laws the entire Southern African region is run (not just a couple of small Boer Republics), and I’ve shown this time again in previous articles. See From Union to Banana Republic! for the latest one.

What I don’t buy into is all this ‘victimhood’, ‘bullying’ and ‘mineral theft’ baloney touted out by the National Party and their cabal in response to losing the Boer War, it’s marred and peppered with political Republicanism and Afrikaner Nationalism and its historically very untrue and utterly unsupported by fact. I hope to show just one more example of the nature of the Boer Republic’s and Kruger’s policies here with the planned invasion of Rhodesia and the types of tensions that existed between Boer and Brit, it’s one of many areas of aggressive expansionist Imperialism – both Boer and Brit, causing friction. We honestly need to engage some brain matter and dispense with the old Nationalist rhetoric on the Boer War.

Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

References include: The Times History of the South African War 1899-1902 – by Leo Amery, the British correspondent for the Times covering the war. Paul Kruger’s memoir “my third Presidency”. The Adendorff Trek by E. E. Burke.

Colourised photographs courtesy and many thanks to Jennifer Bosch (Jenny B Colourised Photos).