Inventing Apartheid – a Chronology

The Chronology of Apartheid: 1652 – 1952

In 2017 Hélène Opperman Lewis released a “psychology” book titled “Apartheid: Britain’s Bastard Child”, the name and cover image of a Boer child emancipated by disease in a concentration camp kicked off a latent voice of Afrikaner Apartheid apologists who held it up as proof positive – the British ‘invented’ Apartheid. She has been joined lately by Albert Blake, who in 2024 in his book on Jopie Fourie used a similar argument of a latent psychological trauma the British imparted on the Afrikaner nation as the raison d’exister for Apartheid.

Despite Opperman Lewis facing serious criticism on trying to peddle a psychological book using the trauma and victim argument to claim ‘her people’ were unwittingly led to commit the crime of Apartheid – detractors noting that her argument was completely unhinged from nearly every history discipline – from historical sweep, the historical method, the chronological method, the archeological record all the way to simple economic history statistics. Despite this, these Neo Afrikaner Nationalists pointed to British Imperialism, Victorian paternal attitudes to “developing civilisations”, petty colonial segregation policies and trauma caused by British warmongering as the causes of Apartheid – not the fault of Afrikaners, the British did it – don’t you see!

Some even going as far as ignoring history completely and stating that Apartheid existed “unofficially” before 1948 anyway, and the only sin of Afrikaner Nationalists did in 1948 was simply to put down onto paper what was already there and define it as law – no foul, no harm, they just propagated what the “British started”.

So, let’s put Hélène Opperman Lewis and Albert Blake and their acolytes aside for a second, and do some proper historical sleuthing, come up with the “who done it”, who is really to blame for “Apartheid”. The chosen method is the basic historical method – the chronological method, and by using dates we will map the progression of Apartheid – from its origins to its final legal manifestations. Follow what the historians like to call “the golden thread” – the string that links the causal history together. At the end we hope to find who exactly is holding this particular “bastard child” as their own.

Nearly every historian, including all the predominant ‘Afrikaner’ historians, put the origins of Apartheid at the origins of slavery in the Cape – so, from a chronological method – let’s start there:

Apartheid – A chronology

1652 – Dutch arrive and form the Cape Colony in 1652 to service VOC shipping. Jan van Riebeeck lands his ships in Table Bay on 6 April 1652 with a small contingent of settlers.

1653 – First slave arrives at the VOC settlement from Jakarta the very next year in 1653.

1659 – First Khoikhoi–Dutch War, by 1672 – Second Khoikhoi–Dutch War, by 1677 the region and its peoples are subjugated by the Dutch. The slave trade continues to expand in the VOC settlement for the next 100 years.

Slavery in the Cape Colony. Insert: Johan Anthoniszoon “Jan” van Riebeeck

From the mid 1700’s the Dutch VOC implements the Inboekstelsil’ system  on the outer borders of the Cape settlement – a policy of indentured slavery to initially capture Khoi and San children for an ‘apprenticeship’ period into adulthood – this done to fulfil demands for labour.

1795 – the French form the Batavian Republic and dispel with the Netherlands. The Cape Colony falls under Batavian rule. Slavery and Inboekstelsel systems in the colony continue.

The British occupy the Cape for the first time in response to activation of the Batavian Republic by the French – it’s short lived as the British settle a peace term with the Batavian vassal state and Napoleonic France – the Treaty of Amiens (1802) sees the British hand the colony back to Batavia.

1802 – Batavian rule again, slavery and indentured slavery practices in the Cape Colony continue.

1806 – The British attack the Batavian fort at their Cape Colony to forestall Napoleon’s troops strengthening the Cape Colony and the British re-occupy the colony as another Napoleonic War action (The Second Occupation of the Cape 1806).

1807 – British open their ban on slavery by banning slave trade between colonies in their empire. The Slave Trade Act 1807, officially an Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade.

1814 – Dutch ‘Burghers’ dissatisfaction with the British occupation increases when the British specifically ban Dutch slave traders from entering any Cape port from 15th June 1814, squeezing labour supply.

1815 – Battle of Waterloo settles the matter of European control and occupied colonies, the Dutch sell their occupied Cape Colony to the British at the Congress of Vienna to aid in the re-establishment of their Dutch homeland in Europe for £6,000,000.1

1824 – The British negotiate territory from King Shaka to establish the Bay of Natal as a British trading post.

1829 – In the Cape Colony – the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) or in Afrikaans the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK) is now under British state authority. Puritan Burghers of Dutch/French and German decent formally request their DRC synod for separated black and white worship on he basis of a Puritan philosophy. It is denied by the DRC 1829 Synod who state:

‘Communion would be administered “simultaneously to all members without distinction of colour or origin.’

It is not a popular decision, Backhouse and Walker noted that in some parishes on the frontier:

‘the prejudices of the Dutch so strong, that some of them were much disturbed at the idea of the Hottentots coming into the “Kerk”; and they afterwards got up a protest against their being allowed to assemble there.’2

1834 – The British announced the full abolition of slavery, they also announced a universal qualified franchise vote putting a small number of ex-slaves and black male citizens who own property and have an education on the same footing as whites – some whites also find themselves on the same qualified footing as blacks. Due date – 1 Dec 1834. In the words of historian C.F.J. Muller:

‘The Afrikaans frontier farmer now got no satisfaction from Church and State.’3

1835 – Louis Tregardt is the very first Voortrekker to leave the Cape Colony in protest against the British legislation ending slavery, he is also wanted for cattle theft and gun running with the Xhosa – he also has no intention of releasing his slaves and takes them with him, one escapes and reports his position to the British authorities forcing him to ‘ditch’ the rest of his slaves and to carry on trekking north – his trek is a failure and disbands.4

1837 – Piet Retief is the most famous of the Voortrekkers, in 1837 he leaves the Cape Colony – and his manifesto is published declaring discontent with the British for abolishing slavery, the terms of compensation thereof and for implementing a colour blind franchise. Included in their decision to “trek” from the colony is dissatisfaction with the colour blind worship and language status of their Dutch Reformed Church. 

These frontier farmers remain ‘Puritans’ within a strict Calvinist dogma regardless of their Church’s position on race – and this sentiment of outrage is captured by this famous quote by Retief’s sister, Anna Steenkamp who writes:

‘and yet it is not (‘the slaves’) freedom that drives us to such lengths, as their being placed on an equal footing with Christians, contrary to the laws of God and the natural distinction of race and religion, so that it was intolerable for any decent Christian to bow down beneath such a yoke; wherefore we rather withdrew in order to preserve our doctrines in purity.’5

This quote can be regarded as the epicentre of Apartheid as it becomes defined in future. 

The Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) i.e. the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK) in the Cape Colony formally denounces the Voortrekkers – they leave anyway, The church’s next reaction is to refusal to permit of ‘any of its ministers to leave the colony with the Trekkers.’6

Voortrekkers – insert pic Piet Retief

The DRC – also known as the ‘gaatjieponders’ splits over the matter of the Great Trek and the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk (NHK) known as ‘Stoepsitters’ forms on 21 May 1837 as a ‘sister church’ of DRC to care for the puritan white Voortrekkers spiritual needs.

1838 – 6 February 1838 – Piet Retief’s party of 67 Boers and 30 of their black servants are murdered by Dingaan whilst negotiating land for a Voortrekker Republic. Later in the year – 16 December 1838, The Battle of Blood River takes place and is a resounding Boer victory.

1839 – The ‘unrecognised’ Republic of Natalia is established by Boers on 12 Oct 1839 with Pietermaritzburg as its capital. It’s ‘het publiek’ constitutional policy dissolves the Republic into administrative chaos. At war with nearly all neighbouring tribes, Zulu, Pondo and Xhosa and the British in addition, the Republic descends into further chaos.

1843 – In an ungovernable state, the Republic of Natalia’s Volksraad turn to the British for voluntary annexation when officially on 23 April 1843 it consented to Natalia becoming a British colony, on 8 August 1843 the Volksraad unanimously finalise the terms proposed by Lord Stanley, the new British ‘Natal’ colony would incorporate the Port Natal settlement and the Drakensberg is set as the northern limit.

There is a fundamental British condition in the formation of this new colonial expansion of Natal, it reads:

‘that there should not be in the eye of the law any distinction or disqualification whatever, founded on mere difference of colour, origin, language or creed.’7

Once again in countenance to Puritan Voortrekker values, unsatisfied with the political state of things, the loss of their republic and with a general dose of both Anglophobia and Afrophobia, a large group of Natalia Voortrekkers trek again over the Drankensberg into ‘Transorangia’ and into what would eventually become the Transvaal.

1848 – The British declare the area of ‘Transorangia’ i.e. the modern Free State, the area between the Orange and Vaal Rivers a ‘British Sovereignty’ (a colony) calling it the Orange River Sovereignty. They also bring with them the ‘Colour Blind’ qualification franchise as specified in the Cape and the abolition of slavery.

1852 – The Sand River Convention between the Boers and the British on 17 January 1852 establishes the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) – a combination of a number of small Voortrekker Republics in the region made up of migrating British colony citizens with varying constitutions now merged. The British delegation at the Sand River convention agree the formation of a fully independent ‘recognised’ ZAR Boer Republic on the proviso that they are not permitted to practice slavery. 

The initial ZAR constitution is ratified and it legally forbids anyone who is not a member of the Dutch Reformed Church (and related ‘sister’ Churches) from holding a voting franchise. Only ‘white’ adult males aligned to the DRC and its sister churches are allowed to vote – people of colour are specifically excluded – so too are white Jews and white Catholics. People of colour are given no political representation whatsoever, cannot vote and cannot own land, marriages are not legally recognised and they are even forbidden in the constitution from entering the ZAR’s ‘Raad’ (parliament).

The ZAR also implements the old Dutch Inboekstelsel system of indentured slavery targeted at indigenous peoples to supplement their need for real slaves and boost labour requirements for expansive farming – the average Voortrekker farm is 6,000 aches of land, in all they occupy a land mass bigger than Great Britain using a ‘grab and hold’ strategy when encroaching on native land.8 Trading of these indentured slaves on the ZAR frontiers even becomes known as ‘black gold’.  

A letter to Piet Joubert, who acquired many inboekstelsel slaves on his military campaigns as the ZAR Kommandant-General, summarises the brutality and manner of the inboekstelsel – sent to his wife it reads:

‘Please ask the General to let me have a little Malaboch kaffir, as of course there are some whose father and mother have been killed. I don’t mind if it’s a boy or a girl. I want one about seven years old, or any one that the General will give me’9

1854 – the Orange River Convention is held on 23 February 1854. Britain agrees to hand their “Orange River Sovereignty” over to Boer stewardship. The Boer Republic of the “Orange Free State” (OFS) was declared on the 23 February 1854, however a key condition for the establishment of the OFS is that it became a British Suzerainty (a British vessel or client state) – the conditions of the Suzerainty specify that the Boer Republic is ‘independent’ and responsible for its own ‘internal affairs’ in terms of self-governance whilst Britain has oversight for the ‘external affairs’ (foreign affairs) of the OFS. Issues of Black African emancipation, political representation and franchise are left to the OFS republicans to manage as an ‘internal affair’. Slavery is specified by the British as outlawed in the region and not permitted.

1856 – the ‘Colour Blind’ qualified Franchise as implemented in the Cape Colony by the British is now officially implemented by the British in the Natal Colony.10

1857 – The Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) holds a Synod in 1857 in the ZAR and makes allowances for separate worship – in a religious quandary it maintains conversion to Christianity as its goal for Black and Whites inclusively – however worship is separated on the basis of race – the “Groot Kerk” (Big Church for the Whites) and “Klein Kerk (Small Church for the Blacks). Sermons for both ‘Groot and Klein’ – Black and White services are run by the same white DRC Dominee. This decision was to have long-lasting ramifications. Unwittingly the church had provided:

‘An ecclesiological blueprint for the Nationalist policy of separate development of the races, or Apartheid’11

1858 – the ZAR State and DRC’s sister church, the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk (NHK) Church are synchronised as an Oligarchy on Theocracy lines.

1859 – the ‘Dopper’ Church – the Gereformeerde Kerke (GK) forms as an off-shoot of the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk (NHK) and a ‘sister’ church of both the Dutch Reformed Church and the NHK. Ultra Conservative – Paul Kruger is a Dopper.

Early image of Pretoria, the capital of the ZAR – insert: the ZAR coat of arms

1860 – The ZAR constitution makes clear the legalities of Black emancipation in its territory when it declares:

‘The people are not prepared to allow any equality of the non-white with the white inhabitants, either in church or state.’

In the same year the British begin an indentured labour program of their own and 342 Indians arrive on board the Truro on 16 November 1860. The fundamental difference between the British “Indentured Labour” and the Voortrekker Inboekstelsel “Indentured Slaves” lies in the use of slave “apprenticeship” policies.

The Voortrekker ZAR Inboekstelsel system allowed for the aggressive capturing of black indigenous African children and holding them in a slave/master “apprenticeship” relationship. Slave Apprenticeships for African females lasted until they were 21 years old and for males it was 25 years old, thereafter the Indentured Slave had the option of been released (although this was not observed in remote frontier districts).12

The inboekstelsel labourer on release could also remain on the farm as a contract or paid worker, and as most were displaced anyway, many indentured slaves remained on the Boer farms as a sub working class in separate ‘kraals’ with no political or property rights whatsoever. Some 10% of the ZAR population qualified as inboekstelsil.

The British Natal Indian Indentured labour system was a 5 year work contract primarily on sugar cane farms or coal mining with minimal wage under very strict and unfair labour policies – which allowed for no labour or political representation for the work contract period – the conditions of work varied and in many instances qualified as an exploitative relationship and a miserable existence for the labourer. Thereafter the labourer could leave his indentured employer and become a ‘free man’, remain in Natal and open his own business or enter employment. If having served 2 indentured work terms (10 years) the passage back to India was free of charge.13

1865 – in terms of the Cape and Natal colonies – the British Westminster Parliament issues the “Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865” which allowed the colonies to pass legislation different from that in Britain provided that it was not repugnant to any law expressly passed by the Imperial Parliament to extend to that colony. This had the effect of granting British colonies more autonomy, to legislate free of Britain, within their own ‘internal’ borders.

1869 – The DRC Synod resolves to condemn the practice of the Inboekstelsel apprenticeship slavery system and within two years (1871) the DRC concludes the system no longer exists in the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (although this is not strictly true).14

1876 – the ZAR heading into a financial crisis, facing bankruptcy due to a Voortrekker culture of non payment of taxes, and under threat from local African tribes. Led by Sekhukune I of the Pedi, a war in 1876 took place which is recorded as a Boer defeat. After losing the battle with the Pedi, the ZAR goes into confederation and protectorate negotiations with the British.

The ZAR President – Thomas Burgers and the British Representative – Sir Theophilus Shepstone, agree to the voluntary dissolving of the Republic and to the annexation of the territory by the British – the idea is a long standing British one of a Federation of loose states in Southern Africa under the British flag (paramountcy). In dissolving the ZAR ‘Raad’ Burgers points a finger at Paul Kruger and his cabal and cites the Inboekstelsil system and consistent conflict with indigenous tribes as the key causes for voluntary dissolution of the Boer republic and annexation and protection from Britain – he says:

‘It is you – you members of the Raad and the Boers – who have ruined the country, who have sold your independence for a drink. You have ill-treated the natives, you have shot them down, you have sold them into slavery, and now you have to pay the penalty.’15

1877 –  the British annex the ZAR, re-naming it “The British Colony of The Transvaal” – they open up immigration to white British settlers who become known as the “Pretoria Loyalists” and embark on a number of reforms. However, importantly, they do not immediately implement their Cape and Natal ‘colour blind’ qualified franchise in their new British Transvaal Colony.

Annexation of the ZAR by Natal Mounted Police ceremonial guard – insert picture, the ZAR President Thomas François Burgers.

1879 – under ambitions for a British led Federation across the entire region, the British regional attentions switch to fighting the Anglo-Zulu war from 11 January – 4 July 1879, a British victory over the Zulu nation. The aftermath would see Zululand eventually annexed as part of Natal in 1897.

1880 – the Afrikaner Bond is established in 1880 to forward Afrikaner political ambitions. Within it lie the origins of Afrikaner Nationalism, which is a unification of Afrikaners across the all the states from the “Zambezi to the Cape” and calls for a Afrikaner led paramountcy16 in the region under the slogan:

‘Africa for the Africander’17

Later in the ZAR the “ox-wagon incident” takes place in November – an issue as to a Boer’s backdated tax, the incident brings up simmering Boer dissatisfaction with British rule. Led by Paul Kruger the Boers rise in a revolt on the 20 December 1880 and attack the British Garrison at Bronkhorstspruit. This marks the start of The Transvaal Rebellion (the first Boer War) in the British Colony of The Transvaal.

1881 – The Transvaal Rebellion ends with a resounding Boer victory over the British relief column at the Battle of Majuba on the 27 February 1881. With Pretoria’s garrisons still in the control of the British, the British sue for peace instead of a protracted rebellion.

A compromise is struck at the Pretoria convention, held on 3 August 1881, which re-established the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) re-named as The Transvaal Republic as a British Suzerainty state (a vassal or client state of Britain). The “Triumvirate’ Presidency” (shared Presidency) was officially recognised on 8 August 1881 by the British to oversee the running of the Transvaal Republic – it was made up of Paul Kruger, Piet Joubert and Marthinus Pretorius.

Under the conditions of the Suzerainty, the Transvaal Republic is permitted ‘independence’ to run all its own internal affairs as a Republic, however Britain remains in control of all the Transvaal Republic’s ‘external’ affairs (foreign affairs), its borders and enjoys a preferred status as to trade.

On the issue of Paramountcy and Federation, the Orange River Convention in 1854 specified upfront that the Orange Free State Republic was a British Suzerainty state, so British paramountcy was regionally assured with the Transvaal Republic becoming a Suzerainty state in addition.

On the issues of franchise and qualification, political rights are devolved to ‘internal affairs’ to be run by the Transvaal Republic.

1883 – Paul Kruger is elected as the President of the Transvaal Republic on 9 May 1883, ending the Triumvirate. He beats Joubert on election promises of increased Church involvement in State, an immigration policy in favour of the white Boer citizens, a cordial stance towards Britain and that the un-enfranchised majority of Black and Coloured citizens of the Transvaal Republic remain as:

‘obedient native races in their appointed districts.’18

From 1883 onwards, as President of the Transvaal Republic/ZAR, Paul Kruger comes to define a system of government and an ideology in the Transvaal known as “Krugerism”. Krugerism, extolled an anti-modernist social and economic order. Contemporary writers at the time almost unanimously conclude that Kruger himself headed this order:

‘as the Kommandant of a medieval oligarchy. Kruger was hemmed in by the “hurrying tide of civilisation”, leaving him and his following “rooted in the seventeenth century”.’19

Krugerism deepened the role of the Dutch Reformed Church and State as a Theocracy, whilst maintaining a white Protestant oligarchy in power. Franchise rights were still not afforded to Jews and Catholics and no political rights were afforded to ‘coloured’ or ‘native’ ZAR citizens whatsoever – even legally according to the constitution a ‘white’ man could not be tried in conjunction with a ‘black’ man in a ZAR court of law. Laws for each racial group were fundamentally separated as specified in the ZAR constitution. The language policy was ‘Dutch’ only in all facets of government and law.

Krugerism entailed compulsory “Commando” military commitments for all white Boer males per the constitution with “unusual” devolved powers to appointed “veldkornets” to marshal all white citizens – this, along with increased GDP focus on munitions, state intelligence services and state police (known as ZARPS) ensured the ZAR’s oligarchy was ensconced in power along the lines of a “Police State”.

Economically, Krugerism advocated ‘local’ (Boer) controlled monopolies to encourage manufacture called  ‘konsensies’ (concessions).20 Concessions extended to all facets of economic production, including eventually the infamous “dynamite” monopoly on mining.

1884 – desirous of returning the name of the region to the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) and desirous of full sovereignty as an independent republic and the removal of the British Suzerainty, a Boer delegation, including Kruger, is sent to London to re-negotiate the terms of the Pretoria Convention.

The London Convention is signed on 27 February 1884, the Republic is re-named the ZAR, however the issue of Suzerainty becomes key – the word “Suzerainty” is dropped from the pre-amble as a sap to Paul Kruger and his report back to his ‘Raad’, however all the legal constructs of the Suzerainty remain unchanged – the ZAR is permitted self governance for its “internal affairs” only, and the British still have full oversight of all the ZAR’s “external affairs” (foreign affairs), its borders and its preferred trade with the British status – the only exception that is made is ZAR’s foreign relations with the OFS. The ZAR remains a British ‘vassal state’ and is still not fully “sovereign”.

The Boer delegation to the London Convention 1884, insert picture Queen Victoria during this period.

On “internal affairs” the ZAR assures the British that white British citizens and white Boer citizens will enjoy the same equal rights status as they held in 1877 with no change – no such emancipation or political rights are specified for Black or Coloured citizens.

The London Convention was a poorly conceived compromise and the Suzerain unclear, the treaty would cause significant political abrasion and tension between Britain and the ZAR for the next 15 years.

1886 – Significant gold deposits are discovered along a reef known as the Witwatersrand in the ZAR, triggering a “gold rush” of large numbers of foreign miners – mainly British into the ZAR, but also significant numbers of migrant Black miners and labourers. Johannesburg is established and very quickly the demographic balance between white British settlers and white Boer settlers in the ZAR changes in favour of the British.

1895 – the Jameson Raid, 29 December 1895 to 2 January 1896 takes place – it’s a botched raid to enact regime change in the ZAR. The raid is made up of British privateers led by Starr Jameson with the support of ‘The Reform Committee’ led by mining Randlords on the ZAR’s gold reef. It is supported by the mining magnate and Cape Colony Premier – Cecil John Rhodes, and although the Raid takes place without the knowledge of the British foreign office and Westminster it leads to considerable souring of the British and Boer relationship. Kruger unsuccessfully attempts to have the 1884 London Convention and the Suzerain declared null and void because of what he sees as a breach of contract.

1897 – Alfred Milner is charged by the British with bringing matters to a head with Kruger and resolving the ZAR unrest situation, on the idea of implementing the colour blind ‘Cape Franchise’ in the ZAR, he writes to Herbert Asquith (a future Prime Minister) and says:

With your great two principles that (1) we seek to restore good relations between the Dutch (Boers) and the English and (2) we should secure for the natives … adequate and sufficient protection against oppression and wrong … the object No.2 is the principle obstacle to the attainment of object No.1 … I should feel quite confident of been able to get over the Dutch-English difficulty if it were not so horribly complicated by the native question.’21

In a letter to a friend, Milner would further lament on the complication of dealing with the ‘native question’ and the ZAR and says:

‘(If I did not have) some conscience about the treatment of blacks I personally could win over the Dutch in the Colony and indeed all the South African dominion without offending the English. You have only to sacrifice ‘the nigger’ and the game is easy. Any attempt to secure fair play for them makes the Dutch fractious and almost unmanageable’.22

Kruger flouts the 1884 London Convention restrictions on foreign affairs unilaterally approaching France and Germany for support and he challenges the suzerainty. On 6 March 1897 Joseph Chamberlain writes to Kruger to remind him that the ZAR is still a British suzerain, and he is also in violation of laws concerning emigration of foreigners – in contravention of Article 14 of the 1884 Convention.23

1898 – The British historian, Professor Andrew Roberts FRHistS FRSL would summarise Krugerism at this juncture. The ZAR, although a Republic in name was in no way a democracy. Jews and Catholics were forbidden to hold office, Johannesburg was not allowed a municipal council, English was banned in all official proceedings, the Judiciary was appointed by Kruger, Kruger controlled all the government monopolies, no open air public meetings were permitted, the freedom of the press was not guaranteed and …

‘Above all, full citizenship was almost impossible to gain for non-Boers. Pretoria ran a tight, tough, quasi-police state.’24

In terms of Church and State, although ZAR is a Oligarchy, Krugerism brings Dutch Reformed ‘Churches’ closer, so much so the ZAR at times resembles a Theocracy and the Raad busies itself with passing legislation that appeases God. An example was a debate in 1895 which forbid the firing of explosives into clouds to induce rain or firing a weapon into the sky as these actions were deemed as ‘being offensive to the Almighty’.25

President Paul Kruger and his cabal.

1899 – With growing imbalance of voter demographics and tensions resulting in political instability in the ZAR, Paul Kruger would seek to consolidate power into Boer hands and unshackle the Suzerain preventing “full” Boer independence of Britain. He would do this through leveraging and denying of political rights and the franchise for white protestant British gold miners now making the ZAR their permanent domicile.

The issue of “political rights” for all the new ‘foreign’ settlers in the ZAR of all colours and creeds and “political freedom” from Britain for the Boers would play the pivot role in the Casus Belli of an upcoming war – the South African War (1899-1902).

With tensions rising over the franchise qualification period and the Milner and Kruger negotiations and breakdown thereof from 30 May to 6 June 1899, both sides start to prepare for war. Whilst in a numerical advantage, the two Boer Republics declare war on Britain on 11 October 1899 by way of an ultimatum followed by a military invasion of all neighbouring British colonies.

F.W. Reitz issues ‘A Century of Wrong’ (in conjunction with Jan Smuts) as an explanation for the Boer Casus Belli – he concludes it with the Afrikaner Bonds nationalist slogan calling for an Afrikaner led paramountcy in Southern Africa. It reads:

As in 1880, we now submit our cause with perfect confidence to the whole world. Whether the result be Victory or Death, Liberty will assuredly rise in South Africa like the sun from out the mists of the morning, just as Freedom dawned over the United States of America a little more than a century ago. Then from the Zambezi to Simon’s Bay it will be: “AFRICA FOR THE AFRICANDER.”26

1900 – from January 1900, the British ‘Army Force’ starts to land. Bloemfontein, the capital of the OFS falls to British forces on 13 March 1900. Pretoria, the capital of the ZAR falls on 5 June 1900. Thereafter the Boer Forces change strategy from conventional warfare to unconventional “hit and run” guerrilla warfare focusing primarily on extended British lines of supply and razing ‘hensopper’ (surrendering Boers taking oaths of loyalty) farmsteads, ‘Joiner’ (Boers joining British forces) farmsteads and British Loyalist farmsteads.

This in turn forces the British to focus on the localised Boer Commandos lines of supply – their ‘bittereinder’ (Boer Forces refusing surrender) farmsteads – and a controversial ‘scorched earth’ policy to raze these farmsteads is implemented – this is done along with a “refugee camp” (concentration camp) policy to deal with all the civilian displacement, comprising both loyalist civilians displaced by Boer actions and bittereinder civilians displaced by British actions.

1901 – Two vastly different types of British “refugee” camps emerge – ‘white’ Boer “concentration” camps taking in displaced white men, women and children of Bittereinders, Joiners, Hensoppers and loyalists (and the odd Black servant) – these camps are run along the lines of tented refugee camps and internees are provided rations (albeit limited), shelter and not forced to labour.

‘Black’ “concentration” camps taking in displaced native farm labour, again men, women and children, are however fundamentally different to the white Boer camps, they are more rudimentary, rations and shelters are highly limited and are purchased in exchange for work. Ultimately these camps are run along the lines of labour camps in support of British ‘Total War’ military objectives.

Black concentration camps of the Boer War – main image courtesy Dr. Garth Benneyworth, insert image colourised by Jenny B.

Both types of camps experience a high incidence of disease (contact and contamination) and civilian death rate. Over the duration of the war, 29,491 Boer Camp civilian deaths are recorded, of which 2/3 are children and infants, all attributed to disease – in the case of children this is attributed primarily to a measles epidemic which sweeps the camps 27.

Over 30,000 Black “concentration” camp civilian deaths are recorded – minimum, the complete Black death toll for the Boer War including both disease and starvation casualties in Black internment or labour camps and in key British towns like Kimberley besieged by Boer forces is projected to be as high as 50,000.28

Noteworthy here, is historian Dr. Garth Benneyworth’s research into the ‘Black’ internment camps of the Boer War, specifies that ‘Blacks’ are not merely “participants” in the war, and the Boer and Black “concentration” camps are not a “shared trauma” of “mutual suffering” at the hands of the British as:

‘The separation of internees along racial lines created fundamentally different internee experiences’29

The first round of peace talks to end The South African War open at Middleburg from 28 February to March 16 1901 between Lord Kitchener and General Louis Botha. One of the conditions of peace specified by the British is the implementation colour blind franchise as it exists in the surrounding territories in the two Boer Republics. The accompanying statement in this respect reads:

‘… the legal position of Kaffirs will be similar to that which they hold in the Cape Colony’30

The peace proposals, on all counts including the question of a colour blind franchise, are universally rejected by the Boers and the war continues.

The latter half of the South African War is marred by the ‘guerilla warfare’ phase which produces two highly undesirable results. The concentration camps become overcrowded and steadily unmanageable and the Boers implement a policy of executing any Black or Coloured person in the service of the British military on the spot, General Christiaan de Wet would inform Lord Kitchener that he personally issued the order and writes:

‘the ungovernable barbarity of the natives realises itself in practice in such a manner that we felt ourselves obliged to give quarter to no native and for these reasons we gave general instructions to our Officers to have all armed natives and native spies shot.’31

Kitchener responds to de Wet:

‘….. (I am) astonished at the barbarous instructions you (General de Wet) have given as regards the murder of natives who have behaved in my opinion, in an exemplary manner during the war.32

Black contractors in the service of British forces, insert General Christiaan de Wet

The ruthless massacres of ‘Black’, ‘Indian’ and ‘Coloured’ citizens and contractors by Boer Generals and Commandants at Tweebosch, Leliefontein, Modderfontein, Uniondale, Calvinia and many other places come to define the closing phase of the South African War.

1902 – The second round of peace talks at Vereeniging end the South African War on 31 May 1902. Joseph Chamberlain insisted the issue of the Colour Blind qualified franchise for the two former Boer Republics is included, however this turns into a deal breaker for the Boers. The British attempt to strike a compromise and the initial draft of the Vereeniging Peace treaty includes the following phrase:

‘The Franchise will not be given to NATIVES until after the Introduction of Self-Government’.

This meant it would be given to them as part of the future self-government package. The Boer delegation even reject this concept, General Jan Smuts in his capacity as a lawyer convinces the British that the Boers will address the matter ‘in the future’ after self governance is granted (here Smuts is looking to the future South African ‘Union’) and the phase is changed again to read:

‘The question of granting the franchise to Natives will not be decided until after the introduction of self-government.’

This meant that the all white parliaments of the Transvaal and Orange Free State would independently decide the colour blind qualified franchise on their own, only after self-government is granted them, and even in that instance they may or may not decide to implement it.

Historian Peter Warwick would claim that as to the future emancipation of Blacks in South Africa this was the most significant clause of the surrender33 Black leaders would look to this as been ‘sold out’ by the British, especially given their considerable military resources and man-power used to help the British win the war.

1903 – With the Boer Republics under British control – The Transvaal Colony and Orange River Colony (both “officially” established in 1902). Lord Milner commissions a study into the “native question” i.e. the black emancipation issue, called the “South African Native Affairs Commission”. It would report back two years later.

1905 – the “South African Native Affairs Commission” reports. It’s Edwardian in its outlook on social Darwinism i.e. recognising where various races lie on a social “civilisation” track – but it does make key recommendations: That the “Cape Law” i.e the Colour Blind qualified franchise is applied across the entire country. In terms property rights it recognisers that land ownership laws applicable in the Cape be extended to the rest of South Africa and to acknowledge Black rights to own land – rural and urban. It also recognisers Black aspirations for an equal education.34

1906 – another “khaki” election takes place in the United Kingdom and the Tory Imperialists of the South African war period lose the election to the Liberal Party led by Henry Campbell-Bannerman – during the South African War, as opposition, the Liberal Party had taken an “Anti-War” ticket and took a “Pro-Boer” position. Campbell-Bannerman famously accused the Tories during the South African War of using “methods of barbarism” in dealing with the white Boer civilian population.

This “anti-Imperialist” and “Pro-Boer” position would lead to this majority “Liberal” government giving concessions to Boer ‘Afrikaner’ politician’s demands ahead of any other demands from South African population or ethnic groups.35

Lord Selborne, the Liberal Party’s new man on the ground, replaced Lord Milner as High Commissioner for South Africa and Governor of the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies. Although Selborne is in favour of extending the Cape Colour Blind Qualified Franchise and land ownership and other recommendations of the “South African Native Affairs Commission” to the old Boer Republics – he is unable to do so, as it would be in violation of the terms of the Vereeniging Peace Accord which Campbell-Bannerman intends to honour. According to Godfrey Lagdon, the Transvaal Commissioner for Native Affairs:

‘(the Boers) would “bitterly resent” it, and it would likely re-ignite the war’36

The Campbell-Bannerman government later grants ‘Responsible Government’ to the Transvaal Colony on 6 December 1906 which reinstates a Boer led Parliament for the region led by General Louis Botha.

1907 – the Campbell-Bannerman government grants ‘Responsible Government’ to the Orange River Colony on 27 November 1907 which reinstates a Boer led Parliament for the region led by Abraham Fischer.

Unlike the Cape Colony and Natal Colony’s ‘Colour Blind’ franchise, the Boer led Parliaments of the Orange River Colony and Transvaal Colony implement a whites only ‘Colour Bar’ franchise.

1908 – To complete the regions ambition to “self governance” as specified in the Vereeniging Peace Accord, the leaders of the old Boer Republics (now in leadership positions in the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal Colony) and the Colonial leadership of the Cape Colony and Natal Colony as well as Rhodesia commence the “The Closer Union Convention” or “National Convention” from 12 October 1908, with the intention of bringing a federation of states together under a unitary paramountcy for shared ‘white’ control (Boer and Brit) – from ‘the Zambezi to the Cape’ – all under the British “family of nations”. The convention is a “whites only” affair for all intents and purposes.

1909 – The Closer Union Convention concludes on 11 May 1909 and agrees to a “Greater Union for South Africa” in phases. Jan Smuts’ plan for union sees Phase 1: the initial South African ‘Union’ between the Cape, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal sans the British “High Commission Territories” consisting of Bechuanaland (Botswana), Lesotho and Swaziland. Phase 2: This later phase encompasses the territorial ambitions of the Union and would see the incorporation of the “High Commission Territories”, German South West Africa (Namibia), the southern half of Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique – Delagoa bay) and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to all join the South African Union.37

The convention concludes that South Africa will be a unitary state with centralised authority. On the thorny issue of Franchise – the ‘English’ led Cape delegates are insistent the Cape ‘colour blind’ Franchise is applied across the entire country, the ‘Afrikaans’ led Free State and Transvaal delegates are immovable on a ‘colour bar’ whites only franchise for the entire country. A compromise is struck which ensures the Cape Franchise is ensconced in the new Union of South Africa constitution on a 2/3 majority for the Cape and Natal provinces, whilst the Transvaal and Orange Free State continue with the colour bar franchise until a future “independent” South African Union Parliament can resolve the matter.

Olive Schreiner, the South African author would make a startling prediction in her letter to the convention when she says:

‘The idea that a man born in this country, possibly endowed with many gifts and highly cultured, should in this, his native land, be refused any form of civic or political right on the ground that he is descended from a race with a civilisation, it may be, much older than our own, is one which must be abhorrent to every liberalised mind. I believe that an attempt to base our national life on distinctions of race and colour, as such, will, after the lapse of many years, prove fatal to us.’38

The “High Commission Territories” (Bechuanaland (Botswana), Lesotho and Swaziland) being ‘Black’ Kingdoms under British protection resolve to remain outside of the Union for the time being, fearful of the sharp racist construct of the Franchise laws in the old Boer Republics. They adopt a “wait and see” approach. As does Rhodesia which eventually opts for a plebiscite to decide of the matter of union with South Africa in 1923.

In Britain, the Pro-Boer governing Liberal Party, now under Herbert Henry Asquith agree to the Closer Union Convention’s recommendations on constitutional, legislative and economic design and they pass “The South Africa Act 1909” which establishes the South African Union as a “Responsible” Self-Governing State with ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty’ – which essentially separated the South African Parliament from Westminster and British Common Law, the South African Union now free to make laws of its own independent of Britain.

The South Africa Act goes ahead despite the “Schreiner Mission” to Britain made up of William Schreiner (the Premier of the Cape Colony), Dr. Abdurahman (the ‘Coloured’ deputation leader) and J.T. Jabavu (leader of the ‘African’ deputation and future ANC) – its mission to convince Westminster of the need to confer the right to vote upon all South Africans regardless of colour. They prophetically warn the British that the future South African Union Parliament with an independent Parliamentary Sovereignty bestowed on it would be empowered to remove the franchise from persons of colour at the Cape.

1910 – The Union of South Africa comes into official existence on 31 May 1910 with independent Parliamentary Sovereignty free of Westminster. The first Union elections are held 15 September 1910, the “Pro-Afrikaner” side of the house – The South African Party in conjunction with Orange Unie (OFS) and Het Volk (Transvaal) win the majority of the house with 66 seats.

Botha’s first cabinet of South African Party members – insert flag is the first national flag of South Africa.

1912 – The South African Native National Congress (renamed the African National Congress in 1923) is formed in Bloemfontein on 8 January 1912 in reaction to the lack of adequate Black representation in the formation of the Union of South Africa and the Closer Union Convention.

1913 – The South African Union with Parliament under the Pro-Afrikaner ‘South African Party’ (SAP) majority government led by Prime Minister Louis Botha – comprising the old ZAR and OFS Boer ‘Bittereinder’ Generals – Louis Botha himself, Koos de la Rey, Jan Smuts, Barry Hertzog, Christiaan de Wet et al – table and then pass the ‘Native Land Act 1913’. To re-affirm the South African Union’s Parliament as “independent” of Britain, the legislation is “rushed” and passed without the input or approval of the British.

This act enforces ‘segregation’ and marginalises Black South Africans economically into a role of perpetual servitude and serfdom. Roughly 20% of “good land” was in the hands of Black Africans in 1913. The Native Land Act reduced Black African land to 7%. It demarcated “Black” farmland and “White” farmland as land solely for either Blacks or Whites. The black farmers and sharecroppers were disadvantaged to the larger degree, they cannot buy land and many are disposed of their land – with little choice many simply became labour on “white” farms.39

‘The Land Act was an anti-capitalist measure aimed at preserving a semi-feudal relationship between white land owners and black “serfs” (with no claim to land ownership)’40

The South African Native National Congress and Sol Plaatjie’s efforts to protest this legislation to the British, still under the governing party of the Pro-Boer Liberal Party, falls on deaf ears.

General James ‘Barry’ Munnik Hertzog is the Orange Free State champion in South African Party, and holds a Cabinet position. However he comes to loggerheads with Prime Minister Louis Botha over ‘language policy’ – Botha and Smuts believe in a “one stream” policy which will see ‘English’ and ‘Afrikaners’ eventually merge as a unitary entity. Hertzog believes in a ‘two-stream’ policy which would see Afrikaans and English speaking whites ‘separated’ in all socialisation aspects – education, culture, religion etc. so as to develop ‘apart’ from one another, and Afrikaner ‘nationalism’ is to carry its own momentum. Known as “Hertzogism”, it divided Botha’s party and resulted in Botha removing Hertzog from his cabinet.

“Hertzogism” is also a pre-curser of Apartheid thinking as the “two stream” policy is eventually extended to exclude Blacks to develop “separately” and “apart” from “whites” in addition.

1914 – Hertzog moves to resign from Botha’s South African Party (SAP), and spits the SAP with key SAP Orange Free State ministers moving with him to establish the National Party in January 1914, effectively ending Afrikaner unity41. The National Party moves to adopt “Hertzogism” and “Krugerism” as its central ideology.

The Nationalists take their initial inspiration from the United States of America (USA), drawing inspiration from Jim Crow, they also admired the USA for having won its war of independence against Britain. They were influenced by the Irish republican movement with a reverence for the notion of popular sovereignty and ethnic self-determination – principles which they did not want to apply to Blacks.42

World War 1 (1914-1918) commences on 28 July 1914. The Union of South Africa, primarily to fulfil its territorial ambitions for German South West Africa (GSWA)43, per the Closer Union Convention, votes in a parliamentary landslide to declare war on Imperial Germany and invade GSWA – 92 votes “for” and 12 votes “against”.

This triggers the ‘Afrikaner Rebellion 1914’, a handful of senior South African Union Defence Force officers and a few ministers of Botha’s South African Party, including the Boer War ‘Volk-hero’ General Christiaan de Wet go into open treason in support of Imperial Germany and he leads the rebellion alongside Lt. Col Manie Maritz, General Christiaan Beyers and Major Jan Kemp et al.

Although Anglophobia is a cited reason for the Rebellion, Philip Sampson a commentator (and historian) at the time argues that the ‘colour blind franchise’ and human rights for ‘natives’ are also key motivations for the rebellion – the Afrikaner rebels are intent on maintaining a Afrikaner led hegemony, an oligarchy based on “Krugerism” as an ideology – which means no franchise or emancipation to anyone of colour. The declaration of war to invade GSWA presents an opportunity for these Afrikaner leaders, with the assistance of Germany, to take over the whole of South Africa and implement this Republican ideal and political construct of theirs.

This sentiment is manifest in Christiaan de Wet, who would go on to say of the Cape Colour Blind Qualified Franchise’, still upheld in the Cape Providence:

‘The ungodly policy of Botha has gone on long enough, and the South African Dutch are going to stand as one man to crush this unholy scandal.’44

To prevent a ‘Black’ uprising in resistance to the Afrikaner Rebellion and maintain white authority, Maritz would make a draconian declaration and states:

‘… an emphatic warning is issued that all coloured people and natives who are captured with arms, as well as their officers, will be made to pay the penalty with their lives.’45

The Afrikaner Rebellion is poorly supported – only 11,476 Boers join the rebellion – primarily desperate ‘bywoner’ (landless or sharecropper farmers) from the Orange Free State, promised a better life if the rebellion was successful.46Strategically, Operationally and Tactically the Rebellion is poorly conceived and poorly led. General Louis Botha is able to crush the rebellion in a matter of months. The state deals with all the rebel leaders with Kidd gloves, with the exception of Jopie Fourie who is executed for treason – Fourie would go on to become a Afrikaner Nationalist martyr and carry with his legacy an on-going and intense National Party propaganda campaign to demonise General Jan Smuts.

On Indian politics, Smuts and Gandhi settle the Indian Relief Act of 1914 abolished the Indian tax which affected indentured labourers and Indian ‘free men’ domiciled in Natal, it facilitated widespread reforms to all Indians domicile in South Africa.47

1917 – The South African Party under Botha, in collaboration with the National Party under Hertzog table the ‘Native Affairs Administration Bill – 1917’, which institutionalises “segregation” between race groups – specifically Black and White. It is debated by not passed – it’s repeatedly amended over the years and only eventually passed as the ‘Native Administration Act’ in 1927 when the National Party has commanding oversight of it.

1918 – The Broederbond is established, a Calvinist, adult white male only Afrikaner secret organisation to forward Afrikaner Nationalist aims and objects on Christian principles.48

1919 – Prime Minister Louis Botha dies suddenly of heart failure after a bout of influenza, aged just 56. Jan Smuts takes over the party leadership of the SAP and the Premiership of South Africa.

1921 – the pillars of the General Mission Committee of the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) Cape synod of 1921 were established in conjunction with delegates from the Transvaal and Orange Free State. At that meeting, it was concluded as follows:

‘The practice of the Church follows the doctrine of the State on the relation of the white and the black races to each other. That doctrine is that the white race is and must remain the ruling race. The coloured and the black sections of the population occupy a strictly subordinate position. This is not due to, as is very generally supposed, to the accident of their colour: it is due to their lower stage of cultural development.’49

1922 – the ‘Rand Rebellion 1922’ breaks out in March 1922. The Rebellion is triggered by white ‘communist’ led miners intent on maintaining a work ‘colour’ bar and preventing the Chamber of Mines from taking on cheaper unskilled and skilled Black labour from taking their jobs. Their intention is to spread worldwide Communism under a slogan:

Workers of the world, unite and fight for a white South Africa!50

Hertzog’s National Party in opposition comes out in support of these white communist mine workers, and issues a pamphlet stating:

‘The (National) party would never accept a “black industrial South Africa with a poor white South Africa”‘.51

The white miners call a general strike, however after ‘the strikers began to assault and massacre black people’ 52, the strike devolves into an armed rebellion and the rebels take up defensive positions, the rebellion in turn is brutally repressed by Prime Minister Jan Smuts, who sends the Union Defence Force into Johannesburg to quell it.

Four “English” Communist ring leaders are found guilty of treason and in two cases the murder of Black South Africans in addition, they go to the gallows singing their anthem, ‘The Red Flag’.

1923 – In sympathy with the miners rebellion, the securing of white proletariate class jobs, the idea of self-determination and in mutual opposition to ‘British Capital’ the National Party moves closer to the Labour Party, Hertzog would say of Communism and Labour:

‘We should not fear Bolshevism (Communism) …. The idea in and of itself is excellent.… If we say that we have the right to govern ourselves and we say that it is our duty to express that right, then we are in fact Bolshevists.’53

Dr. Daniël Francois (DF) Malan, the National Party’s Cape leader would also find an unusual bedfellow in Communism and the Labour movement. As Malan put it:

‘the two parties were tied together by their similar resistance against “capitalistic-monopolistic hegemony” (by which he meant the mine owners)’54

Historian and scholar, William Henry Vatcher, Jr. would say:

‘The alliance of Nationalists and Labour was a strange marriage of convenience. Essentially, it was a white man’s front against the Africans created for the purpose of raising white wages and ensuring jobs for the poor whites, the overwhelming majority of whom were Afrikaners.’55

1924 – Mutual resentment over Smuts’ handling of the Rand Rebellion meant that the National Party/Labour Party coalition was victorious at the polls and formed the ‘Pact Government’ in 1924. This would see the National Party take the reins of the country as a ruling party (in coalition with Labour) for the first time and Hertzog would oust the SAP and Smuts and become South Africa’s Prime Minister.

The Labour Party leader, Col. Frederic Creswell in going into the Pact Government ensures that Hertzog’s and the National Party’s ambitions for a white Afrikaner led South African hegemony and Republicanism are shelved,and that the country remains a British dominion with independent Parliamentary sovereignty.56

In coalition, the National Party were however able to pass three important acts which secured employment opportunities for whites and entrenched segregation in the labour market. The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, allows ‘whites’ to unionise, but specifically forbids ‘blacks’ from joining a union. The Wage Act 1925, sets up a wage board and specifically prevents black workers from undercutting “civilised” levels of wages. The Mines and Works Amendment Act of 1926, firmly established the colour bar and job reservation for whites in certain mining jobs.

1926 – Barry Hertzog as Prime Minister is the South African delegate to the Balfour Declaration of 1926. The declaration gives more autonomous powers to all British Dominion’s including South Africa. To Hertzog, the Balfour Declaration of 1926 is sufficient so as to ensure South Africa’s complete legislative independence of Westminster and therefore no need to fulfil the National Party’s ambitions for a South African Republic.

Prime Minister Hertzog, insert flag is the second South African national flag tabled by Hertzog’s National Party and adopted on 31 May 1928.

1929 – at the DRC conference in Kroonstad the Reverent J.C du Plessis makes the first recorded reference to the term “Aparthied” when he said:

‘In the fundamental idea of our missionary work and not in racial prejudice one must seek an explanation for the spirit of Apartheid that has always characterised our Church’s conduct.’57

The 1929 General Election is fought over the matter of women’s suffrage, Hertzog’s National Party win a majority Parliament, no longer requiring the Labour Party to retain a ruling party status.

1930 –  the Women’s Enfranchisement Act, No 18, of 1930 was enacted by the National Party which granted white women over the age of 21, the right to vote and stand for election. This doubles the size of the white voting bloc. Despite promises on universal female suffrage, the franchise is given to white women only – countrywide, female Black and Coloured voters under the Cape provinces’ “Colour Blind Qualification” Franchise are not given the vote.

1931 – The Free State Synod of the DRC in Kroonstad rejects gelykstelling (racial levelling) and social equality with Blacks, and with it, race degeneration and ‘bastardisation’, as ‘an abomination to every right-minded white and native’. The DRC declares Blacks should develop:

‘on their own terrain, separate and apart’.58

In Britain, the “Statute of Westminster 1931” ends the British empire and replaces it with the Commonwealth. South Africa’s self-governance and independence of Britain’s legislature is complete in all things except name.59

The National Party further entrenches and expands the ‘white vote’ when it passes the Franchise Laws Amendment Act, No. 41 of 1931, which removed all property and educational franchise qualifications applying to white men (and women) countrywide, whereas Coloured and Black men under the Cape Franchise are still subject to education and property qualifications to vote (Coloured and Black women are still not allowed to vote).

1933 – The 1933 General Election outcome forces the National Party to “fuse” with the South African Party to tackle the economic challenges of the Great Depression and a maintain an Afrikaner led hegemony in the interests of South Africa’s white population.60 Hertzog led this fusion undertaking as Prime Minister with Smuts as his deputy. Known as the United South African National Party or simply ‘United Party’ (UP), it contained within it a component of Afrikaner nationalists harbouring republican desires and a component within it of Afrikaners satisfied with Union and South Africa’s status as a British Dominion.61

Unhappy with the centre right politics of ‘Fusion’, Louis Theodor Weichardt breaks away from Hertzog’s old National Party and forms a far right Nazi Party equivalent in South Africa on 26 October 1933 called The South African Christian National Socialist Movement with a paramilitary section (modelled on Nazi Germany’s Sturmabteilung) called the ‘Gryshemde’ (Grey-shirts).

Grey-shirt leadership outside the courts in Grahamstown. Insert picture Louis Theodor Weichardt

By December 1933, the ‘Swarthemde’ (Blackshirts) are formed by Manie Wessels – also breaking away from the National Party, they are called the ‘South African National Democratic Movement’ (Nasionale Demokratiese Beweging). The ‘Black-shirts’ form in opposition to the ‘Grey-shirts’ anti-democracy position and look to a more “purified” whites only democracy free of Jewish and Capitalist influence.62 The Black-shirts themselves would splinter into another Black-shirt movement called the ‘South African National People’s Movement’ (Suid Afrikaanse Nasionale Volksbeweging), started by Chris Havemann and based in Johannesburg, these Black-shirts advanced a closer idea of National Socialism.63 

1934 – by May 1934, the ‘Grey-shirts’ combine with the South African Christian National Socialist Movement and form a new enterprise called ‘The South African National Party’ (SANP). The SANP would all keep the ‘grey-shirts’ as their dress and the caveat of ‘Grey-shirts’ – their political position is one of anti-semitism and pure national socialism (Nazism), the swastika is adopted as the party emblem. Overall, Weichardt saw democracy as an outdated system and an invention of British imperialism and Jews.64

1935 – The DRC Federal Conference declares that education for whites and blacks should remain separate within the barriers of national identity, and defines ‘Coloureds’ for the first time as a “separate nation” from both Black and White but all are equal as individuals before God.65

The mission policy at a DRC Synod held in 1931 in Kroonstad was officially promulgated in 1935 as the official DRC mission policy. It was at this conference that the DRC expressed itself unequivocally against any form of equality (gelykstelling) between blacks and whites.

The church affirmed that the natives had souls as white people have and that they possessed a soul of equal value in the eyes of God. However, in order to stick to this fundamental belief and at the same time to stick to their ‘treasured policy of inequality and separateness’.66

The 1935 DRC Federal Conference reaffirmed the 1931 Free State Synod ‘twist’ i.e. that blacks should develop ‘on their own terrain and apart’ from whites. Language, customs, culture and colour became determinants and the policy was securely aligned with that of the government of the day.67

On the political front, in 1935 the Afrikaner nationalists to the political far right are unhappy with the idea of Fusion between Hertzog and Smuts and their ex-National Party colleagues in the new United Party. The breakaway is led by the DRC theologian Dr. Daniël Francois (DF) Malan and they reconstitute themselves as the ‘Purified’ National Party (PNP).68

The ,central objective of the PNP was a complete break with Britain and the establishment of an independent oligarchy Republic under a white Afrikaner hegemony.69 Anglophobia was a critical ideology underpinning DF Malan’s PNP and Malan sought to exclude English speakers from the PNP completely.70

1936 – the arrival of the S.S. Stuttgart in Cape Town on the 27th October 1936 packed with 537 Jewish refugees on board71 sharply brought the National Party’s policies of immigration and race into focus – it defined what sort of ‘demographics’ the Pure National Party were prepared to focus on to augment the ‘white races’ in South Africa and which were the ‘undesirables’. The arrival of the SS Stuttgart was met with a mass protest of some 3,000 ‘Grey-shirts’.72

The arrival of the SS Stuttgart – insert picture Dr. H.F. Verwoerd

Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd showed his antisemitic colours when he and a deputation of four fellow minded Nationalist academics – Christiaan Schumann, Dr. Johannes Basson and Dr. Theophilus E. Dönges from Stellenbosch University and Frans Labuschagne of Potchefstroom University joined hands with the Grey-shirts and lodged protest with Hertzog’s’ government as to the immigration of Jews from Nazi Germany.73 

At this point these Afrikaner Nationalist academics were concerning themselves with the poor white problem and ‘völkisch‘ mobilisation warning that Jews were ‘unassailable‘ to the Afrikaner Volk , they met to protest the SS Stuttgart at the University of Stellenbosch on 27 October 1936 and resolved that Jews were ‘undesirable‘ on account of ‘religion’ and ‘blood mingling‘ and that ‘cultural cooperation‘ with them was impossible.74

On 4 November, Dr Theophilus E. Dönges (future NP Acting Prime Minister) would nail the Nationalists colours to the mast and said: 

“The Jew is an insoluble element in every national life.”

1937 – DS Valie Strydom of the DRC writes a paper on Apartheid titled “the policy of Apartheid here in our land and the United States of America” comparing it to American South state segregation policies on schooling, church and suburbs as a model for both Coloured and Black Africans in South Africa.75

On the political front, in the wake of the ‘Stuttgart incident’, Dr. DF Malan tables an Immigration and Naturalisation Bill which sought to exclude immigrants who were ‘unassailable‘ with Afrikaner culture and even economics of the Afrikaner Volk and deal with ‘the Jewish problem’ as he termed it. This in turn led to the ‘Aliens Bill of 1937′ 76 being passed by the Hertzog led United Party government which although a watered down version of Malan’s original proposal, still pandered to issue of cultural and economic ‘assimilation’ to prevailing ‘European’ white culture in South Africa – opening the way for the “right kind” of European immigrants (the Aryan kind) and not the wrong kind (the Jewish kind).

1938 – The ‘Baster Plakaat’ political illustration appears in the ‘Die Vaderland’, a National Party mouthpiece on 12 May 1938 and marks the trigger point where ‘Race Law’ starts to enter into National Party thinking from the political front using mass media. Building on a combination of the Nazi Nuremberg Race laws (which banned ‘mixed’ blood marriages of different races and Jews) and Jim Crow American segregation laws (the separation of blacks and whites on which the Nazi German lawyers based their Nuremberg Laws). 

The Baster Plakaat as it appeared in National Party mouthpiece broad-sheet media and election posters.

The race laws find context and expression in a ‘Pure’ Voortrekker woman, in prayer to God and in ‘pure’ white traditional kappie and dress – now “tainted” with “Kaffir” blood, the words ‘dans met Kaffirs’ (dances, i.e to have sexual relations with the black native ‘Kaffirs’) writ in blood … a warning to keep races apart and prevent intercourse lest the purity of soul and the honour of white Afrikanerdom is compromised.77

On the theological front, the Rev. Koot Vorster (the future Prime Minister’s older brother) writes:

‘The Afrikaner’s freedom lies at the foundation of our aspiration and will to keep our blood pure and not to allow our people to miscegenation (bastardise).’78

DF Malan’s Purified National Party (PNP) become the official opposition to Hertzog’s United Party ‘fusion’ after the General Election held on 18 May 1938. Malan and the Purified Nationalists at their The Union Congress of the Nationalist Party in 1938 declared:

‘This Congress regards the dominant position of the White race in the spirit of guardianship as of vital importance to the future and welfare of South Africa. It declares therefore that it must be the earnest and determined struggle of that race to preserve its racial purity, to ensure the creation of a sound relationship between it and the non-White races, and also to avoid its economic destruction.’79

Dr. Malan then proclaimed the basic slogan of the Nationalists would be:

‘We want to make sure that South Africa remains a White man’s country.’

In 1938, the Broederbond under the directive of its Chairman, Henning Klopper sought to use the centenary of Great Trek to unite the ‘Cape Afrikaners’ and the ‘Boere Afrikaners’ under the symbology of the Great trek. In this endeavour artificially creating a shared Afrikaner heritage under the pioneering symbology of the Great Trek and to literally map a “path to a South African Republic” under a white Afrikaner hegemony. Klopper started a Great Trek re-enactment with two Ox-Wagons in Cape Town on 8 August 1938, and addressed the large crowd of 20,000 spectators by saying;

‘Let us build up a monument for Afrikaner hearts. May this simple trek bind together in love those Afrikaner hearts which do not yet beat together. We dedicate these wagons to our People and to our God.80

The trek re-enactment was very successful, and Klopper managed to realign white Afrikaner identity under the Broederbond’s Christian Nationalist ideology calling on providence and declaring it a:

‘sacred happening’81

1939 – The Ossewabrandwag was formed on 4 February 1939 (OB, the Ox-Wagon Sentinel) on the back of the 1938 Great Trek Centennial celebration and tasked with spreading the Broederbond’s (and the PNP’s) ideology of Christian Nationalism like “wildfire” across the country (hence the name Ox wagon “Sentinel”).

Application of Group Areas, insert picture the Rev. Koot Vorster

The Rev. Koot Vorster crosses over from his career as a theologian studying Church Law in the DRC to politician when he Chairs the ‘Separate Neighbourhoods Organisation’ which is a think tank for Group Areas Act and the Separate Representations Act, both keystone ‘pillars’ of National Party’s future Apartheid policy.82

‘In 1939 a ‘colour petition’ organised by the Pure Nationalists and signed by 230,619 Whites was presented to Parliament but not discussed. It demanded: (1) a ban on all mixed marriages; (2) all blood-mixing of White and non-White to be punishable (3) all deurmekaarwonery (living of the various races side by side) to be ended; and (4) economic and political segregation of White and non-White.’83

Manie Maritz, the Afrikaner Rebellion 1914 leader and Afrikaner “people’s hero”, also admired German National Socialism and split from his association with Hertzog’s old National Party to join the SANP Grey-shits, after a leadership purge he joined Chris Havemann’s Black-shirts. A converted antisemite and extreme racist, Maritz blamed the South African War on a Jewish conspiracy. He publishers an autobiography “My Lewe en Strewe” (my life and purpose) in 1939 and he outlines his political purpose to bring “the protocols of the elders of Zion” (a discredited racist propaganda document) and the dangers of Freemasonry, Judaism and Bolshevism contained therein to the Afrikaner people.84

Manie Maritz and a section from My Lewe en Strewe

Dr. Nico Diederichs (future National Party ceremonial State President) on 9 May 1939, in his capacity of the Chairman of the Broederbond, would meet Herr. H. Kirchner, a Nazi foreign ministry representative in South Africa. Diederichs assures Kirchner that the divisions in Afrikanerdom had been overcome by the purging of Freemasons from Broederbond (which he had personally seen to) – he would go on to say that the Pure National Party (PNP) was a committed anti-semitic party and as policy had hung its hat on it, he assures Kirchner that Dr. DF Malan, Malan is also a committed anti-semitic. Diederichs however feels that more needs to be done to frame up National Party policies in line with National Socialism and confides in Kirchner that he does not think Dr. DF Malan is the man to do it, rather the implementation of the ‘anti-democratic’ and other national socialist principles should he left to Dr. Hans van Rensburg (future leader of the Ossewabrandwag) who he also feels would be ideal leader of the Purified National Party going forward.85

By July 1939, the Black-shirts were formally incorporated into the OB and focussed on the recruiting of ‘Christian minded National Aryans’ into the OB and starts to infuse it with National Socialist “volkisch” Nationalism.86

World War 2 breaks out when Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939, the United Party found itself in a dilemma and a parliamentary three-way debate would take place. This debate, primarily between the two factions in the United Party (Hertzog’s cabal and Smut’s cabal) and the Purified Nationalists, was whether South Africa should go to war against Germany or remain neutral.

Prime Minister Hertzog was very confident he had the majority to carry a motion of neutrality. However Smuts’ argument that to stand aside from the conflict would be to expose the whole “civilised” world to danger wins the day.87  Smuts’ amendment to Hertzog’s Motion of Neutrality was carried by 80 votes to 67 votes on the 4 September 1939 and South Africa finds itself at war against Nazi Germany. Surprised at the outcome, Hertzog promptly resigned and along with 36 of his supporters left the United Party, thereby leaving the South African Premiership and the leadership of the United Party to Smuts.88

1940 – Hertzog moved to form a new party – the “Volksparty” and successfully reconciled with the “Malanites” in the PNP to then form the “Herenigde Nasionale Volksparty” (HNP) 89 or Reunited National Party in January 1940.90 However, on 5 November 1940 at the HNP’s Convention in Bloemfontein, Hertzog reaffirmed his position on English-speakers rights, and falling on deaf ears, he grabbed his hat and walked out of the National Party forever, leaving the leadership of the HNP to Malan.

Oswald Pirow, whilst Hertzog’s old Minister of Defence met with Adolf Hitler, Hermann Göring, Benito Mussolini and Francisco Franco, and he becomes a convert to Nazism and Fascism. On 14 March 1940 Smuts forced Pirow out of his position as Minister of Defence for mismanaging his parliamentary portfolio, rendering the defence force unfit for wartime purposes and his failed “bush cart strategy”.91

Pirow gambled his career on a Nazi Germany victory and on 25 September 1940, he founded the national socialist ‘New Order’ (NO) for South Africa. He positioned it as a study group within the reformulated National Party (HNP), and based it on Hitler’s new order plans for Africa.92 During the Second World War, Pirow also positioned the NO as a defender of whites in Africa against the threat of Communism.93 In terms of the NO’s values, Pirow espoused Nazi ideals and advocated the “anti-democratic” principle an authoritarian state.94

The Rev. Koot Vorster in his guise as both a Church Leader and Ossewabrandwag ‘General’ conflates National Socialist “Führerprinzip” or Leader Principle and Afrikaner identity and the need for ‘separateness’ to succeed when on 15 September 1940 he states:

‘Hitler’s ‘Mein Kampf’ shows the way to greatness – the path of South Africa. Hitler gave the Germans a calling. He gave them a fanaticism which causes them to stand back for no one. We must follow this example because only by such holy fanaticism can the Afrikaner nation achieve its calling.’95

Hertzog, now in retirement and angered by his treatment at the hands of HNP and Malan, performs a remarkable volte-face and issued a press release in October 1941 in which he championed National Socialism.96 In the release Hertzog excoriated liberal capitalism and the democratic party system, praised Nazism as in keeping with the traditions of the Afrikaner, and argued that South Africa needed the oversight of a one-party state dictatorship.97

Manie Maritz, moving from the Black-shirts, then founded his own anti-parliamentary, pro National Socialist, antisemitic ‘Volksparty’, in Pietersburg in July 1940. 98 This evolved and merged into ‘Die Boerenasie’ (The Boer Nation), a party with National Socialist leanings originally led by J.C.C. Lass (the first Commandant General of the Ossewabrandwag) but briefly taken over by Maritz until his accidental death in December 1940.

On 30 October 1940, J.C.C. Laas resigns from the Ossewabrandwag as the Kommandant General, Malan also makes a declaration in a speech at Cradock which became known as the ‘Cradock Agreement’, defining the respective spheres of the Reunited National Party (HNP) and the Ossewabrandwag (OB). Each organization undertook not to meddle in the affairs of the other. The HNP was to do the work of Afrikanerdom in the party-political sphere, while the OB was to operate on the other (cultural) fronts of the Afrikaner “volk” (people).99

The Broederbond attempts to define Apartheid as a policy and commissions ‘think tanks’ within its structure to come up with it. However it falls short and L.J. du Plessis urges that Segregation is used rather than Apartheid as segregation was the ‘national policy’ in any event and had not reached its fullest potential as:

‘Afrikanerdom had not yet had the chance to carry it out.’.100

1941 – on 15 January 1941 the Ossewabrandwag (OB) came under the leadership of Dr. J.E.J. (Hans) van Rensburg,101 who had served as a National Party administrator of the Orange Free State. He was a strong admirer of Nazi Germany and campaigned for ‘a free Afrikaner republic based on nationalist-Socialist foundations.’ Explicitly rejecting parliamentary politics, the OB insisted that as the only mass movement it represented all Afrikaners. The OB pinned its hopes on a victory Nazi Germany and German help in establishing an Afrikaner republic. The OB had its own division of storm troopers, called the Stormjaers, who actively resisted the war by acts of sabotage and a handful of assassinations.102

Van Rensburg infused the OB with National Socialist ideology, whereafter the organisation took on a distinctive fascist appearance, with Nazi ritual, insignia, structure, oaths and salutes. Ideologically speaking the OB adopted a number of Nazi characteristics: they opposed communism, and approved of antisemitism. The OB adopted the Nazi creed of “Blut und Boden” (Blood and Soil) in terms of both racial purity and an historical bond and rights to the land. They embraced the “Führerprinzip” (Führer Principle) and the “anti-democratic” totalitarian state (rejecting “British” parliamentary democracy). They also used a derivative of the Nazi creed of “Kinder, Küche, Kirche” (Children, Kitchen, Church) as to the role of women and the role of the church in relation to state. In terms of economic policy, the OB also adopted a derivative of the Nazi German economic policy calling for the expropriation of “Jewish monopoly capital” without compensation and added “British monopoly capital” to the mix.103

Ossewabrandwag dress and bearing

On 1 January 1914, the Afrikaner nationalist mouthpiece Die Vaderland called the OB ‘the greatest Afrikaans organisation outside of the Church’ and van Rensburg was not inclined to play second fiddle to Malan, whom he despised as a hide-bound constitutionalist.104

The Rev Koot Vorster, in February 1941 is sentenced to three years hard labour by the Smuts government when he is caught red handed in acts of sedition supporting the Nazi German war effort.105

In September 1941, fearing a leadership crisis over the OB’s encroachment from the cultural realm into the political realm and the promotion of the “Führerprinzip” over D.F. Malan’s more acceptable approach to working within “parliamentary democracy”, Malan in addition fears an ‘armed uprising’ of Afrikaners, so he moves to ‘ban’ OB members from joining the HNP. 106 B.J. “John” Vorster (the future National Party Prime Minister) refuses to resign from either, so the HNP make his mind up for him and expel him.

1942 – Smuts’ delivers a keynote address to the Institute of Race Relations on 21 January 1942, his usual position on ‘black’ and ‘white’ race and patronage changes, he opposes Nazism and attacks the Afrikaner nationalists who accepted Nazism, Smuts states, ‘.. that Nazi ideology of race produces the idea of a master people, the Herrenvolk. That is going back to an old discarded idea of slavery’ … and the policy of ‘segregation had resulted in very great disappointment at the results’ … and he proposes the need for a new policy, including a more equitable territorial (land) reconfiguration and the recognition of increasing Black urbanisation and their political aspirations.’107 Smuts then states:

‘Segregation has fallen on evil days’108

Smuts’ speech rallies the Afrikaner right wing who take up a position that Smuts’ “liberal” policies intend to give Black South Africans the franchise, and that an Afrikaner who did not believe in Afrikaner Nationalism was an “an Afrikaner of another kind”, a “traitor” with a “British heart”.

Smuts addressing both Houses of Parliament in the UK, insert picture shows Jan Hofmeyr, Smuts’ protégé

On the Afrikaner Nationalist right, the firebrand nature of the Ossewabrandwag (OB) also appealed to B.J. Vorster (future National Party Prime Minister and President of South Africa) more than the National Party during the war years. In 1942 he conflates the Broederbond’s ideology of Christian Nationalism with Nazism and Fascism and publicly states:

‘We stand for Christian Nationalism which is an ally of National Socialism. You can call this anti-democratic principle dictatorship if you wish. In Italy it is called Fascism, in Germany National Socialism (Nazism) and in South Africa, Christian Nationalism.’109

In response to growing support for Nazism in the Afrikaner community, a number of Afrikaner Nationalists find themselves interned by the Smuts government for acts of sedition and treason supporting the Nazi German war effort, these include the Broederbond’s legal stalwart Kowie Marais and B.J. Vorster.110

1943 – The DRC Federal Mission Council approaches Prime Minister Jan Smuts and requests a ban on mixed marriages. The DRC mission includes a biologists report from H.B. Fantham, who:

‘maintained that the colouring of black and white intermixture displayed negative social and mental characteristics.’111

Smuts rejects their proposal stating:

‘The line between white and coloured people in many instances could not be drawn.’112

Die Burger uses ‘Apartheid’ for the first time in mass media, when it referred to Apartheid as the:

‘accepted Afrikaner viewpoint’.113

In 1943, Dr. Verwoerd, as the editor of Die Transvaler, sued the English-language newspaper The Star for libel after it accused him of being a Nazi propagandist, the case back-fired as Justice Millin, in a 25,000-word judgement found Verwoerd had indeed being complicit in promoting Nazism and concluded:

‘Dr. Verwoerd caused this large body of German propaganda to be published and that it was along the same themes as the Afrikaans Zeesen reports which was “calculated to make the Germans look on Die Transvaler as a most useful adjunct to this propaganda service”‘.114

1944 – in May 1944, Dr. D.F. Malan and Paul Sauer, offered the first extended defence of Apartheid as a concept in parliament. Malan called for a republic based on the policy of:

‘apartheid and trusteeship, made safe for the white race and the development of the non-white race, according their own aptitude and abilities.’115

1945 – The Reunited National Party adopts Apartheid as its official policy.116

Surrounded by the Red Army, Adolf Hitler commits suicide and 30 April 1945. Nazi Germany unconditionally surrenders to Allied forces on 7 May 1945.

From 20 November 1945 to 1 October 1946, the Nuremberg Trial takes place and exposes the full criminality of the Nazi Party regime and its ideology. The Nazi dogma with its focus on the bogus “protocols of the elders of Zion” to justify the holocaust is exposed as wilful genocide and deemed a crime against humanity.

1946 – having served his sentence and released from jail, the Rev. Koot Vorster champions a DRC inter-church commission on Communism. This commission’s aim was to ‘combat the communist worldview in South Africa‘ and represents another cross over of Church and Afrikaner Nationalism politics in defining the “Rooi Gevaar” (red danger) policy.117  

In light of his ‘segregation has fallen on evils days’ statement, Smuts appoints The Native Laws Commission (also known as the Fagan Commission) to look at Black African urbanisation and investigate changes to the policies of segregation. In August 1946, in agreement with the Fagan Commission recommendation to end segregation, Smuts nails his colours to the mast in opposition to Apartheid and says of it:

‘The idea that the Natives must all be removed and confined in their own kraals is in my opinion the greatest nonsense I have ever heard.’118

1947 – Malan appoints P.O. Sauer to head a party commission to turn apartheid into a comprehensive racial policy.119 The Sauer Commission was in part intended to forestall Smuts’ Native Laws Commission (the Fagan Commission) and counteract its recommendations as to any changes to segregation policies.

The Sauer Commission proposes a policy aimed at ensuring blacks develop:

‘in their own territory and in their own towns.’120

Malan also declares that it is not the state that took the lead with inventing Apartheid, it was the DRC.121 He says:

‘It was not the State but the Church who took the lead with Apartheid The State followed the principle laid down by the Church in the field of education for the native, the coloured and the Asian. The result? Friction was eliminated. The Boer church surpasses the other churches in missionary activity. It is the result of Apartheid.”

1948 – the DRC Synod of the Transvaal accepts the 1935 DRC Mission for separate education for separate nations and refers the Tower of Babel as the justification for Apartheid.122

April 1948 sees Oswald Pirow re-engage his relationship with Oswald Mosley, the discredited leader of the defunct ‘British Union of Fascists’, in order to collaborate on a Neo Nazi ‘New Order’ model for Africa as a whole. The come up with the Mosley-Pirow Proposals, which were: ‘a natural development of General Hertzog’s Segregation Policy and was foreshadowed by (his) then cabinet colleagues 15 years earlier’.123 The proposals essentially divide Africa into a large southern ‘white’ state with its labour provided by separate ‘black’ vassal states on temporary work permits. The work foreshadows the Apartheid Bantustan program and influx control policies.

The ‘Oswalds’ – Pirow left and Mosely right – collaborating in London

With Nazism now a worldwide anathema, the Grey-shirts (SANP) disbands in 1948 with most its leadership joining Malan’s HNP or aligning with it under a new entity called ‘the white workers party’ in 1949.

Dr. Malan pledges that Aryan German immigrants were necessary to cultivate a ‘broad Nordic front to counter Communism, Blacks and Jews’.124 Schalk Botha and Dr. Vera Bührmann fly to war-torn Germany on behalf of the ‘German Children’s Fund (DKF) on 27 April 1948. They aim to implement a Weimar Eugenic program and locate 10,000 healthy White, German, Protestant (Aryan) orphans and bring them to South Africa for adoption by leading Afrikaner Nationalists in order to:

‘strengthen their own Afrikaner Volk with the blood of “prestigious” German-Aryan Herrenvolk’125

Unable to meet their target due to restrictions in Germany, they secure only 87 “orphans”, the first choice of which is given to Dr. Malan who adopts a little girl.

The 1948 General Elections on 26 May 1948 are a landmark occasion in South Africa, as Malan and his HNP in coalition with the Afrikaner Party win a constitutional majority by a single seat, although not elected on a ‘majority’ popular vote they take up the mantle of ruling party citing divine providence to bring their policy of Apartheid to all South Africans.

As the new ruling party the HNP tables and passes Acts that begin to form the ‘cornerstone’ of Apartheid, these include:

  • The South West Africa Amendment Act. propagated in 1948, provided for the representation for white South West Africans citizens in the South African Parliament, ignoring International Law and the status of the Namibian mandate.
  • Asiatic Laws Amendment Act of 1948 takes away franchise and land ownership rights of South African Indians and confines them to pre-determined ‘areas’.

1949 – the DRC Synod of the Cape declares the 1857 DRC Synod which made way for separate worship as the epicentre of Apartheid – and to the 1935 DRC Church policy on the segregation of schools and education and declares:

‘”Vertical Separation” between black and white so they can each achieve their own “independence “.’126

The fundamental difference in Afrikanerdom between Smuts and Malan is seen on 16 December 1949, at the inauguration of Voortrekker Monument as a symbol of ‘the Afrikaner’s proprietary right to South Africa’. General Jan Smuts warned:

‘Let us not be fanatical about our past and romanticise it.’ Smuts then called for greater co-operation between white and Black South Africans as the ‘most difficult and final test of our civilisation’.

Malan, now the Prime Minister of South Africa, took a different view to Smuts in his speech and warned:

‘Godless communism’ was threatening the achievements of the Afrikaners and ‘there was a danger of blood mixing and disintegration of the white race. The only way of avoiding the spectre of a descent into “semi-barbarism” was a return to the Voortrekker spirit and a return to the volk, church and God.’127

1950 – Acts which constitute the ‘Pillars of Apartheid’ are passed by the National Party as the governing party, these include:

  • The Immorality Amendment Act, 1950 (Act No. 21 of 1950) prohibits sexual intercourse between white people and people of colour. The act was an amendment to the 1927 Immorality Act originally introduced by Hertzog’s governing National Party and its eventually extended to include homosexuality.
  • The Group Areas Act, 1950 (Act No. 41 of 1950) separates urban areas into racially segregated zones where members of one specific race alone could live and work. Group areas were created for the exclusive ownership and occupation of a designated group and it became a criminal offence for a member of one racial group to reside on or own land in an area set aside by proclamation for another race. 
  • The Suppression of Communism Act, 1950 (Act No. 44 of 1950) gives the Minister of Justice broad powers to suppress not only Communism but any scheme aimed at achieving change, whether economic, social, political, or industrial, “by the promotion of disturbance or disorder” or any act encouraging “feelings of hostility between the European and the non-European races … calculated to further (disorder)”
Insert – Dr. D.F. Malan

Jan Smuts passes away on the 11 September 1950 of a heart attack, aged 80.

1951 – The Reunited National Party formally Afrikaner Party are formally amalgamated to form ‘The National Party’ again, ending the long standing division caused by Hertzog and “Fusion” with Smuts back in 1933. The Afrikaner Nationalists who had splintered from the National Party into all the various shirt movements, the Ossewabrandwag and the New Order are welcomed back under a singular party.

These pro-Nazi and anti-war groupings within the National Party planted a fertile seed bed for the future authoritarianism of the Apartheid state. The constant depreciation of liberal democracy in this demographic of Afrikaners alongside an almost ‘hysterical exaltation’ for both ‘racist’ and a ‘Völkisch‘ group ethics were to have long term effects.128

Although Nazi ideology and dogma was no longer permissible in the political sphere, no solid measures were put in place by the Smuts government to prevent it from flourishing. Afrikaner Nationalists entertaining strong National Socialist ideologies and having committed treason and sedition during the war, who in European countries would have been hanged for war crimes, landed up back in mainstream party politics under the banner of the National Party and many even ended their days in Parliament.129

On the legislative front:

  • The Separate Representation of Voters Act 1941( Act No. 46 of 1951) is introduced as part of a deliberate process to remove all non-white people from the voters’ roll and revoke the Cape Qualified Franchise system, this triggers the Constitutional Crisis.

The Separate Representation Act and the Constitutional Crisis, triggers the formation of War Veterans Action Committee (WVAC), a returning ‘white’ war veterans lobby group led by Sailor Malan, which in turn becomes the first mass anti-apartheid protest movement, called The Torch Commando. In Sailor Malan’s words, The Torch Commando’s primary mission:

‘The Torch Commando was established to oppose the police state, abuse of state power, censorship, racism, the removal of the coloured vote and other oppressive manifestations of the creeping fascism of the National Party regime’.

1952 – the African National Congress (ANC) announces the start of the Defiance Campaign scheduled to begin with mass protests and defiance of Apartheid laws by the country’s black majority on 26 June 1952.

Whodunnit

As can be seen from the chronology and historiography of Apartheid, the body that ‘invents’ it is not the British and nor is it the entire white Afrikaner diaspora. It is in fact invented in the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC). The British are the “catalyst” to Apartheid in that without Britain’s abolition of slavery and Britain’s implementation of a colour blind franchise putting Dutch Reformed Church puritans on the same footing as some black slaves – the journey to ‘Apartheid’ would have taken a different path.

There has been a long standing debate in academic circles revolving around Apartheid’s origins and historiography. Two sides emerged from the debate, both agree that the origin of Apartheid is slavery in the Dutch Cape Colony, however after that the two arguments go separate ways.

One group points to the Voortrekker’s Puritan religious standpoint which brought the idea of “separate worship” for Blacks and Whites into Dutch Reformed Church policy. The epicentre is the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) NGK Synod in 1857 and subsequent Synods and Dominees come to define Apartheid along the lines of Jim Crow Laws, Darwinist Eugenics and Southern American State Segregation policies. This group, defines Apartheid as a derivative of American Segregation along ecclesiastical lines.

The other group points to the advent of National Socialism (Nazism) in the mid 1930’s as the key political driver of Apartheid’s origin, and they name the National Party’s ‘Think Tank’ Professors and academics who are all enamoured and besotted with Nazi Germany, anti-Semitism, Nuremberg Race Laws and Weimar Eugenics as the chief proponents of it. This group would define Apartheid as a derivative of National Socialism along party political and ideological lines.

Stepping into the fray to sort the argument out once and for all in 2003 was the heavy-weight Afrikaner historian – Professor Hermann Giliomee. He concluded in his work ‘the making of the Apartheid plan’ that the essence and origin of Apartheid lay along the DRC’s ecclesiastical lines and had nothing to with Nazism. He cites a famous speech by Dr. DF Malan in 1947, and taking it at face value he formats it as the crux of his argument, it’s a speech where Malan declares that it is not the state that took the lead with Apartheid, it was the Dutch Reformed Church who led it – and according to the Church, the DRC Synod in 1857 in the ZAR marks the start of it.130

What Professor Giliomee loses sight of by quoting DF Malan, is it is this very man who is front a centre in a very Weimar Eugenic based Aryan adoption program to boost the bloodline of white Afrikaners with Nazi German Herrenvolk blood and to advance an Völkisch ideology in South Africa. Malan not only opens the way for this ideology and thinking by the “Germanophiles” and wartime pro-Nazi leaders in his party, he even adopts one of the children. The German Children’s Fund (DKF) is not only inspired by National Socialist dogma, it is a vert practical and realistic application of it in South Africa.

The Malan family with their DKF adoptive child re-named Marieke Malan after Dr. Malan’s wife Maria.

Giliomee also loses sight of the fact that Malan makes this declaration in 1947, after the end of the war in 1945 and the exposure of Nazism and its ideological connection to the holocaust, and by deflecting to the Dutch Reformed Church (to which he is pre-disposed to do as a Dominee anyway) he is gaslighting for the plethora of “Germanophiles” who have been advocating National Socialism in all the various Afrikaner Nationalist cultural, media and political structures and who have all subsequently been warmly welcomed into the HNP’s fold and its leadership caucus. Especially after their 1948 election win and the merger with the Afrikaner Party to reconstitute the HNP as the “National Party” (NP). 

To be fair to Giliomee, what he does not have sight of in 2003 is all the recently uncovered archive files and materials found 20 years later. Documents on the Ossewabrandwag pointing to Nazi collusion – files, court records, letters, memos and confessions from South African Nazi renegades within Afrikaner nationalism captured and interrogated in the Rein Commission and published in the Barrett Commission findings after the war – files which were, until recently, regarded as either missing, “gate-kept” or embargoed. Even the recent findings and academic works on the Nazi German propaganda program in South Africa makes for an eye-opening historiography of Apartheid.

Previously “shielded” (gate-kept) or missing files – primary source material – have now finally put the nail into the ecclesiastical argument as the sole origin and development of Apartheid and we can now finally conclude that not only was Apartheid ‘invented’ by the Dutch Reformed Church, it was subsequently infused with National Socialism – and although not Nazism in its purest form it is indeed a derivative of Nazism.

Afrikaner Christian Nationalism vs. German National Socialism

So what’s the real difference between Apartheid and Nazism? The fundamental difference lies in the religious approach to establish a ‘Herrenvolk’ – a ‘pure’ white European race. How this is arrived at is fundamentally different to one another – the Nazis arrived at the idea of a Herrenvolk on a Nordic mythology and occultism platform, the Afrikaner Nationalists arrive at the idea of a Herrenvolk on a Calvinist puritan and ecclesiastical platform. Whichever way they arrive at it, they arrive at the same thing.

Afrikaner Nationalism and youth (left), Nazi German National Socialism and Hitler youth (right).

The ‘dominees’ base their Herrenvolk concept on a strict Calvinist Puritan dogma and an early idea of Darwinism and American eugenics based on Jim Crow and American Anti-miscegenation and segregation laws, the idea that the Afrikaner nation is ordained by God to be a morally superior nation over heathen (Kaffir) nations. The more germaphobe ‘politicians’ in the National Party build on the Herrenvolk concept with Nazi German Nuremberg Race Laws and German (Weimar) eugenics promoted by Hitler – the idea that the infusion of degenerate elements (Untermensch nations – including Blacks and Jews) into the bloodstream weaken the Herrenvolk nation so as to be morally inferior.

With the adoption of Krugerism as its core ideology and the conflating of Church and State, the National Party finds itself split in two camps over its historic sweep – on the one side are the Dutch Reformed ‘dominees’ like Dr. D.F. Malan and on the other side are the ‘politicians’ like Dr. H.F. Verwoerd.

Also, one group in the National Party sphere, like Malan and Sauer tend to favour ‘democracy’ as defined within the ‘white democratic constitution’ of South Africa to attain political objectives (as are the principles in the segregated states of the USA) – the Germaphobe inclined politicians in the National Party sphere like van Rensburg, Dönges, Vorster, Pirow, Diederichs etc. favour the ‘anti-democratic’ principle as defined by the Nazi “Führerprinzip”. This has bearing later as South Africa as they manipulate the constitution and laws to become a police state and with all opposition banned, imprisoned, deported or gagged – the Apartheid state mirrors a Nazi modus operandi and becomes a one party authoritarian state promoting a very thin veneer of wholesome ‘democracy’ to its faithful.

At the end of the day Apartheid – from a dogma standpoint, is a curious mix of Puritan Calvinism and Völkisch Nationalism. Legally it’s a curious mix of American Jim Crow segregation laws and Nürnberger Gesetze Nazi German race purity laws. Ideologically speaking Apartheid is a curious cocktail of Krugerism, Hertzogism, National Socialism and Fascism. None of which have anything to do with the British and their prevailing philosophy – which is a curious mix of monarchism and democratic liberalism.

Neo Nationalist Revisionism

As to Hélène Opperman Lewis book “Apartheid: Britain’s Bastard Child” released in 2017 blaming Apartheid as a psychological consequence of mutual trauma caused the British scorched earth and concentration camps policies of the South African War (1899-1902), and more recently reinforced by Albert Blake’s in his book “Jopie Fourie – ’n besinning” (a reflection) when he writes (my translation from Afrikaans):

Afrikaner Nationalism is increasingly seen as an attempt at self-protection – exclusively, partly to avoid repeating the unacceptable past (referring the South African War 1899-1902 and the Afrikaner Rebellion 1914-1915). This contributed to the emergence of hard-line Afrikaner nationalism which gave rise to an inflexible and, for others, an unacceptable racial policy. The Afrikaner wanted to avoid similar suffering as in the past at all costs, but by doing so overlooked the suffering of others. It became a vicious cycle from ‘abused children’ (under British rule) to ‘abusive parents’ (under apartheid) that is never broken, because there has been no healing for the unprocessed trauma.’131

Blake and Opperman Lewis are effectively extending an old National Party argument, the idea of ‘the politics of pain’ as the justification for nationalism and the identification of a ‘political’ and ‘economic’ enemy embodied therein, in the case of the Afrikaner Nationalists this led to extreme Anglophobia and the raison d’exister for Apartheid. This old Christian Nationalism dogma is largely disproven as rhetoric to drive a racially divided state. But in this case it has been given a new veneer, as in the social sciences Psychology has emerged as another method to understand history and in this case it has a tool called epigenetics.

Epigenetics states that ‘trauma’ is carried from generation to generation in the DNA and called ‘Intergenerational trauma’. So according to Elsabé Brits in her review of Albert Blake’s book titled. Op dees aarde: Oorlogstrauma en die radikale Afrikaner-psige (On this earth: War trauma and the radical Afrikaner psyche) – it was the women’s and children’s suffering in both the white and black concentration camps that was passed on from one generation to the next and although they kept it to themselves it resurfaced generations later.132 The political landscape was impacted, Apartheid instituted as a protection mechanism and mutual suffering entered Afrikaner identity along with Anglophobia. Blake argues further that this Afrikaner Nationalism driven by trauma was accelerated by the 1914 Afrikaner Rebellion and Jopie Fourie’s execution.

There are a number of problems with this Neo Nationalist Revisionism. As can be be seen from the historiography of Apartheid, and the chronology of Apartheid, this revisionist approach really has unhinged itself from the historical method. For the following glaring reasons:

  1. It denies the historical fact that Apartheid’s origins lie in slavery and the abolishment thereof and rejects all contemporary historians who advocate this.
  2. It ignores the historic sweep of all the Boer conflict with Black tribes to establish Afrikaner led hegemony’s and skips out the establishment of the Afrikaner covenant (and Afrikaner Nationalism) on the back of the Boer invasion of the Zulu Kingdom (1837-1840) and warring with “Blacks” (and not the British) – Xhosa, Zulu, Pedi, Tswana etc. In the end ‘Apartheid’ is a system of primarily repressing ‘Black’ ambitions and not the ‘White’ ones (Boer or Brit).
  3. It denies the historical fact that the Dutch Reformed Church invented Apartheid in a fully independent ZAR in 1857 when it instituted separate worship, it even rejects the Afrikaner Nationalist’s and D.F. Malan’s claim that it was the Dutch Reformed Church who invented Apartheid – proof that it has nothing to do with the ‘British’ and it rejects all the contemporary historians who advocate this.
  4. It rejects the fact that the origins of Apartheid legislature lie in the Constitution of the ZAR in 1860, legislature that has no bearing on ‘the British’ or Westminster whatsoever.
  5. It does not recognise the advent of Krugerism in 1883 as the ideological bedrock of Christian Nationalism and Apartheid.
  6. Afrikaner Nationalism as a movement seeking regional paramountcy for the Afrikaner started in 1880 with the Afrikaner Bond – long before the South African War.
  7. The British Scorched Earth policy only impacts the ZAR and OFS boers, which before the Boer War account for less than half the white Afrikaner diaspora – the majority of Afrikaners are in the Cape and they do not take up arms against the British. The idea that they have a ‘shared’ experience with their northern brethren is an artificial one put forward by the Broederbond in 1938.
  8. Even within the concentration camps themselves, it does not acknowledge that the concentration camps contained Afrikaner families with British loyalist leanings because of Boer actions traumatising them (loyalists, hensoppers and joiners) and attempts to lump these groups with Bittereinder families as all been “traumatised by the British” as a “national whole”. Again leaning to the propaganda of the Broederbond in 1938 rather than to actual historic fact and simple statistics.
  9. It also attempts to lump the Black Concentration camp experience with the White Concentration camp experience as a mutually shared trauma, when leading historians on black concentration camps have proven this is not the case.
  10. Although acknowledging the idea of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” with regards Nazi Germany, this Neo Nationalist Revisionism thinking does not adequately explain or even answer why Apartheid becomes so enamoured with National Socialist dogma, ideology, symbology and legislation – even after National Socialism is soundly defeated and exposed for what it is in 1945.

Epigenetics is a new scientific argument in the ‘nature versus nurture’ debate and a highly controversial one at that, what is currently known is that there is no real understanding as to ‘how’ the DNA signature comes about, in mice experiments it shows the phenomenon to be ‘very rare’ and trauma signatures are not transferable to the majority. It is also thought that it can be ‘un-learned’ through social conditioning and therefore the linear transference of trauma can be stopped.133

A case to consider here, is that through two World Wars and the London ‘Blitz’, more British civilians died at the hands of German Luftwaffe bombers from 1940-1941 in the London Blitz alone than the entire Boer population during the South African War 1899-1902, one would think that given “inter-generational’ trauma and ‘Post Traumatic Stress Disorder’ (PTSD) issues the modern Briton would simply “hate” the Germans and be in permanent lock-stop with all the psychological trauma caused by it all the time – and at the same time trying to conceive nationalist mechanisms to protect themselves from Germany in future. But the simple truth is, there is no such hatred for Germans in modern Britain, and that is very much a function of how modern Britons (and Germans for that matter) are socially and culturally “conditioned” – their socialisation process in effect.

The idea that Epigenetics, in the rare cases it can be found, can be ‘stopped’ through social conditioning brings up another point from a historic point of view. In the case of the Boer War, the simple fact that the vast majority of Black South Africans have no inter-generational shared trauma to the Boer War whatsoever, the legacy of the Black concentration camps is all but forgotten. In fact historians like Dr. Garth Benneyworth are having to revert to the forensic and archaeological record to account the history as it is so poorly captured in the written record and even more scarce in the verbal (spoken) record.

The reason that Black South Africans have not been conditioned as to their role in the Boer War is because it was pitched for decades by Afrikaner Nationalists as a “whites only” affair, the trauma of the Boer War almost exclusively on “white” women and children over a five decade long Broederbond ‘Christian Nationalist’ indoctrination and socialisation process – Blacks were merely “by-standers” and only “participated” here and there (and there are still some out there trying to push this narrative) – so simply put, generationally speaking, Black South Africans have “un-learned” it and have lost touch with any latent post traumatic stress (PTSD) it may or may not have caused.

What is however very existent in the Black community today is the trans-generational trauma caused by the Afrikaner Nationalists and their “Apartheid” ideology on the new generation of Black South Africans – and this is also very much a function of “conditioning” due to revolutionist and revisionist history rather than any DNA signature or for those Black South Africans “born free” any sort of latent PTSD.

To answer the question upfront, who does Apartheid’s “bastard child” belong to? Whose the parent? The uncomfortable truth is that many white Afrikaner writers and authors need to face facts – Apartheid has origin in their Church, it’s not birthed outside of it, it’s birthed inside it. The chronology and historiography of Apartheid is very clear and the responsible parent is not “the British” it’s in fact the “Dominee” and for many Afrikaners and their scribes that truism still cuts far too close to the bone to contemplate – its much easier to write to white Afrikaner popularism and appeal to a community desperately seeking absolution for Apartheid and blaming the British instead.


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

Editors Notes

Please note, there will be many who will say … what about this battle, that protest or this strike that are not included? Where’s the Bambatha Revolt, the British war on the Pedi, the ZAR civil war with the OFS, the First Chimurenga, the Sharpeville Massacre, the Battle of Deville Wood, the Gun War, the Ngcayechibi’s War, the Malaboch War, the Griqua and the diamonds, Chinese indentured labour, the mfecane …. there’s LOADS missing!

That’s the problem, to do a chronology of Apartheid we come close to doing an entire chronology of South African history and it would exceed the limits of this blog. So, I’ve had to try and look at the thread of Apartheid – track where it has been part of constitutional changes as nation states have been formed, the legalise and the key players involved. Most important is the history of the ‘vote’ – the colour blind ‘franchise’ as that is critical to the development of Apartheid. Also critical is to look at the two different lines that shape Apartheid – the Dutch and the British and where and with whom the ‘invention’ of Apartheid lies – the “whodunnit”, and here we’ve had to include the history of the Dutch Reformed Church as it is critical – certainly when it comes to the “whodunnit”.

Time has also been spent on all three of The Boer Wars – The Transvaal Revolt (1880-1881), the South African War (1899-1902) and the Afrikaner Rebellion (1914-1915) as these three events are critical to modern psychological studies on the invention of Apartheid and the advent of Afrikaner Nationalist ‘politics of pain’ and ‘identity politics’ into the historiography of Apartheid.

I have also spent a little time to show that ‘segregation’ and the emancipation of people of colour between the British and the Dutch (and subsequently the Boer nations) follows an entirely different trajectory. Whilst British Imperialism is by no means perfect, and whilst over the course of historical sweep they have also instituted or have been privy to racist thinking and philosophy (the Victorian and Edwardian thinking on ‘civilisation’ and where nation states stood in relation to it), their trajectory in general follows a ‘progressive’ path to emancipation, the Liberal Democracy blueprint of Westminster and the Magna Carta guides it, whereas the Boer Nations and Afrikaner Nationalism with Krugerism at the centre of it has consistently followed a ‘regressive’ path to emancipation and served to deepen racial segregation and Apartheid – both before and after the South African War.

I’ve also included a little on Jan Smuts to show the track of ‘segregation’ as government policy sought by his party under Botha with the Land Act, and to show how Smuts evolves, firstly in his resistance to white miner colour bars and the Miners Revolt, then when he is finally back in the pound seats as Prime Minister from 1939 to 1948 his u-turn and rejection of segregation and Apartheid – this to show the development of Apartheid is not a linear phenomenon inherent to white Afrikaners and even within this diaspora there are a great many who are not in support of it.

Included, as it’s often purposefully ignored, and becoming increasing relevant as more information and material comes to light, is the ‘Nazification of the Afrikaner Right’ – the influence of Nazi Germany and National Socialism on the outcome of Apartheid as South Africans get caught up in a global conflict and Afrikaner Nationalist leaders and followers become enamoured and influenced by Nazi ideology.

I hope I’ve done it justice and the ‘essence’, the ‘golden thread’ is clear. I’ve stopped at the advent of the National Party and Apartheid as policy after 1948, as after that it’s less about who invented Apartheid and more about a chronology of “the struggle” from 1948 – 1994, something which has been drilled into every South African by now and a chronology all on its own.

Footnotes

  1. Creswicke, South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol 1, 1 ↩︎
  2. Walker to George Richardson. 10 September 1839, Miscellaneous Letters, Box R4/5, Library of Friends; Backhouse,  Narrative, 81.  ↩︎
  3. Awake, South Africa’s Dutch Reformed Church – A House Divided, 16-19 ↩︎
  4. Binckes, The Great Trek Uncut, 192 ↩︎
  5. Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa, 14 ↩︎
  6. Awake, South Africa’s Dutch Reformed Church – A House Divided, 16-19 ↩︎
  7. Theal, History of South Africa since 1795, Vol. 2, 444 ↩︎
  8. Creswicke, South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol 1, 13 ↩︎
  9. Gordon, The growth in Boer opposition to Kruger, 8 ↩︎
  10. Plaut, Promise and Despair – review by Milton Shain ↩︎
  11. Awake, South Africa’s Dutch Reformed Church – A House Divided, 16-19 ↩︎
  12. Feinstein, An economic history of South Africa, 53 ↩︎
  13. Goolam, Power and Resistance, 299-317 ↩︎
  14. Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 184–185. ↩︎
  15. Fitzpatrick, The Transvaal from Within, Chapter 1 e-book ↩︎
  16. Farrelly, The Settlement After the War in South Africa, 76 ↩︎
  17. Farrelly, The Settlement After the War in South Africa, 294 ↩︎
  18. Meintjes, President Paul Kruger: A Biography, 130-131 ↩︎
  19. Trapido, Imperialism, Settler Identities and Colonial Capitalism, 61 ↩︎
  20. Trapido, Imperialism, Settler Identities and Colonial Capitalism, 60 ↩︎
  21. Headlam, The Milner Papers, 178 ↩︎
  22. Ash, Kruger’s War, 127 ↩︎
  23. Guyot, Boer Politics, 103 ↩︎
  24. Roberts, Salisbury: Victorian Titan, 717 ↩︎
  25. Fitzpatrick, The Transvaal from Within, Appendix D, Volksraad debates. ↩︎
  26. Reitz, A Century of Wrong, 56 ↩︎
  27. van Heyningen, et al. Measles Epidemics of Variable Lethality in the Early 20th Century, 416 ↩︎
  28. Benneyworth, Work or Starve and correspondence between Peter Dickens and Dr Benneyworth – 8 November 2024 ↩︎
  29. Benneyworth, Work or Starve, 47 ↩︎
  30. Pakenham, Boer War, 491 ↩︎
  31. Judd & Surridge, The Boer War, 235 ↩︎
  32. Judd & Surridge, The Boer War, 235 ↩︎
  33. Warwick, Black People and the South African War, 164 ↩︎
  34. O’Connor, A short history of South Africa 1902 – 1989. ↩︎
  35. O’Connor, A short history of South Africa 1902 – 1989. ↩︎
  36. O’Connor, A short history of South Africa 1902 – 1989. ↩︎
  37. Katz, General Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 – 1917, 33-36 ↩︎
  38. Schreiner, A Letter on the South African Union and the Principles of Government. ↩︎
  39. O’Connor, A short history of South Africa 1902 – 1989. ↩︎
  40. O’Connor, A short history of South Africa 1902 – 1989. ↩︎
  41. Katz, General Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 – 1917, 48 ↩︎
  42. Marks, The Rand Revolt, the Red Scare, and the Roots of Apartheid, 203-204 ↩︎
  43. Katz, General Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 – 1917, 59 ↩︎
  44. Sampson, Capture of De Wet, 148 ↩︎
  45. Sampson, Capture of De Wet, 252 ↩︎
  46. Swart, Desperate Men and Bottomly, The Orange Free State and the Rebellion of 1914, 29-73 ↩︎
  47. Meer, Portrait of Indian South Africans, 44. ↩︎
  48. Shain , A Perfect Storm, 46 ↩︎
  49. Van Donk, Land and the church, 32 ↩︎
  50. Marks, The Rand Revolt, the Red Scare, and the Roots of Apartheid, 199-200 ↩︎
  51. Marks, The Rand Revolt, the Red Scare, and the Roots of Apartheid, 203 ↩︎
  52. Marks, The Rand Revolt, the Red Scare, and the Roots of Apartheid, 200 ↩︎
  53. Marks, The Rand Revolt, the Red Scare, and the Roots of Apartheid, 205 ↩︎
  54. Marks, The Rand Revolt, the Red Scare, and the Roots of Apartheid, 206 ↩︎
  55. Marks, The Rand Revolt, the Red Scare, and the Roots of Apartheid, 206 ↩︎
  56. Marks, The Rand Revolt, the Red Scare, and the Roots of Apartheid, 206 ↩︎
  57. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 374 ↩︎
  58. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 382 ↩︎
  59. O’Connor, A short history of South Africa 1902 – 1989. ↩︎
  60. D Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa, 99. ↩︎
  61. D Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa, 99 ↩︎
  62. Shain , A Perfect Storm, 41 ↩︎
  63. Shain, A Perfect Storm, 84 ↩︎
  64. Bouwer, National Socialism and Nazism in South Africa, 18. ↩︎
  65. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 382 ↩︎
  66. Kgatla, Magwira. The defining moments for the Dutch Reformed Church mission policy ↩︎
  67. Kgatla, Magwira. The defining moments for the Dutch Reformed Church mission policy ↩︎
  68. Davenport, South Africa, A Modern History. ↩︎
  69. Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, 41 ↩︎
  70. Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa, 112 ↩︎
  71. Shain, A Perfect Storm,131 ↩︎
  72. Shain, A Perfect Storm,134 ↩︎
  73. Shain, A Perfect Storm, 132-133 ↩︎
  74. Shain, A Perfect Storm,133 ↩︎
  75. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 382 ↩︎
  76. Shain, A Perfect Storm, 143-149 ↩︎
  77. Hyslop, White Working Class Women and the Invention of Apartheid, 76 ↩︎
  78. Louw, Die Vormingsjare van die kerkleier J.D. (Koot) Vorster, 337 ↩︎
  79. Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, 80 ↩︎
  80. Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa, 103 – 106 ↩︎
  81. Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa, 103 – 106. ↩︎
  82. Louw, Die Vormingsjare van die kerkleier J.D. (Koot) Vorster, 338 ↩︎
  83. Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, 80 ↩︎
  84. Maritz, My Lewe en Stewe‘, 97-270 ↩︎
  85. Rein Commission – unpublished ↩︎
  86. Shain, A Perfect Storm, 238 ↩︎
  87. Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, 85 ↩︎
  88. Shain, A Perfect Storm, 233 ↩︎
  89. Shain , A Perfect Storm, 237 ↩︎
  90. Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 441 ↩︎
  91. Mouton, Beyond the Pale, 18 ↩︎
  92. Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, 57 ↩︎
  93. Mouton, Beyond the Pale, 20 ↩︎
  94. Monama, Wartime Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, 1939 – 1945, 62 ↩︎
  95. Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa, 133 ↩︎
  96. van den Heever , General J.B.M Hertzog, Official Biography. ↩︎
  97. Furlong, Pro-Nazi Subversion in South Africa,16. ↩︎
  98. Shain, A Perfect Storm, 230 ↩︎
  99. Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, 104 ↩︎
  100. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 379 ↩︎
  101. O’Mally Collection on-line: The leader of the Ossewabrandwag Johannes Frederik Janse Van Rensburg ↩︎
  102. Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 442 ↩︎
  103. Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, 92 – 93 ↩︎
  104. Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, 110 ↩︎
  105. Louw, Die Vormingsjare van die kerkleier J.D. (Koot) Vorster, 370 ↩︎
  106. Shain, A Perfect Storm, 248 ↩︎
  107. Hyslop, Segregation has fallen on evil days, 451 ↩︎
  108. Hyslop, Segregation has fallen on evil days, 438-460 ↩︎
  109. Bunting, The Rise of the Afrikaner Reich, 88 ↩︎
  110. Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa, 132 ↩︎
  111. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 383 ↩︎
  112. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 383 ↩︎
  113. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 374 ↩︎
  114. du Toit, The Jewish Question and Verwoerd, 83
 ↩︎
  115. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 388 ↩︎
  116. Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 476 ↩︎
  117. Louw, Die Vormingsjare van die kerkleier J.D. (Koot) Vorster, 306 ↩︎
  118. Barber, South Africa in the Twentieth Century, 134 ↩︎
  119. Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 476 ↩︎
  120. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 383 ↩︎
  121. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 383 ↩︎
  122. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 382 ↩︎
  123. British National Archives – Kew reference 2/908, 12 April 1948 – Oswald Pirow Statement. ↩︎
  124. van der Merwe. Herrenvolk Bloed vir die Afrikaner, 81  ↩︎
  125. van der Merwe. Herrenvolk Bloed vir die Afrikaner, 85  ↩︎
  126. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 384 ↩︎
  127. Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 488 ↩︎
  128. Furlong. Pro-Nazi Subversion in South Africa, 1939-1941. ↩︎
  129. Furlong. Pro-Nazi Subversion in South Africa, 1939-1941 ↩︎
  130. Giliomee. The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 383 ↩︎
  131. Brits, Oorlogstrauma en die radikale Afrikaner-psige, Litnet on-line ↩︎
  132. Brits, Oorlogstrauma en die radikale Afrikaner-psige, Litnet on-line ↩︎
  133. Henriques, Can the legacy of trauma be passed down the generations? BBC on-line ↩︎

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Watson, R.I. ‘I Will Gather All Nations and Tongues’: Christian Missions and Racial Integration in the Cape Colony in the Aftermath of Abolition. Kronos vol. 31 n.1. Cape Town. 2005

The Boer War’s Freemasons

To answer a question recently posted on Boer War appreciation media as to whether Freemasonry and the Boer War are in some way linked. The origin of this bizarre statement lies in Manie Maritz, the 1914 Afrikaner Revolt leader, who became convinced of a Masonic and Jewish conspiracy to start the second Boer War. More on insane machinations of Maritz later, however to answer the question – no – Freemasonry as a fraternity and the two Boer Wars – the Transvaal Revolt (1880-1881) and The South African War (1899-1902) – have nothing to do with one another, as much as some deluded conspiracy theory driven arm-chair historians would like to to make a connection. In fact, as in many wars over centuries in many countries, Freemasons have landed up on opposing sides shooting one another – the most significant example of this is The American Civil War (1861-1865).  For those ‘in the know’ Freemasonry plays no role whatsoever in starting (or preventing) wars, which is not surprising as Freemasonry is a charitable fraternity with principles relating to self actualisation and brotherhood.

It’s also not a ‘British’ thing. Freemasonry started in South Africa under the Dutch Grand Lodge, the Orient of the Netherlands in 1772 .. long before the British played any role in South Africa. The oldest Lodge is South Africa is a Dutch Constitution one – De Goede Hoop Loosie – its temple is located inside the Parliamentary buildings complex. It also does not mean the Dutch and English speaking South Africans are separated by English and Dutch constitutions, you’ll find English and Afrikaners in both. Case in point are the early Voortrekker leaders who were Freemasons – Andries Pretorius was a Freemason, he even opened up a Dutch constitution Lodge in Pretoria. Piet Retief was also a Freemason, but of the English Constitution whilst he was living in the Eastern Cape.

Here’s an interesting artefact, this one is located at the Pinelands Masonic complex’s historic display (my photo) – commemorating past South African state land Boer Republic leaders who were Freemasons. For interest, and it’s all in Public space – just ‘Google’it. As notable Boer Freemason Presidents and Prime Ministers go these include:

  • General Louis Botha – Boer War Bittereinder General. 1st South African Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa: 1 May 1910 – 27 August 1919, Prime Minister of the Transvaal: 4 March 1907 – 31 May 1910
  • President Johannes Brand – 4th President of the Orange Free State: 2 February 1864 – 14 July 1888. Awarded a British Knighthood.
  • President Marthinus Wessel Pretorius – 1st State President of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (Transvaal Republic): 22 October 1866 – 20 November 1871. Established the ZAR and its constitution.
  • President Thomas François Burgers – 4th State President of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (Transvaal Republic): 1 July 1872 – 12 April 1877. Introduced the ZAR’s currency.
  • President Francis William Rietz – 5th State President of the Orange Free State: 10 January 1889 – 11 December 1895 and State Secretary of the ZAR in the lead up to Boer War 2.
  • Acting President Pieter Blignaut – Acting State President of the Orange Free State: 14 July 1888 – 10 January 18891
Top Row left to right: Brothers Louis Botha, Marthinus Pretoruis and Thomas Burgers. Bottom Row left to right:: Brothers Johannes Brand, Francis Reitz and Pieter Blignaut

A very good barometer of the early development of the ZAR (Transvaal) and the very cosmopolitan nature of Pretoria with its Voortrekkers, NGK Churches, Jewish traders, British loyalists and Anglican Churches – before the discovery of significant gold deposits and the establishment of Johannesburg – is to look at Freemasonry in the ZAR. The first Freemasons Lodge was a Dutch constitution Lodge in 1862, the Aurora Lodge .

The corner stone of the new temple for this Lodge was laid by President Burgers, as noted, a freemason himself, on 27 May 1876. On the Freemason’s English constitution side, the ZAR voluntarily dissolved itself (led by President Burgers ironically) and it became The British Colony of the Transvaal in 1877 (the first version, there are two). The first English constitution lodge was established a year later on 15 January 1878, called the Transvaal Lodge – and its was established a mere 2 years after the Dutch’s Aurora temple was built. The Aurora temple was destroyed during a severe thunderstorm, disheartened and not keen to start all over again, the Dutch constitution freemasons joined the English constitution freemasons at the Transvaal Lodge (and here’s a rare photo of them).

The Masonic Hall in Pretoria and the Transvaal Lodge in 1884

Here’s another interesting wartime photo – Dutch and English/Scottish/Irish constituted freemasons getting together in the middle of the South African War (1899-1902) a.k.a. Boer War 2 near Bloemfontein. On 12 December 1900, in the middle of the fighting a meeting was held in Jagersfontein, attended by both British (English constitution) and Boer Freemasons (some of which were Dutch constitution) – both on separate sides, but happy to meet one another under a banner of brotherhood. Here’s a fascinating picture of the occasion.

Freemason meeting – Jagersfontein, December 1900

Other famous ‘Boer War’ Freemasons on the ‘Republican’ side include:

  • Commandant General Petrus ‘Piet’ Jacobus Joubert, Commandant General of the ZAR Forces, Vice President to Kruger and Boer War 1 and Boer War 2 veteran. The overall commander of Boer Forces at the start of the war. and political opposition to Kruger.
  • General Benjamin Johannes “Ben” Viljoen, Bittereinder Boer War 2 veteran and American Boer colony pioneer.
  • Commandant Danie Theron, renowned Boer War 2 scout, bittereinder, commander and national Boer hero.
  • Deneys Reitz – veteran Boer War officer and the author of ‘Commando’, although it his noted that he only became a Freemason after the Boer War, as noted his father President FW Reitz was also a Freemason.2

Of the famous ‘Boer War’ Freemasons on the ‘British’ side, these include:

  • Field Marshal Lord Roberts Frederick Sleigh Roberts, 1st Earl Roberts and a Lodge in South Africa is named after him.
  • Field Marshal Herbert Kitchener, 1st Earl Kitchener
  • Sir Winston Churchill but only became a Freemason after he left South Africa after his service in the Boer War and returned to the UK.
  • Sir Charles Warren was a notable Freemason
  • Cecil John Rhodes was a very committed lifelong Freemason.3
Significant Freemasons of the South African War (1899-1902) Boer and Brit.

Of the famous authors associated with the Boer War, Joseph Rudyard Kipling, the famous author of the Jungle Book was a Freemason, so too was Arthur Conan Doyle. Leo Amery, who penned the first official history of the Boer War for the Times was also a Freemason.  

As to co-operation, during the Boer War, many lodges closed. Some of the buildings used by the Freemasons were used for hospitals such as the Masonic Lodge in Mafeking and the Masonic Temple in Johannesburg. During the Boer invasions of northern Natal at start of the war in October 1899, the Masonic Lodge in Dundee was plundered by the Boer Republican Forces, however the Lodge’s artefacts were found and respectfully returned to the Lodge by Boer Freemasons.

Loot taken from the Masonic Lodge in Dundee by Boer Republican Forces. Image courtesy of the Talana Museum Archive.

Noted here, is there is NO General Jan Smuts – there is no evidence whatsoever that he was a Freemason. Many historians have tried to confirm the ‘conspiracy theories’ and there is no evidence, zilch, nothing – not here in South Africa nor in Britain. Smuts is not a Freemason, no matter how much many people wish he was (conspiracists and Freemasons alike).

Of the other ye olde Boer Republic Freemasons in leadership roles the only other significant ones who were NOT Freemasons were President Paul Kruger (his Dopper approach would not have allowed him) and Prime Minister Barry Hertzog. Of the British ‘hawks’ in starting the Boer War, there is absolutely no conclusive evidence that either Alfred Milner or Joseph Chamberlain were Freemasons – sorry for all those conspiracy theorists again. Maybe the decision to go to war should have been left to the Freemasons to negotiate and there would not have been war in the first place … and look there – I’ve created a conspiracy with no grounding whatsoever.

Image: President Paul Kruger and the British Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, having a dust-up both were NOT Freemasons and no brotherly love lost.

Another point in the respect of famous people associated to the Boer War by way of historic sweep who are NOT freemasons .. all the ‘Pure’ National Party’s Presidents and Prime Ministers were members of the Broederbond – from D.F. Malan all the way to their last one, F.W. de Klerk and as a result of their rather perverse public animosity to Freemasonry, none of them were Freemasons. Also, none of them were ‘significant’ Afrikaners in the formation of ZAR, OFS or Union of South Africa, nor did any of them play any significant role in the Boer War – Dr D.F. Malan sat out of the war in safety – for that matter all of them sat out WW1 and during WW2 they either tacitly or overtly supported Nazism while sitting out of that war too. The best they could come up with was a ‘keep South Africa white’ South African Republic in 1961 and Freemasonry must surely thank its lucky stars that it is spared from any association with it for a change, conspiracy or otherwise.

As noted in the beginning, one origin of this bizarre link of Freemasonry to the Boer Wars is ‘General’ Manie Maritz, the Boer War Commander, 1914 Afrikaner Revolt leader and leader of the National Socialist Boerenasie movement. In the mid 1930’s Maritz would become a convert to the racist and anti-Semitic mythical and completely discredited ‘the Protocols of the Elders of Zion’ and convinced of a Jewish and Freemason conspiracy to world domination. He would make the ‘Protocols of Zion’ his life’s meaning and his mission to educate the Afrikaner people (his ‘Volk’) to it – and in it he would blame the ‘hidden hand’ of the Jews as the true conspiracists behind starting the Boer War. He would then go into mortal combat with General Jan Smuts calling him the King of the Jews and therefore a traitor to the Afrikaner people.4 Yet, believe it or not there are still some people out there who would gobble this sort of crap up.

If you want to see how this conspiracy theory nut job rubbish Maritz promulgated in action, consider this, the Broederbond opposed Freemasonry – as a net result the post 1948, the National party’s Minister of Justice C.R. “Blackie” Swart (a Broederbonder himself) famously accused the Freemasons and the ‘Sons of England’ (another South African lodge based fraternity) in the media of infiltrating Sailor Malan’s ‘Torch Commando’ political protest movement in 1952 and in so plotting to militarily overthrow his Apartheid government.5 Pure unfounded gobbledygook and you just can’t make this stuff up!

In my book none of these ‘Pure’ Afrikaner Nationalists really qualified ‘great’ Afrikaners in any event – the simple truth is that they were a fringe party of far right-wing nutters .. nothing more. Also, point to note, no – by bringing up famous Boer leaders who either were or were not part of the Freemason fraternity, I’m not “Boer Bashing” and discrediting Afrikanerdom – because that would be equally daft.


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

References:

  • 250 Years of Freemasonry in South Africa – Commemorative Publication 2022, all Constitutions. Published by the Grand Lodge of South Africa
  • United Grand Lodge of England. On-line repository
  • Maritz, Manie ‘My Lewe en Strewe’ Pretoria 1939

Footnotes

  1. 250 Years of Freemasonry in South Africa ↩︎
  2. Ibid ↩︎
  3. Ibid ↩︎
  4. Maritz, My Lewe en Stewe‘, pages 97 – 270 ↩︎
  5. P Dickens, The Rise and Fall of the Torch Commando – Part 4, on-line record for The Observation Post ↩︎

Boer War by the numbers!

The path to the South African War (1899-1902) i.e. Boer War 2 is often misunderstood – so let’s look at the actual military numbers and the mission creep. Very often on Boer War social media appreciation sites you hear this old myth “the British intended to invade the Boer Republics and built up their forces on the borders to do so”. This build-up of British invasion forces then prompts the Boers to make “a pre-emptive strike” to “take up forward defensive positions” on British territory. The Boers didn’t start the war see! They merely forestalled the inevitable warmonger, none other than the greedy British – get it?

Problem is “I don’t get it”, my training as an Economic Historian will always lead me to look at the statistics and the ‘cold facts’ to make comparisons and conclusions, my training as a military officer will also always lead me to the science of military doctrine in analysing military history, and not a ‘mainstream’ historian’s interpretation of it. As to above assertions on invasion body troop strengths and pre-emptive strikes, let me be upfront – it’s all bunk, a complete myth and it not supported by the historical facts of the day, nor is it supported by military doctrine (then and now) and the cold hard facts – the statistics, ratios and numbers certainly don’t support it . This is again where ‘economic history’ starts to rip ‘political’ history apart, the numbers – the hard facts (measurable and accurate) start to talk and the political bollocks start to walk, and here’s how.

Looking at the numbers

So, here the numbers to the start of the Boer War on the 11th October 1899 when the Boers invade sovereign British territories:

31st July 1899 – Total British Forces in the Cape Colony, Natal, Rhodesia, and Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Protectorates = Total 8,803 men.
1st August 1899 to 11th October 1899, additional British Forces arrive = Total 6,500 men

Total British Forces in the field as at 11th October 1899 = 15,300 men

27th September 1899 – Transvaal Mobilises Forces = 26,871 men
3rd October 1899 – Free State mobilisers Forces = 21,345 men

Total Boer Forces in the field as at 11th October 1899 = 48,216 men.

The Boer forces at the commencement of hostilities when they declare war against Britain are heavily in their favour = Boer Forces outnumber the British 3 to 1.

“On the high seas” as at the 11th October 1899 are an additional 7,418 British Troops on their way to South Africa – called up to bolster an inadequate British force strength in the event of war.

Even with their arrival at the end of October 1899 (after the war has been declared) bringing the British number up to 22,708 – British Forces are still woefully inadequate, and the invading Boer Forces still outnumber them 2 to 1.

There are numerous quotes and historic references which prove the British had no intention of ‘invading’ the Boer Republics, these always result in a slinging match whilst Boer romantics profess to intelligence reports as proof positive of a plan of attack. Like any military with a military academy and a war office, a scenario plan was devised by the British, its called ‘The War Office Plan’ and it was developed in 1886 – it outlines that should the British invade the ZAR, a full Army Corps (invasion force) would assemble at Colesberg and invade the underbelly of the OFS on their way to the ZAR, avoiding mountainous defences completely and just move up the spine of South Africa over flat and easy terrain (more or less the route of the N1 today).

In reality the British made no actual invasion plans, scenario ‘top draw’ plan yes, actual plans a ‘campaign plan’ with start lines showing troop strengths, regiments and units, timelines and objectives – no, that plan doesn’t exist – an entire Parliamentary commission and Royal inquest was made in 1902 after the war ended, and they established that “no plan for campaign ever existed for operations in South Africa” (that they meant an actual operational plan), but you can put all that aside and let’s just look at the numbers.

There is simply no way, that the British intended to ‘invade’ with a force of only 22,700 troops – going up against a 40,000 strong invading Republican Boer army – just no way. Anyone whose served in the military and understands military doctrines knows, you need twice the numbers of the opponent, at least 2:1 (ideally more) before commencing with an invasion. That means Britain would have needed at least 80,000 troops (in excess of an Army Corps) in theatre before it posed any threat as an ‘invasion’ Force. It had nowhere near those numbers, and nor did it intend to have those numbers. In truth – the Boer Army, who had twice the numbers of the British Army, posed far more of an ‘invasion’ threat – and that’s exactly what they did.

Also, so you can see how the ‘numbers’ and the ‘actual’ history correlate – Lord Milner writes to Her Majesty’s government and states that Kruger is unmovable on issues pertaining the Franchise, he warns them that the ZAR is gearing for an invasion of the British Colonies with the call-up of troops and purchase of munitions, and the purchase of state of the art rifles and artillery pieces – one million Mauser rounds alone arrive in Port Elizabeth as early as the 8th July (ordered around April 1899) destined for the Republics (well before the ‘impasse’ between Milner and Kruger).

He implores the British to send a sizeable force – a full “Army Corps” – of about 35,000 troops to bolster the small garrison forces in South Africa, warning them invasion of British colonies is inevitable. 

The British War Office in London respond to Milner, they maintain that the ZAR was simply not bold enough to invade British sovereign territory, and on the remote chance that should an invasion take place, it would be a “farmers army” and could be held back by professional soldiers. 

The war office also does not want to provoke a flammable situation by sending a full Army Corps. So, they bolster the garrison forces with only 6,500 men, including colonial ‘citizen force’ units mustered from the local populations – and an additional 7,400 men “on their way” from India – the doctrine again is that even though they are outnumbered  they should be able to ‘hold the line’ long enough for an expeditionary ‘Army Corps’ to arrive. The war office estimates a ‘Army Corps’ will take four months to muster and would require a £1 million investment upfront – so not necessary unless there is an absolute and proven military threat.

The eve of war

By the end of September and the beginning of October 1899, Boer forces are amassing primarily at Laing’s neck on the Natal border and the ultimatum agreed by the Boers on the 27th September indicates that war is inevitable, presented by the 7th October 1899 to the British (4 days before they invade sovereign British territories), last minute attempts by Afrikaner Bondsmen in the Cape to get Kruger to “step-down” from his position fail, so too do last minute attempts by members of his own Raad and by his young appointed negotiator Jan Smuts in his final negotiations with Greene, even Steyn in the OFS is urged to get the ZAR to ‘step down’  – whilst all urging the ZAR to “step-down” – Kruger’s unbending demand that the 5 year ‘uitlander’ franchise would only come if the British tore up the 1884 London Convention completely and withdraw all her Suzerainty rights to the region, rights which have been in place since 1877 – this is now deemed a ‘step too far’ as it substantially compromised British paramountcy in the region. Kruger’s position remaining unchanged from the beginning of negotiations in June 1899 in Bloemfontein to the end – only with a cat and mouse game promising limited reforms and then withdrawing them in-between (more on this in an Observation Post called “for suzerainty sakes” as most people don’t understand the real Casus Belli of the war).

Kruger is superstitious, paranoid and impatient and doesn’t even wait for the presentation of the ultimatum to the British or the ultimatum’s deadline – he sees tiny troop movements of small garrison forces as the prelude of an invasion, albeit the British are by no means capitalised for such an invasion – they have not even called up their Army Corps at this point. But Kruger is on the warpath. On the same day the ultimatum is drafted – 27th September 1899 – D Day minus 14 days – Kruger telegraphed to Steyn: 

“English troops already at Dundee and Biggarsberg, and will probably take up all the best positions unless we act at once. Executive Council unanimous that commando order should be issued to-day. We beg you will also call out your burghers. As war is unavoidable we must act at once, and strongly. The longer we wait the more innocent blood will be shed through our delay. We don’t intend to have Chamberlain’s note, with your amendments re Convention, telegraphed to you till burghers are at or near borders, and till you have been informed that the English Government has acted contrary to last part thereof. “We are justified in crossing border. Plan of campaign follows.”

27th September 1899 – D Day minus 14 days – Kruger telegraphed to Steyn again (same day again):

Burghers will be in position in our territory near Laing’s Nek on Friday morning 5 a.m. All other burghers being called up to follow as soon as possible. Kock leaves with two cannons tomorrow evening, also big guns for Laing’s Nek. Will Free State then also be in position? Volksraad meets seven this evening. Can you reply by then? Plan campaign follows.” 

On the 29th September 1899 – D Day minus 12 days – Kruger telegraph to Steyn: 

“Our burghers going to hold positions on border to prevent enemy getting hold of them. You still seem to think of peace, but I consider it impossible. I am strongly of opinion that your people ought also to go to border to take positions. You think Chamberlain is leading us into a trap, but if we wait longer our cause may be hopelessly lost and that would be our trap.

President Steyn (left) and President Kruger (right) colour by Tinus le Roux and Jenny B.

In the final minute, with war inevitable and Boers amassing on the border to invade – the British Parliament approves the request to raise the ‘Army Corps’ as a deterrent against Boer aggression and they only start calling up their reserves from the 7th October 1899 – the Boers are already mobilised and its 4 days before the Boers invade. It’s too late, this force would only be arriving in critical mass in the South African theatre by mid January 1900. 

In the end, both ends of the British argument are 100% correct. Milner is 100% correct, the ZAR is a significant destabiliser in the area with territorial ambitions over Swaziland – which they annex, Rhodesia (the Adendorff trek and the Matabeleland concession) and Zululand for access to a Natal based seaport at St Lucia. President Steyn in the OFS also has territorial ambitions over Griqualand and the diamond fields in the Cape Colony.

Afrikaner Bondsmen and their supporters, men like Smuts, Botha, Hofmeyr and Reitz are all promoting the idea of a unitary Afrikaner Republic stretching from the Zambezi to the Cape. Both Boer preachers and politicians are all talking war and the removal of British influence from the entire region altogether (and Milner makes specific note of this). The two Republics are tooling up for war and the ZAR is commissioning and building massive defensive forts and buying advanced state of the art German and French siege guns. Vast stores of smokeless ammunition is been landed, and 40,000 brand new state of the art German Mauser rifles have landed – enough to arm nearly every Boer with not just one but two rifles. President Steyn has signed President Kruger’s long awaited “aggression pact” between the OFS and the ZAR on the 22nd March 1897 which locks the OFS into war even if the ZAR feels “threatened”. Simply put, the ‘winds of war are blowing’.

The purpose for going to war can best be read in the final statements made by the main protagonists. 

Francis Reitz, now acting as the ZAR’s state secretary after sending the final Boer ultimatum, concludes his speech on the eve of war with the following:

“…. from Slagter’s Nek to Laing’s Nek, from the Pretoria Convention to the Bloemfontein Conference, they have ever been the treaty-breakers and robbers. The diamond fields of Kimberley and the beautiful land of Natal were robbed from us, and now they want the goldfields of the Witwatersrand … Brother AfrikanersI The day is at hand on which great deeds are expected of us – War has broken out ! What is it to be ? A wasted and enslaved South Africa or – a Free, United South Africa?”

So, for Francis Reitz accuses the British of breaching the spirit of Transvaal’s Suzerainty, accuses them of stealing Natal and Griqualand and a threat to Boer paramountcy in the region – calling for a ‘United South Africa’ (I.e. the Afrikaner Bond’s ‘Zambezi to the Cape under a Boer hegemony’ objective).

The desire of the Boers and the desire of the British that South Africa fall under their respective paramountcy and hegemony is a clash of interests between Boer Imperial and British imperial desires on territorial expansion and control – and this is the conclusion reached by just about every Boer War historian worth his salt as the basic underlying cause of the war, it’s the Casus Belli. 

This paramountcy and desire for regional control by Boer and Brit respectively is most adequately wrapped up by Jan Smuts’ final word on the matter, when on the eve of war writes:

The aim of the war is to establish “a United South Africa, of one of the great empires (rijken) of the world… an Afrikaans republic in South Africa stretching from Table Bay to the Zambesi”.

On the British front, Joseph Chamberlain concludes his speech to Parliament on the eve of war with the following:

“… we are at war now because the oligarchy at Pretoria … has persistently pursued, from the very day of the signing of the Convention of 1881 down to now, a policy which tended to the evasion of its obligations; a policy by which it has broken its promises; by which it has placed, gradually, but surely, British subjects in the Transvaal in a position of distinct inferiority; by which it has conspired against and undermined the suzerainty, the paramountcy which belongs to Great Britain.” 

So – for Chamberlain, the spirit and agreement of the Transvaal’s Suzerainty (its status as a vassal state as prescribed by the Pretoria and London conventions) has been breached – a breach of treaty – and in so a threat to British paramountcy in the region.

The British War Office is also 100% right, they’ve matched the ‘risk’ perfectly, in terms of military doctrine they augment their forces just enough to prevent total calamity, and its seen upfront in the invasions when these small bordering garrison forces – of professional officers and men, completely outnumbered in Ladysmith, Kimberley, Kuruman and Mafeking make quick work of the invading Boers and stop them in their tracks – on the 14th October 1899 the Boer attack on Mafeking is effectively driven off, and on the 20th October the British forces in Natal are successful at the Battle of Talana Hill and the next day on the 21st October they are successful again at the Battle of Elandslaagte . 

On the 25th October the second Boer assault on Mafeking is driven off and on the 9th November, the Boer assault on Ladysmith is effectively driven off (albeit with heavy losses), the Boers then opt to put the town to siege. The siege of Kimberley starts in earnest on the 4th November with the British defenders firmly dug in, the Boers opt to shelling the town from a safe distance in the hope they capitulate. On the 13th November the Boer attack on Kuruman is successfully driven off and the Boers opt to put it that town to siege in addition. 

The Pre-emptive strike and forward defences myth 

As to a “pre-emptive strike” and “invading for the purposes setting up forward defensives” argument to forestall an inevitable British invasion so often found on Boer war appreciation sites – this is possibly the most stupid assertion and myth generated around Boer War 2 … ever, and for the following reasons:

Upfront, a ‘pre-emptive strike’ is not the plan, never is the plan. These modern-day Boer Romantics ‘couch commanders’ conveniently ignore people like the ZAR commander in chief, Piet Joubert – who states:

“The master plan was to advance rapidly on Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London and Durban”

Jan Smuts in his memoirs of the war refers to his direct planning to take the Port of Natal (Durban) in a rapid advance – a “Blitzkreig’ strategy.

In fact, Jan Smuts is the only man with a plan. His plan is outlined, supposedly whilst he was sick in bed. It was presented to the ZAR raad (council) in a secret session and unanimously adopted. It’s a very specific plan, it is summed up by Smuts himself who said the plan was to invade Natal from Laing’s Neck and he does on;

“The republics must get the better of the English troops from the start … by taking the offensive and doing it before the British force in SA is markedly strengthened …. the capture of Natal by a Boer force together with the cutting of the railway between the Cape Colony and Rhodesia … will cause a shaking of the Empire”.

The idea of cutting the railway line between the Cape and Rhodesia is to create an uprising of Afrikaner support in the Cape Colony for the Boer Republic cause, Smuts in his account is very reliant on this happening, he’s an ex-Cape Afrikaner Bondsman, the Afrikaners in the Cape are the majority population – the idea of taking the Cape Colony would fail if they do not rise in support. Smuts’ objective through these actions – in Natal and the Cape Colony – is to “shake up” the paramountcy and in so force better terms with the British with a peace settlement early on … not to get into a protracted and costly war, and to do all this before any sort of “army force” or “expeditionary force” can be raised in the UK – an early concept of “shock and awe” and “blitzkrieg” is Smuts’ basic military plan. Smuts’ plan is also an early form of “manoeuvre” warfare – using the Clausewitzian concept (developed after the Napoleonic wars) – using superior and simultaneous advances along “exterior” lines (a concentration in space) on an enemy using “interior” lines (a concentration of time) of communication and supply. Smuts would also apply this later when he is tasked with forming the Union Defence Force in 1910.

Smuts’ offensive plan also does not propose laying anything to siege, surrounding and laying either Ladysmith, Kimberley or Mafeking is avoided entirely, he is far more concerned with speed and a quick win before Britain can reinforce anything – especially Natal and Durban which Smuts targets his ‘seat of war’. The rapid seizing of Durban whilst its relatively lightly defended is important to Smuts, without seizing it the British will be able to reinforce and counter-attack – so the taking of Durban will either make or break the plan.

Reference: General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa – D. Katz

So, here’s the Boer Republics’ offensive plan – in includes Smuts’ initial offensive plan and then a greater offensive offensive advance to Port Elizabeth so as to build on a Cape Afrikaner uprising and rebellion. At the start of hostilities on the 11th October 1899, according to Jan Smuts himself, the ZAR Commandant-General Piet Joubert merely had Smuts’ broad outline of the offensive plan in his hand, he had not given it any further thought – “no comprehensive war planning” had been done on how the strategic plan would be met by any planning on a tactical level or even on the operational level (contingency planning).

On launching the offensive, only then does the Boer leadership give thought to how they inited to meet Smuts’ strategic plan on a tactical level and operational level. They draw on inspiration from the first Anglo-Boer War, the Transvaal War of 1880 to 1881 i.e. Boer War 1, this war called for laying British garrisons around Pretoria to siege and then concentrating on using the natural mountain defences around Laing’s Neck on the ZAR/Natal border which squeezed the British ‘relief column’ making their way to relive the sieges onto a single road through the mountain defences – focusing them onto Majuba where the Boers enjoyed an outstanding victory. This reasoning had worked in 1881, no reason why it would not work in 1899.

So, as a defensive strategy to augment the offensive strategy, General Piet Joubert and the Boer leadership decide on laying siege to Kimberley, Mafeking (in the Northern Cape) and Ladysmith (in Natal) – their thinking is this would split the British forces who would then be focussed on relieving these border towns and their relief columns would have to follow singular roads and railway lines to get there, easy pickings for the Boers as they had done to them at Majuba – thereby weakening the British forces further and giving the Boer’s offensive strategy in Natal all the chance of success.

Important Note, as to military doctrine as follows;

“assuming a defensive posture does not win wars and a offensive strategy is essential for winning a war, defensive stances are a temporary measure allowing for an advantage to develop, which will eventually result in offensive action to secure combat success.”

Dr. D Katz’ ‘Jan Smuts and his First World War

Jan Smuts at this point is disillusioned with the Boer leadership’s planning, he feels this offensive and defensive plan is far too complicated and questions whether the Boers are capable of launching a plan of this magnitude. He even goes as far as calling General Piet Joubert “passé” and “hopelessly incompetent”.

The Boers however, initially follow exactly “the plan” in what they do. They advance from Laing’s Neck down the centre spine of Natal heading to Durban as planned, as they push into Natal the Boer Commanders telegram Kruger to say the “Vierkleur” would be soon flying over Durban. The ZAR Chief Justice Gegorowski boasted;

“the war will be over in a fortnight. We shall take Kimberley and Mafeking, and give the English such a beating in Natal that they will sue for peace”.

The general rally call amount the Boer soldiery is that will be “eating fish” in Durban, General Louis Botha convinced he will also be “eating bananas” in Durban. They also initially follow Smuts’ offensive plan in the Orange Free State, cutting the Cape Colony and Rhodesia railway line in the first action of the war at Kraaipan on the 12th October 1899.

Their mistake, they are too cautious and instead of using their much-promoted advantage – mobility, they err on a cautious and slow advance. The plan, as Smuts predicted is overcomplicated, and in so far as intending to split the British forces between the Northern Cape and Natal, the decision to put Kimberley and Mafeking to siege in addition to the offensive plan as a defensive plan also splits the Boer forces and weakens their offensive capability, from a ‘Blitzkreig’ (lightning mobility war) perspective they are unable to put their maximum effort behind their ‘schwerpunkt’ (heavy, focus – or centre point) which is the rapid invasion of Natal and the taking of Durban. The Boers also compromise their mobility and resources in Natal when they start to lay Ladysmith to siege instead of rapidly advancing to Durban.

In following “the plan” – the ‘high water marks’ of the invasions i.e., where they ultimately land up. In the Natal invasion it’s just 60 kilometres north of Pietermaritzburg – Botha stops at Mooi River, this invasion has no reference to the “defence plan” whatsoever (in fact it’s the opposite), and the Boers do not take up very effective “defensive positions” to stop any sort of mythical British invasion – the positions they take up are far worse than the positions they were in before they invaded. Any military person will tell you that Rivers and Mountain Ranges make for the most formidable defences – and in the case of the Boer Republics – the Orange River, Vaal River and Drakensberg are perfect defences – no need to invade anyone, investing in these border defences would have been the logical military doctrine, and far more effective as to a “defensive strategy” without initiating a war and the risk that involves. 

Look at it from the perspective of military doctrine, the Boer “start line” is Volksrust on the border near Laing’s Neck – a most formidable defence position on the border of Natal and the “gateway” to both the ZAR and Natal, home to Majuba mountain and Laing’s neck, where the British were so soundly beaten by the Boers in 1881 – it’s a proven natural defence and one which the British could not breach just 18 years earlier.

As to continuing a deep advance (remember the offensive plan is to invade), after they are confronted by the British in the field at Talana outside Dundee on the 20th October 1899 (D Day plus 8) – the Boers are initially defeated in two pitched battles, the Boers are held up losing advantage daily. After winning the battle at Nicolson’s Neck the Boers manage to advance another 70 kilometres to Ladysmith reaching it on the 2nd November (D Day plus 24 days) – now they are now 190 kilometres into their advance from their start line on the border and nearly a month into their invasion campaign. 

So, if your strategy is only one of defence – why leave such a formidable defence and find something else? Then as to the so called amassed “British threat on the border” – the invasion force overall Commander, General Piet Joubert is joined by General de Kock from the OFS and General Erasmus and they advance from their start line for nearly 120 kilometres deep into Natal territory before they meet any significant British forces or resistance whatsoever – the British are nowhere near the “border” and “poised” to invade anything. The British have rather inadvisably split their forces between Dundee and Ladysmith. Extending military supply lines and logistics support for 120 kilometres in 1899 using wagons and horses to initiate a “pre-emptive” strike aimed at the British in Dundee is pure Hollywood, wishful thinking, it has nothing to do with military doctrine or sound military planning – or even the Boer’s plan for what it is. 

The Boer invasion of Natal as mapped.

General Louis Botha then extends the advance from Ladysmith all the way to Mooi River on the 22nd November 1899 – 100 Km away from Ladysmith and 60 km from Pietermaritzburg and now a staggering 290 km from their start line. That’s the length of the “supply” line for the Boers – their “high water” mark. No military commander in his right mind sets up a “defensive position” with a near 300 km long supply line running through enemy territory intended to support ‘defences’ – no military commander in 1899 advances near 300 km on horseback for a pre-emptive strike either – air warfare has not been invented yet and even by today’s standards a ground force invasion 300 km into enemy territory is never considered by any commander as a mere “strike” – pre-emptive or otherwise. 

The Boer high-water mark is only obtained by the 22nd November – D Day plus 43 days – now having been significantly compromised on mobility and speed. Both HMS Terrible and HMS Powerful had arrived in Durban port by the 6th November 1899, either one of these two Battle Cruisers had more fire power on board than the entire Boer invading armies combined – a Battle Cruiser defending a port from mounted infantryman on horseback is no match. The Royal Navy is Britain’s senior service and it has at its disposal the very best of all their resources and commanders, defending their ports is what the Royal Navy does best, they are very good at it.

HMS Terrible (Left) and HMS Powerful (Right)

The Boer invasion falters, it fails because they had lost their only significant advantage – mobility, aggression and speed gives way to cautiousness, they chose resource draining static warfare instead – sieges and invest into them instead, losing valuable days and sacrificing their “Blitzkreig” offensive plan altogether. 

With Botha’s objective of “eating bananas in Durban” now completely dashed, General Botha has no choice but to do what countless military commanders before and after him have done when an invasion fails – and beat a retreat, creating what are known in the military as “defensive “boxes” as you go along, the idea is to slow the enemy’s counter attack down until you can “join” with more friendly forces and consolidate – which he initially successfully does just north of the high water mark at Willow Grange on 23rd November 1899 and then further north at his next “box” at Colenso on 15th December 1899. He finally settles further north on the Tugela heights as his next defensive box, having now retreated for 80 Km, however he loses this pivotal battle and his final defensive box to the British on the 27th February 1900 (to see a defensive box retreat in action in a more recent war involving South African Commanders – see “Gazala Gallop” in WW2).

On the western front, the Boers are able to invade the arid and sparsely populated northern Cape meeting no real resistance from any British forces – as none are stationed there in any numbers – the Boers end their high water mark at the border with German South West Africa – this has more to do with the strategic imperative of opening up a sea route and port access via Walvis Bay and linking up with a “friendly state” for the purposes of supply than it does with any offensive or defensive plan offered by the Boer command. It certainly has nothing to do with a ‘pre-emptive’ strike.

On other lesser known fronts

If there is any semblance of logic in invading the Cape and Natal colonies for the purposes of establishing forward defences only, there is absolutely no logic in the Boer invasions of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Bechuanaland (Botswana) to suggest invading for purposes of defending – or even a ‘pre-emptive’ strike – the tiny nominal British Police forces in both these countries are no invasion threat whatsoever, and all the invasion of the Bechuanaland Kingdom does is bring the Tswana into the war as a belligerent all on their own, and the Tswana in their own right decimate the invading Boer Kommando and its laager at Derdepoort on the 25th November 1899. The small BSAP (British South African Police) base consisting of 450 British soldiers at Tuli in Rhodesia is however sufficiently professional to stop the 2,000 strong Boer Commando (now with a 1 to 4 advantage over the British) which had forged itself over the Limpopo River into Rhodesia at Rhodes Drift and other points. On the 2nd November 1899 the BSAP successfully halt them at Bryce’s Store and then repulse the invasion, although border incidents and Boer incursions into Rhodesia continue for some time – well into the Guerrilla phase.

Bryce’s Store in Rhodesia showing combat damage

What Defences?

Also, nobody has been able to point where these so called ‘invasion for the purpose of defensive positions’ are, there is no investment in resources or materials for effective defences, the Boer trenching system at the Modder River at the beginning of the war in November 1899 are proven ineffective.

The defensive earthworks that make up the trench line at defence cluster centre at Magtersfontein is merely a shallow trench converted from a natural ‘donga’ at the base of the koppie range (refer Dr. Garth Bennyworth’s groundbreaking work on this trench-line) – the British frontal attack on this trench-line is successfully repelled by the Boers on 11th December 1899 (Cronje’s only real tactical ‘victory’), but after regrouping and reinforcing the British are able to by-pass these defences completely in a highly mobile flanking manoeuvre.

No large defence fortifications are really invested in by the Boers in either Natal or the Cape Colony, and any idea of fortifying the Republics borders are in fact neglected in the drive to invade the British colonies instead. 

It is only from the beginning of the new year in 1900, that the British have been able to muster anywhere near enough troops to land in Cape Town, that they are now matched 1:1 to the Boer army, and it is on these equal footings that the British counterattack, breakout and relieve of all the major sieges. From January 1900 to July 1900 they rout the Republican armies from their colonies, relieve their sieges and in two significant manoeuvres – the Battle of Paardeberg on the 27th February 1900 and Brandwater Basin (Surrender Hill) on 30th July 1900 they break the Republican forces critical mass to fight a conventional war – Brandwater and Paardeberg alone result in the capturing 8,300 men and the Boer Army is now simply just no longer matched to the British on a 1:1 ratio, it’s now in an inadequate position – with more British troops streaming in.

The 500,000 myth

Often on Boer war sites, and even on simple things like wiki we see this statement “it took 500,000 British to defeat 20,000 Boers” – the much-touted ratio in this type of media is that the Boers were outnumbered 25 to 1, at a staggering disadvantage, but these plucky Boers held the mighty British empire at bay. Now that’s a figure designed to paint the Boer fighter as some sort of super-man and the British military as bumbling, monolithic and ineffective. But the truth is far from this and this figure is completely erroneous designed to drive Afrikaner nationalist political rhetoric – it has nothing to do with actual numbers on the ground. 

Now, here’s the truth – at no point in Boer war 2 were there ever 500,000 British troops in South Africa as boots on the ground at any one point in time – in total, over the course of the war the British called up 550,000 men – that bit is true, yes. HOWEVER the British rotated their Regiments in and out of South Africa on ‘tours of duty’ – never really sending a full regiment into the operational theatre at once, retaining many at home and in their other colonies around the world. The “high water mark” i.e., the maximum number of British Troops in South Africa at any one point in time is 230,000 men. Even pro-Boer chronologies like that of Pieter Cloete’s Boer War facts and figures reluctantly has to admit this fact. 

This high-water mark of 230,000 (including African Auxiliaries) is only peaked briefly during the Guerrilla Phase of the war – and at least 50,000 of these troops are being used to man the rather extensive blockhouse defence system stretching from the top to bottom and side to side across the whole of South Africa (as referenced by Simon C. Green in his Blockhouses of the Boer War) – over thousands of kilometers. On average during the Guerrilla Phase of the war – September 1900 to April 1902, the British enjoy 190,000 troops on the ground.

But let’s stick to the high-water marks for a proper account – the high water for the Boer forces, total Boer War – including 6,000 burghers who add onto the original ZAR and OFS Commando call-up, the statutory Boer forces, foreign volunteers and Cape Rebels is 87,365 men (possibly higher if we add African auxiliaries and rear echelon support). That means a realistic ratio between Brit and Boer at the high-water mark is a 3:1 ratio – total Imperial forces versus total republican forces. It’s a far cry from the emotionally and erroneously touted figure of 25:1.

If we want to account Boer War 2 properly and view it with balance, it would be correct and very true to say at the beginning of the war the Boers outnumber the Brits 3:1 – as the war progresses there is a juxtaposing of numbers… and by the end of war the Brits account 190,000 troops in country, Boers account 24,300 left in the field and 47,300 POW in the bag (factoring out the ‘Hensoppers’ and ‘joiners’) = 71,600 or a 3:1 ratio – Brits outnumber Boers, a reversal of the ratio the Boers enjoyed at the start of the war.

In terms of military doctrine, the above estimation is about right – to invade the British territory the Boers need a 3 to 1 advantage to be successful and to counter attack and hold the Boer territory the British need to be at a 3 to 1 advantage – and even by Guerrilla Warfare standards and the doctrine used to fight one, this number is very low. Consider the following:

American Brigadier-General Nelson Miles was put in charge of hunting down Geronimo and his followers in April 1886. Miles commanded 5,600 troops deemed necessary to find and destroy Geronimo and his 24 warriors. In Malaya in 1950 it took 200,000 British, Australian and allied troops to defeat 5,000 Communist guerrillas. In Ireland over the 30-year course of ‘the troubles’ a total of 300,000 British troops were used to contain 10,000 IRA guerrillas. Closer to home, so the arm chair Boer war generals get this – over the course of the Angolan Border War (1966-1988) and the ‘Struggle’ (1960-1994) the SADF would call up 650,000 conscripts and then hold them in reserve – MK and other non-statutory force ‘guerrillas’ at their high water mark in 1990 only have 40,000. 

The modern-day theoretical ratio of counter-insurgency forces to guerrillas needed to defeat an insurgent/guerrilla campaign is 10:1. In 2007, the US Department of Defence produced a document entitled Handbook on Counter Insurgency which quotes this as the rule-of-thumb ratio for all such operations – and that is even with the advent of modern technology in warfare fighting mere insurgents or guerrillas. Little wonder that General David Petraeus needed 180,000 coalition force troops (the same size as the full invasion force) on the ground in 2007 just to deal with the Iraqi guerrilla “surge” spearheaded by an insignificant but determined bunch of suicide bombers.

Boer bashing and other myths 

Military doctrine and planning – to anyone whose served as officer in a military, is made up of three levels – the Strategic level, the Tactical level and the Operational level (when the metal starts flying around and the rubber hits the road). Military Generals and Commanders are judged by how they relate these three components – Strategic, Tactical and Operational. German Forces during WW2 are outstanding at the Operational level, completely dazzling the enemy concentrating overwhelming firepower at the “schwerpunkt” – the ‘heavy or focal’ point. They are equally outstanding at the tactical level, consider the masterful work of Field Marshal Rommel in North Africa. But they fail at the Strategic level by overextending their resources and pandering to wayward political ideologies and ambitions – and that loses them the war.

In reality, and it’s not trying to be nasty or ‘Boer bashing’ in any way shape or form. The Boers at the ground level are a committed, determined, resourceful and extremely brave bunch. They are scarifying much and like the Japanese in WW2 have a deeply ingrained cultural sense of honour. 

But their commanders fail these brave men on all three key aspects of warfare. At an Operational level they are been asked to use a Commando system of mounted infantrymen – good for quelling poorly armed native rebellions – but absolutely hopeless when confronting a modern professional military force with modern weaponry using both combined arms and joint arms in which they are very well versed – and it quickly shows when the British are able to repel the invasions and stall them long enough to get reinforcements in whilst completely outnumbered. The British ORBATS (Order of Battle) are also far superior in just about every key engagement fought – that’s a fact.

It is often noted in all the Battle ORBATS – even the ones that mark the beginning of the war in the conventional phase, that the Boers are always “on the back-foot” always “outnumbered” almost always fighting against the odds – even for battles they win. However, this is again a function of poor leadership – at the beginning of the war the Boers outnumber the British significantly, but they don’t make use of the advantage – instead of driving their forces to their “schwerpunkt” and the “crucible” (Natal) – focusing on their plan and leveraging their only real advantage – mobility, they choose instead to divide their forces and sacrifice their mobility completely. Inexplicably they commit unusually large numbers of these highly mobile combatants and all their resources to siege warfare (static warfare) and not to defeating the enemy in the field (also a key military blunder) – high numbers of Boers sitting around and simply shelling three British towns from afar – safely out of range, and other than Ladysmith, making no real attempt to ‘take’ the town – and in doing this they allow the British to pour in all the reinforcements they need to counter-attack.

General Joubert – colour by Tinus le Roux

On a tactical level, General Joubert – tasked with the invasion of Natal fails on nearly every level, he fails to take tactical advantage of his “mobility” and fails to “take the fight to the enemy”, he fails to prevent the British forces at Dundee from “linking up” with their forces in Ladysmith (a key military blunder), and he fails to take Ladysmith when the opportunity is presented to him on a plate choosing a divine sense of providence instead (another key military blunder). By the time General Botha takes over the advantage is lost, and Buller is able to ultimately dislodge Botha at Tugela Heights with the innovative use of pontoons and manoeuvre and relive Ladysmith.

General Cronje, on a tactical level on the other front in the Cape also fails on every level, he fails in his initial defences, fails to move from his static defences in time, sacrificing mobility again and is outflanked and outmanoeuvred by a more “mobile” General French, Cronje then, for reasons known only to himself fails to link up with General de Wet and presents himself as a sitting duck to the British – the result is the 1st significant capitulation of Boer forces at Paardeberg on the 27th Feb 1900. 

General Cronje – colour by Jenny B

General Christiaan de Wet also fares no better. De Wet’s attack on Wepener is strategically un-sound, committing resources to worthless target and he’s repeatedly beaten back by a gutsy small garrison force. His plan to defend the indefensible at the ‘Brandwater Basin’ is flawed and he too presents his forces as sitting ducks in a ‘pocket’ surrounded on all sides – and then he leaves his command post on the “first train out of Dodge” as the British close in on him and leaves his squabbling subordinates and troops to fight it out instead, the result is a complete breakdown of his command and the 2nd. significant capitulation of Boer forces at Surrender Hill on the 30th July 1900.

This surrender marks the start of the Boer’s loss of the war (it’s the beginning of the end), they are unable to recover it and the surrender marks the end of the Conventional War and chalks it up as a British Victory. Often put up on a pedestal as a “volksheld” (people’s hero) unfortunately General Christiaan de Wet has the stigma of losing the Boer war for the Boer nation – it happened under his watch and his Command – literally. Militarily speaking he’s directly to blame – and he fares no better leading a doomed, inadequately armed, inadequately supported, strategically flawed, and failed Boer Revolt in 1914.

De Wet’s invasion of the Cape Colony in the guerrilla phase is also a disaster as he signals his intentions up-front to the British and over commits a slow and large wagon train which the British chew up and then they expel de Wet from the Cape with a semblance of his invasion force left over and the loss of most of his transports. Tactically de Wet is brilliant, evading his ‘hunt’ and labelled ‘The Boer Pimpernel’ - romanticised somewhat, especially his tactical victory using barefoot burghers to sneak up on the British at Groenkop. However truth be told, on both an operational and strategic level, as a commander he fails, even his victory at Sanna’s Post is somewhat flawed as an ‘own goal’.

General de Wet – Colour by Jenny B

On a strategic level, as we have seen Smuts’ strategic plan adopted by the Boer Forces is thrown out the window almost from the get-go. They start with it, but simply do not follow through with it at all, invading three British colonies and two British protectorates, splitting focus and forces – completely misreading and unable to raise the critical “Cape Rebellion” and completely sacrificing the Blitskreig concept by working to all their weaknesses and not any of their strengths. Smuts’ “Clausewitzian concept” goes out the window too – in the Conventional War phase, the Boers sacrifice their superior and simultaneous advances along “exterior” lines (a concentration in space) and revert to only using “interior” lines (a concentration of time) for communication and supply. 

In terms of strategy, on a political front, Kruger’s decision to strike out, by any type of military action you care to mention, against the world’s single biggest superpower, one whose Navy is bigger than the French, German and American Navy’s combined, at the very height of its Imperial power, is fundamentally flawed – plucky and very brave, yes – but strategically myopic and very unsound. 

The best the Boers can do from here out is a ‘hit and run’ guerrilla campaign in the hopes of wearing the British resolve down to avoid “unconditional surrender” and get better peace terms (which eventually happens). The ‘Bittereinder’ guerrilla campaign is not fought with any romantic idea of actually “winning’ the war”, the Bittereinder Generals – Smuts, Botha and de la Rey are under no illusions, they also see the resolve of their women to endure the farm clearances and concentration camps as their duty in winning a better peace – they never, during or after the war, turn to victimhood, its denies them their pride and their sacrifices. The victimhood argument is a latter day ‘politics of pain’ concept taken up by latter day “pure” Afrikaner nationalists, nearly all of whom sat out the war or were too young at the time.

Even the decision to strategically engage Guerrilla War is unsound given the extreme sacrifice of lives and livelihoods required to run this type of campaign, literally breaking the back of the Boer nation – the folly of this thinking is something even General Botha realises, and he sues for peace before his entire nation is crushed – as in his own words there will be literally nothing left to fight for. 

This is not the failure of the Boer soldier – this is the complete failure of the Boer Command. As military historians we have to look at the ‘score card’ in an objective and disparaging way – pointing out “critical failures” in doctrine it is – “boer bashing” it is not. 

The Score Card

To look at the Boer war by way of its score card we need to divide it into three broad sections – the Conventional War – Phase 1, when the Boers have the advantage, the Conventional War – Phase 2 when the British have the advantage and then The Guerrilla War (Insurgency) phase – which needs to be separate as the edicts of war change completely.

In all, for the duration of the war there are 170 significant actions fought between the Boers and the British (including their allied Black armies like the Tswana and the Swazi), these include significant pitched conventional battles, relief or success of all sieges, successful or repelled attacks and counter-attacks during all phases on strong-points (blockhouses, bases, forts) and trains, and the taking of key cities by way of military objective – Bloemfontein, Kroonstad, Johannesburg and Pretoria.

Not factored is the general carnage of destroying property – by either British or Boer actions – the Boer actions of burning down ‘British’, ‘hensopper’ and ‘joiner’ farms, ransacking and looting towns (Dundee etc.), destroying mission stations and blowing up railway track are excluded – so too is the carnage caused by the British burning down ‘bittereinder’ farms, destroying livestock and blowing up buildings. Trying to even factor this would be impossible. 

From the 11th October to 1st January 1900, the Boer forces have a numeric advantage, however the British battle order stemming and repulsing attacks on besieged towns is very good considering their disadvantage, so too the initial advance to relieve Kimberley  – during this period 21 actions are fought – the Brits win 14 and the Boers win 7.

From 1st January to July 1900, the numeric components start to balance, however on a Operational and Tactical level conducting conventional combined arms – the advantage swings significantly to the British. All the major sieges are relieved, the Boers invasions are turned and they are ejected from the British colonies. The hunt into the Orange Free State decimates the fighting capability of the Boers and forces the surrender of their conventional fighting capability. During this phase 49 actions are fought – the Brits win 44 and the Boers win just 5.

Overall, for the ‘Conventional’ war phase, the balance is overwhelming in favour of the British – British win 58 and the Boers win 12. In terms of timing, the British victory in the Conventional Phase is swift – from October to July – a mere 10 months, they have reversed an invasion, captured two separate countries, taken both Boer Republic’s capital cities, taken the Boer’s economic hub, isolated both countries and starved them of external aid. Broken the critical mass of the enemy to fight conventionally, taken nearly every major gun and artillery piece, and occupied all the enemy’s fortifications and defences. By any military standards that is good Command – Strategic, Tactical and Operational.

The Guerrilla phase is completely different, there are no significant pitched battles, battles resemble skirmishes, sieges are small towns remotely accessed and the focus switches to destroying supply lines (Boer and Brit) and ‘Commando’ hunts. It’s a “slow burner” in other words not much happens for months on end for the hundreds of thousands of troops in the theatre of operations, truly a case of “war is 99% boredom and 1% terror”. From August 1900 to May 1902 – the duration of this phase – 22 months, 100 significant actions are fought that would classify a ‘clash of arms’. It works out to only about 4.5 direct classes between Boer forces and British forces per month. 

The scorecard is also in favour of the British – the Brits win 72 and the Boers win 28. To read this correctly we also need to understand that the Boer strategy in this phase is not to beat or capture British troops (they can’t keep them), generally the strategy is to harass the British, inflict some damage, retreat and fight another day. On a ratio of Brit to Boer “wins” the ratio is 2:1 – the Boers are remarkably successful at insurgency warfare, and they generally evade the ‘hunts’. The Boers do well at the tactical and operational levels and attain their objectives of wearing down British resolve and elevate their monetary and human costs of waging war – but it comes as a massive cost to the Boer lives and livelihood at the strategic level. 

For the British, they win at the strategic level, the objective of starving the Guerrillas of their supply – food, ammunition, transport, weaponry, shelter and human resources, not to get into the moral or ethics of this, this is strategy used to win just about every Guerrilla war ever fought, by Britain or anyone else – it was the focus of the Vietnam War, the South African “Border War” and even most recently the Afghanistan War. On a tactical level their ‘Counter Insurgency” measures – now known as COIN – are very successful, so much so the Boer War’s Guerrilla Warfare phase is the shortest fought Guerrilla War in modern military history.

That said, as Professor Abel Esterhuyse rightly pointed out to the Observation Post – by 1902, the Boers emerge as the masters of ‘Insurgency Warfare’ and the British emerge as the masters of ‘Counter Insurgency Warfare’ (COIN) – lessons that are still referenced at Westpoint Military Academy to this day. This mastery would also define the ‘South African’ way of fighting war, when Jan Smuts is tasked with amalgamating the Boer Commandos and the old British colonial regiments to form the South African Union Defence Force (UDF) in 1910.

Thus, the UDF was built along the lines of using effective combined arms with high degrees of mobility to deal with both conventional warfare (as is the requirement of any statutory force) in the event a Colonial Power in Africa (e.g. Portugal or Germany) invades the Union and any domestic insurgencies (initially ‘internal’ threats are defined as potential Black African uprisings) and the UDF COIN doctrine is been developed to counter-act it along with a ‘Seek and Destroy’ ethos.

Smuts is happy to cherry pick, basically he’s happy to bring all that’s great and good about the British culture of warfare – their discipline and drill (sorely lacking in the Boer army), their uniforms and rank structures (sorely lacking in the Boer army) and their very effective use of combined arms warfare and joint arms warfare (also sorely lacking in the Boer army) and combine it with the Boer culture of warfare – the use of mobility, and applying high rates of survivability thinking to tactics of assault and defence (both of which are sorely lacking in the British army). 

Smuts will build into the UDF the doctrine of highly mobile ‘combined arms’ – mainly the effective use of mounted infantry, armour and artillery (and other ‘arms’) all acting in unison and speed. Finally, he’s able to implement the doctrine of “manoeuvre” using the Clausewitzian concept. Under General Jan Smuts the UDF was shaped into a very effective fighting force, one that is far ahead of the old Boer Republics strategic and tactical constructs and doctrine. This will have far reaching consequences as this South African ‘philosophy’ of warfare would be effectively applied from the 1st World War (1914-1918), to the 2nd World War (1939-1945) to the ‘Border War (1966-1989) and its still used by the SANDF to this very day.

Casualties

The number of casualties in the Boer War needs a whole new Observation Post, as here we look at the very sensitive subject of civilian casualties – Boer, but also British and Black – the number is extreme – about 50,000 and still rising given new research – nearly all of it the result of disease – Measles and Typhoid mainly. The Measles epidemic, which swept the ‘Black’ and ‘White’ Concentration Camps and the besieged British citizens – killed nearly 40% of all the civilians succumbing to disease – measles as a ‘children’s disease’ especially taking its toll on Boer children. Not just civilians, the biggest killer of British soldiery was Typhoid and not the Boer’s bullets, nearly two thirds of all British casualties are the result of disease – young fit men who are dropping like flies from the same diseases sweeping the concentration camps and British towns under siege. Typhoid alone affects 57,684 British soldiers – killing 8,225 of them.

This is a highly sensitive and misunderstood aspect of the war – it requires a full analysis on the disease bell-curves and medical science to fully properly understand the causes and effects, and actions taken or neglected  – look out for a future Observation Post in draft called “The Boer War’s biggest killer” where we will deep dive this subject and these statistics – because if there is one “winner” of this war’s butchers bill it’s not the British or the Boers – it’s an indiscriminate cocktail of micro-organisms.

We also need to look at the Killed in Action (KIA) and Died of Wounds (DOW) and survivability ratios between Republican and Imperial forces, as the KIA/DOW figure for the Brits is around 8,000 and the KIA/DOW figure for the Boers is around 4,000 – this implies the Boers were better soldiers – for every 1 Boer killed in combat 2 Brits are killed in combat (2:1 ratio) – this leads to the myths of the Boers been “better marksman” than the British or the Boers had better command and operational prowess – the British according to these myths were then “Lions led by Donkeys”.

However truth be told is on the survivability given the respective troop size and different doctrine, if you were a British soldier in South Africa in a combat role, your chance of surviving combat without been KIA or DOW was 98% – there was a 2% chance a Boer bullet would kill you – which is pretty good survivability by British doctrine which was “Hidebound by Tradition” with costly frontal attacks and bayonet charges and antiquated cavalry and lancer charges.

If you were a Boer combatant, given your overall troop size and strength, you had a 93% chance of combat survival and a 7% chance of been KIA or DOW from a British bullet. Which is not very good given Boer doctrine actually focussed on high degrees of survivability, choosing to break engagements, reconcile and fight another day (mobility and manoeuvre) – rather than stand and be bayonetted, cleaved and then impaled from a costly British frontal assault of infantry, cavalry and lancers – none of which appealed to the Boer way of fighting and doctrine for mounted infantrymen.

Bottom line – on casualties – statistically speaking the British command in the Boer War actually was pretty good given the improvements over time in doctrine from Waterloo to the Crimean War (see chart above), the Boer command on controlling casualties and survivability on the other hand was much poorer. One thing the British are NOT are “bad shots” and their Commanders are certainly NOT “Donkeys”. Simply put, if you were British you had a better chance of surviving combat, the point where the metal is flying around, than if you were a Boer.

In Conclusion 

Numbers speak more to truths than anything else, and the truth is the numbers support the idea that the Boers invaded the British colonies whilst they were numerically inferior and the Boers numerically superior, for the purposes of changing the regional balance between Boer and Brit and establishing a unitary state under “Afrikaner” influence – and not only does the republican planning and objectives point to this, their military strategy, doctrine and statements of intent supports it – and it is statistically proven. 

The idea that the British were building up an invasion force on the borders is complete Hollywood and panders to the ‘politically inspired’ sabre waving in the “ultimatum” delivered by the Boers and not to the reality on the ground at all. The idea that the Boers invaded British colonies for the purposes of forward defences or as some sort of pre-emptive strike is also completely unsupported by what actually happens, the actual plans and this assertion is woefully unsupported by military doctrine – entirely debunked by the science of military history.

Also, the idea that the Boer command and doctrine is somehow better than that of the British is completely statistically unproven, in fact the opposite is true, the ‘numbers’ point in favour of the British – so too does an analysis of the three aspects of effective command – on the Strategic level, the Tactical level and the Operational level.


Written, researched by Peter Dickens

With thanks to Tinus Le Roux and Jenny Bosch for the use of colourised images.

Related Work

Boer War 3 – The Maritz Revolt Boer War 3 and beyond!

The Black Concentration Camps of the Boer War The ‘BLACK’ Concentration Camps of the Boer War

The intended Boer invasion of Rhodesia The planned Boer invasion of Rhodesia

The Jameson Raid ‘Hurry Up’ and prove it!

References:

“Rights and wrongs of the Transvaal war” by Edward t. Cook. Publication date 1901

Leopold Charles Maurice Stennett Amery “The Second Boer War – The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902” – Volumes 1 to 7.

Military History Journal, Vol 6 No 3 – June 1984. The Medical Aspect of the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902 Part II by Professor J.C. de Villiers, MD FRCS.

The Anglo-Boer war: A chronology. By Cloete, Pieter G

The Battle of Magersfontein – Victory and Defeat on the South African Veld, 10-12 December 1899. Published 2023. By Dr. Garth Bennyworth.

Dr David Brock Katz; ‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917’

Dr Evert Kleynhans and Dr David Brock Katz; ’20 Battles – searching for a South African Way of War 1913 – 2013’.

Anglo-Boer War Blockhouses – a Field Guide by Simon C. Green, fact checking and correspondence – 2023.

The Boer War: By Thomas Pakenham – re-published version, 1st October 1991.

Correspondence and interviews with Dr. Garth Bennyworth, Boer War historian – Sol Plaatjies University, Kimberley – 2023.

Interviews with Dr. David Broc Katz, University of Stellenbosch, South African Military Academy – Military historian – focus on Jan Smuts and fact checking Boer and British military doctrine – 2023.

Correspondence on fact checking British doctrine with Chris Ash, BSc FRGS FRHistS, Boer War historian, Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society for The Boer War Atlas – 2023.

History of the war in South Africa 1899-1902. By Maj. General Sir Frederick Maurice and staff. Volumes 1 to 4, published 1906 

Debunking the myth that the British invented the ‘concentration camp’

It’s an almost ingrained idea in South Africa that ‘concentration camps’ were invented by the British during the 2nd Anglo Boer War (1899 – 1902) and there is an equally ingrained idea in some circles in South Africa which holds that the Nazi holocaust styled concentration camp simply followed on the lead set by the British in South Africa.

However, both of these ingrained concepts are untrue – they are myths.

This is not to say the concentration camps did not happen, they did.  It’s also not to say the concentration camp system in South Africa visited death to a civilian population on an unacceptably large and traumatic scale – they did.  It’s also not to ‘Boer Bash’ by way of any sort of ‘deniability’, the Boer nation suffered greatly under the concentration camp policy – no doubt about that at all.

It is to say that historic perspective and facts need to come to the fore to debunk myths and in the ‘concentration camps’ legacy in South Africa there are certainly a couple of myths – and they arose because of political expediency and the cognitive bias generated by the National party’s ‘Christian Nationalism’ education policy over five very long decades – so they are strongly rooted and tough to challenge.

There are three basic myths at play surrounding the 2nd Anglo Boer War (1899 – 1902) concentration camps.

  1. That Concentration Camps first came into existence during the 2nd Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and the British invented them.
  2. That Hitler modelled the Nazi concentration camp system on the British system used in the 2nd Anglo-Boer War.
  3. That it was the Boer women and children in South Africa who experienced the indignity and tragedy of a concentration camp system, with no thanks to the British.

That’s a lot to take in for someone with an ingrained belief, so let’s start with each of these myths:

Did the British invent the ‘Concentration Camp’?

The straight answer is; No.

750px-Flag_of_Spain_(1785–1873,_1875–1931)The actual term ‘concentration camp’ was invented by the Spanish (as campo de concentración or campo de reconcentración) in 1896 – three years before the 2nd Anglo-Boer War (1899 – 1904) started.  It originated during The Cuban War of Independence (Guerra de Independencia cubana, 1895–98) was the last of three liberation wars that Cuba fought against Spain.

A rebellion had broken out in Cuba, then a Spanish colony in 1895.  The rebels, outnumbered by Spanish government troops, turned to guerrilla warfare (and here another myth which says the Boer’s invented ‘guerrilla warfare’ is debunked).

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Colon Cemetery, Havana, Cuba, 1898

In response to guerilla warfare the Spanish commander Valeriano Weyler ordered the civilians of Cuba to be ‘concentrated’ in concentration camps under guard so they could not provide the rebels with food, supplies or new recruits.

Initial rebel military actions against the Spanish had been very successful and it forced Spain to re-think how to conduct the war.  The first thing they did was replace their commander on the ground in Cuba, Arsenio Martinez Campos, who had for all intents and purposes failed to pacify the Cuban rebellion.  The Conservative Spanish government of Antonio Canovas del Castillo sent Valeriano Weyler out to Cuba to replace him. This change in command met the approval of most Spaniards back home in Spain, who thought him the proper man to crush the rebellion.

Valeriano Weyler reacted to the rebels’ guerilla tactics successes by introducing terror methods: periodic executions, mass exile of residents, forced concentration of civilians in certain cities or areas and the destruction of their farms and crops. Weyler’s methods reached their height on October 21, 1896, when he ordered all countryside residents and their livestock to gather within eight days in various fortified areas and towns occupied by his troops.

Hundreds of thousands of people had to leave their homes and were subjected to appalling and inhumane conditions in the crowded towns and cities.

Civilians interned into these concentration camps were in a perilous situation as poor sanitation quickly lead to deadly disease and combined with the lack of food an estimated 25 to 30 percent of the civilian population subjected to these concentration camps died during the three years of warfare. 

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Patients in San Carlo Hospital, Matanzas, in the last stages of starvation

In the end 225,000 ‘non combatant’ Cuban civilians died in just 18 months between 1896 and 1897.  That is some number, nearly a quarter of a million Cubans, and its a stain of blood which sits with modern Spain and one for which there has been little by way of reparation or apologies.

It also means Spain holds the rather dishonourable mantle of inventing the concentration camp system and even the term itself, not the British.

Then was South Africa the 2nd place where Concentration Camps were used?

The straight answer is again – No.

1024px-Flag_of_the_United_States_(1896-1908)The second country to operate concentration camps was the United States of America in September 1899 in the Philippines.  At this point in the historic time-line the British had not yet engaged the ‘Concentration Camp’ system in its full-blown manifestation in South Africa (which started in earnest at the beginning of 1901).

By 1899, the United States of America had recently acquired the Philippines from Spain, only to be confronted by a rebellion by Filipinos who wanted independence rather than American rule. Known as the  Philippine–American War or the Tagalog Insurgency 1899 – 1902 (same timing as the 2nd Anglo-Boer war more or less).

The Filipinos turned to guerrilla warfare and in response the Americans copied the Spanish solution used in Cuba earlier.

In September 1899, American military strategy shifted to suppression of the resistance, in coordination with the future president, William Howard Taft, then the U.S. civil administrator of the islands changed course. Tactics now became focused on the control of key areas with ‘Internment’ and ‘segregation’ of the civilian population in “zones of protection” from the guerrilla population which became defined as ‘concentration camps’.

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Government issuing rice to civilians in a Bauan concentration camp

Concentration camps were set up on the islands of Marinduque and Mindanao, and civilians from rebel-sympathising districts were forced to reside there. As in Cuba, the death rate in these concentration camps from disease was horrendous.

These “reconcentrados,” or concentration camps, were crowded and filled with disease; as the frustrations of guerrilla warfare grew, many U.S. fighters resorted to brutal retaliatory measures, one U.S. camp commandant referred to the concentration camps as the “suburbs of hell.”

The U.S. State Department estimates that around 20,000 Filipino and 4,000 U.S. combatants died in the fighting in the Philippines, and as many as 200,000 Filipino civilians died as a result of violence, famine and disease, with most losses attributable to cholera.  Stanley Karnow observers that the American treatment of Filipino citizens “as cruel as any conflict in the annals of imperialism.”

The concentration camps policy was highly effective to the American War effort , As historian John M. Gates noted, “the policy kept the guerillas off-balance, short of supplies and in continuous flight from the U.S. army,  As a result many guerrilla bands, suffering from sickness, hunger and decreasing popular support, lost their will to fight.” America had won, but at what cost?

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A concentration camp in Tanauan, Batangas

As with the Spanish in Cuba, the United States of America generally also does not view their use of concentration camps as a crime against humanity, but rather as an extreme measure to stop ‘guerrilla warfare’ by cutting off the civilian support of the guerrilla fighters.

So, no apology from the United States for their status as the second country to use a concentration camp system, it also is not the last time they would use a ‘concentration camp’ system – they would use it again during the Vietnam War (more of that later).

Then was South Africa the 3rd place where Concentration Camps were used?

This time, sadly – the straight answer is – Yes.

1280px-Flag_of_the_United_KingdomThe third country to set up concentration camps was Britain, but they did not initially call them concentration camps, they called them ‘Government Laagers” and ‘Refugee Camps’.

The reasons were similar to that of Spain in Cuba and the USA in the Philippines; Britain was at war with the two Boer Republics of South Africa, which had turned to guerrilla warfare once their conventional field armies were defeated.  This stage is known as ‘Stage 3’ – The Guerrilla Phase of the South African War 1899-1902.

Stage 1 (Boer Success) and Stage 2 (British Response) end the ‘Conventional Phase’ of the war in late 1900 with the capture of Pretoria – Stage 3 – the Guerrilla Phase starts in earnest from the start of 1901 and lasts a year and a half ending May 1902.

The decision taken by the British was to hasten the end of the Guerrilla Phase, in essence the policy was to concentrate civilians located in conflict zones into government run camps (concentration camps) and destroy stock, crops, implements and farm buildings so the Boer guerrilla forces would run out of supplies and their support network would be crushed. As with the two previous situations perpetuated by Spain and the USA before, these British camps soon became rife with disease and thousands of people died, mostly from measles, pneumonia, typhoid and dysentery.

Why do the British refer to their ‘Concentration Camps’ as ‘Refugee Camps’ when they are clearly not?

The reason for the British sticking to the use of the term ‘Refugee Camps’ instead of ‘Concentration Camps’ is because these camps in South Africa actually started out as ‘refugee camps’: The first two of these camps (refugee camps) were established by the British to house the families of burghers who had surrendered voluntarily.

On the 22nd September 1900, Major-Gen J.G. Maxwell signalled that “… camps for burghers who voluntarily surrender are being formed at Pretoria and Bloemfontein.” As result of this military notice the first two ‘refugee’ camps were indeed established at Pretoria and Bloemfontein respectively.

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Imperial War Museum caption “A refugee Boer family, the wife in traditional black and white costume, surrounded by their possessions, at a railway station”.

The aim outlined by the British for these two refugee camps was supposedly to protect those families of Boers who had surrendered voluntarily. A proclamation was even issued by Lord Kitchener by 20th December 1900 which states that all burghers surrendering voluntarily, will be allowed to live with their families in ‘Government Laagers’ until the end of the war and their stock and property will be respected and paid for.

But (and its a big BUT), by 21st December 1900 (the very next day) Lord Kitchener comes up with a different intention completely, and this one does not the safe-keeping of people, property and stock in mind. In a stated  memorandum to general officers Lord Kitchener outlined the advantages of interning all women, children and men unfit for military services, also Blacks living on Boer farms, as this will be;

“the most effective method of limiting the endurance of the guerrillas … The women and children brought in should be divided in two categories, viz.: 1st. Refugees, and the families of Neutrals, non-combatants, and surrendered Burghers. 2nd. Those whose husbands, fathers and sons are on Commando. The preference in accommodation, etc. should of course be given to the first class. With regard to Natives, it is not intended to clear (Native) locations, but only such and their stock as are on Boer farms.”.

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A group of Boer children with a native African woman at a ‘refugee’ camp. Imperial War Museum image.

With that memorandum now writ, effectively by January 1901, the camps stopped becoming ‘Refugee Camps’ and became ‘Concentration Camps’ governed by forced removal, in effect – displacement camps of civilians forcibly removed from their farmsteads.

The British, for the sake of politically sanitizing this policy from a public opinion perspective, continued to call these camps as ‘Refugee Camps’ and in many circles in the United Kingdom they are still referred as such even today, a good example of this is the Imperial War Museum – when they any publish picture showing Boer families being rounded up on their way to a concentration camp they are almost always (and incorrectly) tagged as ‘refugees’ in the caption.

So how is it that Nazi German Concentration Camps are linked to the ‘British’ Concentration Camps?

2000px-Flag_of_the_German_Reich_(1935–1945)The answer is simply, because of Hermann Göring.

During a press interview Hermann Goring (the then spokesperson on behalf of Adolph Hitler), served to deflect a challenge from a British ambassador who protested about the Nazi concentration camps, and by using a ‘press stunt’ when he dramatically sprung up and quoted from a reference book that the British invented them in the first place (when in fact this is factually incorrect) and it just served as a skillful stroke of political deflection of which Hermann Göring was a past master.

Why a deflection? Because the German ‘Concentration Camps’ were fundamentally different from those initiated by the Spanish, and then the Americans and finally the British, their camps were all tactical responses to guerrilla warfare, whereas the Nazi ‘concentration camps’ started out for camps for political dissent in opposition to National Socialism (Nazism) as ‘re-education’ camps, as a central theme to them.

Socialist systems driven on nationalist lines, whether German Nazi or Russian/Chinese Communism all have in them this phenomenon to re-educate (and if necessary exterminate) anyone in their society not conforming to their idea of the ‘social hive’ or ‘community’.  The Soviet system of ‘Gulag’ re-education camps are no different to the early German Nazi concentration camps in their purpose (and as deadly).

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German Nazi Concentration Camp for Political Prisioners

That the German ‘concentration camps’ later evolved into systematic pre-meditated murder with the idea of exterminating entire populations of specific races to solve an ideological problem, and it is an entirely different objective to those objectives behind the British concentration camps in South Africa.

In Nazi Germany and their occupied countries the ‘concentration camp’ evolved into the ‘extermination camp’ for people following the Jewish faith – primarily but not exclusive to Jews – the system also included other people not deemed Aryan enough within the confines of Nazi philosophy or conformist enough to their idea of socialism – gypsies (travellers), free-masons, homosexuals, communists and even the mentally ill all found themselves on the wrong side of Nazism.

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Auschwitz concentration camp for the extermination of Jews and other Nazi undesirables.

But, for some reason, certainly in some circles in South Africa, Hermann Göring’s master class in deflecting a press junket is held up as Gospel, now, in the hindsight of history who would really believe anything Hermann Göring came up with?

What’s the big difference between a Nazi concentration camp and a British concentration camp?

The fundamental differences between a Nazi concentration camp (re-education/extermination camp) and a British concentration camp (forced removal/refugee camp) are massive.

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Himmler’s report to Hitler detailing the executions of civilian prisoners – especially Jews.

For starters, unlike Nazi Germany, there is no historical document or any supporting record that the British embarked on the extermination of the Boer nation using systematic pre-meditated murder.  Not one document or letter whatsoever, whereas in the case of Nazi extermination camps there is an entire undeniable record of premeditated murder.

Secondly, the concentration camps in South Africa were isolated and relatively unguarded, mostly unfenced and they were relatively porous affairs where people came in and out and aid workers came in and out – very different to the Nazi German idea of lining people up on a train platform under armed escort without a suitable aid worker in sight and marching them straight into gas chambers and/or mass graves in their tens of thousands.

The fundamental difference however is in the core thinking behind the military objective requiring concentration camps, for the British the military objective was to bring a quick end to a guerrilla campaign initiated in the final phase of the South African war, They did this by rounding up civilians in support of Boer guerrillas, placing them into camps and cutting off these ‘commando’ guerilla groups from their supply of food, feed, ammunition and recruits.

On the other hand, the objective of the German concentration camps of WW2 was not to put an end to any form of guerrilla warfare whatsoever, it was to systematic exploit and exterminate entire populations along ideological lines of race superiority.

What is common in respect of both forms of concentration camp is that many people died, and in both respects that single act qualifies a tragedy and a failure of the human condition.

Did the deaths in the camps come about because of a hatred for the Boer race?

The answer simply to this question is – No.

The argument that the British concentration camps were designed to systematically wipe the Boer population from the planet by way of extermination because of race hate for Boers falls apart when you consider the British did not target only the ‘Boers’ for deportation to concentration camps.

The truth is the British targeted everybody who they perceived to be involved in the supply of horse feed, ammunition, weapons and food to guerrilla Boer commandos.  This included Black Africans in addition to the Boers themselves.

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Medical inspection inside a Black concentration camp as administered by the Native Refugee Department. Orange Free State, 1901. Photo research by Dr Garth Benneyworth.

The unfortunate truth that central to the concept of concentration camps to South Africa is simply railway supply.

When the British marched into Pretoria, raising the union jack in victory of the conventional war – they found themselves stretched deep into ‘hostile’ territory with extended and vulnerable supply lines stretching over hundreds of kilometres.

On losing their capital cities, the Boer strategy switched and they moved their government ‘into the field’ to embark on a ‘Guerrilla Warfare’ phase – with the intention to disrupt supply to the British now based in Bloemfontein and Pretoria and isolate the British into pockets (mainly along the railway lines).

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To do this they would need food, ammunition and feed supplied directly from their own farmsteads or supporters surrounding their chosen targets. The relatively easy targets were trains and train lines (due to isolation and expanse), and after many a locomotive steamed into Pretoria riddled with bullet holes or didn’t make it all, Lord Kitchener got fed up at the arrogance of Boer resistance after the war had been effectively ‘won’ in his eyes and he acted decisively.

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Locomotive No. 99 “KOMAAS” destroyed by the Boers near Middelburg.

Kitchener concentrated on restricting the freedom of movement of the Boer commandos and depriving them of local support. The railway lines and supply routes were critical, so he established 8000 fortified blockhouses along them and subdivided the land surrounding each of them into a protective radius.

Wherever and whenever an attack took place, or where sufficient threat existed to this system, Kitchener took to the policy of depopulating the radius area, burning down the farmsteads, killing the livestock and moving all the people – both Black and White (it mattered not to the British what colour they were) into their ‘Government Laagers’ which were in effect – concentration camps.

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British burning of Boer farmsteads as a tactic to cut the supplies to and support of Boer Commando’s food, feed, recruits and ammunition.

Two different systems of concentration camps existed in South Africa, one specifically for Blacks only and one mainly for Whites (these also contained Black servants and staff to Boer families).  Both were run very differently.  The outcome was however tragically the same for both. Disease, mainly water-bourne ones took hold and in the Boer civilian’s camps the official death toll is 26 370 people, whereas in the Black camps it is estimated that 20,000 people died (the official records here were not accurately kept by the British – as they were in the Boer camps).

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African women in a Black concentration camp in Klerksdorp,

For a deeper history on the Black concentration camps of The South African War (1899 – 1902) click on this link; To fully reconcile The Boer War is to fully understand the ‘BLACK’ Concentration Camps

Another point to consider as to the tragedy of the British Concentration camps in South Africa, is that some of the British staff working in the camps died from the same diseases that the killed Boer inhabitants of these camps – a sure sign of poor management and lack of proper medical understanding, medicine and aid –  rather than a premeditated intention to murder.  The sad truth here, disease is indiscriminate.

Did we learn the lesson not to use concentration camps again?

The answer to that sadly is … No.

As said earlier, the Spanish and the Americans found the Concentration Camp system highly effective in bringing guerrilla warfare to an end – a grisly, painful, barbaric end yes, but and end none the same.  The British, rather sadly found the same – that despite the unacceptable damage to a civilian population, the tactic of concentration camps proved very succesful in bringing about a prompt end to what was proving to be a protracted war with an equally protracted affair of all round misery to civilian and combatant alike.

But at what price?  Such a tactic of rounding up civilian groupings and containing them so they cannot supply guerrilla fighters in the field has time and again brought unacceptable death rates to civilians – along with fundamental setbacks in a culture or population’s wellbeing and evolution.  The consequences of concentration camps, whether they are culturally, politically, economically or emotionally considered are far-reaching, highly negative and very deep.

Which brings us back to the United States of America, the second country to use a concentration camp system at the end of the 1800’s, because they were back at it again as late as the 1960’s – not even forty years ago – during the Vietnam War.

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US troops Burning villages in Vietnam

In Vietnam they would engage exactly the same system – create ‘firebases’ in ‘protected zones, whenever there was a ‘flashpoint’ of guerrilla activity they would starve the guerrillas of their means to fight by cutting off  their supplies (food and weapons), and they would do this by burning suspected villages and homesteads to the ground and moving all the affected civilian population into government-run ‘Strategic Hamlet’ camps – concentration camps in effect.

The only saving grace in all of this is that by the mid 1960’s medicine had moved on and diseases which had killed civilians in their droves in concentration camps at the end of the 1800’s could now be easily cured and even stopped in the 1960’s – as simply put better medical understanding, vaccination, antibiotics and penicillin had all come a long way by the end of the 1960’s – so too had government agencies handling civilian affairs during wartime.

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Villages in a ‘Strategic Hamlet’ – Vietnam War

So instead of getting any form of admission to running ‘concentration camps’ and wholesale displacement and civilian death in the Philippines and even later in Vietnam – what we get from modern-day America are bland, soulless American military definitions outlining incidents when they the accidentally kill a bunch of citizens – and they now call it unavoidable “collateral damage.”

From a military strategic and tactical perspective, in many respects, the techniques used by the Americans for fighting ‘guerrilla warfare’ in the Vietnam War during the 1960’s and early 1970’s is almost no different to the techniques used by the British fighting the same type of guerrilla warfare in 1901 and early 1902.  The Americans built ‘fire-bases’ to protect strategic points and fan out from to find Vietcong guerrillas, the British built ‘blockhouses’ next to protected strategic points and fanned out to find Boer guerrillas. The Americans rounded up Vietnamese civilians around flashpoints and burnt the farmsteads … the British did the same and burnt the farmsteads.  During the Vietnam War the Americans and their proxy state ran camps for displaced civilians under the strange alias of ‘The Strategic Hamlet Program’ – in effect concentration camps, the British ran camps for displaced civilians under the strange alias of ‘Government Laagers’ – in effect also concentration camps.

Strategic Hamlet

Vietnam War ‘Strategic Hamlet’ – note the containment and defensive perimeter

So what’s the difference?  It’s the concept of ‘Total War’ that has blurred the lines, it starts to become almost impossible to separate the idea of combatants and non combatants from soldier and civilian – when civilians aid the soldiers by maintaining their combat readiness.  The ANC used the same excuse to bomb Southern Cross Aid offices, a civilian charity supplying the SADF with gift aid and the SADF even used the same excuse when a whole bunch of civilians came into the cross-fire at Cassinga in Angola during the Angolan Border War.

In conclusion

The impact of the British concentration camp policy in South Africa is far-reaching, deeply traumatic and still has bearing today as it’s an issue that requires national healing and international recognition.  It is not a light matter.  However, we have to be true to pursuing the facts and discarding the propaganda and politically motivated miss-truths.

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Boer women and children in a British Concentration Camp

So, we stand by the myth now debunked – the British did not invent the ‘concentration camp’, and certainly not the ‘concentration camp’ as we have come to know the system employed by the Nazis.

History however does show us that a policy to counter-act Guerrilla Warfare by herding civilians into concentration camps is generally a very bad idea from a purely humanitarian perspective, nothing of any good has come from it, its morally corrupt and the British (like the Americans and the Spanish before them) are complicit and guilty of using this policy, and it is to their eternal shame.

As to guerrilla warfare bringing on ‘total war’ and the consequences thereof it’s an American General, William Tecumseh Sherman whose comment rings so tragically true in this respect

“War is cruelty. There is no use trying to reform it. The crueller it is, the sooner it will be over”. 


Written by Peter Dickens

Related work and links

The Black Concentration Camps of the Boer War; To fully reconcile The Boer War is to fully understand the ‘BLACK’ Concentration Camps

Emily Hobhouse; I’m not pro Boer, I’m British, this isn’t OUR way!

With sincere thanks to Tinus Le Roux for all the Boer War colourised images used in the article.  References include The Spanish Reconcentration Policy by PBS. The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare by John M. Gates. Imperial War Museum.