War is Cruelty

Not unusually, whenever there is a post of a Boer farm burning on a Boer War social media site there is an inevitable indignation and disgust targeted at the British and usually accompanied by a torrent of abuse from a community still fractured by this conflict.

Harsh reality of ‘total war’: a Boer families’ farm burning. Colourised by Tinus le Roux.

On my blog, The Observation Post, I even had a person write to me personally and state how dare I allude to Boer aggression as a Casus Belli of the war when “the British brought innocent Boer women and children into the war in the first place” – the indignation at the ‘destruction of innocents’ and rather misdirected raw hate at me highly apparent, a quoted figure of Boer women and children sacrificed almost immediately referenced (usually inflated) – and it’s a common theme and a common retort – I see it all the time on all sorts of forums. It’s the kind of retort that is the result of decades of indoctrination and propaganda – and it’s simply completely disconnected with any semblance of full truths or balance.

So, here’s a little balance and understanding of a ‘full-truth’. At the beginning of the South African War (1899-1902), it was the Boers who commenced with creating a civilian refugee crisis, not the British, and the Boers subsequently invaded, besieged and ransacked entire British towns and territories – not only Johannesburg, but on sovereign British territory in addition, the ransacking of Dundee a case in point – burning farms and looting – leaving civilians with no shelter or refugee camps and simply chasing them into the hinterland without food or assistance.

So, let’s account who started what, and let’s account the carnage and scale of civilian casualties and who the really affected parties are – and I think you’ll be a little surprised to learn something that is not part of the old nationalist narrative of this war. Let’s begin at the beginning.

The Johannesburg Exodus

Starting in September 1899 and into October 1899 is a civilian refugee crisis on a significant scale, the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) issue a directive which sees the largest city in the republic empty out of nearly all its inhabitants.

What follows are first hand account of the initial “stampede” of ‘foreign’ (Uitlander) residents fleeing Johannesburg – many to be disposed of their property at the beginning of the war. In the end some 50,000 ‘foreign’ residents of the Transvaal were shipped out in cattle trucks and coal carts creating a refugee crisis of note (6,000 left in cattle trucks over just two days alone). Many were afforded no food or water and there are documented cases of deaths and even births in these cattle trucks and open top coal carts – the dead were buried next to the railway lines. Many of these refugees arrived in places like Durban, Cape Town, East London or Port Elizabeth and those who could not find rented, friendly or temporary accommodation were found to be loitering in parks and on the streets with no place to go, sleeping in the open and subject to the elements. The Boers idea being to chase them out of their homes in the ZAR and empty Johannesburg of its “uitlander” problem … and the British should somehow deal with the crisis.

Uitlanders leaving Johannesburg on cattle trucks – October 1899, colourised by Jenny B

In addition to the 50,000 odd whites departing Johannesburg – it is estimated that some 78,000 Black mine labour and workers fled Johannesburg between September and October 1899, many on foot arriving home in their villages penniless (their money, the last month of their wages, was confiscated by the ZAR government), and they are destitute, malnourished and exhausted (see Black People and the South African War 1899-1902. By Peter Warwick).

Notwithstanding the scale of this forced displacement of civilians – these unarmed ‘foreigners’ and their labour made up the majority of residents in the republican state – the “minority” chasing them out at gun-point.

Here’s the account by a white “British” Bradford man, writing to his parents, from Port Elizabeth, and he gave a vivid picture of the flight (bear in mind this is just the opening of what became a mass exodus).

“When I wrote you a short note on September 29th, 1899, from Johannesburg, I did not expect to have to clear out so soon afterwards, but there was very little time given us to consider. The Boers were commandeering all the Outlanders’ property as a war tax; they claimed all the horses on the mines, and behaved most insultingly to any Englishman they could come across. The way the Boers were treating us was simply outrageous. They are worse than Kaffirs, so I cleared out as quickly as I could.

There were 1500 people left Johannesburg by the same train, and nearly as many left on the platform. I had an awful journey down. We saw all the women and children in the closed carriages, whilst we men had to go in open coal trucks. About two hours after we started there was thunder, lightning, and heavy rain, which continued until we reached Kronstadt next day. Of course, we were all drenched to the skin. There we had some “scoff,” for which we had to pay 3s. 6d. each. At ordinary times the charge is not more than 2s. per meal.

The Orange Free State officials provided us with cattle trucks, which, being covered, were a little better than open coal trucks, and shielded us from the rain. We travelled right through the Free State in this kind of conveyance, and after crossing the border into the colony at Newport we were put into civilised carriages for the rest of our journey. Altogether the journey took us three days and three nights. It was difficult to get quarters, for the place is crowded. Anyhow, we managed to get a room —I and another fellow—for which we had to pay a pound for one week.

There are about 5000 refugees from the Transvaal down here, and I hear that at Cape Town and Durban people are sleeping in churches, warehouses, and, in fact, anywhere they can get a covering for their heads. People who came down here two or three months ago are at their wits’ end, their money being finished, and they having to rely on charity for a bite to eat. Whole families are starving.

The British Government ought to help these subjects, as they are forced to leave their livelihood, and all because the English Government will not hurry up and settle things one way or the other. Johannesburg is very nearly empty. Nearly all the mines have been closed down. All the storekeepers have barricaded their places up and discharged their workpeople, and the principals have cleared out, leaving their goods and property to look after themselves. Thousands of people who a few months ago were doing a nice business are now ruined, and their labours for years past are all wasted. The Boers will not allow them to remove their stock, produce, or anything else.”

Of the exodus from Johannesburg a nurse named Miss Colina Macleay records the ordeal:

“I caught the first train, crowded beyond anything you can imagine, and had to go into a coal truck with fifty white and black people, all mixed, including coolies, samies, Kaffirs, Cornish miners, and other whites. On our way out of the Transvaal we were detained at lots of stations, and insulted everywhere. The heat was intense, with a broiling sun and nothing to protect us from it. And we also suffered from thirst. When we saw a water pump we would try to get out, but guns were pointed at us and we were threatened if we dared to move. All the time the fellows at the stations were drinking and laughing and wasting the water to tempt us all the more … one poor child died in our truck, and our train stopped for a few minutes to bury the body at the railway side on the veldt.  I think I shall never forget the cries of the poor children for meat and drink … At length we arrived at Delagoa Bay at one o’clock in the morning, only to find the place crowded, with people lying in the station, parks, and other available corners. A Committee of kind ladies and gentlemen and the Governor met all the refugee trains, and did the best they could for the poorer ones. As I was a nurse and in uniform I was taken to the Salvation Army Hall, and I had there to lie on the floor with hundreds of others (women and children) …”

To quote Steven’s ‘Complete History of the War’:

“The expulsion of aliens was the order of the (Republican) States, and protection was withdrawn from the mines, which of course came to a stand still. With the opening of October (1899) South Africa became astir with warlike preparations, Burghers and British troops hurrying to the- front, and with martial law (in the Boer Republics) came plunder. Bullion worth a million being conveyed from the Rand to Cape town was seized (by the Boers) and sent to Pretoria —with a ‘receipt’ for the same. It was minted into coin”.

The ransacking of Natal

The Boer Republics declared war on Great Britain on the 11th October 1899. This was achieved by two actions, both of which involved invading two sovereign British territories by way of declaration of hostilities. The first was the cutting of the railway line near Kimberley in the Cape Colony and the second was the invasion of the Natal Colony.

The invasion of Natal is marred by wholesale looting and the ransacking of British towns and farms in northern Natal. Despite Boer proclamations from their war council prohibiting both looting and even annexations. The Republican forces on the ground behave with impunity and ignore their directives, they re-name towns, declare sections of Natal as annexed to the ZAR, appoint Landrosts, hoist the Vierkleur over public buildings and embark on a looting and destructive spree of note (Newcastle is re-named Viljoensdorp and Dundee is re-named Meyersdorp).

Boer forces in front of the Dundee Town Offices – note the ZAR ‘Vierkleur’. Photo Credit – Talana Museum – colourised by Jenny B.

Both Newcastle and Dundee are looted extensively, Republican Burghers also pillage surrounding villages, towns and farms – loading wagons with stolen goods. British farmers and their families are disposed of their property and stock and many are pushed as refugees into the veldt to fend for themselves – no shelter or food given as aid.

The looting spree is so intense the Boers even sacrifice their military objectives of speed and manoeuvrability to cut the British forces off from linking up at Ladysmith and taking Port Natal – the slow-down to loot and pillage takes precedence and it allows the British to re-group and dig-in, this is a fundamental military blunder which ultimately costs the Boers the war. The extent of some of the damage and destruction can be found in this eye-witness account, when the British consolidate and counter-attack:

“General Hildyard at Estcourt lost no-time in following up the retreating Boers. On Sunday morning tents were struck and the order was given for a forward march to Frere. At 8 a.m. the long column streamed out, and after a tiring march arrived at Frere at two o’clock in the afternoon.

All along the line of march were evidences of wanton destruction by the Boer commando. At each railway station the safes had been blown to pieces with dynamite; the lamps and furniture had been smashed to atoms; the papers, tickets, and books had been torn to pieces and lay strewn over the floors. The farmhouses had also suffered in like manner, valued trinkets and ornaments lying smashed among the debris of furniture, etc. The doors and windows had been burst open and broken to pieces with crowbars. But it is impossible to adequately describe the heartrending scenes which were enacted. To understand fully the wanton devastation which had been made in many a happy country home, it would be necessary to witness the scene of desolation.

The disloyal Natal Dutch appear to have been among the principal perpetrators of these acts of despoliation, for in many of their houses were afterwards found articles of furniture which had been taken from the homes of neighbouring English farmers. In one house were found five pianos, which had belonged to English homes in the district. But the enemy had not restricted these wicked acts of destruction to ‘ the interiors of the farmhouses only, for- in some cases orchards of young fruit trees had been chopped down and utterly destroyed, and iron rain-water tanks had been pierced through the sides, rendering them useless. Many a heart was bowed down with grief on beholding the home, which had meant years of work, thus destroyed in a few moments by a ruthless foe.

Much of the live-stock, that had not been driven away, had also been destroyed. Dead poultry were lying about in heaps at one farmstead, among them being fifty young turkeys. Cattle and sheep lay rotting in the paddocks. On another farm three hundred head of cattle and sheep had been destroyed with arsenical poison.

Truly it was a terrible scene ; and yet this destruction had been wrought by the offspring of a civilised European nation. The Law of Environment had here proved itself true in the evolution of this people dwelling among the savage and barbarous tribes of South Africa.”

Stott p. 122. The Boer invasion of Natal.

Images: Looted furniture – Dundee Natal, Talana Museum.

So, in reality – the country “stealing the gold” from private businesses and minting it was the ZAR (not Britain) and the country bringing women and children into the conflict first was the ZAR followed by the OFS and not the British, the countries in initial neglect of duty of care when dealing with civilian refugees are the ZAR and the OFS, the initial illegal looting and stealing of private property is attributed to the Boers and the peoples responsible for the first civilian deaths were the Boer Republics.

The Siege crisis

There are always “two sides to the story” and each side has merit in their argument, but let’s do try and stick to some of these basic facts. The Boers initiated the Johannesburg civilian ‘refugee’ crisis in Sep 1899 and northern natal civilian refugee crisis in Oct 1899 and then they started another civilian refugee crisis when they put British cities like Ladysmith, Mafeking and Kimberley under siege during the first phase of the war from Oct 1899 to March 1900. The siege tactics – cutting water and food supplies, shelling townships, workers compounds and residence suburbs with artillery and the subsequent diseases, starvation and malnutrition killing thousands of civilians – black, white and coloured – over 3,000 in Kimberley alone (see The Battle of Magersfontein. By Dr. Garth Benneyworth).

Kimberley: “The Moir family at their siege shelter” – Colourised by Tinus le Roux

Figures of civilian casualties during the sieges are well documented in the case of white civilians – recorded deaths include women and children killed by shellfire and well-known townspeople, what’s not recorded adequately is the death of civilians by disease, and the death of Black, Coloured and Indian citizens also caught up in the sieges. An example is Kimberley – a pavement plaque marks the first civilian casualty and it simply reads that here the first civilian was killed by Boer shellfire – an unknown black women. In Ladysmith the civilian burials at the provisional hospital amount some 600 casualties, mainly disease – and these are just the whites, no record is made of the Black and Indian Ladysmith civilians.

The Empire Strikes Back!

This is all a pre-curser to the refugee crisis the British created by engaging scorched earth policies issued mid 1900 to deal with insurgency and guerrilla warfare – and the subsequent burning down and destruction of the bittereinder’s farms’ as part of this policy and strategy.

The British counter-attack to the Boer invasions in Oct 1899 is relentless and highly efficient. The British are able to consolidate from the setbacks of ‘Black-week’ in December 1899 whilst they are numerically disadvantaged and they manage to hold their major towns under siege. By the time their hastily assembled ‘Army Force’ begins to land from January 1900 and they are numerically matched – other than the set-back at Spionkop at the end of January 1900, they lose no other other major conventional battle and in a matter of just 6 months, relieve all the sieges of all their cities, dispatch the Republican forces from their colonies, take both the Boer capitals, take the economic hub that is Johannesburg, remove Boer Forces from all their invested defences, break the Boer’s fighting capability with the mass surrenders at Paadeberg and Brandwater Basin (9,000 Republican men in total) and cut the Boers from supply and foreign assistance from the sea. By July 1900, a mere 10 months in, the conflict is un-winnable for the Boers – the British attitude is the war is ‘done and dusted’ – the Boer capitals are in British hands and its back home before Christmas for tea and medals.

With extended and unprotected supply lines stretching all the way from Cape Town to Pretoria the British position in Pretoria is vulnerable. The Boers target these lines and start blowing up rail-line and shooting up trains as the main thrust of their newly devised guerrilla or insurgency campaign. Sick and tired of trains arriving in Pretoria full of holes or not at all, and highly annoyed with the chief protagonist of these tactical hit and runs – General Christiaan de Wet – Lord Roberts writes to Lord Kitchener on the 14th June 1900 and says:

“We must put a stop to these raids on our railway and telegraph lines, and the best way will be to let the inhabitants understand that they cannot be continued with impunity. Troops are now available and a commencement should be made tomorrow by burning De Wet’s farm… He like all Free Staters now fighting against us is a rebel and must be treated as such. Let it be known all over the country that in the event of any damage being done to the railway or telegraph the nearest farm will be burnt to the ground.”

Boer guerrillas derailing a train. British soldiers on the scene. Photo colourised by Tinus le Roux.

The Boer decision to embark on guerrilla warfare and force all the Burghers who have taken up the offer and oaths of neutrality – to take up arms again and rejoin their Commando’s on threat of their farmsteads being destroyed – marks the point where the British military attitudes in South Africa turn from ‘Relentless’ to ‘Ruthless’.

On 16 June 1900, Roberts issues the proclamation on ‘scorched earth’ stating that, for every attack on a railway line the closest homestead would be burnt down. When that does not work, some months later another proclamation is issued in September stating that all homesteads would be burnt in a radius of 16 km of any attack, and that all livestock would be killed or taken away and all crops destroyed.

“Government Laagers”

This is followed by two separate Boer civilian refugee problems – one refugee crisis created by the Boer Republican Forces, burning down and destroying Hensopper, British and Joiner farms after the mid 1900 armistice proclamations – leaving these families in the veldt to fend for themselves – the Boers spurring the British to initiate the first concentration camps on the 22nd September 1900 specifically to deal with these ‘Hensopper’ refugees and give them a bell tent shelter, food and water … Maj. General J.G. Maxwell signals: 

“… camps for burghers who voluntarily surrender are being formed at Pretoria and Bloemfontein.” 

A proclamation was even issued by Lord Kitchener by 20th December 1900 which states that all burghers surrendering voluntarily, will be allowed to live with their families in these “Government Laagers” (concentration camps) until the end of the war and their stock and property will be respected and paid for.

And there is a second refugee crisis, this one initiated by the British forces and their scorched earth policy. The ‘concentration camps’ termed ‘refugee camps’ by the British (or ‘Government Laagers) start to fill up with a mix of Boers who have voluntarily surrendered (Hensoppers) or joined British forces (Joiners) and whose farms have been burned down by the Boers, they are also joined by some British families whose farms suffered the same fate (all these families comprise, men, women and children). They are then joined by ‘Bittereiner’ families directed to the concentration camps by the British who are busy burning down or dynamiting their farmsteads under the Scorched Earth policy – these families comprise a handful of men, but mainly women and children (their husbands still on Commando). Over time and given the sheer scale of destruction of the rural sector, the Bittereinder families start to outnumber the Hensopper families.

By 21st December 1900 Lord Kitchener outlined the advantages of interning all women, children and men unfit for military services, also Blacks living on Boer farms, as this will be;

“the most effective method of limiting the endurance of the guerrillas … The women and children brought in should be divided in two categories, viz.: 1st. Refugees, and the families of Neutrals, non-combatants, and surrendered Burghers. 2nd. Those whose husbands, fathers and sons are on Commando. The preference in accommodation, etc. should of course be given to the first class. With regard to Natives, it is not intended to clear (Native) locations, but only such and their stock as are on Boer farms.”

What gets created now are two separate camp systems, one for ‘whites’ and one for ‘natives’ (Blacks) and they are both fundamentally different in the way they are managed. The ‘white’ camps are structured using bell tents along military camp lines, shelter is provided by way a tent and food and water is provided – the camps are somewhat porous, there are no fences or armed guards and people can come and go with ‘refugee passes’ – isolation and lack of places go for alternate shelter keep the Boers in the camps. Medical facilities are also at hand, some camps better equipped than others.

Winburg Concentration Camp – Photo Credit: Boer War Museum, Bloemfontein. Colourised by Jenny B.

However, and this is key, upfront these camps are very poorly managed, the military have other problems to deal with and are prioritised to do what they know best and fight – there are major problems with sanitation, some camps being better than others. The supply lines to these camps – medicine, food, tents etc. all situated along railway lines for this purpose, are also severely disrupted by the Boer insurgents blowing up railway line. Overcrowding, lack of tents, disrupted food, poor sanitation, poor water and limited medicines all become major issues.

Many people don’t fully understand the concentration camps systems or the phases of their administration, in a nutshell there are two distinctive phases:

Concentration Camps – diseases bell curve – Black and white camps and time-line.

Phase 1: Started in September 1900 – they are set up under British military administration. In the ‘white’ camps – from March 1901 the mortality rates in the starts to climb to unprecedented and alarming levels, and at their peak the mortality rate is driven primarily by a measles epidemic which sweeps the camps and accounts 30% the overall deaths – as a child’s disease, along with the high infancy mortality rate and child death ratio in the Victorian period, coupled with the difficulty of wartime conditions and camp sanitary standards, by the beginning of 1902 children account for nearly 2/3 of all deaths.

The period March 1901 to November 1901 is 9 months of abject misery and suffering in the white Boer camps. However, contrary to modern propaganda, although there are many in white Boer camps who are malnourished and conditions are extremely harsh, they are not purposefully starved to death – ‘Starvation and Scurvy’ accounts for only 2.9% of recorded deaths. There are also no recoded cases of premeditated murder or executions, all deaths are attributed to disease or medically related conditions.

The conditions and plight of the women and children in the camps, against the context of respiratory and waterborne disease, coupled with inadequate medical countermeasures and failures in administration is highlighted by the likes of Emily Hobhouse and later in 1901 by the Fawcett Commission. 

Phase 2: From November 1901 as a result of the Fawcett Commission’s and parliamentary recommendations, Lord Alfred Milner, the Cape Colony High Commissioner is tasked with taking over the white Boer camps from the military and bringing them under civilian authority instead. 

As a result of Milner’s direct intervention, from November 1901 the mortality rates in the ‘white’ camps start to drop off dramatically as his civilian administrators and medical staff start to get on top of the epidemics, food supply and sanitary issues. They also do away with the putative and preferential treatment of ‘hensopper’ versus ‘bittereinder’ families initiated by the military. 

Children fetching water, Bloemfontein concentration camp – colourised by Tinus le Roux – inserted chart is the full account of white Boer concentration camp deaths.

Milner’s actions and policies are extremely effective, in just 4 months the mortality rates in the white camps drop to acceptable mortality rates for the Victorian era, made even more remarkable considering that these mortality rates are declining and have plateaued-out when the Guerrilla Phase and Scorched Earth policy is at its height and at its most destructive. 

These “acceptable” i.e. normal mortality rates continue up to the end of the war on 31 May 1902 and then remain acceptable long after the end of the war as the camps are then used as ‘resettlement’ centres for displaced Boer families until the end of 1902.

As to Milner, it’s also an inconvenient truth, that a man so often vilified by modern white Afrikaners as the devil reincarnate, is the same man responsible for saving tens of thousands of Boer women and children’s lives. However in all, there are exactly 29,491 deaths recorded in the ‘white’ concentration camps, the result of which would deeply harm the white Afrikaner collective psyche and does so even to this day.

The ‘Black’ concentration camps are a different matter, on a point to note here, the ‘Black’ camps are very big, this population of displaced civilians throughout the war, be they from the farms or from the cities far outnumbers the whites. In the Black concentration camps, no food or shelter is afforded, Black internees are instructed to grow their own food, and provided seed for this purpose. The food is both for their own consumption and for the British war effort. Wages are paid for labour provided to the British war machine, and these wages are then used by the Africans in the camps to purchase shelters, provisions and food. Medical assistance is minimal. In terms of structure some of these camps start to reflect a modern day poor shack township – corrugated metal, mud, wood and canvass shacks. In a nut-shell these camps can best be described as ‘forced’ labour camps.

Boer War Black Concentration Camp near Bronkerspruit, c.1901 – Colourised by Jenny B.

These ‘Black’ camps are hit by the same cocktail of viruses and bacteria that hit the ‘White’ camps, mainly typhoid and to a large degree measles. Their disease bell curve follows a similar trajectory as the white camps, however it starts a little later in August 1901. That’s were the similarity ends, in the Black camps there are also cases of starvation as the black populations do not receive enough food from the government to maintain human survivability (unlike the white camps). The mortality rates are also not clearly understood as they were not meticulously recorded (unlike the white camps). Only as late as 2024 do we even have an inkling of an idea of the mortality in these camps. They are now been carefully analysed using archaeological record (primary data, excavating and forensics) and oral history – it is now estimated that over 30,000 Black Africans died in these forced labour camps (refer Dr. Garth Benneyworth ‘Work or Starve’ published 2024).

Seeing the bigger picture

In reality, we now need to start accepting that as many Blacks died in their concentration camps (30,000 plus) as Whites died in their concentration camps (29,461). The key difference given racial prejudices (Boer and Brit) of the time, and more so the racial prejudices of the Afrikaner Nationalist governments after 1910.

So, before “Boer War” Afrikaner enthusiasts start jumping up and using this as yet another stick to vilify and beat the British with, we must note that whilst hundreds of plinths, monuments, museums and thousands of grave markers have focused on the “Boer Women and Children” at every single camp and in every single affected town – erected over the course of nearly 10 decades at massive state expense … and not one grave marker, monument, museum or even a simple single plinth was erected to the Black concentration camps.

As to prejudice and misunderstanding of the Boer War – there remains to this very day no such acknowledgement and remembrance – still, and some still want to call it “The Anglo-Boer War” as if these are the only two groups in it and not by its official designated name “The South African War (1899-1902)” and they still exclude by way of simple acknowledgement the mass of other ethnicities who either took part in the war directly as belligerents – taking service directly in the British Army’s colonial regiments and units, over 30,000 as ‘Black African’ British combatants alone – and were not getting to the thousands of South African based ‘Coloureds’ and ‘Indians’ joining British forces.

Then there are the thousands of ‘armed’ black Agteryers’, labour and servants in the Boer Republican Armies – not to mention the Blacks affected by the war in their concentration camps as forced labour for the British by their tens of thousands.

Black African ‘British’ soldiers defending a rice patten blockhouse, British Army Museum – Colourised by Jenny B.

Remember also that both the Tswana in Botswana and the Swazi enter the war as belligerent nations in their own right – on the side of the British, and both defeat Boer Commandos. There are literally hundreds of thousands of refugees having lost their jobs and been displaced from places like Johannesburg and Kimberley by the Boers or displaced from the Boer farms by the British – so here’s the kicker – there are more “Blacks’ affected by the war than either the Anglos or Boers combined and their death toll is as significant! 

Heck, entire books and academic papers have been written by ‘British’ and then ‘Afrikaner’ historians – but this aspect of the war only started to appear with any degree of sincerity around 2015 – post 1994, and it’s still not fully researched.

War is Cruelty

The Boer’s Guerrilla campaign is not a romantic ‘scarlet pimpernel’ chase of Christian de Wet and his chums, all whilst they cleverly outsmart the British. It’s a brutal, harsh and very cruel campaign – aimed at public networks – trains and rail in addition to the military ones. It is marred by maundering – the destruction of public buildings, mission stations and farms in the British territories – and even the murder of British citizens. Here is just a flavour of it – mission stations and Black and Coloured British citizens and soldiers are especially targeted.

When the Reverend C. Schröder returned to his Gordonia congregation after the war, he was horrified to find that most of his flock had been killed by Boer raiders. A attack by an unhinged Manie Maritz on the Methodist mission station at Leliefontein in Namaqualand was especially savage. The mission station razed and plundered, the civilians hunted down in an act of revenge, in all 27 Leliefonteiners are killed (some accounts say a total of 43) and approximately 100 are injured. So brutal it even shocked Deneys Reitz who recorded it in his diary:

“We found the place sacked and gutted and among the rocks beyond the buried houses lay 20 or 30 dead Hottentots, still clutching their antiquated muzzleloaders. This was Maritz’s handiwork. He had ridden into the station with a few men to interview the European missionaries, when he was set upon by armed Hottentots, he and his escorts narrowly escaping with their lives. To avenge the insult, he returned the next morning with a stronger force and wiped out the settlement, which seemed to many of us a ruthless and unjustifiable act. General Smuts said nothing but I saw him walk past the boulders where the dead lay, and on his return he was moody and curt… we lived in an atmosphere of rotting corpses for some days.”

Deneys Reitz

Bill Nasson, the renowned Boer War historian would note:

“The wretched refugees of this massacre were pitilessly hunted down by parties of Boers. Those unfortunate enough to be captured were brought back to work as slave labourers. Indeed, they were even shackled in irons forged at the mission station’s smithy”.

Manie Maritz is so unhinged that later in the war, he ignores clear instructions from Smuts and attempts to dynamite the town of Okiep – its garrison and civilians included. Using the commandeered Namaqua United Copper Company locomotive ‘Pioneer’ to propel a mobile bomb in the form of a wagonload of dynamite into the besieged town. Luckily the attack failed when the train derailed.

Maritz is not the only unhinged Boer Kommandant in the Guerrilla phase – both Kmdt. Gideon Scheepers and Kmdt. Hans Lötter, amongst other charges – were charged on marauding, property destruction, murdering “native spies” and mistreatment of black civilians (in the case of Scheepers also murdering unarmed but uniformed black British POW) – both were executed by the British once caught.

Images: Kommandant’s Scheepers and Lötter after their capture and ‘Fighting General’ Manie Maritz.

General Christian De Wet even writes to Lord Kitchener requesting clemency for Boer Kommandant’s executing Black soldiers out of hand as he had given “general instructions to have all armed natives and native spies shot.” Kitchener rejected the appeal, replying to General De Wet that Boer officers were personally responsible for their actions, and he wrote:

“[I am] astonished at the barbarous instructions you have given as regards the murder of natives who have behaved in my opinion, in an exemplary manner during the war.”

Ironically, as the modern Nationalist narrative went, Gideon Scheepers, Hans Lötter, Manie Maritz and Christiaan de Wet are all heralded as “volks-heroes” for their deeds, and this involves the outright murdering of black civilians, whereas Lord Kitchener, who would move on to become the face for British recruitment in World War 1, would ultimately be painted as the murderer incarnate.

The cruelty does not stop in the Cape, even General De la Rey’s victory over Lord Methuen’s column at Tweebosch on the 7th of March 1902 in the Transvaal at the end of the war is marred by war crimes. Tweebosch is famous because of General De la Rey’s compassionate and kind treatment of the wounded Lord Methuen and saving his life. What is not recorded at the Battle of Tweebosch in the narrative is the killing spree De la Rey’s commando members go on, as they execute about 30 unarmed Black wagon drivers and servants in service of the British column as well as black and Indian soldiers having surrendered. The testimony of the executions by survivors recently found in WO 108-117 in the UK’s National Archives give a unique and harrowing insight:

Here are some quotes on the killings of that day:

“…the whole Indian and Kaffir establishment of the F.V.H. (Field Veterinary Hospital … One Farrier Sergeant of the Indian Native Cavalry and two Indian Veterinary Assistants (men carrying no arms) were ruthlessly shot dead after the surrender, and nine Hospital Kaffirs were either killed in action or murdered later.

(British Cavalry – Regimental History).

The Boers whom I met on the 8th instantly admitted that their men had deliberately shot down the transport Natives with a view, they asserted, of deterring others from enlisting in our services”.

Captain W.A. Tilney.

“I saw four Cape boys, unarmed and dismounted, come towards the Boers with their hands up. They were shot dead”.

Trooper C.J.J. Van Rensberg

“I saw a young Native boy riding a horse and leading another. He was unarmed. A Boer road up to him and told him to dismount. No sooner had he done so than the Boers shot him in the back of the head and killed him”.

Corporal H. Christopher

These testimony’s go on, there are loads – but its enough to get the point.

Even one of the most biased Republican Historians – Thomas Pakenham, has to acknowledge the slaughter of Blacks in the Transvaal by Republicans under the Command of Jan Smuts when he notes:

“When Jan Smuts’ commando fell on the native village at Modderfontein, for example, they butchered the 200 or so black inhabitants  and left their bodies strewn around, unburied.”

The American General, William Tecumseh Sherman said something very relevant to war generally and the Boer War specifically – he said:

“War is cruelty. There is no use trying to reform it. The crueller it is, the sooner it will be over”.

General Sherman

One can easily see where the origins of the “you reap what you sow” ethos which enters into latter British mindsets when dealing with the Boer Republican refugees and their properties – a “hardening of attitudes” as it is often termed in modern military speak. Not even 40 years later, a ‘Rhodesian’ Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris would really crystallise this type of military sentiment to justify his carpet bombing of German civilians in World War 2 when he quoted Horsea 8:7 and said:

“They sowed the wind and now they are going to reap the whirlwind.”

Also, to General Sherman’s point, the British fight the Boer’s guerrilla phase of the war with such intensity, the commitment of massive resources (8,000 blockhouses alone) and tens of thousands combatants – that the Guerrilla Phase of the Boer War is the shortest fought guerrilla war in the history of modern guerrilla warfare – it’s over in short time – less than 2 years (modern guerrilla warfare of this nature war lasts an average of 9 years), and here’s an uncomfortable fact, it’s over with the least trauma to the general population such warfare has traditionally invokes (then and now) – believe it or not.

The simple truth is the scale of destruction to property, lives and livelihoods is massive on both sides of the fence, so much so its almost impossible to separate the destruction initiated by the Boers and that initiated by the British given its scale – whole sections of the country in Boer territories destroyed and whole sections in British territories were also destroyed – thousands of Boer farms and entire British cities, farms, towns and mission stations … all destroyed.

To give an idea of the scale facing Milner at the end of the war, in trying to recover South Africa economically and deal with repatriations. There is the re-settlement of some 150,000 white civilians involved (mainly Boers) and about 50,000 impecunious white “foreigners” (mainly British) who had been employed on the Witwatersrand, and then there is approximately one million displaced and unemployed “Bantu” (read that again – 1,000,000 Black refugees).

Post war, Boers outside a compensation and repatriation tent. Colourised by Jenny B (insert Lord Milner).

Milner’s repatriation, economic reforms and compensations were naturally decried by latter day Afrikaner nationalists as insufficient – and that’s because they only focused on the Boers’ compensation and nobody else in the bigger picture. Milner, as a studious and rather bull-headed administrator, felt he did a decent enough job given the challenges he faced – and even some latter day economic historians would agree with him. But let’s face it – the community that come off worse, by a miracle mile, were the “Bantu”.

In Conclusion

This is not to say “tit for tat” – the Boers started it first bla … bla … bla! That would be disingenuous and disrespectful to their memory and that’s not the point of this missive – the point is to remind people who are hidebound by a rather poor Christian Nationalist education and blinkered by identity politics – that in war there are no saints, war is nasty, it’s cruel, there are never really any ‘winners’ in war, nothing happens in a vacuum – and in war the truth is always the first victim.

The idea that the white Boer civilians were the unwitting victims in this entire saga, that they are the only real community to really have suffered the ravages of this war at the hands of the British is completely unhinged, baseless and untrue. This sentiment rings more true to politicking and identity politics initiated by the Nationalists than it does to any historical fact.

In truth, both the Boers and the British are equally responsible for waging war, both can be held to account for the resultant civilian crisis that war inevitably produces and all the carnage that follows that, and very importantly they are both equally cruel … and citizens from all communities were traumatised, there is no clear ‘murderous villain’ … there never is in war.


Written and researched by Peter Dickens

References:

Complete history of the South African War: in 1899-1902 By F. T. Stevens. Published 1903.

The Boer Invasion of Natal : Clement Horner Stott. Published 1900.

Leopold Charles Maurice Stennett Amery “The Second Boer War – The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902” – Volumes 1 to 7.

History of the war in South Africa 1899-1902. By Maj. General Sir Frederick Maurice and staff. Volumes 1 to 4, published 1906

The Boer War: By Thomas Pakenham – re-published version, 1st October 1991.

Black People and the South African War 1899-1902. By Peter Warwick. Published 1983.

The Battle of Magersfontein – Victory and Defeat on the South African Veld, 10-12 December 1899. Published 2023. By Dr. Garth Benneyworth.

Kruger’s War – the truth behind the myths of the Boer War: By Chris Ash, BSc FRGS FRHistS, published 2014.

A History of the British Cavalry, 1816-1919, Vol.4, p.270

Commando – By Deneys Reitz, published 1929

Work or Starve - Black concentration camps and forced labour camps in South Africa: 1901 – 1902, By Dr. Garth Benneyworth. Published 2024 by The War Museum of the Boer Republics.

Correspondence and fact checking with Dr. Garth Benneyworth, Boer War historian – Sol Plaatjies University, Kimberley – February 2024.

A tool for modernisation? The Boer concentration camps of the South African War, 1900-1902. By Dr Elizabeth van Heyningen – Department of Historical Studies, University of Cape Town, 2010 South African Journal of Science. 

Correspondence and fact checking with Chris Ash, BSc FRGS FRHistS, Boer War historian, Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society for The Boer War Atlas – February 2024.

Correspondence to The Observation Post on Boer War Repatriation and Compensation – Jan 2024. By Gordon Mackinlay.

Correspondence and fact checking with Boer War historian – Robin Smith, Feb 2024.

With thanks to:

Colorised images on the mast-head thanks to Allan Wood (Kitchener) and Jenny B (de Wet)

Colourised images used with great thanks to both Jennifer Bosch and Tinus le Roux.

Un-Packing Pakenham

I’ve just finished reading Thomas Pakenham’s ‘The Boer War’ … AGAIN, this is my 7th time. Pakenham was the first book I read on the Boer War in the early 80’s and it has been my go-to, it’s easy and it reads like a novel, section 1 sets up a ‘gold-bug’ conspiracy complete with political intrigue, and it becomes a page turner after that.

As I’ve matured as a history lover and commentator, and even lately mapping out my own historical papers for academic scrutiny, I’ve become more astute on challenging material. I’ve learned that the closer you are to archive material and source documents the better – and this is where references and sources become critical to history books.

Doing ‘history’ on a 19th Century topic in the 21st Century is interesting, as in between there are all the 20th Century historians – and sometimes what they have penned as ‘truism’ seems to hold and is simply taken by the 21st Century historian chaps as a grounded fact and then they expounded and expanded on it without really challenging its origins, and whole historical misunderstandings are easily created.

The interesting bit is when you hit an archive and discover the 20th Century historian has not grounded the fact properly, and what has come after him is pure hyperbole – and that unfortunately is the case with Pakenham … and here’s how.

The Boer War and Race

One of the most relevant issues and topics when looking at the South African War 1899 -1902 a.k.a. Boer War 2, in the 21st Century is the topic of ‘race’ and the related topics of ‘franchise’ and ’emancipation’. To really understand how ‘race’ is viewed and acted upon in the war within the context of its time and then what role subsequent historians and commentators during the Apartheid period took to dismiss it from the narrative or side-line it as irrelevant in what has been essentially pitched as ‘white man’s war’ between two ‘white’ antagonists – the black man is a but a part player merely along for the ride. 

Even in ‘white’ communities in modern South Africa today, the ‘Boer War’ is a war from which the ‘Black’ man is excluded at the beginning and excluded at the end. They sincerely believe that. So much so, that academic attempts to re-brand the war on its official name “The South African War (1899-1902)” to incorporate the full scope and all the belligerents (black and white – British, Boer, Tswana, Swazi etc.) – still goes completely unnoticed in ‘white’ Afrikaans communities especially – and they still call it the “2nd War for Independence” (whose independence was at stake is anyone’s guess) or the “Anglo-Boer War” (Brits and Boers only thanks).

This perception starts to really take shape with historians writing on the Boer War during Apartheid, and here Pakenham in section one of his ’The Boer War’ book sets it up perfectly. From the get-go, as the good travel writer and journalist he is (he was not a qualified historian and the “The Boer War” by T Pakenham is his first real attempt at a history book), Pakenham decides on who is a villain and who is a hero, like any good novel – very important if you’re going to set up a ‘page-turner’ and reinvigorate a tired old boring subject with some flare and creative license.

Creating a Villain

Been an Irish Republican himself, Pakenham is almost predisposed to vilifying British Imperialists. To build Alfred Milner as his villain, Pakenham uses two key meetings – one meeting with Joseph Chamberlain on 22nd November 1898 where Milner gets ‘his orders’ so to speak and one meeting with Percy Fitzpatrick from the Reform Committee (the Uitlanders) on the 31st March 1899 where he gives the ‘Uitlanders’ some advice to how to advance their cause and declares his own commitment to their cause. Seems legit right? Let’s focus on each and see how Pakenham ‘interpreted’ these meetings.

On the meeting in London with Chamberlain – Milner outlines that a “crisis” is developing over the Uitlander franchise as Kruger is simply unbending and is showing no signs of compromising. Chamberlain is of the opinion that “time” will resolve the crisis, leave Kruger to his unreasonable demands and simple democracy, civil pressure and process will see in inevitable change (in other words give Kruger enough rope and he’ll eventually hang himself). To quote, Chamberlain tells Milner to do two things 1. That a peaceful settlement is the only settlement the “British Public” i.e. Parliament will accept and 2. Keep things moving “forrarder” in South Africa (old English – ‘Forrarder’ means ‘forward’). 

Joseph Chamberlain (left) and Alfred Milner (right)

Milner also agrees with Chamberlain that he will “screw” Kruger – now before you jump to a 21st Century conclusion, “screw” in Victorian times comes from word used to describe a prison official and the ‘screw’ was a pressure machine prisoners aimlessly turned as a punitive measure – to ‘screw’ means to “increase pressure” on Kruger politically (and not to “screw” him out of his country as would be a ‘literal’ 21st century translation and one that it is so often misquoted by Afrikaner Boer War enthusiasts).

Those are Milner’s orders – from his boss. Straightforward enough.

In a modern context Chamberlain is telling his civil servant in the colonial office in South Africa to conclude an acceptable peace without using violence and keep up the good work, keep going and keep pushing. 

But this is not Pakenham’s’ take on the meeting at all, Pakenham sets up the meeting as Milner intentions on artificially ‘working up a crises’ to urge Chamberlain to agree a pathway to war – that no such ‘pathway’ is even mentioned nor is one discussed matter not a jot to Pakenham. Thomas Pakenham then uses the phase of “moving things ‘forrander’ locally” and declares it a “hint” to Milner to continue with an aggressive ‘forward’ policy to annex the Transvaal Republic. That there is absolutely nothing backing Pakenham up in his assertion that Chamberlain is “hinting” to Milner to continue creating conditions for a war and the annexation of a Republic does not deter Pakenham at all – with no proof whatsoever he keeps up his vilification of Milner (and Chamberlain). It gets worse.

The meeting between Percy Fitzpatrick and Alfred Milner is Pakenham’s next focus. So, what happens here? – Fitzpatrick as a Reform Committee leader (and Uitlander in the Transvaal) meets with Milner to put the case of the Uitlanders, to outline their beef with Kruger as a crisis and put their franchise issue front forward. 

Percy Fitzpatrick (left) and Alfred Milner (right)

Milner sympathises with Fitzpatrick and says his “heart and soul” are with the miners and their predicament. He indicates to Fitzpatrick that their case is not strong enough with the British public, and this is borne out by Parliament (and by default Chamberlain) who are unmoved – he suggests the next step is for the Uitlanders to strengthen their case to the ‘British Public” is a concerted focus on British “media” (the very partisan British press) – he however distances himself personally from involvement in this media campaign and indicates the Uitlanders have to go it alone (as he does not want to be seen as partisan and he’s toeing the line his ‘boss’ Chamberlain is demanding of him). 

That’s it – in modern context, he sympathises with their cause, and he suggests they tighten up their PR and do a media blitz to strengthen their case, only he cannot be seen to be partisan to such a media campaign –  Straightforward enough.

But that’s not Pakenham’s take, instead Pakenham sees this as collusion, purposefully building a crisis for the purposes of strengthening a case for war. He concludes that Milner’s avoiding of the proposed media campaign as duplicitous behaviour – covering his tracks as he’s breaking with his Boss’ instructions and fanning a war, and Pakenham does this again with absolutely no grounded fact whatsoever. It gets even worse.

Pakenham concludes all this with, and I’ll quote Pakenham directly. 

“His (Milner’s) plan was to annex the Transvaal. He would rule it as a crown colony much as his old chief, Cromer, ruled Egypt”.

Pakenham goes on and states

“these were the dreams of Milner’s life and he saw no reason to abandon them because of one obstinate (and obsolete) old man in South Africa (editor – implying Kruger). But how to prevent Chamberlain “wobbling” and ruining everything by compromise? A delicate plan, whose object had to be kept as secret from Chamberlain as from Kruger, was taking shape in Milner’s mind.”

Wow! I mean … wow … a plan for annexation, a secret conspiracy, dreams of grandeur – a Napoleon in the guise of a British bureaucrat and who knew? …Where did Pakenham get all this information from? There must be a source, a reference of some kind, Milner must have betrayed his thoughts to a friend in a letter or similar, he’s drafted an annexation plan surely … and luckily there is a reference, Pakenham’s given it all a notation – number “25”.

Now I want to see this – it’s the entire crux of Pakenham’s argument, it’s the moment of truth, so over to No. 25 under Chapter 6 and it reads … “The evidence that Milner wanted a war is circumstantial.” Huh! … say what! There is no evidence – it’s all circumstantial – and this ‘truth’ is hidden in a notation at the back of the book! What’s going on?

Telling Porkies 

In London cockney rhyming slang if you “tell a pork pie” it’s a “lie”. Telling ‘Porkies’ is to shield or be ‘sparing’ with the truth. One clear way of telling a porkie is to tell a ‘half-truth’ its sounds legit enough and has enough gravitas on which you can base an entire argument. 

When it comes to Pakenham and ‘The Boer War’ on the issue of race and the British franchise demands outside of the ‘white’ uitlander issue i.e. the Coloured Franchise and the recognition of the rights of an urbanising Black African population drawn to mines and industry for labour – this bit of purposeful manipulation becomes masterful – as in one stroke Pakenham paints Milner as a rabid racist and he relegates the entire ‘Coloured’ franchise issue to a secondary status, citing Britain’s lip service to it because in his view deep down they are as racist and segregationist as the Boers – and he uses Milner to ‘deflect’ this rather thorny subject away from the ZAR Republic’s very racist ‘Grondwet’ and its institutionalised racism as reflected in Articles 31 and 32 (applicable to ‘white’ “non-Boers” and “coloured”, “Indians” and “blacks”) of the ZAR constitution.

What this does is relegate this issue of race to a ‘secondary’ status and builds the war as a white only affair for white rights. It goes against the another ‘narrative’ the modern black historians and academics point out – the ‘winds of war’ actually starts in earnest when Edmund Fraser meets Jan Smuts on the 23rd December 1898 and he warns the Republic that their treatment of their ‘Blacks’ is reaching unacceptable levels, he warns Smuts that issues like universal franchise and rights are the type of things the British public like to get behind because they are concepts the average Briton understands – and these easily understood equity and franchise concepts – like slavery – are issues the British government tends to go into a legitimate and justified war over. 

This meeting leaves Smuts utterly gobsmacked and under the impression that the coming war is inevitable … it’s not just about the ‘white’ miners and their rights after all … it’s much bigger than that and the British are not going to stop at insisting on the 5 year franchise for the ‘whites’ only, next is the issue of Black rights. The British also don’t let go of this – throughout the war the ‘Coloured franchise’ and ‘Black’ protectorate and recognition issues are front and forward – it’s a ‘term’ for peace when the first peace negotiations are opened up with Louis Botha in February 1901 in Middleburg and it’s still a ‘term’ for peace when the Vereeniging Peace proposals are put forward in May 1902 …. It is Smuts’ skill as a lawyer and negotiator that its ‘kicked into the long grass’ to be dealt with a ‘future and independent’ union (a move Milner very rightly and prophetically clocks as future problem). 

It’s a key part of the Boer War as the Boers continue with an entire guerrilla phase with the absolute devastation to their family and farm constructs precisely because they absolutely refuse to change their ‘grondwet’ (constitution) on franchise – and especially the coloured franchise. This is NOT what the Apartheid era politicians want taught about the war, to them it’s a whites only affair, it’s a result of a long standing feud dating back to the Voortrekkers … the ‘black’ issue is incidental and the Brits are not that serious about it anyway.

To put this very critical ‘part of the Boer War .. the entire ‘Black’ part of the war on the rump and kick it into the long grass – and in so to fall in line with the Republican narrative (and Apartheid philosophy of Boer victimisation) we need the villain to give the ‘black’ issue the old heave-ho … and Pakenham turns to Milner, his warmongering “Cromer”, so here’s the quote he users – it’s from a letter Milner writes to a friend. 

“You have only to sacrifice ‘the nigger’ and the game is easy”.

Wow, what a powerful and condemning quote – proof positive, the ‘Black’ man is the sacrificial lamb, nothing more – the British will happily deflect the black issue, they’re a pawn in their greater ‘game’ to annex the Transvaal, the British aren’t serious about the ‘black emancipation’ – it’s just a scapegoat – and Milner is a vile racist and bigot to boot! 

Ah … small problem. It’s a half truth, in fact it’s a complete misquote – and by misquoting it Pakenham is setting up an entire preconceived bias, on purpose he is guiding historic opinion and creating fiction not fact – he’s telling porkies … here’s the quote in full and when you’re done reading it you’ll realise the injustice and the depth of the problem, as Pakenham purposefully leaves this bit out, he’s character assassinating and he’s guiding an preconceived agenda – here is Milner’s quote in full:

“If I did not have some conscience about the treatment of blacks I personally could win over the Dutch in the Colony and indeed all the South African dominion without offending the English. You have only to sacrifice ‘the nigger’ and the game is easy. Any attempt to secure fair play for them makes the Dutch fractious and almost unmanageable”.

Hang on a tick, that quote is completely different … hold the horses … Milner is NOT a racist, he cares about the plight of Black South Africans, and he’s frustrated at the Republics treatment of them and their lack of resolve or plain reason to even open the subject of black emancipation and deal with it. The ‘sacrifice’ bit and even the ‘nigger’ bit is a throwaway line referring to simply leaving out the subject altogether when dealing with the Boers as it would make life easier, and it’s something (by his own consciousness) he is simply not prepared to do.

… so that’s a bit different, now you have to ask yourself – what is Pakenham trying to do why is he been deceptive – for what purpose?

Lord Milner (left) and President Kruger (right)

Where Pakenham fails to peruse the ‘Black’ angle of the Boer War, the esteemed and renowned British historian Andrew Roberts FRSL FRHistS has a sharply different take to Pakenham’s argument and would fall back on Leo Amery and the entire black and white franchise argument in this statement of his:

“Although the Boer War has long been denounced by historians as the British Empire’s Vietnam, and characterised as being fought for gold and diamonds, and trumped up by greedy, jingoistic British politicians keen to bully the two small, brave South African republics, the truth was very different. Far from fighting for their own freedom, the Boers were really struggling for the right to oppress others, principally their black servant-slaves, but also the large non-Afrikaans white Uitlander (‘foreigner’) population of the Transvaal who worked their mines, paid 80% of the taxes, and yet had no vote. The American colonists had fought under James Otis’ cry that ‘Taxation without representation is tyranny’ in 1776, yet when Britain tried to apply that same rule to Britons in South Africa, she was accused of vicious interference’.”

Now, if we think this is all unsubstantiated character assassination so far, it gets worse again, Pakenham carries his now artificially grounded warmongering, scheming, conspiracist and racist ogre that is his Milner into the next chapters which he brands ‘Milner’s war’ and we start with the Bloemfontein conference with Kruger.

For Suzerainty Sakes

Most people have the impression that the Bloemfontein conference in June 1899 was all about Milner unbudging and arrogant and Kruger pleading and declaring all Britain wants is his country – greedy and after the gold, Pakenham highlighting Kruger’s tearful cry at the conclusion of Milner’s browbeating arrogance when the poor simple farmer stands up to leave and cries “it is our country you want” a statement which in actuality startled Krugers’ own negotiating team members like Smuts who saw it for what it was – melodrama, but not Pakenham – a whole chapter in his book is named after this statement of Kruger’s and he holds it up as proof positive of Milner’s intentions as a warmonger.

This perception of a callous British bureaucrat intent on war is carefully built by Pakenham as he very carefully omits ‘the British case’ and focuses primarily on ‘the Boer case’, and the proof is in the pudding … what if I said the whole franchise negotiation centred around the Transvaal’s Suzerainty status – and had nothing to do with ‘stealing’ the Transvaal’s gold. “Huh!”, the universal cry … what’s a Suzerainty? And here’s exactly the problem, the ‘British case’ is entirely misunderstood, and its largely thanks to Pakenham – historians prior to Pakenham, like Leo Amery extensively cover the complex issue of the Suzerainty – it’s a critical part of the Casus Belli … Packenham on the other hand merely gives it lip service and glances over it.

If you want to really understand the ‘road to war’ and the real underpinning issues which caused the war, you have to understand the Suzerainty, the ‘vassal state’ or ‘client state’ status of the Transvaal (Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek – ZAR) – as it was by no means, not in a month of Sunday’s, a “Sovereign” or a “fully independent” Republic. On the franchise issue, Britain was “meddling” in its own Suzerain and not in some independent state, something it regarded as perfectly legal in the spirit of the “Conventions” of 1881 and 1884.

Reitz (left) and Kruger (right)

Yup, sorry to burst the bubble on this one but the ZAR was never legally “fully independent” – lots of politicians on both sides gave it lip service, promises of respect for each other’s so called “independence”, but the hard truth is that legal treaties existed, The Pretoria Convention of 1881 and the London Convention of 1884 which allowed the ZAR no foreign policy whatsoever, they had to defer all of it to Britain – for all their foreign relations and even matters pertaining to trade and trading tariffs (affecting movement of “goods” and even labour) and even their borders (their expansion plans and claims to other territories and ‘old’ Republics like Natalia, Winburg and Stellaland were clipped)– the ZAR had no legal rights in external dealings with any other country other than the Orange Free State – neither foreign treaties or even foreign trade tariff deals could be struck legally without Britain’s consent – none whatsoever. The ZAR remained a British vassal state from the day it stopped being a British colony on the 23rd March 1881 to the date the ZAR “Raad’ and Kruger declared war on their Imperial Suzerain – Great Britain, on 11th Oct 1899 – that’s a fact (and a surprise to many I’m sure). 

Now, you can start to see the complexity that was the backwards and forwards between Milner and Kruger. This is such a complex issue that I will be publishing an Observation Post on it called “For Suzerainty Sakes” in future, so readers have a better understanding of the causes of Boer War 2 (and Boer War 1 as the Suzerainty is a critical component of the 1st Boer War or Transvaal War 1880-1881).  Churchill when captive and been shipped to Pretoria as a POW during Boer War 2, passed Majuba mountain and lamented in his historical account on the “disgraceful peace” which resulted from Boer War 1 and the true cause of Boer War 2 – and here he is referring the “Suzerainty” and not “gold” – and he is a commentator “from the time” – a first hand account and not a later commentator “of the time” like Pakenham – a second hand account.  

Suffice to say Pakenham does not cover this issue of the ZAR’s true sovereignty in depth at all, the ‘British historians’ do, Pakenham doesn’t – choosing a rather concocted and completely unsubstantiated “conspiracy” of greedy capitalists in cohorts with Milner instead … and as a net result just about everyone in South Africa has no true understanding of what caused the war in the first place.  

Long and Short to get a better understanding, Kruger opens his negotiations with the proposal that he will only consider a 5-year franchise for the “Uitlanders” if Britain drops all Suzerainty regulations governing the ZAR. Kruger lists 12 points he wants resolved before he will consider dropping the 15 year ‘franchise’ for Uitlanders to 5 years – which would bring it in line with all the bordering states’ franchise and labour movements regulated for ‘whites’ (this includes the Orange Free State, Natal, Rhodesia, Botswana and the Cape Colony).

In fact 9 of Kruger’s points are directly related to the ZAR’s Suzerainty restrictions. If the Suzerainty regulations are dropped this would mean the ZAR could change the power balance and threaten Britain’s paramountcy and power balance in the entire region – from the Zambezi all the way to Cape Point, enabling the ZAR to go into military treaties and trade alignments with other aspirational colonial powers like Imperial Germany thereby threatening Britain’s paramountcy in favour of a Boer one. That is a WHOLE lot more to it than mere “miners rights” and their greedy “gold” magnates on the reef as it put all of Britain’s colonies and the protectorates in the whole of southern Africa in a precarious position (3 full blown colonies and 3 colonial protectorates – 6 countries in all), and bottom line, the British (the Parliament and Chamberlain) and their ‘man’ on the ground – Milner, turn round to Kruger and simply say … “No”.

What follows is a four month long cat and mouse game with the Franchise period gradually dropping to 7 years with “conditions”‘ attached, its rejected by all (especially the Reform Committee) – thereafter desperate negotiations between Jan Smuts (for the ZAR) and W. Conyngham Greene (for Britain) continue and they settle on the final offer on 19th August 1899 – it is a 5 year franchise, the ZAR agree Milner’s original term and that there will be nothing “contrary to the Convention” (the ‘Convention is the 1884 version of the Suzerainty and by this it means the Suzerainty remains in place) – the agreement is outlined in a urgent telegram from Greene to Milner, everyone is relieved as war is now avoided, job done …. not yet … Francis Reitz, the ZAR State Secretary sends the ‘formal’ offer on the 21st August 1899 – in which he outlines the 5 year franchise – all good, on the PROVISO that Britain drops the Suzerainty completely, and he is very specific so as to clear up any ambiguity Smuts may have caused – not good. This is what Reitz writes:

The proposals of this Government (ZAR) regarding question of franchise and representation contained in that despatch must be regarded as expressly conditional on Her Majesty’s Government consenting to the points set forth in paragraph 5 of the despatch, viz. :

  • (a) In future not to interfere in internal affairs of the South African Republic.
  • (b) Not to insist further on its assertion of existence of suzerainty.
  • (c) To agree to arbitration.

In Amery’s historical account, he notes at this stage it was “quite impossible for the British government to accept” Reitz’ final offer and that for the British they come to realise the ZAR has no intention to deal with the franchise issue – and this would lead subsequent historians like Paul Ludi to correctly conclude that all the subsequent Greene-Smuts talks were merely a delay tactic by Smuts to ready the two Afrikaner republics for their declaration of war against Britain.

Smuts (left) and Greene (right)

As historians go, both Leopold Amery (then) and Professor Bill Nasson (now) and Andrew Roberts (now) claim the Suzerainty (not gold and diamonds or ‘Cape to Cairo’ British Imperialism) is the Casus Belli of the 2nd Boer War. Bet you did not learn that in your Christian Nationalism School textbook … nor do you get that conclusion from Pakenham.

In Conclusion

This is NOT say that Milner is a saint – not by any stretch, he’s a hard headed British Imperialist whose expressed desire is a Federation of States in Southern Africa, all under the oversight of the British “family” of nations – and he’s no different to just about every Federalist before and after him, men like Sir Henry Barkly. Milner is also no different to the “Afrikaner” federalists who see some form of Federation between all the states – men like Smuts, Botha, de la Rey and Hofmeyr – only they see it under an Afrikaner paramountcy and not a British one. 

The Boer war is a clash of ideologies and paramountcy for complete regional oversight – and this is where Pakenham falls hopelessly flat – not only is he sparing with truths, sparing with “quotes” and sparing with ‘context’ – he blatantly sets up unsubstantiated conspiracy theory in favour of creative story telling and setting up a “good yarn” and ignores and/or manipulates the hard historical facts like the coloured and white franchise issues and the complexities surrounding the ZAR’s suzerainty – all in favour of complete fables surrounding the “gold conspiracy” and painting Milner as a “warmonger”.

The net result is “revisionist” history, a complete change in the historical narrative, and one which is so skewed to the Afrikaner Nationalist and Republicanism cause that it even had Eugène Terre’Blanche, the rabid white supremacist and leader of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging radical far right “terrorist” group stand up and state that Thomas Pakenham’s “The Boer War” was the definitive work and final say on the Boer War – no need to read anything else!

Now, if the erstwhile “ET” said it, then you must know there is a tremendous bias – unfortunately as I’ve outlined here, this bias undermines the entire integrity of Pakenham’s work. There is merit in a lot of Pakenham’s work if you put his entire Section 1 aside, problem is Section 1 is so flawed and has so many holes in it, it can almost be classified as fiction – and here Pakenham is in effect using fiction to set up all the non-fiction in his subsequent sections – it almost stands in the same category as James A Michener’s The Covenant and Leon Uris’ Exodus. The BIG problem is subsequent Apartheid period “Afrikaner” historians and academics ensconced in institutions like the University of Pretoria, the Rand Afrikaans University (now RAU) and the University of Stellenbosch have taken Pakenham as their lead – and that now calls into the question the integrity of all their work in addition.

That is exactly why you should read the works of other authors on the Boer war, both the “original” old ones like Leo Amery’s The Times History of the South African War (Volumes 1 to 7), Deneys Reitz’ Commando and Churchill’s and Smuts’ definitive works of their involvement in the war – all the way to Rayne Kruger’s Goodbye Dolly Gray. Then we need to focus on the “new” ones like Dr Garth Benneyworth and his 2023 work on “Black” concentration camps and even his ground-breaking insights on battles like Magersfontein, or Dr Elizabeth van Heyningen’s ground-breaking work on the concentration camps and disease, or even the ‘British’ historians like Andrew Roberts FRSL FRHistS and his history of the English-speaking peoples and dare I say it Chris Ash BSc FRGS FRHistS and his book Kruger’s War.

The truly difficult thing for me is the realisation that my much-loved Pakenham’s ‘The Boer War’ is so flawed it now needs to make way for more definitive, revived, and new perspective on the subject – and luckily in un-packing Pakenham and packing him away – on the up-side, what Pakenham has done is a favour for all of us history lovers – as it now keeps a dusty old war alive as a subject – his work out of necessity and relevance now has to be counterbalanced and more critically scrutinised. For in truth, the last word on the Boer War has yet to be written.


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

References:

Leopold Charles Maurice Stennett Amery (1873-1955) “The Second Boer War – The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902” – Volumes 1 to 7.

The Battle of Magersfontein – Victory and Defeat on the South African Veld, 10-12 December 1899. Published 2023. By Dr. Garth Benneyworth. 

The Boer War: By Thomas Pakenham – re-published illustrated version, 1st October 1991.

The Boer War: By Thomas Pakenham – Abacas Edition, 1st October 1979.

The War for South Africa: The Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) Published February 9, 2011 by Bill Nasson

My Early Life. A Roving Commission. Author: Churchill, Winston S, published October 1930.

Salisbury: Victorian Titan: By Andrew Roberts – January 2000 

Boer War by the numbers!

The path to the South African War (1899-1902) i.e. Boer War 2 is often misunderstood – so let’s look at the actual military numbers and the mission creep. Very often on Boer War social media appreciation sites you hear this old myth “the British intended to invade the Boer Republics and built up their forces on the borders to do so”. This build-up of British invasion forces then prompts the Boers to make “a pre-emptive strike” to “take up forward defensive positions” on British territory. The Boers didn’t start the war see! They merely forestalled the inevitable warmonger, none other than the greedy British – get it?

Problem is “I don’t get it”, my training as an Economic Historian will always lead me to look at the statistics and the ‘cold facts’ to make comparisons and conclusions, my training as a military officer will also always lead me to the science of military doctrine in analysing military history, and not a ‘mainstream’ historian’s interpretation of it. As to above assertions on invasion body troop strengths and pre-emptive strikes, let me be upfront – it’s all bunk, a complete myth and it not supported by the historical facts of the day, nor is it supported by military doctrine (then and now) and the cold hard facts – the statistics, ratios and numbers certainly don’t support it . This is again where ‘economic history’ starts to rip ‘political’ history apart, the numbers – the hard facts (measurable and accurate) start to talk and the political bollocks start to walk, and here’s how.

Looking at the numbers

So, here the numbers to the start of the Boer War on the 11th October 1899 when the Boers invade sovereign British territories:

31st July 1899 – Total British Forces in the Cape Colony, Natal, Rhodesia, and Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Protectorates = Total 8,803 men.
1st August 1899 to 11th October 1899, additional British Forces arrive = Total 6,500 men

Total British Forces in the field as at 11th October 1899 = 15,300 men

27th September 1899 – Transvaal Mobilises Forces = 26,871 men
3rd October 1899 – Free State mobilisers Forces = 21,345 men

Total Boer Forces in the field as at 11th October 1899 = 48,216 men.

The Boer forces at the commencement of hostilities when they declare war against Britain are heavily in their favour = Boer Forces outnumber the British 3 to 1.

“On the high seas” as at the 11th October 1899 are an additional 7,418 British Troops on their way to South Africa – called up to bolster an inadequate British force strength in the event of war.

Even with their arrival at the end of October 1899 (after the war has been declared) bringing the British number up to 22,708 – British Forces are still woefully inadequate, and the invading Boer Forces still outnumber them 2 to 1.

There are numerous quotes and historic references which prove the British had no intention of ‘invading’ the Boer Republics, these always result in a slinging match whilst Boer romantics profess to intelligence reports as proof positive of a plan of attack. Like any military with a military academy and a war office, a scenario plan was devised by the British, its called ‘The War Office Plan’ and it was developed in 1886 – it outlines that should the British invade the ZAR, a full Army Corps (invasion force) would assemble at Colesberg and invade the underbelly of the OFS on their way to the ZAR, avoiding mountainous defences completely and just move up the spine of South Africa over flat and easy terrain (more or less the route of the N1 today).

In reality the British made no actual invasion plans, scenario ‘top draw’ plan yes, actual plans a ‘campaign plan’ with start lines showing troop strengths, regiments and units, timelines and objectives – no, that plan doesn’t exist – an entire Parliamentary commission and Royal inquest was made in 1902 after the war ended, and they established that “no plan for campaign ever existed for operations in South Africa” (that they meant an actual operational plan), but you can put all that aside and let’s just look at the numbers.

There is simply no way, that the British intended to ‘invade’ with a force of only 22,700 troops – going up against a 40,000 strong invading Republican Boer army – just no way. Anyone whose served in the military and understands military doctrines knows, you need twice the numbers of the opponent, at least 2:1 (ideally more) before commencing with an invasion. That means Britain would have needed at least 80,000 troops (in excess of an Army Corps) in theatre before it posed any threat as an ‘invasion’ Force. It had nowhere near those numbers, and nor did it intend to have those numbers. In truth – the Boer Army, who had twice the numbers of the British Army, posed far more of an ‘invasion’ threat – and that’s exactly what they did.

Also, so you can see how the ‘numbers’ and the ‘actual’ history correlate – Lord Milner writes to Her Majesty’s government and states that Kruger is unmovable on issues pertaining the Franchise, he warns them that the ZAR is gearing for an invasion of the British Colonies with the call-up of troops and purchase of munitions, and the purchase of state of the art rifles and artillery pieces – one million Mauser rounds alone arrive in Port Elizabeth as early as the 8th July (ordered around April 1899) destined for the Republics (well before the ‘impasse’ between Milner and Kruger).

He implores the British to send a sizeable force – a full “Army Corps” – of about 35,000 troops to bolster the small garrison forces in South Africa, warning them invasion of British colonies is inevitable. 

The British War Office in London respond to Milner, they maintain that the ZAR was simply not bold enough to invade British sovereign territory, and on the remote chance that should an invasion take place, it would be a “farmers army” and could be held back by professional soldiers. 

The war office also does not want to provoke a flammable situation by sending a full Army Corps. So, they bolster the garrison forces with only 6,500 men, including colonial ‘citizen force’ units mustered from the local populations – and an additional 7,400 men “on their way” from India – the doctrine again is that even though they are outnumbered  they should be able to ‘hold the line’ long enough for an expeditionary ‘Army Corps’ to arrive. The war office estimates a ‘Army Corps’ will take four months to muster and would require a £1 million investment upfront – so not necessary unless there is an absolute and proven military threat.

The eve of war

By the end of September and the beginning of October 1899, Boer forces are amassing primarily at Laing’s neck on the Natal border and the ultimatum agreed by the Boers on the 27th September indicates that war is inevitable, presented by the 7th October 1899 to the British (4 days before they invade sovereign British territories), last minute attempts by Afrikaner Bondsmen in the Cape to get Kruger to “step-down” from his position fail, so too do last minute attempts by members of his own Raad and by his young appointed negotiator Jan Smuts in his final negotiations with Greene, even Steyn in the OFS is urged to get the ZAR to ‘step down’  – whilst all urging the ZAR to “step-down” – Kruger’s unbending demand that the 5 year ‘uitlander’ franchise would only come if the British tore up the 1884 London Convention completely and withdraw all her Suzerainty rights to the region, rights which have been in place since 1877 – this is now deemed a ‘step too far’ as it substantially compromised British paramountcy in the region. Kruger’s position remaining unchanged from the beginning of negotiations in June 1899 in Bloemfontein to the end – only with a cat and mouse game promising limited reforms and then withdrawing them in-between (more on this in an Observation Post called “for suzerainty sakes” as most people don’t understand the real Casus Belli of the war).

Kruger is superstitious, paranoid and impatient and doesn’t even wait for the presentation of the ultimatum to the British or the ultimatum’s deadline – he sees tiny troop movements of small garrison forces as the prelude of an invasion, albeit the British are by no means capitalised for such an invasion – they have not even called up their Army Corps at this point. But Kruger is on the warpath. On the same day the ultimatum is drafted – 27th September 1899 – D Day minus 14 days – Kruger telegraphed to Steyn: 

“English troops already at Dundee and Biggarsberg, and will probably take up all the best positions unless we act at once. Executive Council unanimous that commando order should be issued to-day. We beg you will also call out your burghers. As war is unavoidable we must act at once, and strongly. The longer we wait the more innocent blood will be shed through our delay. We don’t intend to have Chamberlain’s note, with your amendments re Convention, telegraphed to you till burghers are at or near borders, and till you have been informed that the English Government has acted contrary to last part thereof. “We are justified in crossing border. Plan of campaign follows.”

27th September 1899 – D Day minus 14 days – Kruger telegraphed to Steyn again (same day again):

Burghers will be in position in our territory near Laing’s Nek on Friday morning 5 a.m. All other burghers being called up to follow as soon as possible. Kock leaves with two cannons tomorrow evening, also big guns for Laing’s Nek. Will Free State then also be in position? Volksraad meets seven this evening. Can you reply by then? Plan campaign follows.” 

On the 29th September 1899 – D Day minus 12 days – Kruger telegraph to Steyn: 

“Our burghers going to hold positions on border to prevent enemy getting hold of them. You still seem to think of peace, but I consider it impossible. I am strongly of opinion that your people ought also to go to border to take positions. You think Chamberlain is leading us into a trap, but if we wait longer our cause may be hopelessly lost and that would be our trap.

President Steyn (left) and President Kruger (right) colour by Tinus le Roux and Jenny B.

In the final minute, with war inevitable and Boers amassing on the border to invade – the British Parliament approves the request to raise the ‘Army Corps’ as a deterrent against Boer aggression and they only start calling up their reserves from the 7th October 1899 – the Boers are already mobilised and its 4 days before the Boers invade. It’s too late, this force would only be arriving in critical mass in the South African theatre by mid January 1900. 

In the end, both ends of the British argument are 100% correct. Milner is 100% correct, the ZAR is a significant destabiliser in the area with territorial ambitions over Swaziland – which they annex, Rhodesia (the Adendorff trek and the Matabeleland concession) and Zululand for access to a Natal based seaport at St Lucia. President Steyn in the OFS also has territorial ambitions over Griqualand and the diamond fields in the Cape Colony.

Afrikaner Bondsmen and their supporters, men like Smuts, Botha, Hofmeyr and Reitz are all promoting the idea of a unitary Afrikaner Republic stretching from the Zambezi to the Cape. Both Boer preachers and politicians are all talking war and the removal of British influence from the entire region altogether (and Milner makes specific note of this). The two Republics are tooling up for war and the ZAR is commissioning and building massive defensive forts and buying advanced state of the art German and French siege guns. Vast stores of smokeless ammunition is been landed, and 40,000 brand new state of the art German Mauser rifles have landed – enough to arm nearly every Boer with not just one but two rifles. President Steyn has signed President Kruger’s long awaited “aggression pact” between the OFS and the ZAR on the 22nd March 1897 which locks the OFS into war even if the ZAR feels “threatened”. Simply put, the ‘winds of war are blowing’.

The purpose for going to war can best be read in the final statements made by the main protagonists. 

Francis Reitz, now acting as the ZAR’s state secretary after sending the final Boer ultimatum, concludes his speech on the eve of war with the following:

“…. from Slagter’s Nek to Laing’s Nek, from the Pretoria Convention to the Bloemfontein Conference, they have ever been the treaty-breakers and robbers. The diamond fields of Kimberley and the beautiful land of Natal were robbed from us, and now they want the goldfields of the Witwatersrand … Brother AfrikanersI The day is at hand on which great deeds are expected of us – War has broken out ! What is it to be ? A wasted and enslaved South Africa or – a Free, United South Africa?”

So, for Francis Reitz accuses the British of breaching the spirit of Transvaal’s Suzerainty, accuses them of stealing Natal and Griqualand and a threat to Boer paramountcy in the region – calling for a ‘United South Africa’ (I.e. the Afrikaner Bond’s ‘Zambezi to the Cape under a Boer hegemony’ objective).

The desire of the Boers and the desire of the British that South Africa fall under their respective paramountcy and hegemony is a clash of interests between Boer Imperial and British imperial desires on territorial expansion and control – and this is the conclusion reached by just about every Boer War historian worth his salt as the basic underlying cause of the war, it’s the Casus Belli. 

This paramountcy and desire for regional control by Boer and Brit respectively is most adequately wrapped up by Jan Smuts’ final word on the matter, when on the eve of war writes:

The aim of the war is to establish “a United South Africa, of one of the great empires (rijken) of the world… an Afrikaans republic in South Africa stretching from Table Bay to the Zambesi”.

On the British front, Joseph Chamberlain concludes his speech to Parliament on the eve of war with the following:

“… we are at war now because the oligarchy at Pretoria … has persistently pursued, from the very day of the signing of the Convention of 1881 down to now, a policy which tended to the evasion of its obligations; a policy by which it has broken its promises; by which it has placed, gradually, but surely, British subjects in the Transvaal in a position of distinct inferiority; by which it has conspired against and undermined the suzerainty, the paramountcy which belongs to Great Britain.” 

So – for Chamberlain, the spirit and agreement of the Transvaal’s Suzerainty (its status as a vassal state as prescribed by the Pretoria and London conventions) has been breached – a breach of treaty – and in so a threat to British paramountcy in the region.

The British War Office is also 100% right, they’ve matched the ‘risk’ perfectly, in terms of military doctrine they augment their forces just enough to prevent total calamity, and its seen upfront in the invasions when these small bordering garrison forces – of professional officers and men, completely outnumbered in Ladysmith, Kimberley, Kuruman and Mafeking make quick work of the invading Boers and stop them in their tracks – on the 14th October 1899 the Boer attack on Mafeking is effectively driven off, and on the 20th October the British forces in Natal are successful at the Battle of Talana Hill and the next day on the 21st October they are successful again at the Battle of Elandslaagte . 

On the 25th October the second Boer assault on Mafeking is driven off and on the 9th November, the Boer assault on Ladysmith is effectively driven off (albeit with heavy losses), the Boers then opt to put the town to siege. The siege of Kimberley starts in earnest on the 4th November with the British defenders firmly dug in, the Boers opt to shelling the town from a safe distance in the hope they capitulate. On the 13th November the Boer attack on Kuruman is successfully driven off and the Boers opt to put it that town to siege in addition. 

The Pre-emptive strike and forward defences myth 

As to a “pre-emptive strike” and “invading for the purposes setting up forward defensives” argument to forestall an inevitable British invasion so often found on Boer war appreciation sites – this is possibly the most stupid assertion and myth generated around Boer War 2 … ever, and for the following reasons:

Upfront, a ‘pre-emptive strike’ is not the plan, never is the plan. These modern-day Boer Romantics ‘couch commanders’ conveniently ignore people like the ZAR commander in chief, Piet Joubert – who states:

“The master plan was to advance rapidly on Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London and Durban”

Jan Smuts in his memoirs of the war refers to his direct planning to take the Port of Natal (Durban) in a rapid advance – a “Blitzkreig’ strategy.

In fact, Jan Smuts is the only man with a plan. His plan is outlined, supposedly whilst he was sick in bed. It was presented to the ZAR raad (council) in a secret session and unanimously adopted. It’s a very specific plan, it is summed up by Smuts himself who said the plan was to invade Natal from Laing’s Neck and he does on;

“The republics must get the better of the English troops from the start … by taking the offensive and doing it before the British force in SA is markedly strengthened …. the capture of Natal by a Boer force together with the cutting of the railway between the Cape Colony and Rhodesia … will cause a shaking of the Empire”.

The idea of cutting the railway line between the Cape and Rhodesia is to create an uprising of Afrikaner support in the Cape Colony for the Boer Republic cause, Smuts in his account is very reliant on this happening, he’s an ex-Cape Afrikaner Bondsman, the Afrikaners in the Cape are the majority population – the idea of taking the Cape Colony would fail if they do not rise in support. Smuts’ objective through these actions – in Natal and the Cape Colony – is to “shake up” the paramountcy and in so force better terms with the British with a peace settlement early on … not to get into a protracted and costly war, and to do all this before any sort of “army force” or “expeditionary force” can be raised in the UK – an early concept of “shock and awe” and “blitzkrieg” is Smuts’ basic military plan. Smuts’ plan is also an early form of “manoeuvre” warfare – using the Clausewitzian concept (developed after the Napoleonic wars) – using superior and simultaneous advances along “exterior” lines (a concentration in space) on an enemy using “interior” lines (a concentration of time) of communication and supply. Smuts would also apply this later when he is tasked with forming the Union Defence Force in 1910.

Smuts’ offensive plan also does not propose laying anything to siege, surrounding and laying either Ladysmith, Kimberley or Mafeking is avoided entirely, he is far more concerned with speed and a quick win before Britain can reinforce anything – especially Natal and Durban which Smuts targets his ‘seat of war’. The rapid seizing of Durban whilst its relatively lightly defended is important to Smuts, without seizing it the British will be able to reinforce and counter-attack – so the taking of Durban will either make or break the plan.

Reference: General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa – D. Katz

So, here’s the Boer Republics’ offensive plan – in includes Smuts’ initial offensive plan and then a greater offensive offensive advance to Port Elizabeth so as to build on a Cape Afrikaner uprising and rebellion. At the start of hostilities on the 11th October 1899, according to Jan Smuts himself, the ZAR Commandant-General Piet Joubert merely had Smuts’ broad outline of the offensive plan in his hand, he had not given it any further thought – “no comprehensive war planning” had been done on how the strategic plan would be met by any planning on a tactical level or even on the operational level (contingency planning).

On launching the offensive, only then does the Boer leadership give thought to how they inited to meet Smuts’ strategic plan on a tactical level and operational level. They draw on inspiration from the first Anglo-Boer War, the Transvaal War of 1880 to 1881 i.e. Boer War 1, this war called for laying British garrisons around Pretoria to siege and then concentrating on using the natural mountain defences around Laing’s Neck on the ZAR/Natal border which squeezed the British ‘relief column’ making their way to relive the sieges onto a single road through the mountain defences – focusing them onto Majuba where the Boers enjoyed an outstanding victory. This reasoning had worked in 1881, no reason why it would not work in 1899.

So, as a defensive strategy to augment the offensive strategy, General Piet Joubert and the Boer leadership decide on laying siege to Kimberley, Mafeking (in the Northern Cape) and Ladysmith (in Natal) – their thinking is this would split the British forces who would then be focussed on relieving these border towns and their relief columns would have to follow singular roads and railway lines to get there, easy pickings for the Boers as they had done to them at Majuba – thereby weakening the British forces further and giving the Boer’s offensive strategy in Natal all the chance of success.

Important Note, as to military doctrine as follows;

“assuming a defensive posture does not win wars and a offensive strategy is essential for winning a war, defensive stances are a temporary measure allowing for an advantage to develop, which will eventually result in offensive action to secure combat success.”

Dr. D Katz’ ‘Jan Smuts and his First World War

Jan Smuts at this point is disillusioned with the Boer leadership’s planning, he feels this offensive and defensive plan is far too complicated and questions whether the Boers are capable of launching a plan of this magnitude. He even goes as far as calling General Piet Joubert “passé” and “hopelessly incompetent”.

The Boers however, initially follow exactly “the plan” in what they do. They advance from Laing’s Neck down the centre spine of Natal heading to Durban as planned, as they push into Natal the Boer Commanders telegram Kruger to say the “Vierkleur” would be soon flying over Durban. The ZAR Chief Justice Gegorowski boasted;

“the war will be over in a fortnight. We shall take Kimberley and Mafeking, and give the English such a beating in Natal that they will sue for peace”.

The general rally call amount the Boer soldiery is that will be “eating fish” in Durban, General Louis Botha convinced he will also be “eating bananas” in Durban. They also initially follow Smuts’ offensive plan in the Orange Free State, cutting the Cape Colony and Rhodesia railway line in the first action of the war at Kraaipan on the 12th October 1899.

Their mistake, they are too cautious and instead of using their much-promoted advantage – mobility, they err on a cautious and slow advance. The plan, as Smuts predicted is overcomplicated, and in so far as intending to split the British forces between the Northern Cape and Natal, the decision to put Kimberley and Mafeking to siege in addition to the offensive plan as a defensive plan also splits the Boer forces and weakens their offensive capability, from a ‘Blitzkreig’ (lightning mobility war) perspective they are unable to put their maximum effort behind their ‘schwerpunkt’ (heavy, focus – or centre point) which is the rapid invasion of Natal and the taking of Durban. The Boers also compromise their mobility and resources in Natal when they start to lay Ladysmith to siege instead of rapidly advancing to Durban.

In following “the plan” – the ‘high water marks’ of the invasions i.e., where they ultimately land up. In the Natal invasion it’s just 60 kilometres north of Pietermaritzburg – Botha stops at Mooi River, this invasion has no reference to the “defence plan” whatsoever (in fact it’s the opposite), and the Boers do not take up very effective “defensive positions” to stop any sort of mythical British invasion – the positions they take up are far worse than the positions they were in before they invaded. Any military person will tell you that Rivers and Mountain Ranges make for the most formidable defences – and in the case of the Boer Republics – the Orange River, Vaal River and Drakensberg are perfect defences – no need to invade anyone, investing in these border defences would have been the logical military doctrine, and far more effective as to a “defensive strategy” without initiating a war and the risk that involves. 

Look at it from the perspective of military doctrine, the Boer “start line” is Volksrust on the border near Laing’s Neck – a most formidable defence position on the border of Natal and the “gateway” to both the ZAR and Natal, home to Majuba mountain and Laing’s neck, where the British were so soundly beaten by the Boers in 1881 – it’s a proven natural defence and one which the British could not breach just 18 years earlier.

As to continuing a deep advance (remember the offensive plan is to invade), after they are confronted by the British in the field at Talana outside Dundee on the 20th October 1899 (D Day plus 8) – the Boers are initially defeated in two pitched battles, the Boers are held up losing advantage daily. After winning the battle at Nicolson’s Neck the Boers manage to advance another 70 kilometres to Ladysmith reaching it on the 2nd November (D Day plus 24 days) – now they are now 190 kilometres into their advance from their start line on the border and nearly a month into their invasion campaign. 

So, if your strategy is only one of defence – why leave such a formidable defence and find something else? Then as to the so called amassed “British threat on the border” – the invasion force overall Commander, General Piet Joubert is joined by General de Kock from the OFS and General Erasmus and they advance from their start line for nearly 120 kilometres deep into Natal territory before they meet any significant British forces or resistance whatsoever – the British are nowhere near the “border” and “poised” to invade anything. The British have rather inadvisably split their forces between Dundee and Ladysmith. Extending military supply lines and logistics support for 120 kilometres in 1899 using wagons and horses to initiate a “pre-emptive” strike aimed at the British in Dundee is pure Hollywood, wishful thinking, it has nothing to do with military doctrine or sound military planning – or even the Boer’s plan for what it is. 

The Boer invasion of Natal as mapped.

General Louis Botha then extends the advance from Ladysmith all the way to Mooi River on the 22nd November 1899 – 100 Km away from Ladysmith and 60 km from Pietermaritzburg and now a staggering 290 km from their start line. That’s the length of the “supply” line for the Boers – their “high water” mark. No military commander in his right mind sets up a “defensive position” with a near 300 km long supply line running through enemy territory intended to support ‘defences’ – no military commander in 1899 advances near 300 km on horseback for a pre-emptive strike either – air warfare has not been invented yet and even by today’s standards a ground force invasion 300 km into enemy territory is never considered by any commander as a mere “strike” – pre-emptive or otherwise. 

The Boer high-water mark is only obtained by the 22nd November – D Day plus 43 days – now having been significantly compromised on mobility and speed. Both HMS Terrible and HMS Powerful had arrived in Durban port by the 6th November 1899, either one of these two Battle Cruisers had more fire power on board than the entire Boer invading armies combined – a Battle Cruiser defending a port from mounted infantryman on horseback is no match. The Royal Navy is Britain’s senior service and it has at its disposal the very best of all their resources and commanders, defending their ports is what the Royal Navy does best, they are very good at it.

HMS Terrible (Left) and HMS Powerful (Right)

The Boer invasion falters, it fails because they had lost their only significant advantage – mobility, aggression and speed gives way to cautiousness, they chose resource draining static warfare instead – sieges and invest into them instead, losing valuable days and sacrificing their “Blitzkreig” offensive plan altogether. 

With Botha’s objective of “eating bananas in Durban” now completely dashed, General Botha has no choice but to do what countless military commanders before and after him have done when an invasion fails – and beat a retreat, creating what are known in the military as “defensive “boxes” as you go along, the idea is to slow the enemy’s counter attack down until you can “join” with more friendly forces and consolidate – which he initially successfully does just north of the high water mark at Willow Grange on 23rd November 1899 and then further north at his next “box” at Colenso on 15th December 1899. He finally settles further north on the Tugela heights as his next defensive box, having now retreated for 80 Km, however he loses this pivotal battle and his final defensive box to the British on the 27th February 1900 (to see a defensive box retreat in action in a more recent war involving South African Commanders – see “Gazala Gallop” in WW2).

On the western front, the Boers are able to invade the arid and sparsely populated northern Cape meeting no real resistance from any British forces – as none are stationed there in any numbers – the Boers end their high water mark at the border with German South West Africa – this has more to do with the strategic imperative of opening up a sea route and port access via Walvis Bay and linking up with a “friendly state” for the purposes of supply than it does with any offensive or defensive plan offered by the Boer command. It certainly has nothing to do with a ‘pre-emptive’ strike.

On other lesser known fronts

If there is any semblance of logic in invading the Cape and Natal colonies for the purposes of establishing forward defences only, there is absolutely no logic in the Boer invasions of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Bechuanaland (Botswana) to suggest invading for purposes of defending – or even a ‘pre-emptive’ strike – the tiny nominal British Police forces in both these countries are no invasion threat whatsoever, and all the invasion of the Bechuanaland Kingdom does is bring the Tswana into the war as a belligerent all on their own, and the Tswana in their own right decimate the invading Boer Kommando and its laager at Derdepoort on the 25th November 1899. The small BSAP (British South African Police) base consisting of 450 British soldiers at Tuli in Rhodesia is however sufficiently professional to stop the 2,000 strong Boer Commando (now with a 1 to 4 advantage over the British) which had forged itself over the Limpopo River into Rhodesia at Rhodes Drift and other points. On the 2nd November 1899 the BSAP successfully halt them at Bryce’s Store and then repulse the invasion, although border incidents and Boer incursions into Rhodesia continue for some time – well into the Guerrilla phase.

Bryce’s Store in Rhodesia showing combat damage

What Defences?

Also, nobody has been able to point where these so called ‘invasion for the purpose of defensive positions’ are, there is no investment in resources or materials for effective defences, the Boer trenching system at the Modder River at the beginning of the war in November 1899 are proven ineffective.

The defensive earthworks that make up the trench line at defence cluster centre at Magtersfontein is merely a shallow trench converted from a natural ‘donga’ at the base of the koppie range (refer Dr. Garth Bennyworth’s groundbreaking work on this trench-line) – the British frontal attack on this trench-line is successfully repelled by the Boers on 11th December 1899 (Cronje’s only real tactical ‘victory’), but after regrouping and reinforcing the British are able to by-pass these defences completely in a highly mobile flanking manoeuvre.

No large defence fortifications are really invested in by the Boers in either Natal or the Cape Colony, and any idea of fortifying the Republics borders are in fact neglected in the drive to invade the British colonies instead. 

It is only from the beginning of the new year in 1900, that the British have been able to muster anywhere near enough troops to land in Cape Town, that they are now matched 1:1 to the Boer army, and it is on these equal footings that the British counterattack, breakout and relieve of all the major sieges. From January 1900 to July 1900 they rout the Republican armies from their colonies, relieve their sieges and in two significant manoeuvres – the Battle of Paardeberg on the 27th February 1900 and Brandwater Basin (Surrender Hill) on 30th July 1900 they break the Republican forces critical mass to fight a conventional war – Brandwater and Paardeberg alone result in the capturing 8,300 men and the Boer Army is now simply just no longer matched to the British on a 1:1 ratio, it’s now in an inadequate position – with more British troops streaming in.

The 500,000 myth

Often on Boer war sites, and even on simple things like wiki we see this statement “it took 500,000 British to defeat 20,000 Boers” – the much-touted ratio in this type of media is that the Boers were outnumbered 25 to 1, at a staggering disadvantage, but these plucky Boers held the mighty British empire at bay. Now that’s a figure designed to paint the Boer fighter as some sort of super-man and the British military as bumbling, monolithic and ineffective. But the truth is far from this and this figure is completely erroneous designed to drive Afrikaner nationalist political rhetoric – it has nothing to do with actual numbers on the ground. 

Now, here’s the truth – at no point in Boer war 2 were there ever 500,000 British troops in South Africa as boots on the ground at any one point in time – in total, over the course of the war the British called up 550,000 men – that bit is true, yes. HOWEVER the British rotated their Regiments in and out of South Africa on ‘tours of duty’ – never really sending a full regiment into the operational theatre at once, retaining many at home and in their other colonies around the world. The “high water mark” i.e., the maximum number of British Troops in South Africa at any one point in time is 230,000 men. Even pro-Boer chronologies like that of Pieter Cloete’s Boer War facts and figures reluctantly has to admit this fact. 

This high-water mark of 230,000 (including African Auxiliaries) is only peaked briefly during the Guerrilla Phase of the war – and at least 50,000 of these troops are being used to man the rather extensive blockhouse defence system stretching from the top to bottom and side to side across the whole of South Africa (as referenced by Simon C. Green in his Blockhouses of the Boer War) – over thousands of kilometers. On average during the Guerrilla Phase of the war – September 1900 to April 1902, the British enjoy 190,000 troops on the ground.

But let’s stick to the high-water marks for a proper account – the high water for the Boer forces, total Boer War – including 6,000 burghers who add onto the original ZAR and OFS Commando call-up, the statutory Boer forces, foreign volunteers and Cape Rebels is 87,365 men (possibly higher if we add African auxiliaries and rear echelon support). That means a realistic ratio between Brit and Boer at the high-water mark is a 3:1 ratio – total Imperial forces versus total republican forces. It’s a far cry from the emotionally and erroneously touted figure of 25:1.

If we want to account Boer War 2 properly and view it with balance, it would be correct and very true to say at the beginning of the war the Boers outnumber the Brits 3:1 – as the war progresses there is a juxtaposing of numbers… and by the end of war the Brits account 190,000 troops in country, Boers account 24,300 left in the field and 47,300 POW in the bag (factoring out the ‘Hensoppers’ and ‘joiners’) = 71,600 or a 3:1 ratio – Brits outnumber Boers, a reversal of the ratio the Boers enjoyed at the start of the war.

In terms of military doctrine, the above estimation is about right – to invade the British territory the Boers need a 3 to 1 advantage to be successful and to counter attack and hold the Boer territory the British need to be at a 3 to 1 advantage – and even by Guerrilla Warfare standards and the doctrine used to fight one, this number is very low. Consider the following:

American Brigadier-General Nelson Miles was put in charge of hunting down Geronimo and his followers in April 1886. Miles commanded 5,600 troops deemed necessary to find and destroy Geronimo and his 24 warriors. In Malaya in 1950 it took 200,000 British, Australian and allied troops to defeat 5,000 Communist guerrillas. In Ireland over the 30-year course of ‘the troubles’ a total of 300,000 British troops were used to contain 10,000 IRA guerrillas. Closer to home, so the arm chair Boer war generals get this – over the course of the Angolan Border War (1966-1988) and the ‘Struggle’ (1960-1994) the SADF would call up 650,000 conscripts and then hold them in reserve – MK and other non-statutory force ‘guerrillas’ at their high water mark in 1990 only have 40,000. 

The modern-day theoretical ratio of counter-insurgency forces to guerrillas needed to defeat an insurgent/guerrilla campaign is 10:1. In 2007, the US Department of Defence produced a document entitled Handbook on Counter Insurgency which quotes this as the rule-of-thumb ratio for all such operations – and that is even with the advent of modern technology in warfare fighting mere insurgents or guerrillas. Little wonder that General David Petraeus needed 180,000 coalition force troops (the same size as the full invasion force) on the ground in 2007 just to deal with the Iraqi guerrilla “surge” spearheaded by an insignificant but determined bunch of suicide bombers.

Boer bashing and other myths 

Military doctrine and planning – to anyone whose served as officer in a military, is made up of three levels – the Strategic level, the Tactical level and the Operational level (when the metal starts flying around and the rubber hits the road). Military Generals and Commanders are judged by how they relate these three components – Strategic, Tactical and Operational. German Forces during WW2 are outstanding at the Operational level, completely dazzling the enemy concentrating overwhelming firepower at the “schwerpunkt” – the ‘heavy or focal’ point. They are equally outstanding at the tactical level, consider the masterful work of Field Marshal Rommel in North Africa. But they fail at the Strategic level by overextending their resources and pandering to wayward political ideologies and ambitions – and that loses them the war.

In reality, and it’s not trying to be nasty or ‘Boer bashing’ in any way shape or form. The Boers at the ground level are a committed, determined, resourceful and extremely brave bunch. They are scarifying much and like the Japanese in WW2 have a deeply ingrained cultural sense of honour. 

But their commanders fail these brave men on all three key aspects of warfare. At an Operational level they are been asked to use a Commando system of mounted infantrymen – good for quelling poorly armed native rebellions – but absolutely hopeless when confronting a modern professional military force with modern weaponry using both combined arms and joint arms in which they are very well versed – and it quickly shows when the British are able to repel the invasions and stall them long enough to get reinforcements in whilst completely outnumbered. The British ORBATS (Order of Battle) are also far superior in just about every key engagement fought – that’s a fact.

It is often noted in all the Battle ORBATS – even the ones that mark the beginning of the war in the conventional phase, that the Boers are always “on the back-foot” always “outnumbered” almost always fighting against the odds – even for battles they win. However, this is again a function of poor leadership – at the beginning of the war the Boers outnumber the British significantly, but they don’t make use of the advantage – instead of driving their forces to their “schwerpunkt” and the “crucible” (Natal) – focusing on their plan and leveraging their only real advantage – mobility, they choose instead to divide their forces and sacrifice their mobility completely. Inexplicably they commit unusually large numbers of these highly mobile combatants and all their resources to siege warfare (static warfare) and not to defeating the enemy in the field (also a key military blunder) – high numbers of Boers sitting around and simply shelling three British towns from afar – safely out of range, and other than Ladysmith, making no real attempt to ‘take’ the town – and in doing this they allow the British to pour in all the reinforcements they need to counter-attack.

General Joubert – colour by Tinus le Roux

On a tactical level, General Joubert – tasked with the invasion of Natal fails on nearly every level, he fails to take tactical advantage of his “mobility” and fails to “take the fight to the enemy”, he fails to prevent the British forces at Dundee from “linking up” with their forces in Ladysmith (a key military blunder), and he fails to take Ladysmith when the opportunity is presented to him on a plate choosing a divine sense of providence instead (another key military blunder). By the time General Botha takes over the advantage is lost, and Buller is able to ultimately dislodge Botha at Tugela Heights with the innovative use of pontoons and manoeuvre and relive Ladysmith.

General Cronje, on a tactical level on the other front in the Cape also fails on every level, he fails in his initial defences, fails to move from his static defences in time, sacrificing mobility again and is outflanked and outmanoeuvred by a more “mobile” General French, Cronje then, for reasons known only to himself fails to link up with General de Wet and presents himself as a sitting duck to the British – the result is the 1st significant capitulation of Boer forces at Paardeberg on the 27th Feb 1900. 

General Cronje – colour by Jenny B

General Christiaan de Wet also fares no better. De Wet’s attack on Wepener is strategically un-sound, committing resources to worthless target and he’s repeatedly beaten back by a gutsy small garrison force. His plan to defend the indefensible at the ‘Brandwater Basin’ is flawed and he too presents his forces as sitting ducks in a ‘pocket’ surrounded on all sides – and then he leaves his command post on the “first train out of Dodge” as the British close in on him and leaves his squabbling subordinates and troops to fight it out instead, the result is a complete breakdown of his command and the 2nd. significant capitulation of Boer forces at Surrender Hill on the 30th July 1900.

This surrender marks the start of the Boer’s loss of the war (it’s the beginning of the end), they are unable to recover it and the surrender marks the end of the Conventional War and chalks it up as a British Victory. Often put up on a pedestal as a “volksheld” (people’s hero) unfortunately General Christiaan de Wet has the stigma of losing the Boer war for the Boer nation – it happened under his watch and his Command – literally. Militarily speaking he’s directly to blame – and he fares no better leading a doomed, inadequately armed, inadequately supported, strategically flawed, and failed Boer Revolt in 1914.

De Wet’s invasion of the Cape Colony in the guerrilla phase is also a disaster as he signals his intentions up-front to the British and over commits a slow and large wagon train which the British chew up and then they expel de Wet from the Cape with a semblance of his invasion force left over and the loss of most of his transports. Tactically de Wet is brilliant, evading his ‘hunt’ and labelled ‘The Boer Pimpernel’ - romanticised somewhat, especially his tactical victory using barefoot burghers to sneak up on the British at Groenkop. However truth be told, on both an operational and strategic level, as a commander he fails, even his victory at Sanna’s Post is somewhat flawed as an ‘own goal’.

General de Wet – Colour by Jenny B

On a strategic level, as we have seen Smuts’ strategic plan adopted by the Boer Forces is thrown out the window almost from the get-go. They start with it, but simply do not follow through with it at all, invading three British colonies and two British protectorates, splitting focus and forces – completely misreading and unable to raise the critical “Cape Rebellion” and completely sacrificing the Blitskreig concept by working to all their weaknesses and not any of their strengths. Smuts’ “Clausewitzian concept” goes out the window too – in the Conventional War phase, the Boers sacrifice their superior and simultaneous advances along “exterior” lines (a concentration in space) and revert to only using “interior” lines (a concentration of time) for communication and supply. 

In terms of strategy, on a political front, Kruger’s decision to strike out, by any type of military action you care to mention, against the world’s single biggest superpower, one whose Navy is bigger than the French, German and American Navy’s combined, at the very height of its Imperial power, is fundamentally flawed – plucky and very brave, yes – but strategically myopic and very unsound. 

The best the Boers can do from here out is a ‘hit and run’ guerrilla campaign in the hopes of wearing the British resolve down to avoid “unconditional surrender” and get better peace terms (which eventually happens). The ‘Bittereinder’ guerrilla campaign is not fought with any romantic idea of actually “winning’ the war”, the Bittereinder Generals – Smuts, Botha and de la Rey are under no illusions, they also see the resolve of their women to endure the farm clearances and concentration camps as their duty in winning a better peace – they never, during or after the war, turn to victimhood, its denies them their pride and their sacrifices. The victimhood argument is a latter day ‘politics of pain’ concept taken up by latter day “pure” Afrikaner nationalists, nearly all of whom sat out the war or were too young at the time.

Even the decision to strategically engage Guerrilla War is unsound given the extreme sacrifice of lives and livelihoods required to run this type of campaign, literally breaking the back of the Boer nation – the folly of this thinking is something even General Botha realises, and he sues for peace before his entire nation is crushed – as in his own words there will be literally nothing left to fight for. 

This is not the failure of the Boer soldier – this is the complete failure of the Boer Command. As military historians we have to look at the ‘score card’ in an objective and disparaging way – pointing out “critical failures” in doctrine it is – “boer bashing” it is not. 

The Score Card

To look at the Boer war by way of its score card we need to divide it into three broad sections – the Conventional War – Phase 1, when the Boers have the advantage, the Conventional War – Phase 2 when the British have the advantage and then The Guerrilla War (Insurgency) phase – which needs to be separate as the edicts of war change completely.

In all, for the duration of the war there are 170 significant actions fought between the Boers and the British (including their allied Black armies like the Tswana and the Swazi), these include significant pitched conventional battles, relief or success of all sieges, successful or repelled attacks and counter-attacks during all phases on strong-points (blockhouses, bases, forts) and trains, and the taking of key cities by way of military objective – Bloemfontein, Kroonstad, Johannesburg and Pretoria.

Not factored is the general carnage of destroying property – by either British or Boer actions – the Boer actions of burning down ‘British’, ‘hensopper’ and ‘joiner’ farms, ransacking and looting towns (Dundee etc.), destroying mission stations and blowing up railway track are excluded – so too is the carnage caused by the British burning down ‘bittereinder’ farms, destroying livestock and blowing up buildings. Trying to even factor this would be impossible. 

From the 11th October to 1st January 1900, the Boer forces have a numeric advantage, however the British battle order stemming and repulsing attacks on besieged towns is very good considering their disadvantage, so too the initial advance to relieve Kimberley  – during this period 21 actions are fought – the Brits win 14 and the Boers win 7.

From 1st January to July 1900, the numeric components start to balance, however on a Operational and Tactical level conducting conventional combined arms – the advantage swings significantly to the British. All the major sieges are relieved, the Boers invasions are turned and they are ejected from the British colonies. The hunt into the Orange Free State decimates the fighting capability of the Boers and forces the surrender of their conventional fighting capability. During this phase 49 actions are fought – the Brits win 44 and the Boers win just 5.

Overall, for the ‘Conventional’ war phase, the balance is overwhelming in favour of the British – British win 58 and the Boers win 12. In terms of timing, the British victory in the Conventional Phase is swift – from October to July – a mere 10 months, they have reversed an invasion, captured two separate countries, taken both Boer Republic’s capital cities, taken the Boer’s economic hub, isolated both countries and starved them of external aid. Broken the critical mass of the enemy to fight conventionally, taken nearly every major gun and artillery piece, and occupied all the enemy’s fortifications and defences. By any military standards that is good Command – Strategic, Tactical and Operational.

The Guerrilla phase is completely different, there are no significant pitched battles, battles resemble skirmishes, sieges are small towns remotely accessed and the focus switches to destroying supply lines (Boer and Brit) and ‘Commando’ hunts. It’s a “slow burner” in other words not much happens for months on end for the hundreds of thousands of troops in the theatre of operations, truly a case of “war is 99% boredom and 1% terror”. From August 1900 to May 1902 – the duration of this phase – 22 months, 100 significant actions are fought that would classify a ‘clash of arms’. It works out to only about 4.5 direct classes between Boer forces and British forces per month. 

The scorecard is also in favour of the British – the Brits win 72 and the Boers win 28. To read this correctly we also need to understand that the Boer strategy in this phase is not to beat or capture British troops (they can’t keep them), generally the strategy is to harass the British, inflict some damage, retreat and fight another day. On a ratio of Brit to Boer “wins” the ratio is 2:1 – the Boers are remarkably successful at insurgency warfare, and they generally evade the ‘hunts’. The Boers do well at the tactical and operational levels and attain their objectives of wearing down British resolve and elevate their monetary and human costs of waging war – but it comes as a massive cost to the Boer lives and livelihood at the strategic level. 

For the British, they win at the strategic level, the objective of starving the Guerrillas of their supply – food, ammunition, transport, weaponry, shelter and human resources, not to get into the moral or ethics of this, this is strategy used to win just about every Guerrilla war ever fought, by Britain or anyone else – it was the focus of the Vietnam War, the South African “Border War” and even most recently the Afghanistan War. On a tactical level their ‘Counter Insurgency” measures – now known as COIN – are very successful, so much so the Boer War’s Guerrilla Warfare phase is the shortest fought Guerrilla War in modern military history.

That said, as Professor Abel Esterhuyse rightly pointed out to the Observation Post – by 1902, the Boers emerge as the masters of ‘Insurgency Warfare’ and the British emerge as the masters of ‘Counter Insurgency Warfare’ (COIN) – lessons that are still referenced at Westpoint Military Academy to this day. This mastery would also define the ‘South African’ way of fighting war, when Jan Smuts is tasked with amalgamating the Boer Commandos and the old British colonial regiments to form the South African Union Defence Force (UDF) in 1910.

Thus, the UDF was built along the lines of using effective combined arms with high degrees of mobility to deal with both conventional warfare (as is the requirement of any statutory force) in the event a Colonial Power in Africa (e.g. Portugal or Germany) invades the Union and any domestic insurgencies (initially ‘internal’ threats are defined as potential Black African uprisings) and the UDF COIN doctrine is been developed to counter-act it along with a ‘Seek and Destroy’ ethos.

Smuts is happy to cherry pick, basically he’s happy to bring all that’s great and good about the British culture of warfare – their discipline and drill (sorely lacking in the Boer army), their uniforms and rank structures (sorely lacking in the Boer army) and their very effective use of combined arms warfare and joint arms warfare (also sorely lacking in the Boer army) and combine it with the Boer culture of warfare – the use of mobility, and applying high rates of survivability thinking to tactics of assault and defence (both of which are sorely lacking in the British army). 

Smuts will build into the UDF the doctrine of highly mobile ‘combined arms’ – mainly the effective use of mounted infantry, armour and artillery (and other ‘arms’) all acting in unison and speed. Finally, he’s able to implement the doctrine of “manoeuvre” using the Clausewitzian concept. Under General Jan Smuts the UDF was shaped into a very effective fighting force, one that is far ahead of the old Boer Republics strategic and tactical constructs and doctrine. This will have far reaching consequences as this South African ‘philosophy’ of warfare would be effectively applied from the 1st World War (1914-1918), to the 2nd World War (1939-1945) to the ‘Border War (1966-1989) and its still used by the SANDF to this very day.

Casualties

The number of casualties in the Boer War needs a whole new Observation Post, as here we look at the very sensitive subject of civilian casualties – Boer, but also British and Black – the number is extreme – about 50,000 and still rising given new research – nearly all of it the result of disease – Measles and Typhoid mainly. The Measles epidemic, which swept the ‘Black’ and ‘White’ Concentration Camps and the besieged British citizens – killed nearly 40% of all the civilians succumbing to disease – measles as a ‘children’s disease’ especially taking its toll on Boer children. Not just civilians, the biggest killer of British soldiery was Typhoid and not the Boer’s bullets, nearly two thirds of all British casualties are the result of disease – young fit men who are dropping like flies from the same diseases sweeping the concentration camps and British towns under siege. Typhoid alone affects 57,684 British soldiers – killing 8,225 of them.

This is a highly sensitive and misunderstood aspect of the war – it requires a full analysis on the disease bell-curves and medical science to fully properly understand the causes and effects, and actions taken or neglected  – look out for a future Observation Post in draft called “The Boer War’s biggest killer” where we will deep dive this subject and these statistics – because if there is one “winner” of this war’s butchers bill it’s not the British or the Boers – it’s an indiscriminate cocktail of micro-organisms.

We also need to look at the Killed in Action (KIA) and Died of Wounds (DOW) and survivability ratios between Republican and Imperial forces, as the KIA/DOW figure for the Brits is around 8,000 and the KIA/DOW figure for the Boers is around 4,000 – this implies the Boers were better soldiers – for every 1 Boer killed in combat 2 Brits are killed in combat (2:1 ratio) – this leads to the myths of the Boers been “better marksman” than the British or the Boers had better command and operational prowess – the British according to these myths were then “Lions led by Donkeys”.

However truth be told is on the survivability given the respective troop size and different doctrine, if you were a British soldier in South Africa in a combat role, your chance of surviving combat without been KIA or DOW was 98% – there was a 2% chance a Boer bullet would kill you – which is pretty good survivability by British doctrine which was “Hidebound by Tradition” with costly frontal attacks and bayonet charges and antiquated cavalry and lancer charges.

If you were a Boer combatant, given your overall troop size and strength, you had a 93% chance of combat survival and a 7% chance of been KIA or DOW from a British bullet. Which is not very good given Boer doctrine actually focussed on high degrees of survivability, choosing to break engagements, reconcile and fight another day (mobility and manoeuvre) – rather than stand and be bayonetted, cleaved and then impaled from a costly British frontal assault of infantry, cavalry and lancers – none of which appealed to the Boer way of fighting and doctrine for mounted infantrymen.

Bottom line – on casualties – statistically speaking the British command in the Boer War actually was pretty good given the improvements over time in doctrine from Waterloo to the Crimean War (see chart above), the Boer command on controlling casualties and survivability on the other hand was much poorer. One thing the British are NOT are “bad shots” and their Commanders are certainly NOT “Donkeys”. Simply put, if you were British you had a better chance of surviving combat, the point where the metal is flying around, than if you were a Boer.

In Conclusion 

Numbers speak more to truths than anything else, and the truth is the numbers support the idea that the Boers invaded the British colonies whilst they were numerically inferior and the Boers numerically superior, for the purposes of changing the regional balance between Boer and Brit and establishing a unitary state under “Afrikaner” influence – and not only does the republican planning and objectives point to this, their military strategy, doctrine and statements of intent supports it – and it is statistically proven. 

The idea that the British were building up an invasion force on the borders is complete Hollywood and panders to the ‘politically inspired’ sabre waving in the “ultimatum” delivered by the Boers and not to the reality on the ground at all. The idea that the Boers invaded British colonies for the purposes of forward defences or as some sort of pre-emptive strike is also completely unsupported by what actually happens, the actual plans and this assertion is woefully unsupported by military doctrine – entirely debunked by the science of military history.

Also, the idea that the Boer command and doctrine is somehow better than that of the British is completely statistically unproven, in fact the opposite is true, the ‘numbers’ point in favour of the British – so too does an analysis of the three aspects of effective command – on the Strategic level, the Tactical level and the Operational level.


Written, researched by Peter Dickens

With thanks to Tinus Le Roux and Jenny Bosch for the use of colourised images.

Related Work

Boer War 3 – The Maritz Revolt Boer War 3 and beyond!

The Black Concentration Camps of the Boer War The ‘BLACK’ Concentration Camps of the Boer War

The intended Boer invasion of Rhodesia The planned Boer invasion of Rhodesia

The Jameson Raid ‘Hurry Up’ and prove it!

References:

“Rights and wrongs of the Transvaal war” by Edward t. Cook. Publication date 1901

Leopold Charles Maurice Stennett Amery “The Second Boer War – The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902” – Volumes 1 to 7.

Military History Journal, Vol 6 No 3 – June 1984. The Medical Aspect of the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902 Part II by Professor J.C. de Villiers, MD FRCS.

The Anglo-Boer war: A chronology. By Cloete, Pieter G

The Battle of Magersfontein – Victory and Defeat on the South African Veld, 10-12 December 1899. Published 2023. By Dr. Garth Bennyworth.

Dr David Brock Katz; ‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917’

Dr Evert Kleynhans and Dr David Brock Katz; ’20 Battles – searching for a South African Way of War 1913 – 2013’.

Anglo-Boer War Blockhouses – a Field Guide by Simon C. Green, fact checking and correspondence – 2023.

The Boer War: By Thomas Pakenham – re-published version, 1st October 1991.

Correspondence and interviews with Dr. Garth Bennyworth, Boer War historian – Sol Plaatjies University, Kimberley – 2023.

Interviews with Dr. David Broc Katz, University of Stellenbosch, South African Military Academy – Military historian – focus on Jan Smuts and fact checking Boer and British military doctrine – 2023.

Correspondence on fact checking British doctrine with Chris Ash, BSc FRGS FRHistS, Boer War historian, Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society for The Boer War Atlas – 2023.

History of the war in South Africa 1899-1902. By Maj. General Sir Frederick Maurice and staff. Volumes 1 to 4, published 1906 

Stealing Republics, gold, diamonds and other myths!

So here’s an old chestnut that keeps coming up on South African history social forums and it’s this:

“The British, using war (The South African war 1899-1902 aka The Boer War), stole two independent Boer Republics – the ZAR and the OFS – from the Boers.” 

Then they stole the gold and the diamonds from the Boers – Britain the bully, the Boers the victims. It’s wonderfully simple – see?   

Small problem with this statement – its utter bunk, compete rubbish, a historic mistruth and this is where understanding history in South Africa gets wonderfully fascinating.

Not surprising really, many in South Africa are still the product of a ‘Christian Nationalism’ inspired education. It’s not their fault, it’s just that propaganda has been drilled into them, so much so they believe it’s a fact .. and that’s why ‘debunking’ these myths and popping up with ‘inconvenient truths’ is both fun and educational – you learn something new.

So, lets understand why this statement is utter rubbish – complete bunk, and I’m going to start with my statement;

“The British could not steal what was already legally theirs to take!” 

WHAT! … you’re smoking your socks right?

Afraid not, .. here’s a truism and it’s a fact – at the start of the South African War (1899-1902) aka The Boer War – the Boer Republics of the ZAR and the OFS were NOT ‘Independent’ Republics at all, in fact they were both British vassal states, each known as a British ‘Suzerainty’ – and by law (the two Republic’s laws themselves and those of Britain), Britain had every right to meddle in the affairs of these two Republics. The hard truth is that these two Republics only existed at the behest of the British and were both accountable to mutually agreed British oversight.  If you think I’m talking bunk – google it now, type in (Republic name) and the word ‘Suzerainty’.

What – NOT “independent” Republics at all! What the hell is a Suzerainty anyway, and how did that come about – those devilish British stealing again, well, erm – no, they did not.  So, here’s what actually happened (and if you’re a romantic fan of fierce independent, pioneering Boere forging their own independence – now is the time to pour yourself a stiff Klippies and Coke).

The Orange Free State 

Let’s start with the Orange Free state. Now, this Republic had never in its entire history seen ‘full independence’ not even from the get go, it was and remained a British vassal state from beginning to end. In fact as a governed territory it was established as British colony first, even the capital city – Bloemfontein, was established by the British. It only became a Boer Republic when the British peaceably handed the territory to the Boers to administrate as a Republic for practical reasons – on the PROVISO that it remained a British Tributary State or British Suzerainty.

Huh .. WTF .. etc. Let me explain. Prior to the ‘Great Trek’ in September 1835, ‘Trek Boers’ from the Cape Colony (nomadic farmers) had already started to venture across the Orange River border. In the territory between Orange and Vaal rivers, these early Trek Boers were then joined by small groups of Voortrekkers in 1835/6 and they had two ways of settling down to farm land – negotiate it with the local inhabitants (and there were many inhabitants – the idea that the land was ‘empty’ is bunk) or, as was sometimes the case, take the land by gunpoint.  

So, very understandably these early trekkers almost immediately came into conflict with the local inhabitants – notably the Basuto and Griquas. This almost immediately came back to the British to resolve, as these people were after all coming from their colony. So, as a first measure to resolve any marauding on behalf of their “subjects” now Trekking outside their border – the British in 1836 issued the ‘Cape of Good Hope Punishment Act’, which ensured that any ‘Trek Boer’ or ‘Voortrekker’ or any other Cape Colony subject now outside the Cape Colony’s border for that matter was liable for all crimes committed south of the 25-degree latitude (which falls just below the old Warmbaths in the old Northern Transvaal). 

So, inconvenient truth – number 1, the ‘Trekkers’ (Voortrekker and Trek Boers) were never really ‘independent’ of British law at any time in any event. Bet you didn’t learn that in your school history book.

Conflict however persisted with Trekkers and local black inhabitants in ‘Transorangia’ as the territory was known then, and not just between white and black – the black tribes in the area were also in conflict with one another – and all this conflict was over land/territory. So, the British on the 8th December 1845 appointed Captain William Sutton as “British Resident” among the tribes living beyond the Cape Colony Frontier (black and white) to resolve all the conflicts. He was succeeded in 1846 Captain Henry Douglas Warden who bought the farm ‘Bloemfontein’ from a Griqua farmer and established– you guessed it – the capital. 

On the 3rd February 1848, to bring governance to the region, Sir Harry Smith declared the area of ‘Transorangia’ i.e. the area between the Orange and Vaal Rivers a ‘British Sovereignty’ (a colony) calling it the Orange River Sovereignty est. 1848 and went out dividing it up into districts for the Boere and the Griqua and land reservations for the Mantatee tribe, the Coranna (Koranna) tribe, the Bataung Tribe, Barolong Tribe, a tribe referred to as the Bastards tribe and a rather big swathe of territory to the Bassutos tribe. This was all overseen by a British High Court and British Governor based in Bloemfontein. The ‘Free State’ as we know it now was first a British colony and not a Boer Republic- inconvenient truth – number 2.

If you look at the map of the Orange River Sovereignty in 1850, you’ll see how these tribal lands and districts were divided – note, about a third of the landmass of what would become The Orange Free State is tribal territory – so much for the old Broederbond inspired education who said it was ‘empty’ for the Boere taking it, that’s the inconvenient truth – number 3.

Image: Map of the Orange River Sovereignty

However, all was not well as a small grouping of Voortrekkers under the leadership of Andries Pretorius became aggrieved at land concessions made by the British to the Griqua leaders and Basotho leaders. He raised a Commando, declared a Republic around Winburg and a skirmish was fought on Boomplaats farm between a British column raised to deal with the insurrection and Pretorius’ commando on the 29th August 1848. The Boer Commando lost the battle and Pretorius fled across the Vaal river into safety. The “battle” would be celebrated as a significant encounter, proof positive of the bad blood between Brit and Boer by Boer romantics in future years, to the British it was nothing but a small insurrection and an isolated footnote of history.

As to the claim of land north of the Vaal River for the Voortrekkers (what was to become the Transvaal), a convention was held called the Sand River Convention on the 17th January 1852 between Boer and Brit – and the British basically agreed that they had no interest in this territory and the Boere could declare it a independent country of their own, on the proviso (written into the agreement) that the Boere were not to practice slavery. Another inconvenient truth to those who say the Voortrekkers voluntarily left the idea of slavery behind them and did not intend to practice it – they did not practice it as they were warned by Britain not to, and then they agreed not to – inconvenient truth number 4.

Later in the year of 1852, with slavery already outlawed by the British in their Orange River Sovereignty. The British found that the remoteness, resources needed and distance of their Orange River Sovereignty difficult to manage and would have to abandon it – which would have happened had it not been for an erstwhile meeting to resolve the matter in Bloemfontein in June 1852 when all enfranchised voters in the territory – mainly the Boere and some Brits – all had a vote and declared in favour of the retention of British rule of the territory (so much for Andries Pretorius and his commando).

However, this did not really deter the British government’s resolve in the UK to finding a solution on the management of their colony in such a remote and difficult place and as a ‘minority’ people there – something had to give. So, they held another convention with the Boers called the Orange River Convention, at the Convention it was mutually agreed that the Boers take over the Colony, declare the Orange Free State as a Republic and be recognised as a self-governing state – But, and this is a BIG but – only on the PROVISO that it became a British Suzerainty – a tributary state with British oversight.

The Republic of the Orange Free State was declared (without a shot been fired mind) on the 23 February 1854, however it remained a British Suzerainty from that day forward, up to and including the South African War (1899-1902) a tad less than half a decade later – and never in that time was it ‘fully’ independent, inconvenient truth – number 5.

As to the ‘stealing of diamonds’ – the Diamond Rush in Kimberley took place in 1871 – the ‘rush’ proper – 23 years AFTER the British had already declared the region under their control and then under their Suzerainty, Kimberley did not even exist as town when the British first took control of the territory – not a single diamond had yet to be found. In any event – in 1871 a diamond rush happened and  EVERYONE – the Cape Colony, the ZAR, Griqualand and the OFS all claimed the diamond fields as theirs – the matter was put to arbitration and the Griquas won it (not the Boere and not the Brits), the Griquas in turn declared their territory a British Protectorate (fearing Boer aggression) and they later resolved that their territory be absorbed into the Cape Colony – and, no – the British did not ‘invade’ an ‘independent’ Boer republic to steal diamonds, inconvenient truth – number 6.

The Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR)

Now, let’s turn to the Transvaal, as here the British conceded, the Voortrekkers could form a full, self-governing and whole-fully independent Republic – a Republic proper – free of British meddling. Preceding the Sand River convention – all the voortekker groupings who had settled the area of the Transvaal had established no fewer than 6 separate ‘Republics’ – so at the Sand River convention the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek (South African Republic) or ZAR came into existence – officially on 17 January 1852 as an agreement to merge all these small republican declarations and make a proper state of them.

If you’re the Boer romantic still holding onto the idea that the Boers were an independent nation with a long history of self-governance – now is the time to refill that branders and coke.

Because, and this is the BIG kicker, the ZAR as a fully independent Republic didn’t last very long, a mere 25 years only. What the heck – the Boers only really enjoyed 25 years of full freedom in one Boer Republic only – that’s it? What the flip, what happened? 

The British up to their devilish ways again? Well, here’s a great Afrikaans term “Ja/Nee” – yes and no, but to be fair to the British, this one is a Boer ‘own goal’.

The ZAR had a rocky start from the get go – the Voortrekkers were in conflict with just about every tribe initially occupying large parts of the ZAR territory (again, the territory was not ‘empty’ as the Broederbond would have you believe) – conflicts with indigenous tribes starting with all their small isolated republics and building up to their big singular republic. 

The ZAR, far from being a pastoral little settlement just wanting to ‘farm’ in peace was a highly aggressive and expansionist state – a ‘coloniser’ in effect, to exist in a hostile environment they also had to either negotiate land or shoot their way in, and they did both – on conflict there is a reason Botswana exists as a state today (the Tswana asking Britain for ‘Protection’ against Boer expansion and aggression). Also, the ZAR was much bigger than you might imagine, its borders extended well into ‘Zululand’ as we know it now (massive swaths of ‘Kwa-Zulu Natal’ were part of the ZAR)– and herein lay a major problem for the ZAR .. the Zulu.

Map of the ZAR in 1899 after the Republic annexed Swaziland – note the borders, especially in ‘Natal’ – achingly close to St Lucia and access to the ocean.

Aggressive expansion by the ZAR had also stirred up the Pedi, led by Sekhukune I and resulted in a war in 1876 which is recorded as a Boer defeat.  Bolstered and confident, the very powerful Zulu kingdom was now also making some very threatening claims on ZAR territory. Added to this, the ZAR government was also struggling financially (remember that gold had not yet been discovered in any significant way), and it is recorded that the ZAR government faced bankruptcy – so they could not afford any more wars or defensive actions – literally. Feeling their small and vulnerable communities were about to be wiped out by the Zulu and unable to raise enough taxes – the ZAR government did the unthinkable and elected to dissolve their Republic – voluntarily and then they turned to the British for protection against the aggrieved and increasingly violent African tribes – yup, the British.

The various indigenous tribes inside and bordering the ZAR felt they had a case too, and they too called on the British to help them from what they saw as ZAR aggression, land grabbing and subjection. They too also invited the British to protect them. 

All good then, invited by EVERYONE the British peaceably moved into the ZAR on the 12th April 1877 to settle the conflicts and with no resistance from the Boers whatsoever, not a shot being fired, took down the ZAR ‘Vier-Kleur’ and hoisted the Union Flag (Jack) over Pretoria and erected a British government there.  In doing so the ex-Boer Republic also handed over their finances, tax from now out, of both Africans and Boers alike would now be collected by the British. With that the British now declared the Transvaal officially a British Colony – The British Colony of the Transvaal, established 1877.

So, here’s another staggering inconvenient truth – number 7, the ZAR became ‘British’ as early as 1877 – having existed for only 25 years. The British didn’t ‘steal’ it, nor did they ‘invade’ it – no they marched peacefully into the ZAR at the invitation of the Boers and strange as it may seem – they were welcomed as saviours by some Boers – fact. 

Now, some modern day Boer Romantics point to being ‘duped’ by deceitful and greedy British officials or state that President Thomas Burgers was nothing but a madman, senile or drunk – when he agreed to the British taking over his Republic – but that’s all debatable, I like to look at the facts and what people at the time said  – Burgers in fact blamed the ZAR ‘Raad’- Kruger and his cabal – and it really cuts to the point and the issues of the day – he said;

“I would rather be a policeman under a strong government (the British) than a President of such a State (the ZAR). It is you—you members of the Raad and the Boers—who have ruined the country, who have sold your independence for a drink. You have ill-treated the natives, you have shot them down, you have sold them into slavery, and now you have to pay the penalty.”

Incidentally (not to get too wide into this subject now as nobody comes out smelling of roses) – but the “slavery” bit Burgers refers to is the inboekselings system widely used by the Boers in the ZAR at the time – an old VOC/Dutch system of ‘indentured slavery’ – primarily of Black women and children captured and indentured to their Boer masters till 25 years of age, it also formed a lucrative trade for struggling farmers on the frontiers of the ZAR known as ‘Black Gold’ hence Burgers’ term “sold them” (and if you think I’m speaking rubbish – look it up).

Now, was everyone happy? Well, no, as you can imagine there was a bun fight amongst the Boers – some not happy with becoming British and others quite happy to crack on with the British – after all the Zulu threat had now abated – in fact the British had gone one step further and literally crushed the Zulu threat in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War (ironically the Zulu thought the British column moving up was intended to deal with issues in their Transvaal colony, and were pretty surprised when they came under attack).

With the British crushing the Zulu threat, some Boers were pretty happy and felt they could now get on and farm safely. However, on the other hand, with Zulu threat now gone completely, it did not take long before the British policies, taxes and concessions for Black African land rights and their policies of taxation of Boer land to become an issue to some other sectors of the resident Boer population. 

It all came to a head with the Boers when the British confiscated one Boer’s wagon in lieu of his backdated tax, which he refused to pay. This brought the British into direct conflict with a Boer Commando drafted to help the farmer .. the incident exploded, 10,000 Boers led by Paul Kruger demanding the return of their old Republic and removal of the British – then they attacked the British Garrisons around Pretoria, starting on the 20 December 1880 at Bronkhorstspruit (there were no British garrisons at Johannesburg – it didn’t exist).  

This then kicked off the ‘Transvaal War’ in November 1880 (to Afrikaner historians it’s the 1st Anglo-Boer War and to the rest its simply known as ‘The Transvaal War’ – I’ll call it Boer War 1).

The long and short of the Transvaal War – it ended rather disingenuously. The British sighted a poor battlefield on top of Majuba mountain on which to hold their ‘waterloo’ and got their arses kicked (there is literally no other way to put it) on the 27 February 1881 and routed from the ZAR.

Image: Painting of Lance Corporal Joseph John Farmer, awarded the Victoria Cross for running the first aid station on the top of Majuba Hill during the battle.  Farmer raised a white cloth over the wounded to indicate their presence to the Boers.  His arm was shot through.  He raised another cloth with his other arm which was also hit.  

The Boers walked away victorious having seen the back of the ‘Rooinekke’ (red-necks) – done and dusted with British rule – back to an Independent Republic and Koeksusters and coffee (at least that’s how it was pitched). But, the truth of the matter, it was far from ‘done and dusted’ – and an ‘independent’ Republic did not materialise, as much as some would like to believe that it did.

The British, deeply aggrieved, decided against sending in a massive expeditionary force and flattening the insurrection in their colony, they sued for peace instead – they understood (as they had in the Orange River Sovereignty) that this was a difficult region, tough customers and they were at the end of the day the minority in it. So, they agreed to give the administration of it back to the Boers, to re-declare their Republic – and here’s the kicker bit – on the PROVISO that it be a British (and here’s the word again) – ‘Suzerainty’. In other words, a British tributary state or British vassal state, with no real ‘recognition’ internationally and one in which they were legally free to ‘meddle’ in at any point in time.

The Boers, over a barrel really, and happy to get back a semblance of a Republic – agreed. Two Conventions – the Pretoria convention, held on 3 August 1881 established the ZAR as a British Suzerainty and at a later convention, the London Convention, signed on 27 February 1884, in which some concessions were given to Kruger and his party as to borders, the word Suzerainty was also dropped from the pre-amble, but the the SAR still had to get permission from the British government for any treaty entered into with any other country other than the Orange Free State – Britain reserved the right to oversight and could still ‘meddle’ in the state’s affairs – a British “client” state if you will – in either event, the ZAR remained a state with mutually agreed British oversight – all the way from 1881 to ‘The South African War (1899-1902)’ a.k.a Boer War 2. It was theirs to legally intervene, a truly ‘free’ and ‘fully independent’ Republic it was not, inconvenient truth – number 8.

As to gold, the Johannesburg gold rush took place in earnest on the reef from July 1886  – 9 years AFTER the British had established interests and control of the ZAR in 1877, in fact when the ZAR became a British colony for the first time, Johannesburg had not even been established – it didn’t exist. So, no – the British did not ‘invade’ the ZAR to steal the gold, their interests were there long before significant deposits of gold were found on the Witwatersrand  – inconvenient truth – number 9.

Understanding the true causes of the South African War 1899-1902

There’s usually lively debate on Boer war forums as to the casus belli (the case for war) of the ‘South African War’ (1899-1902) – incorrectly called ‘The Boer War’.- but for clarity I’ll call it Boer War 2. They look to the greed of British Imperialism or the fact that the Boers declared war on the British in the official declaration – not the other way round .. but that would be to COMPLETELY ignore the three casus belli that Paul Kruger upfront put on the table as Boer ZAR demands at Bloemfontein when ‘negotiations’ kicked off with Alfred Milner in 1899 .. the ZAR’s status as to British oversights specified by the London Convention (which Kruger wanted removed completely) and the qualification time for ZAR citizenship of the miners on the reef (a human rights issue – nothing to do with gold per se) – which Kruger wanted extended. Then there was also the issue of a seaport, and Kruger wanted the British to concede parts of ‘Zululand’ to allow an ‘Independent’ ZAR to expand its borders and secure a vital seaport (key to maintaining future ‘independence’).

Images – President Paul Kruger (left) and Alfred Milner (right) – colourised by Jennifer Bosch.

The British would agree to none of the above, Milner was dogmatic and unmoving – their sticking point, the Franchise – they wanted 5 years qualification – and things simply went south from there – war was on the cards – again! So, let’s understand the ‘belligerence’ of the British – what’s driving it – and it boils down to this niggly issue of both the ZAR and the OFS being British client states. If you understand that, the minds of Rhodes, Milner, Kruger and even Smuts become increasingly clear – so to the casus belli, and here’s how:

Jan Smuts would very famously state that the Jameson Raid 1895 was the ‘real’ start of the Boer War in 1899 (not the Boer invasions of the British colonies), the British had betrayed the Boers and an uneasy peace existed after it – this was the Boer interpretation of events and even Smuts was sticking to it. 

The British on the other hand, viewed the start of the Boer War in 1899 somewhat differently, they viewed the Battle of Majuba back in 1881 as the ‘real’ start of the Boer War in 1899, the ‘peace’ struck with the ZAR was a ‘dishonourable’ one – the Boers had betrayed the British and retribution was coming – this was the British interpretation of events, and commentators at the time like Winston Churchill were sticking to it. 

In truth, Boer War 2 is to Boer War 1, what World War 2 is to World War 1 – a progressive extension of the preceding issues which remained unresolved (and, as inconvenient as this is – these issues were not about stealing gold or diamonds). It would be interesting to see this debate in 1941 when Churchill and Smuts became friends, but I’m sure neither changed their minds – and as to the British position and what started the war, one can clearly see it in their wartime rally call in 1899 – which was “Avenge Majuba” not “let’s go get their gold”- inconvenient truth – number 11.

Image – Postcard of the time calling for the avenge of Majuba during Boer War 2 (1899-1902) note the phrase “wiping something off the slate” – old score.

So back to Cecil Rhodes and his pals, in their minds their actions in implementing the Jameson Raid in 1895 were perfectly justified – sorting out a British Suzerainty’s governance of British citizens on the reef – so confident was Rhodes and Starr Jameson in their right to meddle in the ZAR that they did not bother to get official British government backing in Westminster for the raid (in fact in their minds it was not a raid at all – but a ‘rescue mission’). 

That the raid failed so dismally was an embarrassment to Rhodes, so much so it forced his resignation. But it did not stop Britain from sending their next ‘man’ in to replace Rhodes and ‘sort out’ their troublesome vassal state which was the ZAR – and that was Alfred Milner. Milner, very aware of the legal status of both the OFS and the ZAR as British Suzerainty States was a blunt, unabashed British Imperialist. Kruger, a Boer Imperialist (there is no hiding that fact either) was never going to get Britain to renege on its rights to the ZAR (or the OFS for that matter).

In Milner’s mind the OFS and ZAR as British vassal states had no sway whatsoever, nor did they have the right to claim ‘full’ independence – in his rather dogmatic and arrogant Victorian mind they were merely being ‘troublesome’ children of the bigger British family. Milner made it clear that he wanted ‘independent’ and ‘good civil governance’ of a ‘federated’ composition of states stretching from from the Cape to the Zambezi – all good – but here’s the kicker – ONLY under the ‘British Flag’ – he held that singular view (read agenda) from the day he landed in South Africa in 1897 to the day he left in 1905, and he made it clear it was not for changing – Kruger stood no chance in his demands to drop the ZAR’s Suzerainty status completely or for that matter his demand to gain more territory from the British for a fully ‘independent’ ZAR with a seaport.

Milner was confident enough, the British had to intervene directly with Paul Kruger on his dealings with both Jameson raiders and the round-up and prosecution of the ‘trouble-makers’ in Johannesburg (as Kruger referred them) – to this end the Jameson raiders would not be tried in South Africa but in England. Due to on-going disagreements like the ‘Drifts Crisis’ on ports of entry into the ZAR in 1895 – which kicked off the Jameson Raid, Joseph Chamberlain eventually had to remind President Kruger directly that the ZAR was still a British Suzerainty State in 1897 (incidentally the same year Milner arrived in the Cape Colony).

Image: The officers of the Jameson Raid heading to England for trail in 1896, Starr Jameson is standing in the centre – he got 15 months in prison without hard labour for contravening the Foreign Enlistment Act – of which he served 4 months only in Holloway Gaol for first-class misdemeanants.

This ‘independent’ and ‘self-governing’ unitary state from the Cape to the Zambezi – part of the British family of Nations – was so important to the British to resolve its ‘Southern Africa’ problems that it is the foundation of the Peace Treaty of Vereeniging in May 1902 to end the 1899-1902 Boer War – the guarantee of future ‘independence’ and ‘self-governance’ for the Boers, but as a more robust and formal ‘Union’ of states under the British flag rather than going back to a combination of two British colonies and two British Suzerainty states – which was the case at the start of the war. Here’s the kicker – and the inconvenient truth – number 10, ALL the Boer Generals signed up for it – not just Smuts and Botha. 

It was the ONLY way forward for peace and regional development. Fully ‘Independent’ Boer Republics were an impossibility, a pipe dream – they had never really materialised in the past and were not going to materialise in the future. The ‘Keep South Africa White” Republic pipe-dream of Dr. H.F. Verwoerd and his cabal in 1960 was an abhorrent and short lived testament to Boer independence with disastrous consequences for just about everyone – and Boer Generals like Smuts and Botha recognised the danger of hanging onto this idea from the get-go.

Huh – smoking socks again – of course the Boers could have their Republics back comes the chorus from the Boer romantics even to this day – fully independent and feasible, they would last a thousand years, the Boers just wanted to farm and be left alone, see? Well, no – a future ‘independent’ ZAR was a complete pipe-dream, even in 1899 – even if the war did NOT take place the ZAR – ‘independent’ or otherwise – would not have lasted, nor was it all about farming, it would have possibly have made it till about 1910 MAX and no further, and here’s why.

Franchise

So, we to come to the BIG sticking point between Boer and Brit – the issue of ‘Franchise’ – the vote. An issue of legality and morality for British Imperialists, an issue of power for the Boer Imperialists.  The ‘official’ and most significant casus belli of the Boer War in 1899 (not ‘Ouma’s se stories about stealing gold). The long and short here – the British – Chamberlain, Rhodes, Milner etc. felt legally obligated, politically empowered and morally compelled to ‘meddle’ in their Suzerainty and sort this issue out.

As to ‘peaceful’ pastoral farming – Paul Kruger in his memoirs would rue the discovery of Gold as the downfall of the Boers, but in reality, the discovery of gold would aid the ZAR substantially. For starters, the ‘poor’ pastoral backwater was no more – the bankruptcy prior to 1877 would be well and truly resolved by 1886 – a mere 9 years later. The ZAR was rich, tax on gold had filled the state coffers to bursting – it enabled them to finance and build security forces with state-of-the-art German (and British) weaponry. The ‘poor white’ problem of failed farmers living as bywooners had been resolved as they became urbanised and prosperous along with struggling famers who opted to become miners, manufactures, entrepreneurs etc. and a more prosperous and burgeoning urban Afrikaner middle class took shape in the ZAR. The strengthened and emboldened ‘Commandos’ were able to annex more territory – mainly Swaziland and bits of Natal and marginalise the ‘native’ threat completely. The state started to take emboldened steps on imports, ports of entry and monopolising the supply of things like dynamite. Its role on the international stage changed with its influence on the gold standard and currencies. The ZAR was ‘on the up’ and expanding, it had become a ‘Playa’ and Kruger wanted it recognised as such.

Big problem though – the majority of the miners and entrepreneurs entering the ZAR were of British extraction. They had now built a complete city for themselves in the middle of the ZAR – bigger than the Capital, Pretoria, heavily invested in manufacturing facilities, mining, housing, infrastructure and railways stretching right across the ZAR from east to west – a tented group of migrant pan miners to be over-looked they were not – they were not going anywhere, their lives and livelihood was now firmly in the ZAR and they wanted a say. The attitude of the ZAR was to treat them as ‘uitlanders’ and suppress their political aspirations as long as possible – secondary citizens with a separate ‘raad’ whilst the Boers remained in full control. This kicked off ‘revolts’, violent protests, flag burning incidents and the violent suppression of miners including maiming and murder by the notorious and hated ZAR police known as the ZARP.

These ‘uitlanders’ were also highly political and had started to unionise and form political interest groups – and fast becoming a pain in the arse for both the British establishment and the Boers. By the 28 March 1899, a petition to Queen Victoria contained 21,684 ‘uitlander’s’ signatures demanding Britain intervene in the ZAR as Kruger’s governance had become “well-nigh intolerable.”

Image: Political Cartoon of the time – note the caption.

Now think about that – 21,500 people not happy with Kruger, not just ‘uitlanders’ to be ignored – to a man, these people qualified a future voting bloc in the ZAR, and those sorts of numbers are only the ‘very angry’ ones prepared to make a mark. Really think about it, that’s twice the number of Boers they managed to muster for Boer War 1. If given a full franchise Kruger’s controlling party would be out of power – and Kruger knew it. The miners would rule the ZAR, demographically, economically, and politically the landscape of the ZAR had changed – forever. So, what did he do, he forestalled the inevitable change, clung onto power and tied to kick the franchise question into the long grass – giving his regime 14 more years (before they could all qualify to vote).

The British, and the miners would have none of it, they wanted political rights as an unflinching human right. So, they set the qualification period at 5 years. This would mean that by 1904 – in all likelihood the ZAR with Kruger and his party at the helm would cease to exist. Kruger was however pragmatic enough to know that his position was unsustainable and was prepared to, and did substantially compromise on this point, dropping the qualification to 7 years with a raft of “provisions” and eventually even prepared to meet the British demand of 5 to avoid war – but only on the proviso that Britain relinquish all its claims to the ZAR’s Suzerainty. Whichever way it goes, it would mean – that by 1907 he would be out of power, the ZAR as he knew it would be no more – sheer ‘democracy’ would have seen to that.

The Imperialists

So why Boer War 2 – democracy would have won a painless victory? Why the massive death and destruction brought onto the Boers by the British. Now that’s a good question – why? In a modern context it’s kind of like asking why it was necessary to nuke Japan in 1945, the war was won, Japan was already on its knees – why bring in the wrath of annihilation? 

It boils down to the Imperial mind – Boer and Brit.

To Milner the risk of a prolonged conflict in the ZAR would have just gone on too long with too much drawn out anguish, he feared Boer Imperialists and the possibility of Boer Afrikaners to reconcile with the Cape Afrikaners and take over the whole shooting match for themselves – merely extending the issues of the day – franchise, native rights, territorial conflicts etc. into eternity, so he wanted the whole region in unity under British oversight sooner rather than later. The result is destruction on an epic scale, sheer carnage. Hence the reason Jan Smuts wrote to him on his departure from South Africa in 1905 and said he was hated, and unless he took a reconciliatory approach in future he was not welcome back.

Now, at this point there is bound to be someone whose going to venture out and say “Kak! Man!” the Boers were not ‘Imperialists’ and ‘aggressive’ territory hunters – that’s the British! The Boers just want to Boer and be left alone. Manne – it’s time for that branders re-fill I’m afraid – if you want to understand Boer Imperialism and British Imperialism – know this, both sides were into territorial expansion and control, both sides wanted control of the whole of Southern Africa – the point of departure, the British wanted it under their influence, and the Boers wanted it under theirs. To see just how ‘Big thinking’ Boer Imperialists and British Imperialists were, one only has to look at what they decide to do after Boer War 2 aided with a little ‘helpmekaar’.

All the protagonists put aside their vast differences aside and got together to nut out a solution in 1908 and 1909, known as ‘The Closer Union Convention’ it was the CODESA of its day, a ‘whose who’ of modern Southern African history .., the old ‘Boer’ Generals – de la Rey, Hertzog, Smuts, Botha, de Wet and Burger even sucked it up long enough to sit opposite the likes of Starr Jameson and be nice. Have a look at this photo of it, it’s a stella cast of Imperialists – the heads and ministers of every British colony and ex-Republic in Southern Africa.  

Front row (left to right): Hon. J.W. Saner, (Commissioner for Public Works); Hon. J.X. Merriman, (Prime Minister, Cape Colony): Hon. M.T. Steyn (Vice-President of Convention); Hon. A. Fischer, (Prime Minister, Orange River Colony), Lord J.H. de Villiers (President of the Convention), Right Hon. General Louis Botha, (Prime Minister, Transvaal); Right Hon. F.R. Moor, (Prime Minister, Natal), Sir W.H. Milton (Administrator of Southern Rhodesia), Sir J.P. Fitzpatrick. 

Second row: Hon. E.H. Walton; Hon. Colonel E.M. Greene (Minister of Railways and Harbours); Mr H.C. van de Heerden; Dr J.H.M. Beck, Mr G.H. Maasdorp, Mr H.L. Lindsay; Hon. F.S. Malan (Secretary for Agriculture); General S.W. Burger; Hon. Dr T.W. Smartt; Hon. General C.R. de Wet (Minister of Agriculture); Right Hon Dr L.S. Jameson; Hon. H.C. Hall (Treasurer); Hon. General J.B.M. Hertzog (Attorney General); Mr C.F. Kilpin (Clerk of House of Assembly and Chief Secretary of Convention). 

Third row: General J. H. de la Rey; Mr W.R. Morcom; Hon A. Brown; Mr T. Hyslop; Mr J.W. Jagger; Hon. C.J. Smythe; Sir G.H. Farrar; Hon. General J.C. Smuts (Colonial Secretary); Mr A.M.N. de Villiers (Clerk to House of Assembly, ORC and Secretary of Convention). 

Fourth row: Mr G.T. Plowman (Secretary to the Prime Minister of Natal and Secretary to Convention); Mr W.E. Bok (Private Secretary to Prime Minister of Transvaal); Mr G.F. Hofmeyr (Clerk of House of Assembly Transvaal and Secretary to Convention); Colonel W.E.M. Stanford; Hon. C.P.J Coghlan.

And what do they come up with? The South African Union as was foretold in the Peace of Vereeniging – yes, but oh so much bigger, not just a couple of isolated Republics acting as British vassal states combined with a couple of British colonies – oh no, this is BIG thinking – they agree to a ‘Greater South Africa’ – an here’s a map of it – its in three phases – Phase 1 the initial South African ‘Union’, would incorporate Lesotho and Swaziland.

Phase 2 – this would be followed by the incorporation of Bechuanaland (Botswana), German South West Africa (Namibia), the southern half of Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique – Delagoa bay) and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

And then Phase 3,’Greater South Africa’ does not stop at Phase 2, the next phase would see half of modern Angola, the rest of modern Mozambique (the north part of Portuguese East Africa), the whole of modern Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) and the whole of modern Malawi joining the South African ‘union’. Here’s a map of it (note Jan Smuts’ notations of ‘A’ – phase 2 and ‘B’ – phase 3).

Image: Phase settings for ‘Greater South Africa’

This sort of expansionist Imperial thinking took the idea of the ‘white race’ as the great driver of conquest and civilisation in Southern Africa (Boer and Brit, either together or separate)- starting from South Africa’s borders, then over the Zambezi River and literally all the way to the equator. This thinking also did not just materialise in 1908, oh-no … it started well before that in 1895, BEFORE Boer War 2, when Jan Smuts as the State Attorney to the ZAR started to articulate the thinking of a ‘Greater South Africa’ under ‘Boer influence’ and he was not alone, the likes of Louis Botha and many others agreed with him, not only in the ZAR, but even people like Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr in the Cape, even Kruger was an expansionist had no problem annexing territory for Boer control either – Swaziland and bits of Zululand are just two cases in point. Cecil Rhodes thought the same way, only his idea specified ‘British influence’ – hence the clash of under ‘whose influence’ – its an ideological clash – and its not the .. we just want to be left alone to Boer .. thinking at all!

Just to think, had the issue not been pushed to war, there would not have been the deep mistrust and hatred between Boer and Brit, the Boer Imperialists like Smuts and Botha in conjunction with ‘British’ like Merriman, FitzPatrick and Jameson would have established the grand ideas of ‘union’ and ‘Greater South Africa’ – no problem.

The reason ‘Greater South Africa’ did not materialise – the African tribal leaders and Kings in places like Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Lesotho were a bit jittery over the old Boer Republic’s race laws, they saw the British qualified franchise laws as hopeful but feared the Boere, so they chose a wait and see approach – see how the union’s segregation laws in the old Boer Republics and simmering Afrikaner nationalism and discontent panned out – and we all know how that panned out.

More money than you can shake a stick at!

As to the question of gold and Johannesburg – a government’s income from minerals comes in the form of tax. The plain truth is that the Boers extracted high taxation on gold for ZAR coffers until 1900, thereafter the tax went to an interim Transvaal government pending union and self governance and by 1910 – a mere decade later the money went to an independent South African Union government’s tax coffer – run by the Boers. It is impossible for Britain to even have made money from South African gold to pay for its war in South Africa and the agreed reparations to the Boers guaranteed in the Vereeniging Peace treaty after the war – the war cost Britain £210 million (a staggering £25 billion in today’s money – R 547 billion in South African Rands – that’s more money than it will take to fix our current ‘Energy Crisis’). Britain’s sojourn in South Africa in 1899 was a significant financial loss to them (and political – the ‘Khaki elections’ after the war saw the back of the Tory warmongers and regime change) – proof positive, it was not about ‘stealing gold’.

As to Johannesburg, it would remain a destabiliser – to the ZAR, then the British, then the Union of South Africa – and it’s still a destabiliser in the modern South African Democratic Republic. A true den of thieves and an economic powerhouse controlling the outcome of the entire region – from beyond Zimbabwe all the way to Cape Town, it has never changed, it’s an unflinching reality and we have to accommodate and recognise it, now and then. The idea that it could exist in the middle of some sort of pastoral Boer Republic with Boers in charge of it is just sheer deniability and wishful – pure romanticism.

In reality, in 1899 – the seat of power in the ZAR had shifted, true power – economic power – no longer sat in the ‘Boer’ Republic’s Raad in Pretoria, it sat in The Rand Club in Johannesburg – and everyone knew it, Johannesburg would dictate the future of the region, not Pretoria, or even Cape Town, not even London – and here’s the inevitable truth, it still dictates the future of the region – it’s still the power-hub – the heart of South Africa (nearly 60% of South Africa’s population now live in the Megalopolis it has created).

I mention the Rand Club in Johannesburg, as this really was the real seat of power for the ZAR, the Jameson Raid was conceived and planned in its billiards room as a privateering mission and not in the corridors of Westminster with the endorsement of the British Parliament as some Boer romantics wishfully believe.

In conclusion

At the beginning the statement was made that Britain could not steal what was already theirs – I hope this has shown that true ‘fully’ independent Boer states never really existed with any degree of longevity or sustainability. Britain, from the get-go as an International Superpower, was always going to dictate the outcome – it had an entire planet to run – a vast network of countries the world over in what it regarded as the “British’ sphere, the largest ’empire’ ever built – the Romans didn’t even come close. Just one of the two Boer Republics existed without British oversight for a mere 25 years only and by the start of Boer War 2 they were both British Suzerainty States in any event. Britain peacefully ‘gave’ its colony of the Orange Sovereignty – est. 1848 to the Boers to manage, the Boers peacefully dissolved and gave their Republic of South Africa (ZAR) to the British to manage as their colony in 1887, long before diamonds and gold respectively became an issue in these regions. That’s the uneasy and inconvenient truth of the matter.  

I also hope I’ve shown that Imperialism and colonisation – whether practiced by Boer or Brit is a bloody and violent matter and idea of free and independent Boer republics was a pipe dream – then and now. That things eventually went pear shaped between Boer and Brit and there were lots of shots fired at one another in anger is also a truism – and not just Boer and Brit, but the violence extended to everyone else in-between. I also hope I’ve highlighted the idea of ‘Boer’ victimhood as a population group seeking nothing more than a pastoral farming existence in a peaceful setting is a complete fallacy.

I’m sure someone will point out that this is ‘too simplistic’ and the issue is far more nuanced, the history far more complex and this is way too much ‘factor analysis’ – but these are the truths, they are facts – you can debate and argue them – sure – there are many other compelling facts and historical figures and you can point to them too, however, at best this missive is designed to present different perspectives to get you thinking, engage some brain cells and question political narrative on history and a piss-poor nationalistic education (the Nats then and the ANC now).

In the end, and this is a truism – it all could have been avoided had it not been for the personalities at play and their Imperial aspirations (both Boer and Brit) – the Boer War was a failure of the human condition – enfranchisement, political and economic emancipation and human rights would have marched on regardless. Looking at the complete destruction, death and tragedy that was Boer War 2 with the hindsight of some really inconvenient history – all I can say is I’ll now join those Boer romantics and pour myself a very strong Klippies and Coke.


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens