Trojan horses

Liliesleaf, Rivonia (August 1962 –11 July 1963)

By Garth Conan Benneyworth

Abstract

The police raid on Liliesleaf on 11 July 1963 is understood to be the result of informants within the liberation movements either breaking down in detention or “selling out” and providing information about the farm with its safe house and its people. This paper, while acknowledging that there were informants inside the liberation movements, maintains that this was only a fragment of a kaleidoscope of events culminating in the raid and subsequent Rivonia Trial. Rather it was a covert investigation undertaken since 1962 that resulted in the blow delivered by the combined security agencies, that shattered the underground networks opposing the apartheid state. It was an investigation which relied extensively on the principles of the mythological Greek Trojan horse; it used persons and technology that aimed to undermine and overthrow their opponent, to subvert and defeat it from within, while appearing non threatening. This paper identifies three Trojan horses. A human spy concealed behind the innocent look of a child who fronted for sinister forces. Electronic warfare deployed by the military and linked to an innocuous caravan park; and finally a laundry van to deliver the surgical knockout strike. Yet all this subterfuge has eluded the narrative for 53 years.

The build-up, 1963

By June 1963 the state crackdown was relentless. Political organisations, such as the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party (SACP) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), together with their activists were under banning orders, restricted from almost all social and political contact with others, rendered incommunicado, detained, driven into exile, or serving prison sentences. The PAC’s resistance had been neutralised, numerous political trials were underway and of the various methods exhibited by a growing security police state, one was increasing brutality.

It became increasingly difficult for the members of the underground to operate. Informants were rumoured to be everywhere and the pressure of living beneath the radar became unbearable. At some point a fatal mistake might be made or the sheer weight of the security apparatus might find a leak in the dyke, bursting through to flood into the underground networks.

Dennis Goldberg recalled that there were two sides to operating in the underground.

“It really was as exciting as I imagined it would be. I was a fulltime revolutionary. I felt invincible: on the brink of something great. There was a constant rush of adrenaline”.1

However this came with a price. Goldberg recalled living under this terrible strain:

“What happens when you are working underground is that you’re constantly working under the pressure of discovery; you’re constantly having to think about it. It becomes a terrible anxiety. The pressure of being underground, it was wearing and wearing … and you’re forced into making mistakes. This is what the pressure does, it forces you into mistakes. I am talking about the way the security forces
pressure you.2

And this is the lesson to be learnt from it, there is always too much to do, you’re always in a hurry, the revolution must happen today, if not tonight, and so you make mistakes. What it plays on is that eventually you become so lonely, you give yourself away … It’s like a boil. That is part of the psychology. That might not necessarily be the whole thing. But we don’t train our people for this, you only learn it when it’s too damn late.3

Lionel ‘Rusty’ Bernstein – mugshot

There was a nuance of change taking place; one that the movement was slow to detect. Some members had become complacent, lulled by a false sense of security, which appeared to be presented by the façade of the safe house. After all, once inside the perceived guerrilla zone, the hostile world lay beyond its boundaries. Rusty Bernstein saw it as “evident that the ‘safe house’ syndrome was at work. Liliesleaf farm seemed to be the easy option for every hard choice. It was after all safe.”4

Kathrada recalled his emotions when he arrived at Liliesleaf:

“I’m living in another world. The comrades here were completely divorced, Soweto was just a few miles from here, they were completely divorced from reality. And drawing up very fancy documents. They had even forgotten that when MK was formed, no one had the idea that MK was going to overthrow the government. At the very most MK was going to be a pressure group. The goal remained that MK would be one of the pressure groups together with the political struggle, together with the international pressures, to force the enemy to the negotiation table.”5

In 2006, according to Vivien Ezra who owned the front company, Navian Ltd, established by the SACP to purchase Liliesleaf, there were no internal security arrangements within the cells to resist infiltration. 6 Structures just did not exist whereby suspicions could be reported. In short, there was no structured counter intelligence mechanism in use by the underground. 7 Naïve is a persistent word that crept through all the interviews conducted by the author in the period from 2004 to 2006.

Nothing illustrates this better than the fact that although Mandela was captured in August 1962, Liliesleaf continued to be used by the allied organisations, including the SACP, the ANC, MK, members of the Congress Alliance, South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and members of the Indian political organisations, right up until the raid, eleven months later.

Liliesleaf farm – aerial photo taken after the raid, note the thatch roof room top left connected to rear farm quarters and buildings – this room was used by Nelson Mandela. Brenthurst Library.

One would have thought that once South Africa’s most wanted fugitive was captured, these organisations would have tried to put as much distance as possible between themselves and Liliesleaf, given that Mandela had used the farm as his base of operations. He had travelled throughout Africa and the United Kingdom, yet it would appear that no one considered the possibility that his movements might be tracked back to Liliesleaf, or that had he been under surveillance, which he was, thus compromising the farm around August 1962 when captured. Mandela claimed that he concealed a revolver and notebook within the upholstery of the front seat of Cecil Williams’s car before being arrested and taken into custody.8 The hypothesis is that the police found this notebook, which enabled them to investigate his activities in South Africa after his return from Ethiopia. The impending danger was that by using this information the security branch could hone in on Liliesleaf. In fact, it appears that that the underground activities and the use of Liliesleaf by the liberation movement actually increased after August 1962 and continued to do so until the 1963 raid. It is possible that more leaders of the underground and operatives sought shelter at Liliesleaf after August 1962, than at any other time in its history before this date. Walter Sisulu, Raymond Mhlaba, Wilton Mkwai, Andrew Mlangeni, Govan Mbeki and Ahmed Kathrada certainly did, to name but a few. Meetings of MK’s high command, the Secretariat and the SACP’s central committee were held there, and quite possibly also the ANC’s NEC and various MK committees such as those dealing with intelligence, logistics, transport and housing.

Police searching the living room at Liliesleaf farm – main house, police photograph.

It is widely understood that the meeting of the Secretariat on the day of the raid was the last meeting held at Liliesleaf and that thereafter other venues would be used. Some had serious reservations about returning there believing the farm to be compromised. Bernstein was vehemently opposed to returning to Liliesleaf. 9 Other senior leaders, such as Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba and Wilton Mkwai no longer stayed there, having moved to Trevallyn, a smallholding near Krugersdorp, purchased shortly before by Denis Goldberg under a fictitious name. Meanwhile, Liliesleaf was to be used solely for accommodating the MK high command and those immediately involved in its functioning.10 However this was not the case for that one fateful meeting. The Logistics Committee was due to meet the night of 11 July 1963. So in fact two meetings were intended at Liliesleaf on the day of the raid. All of those captured during the raid concur that because an alternative venue couldn’t be found, it was agreed to meet at Liliesleaf one last time.

Yet other parallel activities were occurring, such as a scheduled Logistics Committee meeting, planned to take place inside the main house after the Secretariat concluded its business in the thatched cottage. One of its members, Denis Goldberg was already seated in the lounge reading a book when the veranda door swung open to initiate his capture. Another member, Arthur Goldreich, drove home into the raid with a copy of Operation Mayibuye concealed behind his vehicle’s hubcap. A third, Hilliard Festenstein, walked into the house punctually that night to attend the meeting which never happened – straight into the arms of the police. The chairman of the Logistics Committee, Wilton Mkwai, narrowly avoided capture when approaching the farm as scheduled and saw the raid already in progress. A fifth member, Ian David Kitson, escaped due to a bout of flu which had kept him in bed; while the reasons for Lionel Gay’s non-show remain unknown.

All those at Liliesleaf that day were arrested. The exceptions were six children, three black and three white. Together with other members of the liberation movement who were serving jail sentences or who were arrested elsewhere, those arrested stood trial in what became a watershed moment in South African history. Rivonia.

Leakage

Liliesleaf was leaking. A few weeks before the raid some MK members had visited the farm and were arrested. It was a matter of time before the security branch broke them. By July 1963, there were numerous security lapses so it was inevitable that if the police hadn’t already done so, they would soon find the farm. Apart from which, “we were total amateurs. You cannot cross both worlds, indefinitely”. 11

The concept of security had broken down. Too many people were using Liliesleaf. Its numerous visitors included people who were known to the security branch and foreign intelligence agencies, such as Joe Slovo, Ruth First, Jack Hodgson, Bram Fischer, Lionel Bernstein, Harold Wolpe and many others. Lionel (Rusty) Bernstein described this osmosis from the safe house:

“Later people who had been overseas for military training would arrive back in Bechuanaland without any proper planning. The first thing we would know was that they were in Bechuanaland and wanted come back. So we’d bring them back and they would stay for a few nights … Rivonia came into sudden use in a way that had not been foreseen.

So this place became a sort of centre, if you like because Sisulu and Mbeki were the two senior ANC people at large at that time. [Since] both of them were [also]participating on the high command, they began to use it for MK high command activities, both for keeping documents and holding meetings, and they were bringing people to their meetings who were not in the high command, not living underground and so on. So the place really changed from being a really closely kept secret to being something of a centre.”12

Even Thomas Mashifane, the foreman, could sense the inherent danger building up. “What are you folks doing? The way motor cars are coming in and out, the next thing the police are going to come.” 13 No one was prepared to listen. The question is, where others listening with a more sinister intent? Had those with a little more intellect than ascribed to them, applied themselves as opposed to the thuggery displayed by the police? Had the proverbial Mr Plod finally caught up?

Rear view aerial image of Liliesleaf farm – Police photograph post raid, Brenthurst Library.

The central thread that runs through the literature is that the security branch experienced a lucky break when they raided Liliesleaf farm. Starting in 1965, Strydom has it that an informant offered to tell what he knew about activities at the farm, yet had only a vague idea where it was. Accompanied by a detective and after driving about the area for some time, he eventually recognised the property.14 Frankel has it that Lt. Van Wyk who led the raid was advised by a colleague that he had an informant with information to sell. Apparently he knew where to find Walter Sisulu and half a dozen other important leaders of the Umkhonto high command. For a large payment he would take the lieutenant there.15 According to Frankel the informant took Van Wyk to Liliesleaf, enabling him to plan the raid which he sprung the following day. After the raid the informant received R6 000.16 More recent works, for example that by Smith, have the security branch depicted as a proverbial Mr Plod staffed with bumbling policemen who eventually caught up with the activists.17 If so, who was listening in besides the SAP and its security branch?

This paper will show that at least three parallel lines of investigation by three separate security agencies took place between 1962 and the day of the raid. There could have been other agencies but these remain unidentified. The three agencies were the SAP’s security branch, using its methods of informer recruitment and information collected; Republican Intelligence (RI), using informants and information trading with foreign intelligence organisations (later better known as the National Intelligence Service or NIS); and the South African Communications Security Agency which was linked to the South African Defence Force (SADF).

Investigating Liliesleaf, 1962-1963

There is no doubt that captured operatives gave the police information. Examples include Bruno Mtolo, Patrick Mthembu and Bartholomew Hlapane.18 However, this paper will identify one informer whose role the author uncovered in 2005 by locating this informant’s 1963 statement to the SAP. A copy was provided by the author to the Liliesleaf Trust in 2005 and is included in an unpublished research report to the Trust in 2007.19 All subsequent references to this informant are drawn from the author’s prior work. Within weeks of Nelson Mandela’s capture on 5 August 1962, the security branch had a ten-year-old informant who had access to the farm. His name is George Mellis. His parents owned the Rivonia Caravan Park directly across the road from Liliesleaf. He was the perfect Trojan horse. He could literally breach the sanctity of the safe house undetected, much like the mythical Trojan horse parked outside the gates of Troy. No one gave the boy so much as a second glance when he arrived to play with his friends Nicholas and Paul Goldreich, or wandered around near the outbuildings while covert meetings were underway.

On 5 August 1963, George Mellis made a sworn statement to Sergeant Fourie who commanded the Rivonia police station.

“About a year ago, one day when I was playing in the yard of the Goldreichs’ place, I saw a number of white and Bantu males together in the thatch-roof building next to the main house. These people were talking and I saw some shaking hands with each other. This seemed strange to me and I told my parents about it. On some occasions that I went there I saw a lot of cars parked in the yard and one occasion,
I took the registration numbers of all the cars parked in the Goldreich yard and handed the numbers I had written down, to the police at Rivonia.” 20

Sergeant Fourie forwarded Mellis’s number plate list and his information to the security branch. Mellis tried to elicit further information from his Goldreich playmates whom he joined inside the main house for lunch. On one occasion, he said, “I asked Nicholas about the persons on the premises but Nicholas said that he was not allowed to tell me anything”. 21

In his 1963 statement Mellis identified Walter Sisulu Raymond Mhlaba, Denis Goldberg and Ahmed Kathrada from police photographs. His Goldberg reference is pertinent in that Goldberg first visited Liliesleaf in May 1963. This means that Mellis was spying on Liliesleaf from the time of his first report (about a year before the raidand soon after Mandela’s capture), through to when Goldberg visited Liliesleaf between May and July 1963. Mellis spied right up until the raid.

Photo of Nicholas and Paul Goldreich who befriended George Mellis, this photograph was taken at Liliesleaf farm and is in the private collection of Arthur Goldreich and shared with the author.

Sergeant Fourie assisted the security branch too. In December 1962, Fourie received a summons for a parking offence from the Alberton magistrate’s court which he had to serve on Arthur Goldreich. Fourie held back.

“Aangesien ek bang was dat dit met die ondersoek mag inmeng het ek die lasbrief nie laat uitvoer nie maar het die agterwee gehou [Because I was afraid that it might interfere with the investigation, I did not serve the summons but held it back.]”.22

Fourie instructed his policemen that any action against anyone at Liliesleaf, for example serving a summons, should first be cleared with him. No policeman was to go onto Liliesleaf for any reason without prior authorisation, because an investigation was underway. The farm was sanitised from any official physical interruption.

On 14 January 1963, Colonel Hendrik van den Bergh was appointed head of the security branch of the South African Police. His orders were to reorganise the South African security establishment and it was he who created the first national intelligence service, originally known as Republican Intelligence (RI). The government needed an intelligence organisation that could function along the lines of America’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). The RI, together with the security branch, were instructed to smash all organised resistance to the minority regime.

According to Gerhard Ludi the RI’s primary focus was the South African Communist Party (SACP). Ludi, one of RI’s first agents, has suggested that the RI identified the SACP as the primary problem confronting the apartheid regime. Ludi has said that the CIA assisted RI and provided intelligence about financial assistance that Russia provided to the liberation movements. The CIA also indicated who the KGB operatives in South Africa might be and pointed out some of the local communists to the RI.23 RI fed intelligence to both the CIA and the SIS on a weekly basis and these agencies reciprocated. This foreign intelligence feed also included information about Operation Mayibuye and Radio Freedom, both implicitly connected to Liliesleaf.24

Ludi related that RI took the approach that, “if one learned about the cores of the Communist Party, one would learn about the why and where and the role the Soviets were playing in this”. 25 Persons of interest who formed their intelligence target were Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba, Michael Harmel, Lionel Bernstein, Hilda Watts, Harold Wolpe and Ahmed Kathrada. Ludi said that Mhlaba, Bernstein and Harmel would be of particular focus for RI.

Liaison between the apartheid regime and other regimes in Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies was improved and intelligence sharing became the established modus operandi. Cooperation with the Portuguese extended into their Angola and Mozambique colonies and surveillance reports were provided to government about the movements of known South African communists such as Ruth First, Hillary Plegg, Ben Turok, V.W. Mkwai, Moses Mabida, Julius Baker and P. Beyleveldt who were travelling through Portuguese controlled territories.26 The Portuguese assisted the SIS in monitoring MK activities. In 1961 Portuguese Naval Intelligence transmitted an intelligence report to SIS that Ghana was recruiting South Africans for political, military and sabotage training and supplying funds to SouthAfrican anti-government groups.27

Documents photographed at Liliesleaf in one of the out buildings – Police photograph

Ludi claimed that RI was, “instrumental in pin pointing Rivonia through the radio”. 28 This was the radio transmitter linked to Walter Sisulu’s Freedom Day, Radio Freedom broadcast on 26 June 1963. It is important to note that this broadcast did not occur at Liliesleaf although the radio equipment was tested there. Ludi claims that one of his agents was an electrical engineer; he was connected to the SACP transport manager who knew someone who ran a dry cleaning operation and whose vans were used to transport underground operatives around the country. This link to a dry cleaning van is another Trojan horse. Someone connected to the underground structures used a vehicle like this one, and inside the van lurked an RI agent. This also shows that the routines at the farm were already under surveillance. They were understood, mapped and logged; a Trojan horse disguised as an innocuous laundry van was the modus operandi when the knockout blow was delivered.

The agent met the go between at a bus terminus where he was tied up and blindfolded inside the van. Driven to Liliesleaf he was shown the radio and commented, “This is the most antiquated piece of rubbish I’ve seen in my life.” He couldn’t do anything with it, but the information assisted RI who now knew that somewhere in that area:

“There was a place where things were happening and I believe that after we fed that information to the police that they then started driving … patterns in that area looking for something they thought must be happening there and that’s how they actually found Rivonia, plus of course somebody also gave them information.”29

Who gave the police information is a moot point – informants or another process? While the role of the security branch and RI is known, what is not known is the role of the SADF and its electronic warfare capabilities in locating Liliesleaf. Research and development into electronic warfare began in the early 1950s in response to SACP underground radio broadcasts. By the early 1960s their direction finding technology was on par with the British and Americans.

In about 1955/56, the Radio Section of the engineers’ section of the general post office (GPO) was tasked to assist the SAP to locate the source of Radio Freedom broadcasts that transmitted on short-wave wavelengths. The SACP transmitted on Sunday evenings at 20h00 for 15 minutes. The Radio Act No. 3 of 1952 stipulated that a conviction could only result if the police caught the perpetrators in the act of broadcasting. 30 As the SAP and the Union Defence Force (later the SADF) had no direction-finding capability to comply with this stipulation of the Act they turned to the GPO. The Derdepoort Radio Station based at Hartebeesfontein farm near Pretoria was given the task. Having no direction finding equipment they then developed their own.31

Transmissions were identified as coming from Natal. They then built a mobile direction finding facility and installed it in GPO vans and undertook the search. After nine months the operation halted without success. During early 1956 the transmissions resurfaced in the Johannesburg/Pretoria area. Each transmission came from a different location thus requiring greater mobility. Derdepoort’s technicians developed man-pack equipment which could be carried while walking. The SAP flying squad drove these operators (known then as chase teams). Three vehicle mounted direction finding units and five man-pack units were deployed. Included in the chase teams were technicians from Derdepoort station. The security branch supported the operation. 32 On Sunday 12 August 1956, they identified 363 Berea Street Muckleneuk, Pretoria and raided the house, seizing the transmitter and other equipment along with a pre-recorded taped broadcast. The four accused were convicted of violating the Radio Act No.3 of 1952, a relatively minor offence, and sentenced to a fine of ₤50 or six months in jail. 33

Following this the engineers’ section acquired more sophisticated equipment to facilitate their direction finding methods. In 1958, they imported the Adcock System from the USA, the most advanced of its kind at the time. Located at Derdepoort, this static system included an all-round direction finding capability. 34 Cooperation on direction finding operations between the GPO and SAP was not unusual for this era. Britain’s Security Service MI5, used British post office technology in its counter intelligence operations, both in the United Kingdom against Soviet agents and operations, and also during military operations against independence movements in its colonies, such as in Cyprus.35

The role of the SADF and South African Communications Security Agency

In 1960/1961 the SADF established an overarching telecommunication function, the South African Communications Security Agency (SACSA). SACSA fell under the directorate of telecommunications, and its director was accountable to the prime minister at the time, H.F. Verwoerd. SACSA’s duties were enabling secure and un-compromised communications between all government departments. This included all arms of the SADF, the Department of Foreign Affairs, military attaches abroad, and between the SAP and its agents. 36

During 1963, SACSA played a key role in locating and spying on Liliesleaf. On 1 April 1963, Captain Martiens Botha was transferred to defence headquarters Pretoria to work for the chief telecommunications officer. Included in this small team was Captain Mike Venter of the South African Air Force (SAAF) who was proficient in Morse code. One of his duties was monitoring radio transmissions that the authorities deemed as subversive. Venter detected suspicious Morse code messages inside the country and showed them to Botha. Venter’s information was reported to the security branch and
to RI. 37

SACSA borrowed a direction finding vehicle from the post office telecommunications section and pinpointed the location to within a few blocks of where the transmitter was located. This was enabled because, according to Captain Venter, the Morse code transmitter burst its signals more than once from Liliesleaf. SACSA then searched for visibly suspicious equipment such as antennas on properties in the area. Liliesleaf had two lightning conductors next to the main house. 38

SACSA observed and noted all these activities. Mary Russell and her husband lived in the Rivonia Caravan Park directly opposite the Rietfontein Road entrance into Liliesleaf. After the 1963 raid, Russell later shared her observations with her family, saying that, she “knew something was going on across the road”. 39 In 2005, Russell’s nephew, Gavin Olivier, shared this account with the author. According to Olivier, Russell was an avid birdwatcher and used binoculars to observe the birdlife from her veranda. Prior to the raid, she saw postal workers standing on ladders erected against telephone poles along Rietfontein Road, working on the telephone lines. For Russell, it was odd that they stood atop for long periods of time and used binoculars. Russell recalled what she described as “mysterious bread delivery vans” parked inside the caravan park several times a week for the entire day. Strange, she said, “we don’t have a shop that sells bread in the caravan park.” 40 Yet there they were opposite the driveway into Liliesleaf. Paul Goldreich also recollected men working on telephone cables outside the farm.41

The view of Liliesleaf farm in the valley to the left taken from the caravan park by Mary Russel (photographing a shrike) and the road and telephone lines on which the bakery van operated.

July 1963 was a cold winter, yet shortly before the raid, from at least May 1963, Denis Goldberg recalled there being a single caravan inside the park. Its presence made him feel uneasy.

“There was only one caravan there most of the time, and this area was so far out of Jo’burg, it was deep countryside … And there was this caravan park, which was bare red earth with what I remember as one caravan. A very sleepy police station around the corner. I believe they said they watched the place, this is what I am basing it on … it would have been the obvious thing.” 42

The Trojan horse was literally across the road, parked inside a caravan park owned by the Mellis family, who were actively assisting this investigation. There is other evidence of electronic surveillance activity, all intersecting towards July 1963. In 2005 the author interviewed an individual who wished to remain anonymous. This person claimed that in 1963 he had supplied the security branch with RM 401 hearing aid microphones together with long life batteries which lasted about a month. The microphones and their batteries fitted into a human ear, making them ideal for covert listening. These bugs could be disguised and planted anywhere and were small enough to be inserted into a pen and worn by an informant during a conversation; three or four such devices fitted into a matchbox. The microphone and transmitter worked at low frequencies, and the range was as much as 1⁄2 km to a listening station located within a line of sight.

The receiver for these devices was very powerful. The signal did not need to be very strong and the microphone did not require a large opening, a pin hole would suffice, as in a standard hearing aid. The listening station required a sizable aerial, about one metre in length. It could be erected in a tree; run along telephone wires; concealed inside a roof; or tucked out of sight inside a caravan. It could even masquerade as a car aerial if parked nearby.

If inserted inside a building then transmission distanced would be reduced and to compensate for this, some type of aerial would have to be attached to boost the transmission. An option was a shortwave radio, working at 10 MHz, providing there was a good receiver on the receiving end. If the transmitter was outdoors the range would increase and the only limitations would be caused by background noise. These transmitters picked up sound in an entire room, and the next room as well. The bug could be concealed in a light switch and fitted by an electrician or plumber. It could be hidden beneath a car or anywhere else and camouflaged to resemble any type of contextual object. Lightning or electrical activity did not affect its performance.

Police purchases began with a phone call to check for available stock; followed by a visit from two plainclothes policemen. Payment with was cash and no receipt was required. Prior to the raid, as many as 1 000 units may have been supplied. When news of the Liliesleaf raid broke, the salesperson thought, “So that’s where all our microphones were going! Damn sure in my own mind – bloody hell, so that’s where our microphones went!” 43

Surveyor General map of Rivonia

In 2004 the author uncovered additional tangible evidence of a surveillance operation. In 1961 the surveyor general updated the cadastral maps and the Rivonia area was aerially re-photographed to produce maps in 1962. Each photographic contact sheet covers a vast area and nothing distinguishes a particular property from the next unless the sheets are significantly enlarged. The next photographic series dates to 1964. The author scanned the sheets depicting Liliesleaf in the 1961 and 1964 mapping process in high resolution. One of these sheets revealed a trace of the SACSA direction finding andelectronic warfare operation. (None of the 1964 photographs reflect any tampering). Three microscopic red dots and a pencil cross (x) emerged when a high resolution electronic scanner was used. Two red dots are on a neighbouring property. One red dot marks the approximate centre of Liliesleaf farm and the pencil cross on the sheet marks the dirt driveway leading into Liliesleaf, directly across the road from the caravan park. 44

Tampering on the surveyor general cadastral map of the Rivonia area to show sophisticated electronic triangulation intelligence and X marks the spot on the Liliesleaf driveway.

Someone involved in this investigation examined this contact sheet and made the markings before returning the sheet assuming that the microscopic tampering would remain invisible. Not only was the SADF proficient in electronic warfare. The technical skills of the SAAF, the second oldest air force in the world, were on par with its international counterparts. In combat operations in Africa, Madagascar and Europe during the Second World War, the SAAF made extensive use of aerial photo reconnaissance. Nor were their skills of electronic warfare neglected in the post-war years.

In 1957, the SAAF acquired the Avro Shackleton MR Mk3 which it used for long range maritime patrolling and naval surveillance operations. 45 Between 1962 and 1964 the SAAF acquired 16 Mirage IIIC fighter aircraft from France, followed by four Mirage RZ fighter reconnaissance aircraft. 46 In late 1963, SAAF took delivery of the Canberra B (I) Mk 12 heavy bomber and photo reconnaissance aircraft from Britain. It was adding to and upgrading its technological capacity. Consequently, in 1962 to 1963 the only agency with the technical skills capable of identifying targets from aerial photographs of Liliesleaf was the SAAF.47

Thursday 11 July 1963

A meeting on Saturday 6 July 1963 to discuss Operation Mayibuye at Liliesleaf deadlocked. The plan was not approved and it created deep divisions within the Secretariat and amongst members of the SACP’s Central Committee. The plan had to be either approved by the political structures, which did not happen, or be sent back for further work. However, the next part of the problem was a practical one: where could the Secretariat meet and when? The matter had to be speedily resolved, yet the issue of a venue was becoming contentious and downright dangerous.

Denis Goldberg’s mugshot after his arrest and one his drawings on the working of a grenade recovered from Liliesleaf farm, evidence used in his trial.

There were a number of people who did not want to return to Liliesleaf. According to Goldberg:

“They had earlier taken the decision not to bring people who were not living underground to the place where others were living in hiding. Too many people had been to Liliesleaf farm. The security risks were great. We urgently needed a different place and the task of buying somewhere new was given to me because I could legally buy property.” 48

A number of the senior leaders, such as Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba and Wilton Mkwai no longer stayed at the farm, having moved to Trevallyn, a smallholding near Krugersdorp, recently purchased by Goldberg under a fictitious name and which was to be used solely for accommodating members of the MK high command and those immediately involved in its functioning. 49 Goldberg later wrote that “the last meeting of the High Command at Liliesleaf was one too many”. 50 Goldberg remembered:

“They didn’t have time to arrange a new venue, so we had to come back here, knowing that it was dangerous to come here. The decision had been taken, no more meetings at Rivonia. Yet we had one more, because of the pressure of Rusty’s house arrest.”51

Kathrada recalled:

Ahmed Kathrada after his arrest – JHB Fort.

“A number of us started feeling uneasy about the continued use of the Rivonia farm. We were well aware that the need-to-know principle had not applied to Liliesleaf for some time, and that far too many people – one of whom was Bruno Mtolo, a saboteur from Durban and leader of the Natal branch, had visited the farm. But there was no avoiding one final meeting in Rivonia. In the days leading up to this crucial gathering, I became more agitated and afraid. The only person who I could share my views with was Walter Sisulu, whose views coincided with my own.”52

As for Bernstein, he was not in favour of holding the meeting there. He had lost faith in
Liliesleaf as an uncompromised venue:

“I don’t even remember who convened the meeting. I know I didn’t want to go to it. I was afraid of the place. It was Hepple who persuaded me. [He said] “Okay, you don’t want to go to this place, just this one last time”. Famous last words.53

The next issue was the timing of the meeting. Which day might be appropriate? Thursdays were delivery days. Produce from the butcher and grocer were delivered; dry cleaning collected and dropped off; cars came and went – these goings-on were an established routine. Because these activities had doubled up as a screen for meetings before, Thursday it would be. However, these routines were known and identified, all watched and listened to inside the Trojan horse parked innocently in the caravan park.

Nothing untoward happened during the day except for Bob Hepple’s encounter with an unidentified individual which alludes to a covert investigation.

“On the morning of the 11th July, a man came to my chambers. He was an Indian. I had never met him before. And he said to me, “I have got a message for Cedric from Natalie.” Now I knew that I regularly received letters addressed to me at my chambers. Inside was an envelope sealed from Natalie for Cedric. And I knew these were for the leadership and I would deliver them personally to Liliesleaf Farm. And I wondered what was going on because Cedric was the codename for the centre and Natalie was the code name for the Natal district. And I knew these names on letters would come to my chambers addressed me. I would open them …and would take them over. Who was this guy? I had no knowledge of him. I fobbed him off. I said I don’t know what this is about but I’ll look into it and see. So I realised he was bringing some message. But I didn’t know if he was genuine, he could have been a police spy. And I was deeply suspicious. I feigned ignorance and said I have to go out now and sent him away and said come back to me tomorrow morning. My idea being to make enquiries if anyone knew what this was about. So the result, I was very worried and it was one of the things when I did go there that afternoon that I was worried about. So on my route there I was extremely nervous, I kept thinking maybe I am going to be followed.” 54

This encounter unnerved Hepple. According to him there were already suspicions that the CIA had had a hand in Mandela’s capture. For what reason and by whom was this visitor sent? 55 Hepple told Kathrada about his suspicious visitor and Kathrada confirmed that he too had received a garbled message from someone who mentioned Cedric. After ten minutes of exchanging pleasantries, the six took their seats inside the thatched cottage, Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba, Walter Sisulu, Lionel Bernstein, Bob Hepple and Ahmed Kathrada. Their agenda was to discuss the impact of the 90 days arrests and to continue the discussion on Operation Mayibuye.

Walter Sisulu after his arrest – JHB Fort

Bernstein held the Operation Mayibuye document on his lap so that he might refer to it and started his critique. No sooner had he commenced when they observed a dry cleaning van, bearing the logo Trade Steam Pressers through a rear window driving down the driveway. It drove up and parked next to the house. Bernstein looked out the window and exclaimed. “Oh my God, I saw that van opposite the police station this afternoon!” 56 The Trojan horse was in position. Perfectly timed and synchronised to the exact moment that the meeting started. Certainly no coincidence. Coordinated by another Trojan horse parked inside the caravan park and listening in. Suddenly the rear doors of the dry cleaning van opened, disgorging the security branch police with their attack dog. While the raiders encircled the main house, Govan Mbeki snatched the Mayibuye plan from Bernstein and tried to burn it but without matches it was useless. Mbeki then shoved the plan into the stovepipe chimney.

Mbeki, Sisulu and Kathrada leapt through a rear window but were immediately caught. The remaining three hoped to bluff their way out. Detective Kennedy opened the door and rushed inside. “Stay where you are. You’re all under arrest!” 57

Arthur Goldreich after his arrest – JHB Fort

The three were then escorted outside. Hepple recalled that by this stage the place was piling up with police and dogs. This suggests that the dry cleaner’s van was the initial probe – the Trojan horse. Once it had breached the gates and parked inside, its occupants would disgorge to secure the buildings while the main body, already in position on Rietfontein Road would then swoop in and overwhelm the farm, while securing the perimeter.

Earlier, in the lounge, Goldberg looked up to see Lt Van Wyk swing open the veranda door and step inside, only metres away from where he sat. Goldberg leapt from his chair, grabbed his coat which contained his notes about weapons manufacture and manufacturing quotations which he had received – and made a desperate dash to reach a toilet to flush them away. Intercepted by another policeman entering through the kitchen he was overpowered in the entrance hallway and arrested. “It was a disconcerting moment. Actually what I thought was, oh shit, we’ve been caught.” 58

Govan Mbeki after his arrest – JHB Fort

The suspects and farm labourers were handcuffed inside the dry cleaner’s van. At about 17h50 Arthur Goldreich drove down Rietfontein Road in his Citroen. 59 When he drew level with the entrance gate he noticed two men wearing the hallmark raincoats of plain clothes policemen, standing beneath a tree in the caravan park, talking to each other. It wasn’t raining and they weren’t relieving themselves.

“And my first thought was special branch, and my second thought was I am late. I can’t just drive by. Then the third thought of mine was how come the guy who’s supposed to be guarding the gate is not there … and I came down the driveway, there were trees on either side and from behind the trees came some police and some dogs. And they jumped on the motor car, and the guy with a pistol in his hand put the pistol to my head, and I heard someone shout, “moenie skiet nie!” So I switched off the engine and rolled down and came in towards the garage.” 60

Arthur’s car ground to a halt. He got out, hands raised above his head. 61 At around 18h00 after each captive had been shown the contents of the outbuildings, Bernstein and Hepple joined Mbeki inside the laundry van. Goldberg was then brought out of the house, four policemen climbed into the van and the Trojan horse drove them off. Having breached the gates of the safe house the Trojan horse left with its captives handcuffed inside, facing the horrors ahead, fearing the worst, potentially a death sentence. Passing the solitary caravan parked in the red dirt of the park. Into the dark. The Rivonia Trial followed.

Arthur Goldreich, looking very worried and Detective Warrant Officer Carel Dirker. By law Goldreich had to be made witness to the search.

Conclusion

Colonels Van den Bergh and Klindt arrived after sunset. Arthur Goldreich was taken into the main bedroom for a one-on-one monologue delivered by Van den Bergh. Among other things Van den Bergh said:

“The trouble with you, Goldreich, and the trouble with all of you, is you’re amateurs. You always have and you always will underestimate your enemy. And that’s why you’re in the shit.” 62

Colonel H.J. Van den Bergh

Liliesleaf and all that was linked to it was captured. The Rivonia Trial followed and after that more arrests and trials until the internal networks were neutralised. A blow most certainly, yet not one which was terminal to the forces of liberation. In the 53 years since the raid the focus on what led to the raid has always been on the security branch. These accounts claim that the SAP, assisted by informants from within the movement, were able to raid Liliesleaf and were lucky to have achieved the success that they did. Kathrada later wrote that the police had the farm under surveillance for some hours before the raid. However, according to him the no one had ever found out the truth:

“ … every version that has been bandied about over the years is based on nothing more that speculation.” 63

The author concurs with Kathrada’s statement. Starting with Strydom in 1965 and weaving through into the recent past with Frankel, popular notion has it that an informant or informants “gave up” the farm to the security branch and fed their information to Lt. Van Wyk who, on receiving it, literally sprung the raid the following day. In a massive twist of fate and coincidence, good luck for some and horrific luck for others, in a single swoop the raid netted prominent leaders connected with MK, the ANC and SACP, together with a haul of documentary and other evidence. This smashed the leaders of organised resistance to the apartheid regime in one massive lucky break, all a result of informants. The security branch pulled it off all on their own. So the story goes. This article demonstrates that to be a fallacy.

By means of an inter-agency investigation into Liliesleaf, this paper outlines some of the complex ways in which the combined security services used a range of techniques and tactics in an attempt to destroy armed opposition to apartheid. One agency was the security branch; its investigations commenced weeks after Nelson Mandela was captured, and later in 1963, the RI and the SADF joined the probe, which led eventually to an operation culminating in the raid. The hypothesis is that information in Nelson Mandela’s notebook and other sources enabled the security branch to identify Liliesleaf. Evidence of the investigation by the security branch soon after Mandela’s arrest is seen in the actions of the first Trojan horse, a young boy, George Mellis, who was able to observe events from within. He was the perfect spy; he passed on information to the Rivonia police station; no one gave him so much as a second glance. However, he would have been carefully handled both by his parents and the security branch, given that he was a minor. Additional evidence of a security branch investigation in 1962, assisted by the Rivonia police station, was the matter of holding back a summons to be served on Goldreich. By December 1962 a determined investigation was underway, so much so that the police sanitised the farm and there were instructions that no policemen were to enter the property.

Mellis’s parents owned the caravan park which offered an ideal position from which to conduct surveillance. A caravan was the second Trojan horse, innocuous on the outside yet filled with electronic equipment, it listened into conversations held at Liliesleaf via hearing devices and telephone line interceptions. Operated by SACSA the timing of the raid could be carefully calculated, which indeed it was. In position during the weeks leading up to the raid, they also detected the Radio Freedom transmitter being tested when it was switched on. The predictably of activities on a Thursday were all observed and calculated. This Trojan horse in turn linked to other SADF technologies of direction finding, electronic warfare and aerial reconnaissance. Evidence of this was provided by those who saw the “postal workers” equipped with binoculars working on the telephone lines. Postal vans and bread delivery vans were seen parked in the caravan park. They were being covertly used by the SACSA. The contact sheets in the surveyor general’s office bear evidence of aerial target identification and the only organisation with the requisite skills to undertake this task, was the SAAF.

The final deception was the third Trojan horse, a laundry and dry cleaning van. Prior to the raid at least one RI spy had accessed the premises in a similar van, so the tactic of using a laundry van to breach the safe house was the ideal choice. Like the mythological Trojan horse which breached the gates of Troy, it was driven inside the farm to disgorge the policemen and their dogs.

In conclusion this paper demonstrates that there was far more to the raid than what has been written about it since that fateful day. It was not merely a police strike. Key roles were played by the SAAF and electronic surveillance was carried out by the SACSA in the state’s offensive against MK. This challenges the commonly held view that the military was not involved in the counter-insurgency operations of 1962 1964. In conventional accounts of the period, the South African military only became involved in counter insurgency when P.W. Botha gained political ascendancy and together with General Magnus Malan, made the notion of Total Onslaught the apartheid government’s strategic doctrine. This paper shows just how heavily involved the military and the security agencies were against MK soon after its formation in 1961.


Written and Researched by Dr. Garth Conan Benneyworth

References

Bernstein, L., Memory against Forgetting (Penguin, London, 1999).Dingake, M., Better to Die on One’s Feet (South African History Online, Cape Town, 2015).
Ellis, S., External Mission: The ANC in Exile (Johnathan Ball, Johannesburg, 2012).
Frankel, G., Rivonia’s Children (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York, 1999).
Goldberg, D., The Mission: A Life for Freedom in South Africa (STE Publishers, Johannesburg, 2010),
Hepple, B., Young Man with the Red Tie: A Memoir of Mandela and the Failed Revolution: 1960-1963 Jacana Media, Johannesburg, 2013).
Kathrada, A., Memoirs (Zebra Press, Paarl, 2004).
Mandela, N.R., Long Walk to Freedom (Abacus, London, 1994).
SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa Volume 1 (1960-1970) (Zebra Press, Cape Town, 2004).
Smith, D.J., Young Mandela (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2010).
Strydom, L., Rivonia Unmasked (Voortrekkerpers, Johannesburg, 1965).
Volker, W., Army Signals in South Africa: The Story of the South African Corps of Signals and its Antecedents (Veritas Books, Pretoria, 2010).
Volker, W., Signal Units of the South African Corps of Signals and related Services (Veritas Books, Pretoria, 2010).
Wright, P., Spy Catcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer (Heinemann, Melbourne, 1987).

Footnotes

  1. D. Goldberg, The Mission: A Life for Freedom in South Africa (STE Publishers,
    Johannesburg, 2010), p 99. ↩︎
  2. Liliesleaf Archives, Rivonia (hereafter LL), INT 2, Interview with Denis Goldberg,
    conducted by G. Benneyworth, Liliesleaf, 2004. ↩︎
  3. LL, INT 2, Interview with Denis Goldberg, Liliesleaf, 2004. ↩︎
  4. L. Bernstein, Memory against Forgetting (Penguin, London, 1999), p 249. ↩︎
  5. LL, INT 4, Interview with Ahmed Kathrada, conducted by G. Benneyworth, Liliesleaf,
    2005. ↩︎
  6. Much of the literature (for example Ellis), has it that Arthur Goldreich was the owner
    of Liliesleaf farm. See S. Ellis, External Mission the ANC in Exile (Jonathan Ball,
    Johannesburg, 2012), p 33. Goldreich was the nominal tenant who rented the property
    from Navian Ltd. The lease was drawn up by R Sepel. See LL, G. Benneyworth of Site
    Solutions© “Research Report: Rivonia Uncovered – Rivonia Recovered” (All Rights
    Reserved, Site SolutionsTM), pp 40–41. ↩︎
  7. LL, INT 6, LOT 2 (a-k), Interview with Vivien Ezra, conducted by G. Benneyworth,
    Liliesleaf, 2006; LL, G. Benneyworth, “Research Report: Rivonia Uncovered”, p 137. ↩︎
  8. N.R. Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (Abacus, London, 1994), pp 372–373 ↩︎
  9. Bernstein, Memory against Forgetting, p 254. ↩︎
  10. A. Kathrada, Memoirs (Zebra Press, Paarl, 2004), p 156 ↩︎
  11. LL, INT 3, LOT 4, Notes 1, Interview with Bob Hepple, conducted by G. Benneyworth,
    Cambridge, 2005. ↩︎
  12. SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 1 (1960–1970) (Zebra Press,
    Cape Town, 2004), p 142. ↩︎
  13. LL, INT 2, Interview with Ahmed Kathrada, Liliesleaf, 2004. ↩︎
  14. L. Strydom, Rivonia Unmasked (Voortrekkerpers, Johannesburg, 1965), pp 17–19. ↩︎
  15. G. Frankel, Rivonia’s Children (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York, 1999), p 29. ↩︎
  16. Frankel, Rivonia’s Children, p 25. ↩︎
  17. D.J. Smith, Young Mandela (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2010), p 276. ↩︎
  18. M. Dingake, Better to Die on One’s Feet (South African History Online, Cape Town, 2015),
    pp 67–69. ↩︎
  19. LL, Benneyworth, “Research Report: Rivonia Uncovered”, pp 142–143. ↩︎
  20. National Archives of South Africa (hereafter NASA), NAN 52, Box 8, MS 385.23, George
    Mellis, Statement, 5 August 1963. ↩︎
  21. NASA, NAN 52, Box 8, Vol. MS. 385.23, George Mellis, Statement, 5 August 1963. ↩︎
  22. NASA, NAN 52, Box 8, MS 385.23, Sgt Christiaan Fourie, Station Commander Rivonia,
    Statement, 23 September 1963. ↩︎
  23. LL, Benneyworth, “Research Report: Rivonia Uncovered”, Appendix C, Interview with
    Gerhard Ludi. ↩︎
  24. LL, Benneyworth, “Research Report: Rivonia Uncovered”, Appendix C, Interview with
    Gerhard Ludi. ↩︎
  25. LL, Benneyworth, “Research Report: Rivonia Uncovered”, Appendix C, Interview with
    Gerhard Ludi. ↩︎
  26. NASA, BLM, Box 22, Vol. 2, File 442. ↩︎
  27. National Archives of the United Kingdom (hereafter NAUK), DO 195, 2, SECRET,
    “Ghana’s Relations with the Union of SA”, 29 July 1960–1962. ↩︎
  28. LL, Benneyworth, “Research Report: Rivonia Uncovered”, Appendix C, Interview with
    Gerhard Ludi. ↩︎
  29. LL, Benneyworth, “Research Report: Rivonia Uncovered”, Appendix C, Interview with
    Gerhard Ludi. ↩︎
  30. W. Volker, Army Signals in South Africa: The Story of the South African Corps of Signals
    and its Antecedents (Veritas Books, Pretoria, 2010), pp 226–227. ↩︎
  31. Volker, Army Signals in South Africa, p 227. ↩︎
  32. Volker, Army Signals in South Africa, p 227. ↩︎
  33. Volker, Army Signals in South Africa, p 228. ↩︎
  34. Volker, Army Signals in South Africa, p 229. ↩︎
  35. P. Wright, Spy Catcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer,
    (Heinemann, Melbourne, 1987), p 154. ↩︎
  36. W. Volker, Signal Units of the South African Corps of Signals and Related Services (Veritas
    Books, Pretoria, 2010), p 534. ↩︎
  37. Volker, Army Signals in South Africa, p 534. ↩︎
  38. Volker, Army Signals in South Africa, p 534. ↩︎
  39. Volker, Army Signals in South Africa, p 534. ↩︎
  40. Gavin Olivier, discussions with the author, 2005 and 2006; and LL, Benneyworth,
    “Research Report: Rivonia Uncovered”, pp 144–145. ↩︎
  41. Paul Goldreich, email to author, 11 March 2007. ↩︎
  42. LL, INT 2, Interview with Denis Goldberg, Liliesleaf, 2004. ↩︎
  43. Anonymous source. ↩︎
  44. Department of Land Affairs, Surveyor General, Mowbray, Cape Town South Africa, copy
    of original contact sheets, 1961–1964, as obtained in 2004. ↩︎
  45. This article is available on the website of the contemporary South African Air Force at
    http://www.saairforce.co.za/the-airforce/aircraft/60/shackleton-mr-3 Accessed 12
    December 2016. ↩︎
  46. This website article focuses on Dassault Mirage jet aircraft for Microsoft Flight
    Simulator and Combat Flight Simulator. At http://www.mirage4fs.com/slides15.html.
    Accessed 12 December 2016. ↩︎
  47. See http://www.saairforce.co.za/the-airforce/aircraft/28/canberra-bi12 Accessed 12
    December 2016. ↩︎
  48. Goldberg, The Mission, pp 109–110. ↩︎
  49. LL, INT 2, Interview with Denis Goldberg, Liliesleaf, 2004. ↩︎
  50. Goldberg, The Mission, p 109. ↩︎
  51. LL, INT 2, Interview with Denis Goldberg, Liliesleaf, 2004. ↩︎
  52. Kathrada, Memoirs, p 156. ↩︎
  53. SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 1 (1960-1970), p 142. ↩︎
  54. LL, INT 3, LOT 4, Notes 1, Interview with Bob Hepple, Cambridge, 2005. ↩︎
  55. B, Hepple, Young Man with the Red Tie: A Memoir of Mandela and the Failed Revolution,
    1960–1963, at https://www.amazon.com/Young-Man-Red-Tie-Revolution-ebook/dp/
    B00EZM7PUW/ref=mt_kindle?_encoding=UTF8&me Accessed 24 March 2017. ↩︎
  56. LL, INT 3, LOT 4, Notes 1, Interview with Bob Hepple, Cambridge, 2005 ↩︎
  57. LL, INT 3, LOT 4, Notes 1, Interview with Bob Hepple, Cambridge, 2005. ↩︎
  58. LL, INT 2, Interview with Denis Goldberg, Liliesleaf, 2004. ↩︎
  59. NASA, NAN 52, Box 8, MS 385.23, Detective Warrant Officer C.J. Dirker, Statement, 12
    August 1963. ↩︎
  60. LL, INT 2, Interview with Arthur Goldreich, conducted by G. Benneyworth, Liliesleaf,
    2004. ↩︎
  61. LL, INT 2, Interview with Arthur Goldreich, Liliesleaf, 2004. ↩︎
  62. LL, INT 2, Interview with Arthur Goldreich, Liliesleaf, 2004. ↩︎
  63. Kathrada, Memoirs, p 161. ↩︎

The Smoking Gun

Torch Commando Series – Part 5

The Smoking Gun

The military ‘struggle’ of White South Africans against Apartheid is a complex one seldom acknowledged. It’s politically ‘inconvenient’ history and hidden from the mainstream. It is often presented in a fragmented manner, somehow dipping in and out of the struggle narrative as a ‘few’ whites with a conscience prepared to forsake their Apartheid white privilege. The advent of this narrative now deepened by revolutionist rhetoric which by its very nature is very unbalanced.

The simple truth is that the ‘white’ struggle against Apartheid is far from a mere side note in the annals of South Africa’s liberation struggle. A full understanding the ‘white’ struggle exposes one overarching truth, the history of the struggle against Apartheid has less to do with race and more to do with ideology. Race was the raison d’être for Apartheid as an ideology, so it’s hard for many to step away from the logic that says race must therefore be the raison d’être for the liberation ‘struggle’ – but step away we must, the ‘struggle’ was an ideological one.

This misdirected populist perspective of a struggle between ‘black’ and ‘white’, makes it necessary to pack out the ‘white’ struggle along a racial line to show the flaw in the current narrative.  So, to fully understand the ‘white’ struggle against Apartheid, we need to first find and follow its ‘Golden thread’ – the key task of historians to find the ‘smoking gun’ and tell the story in a sequential way.  With a little historical sleuthing we need to see the ‘golden thread’ – and connect the dots in order for the history of the ‘struggle’ to be holistically understood. 

The ‘smoking gun’ for the ‘white struggle against Apartheid’ begins in earnest with a military theme and a post-World War 2 military veteran’s formation. The Torch Commando, a mass movement of mainly white ex-servicemen and supporters who mobilised against Apartheid; 250,000 in total.  Not a common feature on South African history of the ‘Struggle’ – simply put it does not suit the current political rhetoric and broad popular understanding of the ‘struggle’ – so how did this come about?

In a nutshell, The Torch Commando mission came on the back of a ‘Constitutional’ (not majority win) of the National Party in 1948 to push for another more representative election and The Constitutional Crisis’ that follows the Afrikaner Nationalist government’s first attempts at Apartheid legislation. The Torch views its fight as an extended anti-fascism one against ‘the rise of the Afrikaner Reich’ and sees a quarter of the 1948 ‘White’ voting base (of an est. 1,000,000), known as the ‘service vote’ – actively mark their protest against the National Party’s accent to power in a mass ‘pro-democracy’ and ‘anti-Apartheid’ movement.  

The Torch’s activation pre-dates the African National Congress’(ANC) activation of their ‘Defiance Campaign’ (which activated on 26 June 1952) and as such ‘The Torch’ as it became to known is the first significant mass protest movement against the intuition of Apartheid legislation, and at the time it posed more significant threat to the National Party than the ANC – militarily, numerically and politically speaking.  

The ‘numeric’ threat alone made the National Party uneasy as it highlighted just how tenuous their new grip on South Africa was, statistically the majority of whites wanted nothing to do with their election promise of ‘Apartheid’ and had voted against them in 1948 (they won by ‘seats’ and not by a majority) and now literally half of the white people who voted against them had gone one step further and joined a mass movement in active protest, a mass movement led by a group of men who were militarily commanders and well experienced in waging war and comprising tens of thousands of very experienced war veterans.

Heady and dangerous stuff for the fledgling Architects of Apartheid – so let’s have a look at this movement a little closer and figure out what happened and why the ‘Torch’ is the epicentre of the ‘white’ militant struggle against Apartheid.

What happens next?  

What arises from the ashes of The Torch’s mass political uprising against the Nationalists and Apartheid post the April 1953 General Election National Party victory? The answer lies in the Torch’s broach church and mixed bag of ex-military servicemen and women. These leading members of The Torch Commando, with their differing ideologies, will move on to re-shape the political landscape and resistance to Apartheid in the coming years.

Broadly the leader element of The Torch Commando comprises groupings of individual members who follow entirely separate ideologies – one faction can be described as ‘Liberals’ the second faction are ‘Communists’, the third faction can be described as ‘Democrats’ and finally there are Torchmen who are ‘Federalists’. Let’s examine each separately. 

At the same time the Torch folds in mid 1953, the ‘Liberal’ Torch members become the founders of The Liberal Party – formed in May 1953. Louis Kane-Berman (The Torch’s Chairman) would recall that the Liberal Party which literally take shape at his house, although Louis Kane-Berman himself became a federalist, favouring the Union Federal Party. Central to the Liberal Party’s formation is the failing of the UP to adequately address the black franchise question. 

The ‘communist’ members of the Torch, limited by the Suppression of Communism Act 1950 and using the Torch Commando for political voice as The Springbok Legion would maintain their Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) identity and fall into lock step with the African National Congress. In late 1951, the Torch Commando moves onto a ‘anti-Communist’ footing and into lock step with the United Party so as to maintain its broad appeal amongst white voters as an anti-fascist protest movement. The Torch had “donned the straightjacket of anti-Communist orthodoxy” according to the very liberal leaning Guardian newspaper on 6 September 1951. 

The Torch’s key Springbok Legion and ‘Communist’ leaders are eventually swept up or fingered in 1956 when the Treason Trial begins, the trial forces most of them underground. After the Sharpsville massacre in 1961 all of them find themselves in jail or in exile.

The ‘democratic’ members of the Torch, who are also disillusioned members of the UP, especially on the UP’s appeasement politics on race relations, would break away from the UP and play key roles in forming the Progressive Party in 1956. This would be the pre-curser to what is now the Democratic Alliance (DA) today. In many respects it is the Torch Commando’s fire-brand politicians demanding the United Party radically change its position on Black political empowerment and open up the franchise who would ultimately end the United Party. 

The ‘Federalists’ in the Torch would also split out of the United Party and peruse an agenda for a qualified franchise and push another constitutional crisis over the Natal breakaway proposal. After the Torch collapses many of these ‘UP’ torchmen would form the Union Federal Party (UFP). 

Depending on their moral convictions, out of these respective breakaways and political parties and movements would emerge a two stream ‘white’ resistance campaign to Apartheid. One stream which focused its military experience on armed resistance and one stream, traumatised and tired of armed conflict, choose civil resistance instead. Both streams would continue with a struggle or a continued fight against ‘Nazim’ and the on-set of the ideology in South Africa under the guise of Afrikaner Christian Nationalism.

So, who are these leaders who are embroiled in the Torch Commando and why are they so important to South Africa’s future democracy?  First, let’s start with the Communists.

The Torch’s Communists 

The communist element of the Springbok Legion and subsequently the Torch Commando are made up of the following key persons:

Cecil Williams

Cecil Willams’ wartime experience was with the Royal Navy (RN) as a RN War Correspondent in the Mediterranean theatre. He joins The Springbok Legion as its Secretary and later becomes its Chairman.  A paid-up Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) member, he becomes the administrative officer of the Torch Commando’s “Steel Commando”.

Cecil Williams

Cecil Williams sought a broad-based white front against the Nationalists and called on the Torch Commando to declare a national strike. He foresaw that the Nationalists would not be ousted in the 1953 General Election, a new delimitation would favour the Nationalists; opponents could be banned or proscribed, and hooligans could stop people voting. He called for a National Strike to make it impossible for the government to continue governing stating it “would unite all anti-Nationalist sections of the population; would prove the government did not reflect the will of the majority; and would show people that power lay in their hands” (Clarion, 17 July 1952). 

Cecil Williams later joins the African National Congress (ANC) and is famously arrested on the 5th August 1962 whilst being ‘chauffeured’ by Nelson Mandela. Driving an Austin Westminster, Mandela was able to travel around the country secretly to meetings post the Sharpeville massacre by disguising himself as a chauffeur for an elegant, impeccably dressed white man (Cecil Williams). Nelson Mandela would famously recall of the day “I knew in that instant my life on the run was over”.

Williams is detained, banned and ultimately goes into exile in the United Kingdom (UK). He pioneers gay rights in the UK in addition to anti-Apartheid activism and he died in London in 1979. A movie about his life “The Man who Drove with Mandela” was released in 1998, and given his influence over Mandela and other ANC stalwarts at this time in history, many would later conclude Cecil Williams had planted the seeds that saw South Africa become the first country in the world to embody equal LGBT rights in its post-apartheid constitution.

Wolfie Kodesh

Wolfie Kodesh sees his military experience in the South African Army fighting in East and then North Africa during World War 2.  Also, a card-carrying member of the Communist Party, The Springbok Legion and The Torch Commando. After the collapse of the Torch Commando and banning of Communism, he puts his logistics and military planning skills to use, secretly moving Nelson Mandela around to avoid arrest. Acting as an uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) Counter-Intelligence and logistics officer he also trains ANC cadres on weapons and co-ordinates communications.

Wolfie Kodesh

Wolfie Kodesh is also credited with introducing Nelson Mandela to Communist military doctrine and tactics and becomes a founding member of uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK). Wolfie Kodesh was a director of The New Age Newspaper, vocally in opposition to Apartheid. In 1963 he was arrested and detained without trial in solitary confinement for 90 days, thereafter he was deported to the United Kingdom (UK). While he was abroad, he worked for the ANC until he was deployed to work in MK camps. He later took charge of logistics for MK in Lusaka, Zambia. He returned to South Africa after the end of Apartheid and died in Cape Town in 2002.

Percy John ‘Jack’ Hodgson

Jack Hodgson’s service during the second world war is in the South African Army where he is deployed in the Western Desert. He is severally wounded under fire and after a long spell in military hospital, he was invalided out in 1943. He marries Rica Hodgson after the war in 1945. Rica and Jack both become a highly active anti-Apartheid team.

Jack Hodgson

A very experienced combat soldier and hard-line Communist Party member, he becomes the National Secretary of the Springbok Legion leading the Legion’s campaign against the National Party in the 1948 election.  In opposition to the National Party’s 1948 win he then plays a key role in setting up The Torch Commando and continued in a highly active role in the Torch’s activities and protests.  When the Torch Commando collapsed in 1953, he went on to become a founding member of the Congress of Democrats aligning with The African National Congress (ANC).

Under the Suppression of Communism Act, he is served banning orders in November 1953 and goes underground.  He is arrested, charged and acquitted in the Treason Trial in 1956, and along with fellow Springbok Legion and Torch Commando stalwart Wolfie Kodesh at his side, he becomes part of Mandela’s security detail during the trial. Rica Hodgson also takes an active role as the secretary of the Treason Trial Defence Fund.

After the trial Jack Hodgson gets involved in the formation of uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and becomes part of MK’s Johannesburg High Command.  He is the person who introduces Nelson Mandela to art of bomb-making and “brings the bomb” to the ANC’s first test bombing at a brickyard outside Johannesburg. He involves himself in all aspects military for MK and spends much of his time training MK cadres in bombmaking.

He is detained and eventually deported to the UK along with Rica. In the UK Jack sets up a workshop producing false passports, letter bombs and fake suitcase bottoms to smuggle covert material into South Africa on behalf of MK. Jack Hogson died in London in 1977, Rica Hodgson returned to South Africa as Walter Sisulu’s secretary after the Communist Party and ANC was unbanned in 1991 and she passed away in 2018.

Lionel ‘Rusty’ Bernstein

Rusty Bernstein at the onset of WW2 he joins the South African Army, serving as an artillery man in all major theatres of South African operations during the war; East and North Africa and finally in Italy. Another highly politicised member of the Communist Party, Springbok Legion and then The Torch Commando – he is eventually charged during the Treason Trial and acquitted, only to be charged again and detained for the Rivonia Trial. He is the only man to be acquitted during the Rivonia Trial.

Rusty Bernstein

Rusty Bernstein is accredited as the person who crafts the Freedom Charter, he was detained without charge for almost five months during the  post Sharpeville state of emergency, thereafter banned he goes into exile. In exile he joins uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and plays a key role in educating MK cadres and others in African struggle politics whilst in the Soviet Union at the Lenin School in Moscow and at the Solomon Mahlangu College in Tanzania.

In 1994 he returned to South Africa for Nelson Mandela inauguration as President and then returned to Britain until his death in 1999.

Joe Slovo

Joe Slovo, politicised early Joe joins the Communist Party at the onset of World War 2, to get in on the fight on the side of the Allies, he joins the South African Army as a signaller and serves in both the North African and Italy campaigns. He plays a pivot role in the Springbok Legion and the Torch Commando. Like his other Communist comrades in The Torch and Springbok Legion he finds himself gagged by suppression of communism act and voiceless when the Torch and Springbok Legion collapse. He is associated with the Treason Trial and acquitted and like Rusty Bernstein takes a role in contributing to The Freedom Charter.  

Joe Slovo

Joe Slovo becomes a Founding member of uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and forms part of its High Command later establishing an operational centre for MK in Mozambique and becoming MK’s Chief of Staff.  During this period, he would be the military strategist and chiefly accountable for nearly all MK’s military operations in South Africa. Like the Hodgson’s, he formed a strong anti-apartheid coalition with his wife, Ruth First who was also a committed Communist. Ruth was killed in 1982 in Mozambique when the South African security police sent her a letter bomb.

Joe Slovo ultimately becomes the General Secretary of The South African Communist Party and plays a key-pin role in South Africa’s future democracy when he brokers the ‘Sunset Clause’ for The National Party government which paves the way to a negotiated and democratic settlement for South Africa.

In 1991, Slovo returned to South Africa and joined the African National Congress’ (ANC) National Executive Committee and served as an SACP representative on the National Peace Committee dealing with constitutional principles and a constitution-making body and process.

After the 1994 elections Slovo was elected to the South African cabinet where he served as Minister of Housing (implementing the RDP housing program) until his death in 1995.

Fred Carneson

Fred Carneson, volunteers at the on-set of World War 2, joining the South African Army as a as radio officer initially in the East Africa campaign, by the time North Africa campaign comes around he is a hardened desert combatant and is badly injured at the Battle of El Alamein. He joins the Springbok Legion after the war and plays a pivot role in The Torch Commando when it is formed. 

Fred Carneson

Fred Carneson is associated with the Treason Trial and acquitted, his Communist leanings then lead him to join uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) as a Political Commissar. Like, the Hodgson’s and the Slovo’s he and his wife Sarah form an anti-apartheid team.

He is arrested by the state police for breaking his banning orders whilst working as an editor on the New Age newspaper. He is tortured and kept in solitary confinement for 13 months, after which he is imprisoned at Pretoria Central Prison for nearly 7 years. Released in 1972 he goes into exile in the United Kingdom (UK).  

In the UK he again became active in the South African Communist Party (SACP) raising funds for the SACP and ANC, eventually becoming the Chairman of the Anti-Apartheid Trade Union Committee. He passed away in South Africa in 2000.

The Liberals 

Within the Torch Commando we find members who form the Liberal Party of South Africa (LPSA). The epicentre for the establishment of the Liberal Party is literally traced to the “Coloured Vote” Constitutional Crisis and the resultant divisions within the Torch Commando.

Some of these Liberals, like their Communist colleagues, would ultimately strive for an armed resistance campaign against Apartheid whilst others who, like their Democrat and Federalist colleagues, would strive for a socio-political resistance campaign against Apartheid. 

Unlike the mainstream Democrats, some of these ‘Liberal’ members are subject to same detention, banning and exile actions that the Communists are subjected to. The only difference between the two, they hold Liberal values and not Communist ones. Values that differ vastly from one another and clear to any Liberal or Communist, but not so clear to the National Party who merely lumped them in the same boat under their definitions in the anti-Communist Act. So, who are they?  

Jock Isacowitz

Jock Isacowitz joins the South African Army during the war and rises to the rank of Warrant Officer. Highly politicised he becomes the National Chairman of the Springbok Legion after the war and is one of the guiding forces behind the establishment of The Torch Commando. Initially a member of the Communist Party of South Africa, when the Torch collapses, he becomes a Founding Member of the Liberal Party of South Africa (LPSA).

Jock Isacowitz

He would become the Transvaal Chairman of the Liberal Party and eventually the Party’s National Vice-Chairman. Recognised as a threat to the Apartheid government, he was banned for two years and during the Sharpeville police sweep in 1960 he was detained for three months. He passed away shortly afterwards in 1962.

Alan Paton

Alan Paton, the famous author of ‘Cry the Beloved Country’ and leading anti-apartheid Liberal. Prior to World War 2 in 1938 Paton was the principal of an African boys’ reformatory at Diepkloof – and being completely bi-lingual – fluent in Afrikaans and considering himself a son of Africa. He gets swept up in Afrikaner Nationalism, grows a Voortrekker beard and joins the 1938 Centenary of the Great Trek on one of the wagons dressed as Voortrekker. As discussed in Part 1 The Nazification of the Afrikaner Right this Voortrekker centennial is pivotal to the advent of Nazism on a large scale in South Africa and the resultant domestic armed resistance to South Africa’s war efforts. At the closing celebrations of the 1938 Centenary Great Trek outside Pretoria, what awaited Alan Paton would change his perspective on Afrikaner Nationalism forever, of his epiphany he said:

“We arrived on a hot day, and I went straight to the showers. Here I was greeted by a naked and bearded Afrikaner who said to me, ‘Have you seen the great crowds?’ I said,’Yes’, He said to me with the greatest affinity: ‘Nou gaan ons die Engelse opdonder,’ (Now we’re going to knock hell out of the English). 

The great day was full of speeches, and the theme of every meeting was Afrikanerdom its glories, its struggles, its grief, its achievements. The speaker had only to shout Vryheid (freedom) to set the vast crowd roaring, just as today a black speaker who shouts Amandla (power) can set a black crowd roaring. A descendant of the British 1820 settlers who gave Jacobus Uys a Bible when he set out on the Great Trek was shouted down because he gave his greetings in English as his forebear had done. 

It was a lonely and terrible occasion for any English-speaking South African who had gone there to rejoice in this Afrikaner festival After the laying of the stone I left the celebrations and went home. I said to my wife: ‘I’m taking off this beard and I’ll never wear another. ‘ That was the end of my love affair with Nationalism. I saw it for what it was, self-centred, intolerant, exclusive.”

Although he was medically exempted from joining up when World War 2 broke out, Alan Paton would find himself a non-military member of the war Veterans’ Torch Commando in protest these very nationalists who staged this Centenary Trek and their accent to power in 1948. 

Alan Paton

An absolute adherent to Liberal values Alan Paton becomes the founder and leader of the Liberal Party, he remained the National President until the LPSA was dissolved in 1968 due to Apartheid legislation banning multi-racial parties.

In 1960 after returning from an award ceremony for the American Freedom Award, his passport was confiscated by the Apartheid government. It was returned only a decade later. Alan Paton would say of the Torch Commando and his time in it, that it was the Torch Commando movement the National Party only ever really feared. 

Alan Paton died in Durban in 1988. The Alan Paton Centre and Struggle Archives at the University of KwaZulu-Natal now houses his papers as well as a major collection of apartheid-related manuscripts.

Leslie Rubin

Leslie Ruben at the onset of WW2 answers Smuts’ call and volunteers to join the South African Army in 1940, he is commissioned as a Lieutenant in the intelligence corps in north Africa, and later attached to the Royal Air Force in Italy.

Leslie Ruben

After the war, he joins The Springbok Legion. He subsequently joined the Torch Commando, becoming a leading member within in the Torch’s Natal branch.

Along with Alan Paton, Leslie Rubin tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade Jan H. Hofmeyr, a leading United Party parliamentarian, to form a liberal party. After Jan Hofmeyr passed away in 1948, they went ahead anyway and created the Liberal party of South Africa (LPSA) in 1953.

Rubin became chairman of the Liberal Party in the Cape, and, in 1954, was elected to the Senate. As a Senator he fought every single Apartheid Legislation to the point that Dr Hendrik Verwoerd or on one occasion – the entire National Party caucus – walked out. Rubin resigned from the Senate in 1960 and went into exile.

In exile he became the chairman of the United States committee of the Defence and Aid Fund, getting funds to South Africa to support political prisoners and their families. He passed away in 2002.

Sailor Malan

Sailor Malan, the President of the Torch Commando, also held liberal values, so much so it did not stop Alan Paton, Margaret Ballinger and Donald Molteno, from persisting that Sailor Malan (as a powerful potential political ally) join the Liberal Party of South Africa. In June 1953, Leslie Rubin would be tasked by the party to put pressure on Malan to join the Liberal Party.

However, with demise of The Torch Commando, Sailor became increasingly focused on his private life seeking serenity sheep farming near Kimberley. For Sailor, the stress of combat and political struggle had led him to say “my nerves are shot” – little did he know, now in his early 50’s, that he had rapid on-set Parkinson’s disease, a neurological disorder some believe triggered as the result of combat stress and the resultant PTSD.

Sailor Malan sheep farming near Kimberley, insert Sailor in fancy dress at a party in Kimberley.

He kept his distance using farming as an excuse not to join the Liberal Party, when pressed for a commitment by the LPSA “to forget your sheep for a little while”. According to the historian Bill Nasson Sailor Malan’ revealed that his reluctance was due to his gradualist conviction that the Liberals were going about things in the wrong way in making a fuss about franchise rights. As Nasson records

“The difficulty of selling it to white South Africans was by no means the least of his reservations. What the country needed was planned evolution. In his view, as he told Rubin, “more emphasis should be placed on economics and less on political rights. It is true that you are today dealing with the more educated Non-Europeans but your concern should be with the masses, to whom a full stomach and a secure life are more acceptable.”

Sailor Malan was very prepared to accept the inevitability of Black African majority rule, he felt the Liberal Party was too focused on black elites and lofty liberal values and not on the needs of the masses. Sailor Malan emphasised addressing “poverty and starvation”, with the primary emphasis falling on “material advancement”, the centre of which should be “very largely the economic advancement and housing of the African”.

In an odd sense Sailor Malan 1953 held the same view that modern Black African politicians hold now, that economic emancipation should precede political emancipation and without empowerment the ‘vote’ becomes meaningless.

Sailor Malan would not join the Liberal Party, nor any Party for that matter – a United Party seat was always open to him anytime he wanted it. Instead he chose to step back from politics after the Torch Commando collapsed and focussed on his private, family life, and having a little fun. Given Sailor’s history people always view him as serious, driven and focussed, but he loved a party and would often lighten them up, his socialising time spent in his Memorable Order of Tin Hats (MOTH) Shellhole in Kimberley and the Kimberley Club (who have a plaque to him at the entrance).

Unfortunately his Parkinson’s disease was misdiagnosed at one point and he was told he would recover, and he rather enthusiastically reflected that finally he could start living, but it was a false sense of hope, Sailor Malan would pass away on the 17th September 1963, aged just 52. In what is arguably the lowest point a government can stoop to for a war hero of Sailor’s magnitude, the National Party declined requests for a formal military funeral, forbade any South African Defence Force members from wearing their uniforms to the funeral and from laying wreaths as military representatives, they specifically forbade the South African Air Force from laying a wreath. The government issued obituary for Sailor Malan circulated nationally contained no reference to his political career whatsoever, simply put the government wanted his memory wiped and nobody making a hero out of him.

In defiance to the National Party and to send a clear message to them, the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Rhodesia sent uniformed personnel and wreaths to Sailor’s funeral.

Image: Here Wing Commander J Moss of the Royal Rhodesian Air Force pays his tribute to Sailor Malan. It also did not stop the Memorable Order of Tin Hats (MOTH), of which Sailor was a member from giving him the rites afforded a MOTH member. Behind Wing Commander Moss stands MOTH Francis John Dressler, a fellow WW2 vet, with the MOTH flag over his arm and a Brodie helmet (Tin Hat) in hand – the MOTH flag was subsequently draped over the coffin. As per MOTH ritual a candle would have been placed on the helmet and lit as a flame of remembrance. 

At the very least his comrades in arms could afford him a privilege his own country refused to do. This injustice was finally corrected in 2023 on the 60th anniversary of Sailor Malan’s death, when in Kimberley the South African Air Force Association laid a wreath to him.

Peter Brown

Peter Brown joined the 6th South African Armoured Division during WW2.  He would go on to become Alan Paton’s right-hand man and a kingpin of Liberal politics in South Africa. He is worth mentioning as he does attend a Torch Commando meeting and chooses not to join the Torch as he finds the organisation too ‘white’ and too ‘hierarchal’ for him.

Peter Brown

In establishing the Liberal Party with the likes of ex-Torch members Rubin, Paton and Isacowitz in 1953, they target the Torch Commando and its now unbundling membership for a more robust LPSA membership. Ronald Morris, the Chairman of The Torch Commando’s Point Branch in Natal is a significant case in point – he would contest the Natal Provincial elections as a Liberal Party candidate.

Peter Brown would become embroiled in a Liberal Party spin off armed resistance movement called ARM (more about ARM later) and he would like so many LPSA members also go into exile.

David Pratt

One of the defining moments in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa was the Sharpeville Massacre on 21 March 1960 and its aftermath.

On the Liberal Party front political resistance was about to take a nasty turn, when in April 1960 – 19 days after the Sharpeville Massacre, Prime Minister H.F. Verwoerd, the architect of Apartheid was giving his ‘good neighbourliness” speech at the Rand Show in Johannesburg.

David Pratt (insert) and his attempted assassination of Verwoerd

After Verwoerd gave his opening speech, he returned to his seat in the grandstand where he was shot at point-blank range by David Pratt, who was an outspoken Liberal Party of South Africa (LPSA) member and a wealthy English farmer from the Magaliesberg region outside of Pretoria. He joined the Liberal Party in 1953 and believed that a coalition between liberals and ‘verligte’ (enlightened) Afrikaners was the only solution to defeating the National Party at the polls. Verwoerd survived Pratt’s attempted assassination of him, only to be finally assassinated by Dimitri Tsafendas, a white man with Communist leanings, on the 6th September 1966.

Pratt was also an epileptic with a long medical history of heavy epileptic fits – so he was excused military service and did not join The Torch Commando. So to dismiss Pratt as a ‘lunatic’ – as to the Nationalists no white person in their right mind would shoot a white Prime Minister – so he was judged as ‘insane’. Pratt was sent to an institution for the mentally ill and by October 1961 he was found – rather too conveniently for the Nationalist government – hanging from a rolled-up bed-sheet.

John Lang

John Lang joined the Navy for World War 2 but did not aspire to any senior rank, he is a qualified lawyer post war and his political and resistance career starts as when he takes up a ‘strong-man’ security role for The Steel Commando protest (the show of strength in Cape Town to oust the National Party and force them to resign).  He also joins the Torch Commando’s national executive.

When the Torch Commando collapses, John Lang tries to revive The Torch Commando in 1955 and through the Torch becomes a key member in The Liberal Party. He is a key force when the Liberal Party branch is established in Johannesburg in co-ordination with the Natal committee. He also raises significant funds for The Liberal Party at its onset. As an attorney Lang becomes embroiled in a trust fund scandal, he however remains a key figure within the Liberal Party as a fund raiser. 

John Lang and a ARM attack.

John Lang is a significant character in our tracing of the Golden Thread of ‘white’ political and armed resistance it’s smoking gun, the Torch Commando, and like all things in the South African armed ‘struggle’ his story really kicks off with Sharpeville Massacre.

The Sharpeville Massacre occurred on 21 March 1960, after which a state of emergency was declared, the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) were banned and forced underground.  Liberation movements were forced to re-evaluate their approach to the liberation struggle and consider non-violence in favour of military sabotage.

Despite the Liberal Party’s initial non-violent stance, the party was not spared the suppression of its political activity by the Apartheid State. The legislative tool used to crush the Communist Party, Springbok Legion, Torch Commando and the Liberal Party was the Suppression of Communism Act 44 July 1950.  The Act’s name was misleading as it was a sweeping act and not really targeted to Communists per se, it was intended for anyone in opposition to Apartheid regardless of political affiliation. The Act defined “any scheme aimed at achieving change whether economic, social, political, or industrial – by the promotion of disturbance or disorder or any act encouraging feelings of hostility between the European and the non-European races…calculated to further (disorder)”.

With the powers of the State of Emergency and the Suppression of Communism Act, the Apartheid State also launched a vicious attack on the Liberal Party, arresting 35 of its leading members in 1961, including John Lang and detaining them at the Fort in Johannesburg.

Whilst imprisoned in the Johannesburg Fort prison John Lang makes contact with fellow Liberal Party members Monty Berman (also a South African WW2 military veteran of the Italy campaign where he is exposed to Partisan warfare) and Ernest Wentzel who are also swept up in the Sharpeville clampdown and between them they establish the National Committee for Liberation (NCL) and embark on an armed struggle of their own.  

The NCL declares itself as an armed struggle movement of ‘Liberals’. The NCL challenges the idea of peaceful protest when the government was evidently intent on using violence. The NCL is formed under a liberal ideological framework, declaring an armed struggle on the proviso that no human life is harmed. Ironically the formation of the NCL pre-dates the formation of MK but the official announcement of its existence occurs on the 22nd December 1961 a couple of days after MK announces its existence on 16th December.

This white ‘Liberal’ armed resistance, like MK, was going to need money to buy arms and explosives – and as a fund raiser John Lang was up to the task. After his release from prison, Lang immediately forms a secretive NCL cell which eventually becomes known to the South African Police Intelligence Services as ‘The Group’. The objective of The Group a.k.a. John Lang, is to obtain financial support for the NCL.  

John Lane’s first mission is to make contact his old Torch Commando comrade and Liberal Party founder stalwart – Leslie Rubin (by now in exile) to source funds from the Ghanaian government – which were given in two financial payments in 1961 (NCL was the first armed resistance group to get finance from Ghana).  With money to buy weaponry and explosives the NCL were now ready to go.

The NCL’s armed Resistance campaign

The NCL was non-racial although its membership was predominantly White. The organisation hoped to attract an African following by acts of sabotage against government installations and institutions.

The NCL attracted three groups of ‘Liberals’ to its ranks: members of the Liberal Party (the largest grouping), the African Freedom Movement (AFM) – made up of disillusioned ANC members not joining MK, and the Socialist League of South Africa (SLA) – made up of disillusioned South Africa Communist Party (SACP) members – ‘Trotskyites’ who also did not want to join MK and its SACP alliance.

Regional Committees of the NCL were to operate autonomously. Between 1962 and 1963 the NCL focused on recruiting – Adrian Leftwich of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) joined the organisation, so too Randolf Vigne, the vice chairman of the Liberal Party, joining after he was recruited by John Lang.

Adrian Leftwitch – NUSAS

Other members included Neville Rubin, Baruch Hirson, Stephanie Kemp, Lynette van der Riet, Hugh Lewin, Ronald Mutch, Rosemary Wentzel, Dennis Higgs and Alan Brookes. Most of them from the Liberal Party. The NCL established two regional committees – Cape Town and Johannesburg but also had a cell in Natal, notably David Evans and John Laredo.

The NCL initially involved itself with smuggling people out of South Africa into exile, this included helping the ANC smuggle Robert Resha into Botswana. The ANC reciprocated by helping Milton Setlhapelo of the NCL move from Tanzania to London.

With a sense of combined purpose the NCL leaders endeavour to join hands with MK, the NCL approached MK through Rusty Bernstein (remember our old Torch Commando stalwart who becomes a founding member of MK – see the Torch’s Communists) to organise joint operations. After one failed operation the two organisations ceased to cooperate again.

NCL Military Operations

Late 1961 the NCL sabotage campaign commenced with the targeting of three power pylons and the burning of a Bantu Affairs office.

By 1962, dynamite was stolen from mines.  Dennis Higgs and Robert Watson, a former British Army officer, provided explosives training to members of the NCL in Cape Town and Johannesburg. In August and November 1962, the NCL carried out sabotage attacks on pylons in Johannesburg, bringing one down.

In Durban, the members of the NCL failed to bring down a electricity pylon as a result of faulty timers. Later, in August 1963, the NCL made two attempts to sabotage the FM tower in Constantia, Cape Town. On the first attempt, the operation was cancelled after Eddie Daniels lost his revolver, which was found a few days later. In the subsequent operation at the same installation, the bomb failed to explode. 

Later, in September, explosives damaged four signal cables at Cape Town railway station, and in November an electricity pylon was brought down.

ARM

Given their declared intentions of armed resistance the NCL became wanted by the Apartheid State, Myrtle and Monty Berman were banned and in 1961 the police searched John Lang’s residence where letters requesting financial assistance were seized. 

On 26 June 1961, John Lang fled South Africa and went into exile to London, where he continued with anti-apartheid activities on behalf of the NCL. That same year, Monty Berman violated his banning order and was given a three-year suspended sentence. As a consequence, he was forced to leave the country in January 1962. His departure threw the NCL into disarray, and morale among the remaining members declined.

The NCL’s efforts to revitalise itself without its leaders on the ground in South Africa failed and to reinvent itself, the organisation changed its name from the NCL to the African Resistance Movement (ARM). ARM launched its first military operation in September 1963.

From September 1963 until July 1964, the ARM bombed power lines, railroad tracks and rolling stock, roads, bridges and other vulnerable infrastructure, without any civilian casualties. ARM aimed to turn the white population against the government by creating capital flight and collapse of confidence of the economy.

In Johannesburg, a cell of the ARM also carried out more attacks in September and November 1963. NCL members used hacksaws to cut through the legs of a pylon in Edenvale, which led to a blackout in Johannesburg’s eastern suburbs. More attacks on pylons were carried out in January and February 1964. The climax of the ARM campaign came in June 1964 when five pylons were destroyed; three around Cape Town and two in Johannesburg.  In fact some sources say that  ARM was more active in this period than MK.

On 12 June 1964 ARM issued a flyer by way of a statement announcing its existence and committed itself to fighting apartheid and it read in part:

“The African Resistance movement (ARM) announces its formation in the cause of South African freedom. ARM states its dedication and commitment to achieve the overthrow of whole system of apartheid and exploitation in South Africa. ARM aims to assist in establishing a democratic society in terms of the basic principles of socialism. We salute other Revolutionary Freedom Movements in South Africa. In our activities this week we particularly salute the men of Rivonia and state our deepest respect for their courage and efforts. While ARM may differ from them and other groups in the freedom struggle, we believe in the unification of all forces fighting for the new order in our country. We have enough in common.”

John Harris 

The end of ARM begins with Frederick John Harris –a member of the executive committee of the Liberal Party in the Transvaal and the Chairman of the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee. He lobbies and is partly accredited for South Africa’s ban from the Olympics in 1964.  His ‘liberal’ actions earned him a banning order and by February 1964 he was recruited and joined ARM. He decided that a dramatic gesture was needed to “bring whites to their senses and make them realise that apartheid could not be sustained”.

On July 24, 1964, John Harris walked into the Johannesburg railway station and placed an explosive charge and several containers of petrol in a suitcase on the main ‘whites only’ concourse. On the case he left a note: “Back in 10 minutes”

Despite a pre-planned detailed telephone warning to the Railways Police and targeted newspapers to evacuate the station, no action was taken. The bomb exploded, injuring several people seriously, in particular Glynnis Burleigh, 12, and her grandmother, Ethel Rhys, 77. Mrs Rhys who died three weeks later. Glynnis, who had 70%- and third-degree burns, was left with life-changing injuries.

Damage caused by Harris’ bomb – insert John Harris

The ARM action produced a horrified reaction amongst the white population – ARM had finally killed an innocent civilian despite their Liberal values. The incident was incorrectly touted by the National Party as part of a terror plot by “Communists” (not liberals). Harris was arrested, tortured and beaten. His jaw was broken in three places.

Harris was tried for murder of a civilian and by the tenets of South African law for murder received an automatic death sentence (despite attempts at an insanity plea and a ‘manslaughter’ plea).  His friends and family believe to this day that the Sate was never going to allow John to beat the rope.

On April 1, 1965 went to the gallows, reportedly singing “we shall overcome”. His remains were never handed to the family – they disappeared. A heart-breaking private investigation after 1994 found them in a prison cemetery – simply marked ‘John Harris’ – the words ‘A Patriot’ were added later to his headstone by his family. His legacy as the only ‘white’ man to be hanged for ‘crimes against Apartheid’ as lost to the history of the struggle as his headstone was.

The end of ARM

After the bombing in July 1964 the police raided the flat of Adrian Leftwich and subsequently raided the flat of Van der Riet, finding documents containing instructions on sabotage and the storage of explosives. Under torture and interrogation, the two implicated their comrades.

Leftwich’s statements were devastating for ARM. He testified against his comrades in at least two of the trials, and as someone who had played a key role in NCL/ARM operations, his evidence was difficult to refute. Subsequently, the police raided and arrested 29 members of ARM, among them Stephanie Kemp, Alan Brooks, Antony Trew, Eddie Daniels and David de Keller – all in Cape Town. Others like Randolf Vigne, Rosemary Wentzel, Scheider, Hillary Mutch and Ronnie Mutch escaped. 

The security police kidnapped Wentzel from Swaziland and brought her back to stand trial in South Africa. She sought relief for her illegal abduction through the courts. Dennis Higgs was also kidnapped by apartheid government forces and challenged the legality of his kidnapping through the courts.

In the subsequent trials, Eddie Daniels was sentenced to 15 years in prison, which he served on Robben Island. Baruch Hirson was sentenced to nine years in prison, Lewin to seven years, while Evans and Laredo were sentenced to five years in prison. David De Keller received a sentence of 10 years, Einstein seven years, Alan Brooks four years, Stephanie Kemp five years, and Anthony Trew four years.

The arrest of ARM members and the flight of others into exile led to the disintegration of the organisation. 

However, some of its members, particularly those in exile, continued fighting against apartheid by working for anti-apartheid organisations. Hugh Lewin was appointed head of the International Defence and Aid Fund’s (IDAF) information department. Rundolf Vigne also worked closely with IDAF in Britain and travelled to the United Nations (UN), campaigning against the apartheid government.  Finally, Alan Brookes, a former member of ARM played a key role in organising demonstrations against the 1969 Springbok Tour to the UK.

A little raw  still

Myrtle Berman and the others never really come to terms with the bombing and killing of a human being and the trauma of the hanging, it counter acts their Liberal values and the stated objective of ARM.

The late Adrian Leftwich describes his behaviour as “shameful, harmful and wrong” and although repentant and his actions the result of unimaginable torture in jail, his status as a ‘sell-out’ still sticks.

Modern attempts to revitalise the Liberal Party do not even account this ‘armed struggle cred’ as part of their history – it’s that disconnected to the modern narrative of Liberalism in South Africa.

The End of the Liberal Party

Sharpeville signals the of the Liberal Party of South Africa (LPSA), but its demise starts earlier with a sustained persecution of Liberal Party members by the Nationalists.

In 1962, BJ Vorster opened the shots at the LPSA when he accused the party of being nothing more than a “communist tool”. This opened the way, as between March 1961 and April 1966, 41 leading members of the LPSA were banned under the Suppression of Communism Act.

By 1965, leaflets were secretly scattered by government agents warning African members of the Liberal Party that they would be banned unless they desisted.

The state would continue to harass and intimidate Liberal Party members. Security branch officers would attend party branch meetings.  The police would intimidate families of party members, even Alan Paton had his telephone lines tapped and house was searched.

In 1966, the government tabled the Prohibition of Improper Interference Bill, which proposed the prevention of interracial political participation. In 1968, the Bill was passed in parliament as the Prevention of Political Interference Act. Two political parties, the Progressive Party (PP) and Liberal Party had members across racial line were severely affected.

The PP chose not to disband but become a white’s only party to fight Apartheid via the legal parameters available to it and be a representative voice of the disenfranchised in a now dominated Nationalist Parliament.

The Liberal Party chose to disband rather than comply with legislation that went against its defining principle of non-racialism. Between April and May 1968, meetings were held in various parts of the country, bringing an end to the Liberal Party’s 15 years of anti-apartheid struggle.

The Democrats 

The Democrats form the backbone of socio-political resistance to Apartheid without engaging an armed resistance campaign – attempting to work within the confines of ever-increasing National Party’s political gerrymandering and jack-boot legislative repression. 

As we have established, The Torch Commando is not all about these fire-brand Communist war veterans joining MK in ‘armed resistance’ to Apartheid.  It’s a mixed bag of Liberals, Federals and Democrats in addition, so who are they and what do they do when the Torch collapses?  Let’s have a look at the Democrats – the ‘Progressives’ and their ‘political’ resistance to Apartheid; 

Harry Schwarz 

Harry Schwarz joins the South African Air Force during the war as a Observer (navigator and bomb aimer) – part of 15 Squadron “Aegean Pirates” fighting in North Africa and Italy. Harry Schwarz is a co-founding member of The Torch Commando after the war and takes a key role in Torch Commando’s anti-apartheid stance. He joins the United Party however; he becomes disillusioned with United Party the party’s appeasement politics to woo back white UP voters now supporting the National Party. 

 

Harry Schwarz’s speech in the USA for the raising of the new South African flag in 1994

He is expelled from the United Party with the ‘Young Turks’ rebellion. Following this he plays a pivotal role in the formation of the Reform Party (RP) and is elected as its leader. The party’s charter calls for full franchise and equal rights for all. In 1975 the Reform Party is fused with the Progressive Party, led by fellow ‘UP Young Turk’, WW2 veteran and Torch Commando member, Colin Eglin (remember, there is a ‘golden thread’ weaving its way through this history).  

The merger forms the Progressive Reform Party (PRP) with Colin Eglin at the helm. As Smuts’ old United Party continues to disintegrate, the PRP takes on more of the progressive old UP members and the PRP evolves into the Progressive Federal Party. Harry Swartz continues in a long-time opposition to Apartheid aas a leading figure in the Progressive Federal Party and continues in opposition to Apartheid when the PFP finally as it morphs into the Democratic Party (DP) – the precursor to the modern-day Democratic Alliance (DA).

After the ANC is unbanned, in 1991 Harry Schwarz becomes the first opposition member to the National Party to be appointed Ambassador to the USA – a controversial appointment Harry Swartz seeks permission before he takes it – it comes in his old Torch Commando friend, Joe Slovo (there is that ‘golden thread’ again) and Nelson Mandela in addition to give him the nod – and he takes the appointment.

During his appointment as Ambassador to the USA, he negotiated the lifting of US sanctions against South Africa, secured a $600 million aid package from President Clinton and signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1991 officially ending South Africa’s armed nuclear program developed during the Apartheid era. He died in South Africa in 2010.

Colin Eglin

Colin Eglin joins the 6th South African Armoured Division in Italy during WW2. He takes an intelligence role as a Corporal whilst serving in combat operations in the Italian mountains. After the war the “Egg” as he is nicknamed cuts his political teeth when he joins The Torch Commando. 

He also joins the United Party (UP) and formulates a relationship with Zach de Beer. In 1959 he joins the ‘Young Turk” rebellion in the United Party, like Schwarz he is dissatisfied with their appeasement politics to the conservative white voting base.  

Colin Eglin

He was one of the 11 UP members of parliament who formed the nucleus of the newly established Progressive Party (PP).  By 1966 he is the Progressive Party’s Chairman and by 1971 the Party Leader.  He negotiates the merger with the RP with his old Torch Commando chum, Harry Schwarz in 1975.  Following the dissolution of the UP, some members were co-opted by his party, and the PRP became the Progressive Federal Party (PFP). In 1986 he was re-appointed chairman following the resignation of Van Zyl Slabbert, he was the PFP’s Party Leader until 1988 when his old friend Zac de Beer took over the leadership.

Eglin is instrumental in the merger of the Independent Party and National Democratic Movement with the PFP to bring about the Democratic Party in 1989 and was elected chairperson of the DP’s parliamentary caucus.  He would also play a key role in founding The Red Cross Children’s Memorial Hospital (financed by World War 2 veterans as a ‘living’ memorial).

The ‘egg’ is a life-long anti-Apartheid campaigner – he remains with the DP when it morphs into the modern-day Democratic Alliance (DA) and he finally retires from Parliamentary politics in 2002. He passed away in 2013. For more on the ‘Egg’ and his military service follow this link: A road to democracy called ‘the egg’!

Dr Jan Steytler

Dr Jan Steytler was decorated for gallantry while serving with the UDF Medical Corps in the Western Desert and held the rank of Captain, disillusioned with the United Party he would also lead the breakaway and form the Progressive Party. He would be named as the first leader of the Progressive Party when it was founded on 13 November 1959. 

Jan Steytler next to Helen Suzman, the PP and anti-apartheid stalwart

Jan Steytler is regarded as one of Apartheid’s most vocal critics. Gradual restrictive Apartheid legislation, silencing and gagging orders, gerrymandering and media bans of the Progressives in Parliament as official opposition, would ultimately lead to them all losing their seats, with the exception of Helen Suzman being the only one – standing as a lone voice of opposition to Apartheid in Parliament for 13 long years. 

Although Jan Steytler did not join the Torch Commando, he had a close connection to The Torch, his brother William Steytler who also broke away from the UP and joined the PP, had served as a lieutenant in the Army and he was the Chairman of the Torch Commando – Burgersdorp branch.

The United Federal Party

The United Party’s loss of the 1953 General Elections and the collapse of the Torch Commando in its wake leaves a vacuum from which both the Liberal Party and the Union Federal Party are formed, as ex-servicemen in the Torch Commando pursue their respective political faults in opposition. It is an absolute truism in every respect to say that both these parties are literally formed within the Torch Commando.

So, what is the difference between these two ‘liberal’ parties – where is the political fault line? 

Sir De Villiers Graaf of the United Party in particular and the party in general was trying to toe a moderate ‘centreline’ politics bridging Apartheid right-wing leaning politics and Liberal left-wing politics into balance – and in fact had taken a more robust and antagonistic approach to the liberal wing of the party. The 1953 elections left the ‘Liberal’ end of the party in need of its own vehicle of political resistance.

A liberal alliance, the South African Liberal Alliance (SALA) was formed In January 1953 to map a route forward, three Torch Commando members see the SALA go in three different directions. Leslie Rubin would guide the formation of the Liberal Party of South Africa (LPSA), Colin Eglin would eventually lead the ex-servicemen break from the United Party and form the Progressive Party, and finally, Geoffrey Durrant would paves the way to another party – The Union Federal Party (UFP).

So, what’s the difference between the UFP and LPSA? For starters the UFP is a little more moderate and its origins lie in ‘the Natal stand’, at the centre of its mandate is South Africa’s dominion relationship with Great Britain and the Commonwealth of Nations (appealing to many ex-servicemen having just fought to maintain these concepts), on race it stands for full enfranchisement of ‘Coloureds’ and ‘Indians’ and a gradual phased qualified enfranchisement for ‘Black’ natives. 

The ‘black native’ position is not a usual one for 1953 given segregation was still been practiced world over. The ‘Native’ ethnic groups were generally left to their respective ‘kingdoms’ (the ex-protectorates in reality) to govern themselves along their traditional systems of monarchy governance, the real problem is an ever growing ‘Black’ urban proletariat class and the idea of even enfranchising it in 1953 is a very ‘liberal’ one. 

After the 1953 election, most senior Torch Commando leaders in Natal are disillusioned with the United Party not taking a stronger stance on the constitutional issue of whether Natal should remain in the Union or break from it if forced into a Nationalist Apartheid hegemony bent on manipulating the constitution illegally (and eventually breaking with ‘Union’ and creating a Republic). These Natal Torch-men include Edward (Gillie) Ford, a SAAF officer taken POW during the war and his fellow torch-men, James Chutter, Roger Brickhill, Robert Hughes-Mason, Arthur Selby, James Durrant and William Hamilton from the Natal Torch’s Executive Committee – who all forged ahead into the Union Federal Party (UFP) which comes into being on 10 May 1953.

Given its Torch roots, it’s no surprise that the UFP, emulates the Torch’s position regarding the South African constitution and race relations. The South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) traces the UFP’s position on race relations back to the Torch’s position on race relations i.e. the preservation of the constitution and the entrenched clause dealing with equal language rights for English and Afrikaans – this led the UFP to consider the other entrenched clause dealing with non-European voting rights, and to formulate a policy to promote racial harmony.

Although a full-time lawyer, and not really a politician, Louis Kane-Berman, the Torch Commando’s Chairman decides to throw in his support for the Federalist cause as opposed to the Liberal Party cause and becomes a member of the Union Federal Party. As to Kane-Berman’s legacy, John Kane-Berman, his son, would become a lifeline guiding light in Institute of Race Relations and Liberal Politics in South Africa.

Louis Kane-Berman

The elected leader of the UFP was an ex-UP Senator George Heaton Nicholls, a well-respected and seasoned Natal politician, and also a military veteran, not of WW2 but of The South African War (1899-1902) a.k.a., Boer War 2.

Unfortunately, the UFP broad public appeal was very limited and as a party it did not exist for every long, its outwardly ‘British’ stand appealed to the white English electorate but alienated the white Afrikaner electorate who perceived it as jingoism. Up against the UP and the Labour Party (and even the Liberal Party) for the opposition vote, it simply did not have the groundswell and critical mass to win seats. It led a ‘NO’ Campaign in the 1960 National Referendum on whether South Africa should become a Republic. After that defeat, the Union Federal Party was dissolved as its ‘raison d’etre’ simply ceased to be after South Africa became a Republic.

Apartheid conditioning of white youth

Conscription of all white men into the South African Defence Force began in 1966 as the National Party feared a United Nations military action against South Africa over the 1966 Resolution deadline for an Independent SWA/Namibia which South Africa ignored (to the National Party the sympathetic ‘white voter’ block in SWA was still critical to their hold on power). 

The National Party was in two minds about initiating conscription, one part felt that conscription was necessary to condition the future white youth to the ideals by which the Nationalists stood – Republicanism, Apartheid and Anti-Communism – and packaged this as the ‘Swart’ and ‘Rooi’ Gevaar (Black and Red Danger) respectively. 

Some in the National Party were against conscription, the South Africa Defence Force after all the ‘Frans Erasmus Reforms’ had worked – the removal key of ‘English speaking’ and ‘Smuts’ officers had been completed, the rank structures and symbology changed to identify with the ‘Volk’, the old Boer ‘Commando Structure’ reinforced – so much so Defence Force was now considered a key ally of the National Party’s power base and vote. Bringing the ‘English’ speaking whites back into it on an equal footing again may destabilise it.

The external threats of the Communist ‘domino effect’ in Africa edging ever closer – in Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia specifically – and the UN threat as to South West Africa (Namibia), along with escalating internal violence – the army needed a substantial human resource boost to maintain the status quo and the Nationalists also saw it as an opportunity to condition ‘all’ white youth to their cause, including the English speaking whites (and forcefully bring them onto their side so to speak).

Added to this was the implementation of the National Christian Education Curricula at all levels of primary and secondary schooling funded by the state. This would see a Nationalist re-interpretation of all South African history along Afrikaner Nationalist lines. The State would also play a direct role in guiding all formal histories of The Second World War – a sanitised ‘white’ version of it would be taught, the role of the Native Military Corps (NMC), Cape Corps (CC – ‘Coloureds) and Indian and Malay Corps (IMC)largely written out of it.

The Nazi sympathies and terrorist actions during the war of leaders of the National Party would be removed – and the direct Nazi German collaborations by Ossewabrandwag (OB), SANP and New Order during the war would be wiped clean – the OB would be positioned as ‘anti-British’ because of the Boer War and nothing more. The OB intelligence and historical archive was slammed shut in 1948 by Frans Erasmus and although partially re-opened by ‘gate-keepers’ it was only fully re-opened as late as 2015 for all the proof on its full blown collaboration with Nazi Germany itself. The political reaction of the returning servicemen and The Torch Commando would also be wiped clean completely.

After years of military and education conditioning, sanitising of media, years of banning and/or gagging of white political opposition – to the majority of ‘white’ male youth and young white adults – both English and Afrikaans – by the 70’s and 80’s the National Party presented itself as the only way forward for ‘white’ survival in Africa in light of a “Total War” against the “Total Onslaught”.

Pesky Students

By the 1970’s almost every Political party and White political figures not in step with the National Party’s ideas of separate representation were imprisoned, in exile, banned or gagged.  End of the ‘troublesome’ whites – not so!

From a military history perspective, one of the many threads of resistance comes where the NCL/ARM found Adrian Leftwich – the student movements, in the case of Whites – The National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). 

The late 70’s and 80’s saw tens of thousands of White students from the ‘Liberal’ white dominated universities on active protest – Natal, Wits, Rhodes, UCT. Entering the fray are many academics and even a student culture music movement – the Voëlvry Movement (James Phillips, Koos Kombuis and Johannes Kerkorrel).

In NUSAS dominated Universities the End Conscription Campaign (ECC) found its bedrock. In fact the ECC took shape initially within NUSAS.

Brett Myrdal – End Conscription Campaign

No shrinking violet, a case in point –  in 1983, the ECC co-founder Brett Myrdal, publicly refused his call-up and elected to stand trial an spend his ‘2 years’ behind bars, in September 1983, three days before Myrdal’s trial the state increased prison sentences for objectors from 2 years to 6 years. Mydral goes into exile and joins MK instead.

Twists and Turns

By 1990 the ANC is unbanned and the ’struggle’ landscape changes – especially for white South Africans. The Yes/No Referendum in 1992 gives voice to the silent majority of pro-democracy whites not heard from since 1948. It ensures that the final defeat of Apartheid becomes a moral one and not a military one.

The composite National Peacekeeping Force NPKF fails and CODESA calls to replace the force with statutory force SADF personnel. The battleground moves to the politically violent void between the African National Congree (ANC)/Inkata Freedom Party (IFP) and in the lead-up to democracy – in a deep irony the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), a white supremacy movement also embarks on a armed resistance campaign against the National Party Government and its CODESA collaboration –  and in an ironic twist, thousands of white conscripts – those from the 80’s generation and post 1990 call-up take up the role of Peacekeeping in the SADF and transition the country to full democracy. This call up of the country’s reserves of white conscripts to their regiments in 1994 to secure the election is paradoxically supported by the ECC as a ‘different kind of call-up’. 

In the end, the instrument of the new democracy – the vote itself – is secured by white military conscripts, not by any non-statute forces – an inconvenient fact in the contemporary narrative of ‘The Struggle’. The old National Party objective of conditioning many of these white conscripts to Afrikaner Nationalism proved null and void and in fact entirely baseless in the end.

To read more on these events leading to the elections follow this observation post link: The Inconvenient ‘Struggle Heroes’ of Freedom Day

The ‘fatal’ 1992 Referendum

In the strange world of the National Party, where “Communism” equated with ‘Liberalism” – the Nationalists made a fatal error.  Feeling confident that their hated nemesis ‘Communism’ no longer really posed a threat to their idea of the ‘Western World’ democracy when the Berlin Wall collapsed in 1989 with the resultant beak up of the Soviet Union. Feeling more confident that with the loss of its ‘communist’ backers the ANC plans as to a socialist communist take-over of South Africa would now not be possible and they would be in a position to ‘talk’.  The National Party was on the ascendancy in terms of ‘seats’ in Parliament in 1989 using more gerrymandering and with the SADF enjoying 5% GDP spend (the average spend of a NATO country on the military is 2% GDP) they were now more powerful than ever – they now even felt confident that with a negotiated settlement with the ANC they had a shot at a sustained political future for themselves. They had started Apartheid, but now they would rather magnanimously end it and all would be forgiven.

So when they hit internal political hiccups and resistance from within their party, coupled with resistance from the ‘all white’ Conservative Party and Afrikaner extreme right (AWB) – and with the ANC not really rolling over in the negotiations. They made the fatal error of thinking they needed ‘populist’ support and put forward what was to become the last ‘whites only’ vote on the issue of Apartheid. But instead of a party political vote where they had a constitutional seat advantage which would see them over the line, FW de Klerk instead opted for a ‘one to one’ count, a ‘one man one vote’ all white referendum.  For the first time since 1948 it would become clear again who in the white community supported Apartheid and who didn’t, and this time constitutional boundaries were moot.

The Nationalists for the first time sided with the ‘liberal white ‘left, it backed the support to end Apartheid and joined forces with the ‘Democratic Party’ (the last remaining “Liberal” party – the direct result of the Progressive Party and the merging of the now collapsed Union Party, Labour Party, Liberal Party and Union Federal Party, Reform Party and all their Torch Commando forebears) – it would spell out just how many liberty loving white South Africans there were to vote ‘Yes’ to end Apartheid – the nearly 3 million strong white voter base brought back an astonishing result.  69% of whites wanted the end of Apartheid – nearly 2,000,000 whites (read that again – 2 million whites willingly and very peacefully voted to end what is now incorrectly touted as their ‘Apartheid privileges’).

In terms of demographics this was not really too dissimilar to the split faced by Jan Smuts in 1948 – the populist white vote was still very much an anti-apartheid vote, even 40 years on. The only difference between 1948 and 1992 was the fact the white electorate base had grown to three times that of 1948 and an armed and civil struggle had kicked off in the interim. The very percentage of the white voter block that the Torch Commando had worked so hard to reinvigorate in its protests from 1951-1953 were still largely intact and had just grown exponentially over the years.

The truth of the matter is that an armed struggle did not really end Apartheid, the ballot did. The initial objects of The Torch Commando as outlined by Sailor Malan and Louis Kane-Berman, that the ‘ballot’ was the only viable way to oust Apartheid, held as true in 1992 as it did in 1951. There was no MK led ‘military victory parade’ over defeated SADF/SAP forces – and that’s because there was no military victory. Victory in the end was a moral one, and it was one in which democracy loving white South African’s played a key role – the first-time white people were given proper representation and voice by weight of sheer numbers – and they voted Apartheid out – that is a fact.

The ‘Yes’ vote spelled the end of the National Party, it had fundamentally misinterpreted its support. Its voting base was fractured further after the 1994 Democratic elections and it continued to diminish until one day it did an unbelievable thing – after flirting with old ‘white’ enemy, the Liberals and Democrats now in a Democratic alliance (DA), the National Party then closed shop, left the Democrats and walk the floor in April 2005 and joined the ranks of none other than the African National Congress (ANC) – their much hated ‘Communists’.  So much for Afrikaner Nationalism and the visions of Malan and Verwoerd – because the inconvenient truth is that this is what they are left with as a legacy.

In Conclusion

In the light of ‘Revolutionary History’ which has now become so predominant in the current ANC government and in formal education, incorrectly shaping the Struggle as a ‘race’ war and not an ideological and ‘moral’ one – our task to the ‘truth’ becomes more important than ever.

From a military history perspective, the white armed struggle has not been given its full scope, the dots have not been fully connected and the ‘golden threads’ not completely woven. Much of ‘the white struggle against apartheid’ it is either ‘lost’ or inadequately woven into the modern narrative of the struggle for the sake of political rhetoric favouring revolutionary Black consciousness and reform.

The ‘Truth’ – if we seeking it, is that here is a rich and very deep history of both ‘white’ military and ‘white’ political struggle against Apartheid, the epicentre of which is a little known and little regarded movement called The Torch Commando – and why is that so important?

Because future stalwarts of ‘The Struggle’ cut their political teeth in the Torch Commando – its members provide the military experience, structure and training for all the ‘Liberation’ non-statute forces – from the African National Congress’ MK to the Liberal Party’s ARM. Where they do not provide a direct military link to the armed struggle, Torch-men also become guiding lights in the political struggle – from Smuts’ old United Party and the Labour Party to the evolved Progressive Party, Union Federal Party and Liberal Party (the origins of today’s Democratic Alliance) which all spin out of The Torch Commando.

In fact, its Torch Commando members who are at the epicentre of the paradigm shift in opposition white politics after 1948 and again in 1961 and finally again in 1994. It all comes full circle, when three key old surviving Torch Commando stalwarts are at the very core of South Africa’s transition to full democracy – one lawyer, one Communist and one Democrat.

Michael Corbett joined the Army in 1942 to fight in World War 2, leaving as a Lieutenant, after the war he was an aspiring lawyer and he joins The Torch Commando in protest against Apartheid becoming part of the Torch’s legal team. Years later and a long distinguished career, by 1989 he is appointed South Africa’s Chief Justice. As Chief Justice he delivers the opening speech at the inaugural session of CODESA in December 1991 – marking the beginning of the negotiations for a new constitutional order for all South Africans.

During the CODESA negotiations, the critical team was ‘Working Group 2’ dealing with Constitutional Principles, in it are the respective party’s ‘Big Gun’ negotiators … Gerrit Viljoen, Cyril Ramaphosa, Colin Eglin, Joe Slovo and Ben Ngubane.

Yup, two old Torch Commando stalwarts are sitting opposite one another bashing out South Africa’s Constitution paving the way to the vote – Eglin and Slovo. This group is also notorious during the negotiations for hitting impasses and creating crisis after crisis as negotiations falter and hang on the edge of the proverbial cliff. 

Peter Soal, the late PFP leader would say of these impasses that it was;

“Colin Eglin’s negotiating prowess that was recognised by Joe Slovo in particular and, when an impasse was reached, the two would get together and generally find a compromise and way forward that enabled talks to continue and, eventually, a worthy constitution to emerge.”

Colin Eglin would say of Joe Slovo;

“Particularly close to my political and private soul was Joe Slovo, most remarkable of them all. Charming and intelligent, he was a creative lateral thinker with a deep human understanding”.

Eglin and Slovo shared a deep common bond, not only were they both veterans of the second World War and ‘brothers in arms’ with a mutual respect that only soldiers find in one other, they are also political veterans of The Torch Commando and they both chartered a course of political struggle with the same aim in mind – albeit on different trajectories.

As a critical part of the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MPNF), Eglin and Slovo hammer out the Interim South African Constitution – the basis of the South African Constitution as we know it today, by no means perfect but one of the most liberal and enlightened constitutions in the world. In a way, it’s the Second World War that forges these ideals of liberty in the South Africans taking part it, it’s a constitutional crisis after the war which triggers them into mass anti-apartheid protests as The Torch Commando in 1951 and in the end after an armed and political struggle, they emerge to change the constitution of South Africa completely and build it into the ‘Torch’ of liberty we see today.

To top it all, entering the stage again, is Justice Michael Corbett, our third Torch-man who wraps it all up for The Torch when he inaugurates Nelson Mandela as the new State President of a fully democratic South Africa on the 10th May 1994.

That’s why understanding The Torch Commando and bringing its history forward and preserving it properly is critical to our shared understanding of struggle against Apartheid.

President Nelson Mandela and Justice Micheal Corbett

Editors Note:

Small teaser for those who wish to really know more on the Torch. There is a definitive book on the Torch Commando which is been planned and penned by Peter Dickens in collaboration with leading academics like Graeme Plint and in support of the legacy of Louis Kane-Berman and Sailor Malan and their families, do look out for it when it hopefully makes it to a publisher.


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

References

Liberal Opinion – March 1962 ‘Jock Isacowitz’ by Peter Brown

A flying Springbok of wartime British skies: A.G. ‘Sailor’ Malan. By Bill Nasson – University of Stellenbosch

South African History On-Line (website)

Liberals against Apartheid – A History of the Liberal Party of South Africa, 1953–68 by Randolph Vigne

The United Party and the 1953 General Election, University of Durban-Westville by W.B. White 

‘Contact’ the Liberal Party’s Newsletter 1954

The Alan Paton Centre and Struggle Archives at the University of KwaZulu-Natal on-line – Interviews with Peter Brown and the History of the Liberal Party South Africa

Business Day press-reader, Nov 2018

Values, Duty, Sacrifice in Apartheid South Africa. By Peter Hain

Crossing the boundaries of power: the memoirs of Colin Eglin.

The Rise of the South African Reich by Brian Bunting 1964

Not for Ourselves – the history of The South African Legion – South African Legion of Military Veterans

The Springbok and the Skunk: War Veterans and the Politics of Whiteness in South Africa During the 1940s and 1950s by Neil Roos – University of Pretoria

A tribute to Colin Eglin – By Peter Soal – 02 December 2013.

The Torch Commando & The Politics of White Opposition. South Africa 1951-1953, a Seminar Paper submission to Wits University – 1976 by Michael Fridjhon.

The South African Parliamentary Opposition 1948 – 1953, a Doctorate submission to Natal University – 1989 by William Barry White. 

The influence of Second World War military service on prominent White South African veterans in opposition politics 1939 – 1961. A Masters submission to Stellenbosch University – 2021 by Graeme Wesley Plint 

The Rise and Fall of The Torch Commando – Politicsweb 2018 by John Kane-Berman. Large extracts taken from the late John Kane-Berman memoirs of his father Louis Kane-Berman with the kind permission of the Kane-Berman family.

Raising Kane – The Story of the Kane-Bermans by John Kane-Berman, Private Circulation, May 2018

The White Armed Struggle against Apartheid – a Seminar Paper submission to The South African Military History Society – 10th Oct 2019 by Peter Dickens 

Sailor Malan – By Oliver Walker 1953. 

Lazerson, Whites in the Struggle Against Apartheid.  

The White Tribe of Africa: 1981: By David Harrison

Ordinary Springboks: White Servicemen and Social Justice in South Africa, 1939-1961. By Neil Roos.

Related Work

The White Struggle Against Apartheid: The ‘White’ armed struggle against Apartheid

The Torch Commando Series

The Smoking Gun of the White Struggle against Apartheid!

The Observation Post published 5 articles on the The Torch Commando outlining the history of the movement, this was done ahead of the 60th anniversary of the death of Sailor Malan and Yvonne Malan’ commemorative lecture on him “I fear no man”. To easily access all the key links and the respective content here they are in sequence.

In part 1, we outlined the Nazification of the Afrikaner right prior to and during World War 2 and their ascent to power in a shock election win in 1948 as the Afrikaner National Party – creating the groundswell of indignation and protest from the returning war veterans, whose entire raison d’etre for going to war was to get rid of Nazism.

For the in-depth article follow this link: The Nazification of the Afrikaner Right

In part 2, in response to National Party’s plans to amend the constitution to make way for Apartheid legislation, we outlined the political nature of the military veterans’ associations and parties and the formation of the War Veterans Action Committee (WVAC) under the leadership of Battle of Britain hero – Group Captain Sailor Malan in opposition to it.  Essentially bringing together firebrand Springbok Legionnaires and the United Party’s military veteran leaders into a moderate and centre-line steering committee with broad popular appeal across the entire veteran voting bloc. 

For the in-depth article follow this link: The War Veterans’ Action Committee

In Part 3, we cover the opening salvo of WVAC in a protest in April 1951 at the War Cenotaph in Johannesburg followed by the ratification of four demands at two mass rallies in May 1951. They take these demands to Nationalists in Parliament in a ‘Steel Commando’ convoy converging on Cape Town. Led by Group Captain Sailor Malan and another Afrikaner – Commandant Dolf de la Rey, a South African War (1899-1902) veteran of high standing their purpose is to raise support from Afrikaner and English veterans alike and they converge with a ‘Torchlight’ rally of 60,000 protestors and hand their demands to parliament. 

For the in-depth article follow this link: The Steel Commando

In Part 4, in response to the success of The Steel Commando Cape Town protest, we then look at the rise of the Torch Commando as South Africa’s largest and most significant mass protest movement in the early 1950’s pre-dating the ANC’s defiance campaign. Political dynamics within the Torch see its loyalties stretched across the South African opposition politics landscape, the Torch eventually aiding the United Party’s (UP) grassroots campaigning whilst at the same time caught up in Federal breakaway parties and the Natal issue. The introduction of the ‘Swart Bills’ in addition to ‘coloured vote constitutional crisis’ going ahead despite ineffectual protests causes a crisis within the Torch. This and the UP’s losses in by-elections in the lead up to and the 1953 General Election itself spurs the eventual demise of The Torch Commando.

For the in-depth article follow this link: The ‘Rise and Fall’ of the Torch Commando

In Part 5, we conclude the Series on The Torch Commando with ‘The Smoking Gun’. The Smoking Gun traces what the Torch Commando members do after the movement collapses, significantly two political parties spin out the Torch Commando – the Liberal Party of South Africa and the Union Federal Party. The Torch also significantly impacts the United Party and the formation of the breakaway Progressive Party who embark on formal party political resistance to Apartheid and are the precursor of the modern day Democratic Alliance. The Torch’s Communists party members take a leading role in the ANC’s armed wing MK, and the Torch’s liberals spin off the NCL and ARM armed resistance movements from the Liberal Party. We conclude with CODESA.

For an in-depth article follow this link: The Smoking Gun


From Union to Banana Republic!

Sitting here in 2023 listening to yet another Nationalist, this time an African Nationalist President urging a Constitutional workshop to forward Nationalistic aims of land appropriation and ‘economic transformation’ in the guise of building a national ‘rainbow’ identity to redress the past, to pass off his own parties political inadequacies and flaws as been a ‘constitutional’ right to fight the wrongs committed “on the many” by what he termed “the state that came before us”

Typical, comes the universal cry, the ANC playing the ‘Apartheid’ card yet again, corrupt as ever now even trying to manipulate the constitution for their own duplicitous aims. Our beloved and hard fought South African Republic becoming like the Republic of Zimbabwe, another ‘Banana Republic’. 

The ‘politics of pain’ rearing its political head, the ‘race card’ played again and again – however playing the race card is nothing new to Nationalists, it has been played for many decades by any ‘nation’ seeking freedom and ‘identity’– and herein lies a deep irony when it comes to creating Republics out of the ideology of  singular ‘nationhood’ – there is always another ‘race’ to blame for it – a license to target another national group as the origins of all their economic, social and political woes.

Even President Ramaposha did not shy away from it one bit – the ‘state before’ his (i.e., the Old National Party ‘Apartheid’ Republic) excelled in it, the idea that a ‘wounded’ nation, dealt a terrible misdeed, must for the survival of its identity and ‘nationhood’ oppress other nationalities/cultures/languages and even entire nation states. 

Republic to Union and back again!

As military veterans we stand by our hard-fought freedoms, from those who fought the ‘cold’ war of communism versus capitalism, and those of us who served to see the country through transition to an all embracing democracy. We all covet the ideals of freedoms so protected in our Republic’s constitution – it came with a lot of blood and toil. 

To see clearly how these ideals of a ‘Democratically Free Republic’ are transitioning to a ‘Banana Republic’ as all the government owned and run utilities and the SANDF, slowly collapses around us is distressing. The fear of another ‘Zimbabwe’ looming large as Eskom turns the country’s economy on and off. 

So, how did South Africa go from its lofty ideals of a Union, a ‘federation of states and nations’ in 1910, to a Banana Republic? Intriguing question and it has to do with the old argument between British Imperialists and Boer Imperialists as to under whose ‘influence’ Southern Africa should be managed (only if it was ‘European’ civilisation leading it mind) – an argument with started long before The South African War (1899-1902) and one that leads directly to the Union of South Africa and it is one which eventually leads to the formation of the Republic of South Africa – as the likes of two Afrikaners, Jan Smuts and D.F. Malan would go hammer and tongs at each other over the issue for decades. 

The white Afrikaner Nationalist right wing and their continued obsession with creating a Afrikaner led Republic from the “Limpopo to the Cape”, and the white English and many moderate white Afrikaners happy with a ‘Union’ along Federal lines of all states in Southern Africa (Colonial, Protectorate and Republic) with British Dominion oversight – like Australia and Canada. The net outcome of it all today – the fully democratic Republic of South Africa – or ‘Banana Republic’ as it is sarcastically referred to, ironically by these same white Republicans and Unionists, who either inadvertently or even directly created it for themselves.

Written as far back as 1900 by Leo Amery, in the middle of the South African War (1899-1902) in his History of the Boer War, was this completely differing outlook, those of the Unionists and those of the Republicans and it is clearly mapped out. It’s very insightful for the time. Here it is:

“Those who believe in progress, in honest government, in political liberty and equality, must upon true statement of the facts, be on the side of England. Those to whom nationalism is all in all, who hold the creation of a nation state, with racial and linguistic characteristics of its own, is the one supreme object of political development – an object justifying every means for its attainment – will naturally be on the side of the Afrikaner Republics.”

Please note: By 1900, Britain regarded itself as a Constitutional Monarchy (where Parliament and Royalty for all intents and purposes of actual governance – are separate) and Parliament considered a ‘Liberal Democracy’ – a tussle between ‘Whigs’ (Liberals) and ‘Tories’ (Conservatives) with a ‘human rights’ agenda (equality and suffrage), secular in nature and with an acculturation focus i.e., getting various cultural groupings to adopt British values and governing principles as their own, whilst at the same time keeping their cultural identity and individual liberties – even in the context of Empire, that was (and remains) the basis of Britain’s Parliamentary system and it needs to read into the context of its time in history and the franchise – which believe it or not was ‘multi-cultural’ and ‘qualified’ – even for 1900. Funnily, the same philosophy even exists to this day, in essence it has not changed. 

Also please note: The Boer Republics at the time were regarded Nationalist Republics run entirely opposite to the British, they were seen as ‘oligarchies’ or even as devolved ‘theocracies’ (not secular at all – State and Church are linked) whose focus was on cultural prejudice (not acculturation in any real respect) i.e., ‘them and us’ and a complete separation of Boer values from all others, almost a cultural assimilation of imposition – and in so combining their ‘Nationalism’ and ‘identity’ into a unilateral ‘nation state’. This manifested itself in the Boer Republic’s Parliamentary systems and needs to be read into the context of its time in history and the franchise as well (which at the time was exclusively ‘Boer’ and ‘white’). Funnily, the same philosophy resurfaced in 1961 when the whole of the Union of South Africa declared itself a Republic.

Obsessing over Republics

So, what’s with the ‘Boer’ obsession with the ideals of Republics and the idea of Boers tacking their identity to them – sheer nationalism?

As far back as South Africa’s initial colonisation goes, Republican ideology has accompanied it. It starts with the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in the Cape Colony with the establishment of ‘Free Burghers’ – these ‘Free Burgers’ held their freedom as paramount, many of them escaping religious and nationality persecution in Europe. The Cape Colony fell under a Dutch Republic government with the VOC as an administrator and the ‘Free Burgher’ colonies fell under it, this Dutch Republic was later replaced by a French Republic vassal state called the Batavian Republic.

Contrary to a mainstream belief, these ‘Free Burghers’ and their fierce need for independence from a meddling state would not start with the British, it would start with the Dutch! .. Huh, how so? Well, here’s some little known history not usually found in a school history book ..

By 1795, dissatisfaction with the Dutch East India Company caused the Free Burghers of Swellendam to declare their own Republic, and Hermanus Steyn its President of the ‘Republic of Swellendam’. It lasted until the 1st British occupation of the Cape. Not just The Republic of Swellendam, the Free Burghers of Graaf-Reinet, also in 1795, had issues with the Dutch East India Company on policies regarding the frontier and tax, and they too declared the Republic of Graaf-Reinet, it also lasted until the 1st British occupation of the Cape in its war against the French. 

Images: The declaration of the Republic of Swellendam, and Southern Africa’s first real President, President Hermanus Steyn of the Republic of Swellendam 1795.

The 2nd British occupation of the Cape after the defeat of the Batavian Republic and the French Republic brought with it policies some of the Dutch speaking Burghers could not abide by. The British had been protecting the Dutch aristocracy during their Napoleonic and Batavian exile – after the Battle of Waterloo in 1815 finally settled the matter, the Dutch sold their Cape Colony to the British to aid in the re-establishment of their country (£6,000,000 then, now worth £150,000,000 or ZAR 3,380,000,000 – more or less). So here’s another inconvenient truth, the British did not ‘steal’ the Cape Colony from the Dutch, the Dutch sold it fair and square to the British to help them re-build the Netherlands after the Napoleonic wars.

The British outlook on suffrage as opposed to the Dutch one would clash in their new colony from the get go. Dissatisfaction started when the British banned Dutch slave traders from entering any Cape port from 15th June 1814, squeezing labour supply, then the British announced the abolition of slavery completely in 1834, they also announced a universal qualified franchise vote putting some ex-slaves and black citizens on the same footing as some white ones. 

To top this indignity to the Burghers, the British announced English as the only official language in the Cape Colony and issued terms for the compensation of slaves which were viewed as unacceptable. Burghers had to go to Britain to get their compensation, an impossibility for many slave owners on the frontiers especially – and the amount been compensated was deemed as way under-valued in any event. With this indignity, and with their fierce need for independence – language, identity and religion, some Cape Burghers on the far-flung Colony’s frontiers (estimated at only 7.8% of the total population) upped sticks a year later in 1835 in a “Great” Trek to form a whole bunch of new Republics north of the Cape Colony’s border. 

Consider why a Republic, Republics by now are based on their lofty French Republic ideals of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity are highly appealing to anyone seeking ‘Freedom’, they also should be free of domination and oversight (theoretically) by other states, and for a people seeking a separate national identity and nation state this is very appealing. But and it’s a BIG BUT, the types of Republics these Burghers were seeking to establish would manifest a version of racial servitude taken with them, strict in Calvinism and steeped in the Old Testament  these ‘Burghers’ saw themselves as God’s ‘Chosen People’ in Africa – a superior race, certainly to their slaves and local African inhabitants, which they simply dismissed as “Kafir” (an Arabic term adopted from Muslim slaves and banished exiles from the Dutch East Indies) meaning “heathens” and therefore unworthy under God – the idea the hated British came up with – that slaves and heathens could hold the same rights as them in future – was an abhorrent one – and herein would lie a future problem (and future derogatory term).

A heady concoction of the ideals Liberty, Equality and Fraternity – but only for the white ‘Free-Burgher’ Nation – within their strong confines of identity, and one in which the ‘servitude’ of other racial groups played a key role – they would have to either barter or shoot their way in to gain land to establish Republics, and they did both. They would also need a disenfranchised labour class to work the vast tracks of arid farmland or in household servitude, they would source this labour either locally when they got there, primarily through a old Dutch/VOC indentured slavery system called the “inboekstelsel” system or take labour and servants with them – and they did both.

It is estimated in some historical sources that the ratio of Voortrekker/Trek Boer to Servant/Labour taken with them from the Cape Colony commencing in 1835 was as much as 1:1. This ratio is easily seen in this sad statistic, of the recorded 282 white Voortrekkers killed along the Bloukrans during the Zulu attacks of the 16th and 17th February 1838, there are 250 ‘black’ servants also recorded as killed by the Zulu’s in addition to their white benefactors. A homogeneous trek of white trekkers the Great Trek was not.

The inboekselings system was widely used by the Boers in the region that would ultimately comprise the Transvaal, the system had its origins in driving Khoi-Khoi to labour in the Cape by the Dutch/VOC, and was still in use by the Batavian Republic (French) when they controlled the Cape. It was a system of ‘indentured slavery’ (indentured or contracted labour with limited or no rights) – primarily of Black women and children captured by force and indentured to their Boer masters till 25 years of age for the men and 21 years of age for women, it also formed a lucrative trade for struggling farmers on the frontiers of the Transvaal known as ‘Black Gold’. It is also not a ‘tiny’ or isolated affair, as numbers go, Keith Breckenridge in ‘his work ‘power without knowledge’ estimates the ratio between inboekstelsel labour and white Voortrekker by 1866 as 1:10 (10% of the population).

Trekboers crossing the Karoo by Charles Davidson Bell, unusual, but do note the Black servants and labour in foreground – an omission from many (if not most) contemporary Nationalist inspired Voortrekker and Trekboer paintings, sculptures and illustrations of the trekkers.

In either event – and another inconvenient truth, between the labour taken with them by the Boer trekkers and the labour acquired when they got to their destinations, within all the future Republics declared by the trekking Boers, there would exist from the very beginning a very large class of displaced black servants and indentured black labourers who were given no rights whatsoever – no right to own land, no right to political representation and no suffrage whatsoever. Most inboekselings remained with the farmers after their indenture period terminated as employed farm labour and servants and in this way the Boer Republican governments also sought to create a ‘black’ buffer class between themselves and the tribal Africans. They would exist on Boer farms in separated conditions in their ‘kraal’ – a very large separated sub-class and disenfranchised social construct which would remain with the Afrikaner communities for nearly two centuries and one that can still be seen in rural areas to this day.

The British, as a world Super-power at this time also found itself playing ‘Global Policeman’ with the abolition of slavery, world over and engaging its Navy to stop the trade, especially along the west and east coasts of Africa. But it did not stop at just its Navy, it uses every means at its disposal, military and legal. On indentured labour/slavery, British policy would remain a little hazy as they practiced the system in Natal bringing indentured labour to work primarily on the sugar cane farms – both servitude and highly exploitative in nature Indian indentured labourers started arriving in Natal from 16 November 1860, albeit a less forceful version that the old Dutch inboekstelsel system, the ‘Coolie’ system (now a derogatory term) focussed on adult labourers free willing to enter into a contract for five years in ‘bonded’ labour with no rights and thereafter as ‘free-men’ they were able to buy or rent land, houses and open businesses – and even form political groups – albeit these concessions (clipped by harsh ‘immigration laws’) were highly limited in terms of both opportunities and human rights (all of which however was certainly not the case in the inboekstelsel system where there were literally no real concessions at all).

The Orange Free State Republic

The Orange Free State Republic was established by a combination of ‘trek Boers’ and ‘Voortrekkers’ having settled there (there is a slight difference between these Boers depending on when these Boers left the Cape, one set are natural migrants, the other set protested the British. But here’s the confusing part and the rather inconvenient truth when it comes to the general narrative, it was a British territory BEFORE it became a Boer Republic. 

So, when these ‘Voortrekkers’ and ‘Trek Boers’ entered the Transorangia territory, re-named the British Orange River Sovereignty in 1848, they were subject to anti-slavery laws – these laws remained in place when it was later mutually agreed at the Orange River Convention in 1854 that Britain’s Sovereignty be administrated by Boers and they could declare a Republic of their own, but only as a proviso that the Orange Free State Republic established 23 February 1854, remain a British Suzerainty state (vassal state) under British oversight – so no slavery allowed in the Republic of Orange Free State from the get go. Also, the Orange Free State would never attain full independence since its inception to its end, it would at all times be a British Suzerainty, even up to and including the South African War (1899-1902) i.e. The Boer War.

The Orange Free State, chose to ally itself with its sister state, the Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek (ZAR), in their dispute with the British leading to the South African War (1899 – 1902) and joined with the ZAR to invade the surrounding British Colonies and Protectorates in Oct 1899. The result to their declaration of war against Britain is a counter-attack which would see the Orange Free State Republic annexed by the British in March 1900 when they took their capital Bloemfontein, a mere 6 months after the Orange Free State declared war against Britain and it was officially renamed and ratified as the ‘Orange River Colony’ by the British a the end of hostilities in 1902.

A conglomeration of Boer Republics

The British at the Sand River Convention in January 1852 would allow the establishment and amalgamation of Boer Republics north of the Vaal River as fully autonomous, only on the proviso that they were not to practice slavery (indentured slavery was a different matter). Unable to practice slavery proper, they enjoyed their autonomy and they would come up with legal and social compacts which defined class structures and franchise along racial and ‘national’ lines, as at 1852 most would become part of the ZAR, however due to the very isolated nature of these Boer groupings the ZAR did not really start to take shape until 1860. So let’s look at all these Republics and consider the number of Republics formed by trekking Boers (Voortrekkers and Trek Boers) and what happened to them; 

The Republic of Zoutpansberg (1835-1864), incorporated into the Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek (ZAR) as a result of the 1st Boer War against the British (Transvaal War).

The Republic of Winburg (1836 -1844) and The Republic of Potchefstroom (1837-1844) amalgamated after 1844 to form the Winburg-Potchefstroom Republic till 1848. Eventually incorporated into the Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek (ZAR).

Natalia Republic (1839 -1843), established after the Voortrekker victory over the Zulu nation at the Battle of Blood River, named Natália after the Portuguese term for Christmas (the day they discovered Natal). The Republic came to an end in 1843 when British forces annexed it to form the Natal Colony, most of the local Voortrekkers then trekked northwest into the the Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek (ZAR) – which held massive swathes of Northern Natal.

The Republic of Klip River (1847-1848), established by Voortrekkers and is now modern-day Ladysmith, the British annexed it as part of the Natal Colony, naming the township ‘Windsor’ and then later re-naming it ‘Lady Smith’ after Sir Harry Smith’s Spanish wife.

Lydenberg Republic (1849 – 1860), established by Voortrekkers, it merged with a second Voortrekker Republic, the Utrecht Republic (1852-1858) and then both merged with the Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek (ZAR).

Klien Vrystaat Republic (1876 – 1891), established by Voortrekkers on land bought from the Swazi King Mbandzini around a township they established called Piet Retief, now controversially renamed eMkhondo. The Republic was incorporated into the Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek (ZAR).

The Republic of Stellaland (1882 – 1883) and the State of Goshen (1882 – 1883), both Republics established by Boer mercenaries awarded the land by the Twana Chief Moshoette for their assistance in his battles against the Mankurwane and Montshiwa Tswana factions. The two Republics merged to become the United States of Stellaland until 1885. In a land grab the Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek (ZAR) annexed it, in response to the Tswana chiefs requesting protection from Boer expansion and aggression, in 1885 the British annexed Bechuanaland in two parts, the Bechuanaland Protectorate (modern Botswana) and British Bechuanaland (later part of the Cape Colony), the United States of Stellaland was annexed as part of British Bechuanaland. 

New Republic (1884 – 1888), also established by Boer mercenaries brought in by the Zulu King Dinuzulu to defeat his Zulu rivals, their compensation was land along the Mfolozi River. The Boers declared it a Republic and ‘Vryheid’ its capital. Long and short after a lot of conformation between the British and the Boers and the British and the Zulu, it was incorporated into Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek (ZAR) and after the South African War (1899-1902) it was incorporated into the Natal Colony by the British.

Republic of Upingtonia/Lijdensrust (1885 – 1887). Declared on 20 October 1885 as a Boer Republic, it was originally named Upingtonia, but changed its name soon after. In 1887, it was merged into German South West Africa (Namibia).

The British did it too!

So, here’s an inconvenient truth – one your school text book would have gleaned over, its not just a Boer disposition to declaring mini Republics everywhere in South Africa, British settlers in South Africa did it too. When diamonds were discovered in South Africa in 1866 a flood of treasure hunters, especially from England, streamed to the diamond Fields around Kimberley.

Ownership of the diamond fields was contested by the Boer Republics of the Orange Free State and the ZAR, as well as various other groups, including the Cape Colony, the Griquas under the leadership of Andries Waterboer, and the Batlhaping, who were ruled by Chief Mankuroane. Before the issue could be arbitrated, the ZAR President Andries Pretorius decided to act unilaterally and declare the Diamond Fields as theirs in 1870. The Immigrant miners were so enraged, a former British sailor called Stafford Parker organised his fellow countrymen and drove all the ZAR officials out of the area and on the 30th July 1870, the Klipdrift Republic was declared and by December of the same year about 10,000 British settlers had made their home in the new republic.

Parker was elected as the President of the new republic, which was also called the Digger’s Republic and the Republic of Griqualand West. The Republic existed for an extremely short time, on 27 October, 1871 the British took possession of it after the matter of the diamond fields was arbitrated, and declared as belonging to the Griquas and it subsequently became a British protectorate (the Griquas fearing future Boer aggression, and unable to effectively administrate diamond claims and foreign miners – called in the British).

Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek (1852-1877, 1881-1902)

The Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek – sometimes outlined as the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (South African Republic) or Transvaal Republic or ZAR has two lives, the ZAR (1852-1877) was initially established by Voortrekkers, whereupon its Parliament (Raad) voluntarily dissolved its status as a Republic and requested the British to convert it to a British Colony called the British Colony of the Transvaal (1877-1881) instead. Dispute, mainly over taxes, land concessions to African tribes made by the British and issues surrounding Boer sovereignty, eventually kicked off  the ‘Transvaal War 1880-1881’ (or 1st Anglo Boer War) and the Republic was re-established as a Boer Republic after their victory over the British at the Battle of Majuba in 1881 – but only on PROVISO it too became a British Suzerainty state (vassal state) under British oversight – much the same status as the Orange Free State Republic.

The re-established ZAR (1881-1902) was again the main protagonist in the dispute with the British (over many reasons to be discussed another day) leading to the ‘South African War’ (1899-1902) hence the official name of the name of the war (not the “Boer War”). The ZAR’s invasion of British Colonies and Protectorates in Oct 1899 (not just the Cape and Natal Colonies, the ZAR and OFS Republican forces also invaded the Bechuanaland protectorate i.e. Botswana and Southern Rhodesia) and it would signal the official declaration of war, the British counter-attack would see the ZAR conventionally capitulate its capital 9 months later. The ZAR would cease to be a Republic and became a British colony again when it was re-proclaimed as the ‘British Colony of the Transvaal’ again on 1st September 1900 (after Pretoria fell to the British in the June of that year) and ratified it as a British colony at the end of hostilities in 1902. It remained The British Colony of the Transvaal (1902-1910) again until Union.

As a ‘fully independent’ Boer Republic, free of another Nation states’ oversight (Britain), the ZAR only really existed for a mere 15 years – but this did not deter the desire for ‘freedom’ from Britain by many of its white Boer population, and this was reinforced by the devastation to their society and economy caused by the South African War (1899-1902) or 2nd Anglo Boer War.

The idea of a ‘Union’

The ‘British’ i.e., the United Kingdom is essentially a union of four separate nation states with varying degrees of devolved authority. It is not a leap in logic to see how the idea of a union has resonance with them. As early as 1875 The Earl of Carnarvon, Henry Herbert – the British Colonial Secretary, approached the Orange Free State and the Transvaal Republics and tried to organise a federation of the British and Boer territories modelled on the 1867 federation of the French and English provinces of Canada. 

The liberal Cape government also objected to the plan for ideological concerns; Its formal response, conveyed to London via Sir Henry Barkly had been that any federation with what were regarded as “illiberal” Boer republics would compromise the rights and franchise of the Cape’s Black citizens, and was therefore unacceptable.

The 4th Earl of Carnarvon, Henry Herbert

Although this initial attempt of Federation by Henry Herbert failed, the concept remained. By 1902 the landscape of Southern Africa had changed with many more British territories bordering the old Boer ones, not just the Cape Colony and the Natal Colony, it included Rhodesia South (now Zimbabwe) and North (now Zambia) and the British Protectorates of Bechuanaland (now Botswana), Lesotho and Swaziland in addition. Some sort of peace and balance between these two antagonists was needed to allow for a stable governance of the region, the Boer Republics lay in tatters after the war, but the desire and fight to re-establish them remained. 

The British were only able to secure a Peace treaty with the Boers at the end of the South African War (1899-1902) – on the CONDITION that Boer self-governance would be re-examined again in the near future. The British had also insisted that The Cape Franchise (a vote for Blacks based on a qualified franchise) be extended to include the old Boer Republics as a Peace Term to end the Boer War, bringing the issue of political emancipation for the region’s Black population sharply into focus. 

General Jan Smuts attending the Peace negotiations with the British, was not only a skilful ‘Bitter-einder’ Boer General but also a skilful lawyer. Smuts was able to convince the British to put this issue of ‘black franchise’ on a back burner to be dealt with by a ‘future’ and ‘independent’ government in South Africa making its laws suitable to the region and not Britain insisting on applying its Westminster laws on the unwilling Boers. This would allow the old conservative Boer Republic’s laws on race division and exclusion to be upheld in their regions and the more liberal Cape Colony and British Protectorate laws on race inclusion to exist in their regions, at least for a little longer until the well-meaning British Colonial and Boer Republic ‘white’ politicians living in South Africa could resolve it.  

The British would leave the amalgamation of their interests in Southern Africa with those of the Boer Republics interests to a future government in which the Boer Generals would have a significant say. So, long and short, something had to be done.

So, here’s some inconvenient truths, very often on Boer War forums, a grouping of Boer Romantics still hung up on Pakenham’s idea that the war was all about gold and diamonds, flat ignore the British historians who repeatedly point out it was about suffrage and human rights (both ‘miners’ in the ZAR and the black population groups inside or adjacent to the two Boer Republics). The Boer Romantics dismiss this as Britain paying “lip service” to African rights and not really that serious about it. However, look at this way – to end the Boer War, the first proper round of peace negotiations where held at Middleburg in February 1901, and the British demanded a “colour blind” qualified franchise, as existed in the Cape and other British territories be extended to the Boer Republics in addition as a peace term. The British also insisted on ‘representative’ governance of the Boer Republics after the war (mainly dealing with the quick inclusion for disenfranchised ‘foreign’ white miners in the ZAR in their political process and the establishment of their political ambitions).

The First attempt at Peace during the 2nd Boer War – Middleburg 28th Feb 1901

So important to the Boers that their racial laws and franchise constructs remain in place, that they rejected these terms outright and walked away from the peace table. The uneasy truth is they were prepared to continue the ‘Guerrilla Phase’ i.e. Bittereinder campaign and endure the scorched earth farm burning policies and the displacement and death of their women and children in concentration camps for 13 more months of really savage war, rather than concede to a more representational system of government – and the British on the other hand were well prepared to continue such was their resolve.

The issue of a ‘black’ franchise would remain on the cards and even laid down again in May 1902 at the Treaty of Vereeniging (literally there were little real changes from the Middleburg Feb 1901 conference’s terms of surrender other than some British concessions on the Cape Rebels and an increase in war compensation funds to fix damaged farms), and here the issue of black enfranchisement was kicked into the long grass with the assurances and promises from ALL the Boer Generals (not just Botha and Smuts) that it would be dealt with in a future self-governance construct (the future ‘Union’). This is NOT just “lip service” as to human rights on behalf of the British, or for that matter the Boers – the issue was costing lives and of course this was not the only issue the Boers walked away from the negotiation table over in 1901, but it certainly is a major and on-going ideological dispute between Boer and Brit.

A well-meaning congress of ‘Closer Union’ 

So, all the protagonists put aside their vast differences aside after the end of the South African (Boer) war in 1902 and got together to nut out a solution in 1908 and 1909, known as ‘The Closer Union Convention’ it was the CODESA of its day, a ‘whose who’ of modern Southern African history .., the old ‘Boer’ Generals – de la Rey, Hertzog, Smuts, Botha, de Wet and Burger even sucked it up long enough to sit opposite the likes of Starr Jameson and be nice. Notably, it also includes Southern Rhodesia (more on this later). Have a look at this photo of it, it’s a stella cast of the heads and ministers of every British colony and ex-Republic (now a British colony) in Southern Africa.  

Front row (left to right): Hon. J.W. Saner, (Commissioner for Public Works); Hon. J.X. Merriman, (Prime Minister, Cape Colony): Hon. M.T. Steyn (Vice-President of Convention); Hon. A. Fischer, (Prime Minister, Orange River Colony), Lord J.H. de Villiers (President of the Convention), Right Hon. General Louis Botha, (Prime Minister, Transvaal); Right Hon. F.R. Moor, (Prime Minister, Natal), Sir W.H. Milton (Administrator of Southern Rhodesia), Sir J.P. Fitzpatrick. 

Second row: Hon. E.H. Walton; Hon. Colonel E.M. Greene (Minister of Railways and Harbours); Mr H.C. van de Heerden; Dr J.H.M. Beck, Mr G.H. Maasdorp, Mr H.L. Lindsay; Hon. F.S. Malan (Secretary for Agriculture); General S.W. Burger; Hon. Dr T.W. Smartt; Hon. General C.R. de Wet (Minister of Agriculture); Right Hon Dr L.S. Jameson; Hon. H.C. Hall (Treasurer); Hon. General J.B.M. Hertzog (Attorney General); Mr C.F. Kilpin (Clerk of House of Assembly and Chief Secretary of Convention). 

Third row: General J. H. de la Rey; Mr W.R. Morcom; Hon A. Brown; Mr T. Hyslop; Mr J.W. Jagger; Hon. C.J. Smythe; Sir G.H. Farrar; Hon. General J.C. Smuts (Colonial Secretary); Mr A.M.N. de Villiers (Clerk to House of Assembly, ORC and Secretary of Convention). 

Fourth row: Mr G.T. Plowman (Secretary to the Prime Minister of Natal and Secretary to Convention); Mr W.E. Bok (Private Secretary to Prime Minister of Transvaal); Mr G.F. Hofmeyr (Clerk of House of Assembly Transvaal and Secretary to Convention); Colonel W.E.M. Stanford; Hon. C.P.J Coghlan.

Mahatma Gandhi would even speak at the Conversion and bring up the issues surrounding Indian indentured labour immigration, Indian ‘free passengers’ and all of their rights. The solution they all came up with, a ‘Union’ was needed, a grouping of federated states, much the same as had been proposed in 1875 by Henry Herbert along his ‘Canadian model’. It would publish ‘The Framework of Union’ explaining the ‘Union’s’ constitutional frameworks as following the likes of the United States of America and Canada. It would then go on to lay down the constitutional framework for the future South African Union.

However, key to this ‘balance’ of British and Boer interests and unity would be the eventual inclusion of Rhodesia in the South African Union, also key would be the eventual inclusion in the South African Union of the British Protectorates of Bechuanaland (Botswana), Lesotho and Swaziland.

What’s missing from this well-meaning congress? Clearly it was the Black African political representatives, this idea of Union was to be progressed without their input. Clearly, they needed a political voice as a homogenous group of ‘Africans’, and it’s a large reason why The African National Congress was formed just 4 years later in 1912, originally as the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) and made up of a ‘conservative’ African intellectual class – ‘Christian’ in its central ideology.

Also, from the outset, the degree of ‘devolved authority’ to the ‘federated states’ was an issue. The Union of South Africa would carry a highly ‘centralised’ government and the likes of Olive Schreiner who was vehemently opposed to a centralised system of government for the new Union and advocated a highly devolved confederation instead, and berated the negotiators as being “men selling their souls and the future.” She, was not wrong, and as we will see in the future, the ‘centralisation’ of government would undermine the future ideals of ‘greater union’ after 1910 and also find a happy matrimonial bed for the South African ‘Banana’ Republic to thrive after 1994.

The South African Union … and it’s not what you think!

This is an expansive subject, bear with me, I’ll make it as brisk as possible. Let’s look at the ‘Union’ argument for South Africa, and upfront this is going to shock many – The South African Union as we know it, is not the South African Union that Smuts and his cronies envisioned, not by a long shot.

The central mechanism to attain ‘Union’ from the Boer perspective starts is a little known political party called ‘Het Volk’ – a party essentially led by a Louis Botha and Jan Smuts in partnership, and a party that would eventually pull together all the old Boer war Generals (including Hertzog) and the leading British Colonial parties into a unified entity – ‘The South African Party’ (the SAP or ‘Sappe’). Its mantra was ‘Union’, its chief philosophy was ‘reconcilliation’ and its chief visionary – Smuts.

For all the ballyhoo of Nelson Mandela being the ‘father of South Africa’ that’s not true, the ‘father of South Africa’ was Jan Smuts – period, and Smuts did not envisage South Africa on its current borders – it was much much bigger. Even before The South African War (Boer War) 1899-1906, the Afrikaner Bond, established in 1881 had as its stated aim a unitary Afrikaner Republic from “the Cape to the Zambezi”, even Smuts had already started articulating his views a greater ZAR incorporating the British colonies from 1895, Kruger and his cabal had always been expansionists – bear in mind ‘Swaziland’ was not a British protectorate at the start of the Boer War, it was annexed by the  Zuid-Afrikaanse Republic (ZAR) in an expansionist grab, along with more bits of Zululand in a bid to extend the borders to include a eastern sea port, plans and threats were even afoot for a Boer invasion of southern Rhodesia – the Adendorff trek. In fact ‘Botswana’ as we know it now was established to protect the Tswana from Kruger’s ever westward expansionism – now, not many people know that!

Cecil Rhodes thought the same way with his British South Africa Company, only his idea specified ‘British influence’ – hence the clash of under ‘whose influence’ and whose ‘laws’ all this expansionism and regional control would take place (British Unionist or Boer Republican) – its an ideological clash between Boer and Brit.

To conclude the Boer War, the Peace Treaty at Vereeniging settled the issue under whose influence all this imperialism, expansionism and unionism would take place – either Boer or Brit. The British demanding a settlement as long as South Africa remained part of the British family of nations, and with the goal of ‘self government’ for the entire region – to be shared by both ex-Boer Republic and ex-British Colony leadership.

By the conclusion of the Union Congress in 1909, the declaration of Union in 1910, and the conclusion of World War 1 in 1918, Smuts’ vision for a Greater South African Union bordered on a ‘United States of Africa’ on a federalism ideology. A proper Union, a system of inter-dependent states pivoted around Smuts’ central philosophy of ‘union is strength’ a philosophy which would all eventually evolve into his philosophy of ‘holism’.

Smuts’ expansionist thinking took South Africa’s borders over the Zambezi River – literally all the way to the equator. Here’s Smuts’ map of it, and note his personal marks of A and B, the map is in three phases:

Image: Jan Smuts’ map marking the phases of Union

Phase 1, the initial South African ‘Union’, which would incorporate Lesotho and Swaziland.

Phase 2, this would be followed by the incorporation of Bechuanaland (Botswana), German South West Africa (Namibia), the southern half of Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique – Delagoa bay) and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). 

Phase 3,’Greater South Africa’ does not stop at Phase 2, the next phase would see half of modern Angola, the rest of modern Mozambique (the north part of Portuguese East Africa), the whole of modern Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) and the whole of modern Malawi joining the South African ‘Union’.

So, what went wrong with a Federation?

Field Marshal Jan Smuts

So, we nearly had a ‘United States of Africa’ a Federation of individual states like Australia, the USA, United Kingdom and Canada – bet you didn’t learn that in your history books. Life may have seen substantially different – Apartheid would probably not have happened, Rhodesian UDI would probably not have happened, even the Angolan Border War would probably not have happened (Southern Angola and SWA would have been part of the Union). So, what was right with the thinking and what was wrong?

On the right side was Smuts’ ideals of globalism and holism – the inter-dependency of peoples, nations and cultures on one another (politically and economically) – this thinking would see Smuts steer in the ideals of the Commonwealth of Nations (instead of ‘Empire’), the United Nations (instead of the League of Nations), and the same philosophy has been implemented after Smuts’ death in 1950 – we’ve seen European Economic Union and closer to home ‘BRIX’ and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) zone.

On the down-side was this persistent problem of Afrikaner Nationalists demanding Republicanism in their likeness, and the on-going issues of segregation and ‘white’ Imperialism in the territories concerned. Even Smuts saw this ‘United States of Africa’ under some sort of white patronage with a qualification franchise to gradually bring Black indigenous tribes into the edicts of western democracy – a gradual transformation to full political emancipation within institutions of western governance – and who can blame Smuts here, even as liberal globalist and a man ‘ahead’ of his time, he was also a pragmatist and a man ‘of’ his time. Smuts understood and often said “a politician cannot move faster than his electorate” (or lose his ticket) – and in his case his electorate was mainly ‘white’ and intensively racially divided and very fearful of a ‘Black’ future.

However, the two big de-railers of this ‘United States of Africa’ were the white voters, suitably enfranchised in South Africa and Rhodesia – oddly, both diametrically apposed and in fear of one another.

At Union in 1910, it was hoped that British Protectorates of Bechuanaland (Botswana), Lesotho and Swaziland would be incorporated. The difficulty in Smuts’ dream was the word British ‘Protectorate’ – they were not British ‘Colonies’. They could not be legally forced into Federation; they were tribal Kingdoms (and still are) and had all requested British protection in response to Boer expansionism and to avoid being swallowed up by the Boer republics.

These Protectorates opted on a ‘wait and see’ strategy – wait to see what ‘Rhodesia’ would do, as this would ‘balance’ Afrikaner nationalism and its race laws which were still apparent in the old Transvaal and Orange Free State legal constructs, Botha and Smuts had still not been able to institute the black qualification franchise vote as required by the British at the end of Boer War in 1902.

Thomas Pakenham (a travel writer and Irish Republican) would make one very good conclusion in his first authoritative work considered history ‘The Boer War’ – and its one which we can agree on, he said the Boer nation would never concede a vote franchise to the Blacks, regardless of promises given and would conclude that the nation which truly came off the worse in Boer War 2 was not the Afrikaner one – despite the white concentration camps and scorched earth policies, but it was the Tribal Blacks and their nationhood who would be the greatest losers. Try as they might Botha and Smuts would never be able to shift this needle. If anyone is wondering why South Africa has great big holes in the middle of it comprising the Kingdoms of Lesotho and Swaziland – this is why.  Botha and Smuts however went ahead with Union in the hope that this burning question of black franchise qualification would be settled by Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). 

With Southern Rhodesia on board, as was planned at the ‘The Closer Union Convention’ a year before in 1909, and even with the South African Act passed in 1909 which outlined ‘Union’ as it made way for the inclusion of Rhodesia as the 5th province in the Union. It would now be up to Rhodesia who would provide the balance between the main British territories of Rhodesia, Natal and Cape Colony – with their more liberated approaches to enfranchisement than those of the two old Boer Republics – and in the end the ‘majority’ of progressively minded whites in the region would win out and the small but burgeoning desire for ‘white’ Afrikaner Republics would be kept at bay by sheer democracy and a willingness for greater Union.

So, up to the Rhodesians to decide the future South African Union and political balance then. Winston Churchill once said, “The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter” (incidentally Churchill was also then the Colonial Secretary to Southern Africa) and in the case of Union this became a truism as the Rhodesians took the matter to a referendum, they called a vote on the matter on the 27th October 1922.  Option 1: ‘Responsible Government’ (own independence) or Option 2: ‘Union with South Africa’.

In Rhodesia, the prevailing government opinion was that Union with South Africa was inevitable, it was supported by the United Kingdom’s government, the South African government, and the British South Africa Company – all of whom favoured the Union option. But (like BREXIT recently), the government was out of touch. The Rhodesian enfranchised voters (mainly white, some black) were afraid of ‘Boer’ policy interfering in Rhodesian politics and fearing the extreme segregationist and race law issues latent in South Africa’s old Boer Republic provinces opted out of Union voting 59% in favour of ‘Responsible Government’ instead. 

Thus ‘nearly’ ended any dreams Smuts had of a ‘Greater South Africa’ or ‘United States of Africa’. It was only 1922, and there was still time and the whole of German South West Africa to consider, which after it was annexed by the Union of South Africa during World War 1 was a South African ‘mandate’ with League of Nations oversight. Jan Smuts have even proposed it be re-named after his friend, fellow Boer General and now the Union’s first Prime Minister – Louis Botha as “Bothaland” (bet you did not see that in your school books either). Bothaland did not go ahead, but Smuts, determined that Union through ‘annexation’ go ahead and ignoring the League of Nations mandates he even tried (again) to name South West Africa as a 5th Province of the Union of South Africa as late as the 17th October 1946. The new United Nation’s defeating Smuts claims in 1946, reducing the Union’s powers over the territory and placing it under ‘Trusteeship’ instead (primarily concerned over black rights) – that was really the end of Smuts’ expansionist Greater South African Union as South Africa never really had ‘full’ legal authority over South West Africa in the past and now going into future, as hard Smuts tried, it never would have full authority and its mandate over the territory was later set by the United Nations to expire in 1966.

Many ex-Rhodesians today lament their decision, as without the power of a large Southern African Federation behind them, they would be left alone to deal with mounting political pressure, especially over the issues of franchise and political emancipation. It laid the bed-rock conflict and for ‘right wing’ Rhodesians trying to hold onto segregation and the qualified franchise system within a white parliamentary construct as long as possible to come to power and declare a “Unilateral Declaration of Independence” in 1965, led by a very conservative Ian Smith and form … you guessed it, a Republic! The Republic of Rhodesia 1970-79.

So, let’s look again to the other problematic part of the Union’s mandate – South West Africa (Namibia) for which act of full Union was (and remained) elusive, the voting population by way of white settlers was small, an all-white affair made up of conservative German settlers who were almost equalled in numbers by Afrikaner settlers venturing into the territory. They would eventually deliver the final blow and bring about the ultimate collapse of the ‘Union of South Africa’ and the forwarding of a ‘expansionist’ white Afrikaner Republic instead.

What! South West Africa (SWA) ended the South African Union – no way! Well, it did, and its also the reason the Nats hung onto it as tightly and as long as they did, even occupying it with sheer military and police force when the South African mandate over the territory expired in 1966 – kicking off the Border War 1966-1989, so here’s why SWA was so important to the National Party and how they did it:

The Nats and their South African Republic.

The return of the idea of a Republic starts with the formation of the National Party in 1914 by Afrikaner Nationalists soon after the establishment of the Union of South Africa. Its founding was rooted in disagreements of ‘Union’ among South African Party politicians (remember ‘Het Volk’ and the formation of the SAP), particularly Prime Minister Louis Botha who sought a ‘unitary’ Unionist state with singular purpose called ‘one-stream’ and his first Minister of Justice, General J.B.M. Hertzog who sought a ‘two-stream’ state which separated English and Afrikaners. 

Incorporated into the ‘Two-Stream’ ideology was the fierce adherence to ‘Krugerism’ – the racial separation and ideological purpose of the old Zuid-Afrikaanse Republic (ZAR) separating not just Afrikaner and English but also all the ‘Bantu’ in addition. With a oligarchy philosophy underpinning it, and the sense of ‘Boer’ Nationalism ahead of all other races in servitude to the Boer cause, the religious reincorporation of the ‘Chosen Race’ – white supremacy in effect. The ‘Politics of Pain’ also factored into the Nationalist ideology – i.e. the need to preserve Afrikaner identity by what was defined as a century long British tyranny, which ultimately manifested itself in the destruction of Boer farms and families during the 2nd Boer War. In essence it generated a victim mentality, and this preservation of Boer Nationalism and identity was paramount to the survival of the ‘Boer’ race – and if that required the subjugation by force of the ‘British’ and all other races and cultures threatening its ‘survival’ for that matter, then so be it.

The formation of the National Party was directly at odds with the aims and objectives of the Closer Union Convention of 1909 – the convention designed to end the Boer and British antagonism for once and for all.

Apartheid as an ideology had not really fully and clearly taken shape at this stage, the Nationalists were pretty loose in defining exactly how they intended to implement ‘Krugerism’, they sat in the pound seats running South Africa in coalition with the Labour Party (the ‘Communists’ in effect) after the Miners’ Strike in 1922  and in ‘Fusion’ with Smuts’ United Party in 1934 generally supporting British Dominion and ‘Union’ – this caused a breakaway called the ‘Purified National Party’ on the 5th July 1935 which stood to the far right politically, under the leadership of Dr D.F. Malan – and it stood in abject rejection of Union and demanding the return to Afrikaner Republicanism along with clearer ideology on racial segregation called Apartheid – this was all ultimately resolved by two events really – the Great Trek Centenary Trek in 1938 and the Second World War (1939-1945).

Henning Klopper, the Chairman of a young and up and coming ‘Broederbond’ initiated the 1938 Great Trek Centenary Trek to artificially bind and brand ‘all’ Afrikaners as decedents of the pioneers (Voortrekkers), symbolic of a ‘white’ Afrikaner hegemony paving the path of future unitary South Africa under white Afrikaner patronage. Long and short, although very fantastical and completely historically incorrect – it worked. 

Afrikaner Christian Nationalism as an ideology outlined by the Broederbond as their official ideology, using the ‘Voortrekkers’ as a binding source of National pride and identity, would ultimately come to define ‘Afrikanerdom’. Even today, if you search ‘Afrikanerdom’ on-line you get a ‘whites-only’ Nationalistic hegemony of what qualifies an Afrikaner.


Smuts (right) and D.F. Malan (left)

Dr D.F. Malan would define the National Party’s ideology of Afrikanerdom when he said in November 1939. “An Afrikaner is one who, whether speaking the same language or attending the same church as myself or not, cherished the same Nationalist ideas. That is why I willingly fight against General Smuts. I do not consider him an Afrikaner.” An Afrikaner, in other words, was one who was prepared to accept the hegemony of the National Party and not those Afrikaners inclined to Unionism, Libertarianism or Liberal Democracy in the United Party and certainly not those like Bram Fischer in the Communist Party. This idea of ‘Afrikanerdom’ also did not extend to Black and Coloured Afrikaners or even Jewish Afrikaners who identified themselves as such.

Christian Nationalism would also be adopted by the Ossewabrandwag – the Ox-Wagon Fire Watch or OB which originated because of 1938 Centenary Great Trek (named because the Centenary trek spread Christian Nationalism and Afrikaner Nationalism like ‘wildfire’), an organisation which drew over 250,000 plus Afrikaner members under the auspices of a ‘cultural society’ on a ‘anti-British’ ticket – and was ultimately infiltrated and coupled to the ideologies of National Socialism (Nazism) through its leadership and their love affair with Nazi Germany and Adolf Hitler. 

The Ossewabrandwag along with other Pro-Nazi Germany organisations like the ‘South African Gentile National Socialist Movement’ or Greyshirts, the ‘National Socialist Rebels’, the ‘Blackshirts’ and Oswald Pirows’ ‘New Order’ ensured that the ideology of National Socialism and Christian Nationalism was fused when all these movements were folded into the ‘Purified National Party’ – now re-named just the ‘Herenigde’ (Re-united) National Party’ after Hertzog resigned over Smuts’ decision to go to war against Nazi Germany. Only this time the Re-United National Party and its Afrikaner nationalists are now powered by a white supremacist nationalist cocktail of Nazism, Christian Nationalism and Apartheid – focussed solely on doing away with Union and implementing a ‘White’ Afrikaner Republic instead, they would undo all the work done by progressive Afrikaners like Smuts and Botha and well-meaning English South Africans of British origin  – D.F. Malan and his cabal went on the political path with this sole objective in mind and time and again declared their aim for a Afrikaner Republic – where ‘English’ citizenship would take a de-facto secondary status along with all other ‘Non-Afrikaners’ like Jews, Indians, Coloureds and Blacks.

We all know about Jan Smuts’ shock defeat in 1948, where an Afrikaner Party coalition comprising The Re-United National Party and the Afrikaner Party squeezed out the United Party on the back of substantive gerrymandering and a fear campaign driving discontent over future black enfranchisement, after winning the two Afrikaner Parties merged to re-establish their original name – the National Party – however, a significant problem existed for the National Party’s dreams and promises of a Republic – their win was not a popular (majority) vote win at all – the majority of whites (English and great many Afrikaners) and the Cape Coloureds did not vote for Apartheid (in 1948 more or less as numbers go – 550,000 voted against Apartheid as opposed to 450,000 who voted in favour), and therefore the National Party still did not have the majority necessary in Parliament to change the South African constitution from a Union to a Republic (another inconvenient truth to the current ANC narratives – the majority of whites, regardless of privilege – did not vote for ‘Apartheid’).

So, what did the National Party do to get their Republican dream, well they cheated really, to gain their majority of 2/3 for a constitutional change they needed to pack the senate with more National Party friendly seats, and they needed to get rid of the Coloured Franchise (remember – in the Western Cape ‘Coloureds’ and Whites were on the same voters roll since the abolishment of slavery and ‘apprenticeships’ from 1853).

The National Party proposed legislation called ‘the Separate Representation Act’ in 1951 to remove ‘Coloureds’ from the Common Voters Roll. Amongst other measures to negate and by-pass the judiciary, they turned to ‘South West Africa’ to push their majority.

Images : The Torch Commando, 250,000 white people alone in open protest countrywide against the removal of Coloureds from the common voters roll and the advent of a ‘Facist Republic’ (see rally placard) – a quarter of the white vote bloc on the streets protesting and demanding the resignation of the National Party government.

As discussed earlier, convenient for the National Party was Smuts’ old Unionist expansion plan, where Smuts had looked to Rhodesia to ‘balance’ Republican politics in South Africa, now with Rhodesia out of the equation, the nationalists looked to South West Africa to reinforce their Republican politics (and if you are an old SADF vet who still thinks you were only in SWA to fight communists – this next bit is going to sting a little manne).

Dr H.F. Verwoerd

One of the first acts passed when the National Party came to power in 1948, was the South West Africa Affairs Act of 1949 Amendment, which went against the wishes of South West Africa’s Trusteeship in the United Nations – it ‘illegally’ gave representation in the South African Parliament to whites only in South West Africa, it gave them 6 seats in the South African House of Assembly and 4 seats in the Senate and it also illegally gave all whites in South West Africa a vote in South African affairs and elections.

This was to the advantage of the National Party who enjoyed strong support by the ethnic Germans as the National Party had through many of its organs expressed support for Imperial Germany and subsequently Nazi Germany during the two war world wars. Such was the support that from 1950 to 1977 all of South West Africa’s parliamentary seats in South Africa’s Parliament were held by the National Party.

On the Cape Coloured Franchise, The Separate Representation Act as put forward by the National Party in 1951 went ahead after the National Party overcame the powers of the judiciary through packing it to by-pass the constitution. The ultimate removal of the Cape Coloureds (some 50,000 voters) from the Common Voters roll in 1956 would pave the way for future and more sinister racially based Apartheid legislation, the complete marginalisation of ‘black’ political representation and it would open the way to the National Party’s dream of a Referendum to take South Africa out of its British Dominion and ‘Union’ status completely to become a White Afrikaner Republic.

By 1960 the National Party was ready, Dr H.F. Verwoerd was now at the helm and a referendum on the matter of Union vs. Republic was held. Single question “In Favour of a Union or Republic” – yes or no. The heavy media campaign to propose the Republic was a “Unite and Keep South Africa White” proposition and the promise of white’s only enclave in South Africa (and SWA). The entire campaign and proposal rejected outright by the majority of South Africans. It went ahead on 5th Oct 1960 and the National Party won it, but by a sliver – 1%, only 70,000 votes – and here’s how the maths worked to do it. 

Image: National Party Campaigner 1960

The illegal ‘white only’ sympathetic South West African (Namibian) voters gave Verwoerd 20,000 Pro-Republic votes and by unconstitutionally removing the Cape Coloureds from the Common Voters Roll he was able to minus 50,000 Anti-Republic votes. Then by ‘banning’ or ‘gagging’ almost all strong opposing ‘white’ voices in the Liberal Party, Congress of Democrats, United Party and Labour Party using the Anti-Communist Act and the ‘Treason Trial’ (which lasted from 1956 to 1961) – basically, silencing many white Unionist opposition almost completely. The Net result was the sliver of 1% – the 70,000 votes he needed for a ‘Republic’. 

The result was a White’s Only Apartheid Republic, declared on the 31st May 1961 in which a foreign country’s white voters played a significant role in establishing the Republic, a Republic rejected by the British Commonwealth of Nations (from which South Africa almost immediately resigned – also read ‘kicked out’) and the near majority of voters in South Africa itself (whites), the Coloured community now disenfranchised and the Black Community when the ANC and Nelson Mandela personally formally rejected the referendum, his letter on the matter of Unions and Republics is most insightful when he said, rather prophetically:

“The adoption of this part of the resolution did not mean that (the ANC) conference preferred a monarchy to a republican form of government. Such considerations were unimportant and irrelevant. The point at issue, and which was emphasised over and over again by (ANC) delegates, was that a minority Government had decided to proclaim a White Republic under which the living conditions of the African people would continue to deteriorate.”

Images: 1960 Union vs Republic campaign.

On track to a Banana Republic

We all know the history of Apartheid, 1960 was the turning point, the massacre at Sharpeville took place on the 21 March 1960 and a white Liberal Party activist attempted to assassinate Verwoerd on the 9th April 1960 at the Rand Show by shooting him in the head. The immediate jackbooted swoop down on the progressive whites (English and Afrikaans) in the United Party, the Liberal Party, the Labour Party and all ‘Black’, ‘Coloured’ and ‘Indian’ political movements and parties by the South African police in 1960/61 was unprecedented, as they literally imprisoned, banned, gagged and deported many of the country’s leadership deemed ‘unpatriotic’ to the Afrikaner Nationalist cause. That action was to change the course of South Africa as it was to change the course of the African National Congress.

So what does the Apartheid Republic of H.F. Verwoerd possibly have to do with the mess we are in now, the ANC are responsible for the mess were in – not the Nats right? It’s an ANC Republic now. Well, wrong – the Afrikaner Nationalists and their desire for a Republic are as much responsible for African Nationalists and their desire for a Republic and the main reason … the “Politics of Pain”. Let me explain.

Remember the ‘Closer Union Convention’ of 1909 to remedy the antagonisms which under-pinned the South African War (1899-1902). The National Party came about in 1914 as they simply could not “bury the hatchet” and focus on Unionism – as a small fringe party at that stage (and they have always been ‘fringe’ in the greater sense of the population of South Africa), they were still determined in their focus of reinstating ‘Krugerism’ and the ultimate dream of a White Afrikaner Republic spanning from Cape Point to the Zambezi, sans British interference. The British had caused them substantial harm, starting with the indignation kicking off the Great Trek and ending with Boer War 2 as the British used scorched earth and concentration camp policies to ultimately win the Guerrilla Phase of the war – which had a massive impact on ‘Boer’ society and psyche.

Added to this in 1914 was the decision to go to war against German Imperial Axis forces in World War 1, by an independent Union of South Africa. By a vast majority vote in the South African Union Parliament comprising a majority Boer (SAP) government – a staggering 92 MP’s voted in favour of invading South West Africa and siding with Great Britain and only 4, yup – only 4 MP’s voted against (an inconvenient truth that’s often conveniently ignored by contemporary Boer Romantics today who repeatedly state the ‘majority’ were against “Smuts’ war”), this kicked off the Maritz Revolt in the same year 1914 – which again sought in its stated objectives to create a Afrikaner Republic, from the Cape to the Zambezi – and with the aid of the Imperial Germany via South West Africa they hoped see the British out (of South Africa and all its surrounding British protectorates) – aid which was never really forthcoming and a revolt doomed from the get go because of lack of any significant support and resolve, from either the Afrikaans or English communities. 

At the same time, and forming in parallel to the National Party in 1914 is the South African Native National Congress (the original ANC), formed in 1914 also in response to Closer Union Convention’ of 1909 and the announcement of The South African Union in 1910, only this time they are on a mission of ‘inclusion’ – as they had been ‘excluded’ from the convention and their political aspirations and desires had not been properly accounted – sending their delegation to the United Kingdom in 1914 and again in 1919.  Small beginnings, like their Afrikaner Nationalist counterparts they are also just burgeoning. 

The 1914 South African Native National Congress delegation to Britain (Left to Right: Walter Rubusana, Thomas Mapikela, Saul Msane, John Dube and Sol Plaatjie.

The ANC sought inclusion, representation and political emancipation throughout South Africa’s tenure as a ‘Union’ and calling on the United Kingdom to assist in this quest became their mission. At this stage the ANC is no means ‘radicalised’ – its central tenants are for the recognition of an African national identity. In fact, like the Afrikaner Nationalists, they were ‘Conservatives’ on the political spectrum – focused on protecting a moral and social order they correctly perceived to be under attack. They are also nationalists in the pure sense of it, aspiring to a unified National identity for all Black South Africans (regardless of tribe).

At this stage the ANC is also relatively happy with the idea of Union’s independence with British dominion oversight and protection as it is far more disposed to working with them to gain political emancipation than any Afrikaner Republic would. The ‘Politics of Pain’ although beginning to germinate had not yet fully entered their ideology and rhetoric as a full blown foundation stone, the advent of Apartheid in 1948 would see to that.

The Politics of Pain

This ‘Republicanism’ and ‘anti-British’ desire the Afrikaner Nationalists had was underpinned by the belief that the British had done the Boer nation an injustice, not just in 1899, this started with the abolition of their slaves in 1834 when small groups decided to leave the Cape Colony and start forming their own Boer Republics along racist lines, with their basis solidly rooted in Afrikaner “Nationalism”.  This ‘injustice’ to their ‘freedoms’ begins the ‘politics of pain’ central to the concept of Nationalism – an injustice caused by the tyranny of another ‘nation’ on it, such that the survival of the repressed nation depends on it usurping its power over anything that would threaten it again and controlling its own destiny.

This led directly to the desire, and the eventual realisation of the Apartheid Republic. But in realising this Apartheid state in 1961, the ANC and all other opposition to it (including white) would need to be banned, murdered, imprisoned, gagged or exiled.

By 1960/1961 the ANC, a previous ‘conservative’ congress, was also forced into armed resistance and into coalition with the Pan African Congress (far left radicalised African Nationalists) and a tripartite alliance with ‘Labour’ – The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). With that came the journey of ANC from a ‘Conservative and Christian’ African Nationalist platform to ‘Sankarism’ and ‘African Socialism’ a heady concoction that at times even borders on National Socialism (similar to the old edicts of Afrikaner Christian Nationalism). This African Nationalist love affair with out-dated Communist and Socialist ideologies is something the ANC carries proudly on its sleeve and even through the world has moved on they continue to try and resurrect this socio-economic system – that it has been historically proven unworkable time and time gain and even seen by many ex-Communist countries as a crime against humanity is simply ignored. Yet on we go.

The politics of pain again, and it rears itself throughout the ‘Struggle’ years – injustice, pain and trauma caused to the Black population by the Apartheid state – and by the ‘white settlers’ not part of nation’s soil – foreigners, seeking to exploit their minerals and labour. To overcome this was the need to for a unified black consciousness who when it comes to power will seek to usurp its power over anything that would threaten the ‘Mzanzi’ Nation – a term now firmly entrenched in the South African national identity and lexicon. The penalty for ‘Apartheid’ – land and capital appropriation without compensation from the ‘white’ owners of it (in much the same way Nazi Germans appropriated through the same legislation – land and capital belonging to Jews). 

Nationalism in a nutshell

Let’s examine ‘Nationalism’ for a minute – and this is Nationalism in the context of Hegemonic Nationalism, as said – to be this sort of Nationalist you need an extreme sense of ‘identity’ formed by a ‘trauma’ and a political and economic ‘enemy’.  In the case of the Weimar Republic or German Reich (realm) 1871-1945 … before World War 2, the Nationalist Socialists (Nazi party) believing in a ‘Aryan’ (white) supremacy as to be a ‘proper German’ or sense of national identity, forms on the back of great injustice dealt to it by the ‘Allies’ (mainly France) during World War 1 – the war, its death and destruction and the indignation of the Treaty of Versailles leaves an enduring scar on the psyche on the German nation. So that’s the ‘Political’ enemy sorted, now for the economic -‘Jewish Monopoly Capital’ – the Jews profiteering from the misery of World War 1 and exploiting ordinary white Germans. The result – a German Reich run on extreme Nationalist lines with a very high incidence of state involvement and an Aryan nation’s survival guaranteed by drawing compensation from the state and its captured Jewish Capital, a race of peoples they were very happy to wipe off the face of the planet for their own ‘Aryan’ survival.

Afrikaner Nationalism – similar belief to National Socialism in Christian Nationalism i.e., a belief in an all-White Afrikaner hegemony to be a ‘proper Afrikaner’. Dealt a great injustice by the ‘British’ during Boer War 2 – the war, its death and destruction and indignation of the peace treaty leaves an enduring scar on the psyche on the Afrikaner nation. So that’s the ‘Political’ enemy sorted, now for the economic -‘British (and Jewish) Monopoly Capital’ the British profiteering from the misery of war stealing the Boer’s rightful claim to gold and diamonds and exploiting ordinary white Afrikaners. The result – a Afrikaner Republic run on extreme Nationalist lines with a very high incidence of state involvement to ensure the survival of the Afrikaner nation whilst drawing compensation from the state – and they went about it with all manner of cronyism setting up mineral and farm produce price fixing boards and creating monopolies and duopolies and state owned companies – even legislating ‘job reservation barriers’ and ‘colour bars’ ostensibly for White Afrikaner economic advancement only (the ‘poor white’ problem argued as a result of, you guessed it – the British and their Boer War 2 scorched earth policy).

African Nationalism, and here we look at African Nationalism as practiced under the principles of Sankarism and Pan-Africanism, which is central to the philosophy put forward by the African National Congress, its ‘RET’ Radical Economic Transformation faction and their related cousins – the Economic Freedom Fighters (the EFF). Again, a ‘Black’ Pan-African hegemony or identification with it. Dealt a great injustice by ‘Apartheid and Colonisation’ (the Europeans – read ‘whites’) and ‘the struggle’ – i.e. the war, its death and socio-economic destruction and indignation leaves an enduring scar on the psyche on the Black African nation. So that’s the ‘Political’ enemy, now for the economic -‘White Monopoly Capital’ the ‘whites’ profiteering from the capital and minerals rightfully belonging to the Africans and exploiting ‘Black’ labour to do it. The result – a ‘Banana’ Republic run on extreme Nationalist lines to ensure the liberty of the ‘Black’ nation with a very high incidence toward state involvement and control (nationalisation) whilst also drawing compensation from both the state and private concerns for the past economic “hobbling” of a enslaved and exploited black nation (pitched as ‘the previously disenfranchised’).

Jerm just nails this historic twist in his political cartoon.

In Conclusion

Nationalism, whether practiced by African Nationalists or Afrikaner Nationalists are two different peas in the same pod. The current ‘Banana’ Republic is a direct consequence of the Apartheid Republic which came before it. The Apartheid Republic was a consequence of Union, the Union was a consequence of the conflict between Boer Republicanism and British Imperialism.

The ‘Keep South Africa White” Republic pipe-dream of Dr. H.F. Verwoerd and his cabal in 1960 was an abhorrent and short lived testament to Boer independence with disastrous consequences for just about everyone – and Boer Generals like Smuts and Botha recognised the danger of hanging onto this idea from the get-go, General Jan Smuts even going so far as to say of National Party’s concept of Apartheid –

“The idea that the natives must all be removed and confined in their own kraals is in my opinion the greatest nonsense I have ever heard.”

This love affair with Nationalism is ultimately reflected in one of the greatest ironies, but not surprising if we understand Nationalism, when the Afrikaner National Party (NP – repositioned as the ‘New’ NP after 1997) folded up shop on the 5th August 2005 and all their members “walked the floor” to join their African nationalist cousins in the African National Congress (ANC) in coalition and membership. Proof positive of the ideological conjugal bed.

The cyclical nature of history has always shown that minorities cannot hold control over majorities indefinitely – and the two always roll over on one another, and where consensus elects a fiercely Nationalistic government, there is a tendency for that government to gravitate to Kleptocracy – and the Afrikaner Nationalists did it, so too now the African Nationalists – a rule by a elitist grouping (a real minority), consolidating absolute power (which corrupts absolutely) and helping itself to the state’s wealth. History fortunately shows us the majority will eventually see them out again (and the sooner the better for the ‘democratic’ South African Republic really).

On the left is a political cartoon from the 1950’s by Bob Connolly – it’s part of a series called “Fat Nat” and targets the National Party’s appetite for Kleptocracy – as does the political cartoon on the right lampooning President Ramaphosa and the ANC.

This also an historic truism, in the great fight of ‘right’ against ‘wrong’ world over – history has always sided with those who fight for human suffrage and emancipation as been on the side of the morally ‘good’ fight. The defenders of regimes which oppress and deny human suffrage and emancipation are always deemed as been on the side of the morally ‘bad’ fight. The net result has seen regimes like Verwoerd’s Afrikaner Republic come and go, often discarded to the scrapheap of history and irreconcilable within decades, whereas Unions which have individual liberties enshrined in their constitutions tend to last (as bumpy as the road gets at times) – the USA’s Bill of Rights, the Swiss Federal Charter and Bills of Rights and the British Magna Carta and all its subsequent Charters and legal interpretations have generally ensured the survival of these Unions over centuries.

Now, what about ‘Unionism’ were Smuts, Botha, Merriman and their ilk on the right track? Well, consider this, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) comprises all of Smuts’ 3rd Phase ‘Greater South Africa’ countries: Angola, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. And it’s even bigger now as this political, security and economic alliance now also includes the Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Tanzania. Also, strangely enough the ideals of Pan-Africanism as aspired to by the ANC and EFF (and obviously the Pan Africanist Congress) speaks very strongly to a unified African construct.

The mission of SADC is similar to that of the Greater South African Union, that is to promote sustainable and co-dependent and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development throughout the region. The obvious difference, Smuts saw ‘Pretoria’ as the capital and the regional economic driver as Johannesburg, with Federated control from Pretoria (like Washington D.C. controls the USA’s ‘Union’ and New York its business hub) … and, here’s the problem child – only with ‘white civilisation’ guiding progress.

This ‘white stewardship’ of the Victorian period clearly would not work out after World War 2 and with historic hindsight would never have been sustainable going forward, however Jan Smuts played ‘the long game’ – by January 1942, even Jan Smuts had seen the end of ‘white Imperialism’ when he admitted at an Institution of Race Relations conference that “segregation has fallen on evil days” and by the time Smuts drafted and ratified the preamble of another “Union” the United Nations (UN) in October 1945 he was all about human rights and suffrage, subscribing to reaffirming “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” (preamble to the UN as drafted by Smuts).

One has to wonder, had Jan Smuts and the Greater South African Union been given time and space, and had the Afrikaner nationalist ideals of a White’s Only Republic not resurfaced as a reality, Apartheid not implemented with such Nationalist vigour, and a less radicalised view of Pan-Africanism in Southern Africa not come around because of Apartheid and Colonial whites clutching onto power once their mandates were well past their ‘sell-by’ dates – whether we would have been on a substantively different trajectory than what we have today … I wonder.


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens