What I love about General Jan Smuts is his ‘classics’ education and intellect, it’s used to rapier effect and you need to be on your toes when reading his material.
Here’s an example, this is a letter – June 1902, from Jan Smuts’ to his wife Isie directly after the South African War (1899-1902), there are two parts which are noteworthy, the opening statement for its raw frankness and humility – it gives insight into how the guerrilla campaign is fought and the peace conditions it was fought for, and then the part where he informs Isie of President Steyn’s health. Here’s the first part:
“My darling Isie, The tragedy is over. The curtain falls over the Boers as British subjects, and the plucky little Republics are no more. Peace was signed last night at Pretoria. You can imagine my feelings on the subject; you will perhaps not be surprised to hear that I worked for peace. I did my best for our cause as long as there was any chance; but I had become convinced that the struggle had become hopeless. So we shall start afresh, working along the lines opened by the new conditions. I accept my fate – that is the only manly course left.”
The next bit on President Steyn’s health is where you need to pull out your copies of Shakespeare. Smuts informs Issie of the following news:
“I shall be very glad to hear how your health is progressing; write to me c/o General Sir John French and don’t forget I have reverted to plain J. C. Smuts. I am very sorry to tell you that President Steyn’s health is quite gone; sort of gradual paralysis; he cannot last long. He was the last of the Romans.”
Now, what does he mean by … ‘he was the last of the Romans’? It comes from Shakespeare’s Julias Caesar and it’s a quote from Brutus when he sees Cassius’ dead body, he says:
“The last of all the Romans, fare thee well! It is impossible that ever Rome should breed thy fellow. Friends, I owe more tears to this dead man than you shall see me pay. I shall find time, Cassius, I shall find time. Come, therefore, and to Thasos send his body.”
In other words Jan is saying to Isie that President Steyn was the last of a special breed of Afrikaner, the likes of which will not be seen again. He is under no illusions that Steyn will die shortly, and he is implying that he must get to work on immediate important issues (which is to secure amnesty for the Cape Rebels) and will mourn the death when he has the time.
Now, that’s deep. Luckily Isie was a well renowned intellectual herself and trained in ‘classics’ – so she would have understood exactly what Jan was trying to say to her.
Classics eh! You can’t beat it, Plato’s Philosopher King in action.
Written and Researched by Peter Dickens
Quoted Reference: Selected Smuts Papers – Volume II by W.K. Hancock
This is a famous speech, 30th January 1940 at the Sportspalast by Adolf Hitler and it had a significant impact on South Africa which very few people know about today. It’s Hitler’s take on the South African War (1899-1902) a.k.a. Boer War 2.
The speech is a lash out against Britain for declaring war against Nazi Germany for the invasion of Poland. Hitler in his speech seeks to paint Britain and the warmonger – and not Germany who we paints as Britain’s victim after the Treaty of Versailles – which he equates as Britain’s “Bible” as they have forsaken God and Christianity in favour of greed and materialism (unlike the God fearing Germans who keep a puritan faith).
To view Hitler’s speech on 30th January 1940 at the Sportspalast in full, here’s the YouTube link:
To ground his argument he uses the Boer War, and makes two significant points, he says:
“They (Britain) waged war for gold mines and mastery over diamond mines.”
Then later in the speech Hitler says:
“When has England ever stopped at women and children? After all, this entire blockade warfare is nothing other than a war against women and children just as once was the case in the Boer War, a war on women and children. It was there (South Africa) that the concentration camps were invented, in an English brain this idea was born. We only had to look up the term in the dictionary and later copy it .. with only one difference, England locked up women and children in their camps. Over 20,000 Boer women (and children) died wretchedly at the time. So why would England fight differently today?”
Now, I’ve seen people on social media immediately conclude that this is yet another rant of a mad-man, Hitler was a megalomaniac with more mental issues than you wave a stick at. As for Nazism – that’s pure evil, nothing to do with good Christians, Afrikaners and the Boer War thanks – no words from the madman here, linking Hitler and World War 2 to the Boer War is mischievous and contentious!
But here is a problem, this is 1940, Hitler is at the absolute pinnacle of his power. Nazism is at the absolute zenith of its popularity – millions, literally millions of Europeans are in favour of the “The Third Reich”. People today don’t really understand what the ‘The Third Reich’ was all about … in a modern construct its a early form of the European Union, only the EU head office is not in Brussels its in Berlin – the Third Reich is all about free trade, semi-open borders, freedom of movement and freedom to assimilate and commercially transact in Europe – its a wealth generator. It’s about respect for “cultural boundaries” according to Hitler – but in reality he’s hoodwinking again – behind the scenes it is in fact a “vampire economy” as Germany gears all its production from food to armaments to war and directs all economies to itself and its nefarious ends.
Adolf Hitler giving a speech at the Berlin Sportspalast
You can hear about all of this in the first 10 minutes of Adolf Hitler’s speech – its a utopian concept, and millions across Europe – in Germany, Austria, Fascist Italy, Hungary, Romania, Fascist Spain – even Belgium, Norway and the Netherlands and literally the whole of the south of France (Vichy France) are into this free trade union with Germany (in fact by definitions of the EU they still are – and immediately after the war ended they strove to get back to it only this time with a different leadership construct without the ‘vampire economy’ ideal).
The speech is also music to the ears of South African Neo-Nazi movements on the far right political spectrum in South Africa, the “cultural fronts” of Afrikaner Nationalism – The Ossewabrandwag, the Grey Shirts, the Black Shirts, The Boerenasie Party and the New Order. All have adopted National Socialism in one form or another and all have declared open admiration for Adolf Hitler – and he’s saying the right stuff, Britain is the warmonger, Britain is greedy for Boer gold and diamonds and Britain waged genocide against Boer women and children. A European world leader, an iconoclast in 1940, a national hero to millions said so. This speech streaming into Afrikaner homes across South Africa by Radio Zeesen (the Nazi Germany’s foreign radio service also broadcasting in Afrikaans).
Mein Kampf
And what’s not to like about Hitler in 1940, he’s a firm fan of the Afrikaner Nationalist cause and shares the ‘politics of pain’ of the Boer War with them. Hitler would write of the Boer War in his autobiography Mein Kampf in 1935:
“The Boer War came, like a glow of lightning on the far horizon. Day after day I used to gaze intently at the newspapers … overjoyed to think that I could witness that heroic struggle.”
Hitler would put his money where his mouth is and engage his propaganda ministry to drive his opinion on the Boer War, Joseph Goebbels on 19 April 1940, on Hitler’s birthday speech, would broadcast over Radio Zeesen (and others), and he said:
“Get rid of the Führer or so-called Hitlerism … British plutocracy had tried to persuade the Boers during the South African war of the same thing. Britain was only fighting Krugerism. As is well known, that did not stop them from allowing countless thousands of women and children to starve in English concentration camps”
Dr Erik Holm – the South African Afrikaans broadcaster for Radio Zeesen would recall Hitler’s open admiration for General Christiaan De Wet during the Boer War and his guerrilla tactics in flummoxing the British – from conversations he personally had with the Führer on the Boer War.
Ohm Krüger
Then there is Ohm Krüger (1941), a movie about the Boer War – Joseph Goebbels’ masterpiece. Winner of the Reich Propaganda Ministry’s “Film of the Nation” rating (one of only 4). A propaganda masterpiece which would reach millions all across Europe, complete with a massacre at the end of hundreds of Boer women as they are mowed down execution style by a skirmish line of British tommies (a scene repeated by Nazi Germany against Jews all over Europe).
Directed by Hans Steinhoff and starring Emil Jannings, Lucie Höflich and Werner Hinz. Although the plot has nothing to do with Germany, the story centres around a character which the Germans could admire, “Uncle” Paul Kruger – a man the Propaganda Minister wants to draw parallels to Adolf Hitler, who he deems is also a man with a common touch, from a simple background and one who is thrust into extraordinary circumstances due to international aggression and a conspiracy of greedy ‘foreigners’.
Waffen SS
The Boer War and Paul Kruger are even used by the Nazi propaganda ministry for recruitment into Dutch Corps of the Waffen SS. In fact the Dutch and Belgians in the Waffen SS Regiment Westland and other SS corps and Wehrmacht formations made up over 25,000 members – the backbone of the Waffen SS.
Press Junkets
During a press interview Hermann Göring (the spokesperson on behalf of Adolf Hitler), took a leaf out his Führer’s leader’s book on the Boer War when he deflected a challenge from Sir Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador to Berlin who protested about the German government’s use of concentration camps for the political ‘re-education’ of German’s dissonant non-believers in Nazism and opposition in 1935, and using a ‘press stunt’ Göring dramatically sprung up, walked over to a bookcase and like a thespian actor, grabbed a German encyclopaedia opening it at “Konzentratinslager” (concentration camp) he read out loud:
“First used by the British, in the South African War”.
Although factually incorrect, his action served as a skilful stroke of deflection of which Hermann Göring was a past master.
Nationalism – two separate peas, same pod!
That the Boer War is nuanced was not on Hitler’s agenda, the fact that the British did not “invent” the concentration camp, the fact that diamonds were already on British soil, the fact that the gold mines in the Transvaal were already owned by British and German private consortiums, the fact that the Boers also first brought ‘British’ women and children into the conflict by driving the ‘Uitlander’ population out of Johannesburg, including all the black mine labour, then declaring war and invading British sovereign territories and laying their towns to siege (with British citizens – black and white – in them). All this mattered not a jot to Adolf Hitler.
Hitler in his speech and radio broadcasts is also reinforcing Anglophobia and Republicanism, he is giving re-assurance to the Afrikaner nationalist cause from Berlin. To understand this better, Afrikaner Nationalism starts in earnest with the establishment of the National Party in 1914 – at this stage it has as its central ideology ‘Krugerism’ – Kruger’s political philosophy and the old ZAR’s (Transvaal) Republicanism constitution and race laws (Grondwet) at its centre. An Oligarchy bordering on a Theocracy with no political emancipation for Black Africans whatsoever (the majority), and racially based franchise and citizenship restrictions for white ‘foreigners’ (read “British” and Jews).
By 1940 this party has evolved its ‘Krugerism’ ideology to a ‘Christian Nationalism’ ideology – a political philosophy which B.J. Vorster (a future South African head of state) famously equated with National Socialism (Nazism) in 1942 when he said:
“We stand for Christian Nationalism which is an ally of National Socialism. You can call this anti-democratic principle dictatorship if you wish. In Italy it is called Fascism, in Germany National Socialism and in South Africa, Christian Nationalism”.
Two people in history play a significant role in generating myths around the Boer War, building into it Afrikaner nationalism constructs and identifying trigger areas for the “politics of pain” necessary for a Christian Nationalism or National Socialism ideology to surface and survive. Known as Hegemonic Nationalism this shared type of Nationalism needs an identified “internal” economic enemy and a “external” political enemy – all grounded on a specified nation’s ‘trauma’. In the case of German National Socialism, it’s World War 1, the Treatise of Versailles is the villainous instrument, the economic enemy is “Judaeo-Capital” profiteering off their misery. In the case of Afrikaner Christian Nationalism it’s Boer War 2, the British concentration camps the villainous instrument, the economic enemy is “British-Judaeo Capital” (“Hoggenheimer”) profiteering off their misery.
The first chap to build up all this nationalism is a fellow by the name of Henning Klopper – he is the Chairman of Afrikaner Broederbond in 1940, Klopper survives a Boer War concentration camp at the tender age of 6 and cannot understand why his older brother is isolated with measles, assuming that Britain murdered him and its all a campaign of genocide – Klopper would use this to principally guide Christian Nationalism as the Broederbond’s official ideology.
The other person is Adolf Hitler himself, one cannot under-estimate his influence, it still influences how the Boer War is seen and understood in Europe to this day – an example is the British “invention” of concentration camps – a myth which still holds right across Europe, the British used the concept of concentrating civilians in camps whilst they fought a guerrilla war (like the Spanish and the United States before them) no doubt there, but they certainly did not “invent” the concept (the Spanish did). To dismiss Hitler as irrelevant to the Boer War is to dismiss factual and relevant history and in fact to censor it for no good reason serves only to distort history.
In Conclusion
On linking Nazism, Kruger, Krugerism and Christian Nationalism, I’m afraid the hard truth is that linking Kruger to Hitler was done very effectively by the German propaganda ministry in Europe prior to and during World War 2. The Afrikaner Nationalist ‘right’ in their support of Nazi Germany during WW2 and infusing the ideology of Krugerism with Weimar Eugenics to create Afrikaner Christian Nationalism certainly creates a linear relationship and reinforces the argument on exactly who is culpable for the ideals of Apartheid.
Not unusually, whenever there is a post of a Boer farm burning on a Boer War social media site there is an inevitable indignation and disgust targeted at the British and usually accompanied by a torrent of abuse from a community still fractured by this conflict.
Harsh reality of ‘total war’: a Boer families’ farm burning. Colourised by Tinus le Roux.
On my blog, The Observation Post, I even had a person write to me personally and state how dare I allude to Boer aggression as a Casus Belli of the war when “the British brought innocent Boer women and children into the war in the first place” – the indignation at the ‘destruction of innocents’ and rather misdirected raw hate at me highly apparent, a quoted figure of Boer women and children sacrificed almost immediately referenced (usually inflated) – and it’s a common theme and a common retort – I see it all the time on all sorts of forums. It’s the kind of retort that is the result of decades of indoctrination and propaganda – and it’s simply completely disconnected with any semblance of full truths or balance.
So, here’s a little balance and understanding of a ‘full-truth’. At the beginning of the South African War (1899-1902), it was the Boers who commenced with creating a civilian refugee crisis, not the British, and the Boers subsequently invaded, besieged and ransacked entire British towns and territories – not only Johannesburg, but on sovereign British territory in addition, the ransacking of Dundee a case in point – burning farms and looting – leaving civilians with no shelter or refugee camps and simply chasing them into the hinterland without food or assistance.
So, let’s account who started what, and let’s account the carnage and scale of civilian casualties and who the really affected parties are – and I think you’ll be a little surprised to learn something that is not part of the old nationalist narrative of this war. Let’s begin at the beginning.
The Johannesburg Exodus
Starting in September 1899 and into October 1899 is a civilian refugee crisis on a significant scale, the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) issue a directive which sees the largest city in the republic empty out of nearly all its inhabitants.
What follows are first hand account of the initial “stampede” of ‘foreign’ (Uitlander) residents fleeing Johannesburg – many to be disposed of their property at the beginning of the war. In the end some 50,000 ‘foreign’ residents of the Transvaal were shipped out in cattle trucks and coal carts creating a refugee crisis of note (6,000 left in cattle trucks over just two days alone). Many were afforded no food or water and there are documented cases of deaths and even births in these cattle trucks and open top coal carts – the dead were buried next to the railway lines. Many of these refugees arrived in places like Durban, Cape Town, East London or Port Elizabeth and those who could not find rented, friendly or temporary accommodation were found to be loitering in parks and on the streets with no place to go, sleeping in the open and subject to the elements. The Boers idea being to chase them out of their homes in the ZAR and empty Johannesburg of its “uitlander” problem … and the British should somehow deal with the crisis.
Uitlanders leaving Johannesburg on cattle trucks – October 1899, colourised by Jenny B
In addition to the 50,000 odd whites departing Johannesburg – it is estimated that some 78,000 Black mine labour and workers fled Johannesburg between September and October 1899, many on foot arriving home in their villages penniless (their money, the last month of their wages, was confiscated by the ZAR government), and they are destitute, malnourished and exhausted (see Black People and the South African War 1899-1902. By Peter Warwick).
Notwithstanding the scale of this forced displacement of civilians – these unarmed ‘foreigners’ and their labour made up the majority of residents in the republican state – the “minority” chasing them out at gun-point.
Here’s the account by a white “British” Bradford man, writing to his parents, from Port Elizabeth, and he gave a vivid picture of the flight (bear in mind this is just the opening of what became a mass exodus).
“When I wrote you a short note on September 29th, 1899, from Johannesburg, I did not expect to have to clear out so soon afterwards, but there was very little time given us to consider. The Boers were commandeering all the Outlanders’ property as a war tax; they claimed all the horses on the mines, and behaved most insultingly to any Englishman they could come across. The way the Boers were treating us was simply outrageous. They are worse than Kaffirs, so I cleared out as quickly as I could.
There were 1500 people left Johannesburg by the same train, and nearly as many left on the platform. I had an awful journey down. We saw all the women and children in the closed carriages, whilst we men had to go in open coal trucks. About two hours after we started there was thunder, lightning, and heavy rain, which continued until we reached Kronstadt next day. Of course, we were all drenched to the skin. There we had some “scoff,” for which we had to pay 3s. 6d. each. At ordinary times the charge is not more than 2s. per meal.
The Orange Free State officials provided us with cattle trucks, which, being covered, were a little better than open coal trucks, and shielded us from the rain. We travelled right through the Free State in this kind of conveyance, and after crossing the border into the colony at Newport we were put into civilised carriages for the rest of our journey. Altogether the journey took us three days and three nights. It was difficult to get quarters, for the place is crowded. Anyhow, we managed to get a room —I and another fellow—for which we had to pay a pound for one week.
There are about 5000 refugees from the Transvaal down here, and I hear that at Cape Town and Durban people are sleeping in churches, warehouses, and, in fact, anywhere they can get a covering for their heads. People who came down here two or three months ago are at their wits’ end, their money being finished, and they having to rely on charity for a bite to eat. Whole families are starving.
The British Government ought to help these subjects, as they are forced to leave their livelihood, and all because the English Government will not hurry up and settle things one way or the other. Johannesburg is very nearly empty. Nearly all the mines have been closed down. All the storekeepers have barricaded their places up and discharged their workpeople, and the principals have cleared out, leaving their goods and property to look after themselves. Thousands of people who a few months ago were doing a nice business are now ruined, and their labours for years past are all wasted. The Boers will not allow them to remove their stock, produce, or anything else.”
Of the exodus from Johannesburg a nurse named Miss Colina Macleay records the ordeal:
“I caught the first train, crowded beyond anything you can imagine, and had to go into a coal truck with fifty white and black people, all mixed, including coolies, samies, Kaffirs, Cornish miners, and other whites. On our way out of the Transvaal we were detained at lots of stations, and insulted everywhere. The heat was intense, with a broiling sun and nothing to protect us from it. And we also suffered from thirst. When we saw a water pump we would try to get out, but guns were pointed at us and we were threatened if we dared to move. All the time the fellows at the stations were drinking and laughing and wasting the water to tempt us all the more … one poor child died in our truck, and our train stopped for a few minutes to bury the body at the railway side on the veldt. I think I shall never forget the cries of the poor children for meat and drink … At length we arrived at Delagoa Bay at one o’clock in the morning, only to find the place crowded, with people lying in the station, parks, and other available corners. A Committee of kind ladies and gentlemen and the Governor met all the refugee trains, and did the best they could for the poorer ones. As I was a nurse and in uniform I was taken to the Salvation Army Hall, and I had there to lie on the floor with hundreds of others (women and children) …”
To quote Steven’s ‘Complete History of the War’:
“The expulsion of aliens was the order of the (Republican) States, and protection was withdrawn from the mines, which of course came to a stand still. With the opening of October (1899) South Africa became astir with warlike preparations, Burghers and British troops hurrying to the- front, and with martial law (in the Boer Republics) came plunder. Bullion worth a million being conveyed from the Rand to Cape town was seized (by the Boers) and sent to Pretoria —with a ‘receipt’ for the same. It was minted into coin”.
The ransacking of Natal
The Boer Republics declared war on Great Britain on the 11th October 1899. This was achieved by two actions, both of which involved invading two sovereign British territories by way of declaration of hostilities. The first was the cutting of the railway line near Kimberley in the Cape Colony and the second was the invasion of the Natal Colony.
The invasion of Natal is marred by wholesale looting and the ransacking of British towns and farms in northern Natal. Despite Boer proclamations from their war council prohibiting both looting and even annexations. The Republican forces on the ground behave with impunity and ignore their directives, they re-name towns, declare sections of Natal as annexed to the ZAR, appoint Landrosts, hoist the Vierkleur over public buildings and embark on a looting and destructive spree of note (Newcastle is re-named Viljoensdorp and Dundee is re-named Meyersdorp).
Boer forces in front of the Dundee Town Offices – note the ZAR ‘Vierkleur’. Photo Credit – Talana Museum – colourised by Jenny B.
Both Newcastle and Dundee are looted extensively, Republican Burghers also pillage surrounding villages, towns and farms – loading wagons with stolen goods. British farmers and their families are disposed of their property and stock and many are pushed as refugees into the veldt to fend for themselves – no shelter or food given as aid.
The looting spree is so intense the Boers even sacrifice their military objectives of speed and manoeuvrability to cut the British forces off from linking up at Ladysmith and taking Port Natal – the slow-down to loot and pillage takes precedence and it allows the British to re-group and dig-in, this is a fundamental military blunder which ultimately costs the Boers the war. The extent of some of the damage and destruction can be found in this eye-witness account, when the British consolidate and counter-attack:
“General Hildyard at Estcourt lost no-time in following up the retreating Boers. On Sunday morning tents were struck and the order was given for a forward march to Frere. At 8 a.m. the long column streamed out, and after a tiring march arrived at Frere at two o’clock in the afternoon.
All along the line of march were evidences of wanton destruction by the Boer commando. At each railway station the safes had been blown to pieces with dynamite; the lamps and furniture had been smashed to atoms; the papers, tickets, and books had been torn to pieces and lay strewn over the floors. The farmhouses had also suffered in like manner, valued trinkets and ornaments lying smashed among the debris of furniture, etc. The doors and windows had been burst open and broken to pieces with crowbars. But it is impossible to adequately describe the heartrending scenes which were enacted. To understand fully the wanton devastation which had been made in many a happy country home, it would be necessary to witness the scene of desolation.
The disloyal Natal Dutch appear to have been among the principal perpetrators of these acts of despoliation, for in many of their houses were afterwards found articles of furniture which had been taken from the homes of neighbouring English farmers. In one house were found five pianos, which had belonged to English homes in the district. But the enemy had not restricted these wicked acts of destruction to ‘ the interiors of the farmhouses only, for- in some cases orchards of young fruit trees had been chopped down and utterly destroyed, and iron rain-water tanks had been pierced through the sides, rendering them useless. Many a heart was bowed down with grief on beholding the home, which had meant years of work, thus destroyed in a few moments by a ruthless foe.
Much of the live-stock, that had not been driven away, had also been destroyed. Dead poultry were lying about in heaps at one farmstead, among them being fifty young turkeys. Cattle and sheep lay rotting in the paddocks. On another farm three hundred head of cattle and sheep had been destroyed with arsenical poison.
Truly it was a terrible scene ; and yet this destruction had been wrought by the offspring of a civilised European nation. The Law of Environment had here proved itself true in the evolution of this people dwelling among the savage and barbarous tribes of South Africa.”
So, in reality – the country “stealing the gold” from private businesses and minting it was the ZAR (not Britain) and the country bringing women and children into the conflict first was the ZAR followed by the OFS and not the British, the countries in initial neglect of duty of care when dealing with civilian refugees are the ZAR and the OFS, the initial illegal looting and stealing of private property is attributed to the Boers and the peoples responsible for the first civilian deaths were the Boer Republics.
The Siege crisis
There are always “two sides to the story” and each side has merit in their argument, but let’s do try and stick to some of these basic facts. The Boers initiated the Johannesburg civilian ‘refugee’ crisis in Sep 1899 and northern natal civilian refugee crisis in Oct 1899 and then they started another civilian refugee crisis when they put British cities like Ladysmith, Mafeking and Kimberley under siege during the first phase of the war from Oct 1899 to March 1900. The siege tactics – cutting water and food supplies, shelling townships, workers compounds and residence suburbs with artillery and the subsequent diseases, starvation and malnutrition killing thousands of civilians – black, white and coloured – over 3,000 in Kimberley alone (see The Battle of Magersfontein. By Dr. Garth Benneyworth).
Kimberley: “The Moir family at their siege shelter” – Colourised by Tinus le Roux
Figures of civilian casualties during the sieges are well documented in the case of white civilians – recorded deaths include women and children killed by shellfire and well-known townspeople, what’s not recorded adequately is the death of civilians by disease, and the death of Black, Coloured and Indian citizens also caught up in the sieges. An example is Kimberley – a pavement plaque marks the first civilian casualty and it simply reads that here the first civilian was killed by Boer shellfire – an unknown black women. In Ladysmith the civilian burials at the provisional hospital amount some 600 casualties, mainly disease – and these are just the whites, no record is made of the Black and Indian Ladysmith civilians.
The Empire Strikes Back!
This is all a pre-curser to the refugee crisis the British created by engaging scorched earth policies issued mid 1900 to deal with insurgency and guerrilla warfare – and the subsequent burning down and destruction of the bittereinder’s farms’ as part of this policy and strategy.
The British counter-attack to the Boer invasions in Oct 1899 is relentless and highly efficient. The British are able to consolidate from the setbacks of ‘Black-week’ in December 1899 whilst they are numerically disadvantaged and they manage to hold their major towns under siege. By the time their hastily assembled ‘Army Force’ begins to land from January 1900 and they are numerically matched – other than the set-back at Spionkop at the end of January 1900, they lose no other other major conventional battle and in a matter of just 6 months, relieve all the sieges of all their cities, dispatch the Republican forces from their colonies, take both the Boer capitals, take the economic hub that is Johannesburg, remove Boer Forces from all their invested defences, break the Boer’s fighting capability with the mass surrenders at Paadeberg and Brandwater Basin (9,000 Republican men in total) and cut the Boers from supply and foreign assistance from the sea. By July 1900, a mere 10 months in, the conflict is un-winnable for the Boers – the British attitude is the war is ‘done and dusted’ – the Boer capitals are in British hands and its back home before Christmas for tea and medals.
With extended and unprotected supply lines stretching all the way from Cape Town to Pretoria the British position in Pretoria is vulnerable. The Boers target these lines and start blowing up rail-line and shooting up trains as the main thrust of their newly devised guerrilla or insurgency campaign. Sick and tired of trains arriving in Pretoria full of holes or not at all, and highly annoyed with the chief protagonist of these tactical hit and runs – General Christiaan de Wet – Lord Roberts writes to Lord Kitchener on the 14th June 1900 and says:
“We must put a stop to these raids on our railway and telegraph lines, and the best way will be to let the inhabitants understand that they cannot be continued with impunity. Troops are now available and a commencement should be made tomorrow by burning De Wet’s farm… He like all Free Staters now fighting against us is a rebel and must be treated as such. Let it be known all over the country that in the event of any damage being done to the railway or telegraph the nearest farm will be burnt to the ground.”
Boer guerrillas derailing a train. British soldiers on the scene. Photo colourised by Tinus le Roux.
The Boer decision to embark on guerrilla warfare and force all the Burghers who have taken up the offer and oaths of neutrality – to take up arms again and rejoin their Commando’s on threat of their farmsteads being destroyed – marks the point where the British military attitudes in South Africa turn from ‘Relentless’ to ‘Ruthless’.
On 16 June 1900, Roberts issues the proclamation on ‘scorched earth’ stating that, for every attack on a railway line the closest homestead would be burnt down. When that does not work, some months later another proclamation is issued in September stating that all homesteads would be burnt in a radius of 16 km of any attack, and that all livestock would be killed or taken away and all crops destroyed.
“Government Laagers”
This is followed by two separate Boer civilian refugee problems – one refugee crisis created by the Boer Republican Forces, burning down and destroying Hensopper, British and Joiner farms after the mid 1900 armistice proclamations – leaving these families in the veldt to fend for themselves – the Boers spurring the British to initiate the first concentration camps on the 22nd September 1900 specifically to deal with these ‘Hensopper’ refugees and give them a bell tent shelter, food and water … Maj. General J.G. Maxwell signals:
“… camps for burghers who voluntarily surrender are being formed at Pretoria and Bloemfontein.”
A proclamation was even issued by Lord Kitchener by 20th December 1900 which states that all burghers surrendering voluntarily, will be allowed to live with their families in these “Government Laagers” (concentration camps) until the end of the war and their stock and property will be respected and paid for.
And there is a second refugee crisis, this one initiated by the British forces and their scorched earth policy. The ‘concentration camps’ termed ‘refugee camps’ by the British (or ‘Government Laagers) start to fill up with a mix of Boers who have voluntarily surrendered (Hensoppers) or joined British forces (Joiners) and whose farms have been burned down by the Boers, they are also joined by some British families whose farms suffered the same fate (all these families comprise, men, women and children). They are then joined by ‘Bittereiner’ families directed to the concentration camps by the British who are busy burning down or dynamiting their farmsteads under the Scorched Earth policy – these families comprise a handful of men, but mainly women and children (their husbands still on Commando). Over time and given the sheer scale of destruction of the rural sector, the Bittereinder families start to outnumber the Hensopper families.
By 21st December 1900 Lord Kitchener outlined the advantages of interning all women, children and men unfit for military services, also Blacks living on Boer farms, as this will be;
“the most effective method of limiting the endurance of the guerrillas … The women and children brought in should be divided in two categories, viz.: 1st. Refugees, and the families of Neutrals, non-combatants, and surrendered Burghers. 2nd. Those whose husbands, fathers and sons are on Commando. The preference in accommodation, etc. should of course be given to the first class. With regard to Natives, it is not intended to clear (Native) locations, but only such and their stock as are on Boer farms.”
What gets created now are two separate camp systems, one for ‘whites’ and one for ‘natives’ (Blacks) and they are both fundamentally different in the way they are managed. The ‘white’ camps are structured using bell tents along military camp lines, shelter is provided by way a tent and food and water is provided – the camps are somewhat porous, there are no fences or armed guards and people can come and go with ‘refugee passes’ – isolation and lack of places go for alternate shelter keep the Boers in the camps. Medical facilities are also at hand, some camps better equipped than others.
Winburg Concentration Camp – Photo Credit: Boer War Museum, Bloemfontein. Colourised by Jenny B.
However, and this is key, upfront these camps are very poorly managed, the military have other problems to deal with and are prioritised to do what they know best and fight – there are major problems with sanitation, some camps being better than others. The supply lines to these camps – medicine, food, tents etc. all situated along railway lines for this purpose, are also severely disrupted by the Boer insurgents blowing up railway line. Overcrowding, lack of tents, disrupted food, poor sanitation, poor water and limited medicines all become major issues.
Many people don’t fully understand the concentration camps systems or the phases of their administration, in a nutshell there are two distinctive phases:
Concentration Camps – diseases bell curve – Black and white camps and time-line.
Phase 1: Started in September 1900 – they are set up under British military administration. In the ‘white’ camps – from March 1901 the mortality rates in the starts to climb to unprecedented and alarming levels, and at their peak the mortality rate is driven primarily by a measles epidemic which sweeps the camps and accounts 30% the overall deaths – as a child’s disease, along with the high infancy mortality rate and child death ratio in the Victorian period, coupled with the difficulty of wartime conditions and camp sanitary standards, by the beginning of 1902 children account for nearly 2/3 of all deaths.
The period March 1901 to November 1901 is 9 months of abject misery and suffering in the white Boer camps. However, contrary to modern propaganda, although there are many in white Boer camps who are malnourished and conditions are extremely harsh, they are not purposefully starved to death – ‘Starvation and Scurvy’ accounts for only 2.9% of recorded deaths. There are also no recoded cases of premeditated murder or executions, all deaths are attributed to disease or medically related conditions.
The conditions and plight of the women and children in the camps, against the context of respiratory and waterborne disease, coupled with inadequate medical countermeasures and failures in administration is highlighted by the likes of Emily Hobhouse and later in 1901 by the Fawcett Commission.
Phase 2: From November 1901 as a result of the Fawcett Commission’s and parliamentary recommendations, Lord Alfred Milner, the Cape Colony High Commissioner is tasked with taking over the white Boer camps from the military and bringing them under civilian authority instead.
As a result of Milner’s direct intervention, from November 1901 the mortality rates in the ‘white’ camps start to drop off dramatically as his civilian administrators and medical staff start to get on top of the epidemics, food supply and sanitary issues. They also do away with the putative and preferential treatment of ‘hensopper’ versus ‘bittereinder’ families initiated by the military.
Children fetching water, Bloemfontein concentration camp – colourised by Tinus le Roux – inserted chart is the full account of white Boer concentration camp deaths.
Milner’s actions and policies are extremely effective, in just 4 months the mortality rates in the white camps drop to acceptable mortality rates for the Victorian era, made even more remarkable considering that these mortality rates are declining and have plateaued-out when the Guerrilla Phase and Scorched Earth policy is at its height and at its most destructive.
These “acceptable” i.e. normal mortality rates continue up to the end of the war on 31 May 1902 and then remain acceptable long after the end of the war as the camps are then used as ‘resettlement’ centres for displaced Boer families until the end of 1902.
As to Milner, it’s also an inconvenient truth, that a man so often vilified by modern white Afrikaners as the devil reincarnate, is the same man responsible for saving tens of thousands of Boer women and children’s lives. However in all, there are exactly 29,491 deaths recorded in the ‘white’ concentration camps, the result of which would deeply harm the white Afrikaner collective psyche and does so even to this day.
The ‘Black’ concentration camps are a different matter, on a point to note here, the ‘Black’ camps are very big, this population of displaced civilians throughout the war, be they from the farms or from the cities far outnumbers the whites. In the Black concentration camps, no food or shelter is afforded, Black internees are instructed to grow their own food, and provided seed for this purpose. The food is both for their own consumption and for the British war effort. Wages are paid for labour provided to the British war machine, and these wages are then used by the Africans in the camps to purchase shelters, provisions and food. Medical assistance is minimal. In terms of structure some of these camps start to reflect a modern day poor shack township – corrugated metal, mud, wood and canvass shacks. In a nut-shell these camps can best be described as ‘forced’ labour camps.
Boer War Black Concentration Camp near Bronkerspruit, c.1901 – Colourised by Jenny B.
These ‘Black’ camps are hit by the same cocktail of viruses and bacteria that hit the ‘White’ camps, mainly typhoid and to a large degree measles. Their disease bell curve follows a similar trajectory as the white camps, however it starts a little later in August 1901. That’s were the similarity ends, in the Black camps there are also cases of starvation as the black populations do not receive enough food from the government to maintain human survivability (unlike the white camps). The mortality rates are also not clearly understood as they were not meticulously recorded (unlike the white camps). Only as late as 2024 do we even have an inkling of an idea of the mortality in these camps. They are now been carefully analysed using archaeological record (primary data, excavating and forensics) and oral history – it is now estimated that over 30,000 Black Africans died in these forced labour camps (refer Dr. Garth Benneyworth ‘Work or Starve’ published 2024).
Seeing the bigger picture
In reality, we now need to start accepting that as many Blacks died in their concentration camps (30,000 plus) as Whites died in their concentration camps (29,461). The key difference given racial prejudices (Boer and Brit) of the time, and more so the racial prejudices of the Afrikaner Nationalist governments after 1910.
So, before “Boer War” Afrikaner enthusiasts start jumping up and using this as yet another stick to vilify and beat the British with, we must note that whilst hundreds of plinths, monuments, museums and thousands of grave markers have focused on the “Boer Women and Children” at every single camp and in every single affected town – erected over the course of nearly 10 decades at massive state expense … and not one grave marker, monument, museum or even a simple single plinth was erected to the Black concentration camps.
As to prejudice and misunderstanding of the Boer War – there remains to this very day no such acknowledgement and remembrance – still, and some still want to call it “The Anglo-Boer War” as if these are the only two groups in it and not by its official designated name “The South African War (1899-1902)” and they still exclude by way of simple acknowledgement the mass of other ethnicities who either took part in the war directly as belligerents – taking service directly in the British Army’s colonial regiments and units, over 30,000 as ‘Black African’ British combatants alone – and were not getting to the thousands of South African based ‘Coloureds’ and ‘Indians’ joining British forces.
Then there are the thousands of ‘armed’ black Agteryers’, labour and servants in the Boer Republican Armies – not to mention the Blacks affected by the war in their concentration camps as forced labour for the British by their tens of thousands.
Black African ‘British’ soldiers defending a rice patten blockhouse, British Army Museum – Colourised by Jenny B.
Remember also that both the Tswana in Botswana and the Swazi enter the war as belligerent nations in their own right – on the side of the British, and both defeat Boer Commandos. There are literally hundreds of thousands of refugees having lost their jobs and been displaced from places like Johannesburg and Kimberley by the Boers or displaced from the Boer farms by the British – so here’s the kicker – there are more “Blacks’ affected by the war than either the Anglos or Boers combined and their death toll is as significant!
Heck, entire books and academic papers have been written by ‘British’ and then ‘Afrikaner’ historians – but this aspect of the war only started to appear with any degree of sincerity around 2015 – post 1994, and it’s still not fully researched.
War is Cruelty
The Boer’s Guerrilla campaign is not a romantic ‘scarlet pimpernel’ chase of Christian de Wet and his chums, all whilst they cleverly outsmart the British. It’s a brutal, harsh and very cruel campaign – aimed at public networks – trains and rail in addition to the military ones. It is marred by maundering – the destruction of public buildings, mission stations and farms in the British territories – and even the murder of British citizens. Here is just a flavour of it – mission stations and Black and Coloured British citizens and soldiers are especially targeted.
When the Reverend C. Schröder returned to his Gordonia congregation after the war, he was horrified to find that most of his flock had been killed by Boer raiders. A attack by an unhinged Manie Maritz on the Methodist mission station at Leliefontein in Namaqualand was especially savage. The mission station razed and plundered, the civilians hunted down in an act of revenge, in all 27 Leliefonteiners are killed (some accounts say a total of 43) and approximately 100 are injured. So brutal it even shocked Deneys Reitz who recorded it in his diary:
“We found the place sacked and gutted and among the rocks beyond the buried houses lay 20 or 30 dead Hottentots, still clutching their antiquated muzzleloaders. This was Maritz’s handiwork. He had ridden into the station with a few men to interview the European missionaries, when he was set upon by armed Hottentots, he and his escorts narrowly escaping with their lives. To avenge the insult, he returned the next morning with a stronger force and wiped out the settlement, which seemed to many of us a ruthless and unjustifiable act. General Smuts said nothing but I saw him walk past the boulders where the dead lay, and on his return he was moody and curt… we lived in an atmosphere of rotting corpses for some days.”
Deneys Reitz
Bill Nasson, the renowned Boer War historian would note:
“The wretched refugees of this massacre were pitilessly hunted down by parties of Boers. Those unfortunate enough to be captured were brought back to work as slave labourers. Indeed, they were even shackled in irons forged at the mission station’s smithy”.
Manie Maritz is so unhinged that later in the war, he ignores clear instructions from Smuts and attempts to dynamite the town of Okiep – its garrison and civilians included. Using the commandeered Namaqua United Copper Company locomotive ‘Pioneer’ to propel a mobile bomb in the form of a wagonload of dynamite into the besieged town. Luckily the attack failed when the train derailed.
Maritz is not the only unhinged Boer Kommandant in the Guerrilla phase – both Kmdt. Gideon Scheepers and Kmdt. Hans Lötter, amongst other charges – were charged on marauding, property destruction, murdering “native spies” and mistreatment of black civilians (in the case of Scheepers also murdering unarmed but uniformed black British POW) – both were executed by the British once caught.
Images: Kommandant’s Scheepers and Lötter after their capture and ‘Fighting General’ Manie Maritz.
General Christian De Wet even writes to Lord Kitchener requesting clemency for Boer Kommandant’s executing Black soldiers out of hand as he had given “general instructions to have all armed natives and native spies shot.” Kitchener rejected the appeal, replying to General De Wet that Boer officers were personally responsible for their actions, and he wrote:
“[I am] astonished at the barbarous instructions you have given as regards the murder of natives who have behaved in my opinion, in an exemplary manner during the war.”
Ironically, as the modern Nationalist narrative went, Gideon Scheepers, Hans Lötter, Manie Maritz and Christiaan de Wet are all heralded as “volks-heroes” for their deeds, and this involves the outright murdering of black civilians, whereas Lord Kitchener, who would move on to become the face for British recruitment in World War 1, would ultimately be painted as the murderer incarnate.
The cruelty does not stop in the Cape, even General De la Rey’s victory over Lord Methuen’s column at Tweebosch on the 7th of March 1902 in the Transvaal at the end of the war is marred by war crimes. Tweebosch is famous because of General De la Rey’s compassionate and kind treatment of the wounded Lord Methuen and saving his life. What is not recorded at the Battle of Tweebosch in the narrative is the killing spree De la Rey’s commando members go on, as they execute about 30 unarmed Black wagon drivers and servants in service of the British column as well as black and Indian soldiers having surrendered. The testimony of the executions by survivors recently found in WO 108-117 in the UK’s National Archives give a unique and harrowing insight:
Here are some quotes on the killings of that day:
“…the whole Indian and Kaffir establishment of the F.V.H. (Field Veterinary Hospital … One Farrier Sergeant of the Indian Native Cavalry and two Indian Veterinary Assistants (men carrying no arms) were ruthlessly shot dead after the surrender, and nine Hospital Kaffirs were either killed in action or murdered later.”
(British Cavalry – Regimental History).
The Boers whom I met on the 8th instantly admitted that their men had deliberately shot down the transport Natives with a view, they asserted, of deterring others from enlisting in our services”.
Captain W.A. Tilney.
“I saw four Cape boys, unarmed and dismounted, come towards the Boers with their hands up. They were shot dead”.
Trooper C.J.J. Van Rensberg
“I saw a young Native boy riding a horse and leading another. He was unarmed. A Boer road up to him and told him to dismount. No sooner had he done so than the Boers shot him in the back of the head and killed him”.
Corporal H. Christopher
These testimony’s go on, there are loads – but its enough to get the point.
Even one of the most biased Republican Historians – Thomas Pakenham, has to acknowledge the slaughter of Blacks in the Transvaal by Republicans under the Command of Jan Smuts when he notes:
“When Jan Smuts’ commando fell on the native village at Modderfontein, for example, they butchered the 200 or so black inhabitants and left their bodies strewn around, unburied.”
The American General, William Tecumseh Sherman said something very relevant to war generally and the Boer War specifically – he said:
“War is cruelty. There is no use trying to reform it. The crueller it is, the sooner it will be over”.
General Sherman
One can easily see where the origins of the “you reap what you sow” ethos which enters into latter British mindsets when dealing with the Boer Republican refugees and their properties – a “hardening of attitudes” as it is often termed in modern military speak. Not even 40 years later, a ‘Rhodesian’ Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris would really crystallise this type of military sentiment to justify his carpet bombing of German civilians in World War 2 when he quoted Horsea 8:7 and said:
“They sowed the wind and now they are going to reap the whirlwind.”
Also, to General Sherman’s point, the British fight the Boer’s guerrilla phase of the war with such intensity, the commitment of massive resources (8,000 blockhouses alone) and tens of thousands combatants – that the Guerrilla Phase of the Boer War is the shortest fought guerrilla war in the history of modern guerrilla warfare – it’s over in short time – less than 2 years (modern guerrilla warfare of this nature war lasts an average of 9 years), and here’s an uncomfortable fact, it’s over with the least trauma to the general population such warfare has traditionally invokes (then and now) – believe it or not.
The simple truth is the scale of destruction to property, lives and livelihoods is massive on both sides of the fence, so much so its almost impossible to separate the destruction initiated by the Boers and that initiated by the British given its scale – whole sections of the country in Boer territories destroyed and whole sections in British territories were also destroyed – thousands of Boer farms and entire British cities, farms, towns and mission stations … all destroyed.
To give an idea of the scale facing Milner at the end of the war, in trying to recover South Africa economically and deal with repatriations. There is the re-settlement of some 150,000 white civilians involved (mainly Boers) and about 50,000 impecunious white “foreigners” (mainly British) who had been employed on the Witwatersrand, and then there is approximately one million displaced and unemployed “Bantu” (read that again – 1,000,000 Black refugees).
Post war, Boers outside a compensation and repatriation tent. Colourised by Jenny B (insert Lord Milner).
Milner’s repatriation, economic reforms and compensations were naturally decried by latter day Afrikaner nationalists as insufficient – and that’s because they only focused on the Boers’ compensation and nobody else in the bigger picture. Milner, as a studious and rather bull-headed administrator, felt he did a decent enough job given the challenges he faced – and even some latter day economic historians would agree with him. But let’s face it – the community that come off worse, by a miracle mile, were the “Bantu”.
In Conclusion
This is not to say “tit for tat” – the Boers started it first bla … bla … bla! That would be disingenuous and disrespectful to their memory and that’s not the point of this missive – the point is to remind people who are hidebound by a rather poor Christian Nationalist education and blinkered by identity politics – that in war there are no saints, war is nasty, it’s cruel, there are never really any ‘winners’ in war, nothing happens in a vacuum – and in war the truth is always the first victim.
The idea that the white Boer civilians were the unwitting victims in this entire saga, that they are the only real community to really have suffered the ravages of this war at the hands of the British is completely unhinged, baseless and untrue. This sentiment rings more true to politicking and identity politics initiated by the Nationalists than it does to any historical fact.
In truth, both the Boers and the British are equally responsible for waging war, both can be held to account for the resultant civilian crisis that war inevitably produces and all the carnage that follows that, and very importantly they are both equally cruel … and citizens from all communities were traumatised, there is no clear ‘murderous villain’ … there never is in war.
Written and researched by Peter Dickens
References:
Complete history of the South African War: in 1899-1902 By F. T. Stevens. Published 1903.
The Boer Invasion of Natal : Clement Horner Stott. Published 1900.
Leopold Charles Maurice Stennett Amery “The Second Boer War – The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902” – Volumes 1 to 7.
History of the war in South Africa 1899-1902. By Maj. General Sir Frederick Maurice and staff. Volumes 1 to 4, published 1906
The Boer War: By Thomas Pakenham – re-published version, 1st October 1991.
Black People and the South African War 1899-1902. By Peter Warwick. Published 1983.
The Battle of Magersfontein – Victory and Defeat on the South African Veld, 10-12 December 1899. Published 2023. By Dr. Garth Benneyworth.
Kruger’s War – the truth behind the myths of the Boer War: By Chris Ash, BSc FRGS FRHistS, published 2014.
A History of the British Cavalry, 1816-1919, Vol.4, p.270
Commando – By Deneys Reitz, published 1929
Work or Starve - Black concentration camps and forced labour camps in South Africa: 1901 – 1902, By Dr. Garth Benneyworth. Published 2024 by The War Museum of the Boer Republics.
Correspondence and fact checking with Dr. Garth Benneyworth, Boer War historian – Sol Plaatjies University, Kimberley – February 2024.
A tool for modernisation? The Boer concentration camps of the South African War, 1900-1902. By Dr Elizabeth van Heyningen – Department of Historical Studies, University of Cape Town, 2010 South African Journal of Science.
Correspondence and fact checking with Chris Ash, BSc FRGS FRHistS, Boer War historian, Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society for The Boer War Atlas – February 2024.
Correspondence to The Observation Post on Boer War Repatriation and Compensation – Jan 2024. By Gordon Mackinlay.
Correspondence and fact checking with Boer War historian – Robin Smith, Feb 2024.
With thanks to:
Colorised images on the mast-head thanks to Allan Wood (Kitchener) and Jenny B (de Wet)
Colourised images used with great thanks to both Jennifer Bosch and Tinus le Roux.
Often on Boer war social media appreciation sites, and even on simple things like wikipedia we see this statement “it took 500,000 British to defeat 20,000 Boers” – the much-touted ratio in this type of media is that the Boers were outnumbered 25 to 1, at a staggering disadvantage during The South African War 1899-1902 a.k.a Boer War 2.
The story goes that these plucky Boers held the mighty British empire at bay. Now that’s a figure designed to paint the Boer fighter as some sort of super-man and the British military as bumbling, monolithic and ineffective. But the truth is far from this and this figure is completely erroneous designed to drive Afrikaner nationalist political rhetoric – it has nothing to do with actual numbers on the ground.
This is why I love economic history and not political history – economic history speaks the raw numbers, the statistics – the unassailable mathematical facts, and it tends to drive great holes into the ‘political’ history and its inherit political rhetoric – its the point when the facts talk and the bull walks.
Let the numbers speak!
Now, here’s the truth – at no point in Boer war 2 were there ever 500,000 British troops in South Africa as boots on the ground at any one point in time – in total, over the course of the war the British called up 550,000 men – that bit is true, yes. HOWEVER the British rotated their Regiments in and out of South Africa on ‘tours of duty’ – never really sending a full regiment into the operational theatre at once, retaining many at home and in their other colonies around the world. The “high water mark” i.e., the maximum number of British Troops in South Africa at any one point in time is 230,000 men. Even pro-Boer chronologies like that of Pieter Cloete’s Boer War facts and figures reluctantly has to admit this fact.
This high-water mark of 230,000 (including African Auxiliaries) is only peaked briefly during the late Guerrilla Phase of the war – and at least 50,000 of these troops are being used to man the rather extensive blockhouse defence system stretching from the top to bottom and side to side across the whole of South Africa (as referenced by Simon C. Green in his Blockhouses of the Boer War) – over thousands of kilometres both ways. On average during the Guerrilla Phase of the war – September 1900 to April 1902, the British enjoy 190,000 troops on the ground.
But let’s stick to the high-water marks for a proper account – the high water for the Boer forces, total Republican forces strength is 87,365 men – including 21,043 burghers who add onto the original ZAR and OFS Commando call-up later (initial call-up is 48,216), the statutory Boer forces (2,686), foreign volunteers (2,120) and Cape Rebels (13,300).
The Boer figure is possibly higher if we add African auxiliaries and rear echelon support – the “tooth to tail” non-combatant ratio – which is accounted in the British numbers in terms of administrators, doctors, pharmacists and medics, batmen, chefs, farriers, holsters, labourers, wagon drivers etc. but NOT in the Boer numbers as this would start to add women, agteryers, servants and farm hands as people acting in Boer combat supporting roles in a non-combatant capacity.
That means a conservative ratio between Brit and Boer at the high-water marks = 230,000 Brits and 87,300 Boers – a ratio of 3:1 – total Imperial forces versus total republican forces (sans the tooth to tail ratio in the Boer number). It’s a far cry from the emotionally charged and erroneously touted figure of 25:1.
Consider the size of the Republican Forces at the beginning of Boer War 2, versus that of the British. At the Boer declaration of war on the 11th October 1899 when the Boers invade sovereign British territories: The total British Forces in the field = 15,300 men. Total Boer forces assembled to attack = 48,216 men. The ratio is heavily in favour of the Boers – Boer Forces outnumber the British 3 to 1.
“On the high seas” as at the 11th October 1899 are an additional 7,418 British Troops on their way to South Africa from India and Australia – called up to bolster an inadequate British force strength in the event of war. Even with their arrival at the end of October 1899 (after the war has been declared and the Boer invasions commence) bringing the British number up to 22,708 – British Forces are still woefully inadequate, and the invading Boer Forces still outnumber them 2 to 1.
If we want to account Boer War 2 properly and view it with balance, it would be correct and very true to say at the beginning of the war the Boers outnumber the Brits 3:1 – as the war progresses there is a juxtaposing of numbers (they start to match capability in numbers from February 1900) … and by the end of war the Brits account 190,000 troops in country, Boers account 24,300 left in the field and 47,300 POW in the bag (factoring out the ‘Hensoppers’ and ‘joiners’ and factoring in the Cape Rebel POW) = 71,600 or a 3:1 ratio – Brits outnumber Boers, a reversal of the advantageous 3:1 ratio the Boers enjoyed at the start of the war.
Let the doctrine speak!
In terms of military doctrine, the above estimation on a 3:1 ratio is about right given Boer War 2 is fought in two distinctive phases, the Conventional warfare Phase (Oct 1899 to August 1900) and the Guerrilla warfare phase (September 1900 to May 1902) – to invade the British territory in Oct 1899 the Boers need a 3 to 1 advantage to be successful … and to counter attack and hold the Boer territory the British need to be at a 3 to 1 advantage – and even by Guerrilla Warfare standards and the doctrine used to fight one, this number is very low. Consider the following:
American Brigadier-General Nelson Miles was put in charge of hunting down Geronimo and his followers in April 1886. Miles commanded 5,600 troops deemed necessary to find and destroy Geronimo and his 24 warriors. In Malaya in 1950 it took 200,000 British, Australian and allied troops to defeat 5,000 Communist guerrillas. In Ireland over the 30-year course of ‘the troubles’ a total of 300,000 British troops were used to contain 10,000 IRA guerrillas. Closer to home, so the arm chair Boer war generals get this – over the course of the Angolan Border War (1966-1988) and the ‘Struggle’ (1960-1994) the SADF would call up 650,000 conscripts and then hold them in reserve – MK and other non-statutory force ‘guerrillas’ at their high water mark in 1990 only have 40,000.
The modern-day theoretical ratio of counter-insurgency forces to guerrillas needed to defeat an insurgent/guerrilla campaign is 10:1. In 2007, the US Department of Defence produced a document entitled Handbook on Counter Insurgency which quotes this as the rule-of-thumb ratio for all such operations – and that is even with the advent of modern technology in warfare fighting mere insurgents or guerrillas. Little wonder that General David Petraeus needed 180,000 coalition force troops (the same size as the full invasion force) on the ground in 2007 just to deal with the Iraqi guerrilla “surge” spearheaded by an insignificant but determined bunch of suicide bombers.
Just kidding!
The idea that it took half a million British troops to subdue a couple of thousand boers is very erroneous .. the old ‘super’ Afrikaner joke – on witnessing an advancing British ‘rooineck’ column a Boer kid asks his Dad “how many Boers are we Dad? – Answer “50 son”, and “how many British Dad?” – Answer “10,000 son”. Punchline … “Dad, does this mean we’re going to finish late again?” A joke that re-appears in different formats in countless forums, and it’s as funny as it’s statistically false and fantastical.
Written and Researched by Peter Dickens
References – all quoted statistics
Leopold Charles Maurice Stennett Amery “The Second Boer War – The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902” – Volumes 1 to 7.
History of the war in South Africa 1899-1902. By Maj. General Sir Frederick Maurice and staff. Volumes 1 to 4, published 1906
The Anglo-Boer war: A chronology. By Cloete, Pieter G
Anglo-Boer War Blockhouses – a Field Guide by Simon C. Green, fact checking and correspondence – 2023.
The Boer War: By Thomas Pakenham – re-published version, 1st October 1991.
Correspondence and interviews with Dr. Garth Bennyworth, Boer War historian – Sol Plaatjies University, Kimberley – 2023.
Correspondence on fact checking British doctrine with Chris Ash, BSc FRGS FRHistS, 2023 – Boer War historian, Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society.
Kruger’s War – the truth behind the myths of the Boer War: By Chris Ash, published 2014.
The path to the South African War (1899-1902) i.e. Boer War 2 is often misunderstood – so let’s look at the actual military numbers and the mission creep. Very often on Boer War social media appreciation sites you hear this old myth “the British intended to invade the Boer Republics and built up their forces on the borders to do so”. This build-up of British invasion forces then prompts the Boers to make “a pre-emptive strike” to “take up forward defensive positions” on British territory. The Boers didn’t start the war see! They merely forestalled the inevitable warmonger, none other than the greedy British – get it?
Problem is “I don’t get it”, my training as an Economic Historian will always lead me to look at the statistics and the ‘cold facts’ to make comparisons and conclusions, my training as a military officer will also always lead me to the science of military doctrine in analysing military history, and not a ‘mainstream’ historian’s interpretation of it. As to above assertions on invasion body troop strengths and pre-emptive strikes, let me be upfront – it’s all bunk, a complete myth and it not supported by the historical facts of the day, nor is it supported by military doctrine (then and now) and the cold hard facts – the statistics, ratios and numbers certainly don’t support it . This is again where ‘economic history’ starts to rip ‘political’ history apart, the numbers – the hard facts (measurable and accurate) start to talk and the political bollocks start to walk, and here’s how.
Looking at the numbers
So, here the numbers to the start of the Boer War on the 11th October 1899 when the Boers invade sovereign British territories:
31st July 1899 – Total British Forces in the Cape Colony, Natal, Rhodesia, and Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Protectorates = Total 8,803 men. 1st August 1899 to 11th October 1899, additional British Forces arrive = Total 6,500 men
Total British Forces in the field as at 11th October 1899 = 15,300 men
27th September 1899 – Transvaal Mobilises Forces = 26,871 men 3rd October 1899 – Free State mobilisers Forces = 21,345 men
Total Boer Forces in the field as at 11th October 1899 = 48,216 men.
The Boer forces at the commencement of hostilities when they declare war against Britain are heavily in their favour = Boer Forces outnumber the British 3 to 1.
“On the high seas” as at the 11th October 1899 are an additional 7,418 British Troops on their way to South Africa – called up to bolster an inadequate British force strength in the event of war.
Even with their arrival at the end of October 1899 (after the war has been declared) bringing the British number up to 22,708 – British Forces are still woefully inadequate, and the invading Boer Forces still outnumber them 2 to 1.
There are numerous quotes and historic references which prove the British had no intention of ‘invading’ the Boer Republics, these always result in a slinging match whilst Boer romantics profess to intelligence reports as proof positive of a plan of attack. Like any military with a military academy and a war office, a scenario plan was devised by the British, its called ‘The War Office Plan’ and it was developed in 1886 – it outlines that should the British invade the ZAR, a full Army Corps (invasion force) would assemble at Colesberg and invade the underbelly of the OFS on their way to the ZAR, avoiding mountainous defences completely and just move up the spine of South Africa over flat and easy terrain (more or less the route of the N1 today).
In reality the British made no actual invasion plans, scenario ‘top draw’ plan yes, actual plans a ‘campaign plan’ with start lines showing troop strengths, regiments and units, timelines and objectives – no, that plan doesn’t exist – an entire Parliamentary commission and Royal inquest was made in 1902 after the war ended, and they established that “no plan for campaign ever existed for operations in South Africa” (that they meant an actual operational plan), but you can put all that aside and let’s just look at the numbers.
There is simply no way, that the British intended to ‘invade’ with a force of only 22,700 troops – going up against a 40,000 strong invading Republican Boer army – just no way. Anyone whose served in the military and understands military doctrines knows, you need twice the numbers of the opponent, at least 2:1 (ideally more) before commencing with an invasion. That means Britain would have needed at least 80,000 troops (in excess of an Army Corps) in theatre before it posed any threat as an ‘invasion’ Force. It had nowhere near those numbers, and nor did it intend to have those numbers. In truth – the Boer Army, who had twice the numbers of the British Army, posed far more of an ‘invasion’ threat – and that’s exactly what they did.
Also, so you can see how the ‘numbers’ and the ‘actual’ history correlate – Lord Milner writes to Her Majesty’s government and states that Kruger is unmovable on issues pertaining the Franchise, he warns them that the ZAR is gearing for an invasion of the British Colonies with the call-up of troops and purchase of munitions, and the purchase of state of the art rifles and artillery pieces – one million Mauser rounds alone arrive in Port Elizabeth as early as the 8th July (ordered around April 1899) destined for the Republics (well before the ‘impasse’ between Milner and Kruger).
He implores the British to send a sizeable force – a full “Army Corps” – of about 35,000 troops to bolster the small garrison forces in South Africa, warning them invasion of British colonies is inevitable.
The British War Office in London respond to Milner, they maintain that the ZAR was simply not bold enough to invade British sovereign territory, and on the remote chance that should an invasion take place, it would be a “farmers army” and could be held back by professional soldiers.
The war office also does not want to provoke a flammable situation by sending a full Army Corps. So, they bolster the garrison forces with only 6,500 men, including colonial ‘citizen force’ units mustered from the local populations – and an additional 7,400 men “on their way” from India – the doctrine again is that even though they are outnumbered they should be able to ‘hold the line’ long enough for an expeditionary ‘Army Corps’ to arrive. The war office estimates a ‘Army Corps’ will take four months to muster and would require a £1 million investment upfront – so not necessary unless there is an absolute and proven military threat.
The eve of war
By the end of September and the beginning of October 1899, Boer forces are amassing primarily at Laing’s neck on the Natal border and the ultimatum agreed by the Boers on the 27th September indicates that war is inevitable, presented by the 7th October 1899 to the British (4 days before they invade sovereign British territories), last minute attempts by Afrikaner Bondsmen in the Cape to get Kruger to “step-down” from his position fail, so too do last minute attempts by members of his own Raad and by his young appointed negotiator Jan Smuts in his final negotiations with Greene, even Steyn in the OFS is urged to get the ZAR to ‘step down’ – whilst all urging the ZAR to “step-down” – Kruger’s unbending demand that the 5 year ‘uitlander’ franchise would only come if the British tore up the 1884 London Convention completely and withdraw all her Suzerainty rights to the region, rights which have been in place since 1877 – this is now deemed a ‘step too far’ as it substantially compromised British paramountcy in the region. Kruger’s position remaining unchanged from the beginning of negotiations in June 1899 in Bloemfontein to the end – only with a cat and mouse game promising limited reforms and then withdrawing them in-between (more on this in an Observation Post called “for suzerainty sakes” as most people don’t understand the real Casus Belli of the war).
Kruger is superstitious, paranoid and impatient and doesn’t even wait for the presentation of the ultimatum to the British or the ultimatum’s deadline – he sees tiny troop movements of small garrison forces as the prelude of an invasion, albeit the British are by no means capitalised for such an invasion – they have not even called up their Army Corps at this point. But Kruger is on the warpath. On the same day the ultimatum is drafted – 27th September 1899 – D Day minus 14 days – Kruger telegraphed to Steyn:
“English troops already at Dundee and Biggarsberg, and will probably take up all the best positions unless we act at once. Executive Council unanimous that commando order should be issued to-day. We beg you will also call out your burghers. As war is unavoidable we must act at once, and strongly. The longer we wait the more innocent blood will be shed through our delay. We don’t intend to have Chamberlain’s note, with your amendments re Convention, telegraphed to you till burghers are at or near borders, and till you have been informed that the English Government has acted contrary to last part thereof. “We are justified in crossing border. Plan of campaign follows.”
27th September 1899 – D Day minus 14 days – Kruger telegraphed to Steyn again (same day again):
“Burghers will be in position in our territory near Laing’s Nek on Friday morning 5 a.m. All other burghers being called up to follow as soon as possible. Kock leaves with two cannons tomorrow evening, also big guns for Laing’s Nek. Will Free State then also be in position? Volksraad meets seven this evening. Can you reply by then? Plan campaign follows.”
On the 29th September 1899 – D Day minus 12 days – Kruger telegraph to Steyn:
“Our burghers going to hold positions on border to prevent enemy getting hold of them. You still seem to think of peace, but I consider it impossible. I am strongly of opinion that your people ought also to go to border to take positions. You think Chamberlain is leading us into a trap, but if we wait longer our cause may be hopelessly lost and that would be our trap.
President Steyn (left) and President Kruger (right) colour by Tinus le Roux and Jenny B.
In the final minute, with war inevitable and Boers amassing on the border to invade – the British Parliament approves the request to raise the ‘Army Corps’ as a deterrent against Boer aggression and they only start calling up their reserves from the 7th October 1899 – the Boers are already mobilised and its 4 days before the Boers invade. It’s too late, this force would only be arriving in critical mass in the South African theatre by mid January 1900.
In the end, both ends of the British argument are 100% correct. Milner is 100% correct, the ZAR is a significant destabiliser in the area with territorial ambitions over Swaziland – which they annex, Rhodesia (the Adendorff trek and the Matabeleland concession) and Zululand for access to a Natal based seaport at St Lucia. President Steyn in the OFS also has territorial ambitions over Griqualand and the diamond fields in the Cape Colony.
Afrikaner Bondsmen and their supporters, men like Smuts, Botha, Hofmeyr and Reitz are all promoting the idea of a unitary Afrikaner Republic stretching from the Zambezi to the Cape. Both Boer preachers and politicians are all talking war and the removal of British influence from the entire region altogether (and Milner makes specific note of this). The two Republics are tooling up for war and the ZAR is commissioning and building massive defensive forts and buying advanced state of the art German and French siege guns. Vast stores of smokeless ammunition is been landed, and 40,000 brand new state of the art German Mauser rifles have landed – enough to arm nearly every Boer with not just one but two rifles. President Steyn has signed President Kruger’s long awaited “aggression pact” between the OFS and the ZAR on the 22nd March 1897 which locks the OFS into war even if the ZAR feels “threatened”. Simply put, the ‘winds of war are blowing’.
The purpose for going to war can best be read in the final statements made by the main protagonists.
Francis Reitz, now acting as the ZAR’s state secretary after sending the final Boer ultimatum, concludes his speech on the eve of war with the following:
“…. from Slagter’s Nek to Laing’s Nek, from the Pretoria Convention to the Bloemfontein Conference, they haveever been the treaty-breakers and robbers. The diamond fields of Kimberley and the beautiful land of Natal were robbed from us, and now they want the goldfields of the Witwatersrand … Brother AfrikanersI The day is at hand on which great deeds are expected of us – War has broken out ! What is it to be ?A wasted and enslaved South Africa or – a Free, United South Africa?”
So, for Francis Reitz accuses the British of breaching the spirit of Transvaal’s Suzerainty, accuses them of stealing Natal and Griqualand and a threat to Boer paramountcy in the region – calling for a ‘United South Africa’ (I.e. the Afrikaner Bond’s ‘Zambezi to the Cape under a Boer hegemony’ objective).
The desire of the Boers and the desire of the British that South Africa fall under their respective paramountcy and hegemony is a clash of interests between Boer Imperial and British imperial desires on territorial expansion and control – and this is the conclusion reached by just about every Boer War historian worth his salt as the basic underlying cause of the war, it’s the Casus Belli.
This paramountcy and desire for regional control by Boer and Brit respectively is most adequately wrapped up by Jan Smuts’ final word on the matter, when on the eve of war writes:
The aim of the war is to establish “a United South Africa, of one of the great empires (rijken) of the world… an Afrikaans republic in South Africa stretching from Table Bay to the Zambesi”.
On the British front, Joseph Chamberlain concludes his speech to Parliament on the eve of war with the following:
“… we are at war now because the oligarchy at Pretoria … has persistently pursued, from the very day of the signing of the Convention of 1881 down to now, a policy which tended to the evasion of its obligations; a policy by which it has broken its promises; by which it has placed, gradually, but surely, British subjects in the Transvaal in a position of distinct inferiority; by which it has conspired against and undermined the suzerainty, the paramountcy which belongs to Great Britain.”
So – for Chamberlain, the spirit and agreement of the Transvaal’s Suzerainty (its status as a vassal state as prescribed by the Pretoria and London conventions) has been breached – a breach of treaty – and in so a threat to British paramountcy in the region.
The British War Office is also 100% right, they’ve matched the ‘risk’ perfectly, in terms of military doctrine they augment their forces just enough to prevent total calamity, and its seen upfront in the invasions when these small bordering garrison forces – of professional officers and men, completely outnumbered in Ladysmith, Kimberley, Kuruman and Mafeking make quick work of the invading Boers and stop them in their tracks – on the 14th October 1899 the Boer attack on Mafeking is effectively driven off, and on the 20th October the British forces in Natal are successful at the Battle of Talana Hill and the next day on the 21st October they are successful again at the Battle of Elandslaagte .
On the 25th October the second Boer assault on Mafeking is driven off and on the 9th November, the Boer assault on Ladysmith is effectively driven off (albeit with heavy losses), the Boers then opt to put the town to siege. The siege of Kimberley starts in earnest on the 4th November with the British defenders firmly dug in, the Boers opt to shelling the town from a safe distance in the hope they capitulate. On the 13th November the Boer attack on Kuruman is successfully driven off and the Boers opt to put it that town to siege in addition.
The Pre-emptive strike and forward defences myth
As to a “pre-emptive strike” and “invading for the purposes setting up forward defensives” argument to forestall an inevitable British invasion so often found on Boer war appreciation sites – this is possibly the most stupid assertion and myth generated around Boer War 2 … ever, and for the following reasons:
Upfront, a ‘pre-emptive strike’ is not the plan, never is the plan. These modern-day Boer Romantics ‘couch commanders’ conveniently ignore people like the ZAR commander in chief, Piet Joubert – who states:
“The master plan was to advance rapidly on Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London and Durban”
Jan Smuts in his memoirs of the war refers to his direct planning to take the Port of Natal (Durban) in a rapid advance – a “Blitzkreig’ strategy.
In fact, Jan Smuts is the only man with a plan. His plan is outlined, supposedly whilst he was sick in bed. It was presented to the ZAR raad (council) in a secret session and unanimously adopted. It’s a very specific plan, it is summed up by Smuts himself who said the plan was to invade Natal from Laing’s Neck and he does on;
“The republics must get the better of the English troops from the start … by taking the offensive and doing it before the British force in SA is markedly strengthened …. the capture of Natal by a Boer force together with the cutting of the railway between the Cape Colony and Rhodesia … will cause a shaking of the Empire”.
The idea of cutting the railway line between the Cape and Rhodesia is to create an uprising of Afrikaner support in the Cape Colony for the Boer Republic cause, Smuts in his account is very reliant on this happening, he’s an ex-Cape Afrikaner Bondsman, the Afrikaners in the Cape are the majority population – the idea of taking the Cape Colony would fail if they do not rise in support. Smuts’ objective through these actions – in Natal and the Cape Colony – is to “shake up” the paramountcy and in so force better terms with the British with a peace settlement early on … not to get into a protracted and costly war, and to do all this before any sort of “army force” or “expeditionary force” can be raised in the UK – an early concept of “shock and awe” and “blitzkrieg” is Smuts’ basic military plan. Smuts’ plan is also an early form of “manoeuvre” warfare – using the Clausewitzian concept (developed after the Napoleonic wars) – using superior and simultaneous advances along “exterior” lines (a concentration in space) on an enemy using “interior” lines (a concentration of time) of communication and supply. Smuts would also apply this later when he is tasked with forming the Union Defence Force in 1910.
Smuts’ offensive plan also does not propose laying anything to siege, surrounding and laying either Ladysmith, Kimberley or Mafeking is avoided entirely, he is far more concerned with speed and a quick win before Britain can reinforce anything – especially Natal and Durban which Smuts targets his ‘seat of war’. The rapid seizing of Durban whilst its relatively lightly defended is important to Smuts, without seizing it the British will be able to reinforce and counter-attack – so the taking of Durban will either make or break the plan.
Reference: General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa – D. Katz
So, here’s the Boer Republics’ offensive plan – in includes Smuts’ initial offensive plan and then a greater offensive offensive advance to Port Elizabeth so as to build on a Cape Afrikaner uprising and rebellion. At the start of hostilities on the 11th October 1899, according to Jan Smuts himself, the ZAR Commandant-General Piet Joubert merely had Smuts’ broad outline of the offensive plan in his hand, he had not given it any further thought – “no comprehensive war planning” had been done on how the strategic plan would be met by any planning on a tactical level or even on the operational level (contingency planning).
On launching the offensive, only then does the Boer leadership give thought to how they inited to meet Smuts’ strategic plan on a tactical level and operational level. They draw on inspiration from the first Anglo-Boer War, the Transvaal War of 1880 to 1881 i.e. Boer War 1, this war called for laying British garrisons around Pretoria to siege and then concentrating on using the natural mountain defences around Laing’s Neck on the ZAR/Natal border which squeezed the British ‘relief column’ making their way to relive the sieges onto a single road through the mountain defences – focusing them onto Majuba where the Boers enjoyed an outstanding victory. This reasoning had worked in 1881, no reason why it would not work in 1899.
So, as a defensive strategy to augment the offensive strategy, General Piet Joubert and the Boer leadership decide on laying siege to Kimberley, Mafeking (in the Northern Cape) and Ladysmith (in Natal) – their thinking is this would split the British forces who would then be focussed on relieving these border towns and their relief columns would have to follow singular roads and railway lines to get there, easy pickings for the Boers as they had done to them at Majuba – thereby weakening the British forces further and giving the Boer’s offensive strategy in Natal all the chance of success.
Important Note, as to military doctrine as follows;
“assuming a defensive posture does not win wars and a offensive strategy is essential for winning a war, defensive stances are a temporary measure allowing for an advantage to develop, which will eventually result in offensive action to secure combat success.”
Dr. D Katz’ ‘Jan Smuts and his First World War
Jan Smuts at this point is disillusioned with the Boer leadership’s planning, he feels this offensive and defensive plan is far too complicated and questions whether the Boers are capable of launching a plan of this magnitude. He even goes as far as calling General Piet Joubert “passé” and “hopelessly incompetent”.
The Boers however, initially follow exactly “the plan” in what they do. They advance from Laing’s Neck down the centre spine of Natal heading to Durban as planned, as they push into Natal the Boer Commanders telegram Kruger to say the “Vierkleur” would be soon flying over Durban. The ZAR Chief Justice Gegorowski boasted;
“the war will be over in a fortnight. We shall take Kimberley and Mafeking, and give the English such a beating in Natal that they will sue for peace”.
The general rally call amount the Boer soldiery is that will be “eating fish” in Durban, General Louis Botha convinced he will also be “eating bananas” in Durban. They also initially follow Smuts’ offensive plan in the Orange Free State, cutting the Cape Colony and Rhodesia railway line in the first action of the war at Kraaipan on the 12th October 1899.
Their mistake, they are too cautious and instead of using their much-promoted advantage – mobility, they err on a cautious and slow advance. The plan, as Smuts predicted is overcomplicated, and in so far as intending to split the British forces between the Northern Cape and Natal, the decision to put Kimberley and Mafeking to siege in addition to the offensive plan as a defensive plan also splits the Boer forces and weakens their offensive capability, from a ‘Blitzkreig’ (lightning mobility war) perspective they are unable to put their maximum effort behind their ‘schwerpunkt’ (heavy, focus – or centre point) which is the rapid invasion of Natal and the taking of Durban. The Boers also compromise their mobility and resources in Natal when they start to lay Ladysmith to siege instead of rapidly advancing to Durban.
In following “the plan” – the ‘high water marks’ of the invasions i.e., where they ultimately land up. In the Natal invasion it’s just 60 kilometres north of Pietermaritzburg – Botha stops at Mooi River, this invasion has no reference to the “defence plan” whatsoever (in fact it’s the opposite), and the Boers do not take up very effective “defensive positions” to stop any sort of mythical British invasion – the positions they take up are far worse than the positions they were in before they invaded. Any military person will tell you that Rivers and Mountain Ranges make for the most formidable defences – and in the case of the Boer Republics – the Orange River, Vaal River and Drakensberg are perfect defences – no need to invade anyone, investing in these border defences would have been the logical military doctrine, and far more effective as to a “defensive strategy” without initiating a war and the risk that involves.
Look at it from the perspective of military doctrine, the Boer “start line” is Volksrust on the border near Laing’s Neck – a most formidable defence position on the border of Natal and the “gateway” to both the ZAR and Natal, home to Majuba mountain and Laing’s neck, where the British were so soundly beaten by the Boers in 1881 – it’s a proven natural defence and one which the British could not breach just 18 years earlier.
As to continuing a deep advance (remember the offensive plan is to invade), after they are confronted by the British in the field at Talana outside Dundee on the 20th October 1899 (D Day plus 8) – the Boers are initially defeated in two pitched battles, the Boers are held up losing advantage daily. After winning the battle at Nicolson’s Neck the Boers manage to advance another 70 kilometres to Ladysmith reaching it on the 2nd November (D Day plus 24 days) – now they are now 190 kilometres into their advance from their start line on the border and nearly a month into their invasion campaign.
So, if your strategy is only one of defence – why leave such a formidable defence and find something else? Then as to the so called amassed “British threat on the border” – the invasion force overall Commander, General Piet Joubert is joined by General de Kock from the OFS and General Erasmus and they advance from their start line for nearly 120 kilometres deep into Natal territory before they meet any significant British forces or resistance whatsoever – the British are nowhere near the “border” and “poised” to invade anything. The British have rather inadvisably split their forces between Dundee and Ladysmith. Extending military supply lines and logistics support for 120 kilometres in 1899 using wagons and horses to initiate a “pre-emptive” strike aimed at the British in Dundee is pure Hollywood, wishful thinking, it has nothing to do with military doctrine or sound military planning – or even the Boer’s plan for what it is.
The Boer invasion of Natal as mapped.
General Louis Botha then extends the advance from Ladysmith all the way to Mooi River on the 22nd November 1899 – 100 Km away from Ladysmith and 60 km from Pietermaritzburg and now a staggering 290 km from their start line. That’s the length of the “supply” line for the Boers – their “high water” mark. No military commander in his right mind sets up a “defensive position” with a near 300 km long supply line running through enemy territory intended to support ‘defences’ – no military commander in 1899 advances near 300 km on horseback for a pre-emptive strike either – air warfare has not been invented yet and even by today’s standards a ground force invasion 300 km into enemy territory is never considered by any commander as a mere “strike” – pre-emptive or otherwise.
The Boer high-water mark is only obtained by the 22nd November – D Day plus 43 days – now having been significantly compromised on mobility and speed. Both HMS Terrible and HMS Powerful had arrived in Durban port by the 6th November 1899, either one of these two Battle Cruisers had more fire power on board than the entire Boer invading armies combined – a Battle Cruiser defending a port from mounted infantryman on horseback is no match. The Royal Navy is Britain’s senior service and it has at its disposal the very best of all their resources and commanders, defending their ports is what the Royal Navy does best, they are very good at it.
HMS Terrible (Left) and HMS Powerful (Right)
The Boer invasion falters, it fails because they had lost their only significant advantage – mobility, aggression and speed gives way to cautiousness, they chose resource draining static warfare instead – sieges and invest into them instead, losing valuable days and sacrificing their “Blitzkreig” offensive plan altogether.
With Botha’s objective of “eating bananas in Durban” now completely dashed, General Botha has no choice but to do what countless military commanders before and after him have done when an invasion fails – and beat a retreat, creating what are known in the military as “defensive “boxes” as you go along, the idea is to slow the enemy’s counter attack down until you can “join” with more friendly forces and consolidate – which he initially successfully does just north of the high water mark at Willow Grange on 23rd November 1899 and then further north at his next “box” at Colenso on 15th December 1899. He finally settles further north on the Tugela heights as his next defensive box, having now retreated for 80 Km, however he loses this pivotal battle and his final defensive box to the British on the 27th February 1900 (to see a defensive box retreat in action in a more recent war involving South African Commanders – see “Gazala Gallop” in WW2).
On the western front, the Boers are able to invade the arid and sparsely populated northern Cape meeting no real resistance from any British forces – as none are stationed there in any numbers – the Boers end their high water mark at the border with German South West Africa – this has more to do with the strategic imperative of opening up a sea route and port access via Walvis Bay and linking up with a “friendly state” for the purposes of supply than it does with any offensive or defensive plan offered by the Boer command. It certainly has nothing to do with a ‘pre-emptive’ strike.
On other lesser known fronts
If there is any semblance of logic in invading the Cape and Natal colonies for the purposes of establishing forward defences only, there is absolutely no logic in the Boer invasions of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Bechuanaland (Botswana) to suggest invading for purposes of defending – or even a ‘pre-emptive’ strike – the tiny nominal British Police forces in both these countries are no invasion threat whatsoever, and all the invasion of the Bechuanaland Kingdom does is bring the Tswana into the war as a belligerent all on their own, and the Tswana in their own right decimate the invading Boer Kommando and its laager at Derdepoort on the 25th November 1899. The small BSAP (British South African Police) base consisting of 450 British soldiers at Tuli in Rhodesia is however sufficiently professional to stop the 2,000 strong Boer Commando (now with a 1 to 4 advantage over the British) which had forged itself over the Limpopo River into Rhodesia at Rhodes Drift and other points. On the 2nd November 1899 the BSAP successfully halt them at Bryce’s Store and then repulse the invasion, although border incidents and Boer incursions into Rhodesia continue for some time – well into the Guerrilla phase.
Bryce’s Store in Rhodesia showing combat damage
What Defences?
Also, nobody has been able to point where these so called ‘invasion for the purpose of defensive positions’ are, there is no investment in resources or materials for effective defences, the Boer trenching system at the Modder River at the beginning of the war in November 1899 are proven ineffective.
The defensive earthworks that make up the trench line at defence cluster centre at Magtersfontein is merely a shallow trench converted from a natural ‘donga’ at the base of the koppie range (refer Dr. Garth Bennyworth’s groundbreaking work on this trench-line) – the British frontal attack on this trench-line is successfully repelled by the Boers on 11th December 1899 (Cronje’s only real tactical ‘victory’), but after regrouping and reinforcing the British are able to by-pass these defences completely in a highly mobile flanking manoeuvre.
No large defence fortifications are really invested in by the Boers in either Natal or the Cape Colony, and any idea of fortifying the Republics borders are in fact neglected in the drive to invade the British colonies instead.
It is only from the beginning of the new year in 1900, that the British have been able to muster anywhere near enough troops to land in Cape Town, that they are now matched 1:1 to the Boer army, and it is on these equal footings that the British counterattack, breakout and relieve of all the major sieges. From January 1900 to July 1900 they rout the Republican armies from their colonies, relieve their sieges and in two significant manoeuvres – the Battle of Paardeberg on the 27th February 1900 and Brandwater Basin (Surrender Hill) on 30th July 1900 they break the Republican forces critical mass to fight a conventional war – Brandwater and Paardeberg alone result in the capturing 8,300 men and the Boer Army is now simply just no longer matched to the British on a 1:1 ratio, it’s now in an inadequate position – with more British troops streaming in.
The 500,000 myth
Often on Boer war sites, and even on simple things like wiki we see this statement “it took 500,000 British to defeat 20,000 Boers” – the much-touted ratio in this type of media is that the Boers were outnumbered 25 to 1, at a staggering disadvantage, but these plucky Boers held the mighty British empire at bay. Now that’s a figure designed to paint the Boer fighter as some sort of super-man and the British military as bumbling, monolithic and ineffective. But the truth is far from this and this figure is completely erroneous designed to drive Afrikaner nationalist political rhetoric – it has nothing to do with actual numbers on the ground.
Now, here’s the truth – at no point in Boer war 2 were there ever 500,000 British troops in South Africa as boots on the ground at any one point in time – in total, over the course of the war the British called up 550,000 men – that bit is true, yes. HOWEVER the British rotated their Regiments in and out of South Africa on ‘tours of duty’ – never really sending a full regiment into the operational theatre at once, retaining many at home and in their other colonies around the world. The “high water mark” i.e., the maximum number of British Troops in South Africa at any one point in time is 230,000 men. Even pro-Boer chronologies like that of Pieter Cloete’s Boer War facts and figures reluctantly has to admit this fact.
This high-water mark of 230,000 (including African Auxiliaries) is only peaked briefly during the Guerrilla Phase of the war – and at least 50,000 of these troops are being used to man the rather extensive blockhouse defence system stretching from the top to bottom and side to side across the whole of South Africa (as referenced by Simon C. Green in his Blockhouses of the Boer War) – over thousands of kilometers. On average during the Guerrilla Phase of the war – September 1900 to April 1902, the British enjoy 190,000 troops on the ground.
But let’s stick to the high-water marks for a proper account – the high water for the Boer forces, total Boer War – including 6,000 burghers who add onto the original ZAR and OFS Commando call-up, the statutory Boer forces, foreign volunteers and Cape Rebels is 87,365 men (possibly higher if we add African auxiliaries and rear echelon support). That means a realistic ratio between Brit and Boer at the high-water mark is a 3:1 ratio – total Imperial forces versus total republican forces. It’s a far cry from the emotionally and erroneously touted figure of 25:1.
If we want to account Boer War 2 properly and view it with balance, it would be correct and very true to say at the beginning of the war the Boers outnumber the Brits 3:1 – as the war progresses there is a juxtaposing of numbers… and by the end of war the Brits account 190,000 troops in country, Boers account 24,300 left in the field and 47,300 POW in the bag (factoring out the ‘Hensoppers’ and ‘joiners’) = 71,600 or a 3:1 ratio – Brits outnumber Boers, a reversal of the ratio the Boers enjoyed at the start of the war.
In terms of military doctrine, the above estimation is about right – to invade the British territory the Boers need a 3 to 1 advantage to be successful and to counter attack and hold the Boer territory the British need to be at a 3 to 1 advantage – and even by Guerrilla Warfare standards and the doctrine used to fight one, this number is very low. Consider the following:
American Brigadier-General Nelson Miles was put in charge of hunting down Geronimo and his followers in April 1886. Miles commanded 5,600 troops deemed necessary to find and destroy Geronimo and his 24 warriors. In Malaya in 1950 it took 200,000 British, Australian and allied troops to defeat 5,000 Communist guerrillas. In Ireland over the 30-year course of ‘the troubles’ a total of 300,000 British troops were used to contain 10,000 IRA guerrillas. Closer to home, so the arm chair Boer war generals get this – over the course of the Angolan Border War (1966-1988) and the ‘Struggle’ (1960-1994) the SADF would call up 650,000 conscripts and then hold them in reserve – MK and other non-statutory force ‘guerrillas’ at their high water mark in 1990 only have 40,000.
The modern-day theoretical ratio of counter-insurgency forces to guerrillas needed to defeat an insurgent/guerrilla campaign is 10:1. In 2007, the US Department of Defence produced a document entitled Handbook on Counter Insurgency which quotes this as the rule-of-thumb ratio for all such operations – and that is even with the advent of modern technology in warfare fighting mere insurgents or guerrillas. Little wonder that General David Petraeus needed 180,000 coalition force troops (the same size as the full invasion force) on the ground in 2007 just to deal with the Iraqi guerrilla “surge” spearheaded by an insignificant but determined bunch of suicide bombers.
Boer bashing and other myths
Military doctrine and planning – to anyone whose served as officer in a military, is made up of three levels – the Strategic level, the Tactical level and the Operational level (when the metal starts flying around and the rubber hits the road). Military Generals and Commanders are judged by how they relate these three components – Strategic, Tactical and Operational. German Forces during WW2 are outstanding at the Operational level, completely dazzling the enemy concentrating overwhelming firepower at the “schwerpunkt” – the ‘heavy or focal’ point. They are equally outstanding at the tactical level, consider the masterful work of Field Marshal Rommel in North Africa. But they fail at the Strategic level by overextending their resources and pandering to wayward political ideologies and ambitions – and that loses them the war.
In reality, and it’s not trying to be nasty or ‘Boer bashing’ in any way shape or form. The Boers at the ground level are a committed, determined, resourceful and extremely brave bunch. They are scarifying much and like the Japanese in WW2 have a deeply ingrained cultural sense of honour.
But their commanders fail these brave men on all three key aspects of warfare. At an Operational level they are been asked to use a Commando system of mounted infantrymen – good for quelling poorly armed native rebellions – but absolutely hopeless when confronting a modern professional military force with modern weaponry using both combined arms and joint arms in which they are very well versed – and it quickly shows when the British are able to repel the invasions and stall them long enough to get reinforcements in whilst completely outnumbered. The British ORBATS (Order of Battle) are also far superior in just about every key engagement fought – that’s a fact.
It is often noted in all the Battle ORBATS – even the ones that mark the beginning of the war in the conventional phase, that the Boers are always “on the back-foot” always “outnumbered” almost always fighting against the odds – even for battles they win. However, this is again a function of poor leadership – at the beginning of the war the Boers outnumber the British significantly, but they don’t make use of the advantage – instead of driving their forces to their “schwerpunkt” and the “crucible” (Natal) – focusing on their plan and leveraging their only real advantage – mobility, they choose instead to divide their forces and sacrifice their mobility completely. Inexplicably they commit unusually large numbers of these highly mobile combatants and all their resources to siege warfare (static warfare) and not to defeating the enemy in the field (also a key military blunder) – high numbers of Boers sitting around and simply shelling three British towns from afar – safely out of range, and other than Ladysmith, making no real attempt to ‘take’ the town – and in doing this they allow the British to pour in all the reinforcements they need to counter-attack.
General Joubert – colour by Tinus le Roux
On a tactical level, General Joubert – tasked with the invasion of Natal fails on nearly every level, he fails to take tactical advantage of his “mobility” and fails to “take the fight to the enemy”, he fails to prevent the British forces at Dundee from “linking up” with their forces in Ladysmith (a key military blunder), and he fails to take Ladysmith when the opportunity is presented to him on a plate choosing a divine sense of providence instead (another key military blunder). By the time General Botha takes over the advantage is lost, and Buller is able to ultimately dislodge Botha at Tugela Heights with the innovative use of pontoons and manoeuvre and relive Ladysmith.
General Cronje, on a tactical level on the other front in the Cape also fails on every level, he fails in his initial defences, fails to move from his static defences in time, sacrificing mobility again and is outflanked and outmanoeuvred by a more “mobile” General French, Cronje then, for reasons known only to himself fails to link up with General de Wet and presents himself as a sitting duck to the British – the result is the 1st significant capitulation of Boer forces at Paardeberg on the 27th Feb 1900.
General Cronje – colour by Jenny B
General Christiaan de Wet also fares no better. De Wet’s attack on Wepener is strategically un-sound, committing resources to worthless target and he’s repeatedly beaten back by a gutsy small garrison force. His plan to defend the indefensible at the ‘Brandwater Basin’ is flawed and he too presents his forces as sitting ducks in a ‘pocket’ surrounded on all sides – and then he leaves his command post on the “first train out of Dodge” as the British close in on him and leaves his squabbling subordinates and troops to fight it out instead, the result is a complete breakdown of his command and the 2nd. significant capitulation of Boer forces at Surrender Hill on the 30th July 1900.
This surrender marks the start of the Boer’s loss of the war (it’s the beginning of the end), they are unable to recover it and the surrender marks the end of the Conventional War and chalks it up as a British Victory. Often put up on a pedestal as a “volksheld” (people’s hero) unfortunately General Christiaan de Wet has the stigma of losing the Boer war for the Boer nation – it happened under his watch and his Command – literally. Militarily speaking he’s directly to blame – and he fares no better leading a doomed, inadequately armed, inadequately supported, strategically flawed, and failed Boer Revolt in 1914.
De Wet’s invasion of the Cape Colony in the guerrilla phase is also a disaster as he signals his intentions up-front to the British and over commits a slow and large wagon train which the British chew up and then they expel de Wet from the Cape with a semblance of his invasion force left over and the loss of most of his transports. Tactically de Wet is brilliant, evading his ‘hunt’ and labelled ‘The Boer Pimpernel’ - romanticised somewhat, especially his tactical victory using barefoot burghers to sneak up on the British at Groenkop. However truth be told, on both an operational and strategic level, as a commander he fails, even his victory at Sanna’s Post is somewhat flawed as an ‘own goal’.
General de Wet – Colour by Jenny B
On a strategic level, as we have seen Smuts’ strategic plan adopted by the Boer Forces is thrown out the window almost from the get-go. They start with it, but simply do not follow through with it at all, invading three British colonies and two British protectorates, splitting focus and forces – completely misreading and unable to raise the critical “Cape Rebellion” and completely sacrificing the Blitskreig concept by working to all their weaknesses and not any of their strengths. Smuts’ “Clausewitzian concept” goes out the window too – in the Conventional War phase, the Boers sacrifice their superior and simultaneous advances along “exterior” lines (a concentration in space) and revert to only using “interior” lines (a concentration of time) for communication and supply.
In terms of strategy, on a political front, Kruger’s decision to strike out, by any type of military action you care to mention, against the world’s single biggest superpower, one whose Navy is bigger than the French, German and American Navy’s combined, at the very height of its Imperial power, is fundamentally flawed – plucky and very brave, yes – but strategically myopic and very unsound.
The best the Boers can do from here out is a ‘hit and run’ guerrilla campaign in the hopes of wearing the British resolve down to avoid “unconditional surrender” and get better peace terms (which eventually happens). The ‘Bittereinder’ guerrilla campaign is not fought with any romantic idea of actually “winning’ the war”, the Bittereinder Generals – Smuts, Botha and de la Rey are under no illusions, they also see the resolve of their women to endure the farm clearances and concentration camps as their duty in winning a better peace – they never, during or after the war, turn to victimhood, its denies them their pride and their sacrifices. The victimhood argument is a latter day ‘politics of pain’ concept taken up by latter day “pure” Afrikaner nationalists, nearly all of whom sat out the war or were too young at the time.
Even the decision to strategically engage Guerrilla War is unsound given the extreme sacrifice of lives and livelihoods required to run this type of campaign, literally breaking the back of the Boer nation – the folly of this thinking is something even General Botha realises, and he sues for peace before his entire nation is crushed – as in his own words there will be literally nothing left to fight for.
This is not the failure of the Boer soldier – this is the complete failure of the Boer Command. As military historians we have to look at the ‘score card’ in an objective and disparaging way – pointing out “critical failures” in doctrine it is – “boer bashing” it is not.
The Score Card
To look at the Boer war by way of its score card we need to divide it into three broad sections – the Conventional War – Phase 1, when the Boers have the advantage, the Conventional War – Phase 2 when the British have the advantage and then The Guerrilla War (Insurgency) phase – which needs to be separate as the edicts of war change completely.
In all, for the duration of the war there are 170 significant actions fought between the Boers and the British (including their allied Black armies like the Tswana and the Swazi), these include significant pitched conventional battles, relief or success of all sieges, successful or repelled attacks and counter-attacks during all phases on strong-points (blockhouses, bases, forts) and trains, and the taking of key cities by way of military objective – Bloemfontein, Kroonstad, Johannesburg and Pretoria.
Not factored is the general carnage of destroying property – by either British or Boer actions – the Boer actions of burning down ‘British’, ‘hensopper’ and ‘joiner’ farms, ransacking and looting towns (Dundee etc.), destroying mission stations and blowing up railway track are excluded – so too is the carnage caused by the British burning down ‘bittereinder’ farms, destroying livestock and blowing up buildings. Trying to even factor this would be impossible.
From the 11th October to 1st January 1900, the Boer forces have a numeric advantage, however the British battle order stemming and repulsing attacks on besieged towns is very good considering their disadvantage, so too the initial advance to relieve Kimberley – during this period 21 actions are fought – the Brits win 14 and the Boers win 7.
From 1st January to July 1900, the numeric components start to balance, however on a Operational and Tactical level conducting conventional combined arms – the advantage swings significantly to the British. All the major sieges are relieved, the Boers invasions are turned and they are ejected from the British colonies. The hunt into the Orange Free State decimates the fighting capability of the Boers and forces the surrender of their conventional fighting capability. During this phase 49 actions are fought – the Brits win 44 and the Boers win just 5.
Overall, for the ‘Conventional’ war phase, the balance is overwhelming in favour of the British – British win 58 and the Boers win 12. In terms of timing, the British victory in the Conventional Phase is swift – from October to July – a mere 10 months, they have reversed an invasion, captured two separate countries, taken both Boer Republic’s capital cities, taken the Boer’s economic hub, isolated both countries and starved them of external aid. Broken the critical mass of the enemy to fight conventionally, taken nearly every major gun and artillery piece, and occupied all the enemy’s fortifications and defences. By any military standards that is good Command – Strategic, Tactical and Operational.
The Guerrilla phase is completely different, there are no significant pitched battles, battles resemble skirmishes, sieges are small towns remotely accessed and the focus switches to destroying supply lines (Boer and Brit) and ‘Commando’ hunts. It’s a “slow burner” in other words not much happens for months on end for the hundreds of thousands of troops in the theatre of operations, truly a case of “war is 99% boredom and 1% terror”. From August 1900 to May 1902 – the duration of this phase – 22 months, 100 significant actions are fought that would classify a ‘clash of arms’. It works out to only about 4.5 direct classes between Boer forces and British forces per month.
The scorecard is also in favour of the British – the Brits win 72 and the Boers win 28. To read this correctly we also need to understand that the Boer strategy in this phase is not to beat or capture British troops (they can’t keep them), generally the strategy is to harass the British, inflict some damage, retreat and fight another day. On a ratio of Brit to Boer “wins” the ratio is 2:1 – the Boers are remarkably successful at insurgency warfare, and they generally evade the ‘hunts’. The Boers do well at the tactical and operational levels and attain their objectives of wearing down British resolve and elevate their monetary and human costs of waging war – but it comes as a massive cost to the Boer lives and livelihood at the strategic level.
For the British, they win at the strategic level, the objective of starving the Guerrillas of their supply – food, ammunition, transport, weaponry, shelter and human resources, not to get into the moral or ethics of this, this is strategy used to win just about every Guerrilla war ever fought, by Britain or anyone else – it was the focus of the Vietnam War, the South African “Border War” and even most recently the Afghanistan War. On a tactical level their ‘Counter Insurgency” measures – now known as COIN – are very successful, so much so the Boer War’s Guerrilla Warfare phase is the shortest fought Guerrilla War in modern military history.
That said, as Professor Abel Esterhuyse rightly pointed out to the Observation Post – by 1902, the Boers emerge as the masters of ‘Insurgency Warfare’ and the British emerge as the masters of ‘Counter Insurgency Warfare’ (COIN) – lessons that are still referenced at Westpoint Military Academy to this day. This mastery would also define the ‘South African’ way of fighting war, when Jan Smuts is tasked with amalgamating the Boer Commandos and the old British colonial regiments to form the South African Union Defence Force (UDF) in 1910.
Thus, the UDF was built along the lines of using effective combined arms with high degrees of mobility to deal with both conventional warfare (as is the requirement of any statutory force) in the event a Colonial Power in Africa (e.g. Portugal or Germany) invades the Union and any domestic insurgencies (initially ‘internal’ threats are defined as potential Black African uprisings) and the UDF COIN doctrine is been developed to counter-act it along with a ‘Seek and Destroy’ ethos.
Smuts is happy to cherry pick, basically he’s happy to bring all that’s great and good about the British culture of warfare – their discipline and drill (sorely lacking in the Boer army), their uniforms and rank structures (sorely lacking in the Boer army) and their very effective use of combined arms warfare and joint arms warfare (also sorely lacking in the Boer army) and combine it with the Boer culture of warfare – the use of mobility, and applying high rates of survivability thinking to tactics of assault and defence (both of which are sorely lacking in the British army).
Smuts will build into the UDF the doctrine of highly mobile ‘combined arms’ – mainly the effective use of mounted infantry, armour and artillery (and other ‘arms’) all acting in unison and speed. Finally, he’s able to implement the doctrine of “manoeuvre” using the Clausewitzian concept. Under General Jan Smuts the UDF was shaped into a very effective fighting force, one that is far ahead of the old Boer Republics strategic and tactical constructs and doctrine. This will have far reaching consequences as this South African ‘philosophy’ of warfare would be effectively applied from the 1st World War (1914-1918), to the 2nd World War (1939-1945) to the ‘Border War (1966-1989) and its still used by the SANDF to this very day.
Casualties
The number of casualties in the Boer War needs a whole new Observation Post, as here we look at the very sensitive subject of civilian casualties – Boer, but also British and Black – the number is extreme – about 50,000 and still rising given new research – nearly all of it the result of disease – Measles and Typhoid mainly. The Measles epidemic, which swept the ‘Black’ and ‘White’ Concentration Camps and the besieged British citizens – killed nearly 40% of all the civilians succumbing to disease – measles as a ‘children’s disease’ especially taking its toll on Boer children. Not just civilians, the biggest killer of British soldiery was Typhoid and not the Boer’s bullets, nearly two thirds of all British casualties are the result of disease – young fit men who are dropping like flies from the same diseases sweeping the concentration camps and British towns under siege. Typhoid alone affects 57,684 British soldiers – killing 8,225 of them.
This is a highly sensitive and misunderstood aspect of the war – it requires a full analysis on the disease bell-curves and medical science to fully properly understand the causes and effects, and actions taken or neglected – look out for a future Observation Post in draft called “The Boer War’s biggest killer” where we will deep dive this subject and these statistics – because if there is one “winner” of this war’s butchers bill it’s not the British or the Boers – it’s an indiscriminate cocktail of micro-organisms.
We also need to look at the Killed in Action (KIA) and Died of Wounds (DOW) and survivability ratios between Republican and Imperial forces, as the KIA/DOW figure for the Brits is around 8,000 and the KIA/DOW figure for the Boers is around 4,000 – this implies the Boers were better soldiers – for every 1 Boer killed in combat 2 Brits are killed in combat (2:1 ratio) – this leads to the myths of the Boers been “better marksman” than the British or the Boers had better command and operational prowess – the British according to these myths were then “Lions led by Donkeys”.
However truth be told is on the survivability given the respective troop size and different doctrine, if you were a British soldier in South Africa in a combat role, your chance of surviving combat without been KIA or DOW was 98% – there was a 2% chance a Boer bullet would kill you – which is pretty good survivability by British doctrine which was “Hidebound by Tradition” with costly frontal attacks and bayonet charges and antiquated cavalry and lancer charges.
If you were a Boer combatant, given your overall troop size and strength, you had a 93% chance of combat survival and a 7% chance of been KIA or DOW from a British bullet. Which is not very good given Boer doctrine actually focussed on high degrees of survivability, choosing to break engagements, reconcile and fight another day (mobility and manoeuvre) – rather than stand and be bayonetted, cleaved and then impaled from a costly British frontal assault of infantry, cavalry and lancers – none of which appealed to the Boer way of fighting and doctrine for mounted infantrymen.
Bottom line – on casualties – statistically speaking the British command in the Boer War actually was pretty good given the improvements over time in doctrine from Waterloo to the Crimean War (see chart above), the Boer command on controlling casualties and survivability on the other hand was much poorer. One thing the British are NOT are “bad shots” and their Commanders are certainly NOT “Donkeys”. Simply put, if you were British you had a better chance of surviving combat, the point where the metal is flying around, than if you were a Boer.
In Conclusion
Numbers speak more to truths than anything else, and the truth is the numbers support the idea that the Boers invaded the British colonies whilst they were numerically inferior and the Boers numerically superior, for the purposes of changing the regional balance between Boer and Brit and establishing a unitary state under “Afrikaner” influence – and not only does the republican planning and objectives point to this, their military strategy, doctrine and statements of intent supports it – and it is statistically proven.
The idea that the British were building up an invasion force on the borders is complete Hollywood and panders to the ‘politically inspired’ sabre waving in the “ultimatum” delivered by the Boers and not to the reality on the ground at all. The idea that the Boers invaded British colonies for the purposes of forward defences or as some sort of pre-emptive strike is also completely unsupported by what actually happens, the actual plans and this assertion is woefully unsupported by military doctrine – entirely debunked by the science of military history.
Also, the idea that the Boer command and doctrine is somehow better than that of the British is completely statistically unproven, in fact the opposite is true, the ‘numbers’ point in favour of the British – so too does an analysis of the three aspects of effective command – on the Strategic level, the Tactical level and the Operational level.
Written, researched by Peter Dickens
With thanks to Tinus Le Roux and Jenny Bosch for the use of colourised images.
“Rights and wrongs of the Transvaal war” by Edward t. Cook. Publication date 1901
Leopold Charles Maurice Stennett Amery “The Second Boer War – The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902” – Volumes 1 to 7.
Military History Journal, Vol 6 No 3 – June 1984. The Medical Aspect of the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902 Part II by Professor J.C. de Villiers, MD FRCS.
The Anglo-Boer war: A chronology. By Cloete, Pieter G
The Battle of Magersfontein – Victory and Defeat on the South African Veld, 10-12 December 1899. Published 2023. By Dr. Garth Bennyworth.
Dr David Brock Katz; ‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917’
Dr Evert Kleynhans and Dr David Brock Katz; ’20 Battles – searching for a South African Way of War 1913 – 2013’.
Anglo-Boer War Blockhouses – a Field Guide by Simon C. Green, fact checking and correspondence – 2023.
The Boer War: By Thomas Pakenham – re-published version, 1st October 1991.
Correspondence and interviews with Dr. Garth Bennyworth, Boer War historian – Sol Plaatjies University, Kimberley – 2023.
Interviews with Dr. David Broc Katz, University of Stellenbosch, South African Military Academy – Military historian – focus on Jan Smuts and fact checking Boer and British military doctrine – 2023.
Correspondence on fact checking British doctrine with Chris Ash, BSc FRGS FRHistS, Boer War historian, Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society for The Boer War Atlas – 2023.
History of the war in South Africa 1899-1902. By Maj. General Sir Frederick Maurice and staff. Volumes 1 to 4, published 1906
I was a discussant at a book launch of Jan Smuts’ First World War by Dr. David Brock Katz, and the minute questions were opened to the audience, the very first question was “What about Jopie?”, to which there was a universal sigh and “here we go again”.
Turns out you just cannot discuss Jan Smuts’ career as military strategist and Field Marshal, his career as lawyer, botanist, academic, philosopher, conservationist or statesman – without covering the “Jopie” base. The interesting bit about covering the Jopie base is just how little people understand about him, the nature of events that led to his execution, or even fully understand Smuts’ role in it.
So, to ask the question … “What about Jopie?” To truthfully answer that question – we also have to ask another question, and that is … “What about William?”.
What about William?
William! Who is then heck is William and what is he in the life of Jopie? – Never heard of him! Comes the retort – ah, but here we uncover a part of the Jopie Fourie story which is often glossed over and even never mentioned in all the Nationalistic inspired dogma that surrounds Jopie Fourie, and you have to ask yourself why? So, here goes.
Our story begins with three men who had taken officer commissions in the newly fledged Union Defence Force of South Africa (the UDF) army (the South African Union was declared in 1910). They served together in the ACF (Active Citizen Force) and knew one another well, they are Captain William Allan King, Major Harry Trew and finally Captain Jopie Fourie.
When South Africa declared war on Germany in 1914, by a landslide Parliamentary vote, those UDF officers who held a ‘Conscientious Objection’ to war against Germany were invited to resign. The Union government was well aware of the sympathies the Boer forces had to Germany during the South African War 1899-1902 and would accommodate them, in other words individual UDF members were not forced to go war against Germany, Botha (then the Prime Minister) and Smuts (then the Minister of Defence) expected a ‘handful’ of resignations from those that refused to fight Germany – and they got exactly that – ‘a handful’ (less than 1% of the UDF construct).
Key resignations from the UDF came from Major Jan Kemp, Lt. Col Manie Maritz and General Christiaan Beyers. All of whom took the precaution of resigning their UDF commissions and oaths before going into armed revolt against the lawfully elected Union government over the issue of the invasion of German South West Africa. Failure to do so in 1914 would amount to a charge of High Treason which carried with it the death sentence.
Images: Jan Kemp, Christiaan Beyers and Manie Maritz
Captain Jopie Fourie decided to join Kemp, Maritz and Beyers in open armed revolt, however for reasons known only to him, he chose not to resign his commission and oath to serve the Union of South Africa. In other words, as an active serving UDF officer (not just a rebel) he chose to make war against the UDF and his colleagues with the intention of killing them. This in 1914 constituted treason in the highest order.
According to Major Harry Trew, Fourie was a close friend of his and was a likeable chap with a wicked sense of humour, and Fourie had a somewhat cavalier approach to things, this can be seen during the revolt when Trew recalled a commandeering note that Fourie had given to the hotelkeeper at Pienaar’s River. In the note he stated he had taken goods to the value of £10 for the use of the Republican Forces; if his side won it would be honoured by the Republican Government, if he lost: The amount was to be debited against Generals Botha and Smuts.
In another rather cavalier approach to the rebellion, and a very ill-advised one, Jopie Fourie had rather foolishly decided to fight for the rebels whist wearing his Union Defence Force Uniform (refer Military History Journal Vol 16, No.4). The wearing of your ‘enemies’ uniform in 1914 also immediately guaranteed a place in front of firing squad, its treason of the highest order.
During the South African War 1899-1902 (or Boer War 2) there is an extensive list of Boers executed for “wearing khaki” i.e., wearing a British uniform, by 1914 and the 1st World War this sort of offence earned you a ‘drumhead’ court martial in the field and immediate execution on the spot.
Even by World War 2, who can forget the harrowing images of the execution of German soldiers – Pernass, Billing, and Schmidt by firing squad of American GI’s for wearing American uniforms, they were condemned to death under the Hague convention concerning land warfare, article 23: “It’s especially forbidden .. to make improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy”.
Unteroffizier Manfred Pernass, Oberfähnrich Günther Billing, and Gefreiter Wilhelm Schmidt were given a military trial at Henri Chapelle, sentenced to death, and executed by a firing squad on 23rd Dec 1944 for wearing American uniforms to infiltrate their lines.
Jopie Fourie took a tremendous risk choosing to continue to wear his UDF uniform whilst joining a revolt against the UDF, and there is absolutely no doubt that he knew the consequences of his actions, as a Boer War veteran and subsequently a UDF officer he knew exactly the consequence.
Captain Jopie Fourie and Captain William Allan King where also colleagues and friends. Captain William Allan King was a part-time ACF officer in the UDF, full-time he was the Sub-Commissioner of Pretoria, he was Pretoria’s ‘Native Commissioner’ responsible for the affairs of Blacks and Coloureds in the Transvaal. His duties and responsibilities included arbitrating between the employers of labour in the Pretoria Labour District with the Black African Natives performing the labour.
According to Sol Plaatje, the first General Secretary of the African National Congress (ANC) in his book ‘Native Life in South Africa, Before and Since the European War and the Boer Rebellion’, William King is described as;
“Without doubt the ablest native administrator in the Transvaal Civil Service … an expert on Native matters, and no commission ever sat without his being summoned to give evidence before it”.
Sol Plaatje went on to say of William King:
“The Natives called him ‘Khoshi-ke-Nna’, which means ‘I am the Chief’. A firm but just Englishman, with a striking military gait, he would have been an ideal leader of the native contingents had the offer of native help been accepted by the Union Government.”
That William Allan King was a very popular and well-liked man in South African politics and amongst the majority communities and their representatives in South Africa would be an understatement.
Captain William Allan King, was sent to arrest Captain Jopie Fourie, presumably as they had a personal connection to talk him and his Commando into surrender as a first prize. King was also to warn Fourie that he needed to resign his commission. King’s small UDF force came into contact with Jopie Fourie and his Commando on the 23rd November 1914, just north of Pretoria near Hamaanskraal and a skirmish ensued. During the firefight Captain William Allan King attended to a wounded man. Whilst attending to the man he was shot dead by one of Fourie’s men. Again, military doctrine viewed these sorts of incidents in 1914 as outside accepted rules of engagement.
“What made it so tragic was that Jopie and King, who was Native Commissioner of Pretoria, had been good friends prior to the rebellion” recorded Major Harry Trew, Jopie Fourie’s other friend. It would now be left to Major Harry Trew to capture and arrest Fourie, which he and detachments of South African Police (SAP) and Union Defence Force (UDF) troops eventually managed to do on the 16th December 1914 at Nooitgedacht in the Rustenburg district.
It needs to be noted at the “Battle of Nooitgedacht” to arrest Fourie, Jopie Fourie and his men killed one policeman and many other policemen were injured – Dr C Louis Leipoldt was the ‘police doctor’ that day and was mentioned in dispatches for attending to all the wounded.
Images: Captain William Allan King’s headstone and newspaper notice, note the population group who erects the headstone (the Waterberg Chiefs) and his honouring as an African Chief in a native language.
It was also not the first time Fourie and his men would flout rules of engagement. In a earlier engagement, from under a white flag of truce they opened up on a UDF detachment, this time killing another popular UDF officer, who happened to be unarmed. Captain John (Koos) Nolte, an Afrikaner, was treacherously shot. The epitaph on Nolte’s grave, who was a well-known rugby player and attorney on the East Rand, states; “Gesneuveld 29 October 1914 te Treurfontein onder Witvlag met Rapport. Geboren 11de Juli 1881.”
Retribution
Captain William Allan King’s funeral was a national outpouring of grief, newspapers across the county lamented at his passing, his funeral was the largest funeral since the Union was declared in 1910. Plaatje would read his obituary and would record that he was “one loss which the Natives, judging by articles in their newspapers, will not easily forget”.
Retribution for Fourie was coming – not only from the large swaths of English’, ‘Coloured’ and ‘Black’ communities grieving for William Kings death, of all the Rebel’s Commandos – it was Fourie’s Commando which exacted the greatest number of Union Defence Force deaths. Of those most of them were Afrikaners – Prime Minister Botha insisted the ‘English’ regiments who made up the Active citizen Force (ACF) part of the UDF ‘stay out of it’ for the most part and the Afrikaner ‘Rifle Associations’ – the old Boer Republic Commandos the RA part of UDF to deal with the brunt of the revolt – so, brother against brother, this was to be the Afrikaners sorting out their seditious brethren amongst themselves. Retribution was coming for Fourie from many in the Afrikaans community and the UDF families affected by the loss of their husbands, brothers and sons – men like Captain Koos Nolte.
Unlike many of the other rebel leaders who faced a single count of treason, Captain Jopie Fourie had committed High Treason on three counts, not resigning his Army commission in the UDF, caught wearing his UDF uniform and undertaking a seditious armed revolt against his lawfully elected government and his own armed forces – the UDF.
Also, unlike the other rebel leaders who faced a trial in a civilian court, having resigned from the UDF, that would not be the case for Jopie Fourie, as he had not resigned from the UDF he was considered as still in service in the UDF, so he faced a military court. A military court martial is fundamentally different to a civilian one as there are a whole set of laws that apply to military personnel that don’t apply to civilians. Military tribunals are almost a ‘law unto themselves’ – sentences tend to be carried out quickly and punishments harsh – very little latitude is given to appealing convictions, and military courts do not really tolerate interventions from civilian authorities and government structures.
This is compounded further when the military is ‘in a state of war’ with a foreign power or if a state of ‘martial law’ is declared against an internal enemy, and South Africa and the UDF specifically was in both states. During these respective states of war military law becomes even more intolerant and convictions even more punitive. Retribution from the UDF was most certainly coming for Fourie and there was very little anyone could do about it.
Retribution was also quick, South Africa was in a state of martial Law and there was no dilly-dally, from the time Jopie Fourie was captured on the 16th December 1914, he was tried by this fellow military officers, from all accounts he was given a proper military trial, he was found guilty of high treason and sentenced to death by firing squad (a military ‘death’ afforded only to military personnel – civilians are hanged).
The firing squad was comprised equally of members of the South African Police (as they were involved in his capture and he took a toll on them), members of Jopie Fourie’s own regiment – the “Botha Ruiters”, and members of the South African Mounted Rifles. The execution took place with Fourie refusing a blindfold on the 20th December 1914 …. from capture to execution, it took a mere 4 days.
Images: Authorisation Letter: Jopie Fourie Execution: 20th December 1914 and colourised image of Jopie Fourie (courtesy Jenny B Colourised Photos)
Why Smuts?
Usually in a legal and parliamentary construct like the Union of South Africa, the only person who can stay an execution or offer an amnesty is the Prime Minister and usually that is done with a consensus of cabinet ministers, so the Prime Minister is not seen to act unilaterally. The Prime Minister of South Africa in 1914 was Louis Botha, not Jan Smuts – Smuts was one of 66 South African Party Ministers of Parliament and he is one of Louis Botha’s Cabinet Ministers – holding two portfolios reporting to Botha. Jopie Fourie’s execution is on Botha’s watch – it’s his responsibility, not Smuts’.
General Jan Smuts during WW1
So why not Botha, why the focus on Smuts?
As Dr David Katz in his work ‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917) points out. Jan Smuts had been the key Minister keeping a level head and seeking reconciliation and understanding all the way through the rebellion, and when it was clear the rebellion had failed, Smuts called for a ‘Blanket Amnesty’ across the board for the Boer Rebel leaders and their troops if they laid down their arms.
General Louis Botha, the Commander in Chief, on the other hand took a much harder and less reconciliatory line than his colleague – he was livid at the sheer betrayal, the sheer waste of lives, resources and time it took and the complete stupidity of it all – an unsupported revolt against a lawfully elected government with absolutely no chance of success.
It was reported that Louis Botha once joking said to Jan Smuts “Let’s face it Jannie, you’re no General!” By that he meant Smuts was far too reconciliatory and soft-hearted – as far as Louis Botha was concerned, under the edicts of martial law, all rebels, officers and men alike should be tried, the most treasonous of which, the leaders, put up against a wall and shot – even if they were all his old friends.
Smuts however persevered – Botha eventually agreed to an Amnesty, but for the rank and file only, the Boer Rebel leaders would have to be prosecuted. The amnesty, excluding the Rebel leadership, was in put place from 12th to 21st November 1914, and with it the 1914 Boer Rebellion was effectively over, by the end of November General de Wet’s force alone was down to only 40 men. Rear actions and isolated and desperate battles continued to be fought for a couple of months by woefully under-strength hard liners like Jopie Fourie refusing surrender and amnesty, but by the end of January 1915 the rebellion was over.
Even by standards of the day, at the end of the revolt Smuts would seek clemency and compassion with Botha for the rebel leaders, consider their sentences. In private correspondence with his confidant and friend, Emily Hobhouse, Hobhouse would urge both Smuts’ and Botha’s compassion in dealing with the rebel leaders, to which Smuts agreed.
Of the main rebel leaders, General Christiaan Beyers tragically drowned in the Vaal River whilst attempting to desperately evade capture on 8th December 1914. General Christiaan de Wet was captured during the amnesty and sentenced to six years imprisonment, with a fine of £2000, he was released by Botha and Smuts after one year’s imprisonment, after giving a written promise to take no further part in politics.
Major Jan Kemp was captured on the 2nd of February 1915 and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment, with a fine of £1000. However, a mere 10 months into his sentence Botha and Smuts agreed to release him – also on the condition that he may not participate in any politics – a promise Kemp almost immediately broke entering politics as a National Party MP under Hertzog in 1920.
Lt. Colonel Manie Maritz would evade capture and escape into self-imposed exile, he would re-enter South Africa in 1923 and spent a couple of months in jail for treason, when General Barry Hertzog came to power later in 1924 he was given amnesty. He would enter into politics as the leader of an antisemitic, one-party state, National Socialist (Nazi) inspired ‘Boerenasie’ party prior to World War 2.
Of all the other rebel officers, men like Kmdt Daniel Flemming, who were also captured or returned from exile in GSWA. All were sentenced to short imprisonments and fines, almost all of them walking free within a year … except for just one man … Captain Jopie Fourie.
The Visit
The delegation in December 1914, headed up by Dr D.F. Malan, which decided on a last minute ‘drop in’ visit at Jan Smuts’ house and deliver a petition Malan had drafted, with the remote hope of getting clemency for Fourie, did so because they saw Smuts as the ‘weakest link’ – they knew he had a soft spot for the rebels and they would have no such luck with a no-nonsense General like Louis Botha, and how do we know this?
Simply because General Botha, as Prime Minister made no effort to stay the execution of Jopie Fourie, he did not lift a finger, he didn’t even offer an opinion on the matter or make a statement, and one can only deduce that given his very hard stance he initially held against giving the rebels any sort of amnesty, that he wanted an example made of Fourie. Botha was livid, this revolt in no way received the support of the broad Afrikaner community, it was poorly planned and poorly led and an utter waste of life – to read more on this position read Observation Post – Boer War 3 and Beyond, here’s the link Boer War 3 and beyond!
Now consider what the delegation is asking of Jan Smuts, they are asking him to make a decision he is not really mandated to do, they are asking him to override his boss’ intentions and act unilaterally of the Prime Minister. They are asking him to act unilaterally of all this fellow cabinet ministers and as a UDF General, they are also asking him to act unilaterally of the military, its laws and its tribunals. They are also asking Smuts to perform a communications miracle, considering the speed at which the Fourie trial takes place – a mere 4 days, it’s 1914 – the country is at war and Smuts has to contact a wide variety of MP’s and his Boss the PM who is on a military campaign to get any sort of consensus before the execution – and he only has about a single day to do it in.
Future nationalists would blow this delegation and incident out the water and pay far too much attention to Smuts than he deserves, they would try and turn Smuts into a coward for not meeting the drop in delegation, stating he was ‘hiding’ in the house – in fact Smuts was visiting on the next door farm when the delegation turned up, and unlike President Paul Kruger who entertained the general public dropping in unannounced, Smuts did not.
What if?
Even if Smuts had entertained the visit, there is literally nothing he could do about Jopie Fourie – as noted, Fourie’s case was far too complicated, his crimes were far too serious and there were far too many incriminating circumstances of high treason. Smuts in even trying to get Fourie off the hook would have incurred the wrath of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the majority of the government, the Union Defence Force and all its commanders, many in the Afrikaans community, the families of the UDF slain, and finally the broader English, Coloured and Black communities, the vast majority, thanks to the death of William King at the hands of Fourie.
This was World War 1, this was Martial Law after all, soldiers and officers were executed in front of firing squads for ‘cowardice’ or ‘leaving posts without permission’ or ‘refusing orders’ – let alone High Treason, Sedition and White Flag incidents. There was just no way anyone was going to get Fourie any form of amnesty or clemency, not in a month of Sundays.
It is very naive and a very arrogant assumption on behalf of Dr. Malan to think that Smuts could stay the execution and its smacks more of a political assassination exercise than it does of a philanthropic one, and that’s exactly what happened – Prime Minister Louis Botha, the man who was in fact responsible – the bittereinder’ hero of the Boer War – would remain relatively unscathed and still heralded as Boer hero in the Boerevolk community, whereas Smuts would unfairly take the full brunt of Afrikaner Nationalist vitriol in Botha’s place – unrelenting and for decades – he still does.
Images: Hate mail sent to Jan Smuts – Jan Smuts collection
Uneasy is the head that wears a crown
Smuts would go on to be regarded as one of the greatest Statesmen South Africa has ever produced, Jopie Fourie was a junior officer and simply not on the same playing field as Smuts (or Botha for that matter). To quote Shakespeare “uneasy is the head that wears a crown” – no ‘coward’ when it came to his convictions – in Smuts’ career, as a Boer War General during the South African War 1899 – 1902 (Boer War 2) he would personally oversee the court martial and execution by firing squad of Lambert Colyn, a Boer traitor who betrayed his Commando’s position to the British.
After the 1922 Miners’ Strike, when Smuts was Prime Minister in his first term and had powers of amnesty, the English ‘Communist’ rebels – Samual ‘Taffy’ Long, Herbert Hull and David Lewis were all hanged singing the Red Flag song, Smuts remained unmoved.
As Prime Minister on two separate occasions many South Africans were executed for a variety of crimes under his watch for clemency, mainly murder, none received it. The UDF in its only recorded execution during World War 2, executed one of their own during the Italy campaign – Johan Mgema (a Native Military Corps man) attached to 12 Squadron SAAF, executed by firing squad when he was found guilty of murdering an Italian woman. Again, as Prime Minister at the time Smuts granted no amnesty.
Smuts however went one step further, and only for one man, when he was Prime Minister during World War 2, and mandated to grant amnesty and clemency, stay executions and intervene in judicial process – he stayed the execution of Robey Leibbrandt – the South African Nazi zealot inserted into South Africa by Nazi Germany to overthrow the government and assassinate Smuts. Captured and found guilty of High Treason Leibbrandt was sentenced to death – he claimed that he had acted “for Volk and Führer” (Adolph Hitler and the Afrikaner people) and gave the Hitler Salute in court, declaring “I greet death”.
Robey Leibbrandt
Smuts commuted his sentence to life in prison instead. Smuts had served with Leibbrandt’s father, Meyder Leibbrandt during Boer War 2 and admired him as a “courageous Boer warrior”. In the case of Robey Leibbrandt only did Smuts intervene as Prime Minister and exercise his powers, nobody else, again demonstrating his ‘soft spot’ for his most beloved Boere community, one in which he consistency sought reconciliation and understanding. However, even this act would not deter his most obstinate detractors. Robey Leibbrandt was subsequently released on amnesty granted by the incoming nationalists led by Dr. D.F. Malan in 1948.
The point been, for all the executions and all the variety of people of communities involved, it was only with the Boerevolk that Smuts exhibited extraordinary measures of compassion. The execution of Fourie was an extraordinary one, and considering the William Allan King incident, the white flag incident, his commission and his uniform, far too large a segment of the population sought retribution.
This is one of the key reasons why the Jopie Fourie mythology and narrative put forward by Afrikaner Nationalists never really includes William Allan King – Fourie was pitched as been of ‘pure’ Afrikaans heart, unfairly executed for it by traitorous Afrikaners, it’s all about Afrikanerdom – the English, Black and Coloured Communities’ in South Africa who Fourie also went to war against don’t count – that would make him universally unpopular and a genuine traitor – nor do all the other communities affected by government policies in dealing with treason and those executed for it count – it just doesn’t fit their insular and myopic Afrikaner Nationalist narrative.
In Conclusion
In relating the story of Jopie Fourie, it’s clear that the story of William King a.k.a. The Chief is lost. In weighing up the two, the man who died for his country, the man who is the true patriot, the member of the statutory forces representing a legal government and the broad communities of South Africa as a whole – the majority of South Africans, the man who is functioning as a legitimate commissioned officer and upholding his oath to serve his country and men, the man ‘unfairly’ killed, the man whose loss is felt across the entire nation – is Captain William King, as a South African Army officer doing his duty his sacrifice is fully deserving of the nation’s recognition. The true national hero is Captain King, and when we ask ourselves “what about Jopie?” We must also ask of ourselves … “what about William?”
We will never know what Jopie Fourie’s true reasons were for not taking the precaution of resigning his UDF commission, despite been warned to do so. Nobody knows what was going through his head when he donned on his UDF uniform to rebel against the UDF. Given the extremely grave consequences of these actions – one can only assume that the person who wanted Jopie dead, was Jopie himself and he foresaw himself as some sort of martyr.
It remains perplexing, no matter what Smuts did right, no matter all his achievements, no matter that he arbitrated the peace deal to end the Boer War, no matter that he twice put South Africa on the right side of history when Germany acted as polecat, no matter that he consolidated Afrikaners and English and established Union and a whole new country – the true father of South Africa, no matter that he established the UDF and its military doctrine, identified new botanicals, established both the Royal Air Force and the South African Air Force, wrote an accredited work of philosophy, established South Africa as an economic powerhouse, no matter that he commanded British troops in East Africa and was Churchill’s personal advisor during Operation Overlord (D-Day) and the liberation of Europe, no matter that he established the concept of the Commonwealth of Nations and wrote the pre-amble to establish United Nations – all that matters not a jot to the chap in the back of the room at any modern day Smuts related seminar who sticks up his hand and inevitably asks “what about Jopie?”.
Military History Journal, Vol 16 No 4 – December 2014 – Forgotten casualties of the 1914 Rebellion. By Richard Wadley
‘Native Life in South Africa, Before and Since the European War and the Boer Rebellion’. By Sol. T. Plaatje
Nongqai Vol 10, No 4 A (1) by Brigadier Hennie Heymans
‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa’ 1914 -1917. By Dr David Broc Katz
A large thank you to Stef Coetzee for his inputs on Captain William Allan King and further thanks to Admiral Arne Söderlund for his assistance, along with Brigadier Hennie Heymans
A lot has been written on the extreme sacrifice at the Battle of Delville Wood during the Somme offensive of 1916, and lets also remember the extreme courage of these South Africans, a young country, the Union of South Africa formed just 6 years prior in 1910 after the devastation of the South African War (1899-1902) i.e. Boer War 2 … and here Afrikaner and English heritage South Africans were fighting shoulder to shoulder in one of the most most desperate engagements in the history of World War 1, and the most heroic and desperate battle in South African’s entire military history – then and even now, and that’s saying something as there have been quite a few notable actions in between.
If there was courage to be rewarded from this desperate South African action on the Somme, the Battle of Delville Wood saw one South African individual rise above to an unprecedented level of gallantry and was awarded The Victoria Cross (VC) – the highest award for valour in the British and Imperial Forces (later Commonwealth) – that was Cpl William Faulds serving in the 1st South African Infantry Brigade. For his full story follow the link to this Observation Post Delville Wood’s Victoria Cross – William Faulds
Cpl William Faulds and an artists impression of his heroic deed at Delville Wood 18th July 1916
However, there is a missing South African Victoria Cross from the Somme Offensive and Battle of Delville Wood, one not usually recognised or known about in South Africa, and one that is not often referenced in the narrative of Delville Wood, his name is Lt. Alexander Young VC of the 4th South African Infantry Brigade (South African Scottish).
The ‘missing’ story of Lt. Alexander Young VC – 4th South African Infantry
Lieutenant Alexander Young VC is ‘missing’ in more ways than one, not only from our general conciseness as South Africans, but he is also literally missing too – his body has never been found.
You can however find him today on the ‘Thiepval Memorial to the Missing in the Somme’ in France – his name is on Pier 4, Face C, alongside all the other missing South Africans from the Somme Offensive and Battle of Delville Wood who have no known grave.
Thiepval Memorial – Pier 4, Face C – South African section names – my photo, Peter Dickens copyright
So, why don’t we as South Africans know much about this missing South African Victoria Cross? Well, the first reason is that the Irish regard it as their Victoria Cross as Alexander Young was born in Ireland, the second reason is his Victoria Cross was awarded to him for actions, as a Cape Colony colonialist serving in the Cape Colony Police, during The South African War (1899-1902) i.e. Boer War 2 – and not World War 1 (1914-1918) which took place after the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910.
All that aside, Alexander Young VC was a South African to his bones and an incredibly brave one at that – not only fighting for the British Army, but also fighting as Cape Colony Mounted Policeman as their Regimental Sergeant Major and then ultimately fighting as a Commissioned Officer in the Union of South Africa’s forces during World War 1. He saw action and served in India, Egypt, Sudan, Zululand, South Africa, German South West Africa, East Africa and France – his impressive array of decorations and medals include: The Victoria Cross, The Queen’s South Africa medal, The King’s South Africa medal, The Zulu Rebellion medal and then his three WW1 medals – The 1914-1915 Star, British War Medal, and the Victory Medal.
That he was a very remarkable South African is beyond doubt, and this is his story and the story of his Victoria Cross (large extracts courtesy The South African War Graves Project):
Ireland and British Army (early years)
Alexander Young was the son of William and Annie Young, of Ballinamana, Co. Galway. He was born in Ballinona, Galway, Ireland on the 27th January 1873. Educated at the Model School in Galway, Young showed great prowess as a horse rider in his youth and when he was only seventeen, he joined the Queen’s Bays at Renmore. He soon gained the attention of his superiors, was sent to India as a riding instructor, and then served as a sergeant major with Lord Kitchener during the 2nd Sudan War (1896-1898).
South African War (1899-1902)
Sgt Maj Alexander Young became recognised as one of the best horseman in the British Army and as a rough rider was unexcelled. It was after he had been injured by a horse that he retired from the British Army and came to the Cape Colony in August 1899 when The South African War (1899-1902) i.e. Boer War 2 broke out, here he joined colonial forces, attesting in the Cape Mounted Police, and as a skilled horseman he was soon picked to form one of a mounted bodyguard for Lord Milner on an official visit to the Transkei.
Now this is an interesting photograph of these Cape Mounted Policeman escorting Lord Milner from Grahamstown to King Williamstown in 1899 – in just this single tiny detachment of Policemen there are three future recipients of the Victoria Cross. It says a lot for the calibre of soldier South Africa has bred (The three men are: Colonel J. Sherwood-Kelly VC, CMG DSO, received his VC during the First World War, Lieutenant W. Bloomfield VC, also First World War and finally our man, Sergeant Major Alexander Young VC, who received his during the South African War).
Now stationed at King William’s Town, Sgt Maj. Young saw action whilst serving with General W. F. Gatacre at Stormberg Junction (December 1899) which was routed by Boers, he escaped and was mentioned in dispatches for his coolness in saving Bethulie bridge in March 1900.
Alexander Young’s day in the military history annuals for the highest valour would come on the 31st August 1901 when he took part in the engagement at Ruiterskraal and led a small body of men against a hill held by Republican forces under Commandant J.L.P. Erasmus.
When the Boers tried to escape, he closed in on them, succeeded in taking prisoner Erasmus (who had fired at him point-blank three times) and was awarded the Victoria Cross for his heroic deed. His Citation in the London Gazette on 8thNovember 1901 reads:
“Towards the close of the action at Ruiter’s Kraal on the 13th August, 1901, Sergeant-Major Young, with a handful of men, rushed some kopjes which were being; held by Commandant Erasmus and about 20 Boers. On reaching these kopjes the enemy were seen galloping back to another kopje held by the Boers. Sergeant-Major Young then galloped on some 50 yards ahead of his party and closing with the enemy shot one of them and captured Commandant Erasmus, the latter firing at him three times at point blank range before being taken prisoner.”
German South West Africa and Bambatha Rebellion
Young remained with the Cape Mounted Police until 1906, when he joined the German forces in German South-West Africa and saw service during the Herero uprising (January 1904 to March 1907). For this he was decorated by Kaiser Wilhelm II. During the last phase of the Bambatha Rebellion (February-June 1906) he served in Natal and Zululand, after which he turned to farming.
1st World War
When the First World War (1914-1918) broke out he took up his old position of Regimental Sergeant-Major in the Cape Mounted Police, and served under General Louis Botha in German South-West Africa campaign, thereafter he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant and was subsequently active again during the East Africa campaign under General Jan Smuts, joining the Natal Light Horse.
He was amongst the first to respond to the call for South African troops to head to Europe and he transferred his commission to the 4th South African Infantry (the South African Scottish), he would however first see action against the Senussi in Egypt, he was again in the thick of it with the 4th South African Infantry in France during the Somme Offensive of 1916 and was later wounded in the crucible which was the Battle of Deville Wood in July 1916.
On recovering, he returned to take part in the later stages of the Somme Offensive under Captain T. H. Ross, he was tragically Killed in Action just before the battle of Warlencourt by German bombs and flame-throwers during an attack on his ‘Snag Trench’ on the 19th October 1916.
His body has never been identified and his mortal remains are known only to his God. Thiepval Memorial is unique in that it is both a British and South African monument, recorded on its walls are all the ‘missing’ during all the battles of the Somme offensive – a staggering: United Kingdom 71,341, South Africa 832. Total 72,173.
The Thiepval Memorial is one of the most visited Commonwealth War Graves Commission sites in the world. On the first day of the Battle of the Somme (1 July 1916) almost 20,000 men under British command died. By the time the battle was over, 141 days later, more than a million people on all sides were killed, wounded, or went missing.
For the British and South Africans with no known grave, the Thiepval Memorial stands in their honour.
In Conclusion
I had the privilege of officiating and commanding the remembrance parade at Thiepval Memorial to mark the centenary of the Battle of Delville Wood. During my speech I referenced Lt. Alexander Young VC and pointed out the panel on which his name is recorded.
It is with deep appreciation and honour, that on the 10th July 2016, South African military veterans of The South African Legion, Memorable Order of Tin Hats, The Royal British Legion – South African Branch and just about every single CMVO Registered South African Veterans Association, with Rhodesian veterans in addition could ‘stand-to’ on top of Thiepval Memorial 100 years later – with banners flying and heads bowed – whilst we remembered the sheer sacrifice and the many brave South African men, men like Alexander Young VC.
References and extracts from The South African War Graves Project
Commonwealth War Graves Commission
Thank you to Brigadier Hennie Heymans for this remarkable photograph artefact of the Cape Mounted Police.
The artist`s impression of the action at Deville Wood for which William Faulds was awarded the Victoria Cross. From the book “Deeds that thrill the Empire” Vol 5
From Boer ‘Refugee Camps’ to Nazi ‘Konzentrationslager’
In some recent social media postings, the old fracas between the Tory MP Jacob Rees-Mogg’s inflammatory statements about Boer War concentration camps and Pretoria University’s erstwhile Professor Fransjohan Pretorius’ emotionally charged response to it seems to have resurfaced (not that Rees-Mogg cares a jot, or has even responded to Professor Pretorius), a key source of the fracas in both respects – the use of language surrounding concentration camps.
The issue lies around how ‘concentration camps’ are perceived in our common modern consciousness and what the phrase means to us – not only in South Africa but world over. This was adequately demonstrated in the TV interview with Jacob Rees-Mogg, who, whilst defending Winston Churchill’s legacy, was challenged on the issue of British concentration camps in South Africa during the South African War (1899-1902) a.k.a. Boer War 2.
His response, falling back on a typical Etonian education, compared the death rate in Boer War concentration camps to the death rate in Glasgow at the beginning of the 20th Century – i.e., disease, not war, being the major issue. In Reese-Mogg’s political context he is using a ‘deflection’ as one can scalp mortality statistics and disease statistics by demographic segment and by country from 1899 to 1902 in many ways.
Rees-Mogg’s comparison of Glasgow and South African camps is, however, statistically unsound – mortality rates in South Africa during disease epidemics at the time, notably the Influenza Pandemic of 1918 would have been more compelling and comparative argument.
Rees-Mogg’s grip on disease statistics aside, he then went to state that the camps were set up for protecting Boer citizens. This is a partial truth, believe it or not, the camps were initially set up for protecting refugees – but it comes with a double-edged sword when forcibly displaced citizens were added to the genuine refugee population of the camps, hence the controversy, confusion and general indignation across the Afrikaner community.
Then, Rees-Mogg goes on to state that one should not to confuse the Boer concentration camps with Hitler’s extermination camps. This is an absolute truth, Rees-Mogg is correct, the two concepts are completely different. However, the morality issue regarding the outcome of both systems (i.e. the death of civilians in wartime) will forever be argued – especially when one starts to add modern day 21st Century WOKE sensibilities to 20th Century contexts – the idea that war kills, whether by virus or bullet, makes no difference to the dead.
Wading into this fracas to “set Rees-Mogg strait” comes Professor Fransjohan Pretorius from the University of Pretoria, using equally emotionally charged language.
What is however very interesting to this discussion, and more to the subject to this article, is just how loaded the words ‘concentration camp’ are, and it’s seen in Rees-Mogg’s co-discussant on the panel, Grace Blakeley, an academic, journalist and far left leaning political commentator who best describes herself as a ‘socialist’ – and on the Boer War concentration camps she literally loses the plot – dramatically declaring with great dollops of repugnance that “the British invented the Concentration Camp” – a complete untruth, the Spanish invented concentration camps.
Grace Blakeley then loudly proclaims with all the authority in the world “it was systematic murder!” Now, in the 125 odd years since the war not one single case of ‘systematic murder’ in a Boer concentration camp has been proven – not then and not now – and that’s not an opinion it’s a fact, whether some like it or not. Even the old Afrikaner National Party had 40 years in the pound seats with all the resources at hand to try and ‘prove’ a legitimate case of systematic murder which could hold up to legal scrutiny and could not do it. The simple truth is that all deaths recorded in both the ‘Boer’ and the ‘Black’ Concentration camps of the Boer War are disease or health related (more on this later).
She then excitedly declares “hundreds of thousands of people died” in the white Boer concentration camps – implying mass genocide and ethnic cleansing – whilst in truth 28,000 people died in the ‘white’ camps and about 20,000 in the ‘black’ camps (some say more) – all whilst very tragic, it is hardly ‘hundreds of thousands’ that really is hyperbole.
In Jacob Rees-Mogg’s rather measured counter response to Grace Blakeley’s wild claims he reiterates that it is “completely wrong” for her to compare the Boer War 2 concentration camps to that of Adolf Hitler’s extermination camps of World War 2.
So, how is it that Grace Blakeley (a Labour Party strategic think-tank economist with a Masters Degree in African Studies) gets her facts so woefully wrong?
Another glaring problem with her outbursts, and its highly indicative of the issue at hand, Professor Fransjohan Pretorius in his effort to “set Jacob Rees-Mogg strait” on his facts, only takes aim at Rees-Mogg, the net result is a raft of indignation levelled directly at Rees-Mogg by many in South Africa simply because the good Professor said so. What he does not do, is take aim at Grace Blakeley, an expert in her field, for her equally stupid, emotionally charged and factually incorrect statements. This is a BBC ‘Balance’ panel of Tory and Labour after all. Here the good Professor is ‘Tjoepstil’ – nada, nothing, silent … crickets! But why?
The uneasy answer is that he agrees with Blakeley, and by NOT “setting Grace Blakeley strait” in addition to Rees-Mogg, he tacitly approves of her statements. He is ‘weaponising’ the issue, the surge in indignation from South Africa (and even the UK) does not target the ‘Labourite’ in the debate, but rather the ‘Tory’ – nobody cares about what Grace Blakeley said, they all tacitly agree with her in addition.
It exposes a tremendous old Afrikaner Nationalist bias, something Professor Fransjohan Pretorius is often criticised for in his history writing, and one that is currently undermining his credibility. As they say in Afrikaans “Jou onderrok steek erg uit” (your underwear slip is exposed i.e. your hidden bias is plain to see) – and by nailing his bias to the mast in the way he does – calling the British “scandalous” in addition, and politicising the issue by focusing only on the Tory MP, he creates a fracas and feeds a hungry audience seeking to chastise the British for just about every misery on the planet.
So, what’s with all this tacit approval of this Labourite’s assertions that this was a “British invention”, “systematic murder” and a genocide of “hundreds of thousands” … what’s the connection between the South African War (1899-1902) a.k.a. Boer War 2 and World War 2 (1939-1945) in weaponising words like “concentration camps” for political currency?
The answer funnily enough lies in the little Austrian born Bavarian Lance Corporal with megalomaniac tendencies, to which Jacob Rees-Mogg refers and to whom Grace Blakeley infers (more on Hitler later).
The Boer War ‘Concentration Camps’
Let’s take a quick step back, what’s with attributing the term ‘Concentration Camp’ to the Boer War of 1899 and why the confusion?
Many people have little understanding of the concentration camps of the Boer War. In essence there are two separate phases.
Data Reference: The Boer concentration camps of the South African War, 1900-1902 by Elizabeth van Heyningen.
Phase 1: Started the 22nd September 1900 – they are set up under British military administration by Major-Gen J.G. Maxwell and they are initially intended and termed as “refugee camps” for ‘hensopper’ families (Boers who surrendered early – these include men in addition) and ‘joiner’ families (Boer families whose menfolk joined the British forces and were away fighting) – they are all voluntarily seeking shelter and safety from the Guerrilla phase (Bittereinder campaign) of the war which commences from mid 1900 once Pretoria falls to the British. Here these families are, as Rees-Mogg correctly points out, “sheltered and fed” as there is a “war going on”.
The camps are also referred to as “Government Laagers” – however on the 21st December 1900 Lord Kitchener comes up with a different intention for these “Government Laagers” completely, and he decrees:
“the most effective method of limiting the endurance of the guerrillas … The women and children brought in should be divided in two categories, viz.: 1st. Refugees, and the families of Neutrals, non-combatants, and surrendered Burghers. 2nd. Those whose husbands, fathers and sons are on Commando. The preference in accommodation, etc. should of course be given to the first class. With regard to Natives, it is not intended to clear (Native) locations, but only such and their stock as are on Boer farms.”
The camp concept is then opened up from January 1901 to include “bittereinder” families, which are primarily women and children as their menfolk are still “on Commando” (and any other families for that matter), they are involuntarily displaced by Kitchener’s Scorched Earth policies and this curious concept of a refugee camp/displacement camp is expanded somewhat. Similarly, internees in the black camps (which include men and women) are civilians who are also involuntarily displaced. It’s this bit that Rees-Mogg conveniently ignores.
From March 1901 disease related mortality rates in the camps start to climb to unprecedented and alarming levels, and at their peak the mortality rate is driven primarily by a measles epidemic which sweeps the white camps and accounts 30% the overall deaths – as a child’s disease, along with the high infancy mortality rate and child death ratio in the Victorian period, coupled with the difficulty of wartime conditions and camp sanitary standards, by the beginning of 1902 children account for nearly 2/3 of all deaths.
The period March 1901 to November 1901 is 9 months of abject misery and suffering. However, contrary to modern propaganda, although there are many in the camps who are malnourished and conditions are extremely harsh, they are not purposefully starved to death – ‘Starvation and Scurvy’ accounts for only 3% of recorded deaths in the white camps (the records for the black camps are incomplete). There are also no recoded cases of premeditated murder or executions, all deaths are attributed to disease or medically related conditions.
The conditions and plight of the women and children in the camps, against the context of respiratory and waterborne disease, coupled with inadequate medical countermeasures and failures in administration is highlighted by the likes of Emily Hobhouse and later in 1901 by the Fawcett Commission.
Phase 2: From November 1901 as a result of the Commission’s and parliamentary recommendations, Lord Alfred Milner, the Cape Colony High Commissioner is tasked with taking over the ‘white’ camps from the military and bringing them under civilian authority instead (the Black camps remain under military authority).
Image: Boer concentration camp – children carrying water buckets, colourised by Tinus Le Roux – note the nature of the camp – bell tents, demarkation lines and administration blocks.
As a result of Milner’s direct intervention, from November 1901 the mortality rates start to drop off dramatically as his civilian administrators and medical staff start to get on top of the epidemics, food supply and sanitary issues. They also do away with the preferential treatment of ‘hensopper’ versus ‘bittereinder’ families initiated by the military in the white camps.
Milner’s actions and policies are extremely effective, in just 4 months the mortality rates in the white camps drop to acceptable mortality rates for the Victorian era, made even more remarkable considering that these mortality rates are declining and have plateaued-out in the white camps when the Guerrilla Phase and Scorched Earth policy is at its height and at its most destructive (the black camps are a separate matter).
These ‘acceptable’ i.e. normal mortality rates in the white camps continue up to the end of the war on 31 May 1902 and then remain acceptable long after the end of the war as the camps are then used as ‘resettlement’ centres for displaced Boer families until the end of 1902.
As to Milner, it’s also an inconvenient truth, that a man so often vilified by modern white Afrikaners as the devil reincarnate, is the same man responsible for saving thousands of Boer women and children’s lives.
Look out for a future Observation Post on the Boer War camps whilst we tackle this extremely difficult, deeply tragic and often misunderstood concept of Boer War refugee/displacement/re-settlement camps for whites and refugee/displacement/labour camps for blacks (a.k.a concentration camps). This subject is highly nuanced and highly complex and it is certainly not the highly simplistic and emotionally charged outline put forward by Professor Pretorius in his response to Rees-Mogg.
What’s in a word?
The words “concentration camp” comes from two sources really, the Spanish invent the concept and are accredited with the first use of concentration camps starting in 1896 (not the British – the Spanish ‘invent’ the camps three years before Boer War 2), the Spanish call them “campo de concentración” (concentration camps) during The Cuban War of Independence (1895–98) and they ‘concentrated’ Cuban civilians in camps to break their supply lines to marauding Cuban guerrillas.
The second source of the word “concentration camp” ironically comes from the source of the argument between Rees-Mogg and Grace Blakeley, it’s the Germans. It is the ‘German’ version and evolution of concentration camps which would really weaponise the words and bring in concepts of pre-meditated genocide and systematic murder, and oddly enough it does NOT start with Adolf Hitler and his Nazi cabal, it happens well before Hitler’s time and it does NOT start in Europe, as irony goes – it starts in Africa.
Etymology of concentration camps
As to the actual etymology of concentration camps – as said earlier they start with the Spanish during Cuban War of Independence in 1896, the next country to use concentration camps are the Northern Americans (the USA) in the Philippines during the Tagalog Insurgency earlier in 1899 (as with the Spanish – the USA concentrated Filipino civilians in camps to break their supply lines to marauding guerrillas – with the same tragic outcome as the Spanish when disease takes root in the camps).
The third country to use Concentration Camps are the British in late 1900 to forcibly displace Boer ‘Bittereinder’ civilians and cut Boer guerrilla supply lines in addition to providing genuine refugee shelter to ‘Joiners’ and ‘Hensoppers’, with the same disastrous consequences as the Spanish and the Americans as disease takes root in the camps.
As irony goes (and inconvenient truth) it is also the Germans who suggest the use of a concentration camp system during the Boer War, in addition to a Scorched Earth policy, to the British. Kaiser Wilhelm II, as a favour to his blood relative Queen Victoria – after the ‘Black Week’ British defeats to the Boers in late 1899, sets up a strategic planning session with his military elite and compiles a military strategy, not to help the Boers, but to help the British win the war and shared it with them instead. Kaiser Wilhelm II even proudly proclaiming at the end of the Boer War that the British had followed his plan precisely as he had outlined it to them – not Field Marshal Frederick Robert’s plan (see: John C.G. Röhl: The Kaiser and England during the Boer War).
Now, also as inconvenient history and etymology of concentration camps goes, the fourth country to use Concentration Camps is Germany, it’s Kaiser Wilhelm’s military elite who first uses the system for Germany – and it is NOT Adolf Hitler and his Nazi circle.
The 1st Genocide of the 20th Century
The first German concentration camps are initiated just 2 years after the Boer War, they fall part of the Herero Wars (1904-1908) in German South West Africa (now Namibia) and it is infamously officially regarded as the first Genocide of the 20th Century (not the Boer War).
It starts in a similar vein to the Boer War’s Guerrilla Phase, the Herero lead a guerrilla campaign against the Germans to overthrow their colonial yoke. It cumulates in a battle on the 11th August 1904, known as the Battle of Waterberg and the Herero army is defeated, scattered and weakened. In October 1904, General Lothar von Trotha issued orders to kill every male Herero and drive women and children into the desert, denying them access to key water holes. In the desert ‘hundreds of thousands’ of them promptly die of thirst.
The extermination order was finally suspended by the German government at the end of 1904, the surviving tribesmen are then herded as prisoners into Concentration Camps – in German, now termed “Konzentrationslager” (Concentration Laager or ‘camp’), there are 5 concentration camps and over the course of their existence the Hereto tribe is joined with members of the Nama tribe also rebelling against the Germans. In the concentration camps the Hereto and Nama are put to slave labour in support of the German military and German settlers. Again, the camps are horrific, and the inmates starved of rations and water, disease also takes hold.
These camps are fundamentally different to the British Boer War concept, these are slave labour camps, inmates are imprisoned, there are cases of them been shot, starved and worked to death – some are even hanged. There is no real consideration to medical care and as to medical intervention, the Germans also enter the history books as the first to use concentration camp inmates for medical experimentation.
In all, between the war, the order of extermination and resultant starvation and the concentration camps engaging slave labour approximately 80,000 Hereto and Nama die.
Image: Chained prisoners from the Herero and Nama tribes during the 1904-1908 war against Germany.
Modern Historians have drawn a linear connection between Germany’s ‘Konzentrationslager’ of the Namibian conflict in line with the German ‘Konzentrationslager’ of World War 2, the central thread is “pre-meditated Genocide” (systematic murder in effect). The idea of Concentration Camps to exterminate races of people and ‘purify’ the population starts with General Lothar von Trotha in his written statement on the matter;
“I destroy the African tribes with streams of blood … Only following this cleansing can something new emerge, which will remain.”
The simple truth is, when the Nazi party came to power in Germany, this German policy of using concentration camps for ethnic cleansing and not merely for defeating ‘Guerrilla’ warfare by cutting civilian supply lines as the Spanish, Americans and British had used them – and this Genocidal intent for “Konzentrationslager” becomes highly apparent and acceptable in Germany itself.
Enter Herr Hitler
Now we get to the subject of the Austrian born Bavarian Lance Corporal with megalomaniac tendencies, to which Jacob Reece-Mogg refers and to whom Grace Blakeley infers. What is his connection to The Boer War?
If you’re a big fan of Paul Kruger and Boer Republicanism, and believe that our modern interpretations of the Boer War have nothing to Nazism – now is the chance to look away, because this next bit is going to sting somewhat – our modern interpretation of the Boer War has a lot to with Adolf Hitler and Nazism – in fact Hitler and his Nazi inner circle’s interpretation of the Boer war still guides European opinion of it in Europe and it fundamentally reinforced the Afrikaner Nationalist interpretation of it in South Africa – a legacy that continues even to this day.
Huh! How’s that all connected … Kruger, Hitler and Nationalist Afrikaner ideology and identity? Well, it starts with Herr Hitler’s enthusiasm for everything Boer War related and his dramatic and spell-binding speeches.
Hitler would record in his book ‘Mein Kampf’ that in his youth;
“The Boer War came, like a glow of lightning on the far horizon. Day after day I used to gaze intently at the newspapers, and I almost ‘devoured’ the telegrams and communiqués, overjoyed to think that I could witness that heroic struggle, even from so great a distance…”
Then on the 30th January 1940, with Nazi Germany at the height of its influence and popularity, Adolf Hitler gave a speech at the Sportspalast and stated the following on The Boer War;
“They (Britain) waged war for gold mines and mastery over diamond mines”
Hitler then went on in the same speech to say of the Boer War:
“After all, this entire blockade warfare is nothing other than a war against women and children just as once was the case in the Boer War … It was then that the concentration camps were invented. England locked up women and children in these camps. Over 20,000 Boer women (and children) died wretchedly at the time.”
Just about every sentence Hitler is uttering here is either pure falsehood or a half truth – blaming the British for “inventing” the “Konzentrationslager”, painting the camps as “locked” prisons, and implying the British wage genocide and not war.
Image: Adolf Hitler speaking at the Sportspalast
Ah, but it’s just a speech Mr Dickens – you make too much of it! Hitler said many things comes the universal call … nobody took him seriously! Wrong … this gets much bigger than just a speech – this ‘Pro-Boer’ Nationalism morphs into an entire Nazi propaganda campaign – one which is regarded as the most influential and successful Nazi propaganda campaigns ever devised – so bear with me.
What Hitler is doing in his speech is using his intense ‘fame’, peaking in 1940, across Germany, Western Europe and the globe in some respects – remember that Hitler is a world player and influencer from 1935 to 1940, he is literally a “God” in Germany and Austria – what comes out his mouth people listen to and literally millions of people gobble it up as a truth. With this statement he achieves three things:
Firstly, he demonises the British (the only real “enemy” he has left in 1940) as an enemy of the German people, but also – most importantly – an enemy to Europeans at large – and he uses the Boer War for this purpose as it is in living memory for many Europeans, this deflects the focus on Germany as the enemy to Britain as the enemy of Europe. Europe is now also within the 3rd Reich’s scope of influence – which at the time needs to be viewed as sort of early version of the European Economic Union, and in 1940 it was literally at its height.
Nazism and the concept of the 3rd Reich was a lot more popular in Europe in the lead up to World War 2 than most people would believe now. In fact its position as “anti-bolshevist” (anti-Communist) and as “anti-Judeo Capital” found vast popular appeal in right wing and conservative parties across Europe – especially in France, the Netherlands and Belgium, these people would see Nazi Germany as liberators – not invaders – and after Germany invades Western Europe in 1940 they all immediately come into government of their respective countries as collaborating parties to the Nazi cause (the conservative and popular southern based “Vichy French” government is a case in point), and they immediately engaged with the 3rd Reich and it’s regional economic and political policies. Hitler is relying on these supporters to support his view that Britain and not Germany is the true enemy, and the Boer War according to Hitler is his ‘proof positive’ of this.
Secondly, Hitler is reinforcing Anglophobia and Republicanism in South Africa through propaganda and he is giving re-assurance to the Afrikaner nationalist cause from Berlin. To understand this better, Afrikaner Nationalism starts in earnest with the establishment of the National Party in 1914 – at this stage it has as its central ideology ‘Krugerism’ – Kruger’s political philosophy and the old ZAR’s (Transvaal) Republicanism constitution and race laws (Grondwet) at its centre. An Oligarchy bordering on a Theocracy with no political emancipation for Black Africans whatsoever (the majority), and racially based franchise and citizenship restrictions for white ‘foreigners’ (read British) and Jews.
By 1940 this party has evolved its ‘Krugerism’ ideology to a ‘Christian Nationalism’ ideology – a political philosophy which B.J. Vorster (a future South African head of state) famously equated with National Socialism (Nazism) in 1942 when he said:
“We stand for Christian Nationalism which is an ally of National Socialism. You can call this anti-democratic principle dictatorship if you wish. In Italy it is called Fascism, in Germany National Socialism and in South Africa, Christian Nationalism”.
Also bear in mind in 1940, when Hitler gave this speech and referenced the Boer War, the National Party was bound to the hip with openly pro-National Socialism, Pro-Hitler, Pro-Nazi Germany movements in South Africa – domestic political organs like the South African Nazi ‘shirt’ movements – Louis Weichardt’s South African Christian Nationalist Socialist Party or “Greyshirts” and Manie Wessels’ and Chris Havemann’s ‘Democratic Movement’ or “Blackshirts”. Other Nazi ‘shirt’ organisations included the Volksbeweging (People’s Movement) or ‘African Gentile Organisation’ which was established by H.S. Terblanche. Johannes Bruwer also founded the ‘Bond van Nasionale Werkers’ (National Workers Union) which became known as the “Brownshirts”.
Added to this was the Ossewabrandwag led by a Nazi devotee – Dr J.F.J. van Rensburg who transformed the Ossewabrandwag from a predominately Afrikaner cultural movement surrounding the 1938 Great Trek Centenary into a militarised, totalitarian, anti-Semitic, anti-British, anti-Anglo/Judaism capital and pro-Nazi movement operating under the guise of an Afrikaner cultural movement. In addition, the National Party’s Defence Minister, Prime Minister Barry Hertzog’s right-hand man, Oswald Pirow was another Nazi devotee, and it inspired his organisation – the Nazi ‘New Order’ or Nu Order. Added to this is the popular leader of the 1914 Boer Rebellion – Manie Maritz, who has become an Hitler worshiper and rabid antisemite, now leading the ‘anti-democratic’, ‘one party’, ‘national socialist’ – ‘Boerenasie’ (Boer Nation) party.
Images: SANP and Ossewabrandwag
As outlined by Werner Bouwer in his ‘National Socialism and Nazism in South Africa’ – to all these South African Hitler admirers and their followers, Hitler’s assurance that the British committed a Boer ‘Genocide’ is music to their ears. They all attested to the concept that the British had tried to ethnically cleanse South Africa of the Boer nation during the war – and here one of the world’s greatest leaders, a 20th Century iconoclast who agreed with them, and whose not to believe Adolf Hitler? He is a European powerhouse, he’s at the helm of a super-power like Britain and now he’s standing up to Britain and telling it as it is – if it comes from Hitler it’s a truism, the British committed Boer Genocide and stole the Boer’s gold … and it does not end there, Hitler goes further … much further.
Enter Herr Göring
During a press interview Hermann Göring (the spokesperson on behalf of Adolf Hitler), took a leaf out his Führer’s leader’s book on the Boer War when he deflected a challenge from Sir Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador to Berlin who protested about the German government’s use of concentration camps for the political ‘re-education’ of German’s dissonant non-believers in Nazism and opposition in 1935, and using a ‘press stunt’ Göring dramatically sprung up, walked over to a bookcase and like a thespian actor, grabbed a German encyclopedia opening it at “Konzentratinslager” he read out loud,
“First used by the British, in the South African War”.
Although factually incorrect, his action served as a skilful stroke of deflection of which Hermann Göring was a past master.
Image: Adolf Hitler (left) and Hermann Göring (right).
It was not just Hermann Göring in Hitler’s inner circle toeing his Führer’s line on the Boer War, using all the propaganda tools at their disposal, this myth was about to hit the big time as also in the ‘inner circle’ is the Nazi Propaganda Minister and he’s going to really propagate Boer War myths – not only in Germany, but also across the entire Western European continent.
Enter Herr Goebbels
Dr. Joseph Goebbels was a propaganda mastermind, he was a rabid, almost insane follower of his Führer, Adolf Hitler and a devout Nazi.
In printed media, the German propaganda machine would go even further on the back of Hitler’s speeches and use an image of Paul Kruger and the Boer War on propaganda posters to recruit Waffen SS troops in the Netherlands and Belgium, with whom these countries had an affinity for the Boer War. Both these countries proved highly fruitful in recruiting Waffen SS troops as they feared Bolshevism more than Nazism and for these conservative sections of the populations Nazism had an appeal (not to be confused with the SS, the Waffen SS also comprised ‘non-German’ and ‘foreign’ battalions – and later in the war they proved to be ferocious and devout combatants).
Next up in Goebbels’ propaganda arsenal was radio. Joseph Goebbels made this radio address on 19 April 1940, on the eve of Adolph Hitler’s birthday and said:
“On 3 September last year (1939), two hours after English plutocracy declared war on the German Reich, the British Prime Minister Chamberlain gave a radio speech …The point of the speech was that England had no intention of waging war against the German people … get rid of the Führer or so-called Hitlerism …. At the beginning of the war, however, they sang the same old song …. Its melody was dull and worn out. British plutocracy had tried to persuade the Boers during the South African war of the same thing. Britain was only fighting Krugerism. As is well known, that did not stop them from allowing countless thousands of women and children to starve in English concentration camps”.
Image: Joseph Goebbels making a radio address on the eve of Adolph Hitler’s birthday.
The idea that Britain and not Germany is the natural enemy of civilised Europe because of they way they conducted the Boer War and committing pre-meditated genocide in concentration camps is starting to take shape. Goebbels said of radio;
“We want a radio … that is an intermediary between the government and the nation, a radio that also reaches across our borders to give the world a picture of our character, our life, and our work.”
In this respect Radio Zeesen was also part of the arsenal, it was a Nazi German ‘International’ propaganda service radio station broadcasting in short wave in eighteen different foreign languages including Afrikaans, it broadcasted both Hitler’s speeches and Goebbels’ messages – and eagerly picked by devout Afrikaner Nationalists in South Africa.
Also, Goebbels loved, literally adored movies and the moving picture industry – he regarded this industry as his single most powerful propaganda tool, and he made a number of movies that came to define the Nazi legacy:
The Jud Süß – ‘Süss the Jew’ – was released in 1940, and it became an absolute blockbuster – today it is considered one of the most antisemitic films of all time. However, even this movie did not make it to the much-converted Reich Propaganda Ministry’s “Film of the Nation” rating. Only four movies made it to this rare honorary distinction deemed critical viewing for national identity in Nazi Germany – Heimkhehr (1941) – an anti-Polish movie, Der große König (1942) – a movie about Frederick the Great of Prussia, Die Entlassung (1942) – a movie about the dismissal of Otto von Bismarck and finally …… Ohm Krüger (1941), a movie about Paul Kruger and the Boer War.
Say what? Ohm Krüger – Uncle Paul Kruger! What on earth does that have to do with German National identity, all the other movies are about Germany and the Nazi journey in forging their National Socialist identity – that all makes sense, what on earth is a movie about South Africa and the Boer War doing in the mix – what does that possibly have to do with Nazi identity?
Well, as an inconvenient truth goes, it turns out quite a lot – so let’s examine what its purpose was, how its linked to Nazim, its relationship to Concentration Camp propaganda and how it fared – its impact.
Ohm Krüger, the man, the movie and the myth
Directed by Hans Steinhoff and starring Emil Jannings, Lucie Höflich and Werner Hinz. Although the plot has nothing to do with Germany, the story centres around a character which the Germans could admire, “Uncle” Paul Kruger – a man the Propaganda Minister wants to draw parallels to Adolf Hitler, who he deems is also a man with a common touch, from a simple background and one who is thrust into extraordinary circumstances due to international aggression and a conspiracy of greedy ‘foreigners’.
The plot revolves around a dying Kruger’s flashback, now old and blind confined to a sanatorium in Switzerland.
Harping back to an earlier time, Kruger is portrayed as having all the mystique of a great national leader at odds with Great Britain and proclaims, “With England, one cannot come to an understanding”, “We have only one aim, peace and liberty”, “One must be a dreamer to become a ruler.” Much as Adolf Hitler himself is proclaiming.
Lord Kitchener, the British Commander in South Africa is portrayed as a sadist stating things like “No more humanity”, “We must be without mercy”, “We must set up concentration camps” and fight the war “by colonial means.”
The film also centres on Cecil John Rhodes as the principle villain, desirous of Transvaal Gold he creates border disputes (the Jameson Raid) in cohorts with Joseph Chamberlain (the Colonial Secretary), who in turn solicits the support of Queen Victoria and Price Edward, who also become desirous of invasion once they learn of the gold in the region, Queen Victoria’s character states “If there’s gold to be found, then of course it’s our country. We British are the only ones capable of carrying the burdens of wealth without becoming ungodly”.
Kruger then tricks the British into signing a treaty which gives them the gold, but Kruger holds onto the supply of dynamite as a monopoly, which the British then have to buy from him at exorbitant prices.
Cecil Rhodes, having been tricked and outmanoeuvred by the astute Kruger, then tries to buy Paul Kruger’s allegiance offering him a ‘open’ chequebook. However, Kruger is incorruptible and rejects his offer. Rhodes then decides to expose members of Paul Kruger’s Raad (council) who are British spies on his payroll and shows Kruger a list of names. Fearing an internal plot that will over-throw his authority, Kruger decides to declare war against the British or lose his country.
The Boers are initially victorious in the war, but Lord Kitchener then rather cowardly decides to use Boer women and children as human shields and places them in concentration camps in an attempt to demoralise the Boer Army. To this point Kitchener’s character says, “an end to woolly humanitarianism, which means hitting the Boers where they are vulnerable. We must burn their farms, separate wives and children from their men folk, and put them in concentration camps. From today all Boer, without exception, are outlaws. No distinction is to be made between soldiers and civilians.”
Kruger’s own son, Jan Kruger, tries to find his wife in a concentration camp, he’s portrayed as educated at Oxford University and at first harbours pro-British sympathies, but changes his mind completely when a drunken British Sergeant assaults his wife. Jan Kruger is caught and becomes the martyr for the Boer cause when he is hanged by the neck by the British on a hill that looks like Golgotha. “I die for the Fatherland” he cries.
Like a Shakespearean tragedy, a British soldier then shoots Jan Kruger’s wife (their children are already dead) and the interned Boer women respond angrily to the hanging, so the British then form a skirmish line and brutally massacre them – indiscriminately shooting women in the back and mowing them down as they flee the executioner’s hill with Jan Kruger swinging from a lone tree.
The flashback concludes in the Geneva hotel room. In conclusion, the dying and blind Kruger reflects on the defeat of the Boers then prophesies the destruction of Britain by major powers of the world declaring “We were a small people, but great and powerful nations will arise to reduce the British to pulp” which alludes to the German Third Reich, Fascist Italy and later Imperial Japan.
To any historian who knows his salt, this entire plot is pure fable, it really is “Ouma se stories” – absolute ‘Hollywood’. Gold is the ‘Catalyst’ to the war but not the ‘Casus Belli’ of the war – that’s a franchise vote for a disenfranchised majority in the Transvaal. No women and children are ever shot in a Concentration Camp by any British soldier – ever, didn’t happen, there’s also no recorded ‘massacre’ as is portrayed in the movie, didn’t happen either – in fact there is also no recorded hanging in a concentration camp, public or otherwise.
The British are victorious in both phases of the war – not the Boers. Kruger’s’ son is never executed by the British, they also never shoot his wife. Kitchener goes to pains to distinguish between civilians and combatants in proclamation after proclamation. The Jameson raid is to raise ‘white’ disenfranchised miners, into revolt not hordes of native ‘blacks’ into rebellion (as is the movie’s sub plot – with Blacks depicted as ‘treasonous’, ‘primative’ and ‘ignorant’ requiring good white Afrikaner benevolence and oversight). Joseph Chamberlain is exonerated over the Jameson Raid and there is no documented proof he had oversight of the raid whatsoever, Queen Victoria certainly had no knowledge of the Raid.
Queen Victoria is also not a drunk and in fact goes out her way to affirm her wish for independence for the ZAR. Jan Kruger is never a British sympathiser, nor does he go to Oxford, also there is no such thing as list of ZAR ‘Raad’ spies shown to Kruger by Rhodes as the ‘trigger’ to the war – the ‘trigger’ to the war is the Boer invasions of sovereign British territories on the 11th October 1899. The British never seize a gold mine, they nationalise nothing, in fact they don’t even really benefit from the taxes from the mines – the mines remain in private hands, before and after the war.
And the Nazi German propaganda machine didn’t miss a beat in the movie, the evil Cecil Rhodes is played by none other than the Austrian actor Ferdinand Marian, who was better known to German audiences as Süss the Jew in the very popular and disgustingly antisemitic “The Jud Süß” – a better villain to link Judeo-Capitalism with British-Capitalism they could not find.
As antisemitic the undertone is, as racist the overtone is, British missionaries are seen handing out rifles to Black South Africans to rise in rebellion and kill Boers singing ‘God save the Queen’ and onward Christian soldiers. Queen Victoria herself is portrayed as a cunning old harridan addicted to whisky, and a Winston Churchill look alike is portrayed as an overfed commander of a concentration camp for Boer women, who are kept in a condition of starvation and whose plight is depicted, not in bell tents on open veldt, but in an Auschwitz look-alike camp complete with towers and barbed wire containment fences.
On Churchill, the Nazi propaganda machine surrounding the movie also doesn’t miss a beat either. Churchill’s involvement in the Boer War is mercilessly exploited, even accusing him directly of implementing the concentration camp policy (which is pure fabrication) – and the following media release accompanies the film:
“The same Churchill who in South Africa saw his ideas about exterminating the Boers followed throughout, as the English rulers, voicing polished humanitarian slogans, while driven by mere greed, unleashed the most contemptible actions on a people under attack. The same Churchill is now Great Britain’s prime minister.”
Winston Churchill is an imbedded journalist and later a combatant and has nothing to do with concentration camps, in fact he never laid eyes on a Boer one – he returns to Great Britain at the end of the 1st Phase (Conventional war phase) of the war before the camp system is initiated.
British concentration camps were portrayed in the film as intentionally inhumane. Meanwhile, as irony goes, at the same time major expansion of the Nazi German system of concentration camps is taking place, designed for actual ethnic cleansing, slave labour and systematic murder and it was being enthusiastically implemented by those very same Nazi.
As extreme irony goes, the set of the British concentration camp for Ohm Krüger was actually but a few miles from a real Nazi Concentration Camp at Sachsenhausen, an interesting case of art imitating life. Out of 200,000 inmates in the real camp, half died, about 100,000 people from 1936 to 1945 – twice as many than the entire Boer War, and that is only ONE of the German concentration camps – theirs is murder on an industrial level.
Finally, as the film’s prediction goes – the world powers do not rise up to crush Britain, in fact they rise up and crush Germany. But to the power of propaganda, there are still people in South Africa and Europe who would take all of Ohm Krüger as an absolute truism – even to this day.
To see the full movie of Ohm Krüger – with English sub titles, here is the YouTube link:
What’s the outcome, how does this movie do?
It’s a massive success, a propagandistic blockbuster, it’s by far the most expensive film produced in Nazi Germany up to that time with a 5.5 million Reich Marks budget and a massive film lot outside Berlin that resembles a mini-South Africa with 100 Longhorn cattle and African huts. Ohm Krüger offers plenty of entertainment – ‘wild west’ frontier grit alongside its vivid battle scenes, as if John Ford’s Monument Valley had been transposed onto South Africa’s Transvaal region.
It is first screened on 4th April 1941 in Germany, and it’s rolled out across Europe – it opens in Italy in September 1941, France on the 1st October 1941, Hungary on the 19th December 1941, Finland on the 15th March 1942 and it even makes it to Japan on the 2nd September 1943. It makes it way right across Europe – Bulgaria, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium etc.
Both locally and internationally, it is received to rapturous applause. It is pitched as the European cinema equivalent to ‘Gone with the wind’ and it’s a winner – literally, not only the first movie to win the converted ‘Film of the Nation’ and the award for ‘Film of Special Value in terms of state policy and art’, but importantly – it also wins the Mussolini Cup for the Best Foreign Film at the 1941 Venice Film Festival.
The movie is so popular, the Nazi propaganda machine even decided to re-release it in 1944. In the end – millions of people see it, today it is regarded as Nazi propaganda master stroke. However, as irony goes the Nazi propaganda machine ‘Bans’ the movie in 1945, not because it’s a great yarn, entertaining and an outstanding propaganda piece – but because they are concerned that the graphic massacre of Boer women at the end of the movie would upset the female population of Germany concerned about their treatment at the hands of the counter-attacking and invading Soviet Union and other Allied armies at the end of the war.
How does this movie stack up to our modern understanding of Concentration Camps, what does it do to link Nazi Concentration camps to Boer Concentration Camps? Let’s look at how the international critics review this movie in relation to this question.
Erwin Leiser in his 1974 work Nazi Cinema said;
“Ohm Kruger is meant to show that Britain is the brutal enemy of any kind of order or civilization … when England realizes that even with cannon and rifles she cannot crush the little nation whose heroic struggle is jubilantly acclaimed by the whole world, she (England) decides to commit one of the most obscene acts in the history of the world … the technique makes it possible to reveal that concentration camps were no German invention: the peculiar logic of Gobbels thereby justifies the Nazi camps.”
And Roger Manvell in his study of Films and the Second World War concludes;
“The shattering conclusion to the movie, the concentration camp massacre, provokes and disturbs even today, not only due to its undeniable artistry, but more because of how it invites comparison with the still greater horrors we associate with Nazi Germany, atrocities this movie was designed to rationalize and exonerate.”
Bottom line, the movies broad appeal, the unrelenting publicity and propaganda machine surrounding it, its popular acceptance in Europe and extensive distribution cements the idea throughout Europe that the Boer Concentration Camps are a British invention and that they are intended to ethnically cleanse the Boer nation. By demonising the British in this way, the German propaganda machine very successfully deflects and sanitisers their own Nazi ‘Extermination Camp’ Concentration Camps which are indeed intended to ethnically cleanse Europe of Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, asylum patients and even Freemasons.
The Nazi German death rate in their concentration camp, POW camp and extermination camp systems is on an industrial scale, 18.5 million die in total, a figure so high that it is almost impossible to comprehend – the idea that concentration camps are purposefully engineered and designed to eliminate hundreds of thousands of people at a time, the 6 Nazi extermination camps in Poland alone kill over 3 million people.
In Conclusion
The net result of it, to this day, throughout Europe (as this is all still in living memory within one generation to many) the British are forever tarnished with the idea that they “invented the concentration camp” and they committed “systematic murder” and genocide to “hundreds of thousands” of Boers as the poorly misguided and very misinformed Grace Blakeley blurts out in her response to Jacob Rees-Mogg.
Now, Grace Blakeley is not a known South African historical commentator, in fact it’s doubtful she’s ever read a proper historic treatise on the Boer War, the conversation she is having with Jacob Rees-Mogg is on Winston Churchill’s legacy, the Boer War is mentioned in passing. What she states as ‘facts’ on the Boer War are nothing more than perceptions, and in Europe the perceptions on the Boer War were driven by the both Nazi propaganda machine and the concept of the German Konzentrationslager.
Afrikaner Nationalism from 1948 and their Christian Nationalist propaganda on the Boer War is highly isolated, it exists in South Africa only, it does not make it onto a European platform in any significant way whatsoever – as far as the British education establishment are concerned the official history of the Boer War is Leo Amery’s 7 volumes titled ‘The Times History of the war in South Africa’ – end of story, and it says nothing about “systematic murder”, ethnic cleansing or the British “inventing the concentration camp”, it’s this history that Etonian teachers impart to the likes of Jacob Rees-Mogg.
Grace Blakeley has never been exposed to an Afrikaner Christian Nationalist education and it’s doubtful she’s even read Leo Amery – she would not know what a South African ‘Boer’ is if one jumped up and bit her on the bum. It’s not accredited history that is guiding Grace Blakeley, she has no clue that the Spanish and Americans used concentrations camps before the British. The Spanish who actually invented the concentration camp and whose mortality rate on Cuban civilians far exceed that of the Boer camps get away with it scot-free, even to this day, such is the power of this propaganda.
Nor has Grace Blakeley any idea of Boer mortality during the war. Her view is sheer perception based on the output of an extensive and very effective Nazi German propaganda campaign in Europe, coupled with the fact that Germany is singularly responsible for linking concentration camps to systematic murder and pre-meditated genocide, which it invented (not the British) as early as 1904, and by 1945 had perfected the killing machine on an unpredicted level. Hence the reason Jacob Rees-Mogg has to remind her that she’s promoting a Nazi construct and intensionally confusing the matter.
The erstwhile Professor Fransjohan Pretorius in tacitly harbouring the same sentiment and directly supporting Grace Blakeley as both of them are now in unison challenging Jacob Reese-Mogg, and this desire to morally “set him strait” is testament to the power of the propaganda driving both of them. In pitching his rebuttal to Rees-Mogg and approaching the media in the way Professor Fransjohan Pretorius does, he is allowing everyone else, now armed with confirmation bias, to challenge Jacob Rees-Mogg’s misunderstandings only and not challenge the Nazi inspired mistruths peddled by Grace Blakeley.
On linking Nazism, Kruger, Krugerism and Christian Nationalism, I’m afraid the hard truth is that linking Kruger to Hitler was done very effectively by the German propaganda ministry in Europe prior to and during World War 2. The Afrikaner Nationalist ‘right’ in their support of Nazi Germany during WW2 and infusing the edicts of Krugerism with Weimar Eugenics to create Apartheid after World War 2 certainly creates a linear relationship and reinforces the argument somewhat.
Written and Researched by Peter Dickens
References:
National Socialism and Nazism in South Africa: The case of L.T. Weichardt and his Greyshirt movements, 1933-1946 By Werner Bouwer
Ohm Kruger/Uncle Kruger: The notorious of Nazi Germany’s Anti-British Statements. By Blaine Taylor
Concentration camps in the South African War? Here are the real facts! by Professor Fransjohan Pretorius
BBC On-Line: Jacob Rees-Mogg comments on concentration camps
IMDb On-Line: Ohm Krüger
Ohm Krüger: The Genesis of a Nazi Propaganda Film By Christian W. Hallstein
Films and the Second World War (1974) by Roger Manvell
Morbidity and Mortality in the Concentration Camps of the South African War, 1899-1902 (2007) by Dr Iain R. Smith (History, Warwick University) and Dr Elizabeth van Heyningen (University of Cape Town) 2007.
Nazi Cinema (1974) by Erwin Leiser
The Kaiser and England during the Boer War by John C.G. Röhl
South African Scientific Journal “The Boer concentration camps of the South African War, 1900-1902” By Elizabeth van Heyningen – Department of Historical Studies, University of Cape Town, South Africa
The Rise of the South African Reich. By Brian Bunting – published in 1964.
Thanks to JennyB Colourising and Tinus Le Roux for the colourised images.
An opposing view, a massacre, a revolt, and a Nazi.
There is an old joke in Afrikaner politics, put two Afrikaners in a room and they will come up with three political parties!
It’s funny because throughout history it has always proven to be very true, As a nation from the get go, literally from the Great Trek serious schisms have occurred within the Afrikaner culture – from the Great Trek’s “Vlugkommando” where two trekking parties could NOT agree a overall Commando Commander for an assault on the Zulu on the 6th April 1838 and decided instead to have two equal Commanders in equal positions of authority – the result (if you’re a military vet – you guessed it) .. a Zulu victory and the death of 10 Voortrekkers including Piet and Dirkie Uys – the surviving “Vlug” Kommando (meaning “Flee” or ‘run-away’ commando) splitting ways after the battle, both accusing each other of been “Veraaiers” (traitors) and heading off on their respective treks.
So, as humorous as it is seriously tragic, nothing represents this dichotomy of views more so than this image of Jan Smut’s Commando during the South African War (1899-1902) a.k.a. The 2nd Boer War. In it are two leaders who have – right upfront – two massively differing opinions, two completely differing views of life and vastly differing outlooks on the objects of the war and the country as a whole going forward. So much so that it is a surprise that Smuts was even able to command this Commando, that his is arguably one of the most successful ‘Bittereinder’ Commanders of the war is even more surprising, and testament to Smuts’ abilities.
Image: General Jan Smuts’ Commando during the South African War 1899-1902. Smuts and Maritz are seated in the centre – photo colourised by Jennifer Bosch
So, what’s with this leadership battle – what’s with these vastly differing views? The two people in this famous photograph are Manie Maritz and Jan Smuts, and the composition of the shot by the photographer ironically betrays their future feelings towards one another as an intense dislike of one another would emerge – and even here, almost by purpose, Smuts is seated opposite Maritz for a group portrait and both of them have their backs to one another looking the other way.
This differing view and outlook of these two men would forever taint Smuts’ commando with a mass murder of civilians – something your school history book would have conveniently glanced over – this differing outlook on Afrikanerdom would result in a serious schism in Afrikaner cultural fabric after World War 1, a schism that still exists to this day believe it or not and it would it would even add to the “Nazification” of the Afrikaner far right-wing prior to World War 2 and as a result create a diametrically opposing view of Afrikaner identity itself.
What, Maritz, Smuts … mass murder and Nazism – you smoking your socks again right Mr. Dickens? Well, no – let me explain … and if you are a fan of the 1914 Boer Revolt and a Boer Romantic looking to this revolt as the bedrock of Boer stoicism and independence – now is the time to look away, as this next bit is going to sting a little.
Let’s get this out upfront. General Manie Maritz, as the leader of the 1914 Boer revolt does not end up a very redeemable figure in history bathed in glory, instead he ends up as a murderer, an antisemite, a racist and a devout Nazi … the bit your Nationalist inspired school history book did not want you to know about him … the inconvenient truth.
An opposing view
Let’s start with Boer War 2, and upfront Maritz and Smuts are already at different points of view in Smuts’ Commando. It starts with Maritz’ rank, role and appointment in the Commando. Maritz would maintain Smuts gave him the rank of ‘General’ as a field commission – in the Republican Armies this was known as a “veggeneraal” or ‘fighting-general’. Deneys Reitz, Smuts’ long-time right-hand man, confidant, and friend, has a different view and claimed Maritz was only a “leader of various rebel bands” and never given a Generalship – as Reitz was also on Smuts’ staff, Reitz would have known if Martiz was made a ‘veggeneraal’or not.
The two leaders upfront also differ on leadership style, experience and philosophy. Smuts is a skilled lawyer and academic, he is a ‘Philosopher General’ and takes a very holistic view to the fighting seeking a consolidation of ‘white civilisation’ in Southern Africa between Boer and Brit as its final object. Smuts also has an outward look, seeking through the ‘consolidation of the white races’ good neighbourliness with all South Africa’s peoples, including South Africa’s ‘coloureds’ and ‘blacks’. Maritz on the other hand is a ‘Soldier’s General’, he starts his military career as a guard at the Johannesburg Fort after the Jameson Raid and subsequently becomes a ZARP Policeman. Maritz has a reputation as a “thug” he’s a devout Boer Republican, he wants nothing to do with reconciliation with the ‘hated’ British, he is inwardly focussed and views ‘coloureds’ and ‘blacks’ very suspiciously.
So, Smuts and Maritz are fundamentally different in their leadership styles, outlooks and personalities and it would come to a head towards the end of Boer War 2 in what was to become known as the ‘Leliefontein massacre’. For those who have an abiding admiration for Smuts, now is also the time to also look away, as some historians have tarnished Smuts with the title of “mass murderer” as it took place ‘under his watch’ so to speak, but the culprit is really Maritz – so what happened?
A Massacre
Over two days, starting on the 31st January 1902, the ‘noble’ Boer bittereinder effort of the Boer War, and even Jan Smuts, would emerge forever tarnished by what is considered by some as the first massacre of innocents of the 20th Century.
A rather dishonourable title and achievement not often emphasised by Boer War ‘Republican’ historians, journalists and commentators – rather conveniently ignored by them is the nature of this phase of the war really – the repeated targeting, pillaging and ransacking of mission stations, ‘hensopper’ farms (farms belonging to Boers who surrendered prematurely during the amnesty), ‘Joiner’ farms (farms belonging to Boers who joined the British) and even tribal villages by marauding Bittereinder groupings. This period also sees many Black and Coloureds executed by Bittereinder Boer firing squads and hangman nooses, mainly charged with “spying” for or “working” with the British. It is not such a ‘glorious’ end to a noble fight to the end, as romantic Boer war novelists would have you believe – its harsh war – bloody and revengeful, and nobody in the ‘Guerrilla’ phase of the Boer War comes out smelling of roses – not the British with their tactic of Scorched Earth and certainly not the Boers with their tactic of Marauding.
Manie Maritz
Many of these actions were of little real tangible military value in the war against the British and have more to do with retribution than anything else, and front and centre in this controversial phase is Manie Maritz, who whilst he is under Jan Smuts’ command, rides into the ‘Nama’ missionary town of Leliefontein in the far north west Cape – deep inside the British Cape Colony. Here Maritz immediately detains the Methodist missionary – Barnabas Links – who was acting in place of the absent Rev J.G. Locke. Maritz subsequently reads out a proclamation threatening death to both residents and the town’s missionaries alike if they are found guilty of aiding or abetting the British.
The Nama people (the local people made up of a mix of KhoiKhoi, Namibian and Tswana) and their missionaries are British subjects living in a British colony and fearing for their lives don’t take lightly to the proclamation threat and become steadily agitated. From here out there is a lot of conflicting account, in detaining Barnabas Links a rather strong verbal exchange over jurisdiction and authority takes place and some say Links strikes Maritz with his stick, others say Maritz strikes Links with his sjambok. Either way, a ‘fists and knives” scuffle breaks between a group of citizens and Maritz’ men, one Republican is injured, Links is also injured, and Maritz and his men manage to disentangle themselves from the melee, leaving 8 Leliefonteiners dead, and ride back to their rendezvous camp.
That night, Maritz and his men become indignant at their treatment at the hands of the Leliefonteiners and elect to exact revenge by wiping the missionary off the face of the earth. So, the next morning the Commando detachment numbering about 100 mounted Boers attacks the missionary in full force. The Nama and their missionaries are no match for a fully armed Boer commando, having some antiquated muskets they try and hold off the assault and most take refuge in the mission building. A further 27 Leliefonteiners are killed (some accounts say a total of 43) and approximately 100 are injured.
Image: Modern day image of the Methodist Mission Church, Leliefontein (erected in 1855, it was the third church built at the mission station).
Maritz then directs all the surviving women and children, male survivors, and the wounded (including Links) be taken away in chains to the Boer positions surrounding Okiep, one account points to the local blacksmith been instructed to fashion iron shackles for this purpose. Some accounts also point to general violence been meted out by the Boers against surviving Leliefonteiners after the skirmish and ‘refugees’ been hunted down and killed.
Maritz instructs that the mission station be pillaged and then burned down – all the captured sheep and grain are to be forwarded to a Boer supply depot. The mission station is completely destroyed and the dead Leliefonteiners are left where they died – and here they remained unburied for months.
So, how does Smuts and his General Staff react to the news that a detachment of his Commando had ransacked a mission station and killed over 30 poorly armed or unarmed British civilians in a revenge attack? Deneys Reitz on arriving at the destroyed mission station described the scene as follows:
“We found the place sacked and gutted and among the rocks beyond the buried houses lay 20 or 30 dead Hottentots, still clutching their antiquated muzzleloaders. This was Maritz’s handiwork. He had ridden into the station with a few men to interview the European missionaries, when he was set upon by armed Hottentots, he and his escorts narrowly escaping with their lives. To avenge the insult, he returned the next morning with a stronger force and wiped out the settlement, which seemed to many of us a ruthless and unjustifiable act. General Smuts said nothing but I saw him walk past the boulders where the dead lay, and on his return he was moody and curt… we lived in an atmosphere of rotting corpses for some days.”
Deneys Reitz
Smuts, although clearly unimpressed with Maritz, actually comes through for Maritz in accounting the massacre in his letter to General de la Rey, he down-plays the instance as a “close shave” for Maritz and somewhat covers up the incident, citing that Maritz was attacked by a knobkerrie whilst acting as a peace envoy, it was taken as a sign of attack and only “8 hottentots” were killed due “to misunderstanding and ignorance” (Nel, Eben: Kaapse rebelle van die Hantam-karoo, p 461).
Some commentators point to this as collusion, as Maritz is completely exonerated and never held to account for the massacre – whereas similar instances of ‘murdering’ civilians in the cases of the Australian officer Lt. Harry ‘Breaker’ Morant and the Boer Commandant Gideon Scheepers landed them both in front of their respective firing squads.
To further demonstrate just how off the hinge Maritz was, the last real Boer action of the Boer War was when Jan Smuts’ Commando laid siege to the mining town of Okiep in the British Cape Colony in April, 1902. On hearing the news of the Peace Conference, Reitz writes “General Smuts set to work at once. Next morning a messenger was sent into O’Okiep, to advise the garrison that both sides were to refrain front active military operations while the Congress lasted”.
Jan Smuts then left the siege of O’okiep to take part in the final Peace talks at Vereeniging at the end of April 1902. With Smuts away Manie Maritz decided to attack Okiep with the idea of literally wiping the entire town off the map, using the commandeered Namaqua United Copper Company locomotive ‘Pioneer’ – which was used to propel a mobile bomb in the form of a wagonload of dynamite into the besieged town. The attack failed when the train derailed, snagged upon a barbed wire fence which wrapped around the points, spilling the dynamite upon the ground which burnt out harmlessly.
The exercise could have resulted in killing large numbers of women and children (mainly coloured) who sheltered behind the defences, the failure of the operation was a blessing at a time when deliberations at the Vereeniging peace talks potentially heralded the end of the conflict. Smuts would again gloss over the incident and cover for Maritz when he stated that the railway was still intact after the incident anyway, and since there were women and children in Okiep town, all the commando was allowed to do was to give the good citizens of Okiep a “tremendous fright with a harmless explosion.”
Images: General Jan Smuts and General Christiaan Beyers at the Vereeniging Peace negotiations (left), and the locomotive ‘Pioneer’ used by Maritz to try and blow up the town of Okiep in Smuts’ absence (right).
Smuts’ disposition to treating treasonous, rebellious and insubordinate Boer commanders with ‘kid gloves’ in the hopes of placating and consolidating their views to see his way on things would be Smuts’ greatest ‘Achilles heel’ – as there would be no such quarter given in the way they would view or treat him in future. Which brings us to the next instance – The Boer revolt of 1914.
A Revolt
Much has been written on the Boer Revolt of 1914, but let’s understand the ‘differing’ view between Smuts and Maritz in the lead up and then the instigation of the revolt itself. Where Smuts was involved in negotiating the Peace at Vereeniging to end the Boer War in 1902, Maritz as part of his leader element would have none of it. When peace was made, the burghers of the erstwhile Republics were obliged to lay down their arms and sign an oath of allegiance to the British monarch – Maritz refused and instead he slipped over the border into German South West Africa (modern Namibia).
In German South West Africa (GSWA), Maritz would become embroiled in another massacre, this time the Hereto and Namaqua genocide – which as irony goes it is the first recorded case of Germans using the concentration camp system along with the resultant mass death (something ignored by both Hermann Göring and Adolf Hitler when they solely laid the blame on the British for “inventing” concentration camps and the “Genocide” of the Boers – in their book white deaths count, black deaths don’t seem to count – and these two criminals were are also happy to try and deflect Germany’s real crimes of genocide).
Returning to South Africa by sneaking back over the border, Maritz is briefly arrested in the British Colony of the Transvaal for not signing the oath of allegiance (and therefore still a combatant) – it’s a forewarning of a general dislike of his deep-seated dislike of the British. He is ultimately released and joins up again as a Transvaal Policeman.
Smuts on the other hand at this time in 1909 is concerning himself with Union, the Union conference on the back of the Peace of Vereeniging specifies an expanded Union border to incorporate Britain’s Southern Rhodesia colony as a 5th Province along with the incorporation of the British protectorates of Bechuanaland (Botswana), Lesotho and Swaziland. By doing this the Boer and the Brits agreed ‘Union’ negotiations are hoping to gain balance and reconciliation between Boer and Brit interests in the region, although now all under the “British family of nations” as specified in the Vereeniging Peace Treaty – Jan Smuts, Louis Botha and all the other significant Boer Generals – De la Rey, Hertzog etc are all consolidating to ensure this new ‘Union’ is managed by the Boers and not the Brits, which is in fact the subsequent outcome when The Union of South Africa is formed in 1910 – the South African Party, consisting of Botha, Smuts, De la Rey, Hertzog etc. win the majority seats.
Image: The borders of ‘Greater South Africa’ as outlined in the Union conference in 1909 – phase one – the Limpopo River marks the border of South Africa, phase two – Zambezi River marks the border and phase three – the Ruvuma River marks the border, this is Smuts’ map, note his personal notations ‘A’ and ‘B’.
The arrival of World War 1 in 1914 is both a blessing and a curse for the Boer led government of the newly formed Union of South Africa. Both Botha as Prime Minister and Smuts as his ‘right hand man’ were walking a tight rope – as Boer commanders they represented a faction of the new “Union”, balancing the two small old Boer Republic’s politics and laws with those of all the British colonies and protectorates surrounding them (six large British territories and their interests in them in effect) – so they are obliged to support Britain as the major player in the region, and honour their word to them, the oath that brought about peace – that’s the ‘curse’.
The ‘blessing’ to the Union government is that the war presents them with an ideal opportunity to realise the expansive border of ‘Greater South Africa’ as envisioned and concluded in the Union conference in 1909 – as this border also specifies the eventual inclusion of German South West Africa into South Africa in the first phase of the ‘Greater’ South Arica Union and eventually even German East Africa would be included in the second phase of South Africa’s territorial advancement.
So it’s really no surprise, that when the decision to go to war is put to the vote in the Boer led and very independent Union of South Africa parliament (at Union, Britain takes a figurehead role, the South African Union’s Parliament and legal construct is not governed by Westminster, its fee to make its own laws) – and the result is not what your school history teacher plugged – it’s a staggering vote of confidence by nearly all the Boer MP’s favouring going to war alongside Britain (and France) against Germany, by a landslide – literally. Consider the result.
92 = For invasion of German South West Africa by the Union of South Africa
12 = Against
So, as to the ‘majority’ of Afrikaners NOT wanting war with Germany, that is simply untrue, the Afrikaner community’s representatives in Parliament were overwhelmingly in favour of war against Germany. This is also where some ‘Boer Romantic’ commentators on the 1914 Revolt make a fundamental mistake, the Union of South Africa’s decision to conquer German South West Africa (Namibia) was NOT just a service to the ‘British Empire’ – it was largely in service to the objects of The Union of South Africa and its own territorial expansion ambitions and the prescribed ‘sphere of influence’ over the Southern African region as a whole (as agreed by all Boer and British leaders involved in the Union conference in 1909).
Image: Political cartoon of the day captures the Union’s territorial ambitions
Smuts, as the Minister of Defence at this time had also been busy amalgamating the armed forces of the republics with those of the colonial citizen force regiments to form the Union Defence Force i.e. the UDF (in much the same way as the SADF was amalgamated with other forces in 1994 to form the SANDF – with the same challenges).
The UDF had taken shape to consist of a small contingent of permanent force, but the backbone would remain voluntarily forces in a two-stream approach, the voluntary ‘English’ colonial citizen force regiments – Transvaal Scottish, Royal Natal Carbineers, Royal Durban Light Infantry etc and the voluntary ‘Afrikaans’ citizen force “skiet” Commandos known as the ‘Rifle Association Mounted Infantry’ in parallel to them (the old Republic’s commando system in effect). It was a careful construct to keep everyone happy, but the point is this, it was NOT “British” – Imperial British troops had returned to the United Kingdom, any engagement the Union of South Africa was going to fight in World War 1 in Africa, whether foreign or domestic, was going to be made up of ‘South Africans’ and led by ‘South Africans’ – and commanded by the old Republic’s ‘Bittereinder’ Boer Generals – primarily Botha (as Prime Minister was Commander in Chief) and Smuts (as Botha’s Minister of Defence).
Smuts was sensitive to the fact that many Afrikaners shared German heritage and they (falsely) believed that Germany extensively supported the Boer cause during Boer War 2 – ‘falsely’ because in fact, Germany was happy to ‘sell’ them arms (as did the British arms manufacturers) at a premium and send some medical assistance later on, however Germany withdrew their support officially – they provided no troops and no substantial funding to the Republican Boer War effort whatsoever.
Kaiser Wilhelm II
Kaiser Wilhelm II, although sending a letter to Kruger congratulating him on the Jameson Raid victory (given the Boer nation their false sense of ‘support’), in fact refused point blank to receive any Boer representations and after the ‘Black Week’ British defeats to the Boers in late 1899, he and his Generals compiled a military strategy, not to help the Boers, but to help the British win the war (he was after all related to the British monarchy – part of the family so to speak) and shared it with them instead – Kaiser Wilhelm II even proudly proclaiming at the end of the Boer War that the British had followed his plan precisely as he had outlined it to them and it was the German plan that won the war for the British – not Field Marshal Frederick Robert’s plan and as inconvenient truths go the Kaiser’s plan involved scorched earth policies and concentration camps. (see: John C.G. Röhl: The Kaiser and England during the Boer War). Now, I bet none of this was in your Nationalistic inspired history teachings.
Ethnic Germans (local and foreign) volunteering to join Boer Commandos also qualified very few (550 odd) – far more Anglo-Irish, Dutch and Flemish joined the Boers (5,500 odd). A Boer leader delegation, including Botha and de Wet visited Germany after the war in 1902, and although they received a royal welcome and ovations, they were not officially received – they did raise a little money from private donators and a Boer help fund, but that’s it. However, all this still did not resonate with many in the Boer community who almost illogically saw Germany as an Ally.
Smuts would argue the case for war, not on the basis of warring against Germany on the side of ‘Britain’, but for supporting the other old Boer Republic’s supporters – France, Belgium and the Netherlands in their war against a hostile and aggressive Germany busy de-stabilising western and eastern Europe, and Smuts was very aware of the vast majority of Boers had Dutch, Belgian and French roots, as opposed to the ones with German roots. He would use the same argument again for his declaration of war against Germany in World War 2.
Smuts however anticipated that the decision to go to war, although largely supported by the Afrikaner political elite and leadership, would have with it a handful of resignations from the Union’s Defence Force from those strongly in favour of Germany and whose sheer hatred of the British superseded everything, and the Union government received exactly that – a “handful” – nothing that would fundamentally compromise the UDF’s fighting ability or construct.
Of the handful of resignations which were received, a rather long-winded one came from General Christiaan Beyers, the UDF’s Commandant General in charge of the Active Citizen Force and his was the most important resignation. Prior to the decision to go to war, Smuts and Botha’s old friend and highly respected comrade, General Koos de la Rey had been one of the handful of Parliamentary Ministers vocally against the decision to invade GSWA and advocated neutrality, and because of his popularity his opinion held massive sway over the old Boer Republic’s Afrikaner electorate – nevertheless he was persuaded by Louis Botha and Jan Smuts not to take actions which may arouse the Boers, he then held a political rally for 800 Boers and took a reconciliatory approach – contrary to what the attendees expected of him.
Images: General Christiaan Frederik Beyers (left) and General Jacobus Herculaas de la Rey (right)
De la Rey seemed torn over his decision, and he was then targeted by General Beyers to join him for meeting with Major Jan Kemp, a mid-line UDF officer who had also resigned – the purpose of the meeting; Beyers and Kemp wanted to persuade de la Rey to take a stronger stand and initiate more Union Defence Force resignations to compromise its fighting capability. Joining the conspiracy was another heavyweight – the significant Boer General and Parliamentary Minister, Christiaan de Wet.
What follows next is well documented, however the generally accepted and investigated history concludes; General De la Rey and General Beyers were travelling in a soft top sedan car to their meeting with Major Kemp and did not stop at a Police blockade set up to capture a notorious gang of robbers and murderers called The Foster Gang. One of the Policeman fired a warning shot into the road to get them to stop, the bullet ricocheted and hit De la Rey, killing him.
It was tragedy – plain and simple, and both Botha and Smuts were devasted at the loss of their friend, as a signal to the inevitable accusations of ‘political assassination’ both Botha and Smuts attended De la Rey’s funeral in front of thousands of mourning Boers, they appeared without any bodyguard at the mercy of the assembly – a token of no malice intended, and there were no protests or accusations from the mourners.
Regardless, despite sound and tested enquiries and court cases, and the Nationalists having full scope and the resources at hand for 40 years to uncover a ‘plot’ – no concrete proof has emerged of a plot by Smuts to kill De la Rey whatsoever – ‘conspiracy theory’ nevertheless grew out of the incident which would plague Smuts in future years, and it still does.
It is also generally understood that with the death of De La Rey, that would probably have been the extent of Boer resistance to the war, and it would have devolved into simple political protest and peaceful demonstrations, had it not been for one man … the subject of the differing view – none other than Lt. Colonel Manie Maritz, who by now had joined the UDF and commanded a small UDF force at Upington, near the border with German South West Africa (GSWA).
The day after de la Rey’s funeral, Kemp, Beyers and de Wet addressed a large crowd at Lichtenberg, calling on protest meetings against the decision to invade GSWA. Manie Maritz however took a more robust position than Kemp, Beyers and de Wet, he instead went into open sedition and started ignoring Smuts’ and his other Commander’s orders been sent to him. Intel told Smuts that Maritz had joined the Germans, however contradictory to Smuts’ usual manner of decisiveness, he vacillated instead hoping to persuade Maritz not to revolt and get him to see reason.
Images: General Christiaan Rudolf de Wet (left) and Major Jan Christoffel Greyling Kemp (right) in his UDF dress uniform.
Not dissuaded by Smuts and bent on a sedition, Maritz resigned his commission from the Union Defence Force and openly rebelled on 9 October, taking 300 odd of his UDF soldiers with him when he went over to the Germans.
Major Barend ‘Ben’ Bouwer was sent to deal with Maritz’ sedition and insubordination (Bouwer had also been a ‘Veggeneraal’ in Smuts’ commando during the Boer War and as irony goes was alongside Maritz when he sent the dynamite train into O’okiep). Maritz took Bouwer prisoner along with his fellow officers, he was subsequently released and sent back with the ultimatum from Maritz to the Union Government to the effect that:
That unless the Union Government guaranteed safe passage of his fellow plotting Generals (De Wet, Beyers, Kemp et al), to his position on the GSWA border by the 11th October he would immediately attack General Brits’s UDF forces preparing to invade GSWA and then he would invade the Union of South Africa.
Major Ben Bouwer reported that Maritz was in possession of some guns belonging to the Germans, and that he held the rank of General commanding the German troops. He also had a force of Germans under him in addition to his own rebel commando. Maritz arrested all the UDF officers and men under his command who were unwilling to join the Germans, and then sent them forward as prisoners into German South West Africa.
To drive Maritz’ point home, Major Bouwer was shown an agreement between Maritz and the Governor of German South West Africa guaranteeing the independence of the Union as a Republic, ceding Walfish Bay and certain other portions of the Union to the Germans, and undertaking that the Germans would only invade the Union on the invitation of Maritz.
Major Bouwer was shown numerous telegrams and helio messages dating back to the beginning of September. Maritz boasted that he had ample guns, rifles, ammunition, and money from the Germans, and that he would overrun the whole of South Africa.
Image: Rare image of Lt. Col Maritz, front and centre in his South African Union uniform and his staff behind him – his ‘Agterryer’ (man-servant) is at his heels (It’s the man-servant’s expression and position that is most interesting as in many ways it gives away the complete disregard Maritz felt for people of colour).
In response to Maritz’ action and ultimatum, on 12 October, the Union government imposed martial law across the whole of South Africa. On proclaiming martial law, Smuts, the eternal reconciler, immediately called again for “reason” and urged the rebels not to be swayed by “foreign agents influencing them”.
The ‘Maritz Revolt’ as it would now become known was underway, and with their sedition hand now played by Maritz in the Cape Colony, his fellow conspirators – Beyers, Kemp and de Wet had no choice, now ‘in for a penny and in for a pound’ they all broke their ties with the Union Defence Force, resigned their commissions and went into open revolt against their lawfully elected government – raising Commando’s in the Transvaal and Orange Free State to come to Maritz’ aid
The revolt is well documented and carries with it a number of consequences for Jan Smuts, and we will cover these in future Observation Post articles called “Boer War 3 and Beyond” and “What about Jopie?” (look out for them). However, the long and short of it from a military historian’s perspective let’s look briefly look at the objective, the capability and strategy to achieve the objective and the outcome.
The stated objective: Maritz issued a proclamation by way of objective – “the former South African Republic and Orange Free State as well as the Cape Province and Natal are proclaimed free from British control and independent, and every White inhabitant of the mentioned areas, of whatever nationality, are hereby called upon to take their weapons in their hands and realize the long-cherished ideal of a Free and Independent South Africa.”
In other words, to take by force, the former British Colonies and re-start the Boer War, resistance to the declaration by any “white” in the entire Union of South Africa would be treated by Maritz’ Provisional Government as treasonous.
Capability: To attain this objective, the Rebels raised 11,476 Boers. Union Defence Force strength was around 32,000 troops (so in essence the Rebels were outnumbered 3 to 1). Important to note here that of the 32,000 UDF troops, 20,000 were Afrikaners – mainly ex-Commando and most of them in the UDF’s mounted infantry ‘Rifle Associations’ (the old Commandos). General Louis Botha would primarily use the Rifle Associations to counteract the rebellion, insistent that the British ‘stay out of it’, this was going to be the Boer leaders sorting their differences out between themselves – so ‘Brother against Brother’ and in effect the UDF’s Afrikaners outnumbered the rebel Afrikaners 2 to 1.
Images: General Smuts (left) and General Botha (right) as depicted on cigarette cards during WW1.
Important also to note here as to capability, the Rebel force was not made up entirely of first rate ex-UDF soldiers going against their counterparts, the rebel force was made up primarily of destitute Orange Free State Boers having come through a drought and agricultural reforms on the back of the devastation of their farms during Boer War 2.
Many of these Free State Boers as has been pointed out by historians like Sandra Swart (Desperate Men: The 1914 Rebellion and the Polities of Poverty’ in South African Historical Journal, Vol 42) and John Bottomly (The Orange Free State and the Rebellion of 1914: the influence of industrialisation, poverty and poor whitism: pages 29-73), were simply desperate ‘Bywoners’ (landless farmers or share-croppers) promised a better life if the rebellion was successful.
Consider the statistics of the Boer rebels and from where they came, and you’ll see how the above statement holds true. 7,123 (62%) of the Boer Rebels came from the Orange Free State – the least populace, most rural and economically worse off province in the Union. As an aside, to gauge the extent of success of Maritz’ proclamation and its resonance across the broader Afrikaner community across the whole of South Africa, he was only able to motivate 1,215 (12%) of the Boer Rebels from the Cape province – the biggest province in the Union. The balance coming from the Transvaal, and no real support from Natal.
The Potchefstroom Herald at the time best tried to explain why there was no traction behind the revolt from Cape Afrikaners and the black/brown African communities in this quote – and not surprisingly it boils down to the lack of suffrage and plain racism in the old Republics;
“When these high officers of the Defence Force in Transvaal and Orange “Free” State rebelled and joined the Germans with their commandos, the Dutchmen of the Cape (presumably because “they vote side by side with the Kafirs”) denounced the treachery in unmistakable terms. The South African party at the Cape beat up its followers to the support of the Government, and the voice of the Cape section of the Dutch Reformed Church rang from pulpit and platform in denunciation of disloyalty and treason. But in the Northern Provinces, where white men are pampered and guarded by the Government against the so-called humiliation of allowing native taxpayers to vote, there the rebellion, having been regarded with seeming approval, gained a marvellous impetus.
Plaatjie: The Boer Rebellion – snippet from the Potchefstroom Herald
As a unified, coherent, trained and fully armed force, the Rebel Boers were not. Desperate and landless farmers in the main up against fully trained, motivated, even mechanised in some instances, and properly armed UDF soldiers on a 3:1 numerical advantage – the Rebels were no match and it quickly showed. The long and short the rebellion was almost immediately repelled and then very quickly crushed as Botha’s UDF Rifle Associations with some Regiment elements in support hunted the Rebel Commandos down as they tried to make their way to assist Maritz on the GSWA border.
Image: The last pursuit of Major Kemp. A South African Union ‘Flying column’ crossing the Orange River after him.
As Dr David Katz in his work ‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917) points out. Jan Smuts, eternally the one Boer General keeping a level head and seeking reconciliation and understanding, and when it was clear the rebellion had failed, Smuts called for a ‘Blanket Amnesty’ across the board for the Boer Rebel leaders and their troops if they laid down their arms. General Louis Botha, the Commander in Chief, on the other hand took a much harder and less reconciliatory line than his colleague Smuts – Botha agreed to an Amnesty, but for the rank and file only, the Boer Rebel leaders would have to be prosecuted. The amnesty, excluding the Rebel leadership, was in put place from 12th to 21st November 1914, and with it the 1914 Boer Rebellion was effectively over, by the end of November General de Wet’s force alone was down to only 40 men. Rear actions and isolated and desperate battles continued to be fought for a couple of months by woefully under-strength hard liners refusing surrender and amnesty, but by the end of January 1915 the rebellion was over.
Of the Rebel leadership now having surrendered, Botha and Smuts would again be especially magnanimous, considering the Union was in a state of war externally and in a state of martial law internally – and this was 1914 ‘World War 1’ – people were put in front of firing squads for ‘cowardice’ and being AWOL (absent without leave) – let alone ‘sedition’ and ‘treason’. Smuts would treat the Rebels in general very kindly, literally with kid gloves, all the time urging reason, understanding and reconciliation.
Of the main rebel leaders, General Christiaan Beyers tragically drowned in the Vaal River whilst attempting to desperately evade capture on 8th December 1914.
General Christiaan de Wet was captured during the amnesty and sentenced to six years imprisonment, with a fine of £2000, he was released by Botha and Smuts after one year’s imprisonment, after giving a written promise to take no further part in politics.
Major Jan Kemp was captured on the 2nd of February 1915 and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment, with a fine of £1000. However, a mere 10 months into his sentence Botha and Smuts agreed to release him – also on the condition that he may not participate in any politics (a promise Kemp almost immediately broke entering politics as a National Party MP under Hertzog in 1920 and again under Malan’s ‘Reformed’ National Party after 1948).
Lt. Colonel Manie Maritz would evade capture and escape into German South West Africa, at the conclusion of the GSWA campaign and the Union Defence Force’s victory and annexation of the territory (the first real victory for the Allies against Imperial Germany in WW1), Maritz would again evade capture, going into self-imposed exile in Angola, Spain, Portugal and then Mozambique.
Of all the other leaders – junior and mid-level rebel officers who were also captured. All were sentenced to short imprisonments and fines, almost all of them walking free within a year … except for just one man … Captain Jopie Fourie was executed for ‘High Treason’ having not resigned his UDF officers commission, captured still wearing his UDF officer’s uniform and opening fire on his fellow UDF troops whilst under a ‘white flag’ of truce (this was WW1 after all and there was no way anyone could get him out of this one with a no-nonsense leader like Botha as Prime Minister, not in a month of Sundays – more on him in a later article “What about Jopie?”).
To pay for all their fines the Bloemfontein newspaper ‘Het Volksblad’ established the ‘Halfkroonfonds’ (Half-a-Crown Fund). Shop owners and other people whose property had been damaged during the rebellion were able to claim compensation, leading to the establishment of the Helpmekaar Beweging (the Help-One-Another Movement). By the end of 1917, all the debts were paid.
Of the handling of the 1914 Maritz Revolt, Louis Botha would summarise Smuts role and leadership, when he said of him;
“Nobody can appreciate sufficiently the great work General Smuts has done – greater than any man throughout this unhappy period. At his post day and night, his brilliant intellect, his calm judgement, his amazing energy and his undaunted courage have been assets of inestimable value to the Union in her hour of trial.”
Prime Minister Louis Botha
As a rebellion with any chance of success consider just what a small minority they represented – no Cape Province or Natal Afrikaner would really come near it, of the Afrikaners in the Transvaal and OFS they were unable to raise an effective fighting force, the vast majority of Afrikaners in the armed forces remained in the UDF, the vast majority of Afrikaner political leaders remained behind Botha and Smuts and they gained no traction whatsoever to raise anything from the Black and Coloured communities (the real ‘vast’ majority) – no “Askari” troops whatsoever, and they got no support whatsoever from the white South Africans of British decent – who by way of ‘white’ population were not insignificant in size, commanding massive swathes of white population groups in the Transvaal (most of Johannesburg and the reef), Natal (most of Durban) and the Cape Colony (especially in Cape Town and the Eastern Cape) .
In the end the Maritz revolt did little in terms of its military objectives, it managed to delay the invasion plans of GSWA for a couple of months only whilst the UDF dealt with it, however in the end the GSWA campaign was a decisive victory for the Union and the territory successfully annexed under ‘Greater South Africa’ in a trusteeship – as was the Union’s expressed casus belli.
Image: General Botha (right) accepts the surrender of German South-West Africa from Lt Col Francke, (left) at Kilo, 9 July 1915.
What the Rebellion did however do was plant the seeds for political division and is one of the key propaganda tools used by the Nationalists to create the deep split in Afrikaner outlooks. Louis Botha would look at the Rebellion as complete folly, a waste of time and an utter waste of life, his opponents would look at it rather romantically instead – a sort of – ‘Boer Last Stand’. It stands today in some Afrikaner communities, precisely because of its ‘Romanticism’ and ‘political currency’ and not because of its military prowess or even its unattainable objectives.
Now, back to Maritz and Smuts, the subjects of this vastly differing outlook on Afrikanerdom, because it would manifest itself again just prior to the Second World War.
A Nazi
Manie Maritz decided to end his self-imposed exile after the 1st World War ended and returned to the Union of South Africa in 1923. The Smuts government treating him very kindly by way of reconciliation, and all things considered for a crime as serious as treason he received a short imprisonment of three years. Luckily for Maritz, Hertzog’s National party won the 1924 election and Maritz was granted full amnesty and walked free having only served three months.
Maritz took to farming, but came under the influence of National Socialism (Nazism) in 1936 and founded a ‘anti-parliamentary’(dictatorship led) party called the Volksparty (People’s Party) in 1940. Maritz also took control of another ultra-right, national socialist, pro-Nazi movement initially set up by Colonel J.C. Laas (the first Commandant-General of the Ossewabrandwag) called “Die Boerenasie” (The Boer Nation), he then merged the Volksparty with Die Boerenasie and continued under the “Die Boerenasie” banner. He became known as a very outspoken proponent of The Third Reich and admirer of Adolf Hitler. During this time, he had also developed a theory about the alleged Jewish conspiracy and interference in South African and world politics and became a fanatical Antisemite. He would detail his Antisemitic and National Socialist views in his autobiography ‘My Lewe en Strewe’ (My life and Aspiration) which he published in 1939, a book regarded as lacking in objectivity, inciting racial hatred and like his hero Adolf Hitler’s book ‘Mein Kampf’ (My Struggle) Maritz’ book was full of emotional and racially driven rhetoric. He was even taken to court over all the anti-Semitic statements he made in his book, found guilty of fomenting racial hatred and he was fined £75.
Images: Maritz’ book ‘My Lewe an Sterwe’, later political portrait and the ‘Die Dappere Bloodskapper’ second world war mouthpiece for The Ossewabrandwag and Maritz’ Boerenasie.
Die Boerenasie rose to prominence under Manie Maritz, in September 1939 Jan Smuts declared war against Nazi Germany and once again you could not find a more vastly differing view than that of Smuts and Maritz. Smuts was extremely wary of the dangers of Nazism and Adolf Hitler, who he accused of being a “false messiah” and whose Nazi symbology of the Swastika Smuts called “the crooked cross” in reference to it being a corruption of true Christianity. Smuts was so anti-Nazism that he would take the Union of South Africa to war again to fight it, and once again at ‘war’ with Maritz.
On antisemitism, here again Smuts held a polarising opposite view to Maritz. Smuts was a devout Zionist, he believed in the establishment of Israel as nation state, supported Jewish immigration and refugees (even controversially as Prime Minister he was involved in rescuing 200 Jewish orphans from the ‘Pogroms’ in the Ukraine in 1921, bringing them to safety in South Africa). Smuts supported the ‘Balfour Agreement’ which gave rise to Israel, he was also a personal friend of Chaim Weizmann, the President of the Zionist Organization. Weizmann went on to become the first President of Israel. Smuts is so loved and honoured in Israel that even today a kibbutz in Ramat Yohanan is named in his honour.
It is however difficult to say if Smuts would have interned Maritz again for his Nazi sympathies along with the other strong proponents of Nazism during the 2nd World War as Maritz’ life ended tragically and very early on in the war, he died in a car accident in Pretoria on the 20th December 1940. Probably, had he lived, Smuts and Maritz would have been at extreme loggerheads and Maritz back on the warpath with the Union – and very possibly back in jail.
A completely differing outlook
So, back to the image of Smuts and Maritz on Commando during the South African War (1899-1902) a.k.a. The 2nd Boer War on the masthead. It is hard to think how Smuts and Maritz could find anything in common, and to think they are fighting side by side in common cause against the British, living hard in the bush on horseback and up to their necks in the blood and gore of war – brothers in arms in effect.
Both saw South Africa – from the “Limpopo to the Cape” – even incorporating all the surrounding British protectorates and German South West Africa in addition. Both saw ‘white civilization’ as the steward to develop the region – this was the era of ‘Empire’ after all. Both put their ‘Afrikanerdom’ front and centre and both believe sincerely that only an Afrikaner hegemony in Southern Africa would successfully unlock the region’s potential, and both were prepared to fight for it.
That’s where the similarity ends. Smuts believed the ‘Afrikaner’ led hegemony would only work with an outward, embracing and reconciliatory disposition – and with all the British protectorates, British colonies and British subjects living in ‘Greater South Africa’ in partnership … so, he saw that the future lay only with the co-operation of the British super-power as a steward protecting the region as part of Britain’s family of nations. Progress for Smuts would only lie in establishing peace and co-operation with Britain.
Maritz on the other hand believed in a similar hegemony, only he believed that South Africa would fall under the stewardship of white Afrikaners with Germany as the super-power providing the glue to keep the region stable and prosperous. He believed that the only way the troublesome ‘British’ subjects in the colonies and protectorates would be brought into line was with jack-boot authority – and Germany would provide the Afrikaners with the protection, money, military backing and arms to do so.
Maritz’s political disposition had its roots in “Krugerism” – a philosophy whereby White Afrikaners were ‘pure’ with an orthodox Calvinist ‘dopper’s’ approach to religion, through God and a theocracy styled republic they had an ordained right to rule over non-Afrikaners and Africans alike – they would have limited or no basic suffrage rights whatsoever in Kruger’s Republic. Maritz’ view so inwardly directed that he demonstrated a deep seated racist and violent response to anything “non-Aryan” (non pure). By 1939 Maritz’ Afrikaner cabal consisted of far-right wing Afrikaner nationalists with Nazi leanings – all of whom adopted or supported Nazism prior to, including and some even after the war – the likes of H.F Verwoerd, F.C Erasmus, Jaap Marais, B.J. Vorster, F.C. Erasmus, Oswald Pirow, Hendrik van den Bergh, Johannes von Moltke, P.O. Sauer, C.R. Swart, P.W. Botha, Eric Louw, Louis Weichardt, Rev. Koot Vorster, Henning Klopper, Albert Hertzog, Dr Nico Diedericks, Piet Meyer, Dr Eben Dönges, Dr Hans van Rensberg etc., etc. All of whom were infusing Afrikanerdom with a heady mix of Christian Nationalism, Oligarchy Republicanism and National Socialism (Nazism).
Smuts’ political disposition on the on the other hand had it roots in “Holism” – a philosophy whereby White Afrikaners lived in an interdependent state with all the cultures and societies surrounding it, he cherished the Cape Franchise, acknowledged Black South African medieval history and although a segregationist for much of his early life, his political philosophy would focus on consolidation, reconciliation and mutual recognition. By 1939 Smuts had abandoned segregationist thinking altogether famously stating that “segregation had fallen on evil days” in 1941 – his thinking had turned to universal suffrage and human rights and his Afrikaner cabal consisted of ‘left’-leaning Afrikaners with liberal suffrage and democratic leanings in the main – they were known as “Smuts-men” and they consisted of people like Deneys Reitz , Kmdt Dolf ‘Oom’ de la Rey, Group Captain ‘Sailor’ Malan, General Dan Pienaar, Group Captain ‘Dutch’ Hugo, Uys Krige, General Kenneth van der Spuy, General George Brink, Jacob Pretorius, Jan Steytler, Captain De Villiers-Graaff, Pieter van der Byl, Dr Ernst Malherbe, Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr etc., etc.
A more vastly different and polarising view of Afrikanerdom you could not find – one inward and one outward.
In conclusion
So how does it all work out for these two vastly different views of Afrikanerdom? Well, unfortunately we all know the history, and after Smuts’ shock electoral defeat of the Nationalist Afrikaners in 1948, these Afrikaners had a free-reign with complete control of education channels and media channels coupled with ‘gagging’ powers over opposition voices – for 40 long years – in which they also took the opportunity to resurrect Manie Maritz and the ‘Boer Rebels of 1914’ as the true Afrikaner ‘heroes’ of Afrikanerdom and paint Smuts and his Smuts-men as the ‘traitors’.
The net result, sad to say, is Maritz’ view won out, Maritz would be directly responsible in his rebellion in creating a schism that would break the Afrikaner camp into two distinctive groups and continue to drive a schism through it all the way to the on-set of World War 2 and then Apartheid and beyond.
Thanks largely to leaders like Maritz and advent of the Broederbond’s ‘Centenary Trek’ in 1938 the modern Afrikaner is still seen in South Africa by most other societies in the context of a whites-only ‘Voortrekker’ (pioneer), ‘Boer’ (farmer) hegemony, sometimes with conservative and ‘racist’ leanings – which, as it happened in Maritz’ beloved Nazi Germany put the Afrikaner on the same footing as Nazi Germans in many people’s eyes after the Afrikaner nationalists formally gazetted their eugenically driven ideology of Apartheid in 1948.
The small difference, modern Germany goes to great extent to re-dress, re-educate, reconcile and consolidate their military history and political ideologies from both the 1st World War and the 2nd World War … so as to overcome the tremendous impact of propaganda and conditioning initiated by the National Socialists and ‘open’ minds to the truth. Whereas in South Africa no real deep-seated action of reconciliation, re-education and understanding has taken place to counteract the old Christian Nationalism conditioning and propaganda initiated by the Nationalists, and in many circles the likes of General Christiaan de Wet, General Christian Beyers, Major Jan Kemp, Captain Jopie Fourie, Lt. Col Manie Maritz in active sedition with Germany and eventually the likes of the other Afrikaners flirting with Germany and its ideologies, D.F. Malan, H.F. Verwoerd, B.J. Vorster and P.W. Botha are still held up fervently and sometimes illogically by some as the ‘true’ heroes of Afrikanerdom – as certainly is the case with Maritz.
In all honesty, the challenge for ‘white’ South Africans especially in reviewing, redressing, and balancing their history – and this massively different outlook initiated by the likes of Maritz and Smuts – is to better resurrect the ‘redeemable’ Afrikaners – the iconoclasts, the ones who held the opposing view to Apartheid, the ones who went to war against Imperial Germany and then again against Nazi Germany – Smuts and his ‘Smuts-men’ – NOT the ones who joined hands with Germany and its ideologies. Hold up the true ‘heroes’ to account Afrikanerdom, the ones who demanded suffrage and fought against racist oppression – and believe it or not, there is a very big pool to choose from. Their histories and ‘differing’ views where savagely repressed by the Nationalists and literally scrubbed from our national consciousness – and they need to come to light in order to affect a more balanced outlook on Afrikanerdom – as in truth when we look at it with the hindsight of history, they are really the true ‘ysters’ (heroes) and not the ‘veraaiers’ (traitors). Krugerism, National Socialism, Christian Nationalism, Apartheid and a ‘keep South Africa white’ Verwoerd Republicanism are an abhorrent testament to Afrikaner nationalism as an ideology and an anathema to Afrikanerdom itself.
Written and researched by Peter Dickens
References:
Eben Nel; ‘Kaapse rebelle van die Hantam-karoo’
Dr David Katz; ‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917’
Sandra Swart; ‘Desperate Men: The 1914 Rebellion and the Polities of Poverty’
John Bottomly; ‘The Orange Free State and the Rebellion of 1914: the influence of industrialisation, poverty and poor whitism’
André Wessels; Afrikaner (Boer) Rebellion (Union of South Africa) 2018.
Brian Bunting; ‘The Rise of the Afrikaner Reich’
John C.G. Röhl: ‘The Kaiser and England during the Boer War’
Plaatje: Chapter XXIII The Boer Rebellion
Colourised images with greatest thanks and appreciation to Jennifer Bosch – Jenny B Colourised on line:
What! Smoking your socks again Mr Dickens! Well, here’s some really inconvenient hidden history, the ZAR Republic (Transvaal) planned to invade Southern Rhodesia, amassed thousands of their troops on the Limpopo River border in 1891, and when they sent in an advance party, the incursion into British territory was challenged by Starr Jameson and The British South African Police and the Boer leaders arrested – and all this took place BEFORE the Jameson Raid (1895 -1896) and BEFORE the South African War (1899-1902) a.k.a. The Boer War.
But, But, But … it was Jameson and the British who invaded the Transvaal Republic, not the other way round! The British are guilty of expansionism, imperialism, land grabbing and stealing minerals .. not the Boers! Afraid not – the Boers are as guilty of expansionism using military means in Southern Africa as the British, and this episode is one in many.
President Paul Kruger
But .. Rhodesia, the Boere wanted nothing to do with Rhodesia, this was not in my school history book! Well, if you a student of Rhodesian history this incident was emblazoned into the birth of Rhodesia, if you were taught a South African Christian Nationalist history, chances are you’ve never heard of it, and for good reason – it simply does not fit with Afrikaner Nationalist rhetoric surrounding the origins of Boer War 2 (1899-1902) and its just strait-forward inconvenient.
Now, I’ll make a statement, the planned Boer invasion of Rhodesia was so important to the history of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek or Transvaal Republic (ZAR), it nearly cost Oom Paul Kruger his third Presidency. It’s so important that in his memoir Paul Kruger cites this specific incident as one of the key reasons hampering his second Presidency, his relationship with Britain and his aspirations to hold into Swaziland, he uses it to initially outline Rhodes’ duplicicity in the entire South African region and paint him as a scoundrel – in fact Kruger outlines this entire incident as the epicentre for Rhodes’ desire for Transvaal gold – albeit unsubstantiated and a little fantastic. This incident is that important to Kruger and the ZAR – so why do we know nothing about it?
So here’s a little inconvenient history:
1887 – Boer and British Imperial claims to modern day Zimbabwe
So, what’s the beef over Rhodesia? Well, it starts in 1887, Paul Kruger attests that although relations with the Matabele (controlling what is modern Zimbabwe) and the Boers had initially been strained, Boers hunting in their region gradually improved relations and the leader of the Matabele, Chief Lobengula, sent an envoy to Pretoria to request the ZAR take over his Chiefdom (comprising Mashonaland and Matabeleland) as a ZAR Protectorate. The ZAR in return responded by sending their envoy, Piet Grobler with a draft treaty of ZAR annexation to see Chief Lobengula in Bulawayo (Kruger himself drafted the treaty). The treaty was read to Chief Lobengula who requested time to consult the terms of the treaty with his indunas. Then, in mysterious circumstances, Grobler was murdered before the treaty could be signed.
Chief Lobengula
Chief Lobengula seems to be a rather duplicitous man, because the other side of the story is somewhat different. Around the same time, a British team in 1888 consisting of Francis Thompson, Charles Rudd and Rochfort Maguire approach Chief Lobengula for mining rights in his Chiefdom. Chief Lobengula is wary of them but goes along because he trusts Dr Starr Jameson (who as a medical Doctor also treated him for gout). He concludes a treaty with the British which gives their company – the British South Africa Company (BSAC) the sole mining and settlement rights in Matabeleland and Mashonaland in return for weapons and money, the treaty also specifically prohibits the Boers (ZAR) and the Portuguese from settling in his territory or gaining any concessions of any kind.
Paul Kruger would claim the loss of his Matabeleland and Mashonaland Protectorates along with ZAR mining and hunting rights there, squarely solely on the shoulders Cecil John Rhodes, who he accused of being “one of the most unscrupulous characters that have ever existed”. Kruger then goes on to conclude, without an ounce of any evidence, that Rhodes and his cronies arranged the murder of his ZAR envoy to the Matabele – Piet Grobler.
In his claim to Rhodesia, President Kruger would also completely ignore the 1884 London Convention which specified that the ZAR was not permitted to expand its borders in exchange for more concession’s on the ZAR’s British Suzerainty status, the Suzerainty issue (the ZAR was a British Vassal state and not fully independent) is a primary source of discontent between Boer and Brit, British commentators at the time make note that although the London Convention did not mention Suzerainty in its pre-amble it by no means meant that the 1881 Pretoria Convention which specified Suzerainty fell away (had that been the case it would have been stated in the new agreement) and Kruger had been both deceitful and duplicitous in informing the ZAR Raad that it had. In any event, the ZAR had repeatedly breached both the Pretoria and London conventions and this was causing significant tension (The Times History of the South African War 1899-1902). For more on this see, Stealing Republics, gold, diamonds and other myths!
Not only does the ZAR have ‘buyers regret’ of its British Suzerainty, even our man Chief Lobengula has ‘buyers regret’ feeling he’s been duped when he says “Did you ever see a chameleon catch a fly? The chameleon gets behind the fly and remains motionless for some time, then he advances very slowly and gently, first putting forward one leg and then the other. At last, when well within reach, he darts his tongue, and the fly disappears. England is the chameleon, and I am that fly.”
So, we are off to a very contentious start between the Matabele, Brit and Boer over what was to become Rhodesia – nobody happy, and no, Kruger and his Boer supporters are not just content with only farming in the confines of the Transvaal with no plans of northward expansion, the truth is they never have been. Kruger himself makes it clear when he says Rhodes used his concession “to obtain a firm footing in Matabeleland, with the intention of preventing the extension of the South African Republic in this direction.”
To secure the area as ‘British’, Cecil John Rhodes then presented this concession to British Government and obtained a Royal Charter for The British South Africa Company (BSAC) over Matabeleland and its subject state Mashonaland. The area was designated as ‘Zambesia’ and he also determined mining rights extending from the Limpopo River to Lake Tanganyika (For clarity, as ‘Zambesia’ is a relatively unknown entity as it’s so short lived, ‘Zambesia’ would officially become ‘Rhodesia’ in 1895 named after … you guessed it … Rhodes, and it was eventually spit it into ‘Northern Rhodesia’ – now Zambia and ‘Southern Rhodesia’ – now Zimbabwe in 1898).
British South Africa Company flag
Wary of ZAR expansionism to the north of their border, the British try and clear up the matter in 1890 when a conference takes place between the Governor of Cape Colony and High Commissioner for Southern Africa – Sir Henry Loch, and President Kruger to decide on several disputed questions, especially those relating to the Boer encroachments upon the independence of the Kingdom of Swaziland. A convention was ratified in August 1890 by which, the ZAR takes over the administration of Swaziland on the condition that the ZAR makes no further concessions or treaties with indigenous chiefs to the north or north-west (i.e., anywhere in Matabeleland and Mashonaland).
The Invasion Plan
On the back of the Convention with Sir Henry Lock and President Kruger, Paul Kruger had difficulty selling it to the ZAR Volks Raad, the Raad expressed its dissatisfaction with the terms of the convention, and no sooner was it ratified than an attempt was made to violate it.
General Piet Joubert
Despite agreements, the ZAR never takes it eyes off Matabeleland and Mashonaland, they believe they have first rights to the territory and have been thwarted by the British plotting against them, so they plan to take the region by force. The planned invasion becomes known as the Banyailand Trek, the plotters are General Piet Joubert – The Commandant General of the Transvaal, Barend Vorster, and Louis Adendorff.
Their plan calls for some 2,000 armed Boers (some sources also point to 2,000 odd Black helpers in addition) to cross the Limpopo at the Middle Drift and then trek northwards into British ‘Zambesia’, overcome relatively small British South Africa Company ‘Police’ forces present and British ‘Pioneer Settler columns’ and occupy the region for the Boers before the British can really take hold of it. The main Boer component of the trek would be drawn from the ZAR’s Zoutpansberg region.
After annexation the trekkers were to form themselves into an independent Republic and would hold a conference with delegates from Portuguese East Africa for the partition with them of the whole of Mashonaland. The prospectus went on to state that Doctors of Medicine, Ministers of Religion, Journalists and all other professions were to be represented in the expedition. After crossing the Limpopo River the trekkers would proclaim the “Republic of the North”; a provisional Government would be organised, and a constitution drawn up on the principles of the old Transvaal Grondwet of 1858.
Kruger however was a little nervous given the convention held with Sir Henry Lock and the hold he desired over Swaziland, so he needed more solid concessions to warrant an invasion, a stronger casus belli, so he opted to delay the Banyailand trek. Essentially kicked into the long grass, and it was a mistake by Kruger to do it, as if they had invaded in 1890 they stood a chance as British occupation was thin on the ground and various ‘treatise’ and rights to the area under contention, when the invasion was revisited again a year later in 1891 they had lost their initiative – Rhodes had tightened down the mining ‘concessions’, the Royal Charter and all the various treatise needed with the local inhabitants. By the 13th September 1890 the Rhodesian Pioneer Column had reached Fort Salisbury and the occupation of Mashonaland by the BSAC was now a fait accompli.
The Adendorff Concessions
So, the ZAR needed more concrete reasons for invading to counteract all the treatise and concessions been written up by Rhodes. They would find these in Louis Adendorff (which is why this planned invasion, the Banyailand Trek is sometimes also known as the Adendorff Trek).
Cecil John Rhodes
In March 1891 Louis Adendorff and Klein Barend Vorster rather dubiously claimed they had a Banyailand concession given by Chief Chibi to a party of 4 Transvaalers, led by Adendorff, for an area of 200 miles by 100 miles. They in turn offered the concessions to Rhodes to purchase. Rhodes concluded the concessions illegal, the plot as nothing more than blackmail and refused. Adendorff would then use this as a casus belli for an armed invasion.
So, the Zoutpansberg Boers, now led by Kommandant Ignatius Ferreira and encouraged by General Piet Joubert – the Kommandant General of the ZAR, decided to push on ahead with their plans. This reinvigorated push to invade almost immediately became known to the British Foreign Office and they took to military countermeasures to repel the Boer invasion and diplomacy.
So, how does the plan fare?
Frederick Selous
Initially not well, the British had already got wind of the plan in early 1890. Captain Frederick Selous (for whom the famous Rhodesian Special Forces Regiment the ‘Selous Scouts’ is named) is in the employ of the British South Africa Company and pioneering Zambesia. He is in the Zoutpansberg area of the Northern Transvaal in February 1890 and comes to hear of the Boer’s plan. Selous immediately informs his good friend … none other than Cecil John Rhodes, of the details – the ZAR had planned for the invasion to take place during the approaching winter months and form themselves into an independent ‘Northern’ Boer Republic in cahoots with the Portuguese. The British react in two ways to the news – militarily and diplomatically.
On the military front, General Sir Frederick Carrington was placed in command of the area from Mafeking down the Limpopo River to the Indian Ocean with Capt. Sir John Willoughby in command of the Limpopo drifts, the British South Africa (Company) Police (BSAP) would be deployed to do this. The Bechuanaland Border Police (BBP) were used for guarding the drifts from the Transvaal to Khama’s country (present-day Botswana). Furthermore, Lt Col. Pennefather was dispatched to Fort Tuli in early May 1891 to make defensive preparations.
Sir John Christopher Willoughby
On the diplomatic front, in May 1891 the British then sent Captain Sir John Christopher Willoughby and Rhodes’ right hand man, none other than Dr Starr Jameson, to meet with Paul Kruger and to dissuade the ZAR from entering their territory or face war, not just with the British South Africa Company’s private police detachments, but against the might of a British Imperial Force if need be (the British army proper). Kruger is initially adamant and takes a very belligerent position, he responds to Willoughby with a he’ll do his best to discourage the Banyailand Trek, but in the event he’s not able to “what must be, must be” and when threatened with the might of the British Imperial Army he responded with bravado “I have dealt with the British Army before” (Referring to the stunning British defeat at Majuba in 1881 at the hands of the Boer forces).
He is however a little shaken by Willoughby and Britain’s threat, he is aware of his agreement over the ZAR annexation of Swaziland and any venture north would put that agreement into jeopardy too.
Kommandant Ignatius Ferreira
Kmdt Ignatius Philip Ferreira
Let’s turn to Commandant Ignatius Ferreira for a minute as he is a most interesting character. Some sources point to this being Ignatius Philip Ferreira and one is never exactly sure on which side his loyalties lay – Republican or Colonial. He was born in the Cape Colony in Grahamstown as a British citizen, becomes a diamond prospector in Kimberley. His military career starts with the Cape Colony as part of the Cape Mounted Police. He makes his way into the ZAR as a gold and diamond prospector, becomes a Field Cornet in a ZAR Kommando under Schalk Burger and takes part in various ‘Bantu’ wars fighting for the ZAR. He then establishes Ferreira’s Horse (a Cavalry unit) whilst Britain takes control of the ZAR from 1877-1881 and fights alongside the British in their various ‘Bantu’ wars.
All in all, he a bit of a combination between raconteur, military officer, entrepreneur, miner, policeman and mercenary. He is also the chap who really established Johannesburg in 1886. The town literally sprung up around his camp, known as Ferreira’s Camp – and it now considered the original Johannesburg settlement. Ferreira also becomes a gold mining magnate in his own right. The ZAR had also been re-established under Boer authority by this stage (from 1881) and Ignatius Ferreira now finds himself in Republican Forces again as a Colonel (Kommandant) about to invade what was to become Rhodesia and wage war against the British in 1891. Such is the rich tapestry of individuals and the history of the ZAR.
Assembly at the ‘start line’
With the invasion plan encouraged by General Piet Joubert going ahead, Louis Adendorff appealed for “five thousand armed Afrikaners, including the best fighting men South Africa could produce, the Zoutpansberg Boers”, to assemble at the Limpopo River’s main drift by 1st June 1891.
In response to Adendorff’s call, approximately a thousand Boers, with 400 wagons, under the military leadership of Commandant Ignatius Ferreira, mostly stemming from the Waterberg and the Zoutpansberg areas, began to assemble on the Limpopo River start line near ‘Rhodes’ Drift. This posed a significant threat; these numbers could easily overwhelm the small British Company Police detachments opposing them.
The British High Commissioner proclaimed that any attempt to enter the territories under Her Majesty’s protection would be met by force and the British South Africa Company immediately looked to its defences. Trenches and bunkers were dug to command the various drifts across the Limpopo and small detachments of the Bechuanaland Border Police and the British South Africa Company’s Police manned them.
Further in-land, at the Naka Pass, north of the Lundi river, The British South Africa Police D Troop and F Troop (Artillery) build Maxim gun defences dominating the Pioneer Column Road through the Naka Pass, the only real access for a trekking column to get to Bulawayo.
1890 BSAP Troop with Maxim Guns
Paul Kruger, now highly pressurised to stop the Louis Adendorff’s trek and Kmdt Ferreira lest the ZAR face full blown war with Britain and realising the ZAR had no real appetite to become embroiled in a Central African adventure with Britain, acted decisively. Kruger issued a proclamation denouncing the Adendorff trek on behalf of the ZAR government and threatened confiscation of the lands of any Boer who took part in the trek.
Kruger’s announcement discouraged some from taking part and the numbers at the Limpopo River start line started to dwindle somewhat – however it did not stop a number of Boers digging in their heels, including their leader – Kmdt Ferreira, and continuing in their invasion plan and tooling up for it. They strongly retorted to President Kruger ‘s proclamation with a declaration of rights, in which they declared that the occupation of the lands to the north of the Transvaal by a “foreign” government was monstrous and unconstitutional. To quote their own words, “the right to decide the policy and fate of the South African Continent belongs exclusively to the South African (ZAR) nation, and any assumption of that right is illegal, unconstitutional, and an insult to the natural freedom of the South African (ZAR) nation.”
Proposed advance over the Limpopo main drift
Incursion and Arrest
Dr Starr Jameson arrived at Fort Tuli, the BSAP base in Southern Matabeleland on the border of Bechuanaland and the ZAR on 3rd June. On 20th June he left the Fort to make a tour of the Limpopo drifts and billeted near the Main drift. Suddenly things started to heat up, when on 24th June a party of 112 armed and mounted Boers appeared at the Main Drift on the ZAR side of the Limpopo – and 5 fully armed Boers including Kommandant Ferreira, crossed at the drift into the British territory on the other side.
Whether this party of 5 was a leadership detachment scouting the drift and British defences ahead of their invasion force or whether they were simply on a parley mission with the British remains unclear to history – there are two sides to this story, what is clear and known to history is that it constituted an armed incursion, and they were all arrested by a rather surprised BSAP trooper and taken into custody by the only officer at the drift, Surgeon-Lieutenant E. Goody.
By all accounts of the arrest, Kmdt Ferreira submitted quietly, but one of his companions, a robust Boer with a red tie did not submit quietly, but eventually calmed down. Dr Starr Jameson was then called in.
Captain A.G. Leonard commanding E Troop of the BSAP who were given the task of defending the major drifts, then recalls the rest of the incident in his account “Jameson then taking an interpreter and (Kmdt) Ferreira with him, went over to the Boer outspan. On arrival there, he informed them that they would not be allowed to cross the river and advised them to appoint a deputation, to whom he would be only too happy to grant an interview and having again warned them not to make any hostile attempt to invade our territory, he returned to the camp.”
“The next morning the Boers sent Messrs Senekal, David Malan and Pete Marais to represent them, who intimated to Jameson that it was their intention to occupy Banyailand by virtue of a concession which they had in their possession and on the strength of which they refused point-blank to sign any document or comply with any rules or regulations of the Chartered Company.”
Despite this bravado and postering, the Boers realised they did not really have any backing from their government and realising the British were deadly serious, decided to negotiate peacefully. Jameson welcomed any Boers entering the territory if they obeyed the Company’s laws and would offer them the same opportunities for land and business as the British Pioneer column settlers.
The trekkers then dispersed, although some with an eye to business began selling meal, tobacco and horses to the troopers. Others applied for permission to hunt and said they would sign any documents required by the Company, others even asked if they could join the British South African Police. If anyone is wondering where all the Afrikaners who peacefully settled in Rhodesia and became Rhodesian citizens came from – a lot of it points to this episode.
The Jameson Raid
Now consider just how diplomatically that incident was settled by Dr Jameson, and then consider – that just 6 years later in 1896, the tables had turned, as Ferreira had lead a private armed expedition without the ZAR government’s official backing into Rhodesia with the idea of disposing its British government in 1891 – Starr Jameson was leading a private armed expedition without the British government’s official backing into the ZAR with the idea of disposing its Boer government.
The outcome is that the Boers would not be so diplomatically inclined in their dealings with Starr Jameson, whom many wanted to see executed after his arrest. The Boers would also turn to the Jameson Raid as their leading casus belli for the South African War 1899-1902 – whereas their territorial ambitions in places like Rhodesia in 1891 and their aggressive policies in the region before the Jameson Raid are flat ignored.
In Conclusion
The British historians account of the Boer War fundamentally differs from the Boer historians account – and it differs on primarily on the subjects of Imperialism and victimhood. The old Afrikaner Nationalists and their sponsored historians painted the Boers as peaceful, just wanting to farm in their place in the sun – and the British with Imperial ambition and greedy warmongers bent on destroying the Boer culture. However, anyone whose actually read a proper history book, will know that this rhetoric is nothing more than just that – the Boers were as Imperially minded as the British and as aggressive and deadly in the way they went about expanding their states in a very warmongering way.
To see this in action, consider Leo Amery in The Times History of the South African War 1899-1902 written at the time would conclude this period of the ZAR’s history, i..e. the Banyai Trek (or Adendorff Trek) from the British perspective and if you are cognisant of the ZAR as an expansionist and Imperialist nation in its own right, his conclusion rings rather prophetically true, Amery said:
“Kruger was now ” shut up in a kraal,” to use his own phrase, and his only hope of carrying out his (expansionist) policy lay in increasing his military resources, in strengthening himself by foreign alliances, and in recovering the influence he had lost in the Free State and Cape Colony, till he should be strong enough to reconquer by force from Great Britain the territories of which he considered himself unjustly robbed.”
Consider the position Kruger was in by 1896 – his entire border was hemmed in by the British, with absolutely no means of expansion and the ZAR’s British Suzerainty agreements prevented them from any international ambitions. The territories Amery specifically referred to are Bechuanaland and specifically Kruger’s ‘lost’ United States of Stellaland i.e. Kimberley (1882-1885), his ‘lost’ protectorates of Matabeleland and Mashonaland (i.e. Southern Rhodesia) in 1890, the ‘maintenance’ of the ZAR protectorate status of Swaziland and the old Klien Vrystaat Republic (1876-1891) ensuring it was not ‘lost’ to the British, his ‘lost’ Natalia Republic (1839-1843) and The Republic of Klip River i.e. Ladysmith (1847-1848), the ‘lost’ New Republic (1884-1888) and parts of Zululand he laid claim to – opening a frontier to a seaport for the ZAR (his outlined target – St Lucia and Kosi Bay).
These are all Kruger’s ambitions going into The South African War (1899-1902), and once armed to the hilt (the ZAR goes on a massive arms buying spree with taxes obtained from Gold Mining) he follows these claims almost exactly in the Boer Republic’s invasion plans. Where they invade British territory in October 1899 is not a function of overcoming British military positions, where they invade is by design, they initially invade exactly those regions that they feel are ‘theirs’ in the first place, the regions in which they believe they have rights, concessions and treatise which pre-date the British – the invasions need to be justified and hold up to international scrutiny and make no bones – Kruger is well aware of that. It’s also reflected in the way the invasions are conducted, the invading forces very interested in immediately declaring their territorial gains (for which they had been ‘robbed’), bit by bit, as part of the ZAR Republic.
The ZAR would also not forget to attack Rhodesia during Boer War 2, on the 2nd November 1899 when 2000 Boers under the joint command of Commandants Van Rensberg and Grobbelaar did enter Rhodesia over Rhodes Drift and captured a small convoy of wagons at Bryce’s Store. A simultaneous attack on the squadron of the Rhodesian regiment under the command of Colonel Jack Spreckley holding Rhodes’ Drift was less successful. The Rhodesians held off the Boer invaders until nightfall before withdrawing in good order to Fort Tuli, unsure how to progress and a little shaken by the Rhodesian battle order the Boers entrenched their forces at Bryce’s Store and played no further action in invading Rhodesia.
Oct 1899 – Dec 1899 Boer invasions
The idea that some pre-and post Apartheid Afrikaner historians and commentators have that Kruger was merely conducting a ‘pre-emptive’ strike into British territory to counteract a mystical British invasion in Oct 1899 is not only laughable its completely unsupported by a stack of historical fact that show otherwise – it’ also wholly flies against both Kruger’s character and his actual polices.
This is not “Boer Bashing” in any way shape or form, I personally admire many things about the Boer nation, I buy into their desire for national pride, their fierce bravery, desire for independence and ambitions to gain wealth and upliftment – all whilst operating in a very hostile environment. The clash of Boer and Brit is an ideological clash on whose influence and laws the entire Southern African region is run (not just a couple of small Boer Republics), and I’ve shown this time again in previous articles. See From Union to Banana Republic! for the latest one.
What I don’t buy into is all this ‘victimhood’, ‘bullying’ and ‘mineral theft’ baloney touted out by the National Party and their cabal in response to losing the Boer War, it’s marred and peppered with political Republicanism and Afrikaner Nationalism and its historically very untrue and utterly unsupported by fact. I hope to show just one more example of the nature of the Boer Republic’s and Kruger’s policies here with the planned invasion of Rhodesia and the types of tensions that existed between Boer and Brit, it’s one of many areas of aggressive expansionist Imperialism – both Boer and Brit, causing friction. We honestly need to engage some brain matter and dispense with the old Nationalist rhetoric on the Boer War.
Written and Researched by Peter Dickens
References include: The Times History of the South African War 1899-1902 – by Leo Amery, the British correspondent for the Times covering the war. Paul Kruger’s memoir “my third Presidency”. The Adendorff Trek by E. E. Burke.
Colourised photographs courtesy and many thanks to Jennifer Bosch (Jenny B Colourised Photos).
The Observation Post 