The ‘Rise and Fall’ of the Torch Commando

Torch Commando Series – Part 4

The Torch – a mixed bag

On the back of the successful widespread support of ‘The Steel Commando’ and determined to continue the fight to effect regime change, the ‘The Torch Commando’ took shape and it took to a more formalized structure of a central command with devolved authorities in the various regions of South Africa, using military discipline, military styled planning and lines of communication to activate.

Officially launching as the Torch Commando, Group Captain Sailor Malan, the hero of The Battle of Britain was elected National President of the Torch, Major Louis Kane-Berman, a highly respected North Africa and Italy campaign officer, was elected National Chairman. To keep a very even keel, the appointed Patron-in-Chief for the Torch Commando was Nicolaas Jacobus de Wet, the former Chief Justice of South Africa. The National Director was Major Ralph Parrott, a ‘hero’ of the Battle of Tobruk from the Transvaal Scottish who received the Military Cross for bravery. 

Group Captain Sailor Malan (left) and Major Louis Kane-Berman (right), the top two Torch leaders.

The Torch went to pains to put two English speakers and two Afrikaans speakers at the top of the organisation to reflect balance – critical where white Afrikaners, who made up 60% of the 334,000 South Africans who had volunteered to fight in the war against Nazim. Some, disillusioned with the military’s demobilization and re-integration process and been ‘politically disenfranchised’ had voted for the National Party in 1948 in protest and expecting change to their circumstances, and the Torch sought to ‘bring them back’ to centre-line politics on the ‘camaraderie’ ticket (however, this group was small and fleeting, in the main a ‘Service block’ vote emerged in the United Party’s ambit and it did not really materialize in the National Party’s ambit). 

The manifesto of the Torch Commando was released, it was a ‘rededication of service and a call to the nation,’ it read:

We, veterans of many wars, once more dedicate ourselves to our land. In the belief and with the guidance of Almighty God, we shall pursue the truth and uphold it.

We shall strive for justice, mutual trust and honour in all our affairs.

South Africans, men have died that you shall be free, let no-one rob you of your heritage.

Having met together in a spirit of mutual faith and trust, our father’s founded the Union of South Africa. In the same spirit let us go forth together, free men, free from fear, free to worship and free to speak.

South Africa Awake.

Rise of The Torch

All over the country people started to flock into devolved Torch Commando structures and almost immediately ‘joined up’. Hundreds at a time joined new branches springing up outside the major metropole branches/commands in small places like Pinetown, Paarl, Umtata, Amanzimtoti, Eshowe, Dundee, Colenso, Eliot, Strand, Fish Hoek, Sunday’s River Valley, Bedford and Ficksburg. By the end of September 1951 there was a branch in every Reef town and on most of the mines. 

The enthusiasm for ‘The Torch’ (as it became to be known) was almost sporadic and widespread, as if an immediate need of the returned war veterans to express frustration at the National Party’s policy of Apartheid and re-kindle their camaraderie had been answered in a legitimate political pressure group. Such was the support that it took Louis Kane-Berman and Sailor Malan by surprise.

The Torch Commando Executive, Louis Kane-Berman is 4th from the left, Sailor Malan is seated next to him – 5th from the left – photo courtesy the Kane-Berman family.

Within three months of the official launch of the Torch, it had almost 100 000 members enrolled in 206 branches. By the end of January 1952, there were 120 000 members in 350 branches. By mid 1952 the Torch had 250 000 members. 

Membership of The Torch was not exclusive to military service, it was open to all who supported the Torch’s cause. A significant non-veteran joining The Torch was Alan Paton (the famous author and future leader of the Liberal Party). Of its zenith membership of 250,000 members one quarter were white ex-servicemen – about 63,000.  Membership was relatively cheap and accessible – half a crown (about R 100 or £ 5 today’s money), and ‘Torch’ lapel pins and various other ‘Torch’ symbology was adopted by members to signify to others their political convictions and support of ‘The Torch’ and its ideals by way of a ‘badge’ (lapel pin).

Torch Membership – half a crown

Of major concern to the National Party was the profile of people joining The Torch Commando, members soon included five former Judges, and ten Generals, including the Lieutenant-General George Brink CB, CBE, DSO, who had a very distinguished military career, he was the Commander of the 1st South African Division during the Second World War. In 1942, Brink turned over command of the division to Dan Pienaar and Commanded the Inland Area Command in South Africa from 1942 to 1944. Other Generals joining the Torch were the highly regarded Major General R.C. Wilson and Brigadier A.H. Coy.

Another very notable General joining The Torch Commando was General Kenneth van der Spuy CBE MC, the man who pioneered the formation of South African Air Force (SAAF) under General Smuts’ directives. General Van der Spuy is regarded as the modern father and founder of the SAAF (Smuts would be the ‘Grandfather). After the war he was a key role-player in the establishment of The Springbok Legion and on the executive of the South African Legion of Military Veterans (The South African Legion), South Africa’s prima and largest veterans’ association with 52,000 registered veterans. 

Alarmed by this rapid rise in protesting whites and the profile of members joining The Torch, the National Party did what it did best, and acted ‘decisively’. It looked to the most important ‘feeder’ for the Torch Commando, the military – the Union Defence Force, and immediately instituted a ban on all permanent force members still serving as well as any public servant from joining the Torch, amending The Public Service Act.

General van der Spuy (left) and Lt. General Brink (right)

However, they had difficulty instituting this ban on the Citizen Force units and Regiments – whose members continued to join. The ban in many ways did affect membership as many still in the active employment of the government – either in the military or in the systems like the judiciary were discouraged from joining The Torch, lest they lose their livelihood. 

El Alamein Commemoration Campaign – October 1951

The Torch Commando targeted the anniversary celebrations of the Battle of El Alamein pivoting around the 26th October 1951 to draw countrywide protest and support. In all the El Alamein Commemoration Campaign drew a staggering 150,000 people into active protest against the National Party government. A coordinated protest this size had never been seen in South Africa before.

Ten Days before a mega-rally planned for Johannesburg, Sailor Malan lit a flaming torch outside the Langham Hotel in Johannesburg, the Torch was placed on a ‘Torch Truck’ which then travelled around the country driving up awareness and support and creating media hype (in all it travelled over 6,500 km drumming up support).  A huge crowd greeted the Torch Truck when it finally arrived in Johannesburg just in time for the El Alamein commemoration protest. The Johannesburg torch protest started when veterans carrying flaming Torches gathered at the square next to the City Hall, converging on them four separate mustering points elsewhere in the city came thousands of ex-servicemen and women, twelve abreast, singing the old stirring war songs of their day.

A massive crowd, tens of thousands, gathered around a dais erected among the palm trees on the square to hear speeches from Sailor Malan and Kane-Berman, who told them that the flaming torches were symbolic of the searchlights used at Alamein to guide troops to their objectives and remove the possibility of any man being lost. He said;

“These are the lights of democracy – let them be a source of comfort to the people of this country whatever their language, race, or colour. They convey a message to the people of South Africa in the name of those who fought and lived and in the name of those who fought and died.”

As to the large protests like this one, according to the Star Newspaper on 27th October 1951, the Torch Rallies for EL Alamein Commemoration brought the following numbers, Johannesburg 40,000 protestors, in Cape Town 20,000, in Durban 10,000 and in Pretoria 6,000.  But the protests did not stop at these large events, large bonfires symbolising Torches were lit across the country, some of them on the mountains above Barberton, six in Pretoria, and one at a peak high in the Drakensberg. People gathered also in Benoni, Krugersdorp, Vereeniging, Port Shepstone, Empangeni, and elsewhere. Hundreds of bonfires were lit around Kimberley in a massive ‘fire chain’. These smaller protests were often linked to a bugler playing the Last Post followed by a period of silence for the fallen. 

El Alamein Torch Commando protest poster targeted at Afrikaner ex-servicemen to bring them to the Torch’s cause – poster reads ‘Remember Alamein, we were Brothers remember?’

In all, it is estimated that a staggering 150,000 people would ultimately participate in the Torch’s El Alamein Commemoration protests. The government sat up and noticed, the Torch posed a potential military threat. Dr D.F. Malan, South Africa’s Prime Minister announced:

“People content that the Torch will go a little way and then vanish. That is not my view. The Torch Commando is to be taken seriously because it had a military or semi-military character. Private Armies of that nature cannot be tolerated …“

Officially, the government tried to gag the entire protest by way of instructing the SABC not to broadcast on any of the dates or activities, an instruction the broadcaster followed. The Torch tried to initiate the same campaign the following year in October 1952, but their permissions for gatherings were ‘banned’ – declined by Ben Schoeman (an NP Cabinet Minister).

After the El Alamein activations five guiding principles were penned crystallising the objectives of the movement by way of principals:

  • To uphold the spirit and solemn compacts entered into at Union as moral obligations of trust and honour binding upon the people
  • To secure the repeal of any legislation enacted in violation of such obligations
  • To protect the freedom of the individual in worship, language, and speech, and to ensure his right of free access to the courts
  • To eliminate all forms of totalitarianism, whether communist or fascist
  • To promote racial harmony in the Union

Rejection of Communism 

Noteworthy at this point is the Torch Commando in their objectives rejects Communism – they do this primarily because the National Party’s anti-communist legislation is so open ended. It is the legislative tool the National Party would use the Communist Party of South Africa and the Springbok Legion, it would also fundamentally undermine the activities of Torch Commando, and would even be used to curtail, arrest and even gag mainstream politicians in the Liberal Party and the Labour Party.

This was the infamous ‘The Suppression of Communism Act 44 July 1950’. The act was a sweeping act and not really targeted to Communists per se, it was intended for anyone in opposition to Apartheid regardless of political affiliation.

The Act defined communism as any scheme aimed at achieving change–whether economic, social, political, or industrial – “by the promotion of disturbance or disorder” or any act encouraging “feelings of hostility between the European and the non-European races … calculated to further (disorder)”

Thus, the Nationalist government could deem any person (liberal, humanitarian or Communist) to be a ‘communist ‘if it found that person’s aims to be aligned with these aims. After a nominal two-week appeal period, the person’s status as a communist became an un-reviewable matter of fact and subjected the person to being barred from public participation, restricted in movement or even imprisoned. In effect, it could be, and was applied to anyone from both the White community and Black community not buying into Apartheid.

Within the formation of the Torch Commando and paid-up members, were members of The Springbok Legion, and many of them had been members of the Communist Party of South Africa before and after the war. Influential and highly vocal Torchmen like Cecil Williams, Wolfie Kodesh, Jack Hodgson, Rusty Bernstein, Fred Carneson and Joe Slovo were all card carrying and outspoken members of the Communist Party.

Under the edicts of the Suppression of Communism Act 44 July 1950 the Nationalist government could have immediately such down The Torch Commando and arrested its members if it could prove it was a ‘Communist threat’ or carried with it Communist philosophy and ideology. This would force the communist members in the Torch to seek other more robust avenues to political protest like ‘The Congress of Democrats’ – some like Rusty Bernstein, Joe Slovo and Jack Hodgson are even arrested and charged with treason, alongside the likes of Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela in 1956.

This rejection of Communism not only kept The Torch Commando clear of repressive government legislation, it also opened the Torch Commando to the great many war veterans and their supporters who feared the advent of Bolshevism and Communism and other forms of socialism like National Socialism (Nazism). By rejecting Communism, The Torch would open itself up to far greater appeal and take a far safer trajectory than toeing the line of its communist members. This would cause a schism between the more robust ‘Springbok Legionnaires’ with Communist leanings would eventually even take aim at The Torch Commando and issue much critique of The Torch in the ex-servicemen’s newspapers like ‘Advance’ whose contributors included the wives of Jack Hodgson – Rica Hodgson and Joe Slovo’s wife – Ruth First, amongst others.

As irony and own goals go, even ‘Advance’ which evolved from ‘The Guardian’ and ‘the Clarion’ from November 1952 to October 1954, becoming the “New Age” in 1962 was eventually banned and closed by the National Party. Such is the nature of ‘white’ politics in South Africa, it’s never held a unitary view.

Smear Campaign

Also the National Party government, being extremely concerned about the influence this movement might have, especially under the leadership of the war hero, acted ‘decisively’ (as was its usual modus operandi) and went about discrediting the Torch Commando and its leaders through means of negative propaganda.

For the rest of his life, Sailor would be completely ridiculed by the Nationalist government. The National Party press caricatured him  ‘a flying poodle’, dressed in his leathers and flying goggles, in the service of Jan Smuts and the Jewish mine-bosses, who they referred to as the “Hochenheimers”.  The National Party openly branded Sailor Malan as an Afrikaner of a ‘different’ and ‘unpatriotic’ kind, a traitor to his country and ‘Volk’ (people).

The ‘Crisis’ Continues – 1952

Dr D.F. Malan also publicly warned Torch Commando members, that as he viewed them as being paramilitary in nature, Torch Commando members who picketed National Party rallies would be met with a violent response, and this would set a nasty tone at grass-root levels.

In the National Party heartland town – Lydenberg, the new year started badly on 11th Jan 1952, emboldened by the governments position on the Torch Commando, a Torch meeting in Lydenberg was violently broken up by Nationalists (in the clash, Charles Bekker, the Torch’s National Organiser’s arm was broken). 

The Torch announced that they would be back before the end of January in a show of strength and force. Commandant Dolf de la Rey, the old Boer War, ZAR veteran headed up the steel commando styed convoy again as hundreds of vehicles descended on Lydenberg. This time the Nationalists thought better of violence and there was no trouble, to drive the point home as to the freedom to assemble and protest a new Torch Commando branch was promptly constituted in Lydenberg. 

Video: AP footage of the Torch Commando in action, note the military styled operations room the use of leaflet drops from the air, also note the marketing materials the ‘V’ for Victory slogan which was a wartime rally call.

Whilst the Torch was focussed on small town grass-root recruitment and expanding demonstrations and branches, things started to go their way as to the ‘Constitutional Crisis’ – in a landmark decision in March 1952, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court declared the Separate Representation of Voters Act as 

“invalid, null, and void and of no legal force and effect.”

The Torch Commando’s jubilation at the ‘win’ did not last long. Dr D.F Malan declared that courts were not entitled to pass judgement on the will of Parliament. Kane-Berman would warn that 

the fecundity of a mind like that of Dr Dönges cannot be ignored”. He and his colleagues in the Broederbond would find a way “of circumventing this judgement”

And that is exactly what happened next.

The Nationalists acting very un-constitutionally and with unparalleled cynicism over time, would pass the High Court of Parliament Act, effectively removing the autonomy of the Judiciary in matters regarding the Constitution and loaded the Appellate Court with additional NP sympathetic representatives.

So, the ’Constitutional Crisis’ continued.  Sailor Malan was quick to react, of the Nationalists by-passing of the highest court in the land he said:

“The mask of respectability is there for all but the blind to see. The sheepskin has fallen off and the fascist wolf is snarling at the courts. We accuse the government of preferring jungle law to the rule of law. We accuse them of preferring unfettered dictatorship to a constitution which binds them to certain standards of procedure.”

In a co-ordinated and with military precision, Mass Torch protests in major metropoles immediately convened in Umtata – 3,500 people. Pietermaritzburg – 15,000 people, Johannesburg – 20,000 people. In Pretoria 20,000 people gathered despite being teargassed. The Torch leader in Pretoria, John Wilson, said;

Dr Malan was putting himself above the courts in the best tradition of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini”.

Torch Light protest meetings also immediately sprang up in minor metropoles – many in National Party heartland towns – from Groblersdal to Louis Trichardt, further attesting to the gradual conversion of Afrikaner voters and the pulling power of The Torch. 

As to the Constitutional Crisis, regardless of the Torch’s mass protest efforts, the Nationalists pressed ahead, they continued to load the Parliamentary system to get their majority by gerrymandering constituencies, they appointed National Party MP’s as ‘Native Representatives’ in the Senate and illegally incorporated South West African (Namibian) MP’s into the Senate (South West Africa as an ex-German colony was a National Party sympathetic block, given their right wing German sympathies during the war, and although a ‘Protectorate’ was still a separate country).

Sailor Malan at a Torch Commando rally in Pretoria, note the ‘V for Victory’ salute and his trademark flying jacket and medals.

Kane-Berman would say of it; 

“a vast section of the people of South Africa are no longer prepared to stomach the totalitarian tendencies of the present government with its piecemeal invasion of their civil liberties and its tinkering with the Constitution.”

Simply put, if the rights of the coloured people could be removed then nobody’s rights were safe. More action was needed, simple protesting by Torchlight was not working, real and meaningful change needed to occur for the Torch to remain relevant. A coalition of all opposition parties who had members who could vote needed to come together in a concerted effort using all forms of politicking to oust the Nationalists constitutionally – by the ballot box. 

This would take shape in an organisation called ‘The United Democratic Front’. 

The United Democratic Front 

The Torch’s mixed bag of moderate ‘pro-democracy’ and firebrand ‘Liberal’ and ‘Communist’ members would also ultimately swing it from an independent ex-serviceman’s popular movement to a political alliance with stated affiliations. 

However, the Torch gradually came to realise that mass protesting would not lead to effective regime change and ‘door to door’ politicking would be required to build ground-swell voter’s block and beat the National Party at the next General election.

Sailor Malan would nail the Torch’s colour’s to the United Party’s mast and say of this move to becoming more of political movement rather than a popular protest movement.

“We have no intention of affiliating with the United Party, but since the National Party was elected to power in a constitutional way, we must fight them constitutionally, and we can only do this by helping the United Party.” (the largest and most viable opposition party).

However, the ‘mixed bag’ of vastly different political views of the Torch’s members would not enable it to rally behind any single political party, Sailor Malan would also say that it would be fatal for the Torch to form a separate party in its own right – so a better vehicle was to needed to enable the Torch to politic at grass-roots across the political spectrum.

Political Cartoon in Advance shows the opposition to the National Party pulling in different directions. The Torch sitting in the back.

This came in the form of the United Democratic Front (the ‘first’ UDF – the UDF of later years was an entirely different body with the same name) – announced by Koos Strauss on 16th April 1952, the leader of the United Party (UP) as essentially an alliance between the Torch and the UP. The full-makeup of the United Front would be partnership between the Labour Party (LP), the Torch Commando, an organization called ‘The Defenders of the Constitution’ and the United Party (UP). In essence The Torch would remain independent, but it was now free to canvass votes for the UP and the LP in the upcoming 1953 General Election.

To many, the joining of the UDF and opening the Torch to the party politics of the UP and the LP would signal the point where the Torch would ‘jump tracks’ from its singular grass-roots vision of demanding the removal and/or resignation of the National Party as a political pressure group and become a vehicle on which the UP especially could rely on for its party-political aims, its messaging becoming defused as it entered mainstream politics. This would be the first signal of the end of the Torch.

A veiled threat

One area where this political dilution of the Torch occurred in mid April 1952. As an ‘ex-military’ movement it could realistically threaten the government with force, and this made the government very jittery and careful in the way it dealt with the Torch. At a Torch meeting in Greenside, Kane-Berman proposed a ‘National Day of Protest’ and said;

“We will fight constitutionally as long as we are permitted to fight constitutionally, but if this government are foolish enough to attempt unconstitutional action, then I say the Torch Commando will consider very seriously its next step.” 

In his mind the next step would be a national strike and countrywide shutdown, however he also went to give a veiled military threat and said:

“As good soldiers we must have something in reserve!”

The National Party took this statement literally to be a final threat of military force and the idea of National Strike or ‘National Shutdown’ by ‘whites’ would embolden the ‘blacks’ to join in a national revolt – in their eyes a powder-keg. The Afrikaans media jumped on it declaring the Torch as provoking national chaos and drawing ‘blacks’ into ‘white’ politics.  C.R. Swart, the NP Minister of Justice falsely declared that the government had evidence that The Torch was plotting an armed uprising. Then Die Transvaler, falsely reported that the Torch had plans for a coup d’état.

Laughable as this all was Kane-Berman responded:

“I do not doubt that there is a plot afoot, but it is not the one mentioned in the Transvaler report. The real plot is a Nationalist one and it consists of trumping up an excuse to do precisely what Hitler did in Germany – ban opposition movements.”

Foreign newspapers now started picking up on the Afrikaner newspaper news-feed that the Torch was planning a coup d’état. National Party Ministers were so spooked many of them started surrounding themselves with bodyguards – by June, 250 new plainclothes policemen had been appointed to protect National Party Ministers. The whole issue, now blown completely out of proportion was demonstrable of just how fearful of the Torch the National Party had become.

The newly formed United Democratic Front had to jump in to diffuse the situation on behalf of their now aligned Torch Commando. Koos Strauss, the UP leader almost immediately re-iterated that the United Front (the UP and the Torch) intended to fight the battle constitutionally, there would be no national shutdown and there would be no threat of arms. In this way the UP ‘blunted’ the fighting edge and military threat of The Torch and forced its leaders like Kane-Berman to toe the UP’s party-political line and agenda.

Political Cartoon by Victor Ivanoff over the United Party endeavours to use the Torch Commando to win the 1953 elections, it shows the Torch as the UP’s hinderance.

D-Day commemorations – June 1952

On 6th June 1952, a Torch Commando procession was planned around D-Day anniversary – the invasion of Europe which would see the end of Nazi Germany – a mere 8 years into its celebrations.

A staggering 45,000 people gathered in Durban for a “hands-off-our-constitution” Torch Commando meeting. The meeting was preceded by a pipe band and march into the city of 5,000 Torch members. 

In addition, 2,500 women met in the Durban city hall to dedicate themselves to unseating the Nationalist the government, so impressed by the convictions of the women, and aging Ouma Smuts, Jan Smuts’ widow and darling of ex-servicemen and women even sent them a goodwill message.

Wakkerstroom by-election – June 1952

Also, in June 1952 the National Party incumbent for Wakkerstroom died, forcing a by-election. Wakkerstroom was Jan Smuts old seat when he was ousted in 1924 and had become a National Party strong-hold. It became important because the UP wanted to show it had not lost touch with the rural vote and to the NP it became important as the African National Congress (ANC) had announced it’s ‘Defiance Campaign’ at the same time as the by-election and the NP wanted to show it still held the confidence and will of the voting people (albeit they were only white). 

Torch Commando protest – note the size and the support

Although the seat was a ‘sure win’ for the Nationalists in any event, the Torch decided that a show of unity would be necessary to assert their freedom to assemble and meet anywhere they choose.  The Torch also felt it would be an ideal opportunity to present a friendly face to the rural Afrikaners as militarily non-threatening – a moral opportunity to present themselves as ordinary decent citizens, contrary to the lies that were being told about them in the Afrikaans media. They proposed to set up a nearby ‘camp’ – have a meeting and then have a social gathering and ‘braai’ with the local farmers.

To protect their stronghold and assure themselves of the win the Nationalists announced that the United Front (the Torch in effect) would not be allowed to hold a meeting in the Wakkerstroom constituency. Local officials refused permission for the Torch to road transport equipment to the town – so the Torch charted a Dakota aircraft to fly in with all the necessary. The Police were then ordered to block any Torch Commando convoy, so the convoy simply drove around them on the open veld and entered Wakkerstroom to set up camp.

They held their meeting with no problems from the locals, asserted their right to meet anywhere and then had a braai with the locals who brought meat and vegetables with them, a nice friendly social.

By did all this goodwill and positive spin swing a vote?  Nope, the United Party was soundly beaten at the poll, embarrassingly they had lost ground to the previous vote – on aggregate they had lost more voters to the National Party, in retaining the seat, the NP received 4.9% more votes than it had attracted in the 1948 election. This was taken as a barometer of the general state of the United Party’s appeal to the rural Afrikaner vote.  

Summing up the reasons for the magnitude of the defeat, a United Party memorandum stated:

the National Party candidates and election agents ascribe their success to the existence of the Torch Commando, the Kane-Berman ‘Day of Protest’ statement and the obvious tie up to the non-European protest movement. They were able to lump us (the UP) into a ‘bonte opposisie’ the Torch Commando, the Labour Party, Kahn, Sachs, Carneson (and) the African National Congress.”

By Carneson, they referenced Fred Carneson, a military veteran, leader of the Springbok Legion and a devout Communist. Based on this, the UP executive concluded at a meeting on the 17th July 1952, that in order to re-gain the confidence of their lost rural Afrikaner voters they had little choice but to move the United Party’s platform even closer to that of the National Party. 

This would mean tapering back on the UP’s ‘liberal’ faction and their demand for a universal franchise for both black and white voters and a move towards the UP’s conservative faction who were happy the Cape Franchise for Colourds and who wanted to see an ‘eventual’ qualified franchise for black South Africans. This would spell, not only the death of the United Front, but the Torch Commando and the eventual death of the United Party itself.

On the up, in 1952, the Torch Commando continued to rise at the grass-roots level. Torch meetings attracted 3 000 in Witbank, 500 in Vryheid, 300 in Bathurst, 60 farmers in Salem, 400 at Montagu, 2,000 at Adelaide, 2 000 at Bredasdorp, and thousands again in the main metropoles of Pretoria, Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town. Torch branches were formed in Oranjemund and Port St Johns. As to rising popularity Danie Craven, the South Africa Springbok rugby stalwart even joined the Torch. 

However, in line with the fear that ‘The Torch’ was planning a military overthrow and National Party hype surrounding this, along with down-right under-handed politics – on the downside Torch rallies and meetings in the latter part of 1952 increasingly came under attack by Afrikaner Nationalists, so much so ‘Torchmen’ started to wear their ‘old tin hat’ brodie steel helmets to meetings. A Torch meeting in   Queenstown was violently broken up, in Brakpan Nationalists lined the streets and spat at a passing Torch rally. A Torch/United Front meeting in Vrededorp was so violently attacked by Nationalists banishing iron bars and nailed sticks that 100 people had to be treated by doctors on site whilst others were taken to hospital. A Torch meeting at Milner Park was attacked and stoned.

The Torch and Race 

One aspect of the Torch Commando that comes under scrutiny of modern ANC political commentators is the ‘whiteness’ of the organization.  They are quick to dismiss it as an irrelevant movement because it was not inclusive of ‘blacks’ … but that would be to completely mis-understand what the Torch was.  So, what’s with the ‘whiteness’?

Torch Commando rally – note the placard expressing fear of the National Party’s intentions to implement a ‘white only’ fascist Republic

The Torch had been formed to oppose the violation of the Constitution. Although the violations directly affected the voting rights of coloured people, this violation intended to create a “whites-only” vote – so it was a ‘Constitutional’ fight at the ballot to prevent the on-set of Apartheid in its more sinister forms. Only whites and Coloureds had the franchise, so only they could fight a constitutional fight at the polls and in the greater scheme of ‘white parliamentary constituencies’ the handful of parliamentary constituencies where coloured people were registered on the common voters roll was relatively small – however to this effect The Torch did have a few coloured branches in these constituencies – in the but it remained an almost entirely white organization.

Outside of The Cape, the vast majority in the rest of country of ‘Black’ people did not have ‘the ballot’ so they could not participate at all. Kane-Berman summed it up in October 1952 when he said that because the Torch’s fight was through the ballot box, there was no point in enrolling people who could not vote.

Coloured representation at a Torch Commando protest

Since the Torch did not want to become a political party, the best way of throwing out the NP government in 1953 was to encourage Torch supporters to vote for its two parliamentary partners in the United Front, the United Party and the Labour Party. By late 1953 this had become the key objective of The Torch Commando, and it only really involved ‘whites’ and their ballot.

To illustrate the point, even the Coloured Servicemen felt the Torch was the ‘white man’s fight’ and not theirs.  In July 1952, a letter to Sailor Malan the Kimberley Coloured War Veterans’ Association said;

“No good purpose will be served by us becoming members of your vast organisation, notwithstanding the fact that the Torch came into being on one of the most vital issues affecting the coloured people”.  Our “sincerest wishes that (the Torch) shall grow in strength to face the crisis affecting South Africa …. Coloured people made great sacrifices and paid dearly for their loyalty in assisting to uphold democracy”.

Later in 1952 a group of coloured ex-servicemen declared that they had no desire to become members of the Torch’s fight as;

“(This) constitutional fight is the white man’s fight to re-establish the integrity of his word”.

The Torch’s mixed bag broad church of Communists, Liberals, Moderates and Democrats found common cause and ‘unity’ in their horror at the NP’s plans to violate the Constitution, but in reality true ‘unity’ did not go very much further than that. Any attempt to develop hard-line, defined and detailed policies on race in a country so racially obsessed with vastly different views on it might have split the organisation, so the Torch leadership chose to avoided it as much as possible and focus on what ‘unified’. In any event, the priority was to defeat the NP party in the general election due to be held in March 1953 and they would just focus on that.

Torch Commando protest placard warning ‘they (the National Party) breed race hate’.

Dr. Maurice McGregor is a regular member of the Torch, but very active and he gives a perspective on the issue as to race and The Torch and its mission, he said; 

“I was in the Torch Commando for about two years and took part in several marches. As I remember it the commando was primarily created to protect democracy, meaning the democratic process, the right to hold political meetings, and this in effect meant protecting the United Party which was the principal opposition to a Nationalist party.”

He goes on to say on the issue of protesting against ‘Apartheid’ his position is one of a typical white United Party voter in the 1940’s and 1950’s many of whom maintained that it was important that Black South Africans be taken out of poverty first, the poverty cycle and lack of education needed to be addressed before any form of franchise is afforded to them. Maurice recalls:

“To say that they held mass protests against apartheid is correct so long as you don’t start defining too precisely what apartheid was about. For example, the torch commando would never have endorsed a vote for Africans, even a very limited vote for those with education and property. But they did oppose the specific steps involved in the application of apartheid such as the bulldozing of Sophia town and the creation of rural ghettos.”

On the racial make-up of The Torch Commando (that been an organisation for ‘white voters’ only) he points out that although predominantly ‘white’ it was not exclusively white, he says;

“(The Torch) was not only white. There were Blacks as well as coloureds in the Torch Commando. But then there were very few Blacks in the Army.”

The ANC’s Defiance Campaign and the Swart Bills

Black resistance to Apartheid was also starting to lean towards violent civilian defiance as the ANC’s Defiance Campaign, officially launched from 26th June 1952, started to descend into full blown rioting in every major metropole around the country by October 1952, this was also not a stated aim of the Torch Commando (Kane-Berman’s National Shutdown statement aside).

C.R. ‘Blakkie’ Swart as portrayed in Advance – the ‘gagger’ of free speech in front of a Nazi swastika.

It was clear from the nature of the Defiance Campaign that the ANC and The Torch were on different political trajectories. However, the Torch did take a strong position when Kane-Berman in September 1952 and now re-elected as the Chairman of The Torch Commando called on the Nationalist government “to cease its suicidal policy of fanning the flame of race hatred and to meet the non-European leaders in conference.”

The ANC’s Defiance ironically would also trigger the demise of both The Torch and The UP and spit them apart, and it’s not what you think – it would come from the National Party in the form of new statutes and because of polarising views within the United Party to them. So how is that?

In response to ANC’s Defiance Campaign, the National Party behaved ‘typically’ in January 1953, C.R Swart introduced the “Whipping Bill” (giving powers to Police to give lashes to people inciting political violence) and the “Public Safety Bill” (to prevent highly defiant political gatherings in the interests of safety and call a ‘State of Emergency’ when needed). 

ANC Defiance Campaign – commences on the 26 June 1952

Known as the ‘Swart Bills’ the Torch was bitterly opposed to these bills – and not without good reason, the ‘Swart Bills’, which gave the Minister of Justice immense powers in the event of civil unrest. Had these Bills been in place when the Steel Commando rioted in Cape Town in May 1951 the State would have had the powers to imprison and whip the Torch Commando’s executive. However, the United Party dithered over these Bills as the conservative element within the UP felt they were decisive in resolving spin off violence from the ANC’s Defiance Campaign and therefore necessary.

On the other side of the fence, the United Party would support the National Party in passing Swart Bills on the grounds of national security, concerned with the unrest the ANC’s Defiance Campaign was creating whereas the Torch insisted that the bills conflicted with their principles and were the re-curser to fascist dictatorship. 

Louis Kane-Berman argued;

“… unless the Torch Commando take the lead and the initiative in rousing public feeling against these Bills, the lead will be taken by other less responsible organisations (both European and non-European)”

Kane-Berman also, after rioting broke out, stated that;

“we (in the Torch) are not surprised, nor should be the Nationalist leaders be, that extreme elements among the natives have gone berserk.”

Torch Commando artefact, telegram to Sailor Malan from the League of Women Voters (Black Sash) urging The Torch’s vigorous opposition to the Swart Bills.

The infamous “lunch

The issue over the Swart Bills came to a head when Louis Kane-Berman attended a luncheon hosted by the Torch’s primary benefactor and UP stalwart – Harry Oppenheimer. Harry Oppenheimer pressed Kane-Berman to elaborate on the Torch’s position with regard The Swart Bills, and was highly offended, when a United Party Minister of Parliament with whom Kane-Berman had served alongside in the North African campaign during the war, rebutted Kane-Berman’s argument on the evils of the Bills and detention without trial when and he flippantly stated:

“Louis you are talking nonsense. During the war Smuts threw many Afrikaners into prison without trial and now because the government wants to imprison some …(African)… trouble-makers, you now wish to raise all manner of objections.” 

Alarmed that the United Party (UP) would support the bills, Louis Kane-Berman summoned The Torch Commandos National and Provincial executives and members of provincial executives of the Torch to Cape Town for an emergency meeting, also attended by leaders of the UP and of the Labour Party (LP). The LP was bitterly opposed to the bills. The UP representative, Pilkington-Jordan failed to convince the meeting of the UP position in support of the Swart Bills, so to conclude the meeting the Torch executives “decided unanimously there and then that if these bills went ahead, we would now call a National Day of Protest”. 

Louis Kane-Berman issued a press release reaffirming the Torch’s stance against the Swart Bills on the 8 February 1953 – the invited press gave it a standing ovation so well was it received, “to my surprise” said Kane-Berman later. The press release drew a line in the sand as to The Torch’s political intentions and it immediately put The Torch at loggerheads with the UP and with the likes of Harry Oppenheimer, the Torch’s primary financial benefactor and sponsor.

The Torch had reverted to their original threat of shutting down the country and aligning with the objects of the ANC’s defiance campaign, and almost immediately there was dissent over the call for a ‘National Day of Protest’ within the Torch at a grass-roots level from the Torch’s rank and file who supported the UP. Torch members declaring the ‘day of protest’ as not properly approved by the Torch’s structures – the organisation now fighting internally with its leadership started the slippery slope towards an implosion.

Political cartoon, shows the UP leader Koos Strauss concerned that the Torch Commando, depicted as children getting a little too close to his thatch house for comfort. Courtesy the Kane-Berman family.

The General Election – April 1953

Although Louis Kane-Berman would describe these two bills and the loss of financial support from Oppenheimer and support from the UP as the death-knoll for the Torch, its broader than just that. The real death-knoll would come in the 1953 General Election. The NP went into the election campaigning taking advantage of the unclear UP policies on black emancipation and weak leadership, promoting the ‘red danger – communist – rooi gevaar’ threat of ‘the Torch’ and ‘Springbok Legion’ and the ‘black danger – swart gevaar’ of the ANC and its defiance campaign. The ‘fear factor’ resonated with white voters fearing an uncertain future and seeking strong leadership and structure. 

Again, as in the 1948 election, the National Party did not win a majority vote – it won 45% of the vote, but more importantly it won more constitutional seats, increasing its number of seats from 86 before the election to 94 – bringing it 61% of the ‘Constituency’ vote – well up on its performance in 1948. The UP’s seats dropped from 64 to 57. Labour dropped from 6 to 5. 

Ideological Conflict – Natal

The Torch Commando dithered between two conflicting Constitutional issues, the first surrounding the Cape Coloured Franchise – which in essence called for the maintenance of the South African Union on moral grounds and the second issue, Natal’s sovereignty – which called for a break-up of the South African Union on legal grounds.  Diametrically opposing views indeed.

The ‘Apartheid-Lite’ politics of the UP to attract back the vital marginal ‘white’ voters drawn to the National Party in the 1948 election and the ‘Liberal’ UP Torch members at odds with their party’s politics would ultimately lead to downfall of the Torch (and eventually to the downfall of the UP itself). 

To illustrate the effect of this political feud in which The Torch now found itself in, after the 1953 elections the leader group of the Natal Torch Commando who were in the United Party, split from the United Party to form their own ‘Union Federal Party.’ The Party stood for full enfranchisement of Indian and Coloured voters and a qualified franchise for Black voters. As much as Sailor Malan tried to assure all that their choice was not that of The Torch and the Torch had nothing to do with it or its stated aims, key members of the Torch resigned over the matter – including The Patron in Chief.

Critical to The Torch’s strategy was that it attempted to avoid been party political and simply be a ‘mixed bag’ of political views, with the idea of re-igniting the old war time camaraderie to swing the ‘service vote’ so as to oust the National Party at the ballot box through a united front of political opposition. 

It made it clear that although a ‘militant’ movement it was not a ‘military’ one. It liked to hint at its potential to become a military threat but made it very clear that it was not an armed resistance movement or military wing of any political party, it also made it clear that it was not a ‘political party’ – it left its members to campaign and politic for any party in opposition to the National Party. This wishy-washy standpoint would lead some of its members into military resistance and others into political resistance and would count as one of the reasons for the movement’s ultimate downfall.

A heady combination of the 1953 UP Election loss, the firebrand anti-Apartheid Liberals and Communists in the Torch and the state’s legislature actions banning or politically restricting members of The Torch – would all result in the final nail in the Torch’s coffin.

Demise

In June 1953, the Torch met in Johannesburg for its second national congress and decided by a narrow majority to continue, but in reality – without meeting its first raison d’etre – the removal of the NP in 1953 General Elections – the Torch was done and it ceased to really exist.

As to the Torch’s second raison d’etre – the Removal of Coloureds from the Common Voters roll to stop the slide to more sinister Apartheid legislation and a Republic – after the 1953 elections the National Party was able to complete its strategy of loading the senate and by-passing the Judiciary and by 1956 the Colourds were removed from the voters roll. That opened the way forward for Apartheid proper and by 1960, the ‘Union’ Constitution would fall apart when a South African Republic was declared with a ‘whites only’ vote with the aid of ‘whites only’ voters in SWA (Namibia) to swing a tiny referendum majority (just 1%) to a National Party ‘Keep South Africa White’ referendum promise.

As to the United Democratic Front. After the 1953 elections, the UP’s demise was also set. It’s firebrand Torch Commando members in it would split the party and form the Liberal Party and the Progressive Party. The UP would attempt re-direct Koos Strauss’ conservative approach to include a more palatable ‘ex-services’ appeal by appointing the very popular ex-services choice – Sir De Villiers Graaf to lead it. But, it was done, the Progressive Party split, led by ‘Torchmen’ like Colin Eglin would eventually take over as official opposition and the UP would cease to exist.  The Labour Party in turn would also lose relevance in the battery of ‘Anti-Communist’ legislation, ‘whites only’ participation legislation and ‘banning’ of its members and would also cease to exist.

Dr Maurice McGregor, our eyewitness Torchman to the demise of the Torch offers a slightly different view on The Torch Commando, he did not see the collapse as been caused by suppressive actions of the National Party and he differs from the view that the Torch collapsed because the United Party tried to pull the Torch to ‘toe the line’ on with its policies creating disunity and ultimately become directionless. 

What Dr Maurice McGregor recalls is a ‘implosion’ – not because of the United Party, but because of an anathema towards Nazism – an internal moral dilemma. This is what he said;

“The torch commando eliminated itself at the peak of its power through fear of creating a paramilitary organization like the Greyshirts in Germany. I was in was actually the last March that the organization took part in. We marched in the dark to ‘protect’ a United party meeting and had to survive a shower of stones coming in over our heads. As the discussion went afterwards, we had the personnel and could very easily have put together a group to deal with such thugs, but the leadership, as indeed many of us, we’re extremely nervous of creating a private army which would take paramilitary action and considered that such an act would be an antidemocratic thing. So, the organization dissolved itself.”

He summarises the Torch very accurately, per the Torch’s initial role – that of a ‘Political Pressure Group’ and not that of a political party whose mandate is the machinery of political reform, nor that of a political movement seeking reform through social dissonance and revolution. A Political Pressure Group is defined as a special interest group which seeks to influence Government policy in a particular direction. Such groups do not seek Government control or responsibility for policy. Maurice summarised The Torch Commando as;

“It was … a history rewrite with a very definite slant … to try to define the slant … the Torch Commando was there primarily to check erosion of the democratic process, and it did try to protect the very limited coloured vote in the Cape. It also opposed various applications and extensions of Apartheid. But it kept away from advocating any real reform, saying that that such decisions should be made by a functioning democratic system.”

The Torch’s demise as a comprehensive and organised ‘whole’ of ‘whites in opposition to Apartheid would see future white political resistance terminally fractured, isolated and largely ineffective. This is the first significant mass of ‘pro-democracy’ whites against Apartheid as a ‘whole’ – it would not be given a political voice again as a ‘whole’ again until F.W. de Klerk’s Yes/No referendum in 1992.

To wrap it up Louis Kane-Berman and some colleagues would use some of the remaining funds in the Torch Commando’s financial accounts for donations – which they gave to the Memorable Order of Tin Hats (MOTH), the Black Sash and St Nicolas Home for Boys. Donations were also made to Chief Albert Luthuli, the President of the ANC and to Professor Z.K. Matthews at Fort Hare University.

Michael Fridjhon concluded his paper on The Torch Commando in 1976 stated:

The Torch became nothing. It was a bubble which burst over the South African political scene. It vanished almost as suddenly as it emerged”.  

In Conclusion

However, nothing is further from the truth, with respect to Michael Fridjhon he would have been barred from accessing information on Torch Commando and its members because of Apartheid policies banning such information an access in 1976 – he would have been unable to see ‘the golden thread’ – who from The Torch Commando did what after it folded – what happened next?  We can research this now – so, let’s pick up where he would have been unable to and ask ourselves what happens next – what legacy does the Torch Commando leave, where do the ‘dots’ connecting its thread to the armed and political struggle go?

The Torch Commando for the most part was ‘written out of history’ by The National Party and remains ‘written out’ for political expedience by the current government. It is a ‘inconvenient truth’ as it highlights a mass movement of pro-democratic white people not in alignment with Apartheid. It challenges the prevailing malaise of thinking in South Africa – that everything prior to 1994 was ‘evil’ and white South Africans must therefore share a collective ‘guilt’.

Torch Commando rally – note the demographic profile is almost exclusively middle class ‘white’.

The Torch Commando stands testament to the fact that the majority of white people in South Africa did not vote for Apartheid and as much a quarter of the entire voting bloc – 250,000 white people actively hit the streets in protest against Apartheid. It’s a prevailing and undisputed fact that the Torch Commando protests are the first mass actions against Apartheid, they pre-date the African National Congress’ Defiance Campaign – so as to a inconvenient truth to the current ANC narrative, the first significant mass actions where led by white South Africans and not black South Africans – a testament to the fact that the struggle against Apartheid was an ideological and moral struggle and not one of race.

The Torch Commando – next instalment 

What follows next is called ‘The Smoking Gun’ – please click through to this Observation Post link which covers in this phase depth.

The Torch Commando – Part 5; The Smoking Gun


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

References:

Written testimony of Dr Maurice McGregor submitted to Peter Dickens: 20th December 2016.

The Torch Commando & The Politics of White Opposition. South Africa 1951-1953, a Seminar Paper submission to Wits University – 1976 by Michael Fridjhon.

The South African Parliamentary Opposition 1948 – 1953, a Doctorate submission to Natal University – 1989 by William Barry White. 

The influence of Second World War military service on prominent White South African veterans in opposition politics 1939 – 1961. A Masters submission to Stellenbosch University – 2021 by Graeme Wesley Plint 

The Rise and Fall of The Torch Commando – Politicsweb 2018 by John Kane-Berman. Large extracts taken from the late John Kane-Berman memoirs of his father Louis Kane-Berman with the kind permission of the Kane-Berman family.

Raising Kane – The Story of the Kane-Bermans by John Kane-Berman, Private Circulation, May 2018

The White Armed Struggle against Apartheid – a Seminar Paper submission to The South African Military History Society – 10th Oct 2019 by Peter Dickens 

Sailor Malan fights his greatest Battle: Albert Flick 1952. 

Sailor Malan – By Oliver Walker 1953. 

Lazerson, Whites in the Struggle Against Apartheid.  

The White Tribe of Africa: 1981: By David Harrison

Ordinary Springboks: White Servicemen and Social Justice in South Africa, 1939-1961. By Neil Roos.

Related Work

Torch Commando Series – Part 1 The Nazification of the Afrikaner Right

Torch Commando Series – Part 2  The Steel Commando

Torch Commando Series – Part 3 The War Veterans’ Action Committee

Torch Commando – ‘New’ rare footage of The Torch Commando in action, the first mass protests against Apartheid by WW2 veterans.

The Torch Commando Series

The Smoking Gun of the White Struggle against Apartheid!

The Observation Post published 5 articles on the The Torch Commando outlining the history of the movement, this was done ahead of the 60th anniversary of the death of Sailor Malan and Yvonne Malan’ commemorative lecture on him “I fear no man”. To easily access all the key links and the respective content here they are in sequence.

In part 1, we outlined the Nazification of the Afrikaner right prior to and during World War 2 and their ascent to power in a shock election win in 1948 as the Afrikaner National Party – creating the groundswell of indignation and protest from the returning war veterans, whose entire raison d’etre for going to war was to get rid of Nazism.

For the in-depth article follow this link: The Nazification of the Afrikaner Right

In part 2, in response to National Party’s plans to amend the constitution to make way for Apartheid legislation, we outlined the political nature of the military veterans’ associations and parties and the formation of the War Veterans Action Committee (WVAC) under the leadership of Battle of Britain hero – Group Captain Sailor Malan in opposition to it.  Essentially bringing together firebrand Springbok Legionnaires and the United Party’s military veteran leaders into a moderate and centre-line steering committee with broad popular appeal across the entire veteran voting bloc. 

For the in-depth article follow this link: The War Veterans’ Action Committee

In Part 3, we cover the opening salvo of WVAC in a protest in April 1951 at the War Cenotaph in Johannesburg followed by the ratification of four demands at two mass rallies in May 1951. They take these demands to Nationalists in Parliament in a ‘Steel Commando’ convoy converging on Cape Town. Led by Group Captain Sailor Malan and another Afrikaner – Commandant Dolf de la Rey, a South African War (1899-1902) veteran of high standing their purpose is to raise support from Afrikaner and English veterans alike and they converge with a ‘Torchlight’ rally of 60,000 protestors and hand their demands to parliament. 

For the in-depth article follow this link: The Steel Commando

In Part 4, in response to the success of The Steel Commando Cape Town protest, we then look at the rise of the Torch Commando as South Africa’s largest and most significant mass protest movement in the early 1950’s pre-dating the ANC’s defiance campaign. Political dynamics within the Torch see its loyalties stretched across the South African opposition politics landscape, the Torch eventually aiding the United Party’s (UP) grassroots campaigning whilst at the same time caught up in Federal breakaway parties and the Natal issue. The introduction of the ‘Swart Bills’ in addition to ‘coloured vote constitutional crisis’ going ahead despite ineffectual protests causes a crisis within the Torch. This and the UP’s losses in by-elections in the lead up to and the 1953 General Election itself spurs the eventual demise of The Torch Commando.

For the in-depth article follow this link: The ‘Rise and Fall’ of the Torch Commando

In Part 5, we conclude the Series on The Torch Commando with ‘The Smoking Gun’. The Smoking Gun traces what the Torch Commando members do after the movement collapses, significantly two political parties spin out the Torch Commando – the Liberal Party of South Africa and the Union Federal Party. The Torch also significantly impacts the United Party and the formation of the breakaway Progressive Party who embark on formal party political resistance to Apartheid and are the precursor of the modern day Democratic Alliance. The Torch’s Communists party members take a leading role in the ANC’s armed wing MK, and the Torch’s liberals spin off the NCL and ARM armed resistance movements from the Liberal Party. We conclude with CODESA.

For an in-depth article follow this link: The Smoking Gun


The War Veterans’ Action Committee

Torch Commando Series – Part 2

War Vets Arise

Very broadly, at the end of The Second World War (1939-1945), returning white South African soldiers found themselves in three broad veteran association camps, either in an returned serviceman organisation called The Springbok Legion – which was highly politicised, steeped in ‘liberal’ and ‘labour’ politics and trade unionist in its manifesto, or as ‘Smuts-men’, they found themselves in the more sedate and larger South African Legion and Memorable Order of Tin Hats (MOTH) veteran associations with their remembrance manifestos, and they returned to the ‘centre-line’ and ‘democratic’ politics of the United Party (UP), their decision to go to war reinforced their conviction to Smuts’ brand of politics and call to arms.

In the chapter on the ‘Nazification of the Afrikaner Right’ we looked at the rise of Nazism and Fascism during the war in South Africa and the amalgamation of Pro-Nazi and Neo-Nazi movements into the Afrikaner Nationalist Party after their shock election win in 1948. The advent of ‘Apartheid’ into South African policy and moves to amend the South African constitution caused widespread angst amongst the ex-servicemen, how had just returned from eradicating the world of Nazism and fascism in WW2 and now they found a home-grown version of it had come into power.

As the National Party consolidated its power after its election win in 1948, sporadic small protests and picketing of ex-servicemen broke out around the country at by-elections and the like protesting the gradual implementation of racially divisive policies around the country. The National Party using plain thuggery drawn from the old Ossewabrandwag structures continued to violently disrupt opposition United Party (UP) and Labour Party (LP) political meetings well beyond the 1948 elections. During various by-elections, UP and LP politicians depended on ex-servicemen to aid them with canvassing and for physical protection from the National Party’s thugs disrupting their political rallies.

On one side of these picketing and ‘protection’ activities around by-elections and political meetings were members of the Springbok Legion (SL), at the time dominated by firebrand Legionnaires, with a significantly strong ‘Jewish’ veteran demographic and with equally strong Liberal and Communist leanings, and they were bent on more aggressive outcomes and military solution to advent of the National Party – whose National Socialist philosophy and whose strong anti-sematic and anti-communism politicking before and during the war posed a significant threat to many of them who had Jewish heritage and/or Communist leanings.

The Springbok Legion

The Springbok Legion (SL) was born along labour manifesto principles during World War 2 seeking (amongst others) equity for Black and White servicemen. The Springbok Legion is initially formed in 1941 within a debating society comprised of members of the 9th Recce Battalion of the South African Tank Corps, at the Kafferskraal training camp near Klerksdorp. By mid 1941, two similar soldiers’ groups formed. One called the ‘Soldiers’ Interests Committee’ formed by members of the 1 South African Brigade (1 SA Bde) in Addis Ababa. The other was the Union of Soldiers, which was also created in Egypt by soldiers of t1 SA Bde. Over time, they agreed to merge these three debating societies/committees together to form ‘The Springbok Legion’.

The aims and objectives of the Springbok Legion were enunciated in its ‘Soldiers Manifesto’. The Springbok Legion was open to all servicemen regardless of race or gender and was avowedly anti-fascist and anti-racist.

Initially led by Jock Isacowitz as the National Chairman – a previously ‘Liberal’ student at Witwatersrand University before joining the South African Army, Isacowitz would be the guiding force behind the establishment of The Torch Commando and later he also became a founding member of the Liberal Party of South Africa.

‘Liberals’ like Isacowitz and Leslie Rubin, as well as future United Party stalwarts like Vic Clapham and anti-Apartheid activists like Brian Bunting made up a significant part of the Springbok Legion, however the Springbok Legion’s membership and leadership also contains Communist Party of South Africa stalwarts who had served in the UDF during the war – key amongst them were Wolfie Kodesh, Rusty Bernstein, Joe Slovo, Cecil Williams, Fred Carneson and Jack Hodgson (all of whom would become founders of the African National Congress’ MK military wing). Cecil Williams for example had served in the Royal Navy during the war, he would become the administrative officer of the Torch Commando’s “Steel Commando”, later he would famously be arrested whilst being ‘chauffeured’ by Nelson Mandela post Sharpeville to get Mandela around to his political meetings.

Cecil Williams

Although politically very ‘firebrand’ the Springbok Legion often sought out the sage advice of General Jan Smuts, and Smuts had a soft-spot for them calling them “my boys”).

Motivations for joining The Springbok Legion as a veteran’s association differ, Fred Carneson had served as signaller and saw action in East Africa and North Africa, he was badly injured at the Battle of El Alamein. He would highlight the divide in the Afrikaner diaspora caused by the Nazi leaning Ossewabrandwag and the National Party – and would say of the formation of The Springbok Legion: 

“(the Springbok Legion) became a vehicle in the South African Army for a lot of progressive thinking, on the race issue as well, amongst white South African soldiers … We took up all sorts of issues there – not only the question of increasing family allowances and things that were hitting their pockets and their families, but on political issues calling for sterner measures against the Broederbond and against the Ossewadrandwag.”

Rare photograph of Jan Smuts addressing a Springbok Legion meeting.

Fred Carneson went on to say:

“the bulk of the South African Army were Afrikaners, not English-speaking, and they were also bloody fed up with this lot (the Ossewabrandwag et al). Some of them were being beaten up when they went to their hometowns and their dorps (villages) by these anti-war elements. The Springbok Legion organized a huge demonstration in Johannesburg which smashed up a Nationalist Party conference, again with whites turning out in force, and a hell of a lot of Afrikaners ex-servicemen. I remember one huge Afrikaner coming along there carrying a rope, and he says, ‘If I put my hands on Malan (referencing Dr. D.F. Malan, the National Party leader) I’m going to hang the bastard!’ … that was the strength of feeling that arose then against those they regarded as traitors, who tried to stab them in the back when they were fighting.”

On the returning white servicemen and women, Afrikaner and English, Carelson would offer an interesting insight on their disposition to race, an insight fundamentally at odds with the National Party and its doctrine, he said:

“… you seldom heard any anti-black sentiment amongst the white soldiers. If you’re in an army and a man’s on your side, you respect him, you see. They saw people of different races fighting together on the same side against the common enemy. This couldn’t but have an effect on their general thinking”.

Wolfie Kodesh offers a differing perspective on why he joined The Springbok Legion, Kodesh is also a combat veteran seeing action in both North Africa and Italy. He becomes politicised during the Italy campaign when he realises that it’s the poor lower class most affected by the bombing campaigns who see their houses bombed flat – whilst the rich upper class and their houses remain relatively unaffected – he identifies in a ‘class’ war and equates it with the Black and Coloured communities in South Africa. He finally decides to join the Springbok Legion and says …

I got involved in the SL to “overcome this racialism, which was like poison. After all, Hitler had been a racist against the Jews – he said he was going to do the same thing to the blacks. Here were the South African whites doing the same thing as Hitler said he would do … this is wrong … and I have to do my bit towards getting rid of it.”

Branches of the SL were established in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban. Membership to the SL was open to all races and to women (although few women joined). Black Africans, Indians and Coloureds also joined the SL, men like Peter Kay Selepe, a WW2 veteran and an organiser of the African National Congress (ANC) in Orlando (although few Black members joined – only 98). 

Joe Slovo (left) is seen in his South African Army uniform (and Signaler insignia) in the feature image with fellow South African soldiers Mike Feldman and Barney Fehler.

The Springbok Legion acted as political pressure group on issues relating to housing, equality, pensions etc and not a political party, members were encouraged to become active in their mainstream political parties – like the United Party and the Labour Party.

The South African Legion

The South African Legion – then known as ‘The South African Legion of the British Empire Services League’, it was founded by Jan Smuts in 1921 was the ‘official’ national body for all South African veterans, and it took a formal approach when dealing with the Nationalist government and its policies as they impacted Black, Indian and Cape Coloured veterans – choosing to try and negotiate with the government via the formal and non-confrontational channels made available to it as the national body for veterans. The South African Legion is South Africa’s prima and largest veterans’ association with 52,000 registered military veterans. 

Involved in both The Springbok Legion and the South African Legion is the very influential General Kenneth van der Spuy CBE MC, he is the man who pioneered the formation of South African Air Force (SAAF) under General Smuts’ directives. General Van der Spuy is regarded as the modern father and founder of the SAAF (Smuts would be the Grandfather). After the war he was a key role-player in the establishment of The Springbok Legion and on the National Executive of The South African Legion.

General van der Spuy – South African Legion

General van der Spuy became increasingly frustrated with The South African Legion position of remaining ‘apolitical’ but quietly’ supporting the anti-apartheid causes in the veteran’s community simply by opening their branches up to them, so he looked to the politically charged Springbok Legion to do what he referred to as the South African Legion’s “painfully correct whisper of polite protest” at the National Party’s policies to become a “shout” of protest instead, thereby encouraging members of the South African Legion to join hands with these concerned veterans in the SL and eventually join the Torch Commando along with General van der Spuy when it is formed.

 The United Party

On the other side of the veteran’s diaspora is the largest political Party – the United Party (UP) led by Jan Smuts during wartime, although in the 1943 General Election they come out victorious, Jan Smuts receives an unprecedented level of support, and they command 75% of the house. However, after the end of the war in 1945 the United Party becomes complacent and directionless, even more so after their shock election loss in 1948 to the National Party.  

Smuts (right) consults Hofmeyr (left) during WW2

Jan Smuts had intended that his deputy and protégé Jan H Hofmeyr, a ‘Liberal’ in every sense of the word (the nephew of the Afrikaner Bondsman “Onze Jan”), Hofmeyr was the effective PM of South Africa through most of WW2 and like Smuts was farsighted in matters on race – far more than his peers in the United Party. Tragically, he died young at 53 years in 1948. At his funeral Smuts said of him:

“Here was the wonder child of South Africa, with a record with which South Africa shows no parallel, who from his youngest years beat all records, whose achievement in a comparatively brief life shows no parallel in this land, and whose star at the end was still rising ..He has passed on, but his service and the high spirit in which he sought to serve his country and his fellow-men of all races remain our abiding possessions. This is a better and richer country for his service, and his message will not be forgotten.”

It was the first significant setback for the United Party and a more liberal outlook on race, and within two short years of Jan Hofmeyr’s death, Smuts too would pass on – this been the UP’s second and most significant setback. In essence the party had lost both of its key visionaries, and Smuts had been the ‘glue’ holding the party together and giving it direction. 

The UP was sorely in need of an injection of young blood and firebrand politics – and it found this in the returning servicemen who were highly politicised influences and equally angered with the National Party’s flirtation with Nazism prior to and during the war. In all they would form a ‘ex-services’ caucus with the United Party and Parliamentary politics.

Captain Sir de Villiers Graaf

Notably amongst this UP faction was Captain Harry Oppenheimer, who, aside from being a significant economic and political powerhouse, served as an intelligence officer in the 4th South African armoured brigade during the war. Son of the industrialist Earnest Oppenheimer, Harry became the UP Minister of Parliament for Kimberley, as a prominent South African businessman, industrialist and philanthropist. Oppenheimer was ranked as one of the wealthiest people in the world and was considered South Africa’s foremost industrialist for four decades. He would become the key financial benefactor behind the Torch Commando.

The second notable UP member was Captain Sir de Villiers Graaf, a veteran of North Africa and been taken Prisoner of War (POW) during the fall of Tobruk, given an MBE for his relief efforts amongst prisoners, he would eventually lead the UP, and although not a Torch Commando member, he would become the official liaison officer between the Torch and the UP in 1952. 

Also within the UP fold was Major Louis Kane-Berman, a veteran of both the North African and Italy campaigns and Democratic politics pioneers – Louis Kane-Berman would become the National Chairman of the Torch Commando. 

Also of significance in this group of UP members was L/Cpl. Colin Eglin who had joined the 6th South African Armoured Division fighting in the Italian Apennines around Florence as part of the Cape Town Highlanders – Colin Eglin “the egg” would become a future Progressive Party powerhouse politician, cutting his political teeth in the UP and Torch Commando. Eglin could already see the malaise and disarray the UP had landed in when he said of the UP:

 “morale was low; organisation pathetic; policy and ideology were confused and ambivalent. In this situation, the old- guard leadership looked for someone other than themselves to blame.” 

L/Cpl Colin Eglin

Finally in the UP, Lt. Vic Clapham Jr., who had served in the SA Tank Corps in WW2 as a Lieutenant, and who was the son of the famous World War 1 veteran who started the Comrades Marathon, also Vic Clapham – Vic Clapham Jr. was an ex-Springbok Legionnaire, he had resigned from the SL National Executive in 1945 and he was now United Party stalwart. Vic Clapham would act as the conduit between his old chums in the SL with his new chums in the UP, and the two groups of concerned veterans from the Springbok Legion and the United Party decided to join hands and consolidated in April 1951 to form the ‘War Veteran’s Action Committee – WVAC’ (the WVAC was to evolve into The Torch Commando). 

The leadership team of the WVAC was made up of veterans perceived as ‘moderate’ (as opposed to the more firebrand ‘Communists’ in the Springbok Legion) to present a broader appeal across the political spectrum. It’s also a balanced committee between ‘English’ and ‘Afrikaners’ – designed to address the polarisation in Afrikaner politics and bring Afrikaner voters who had served in the military during WW2 back to mainstream and moderate politics.

Lt Vic Clapham jnr.

The leaders appointed were Group Captain Adolph ‘Sailor’ Malan, Major Louis Kane-Berman, Major Ralph Parrott (a UP man who had served in the Transvaal Scottish in the South African Army and was awarded the Military Cross for bravery in the Battle of Tobruk), Major Jacob Pretorius (ex-SAAF and also a UP man) and Lt. Colonel Doreen Dunning – who during the war was the Officer Commanding the South African Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (SAWAAF). Harry Oppenheimer, not wanting to take a forward role pushed for Sailor Malan (Oppenheimer’s former Private Secretary) to take the role as the leader of the WVAC. 

In the company of greats, Lt Col. Doreen Dunning (also remembered as Doreen Hooper) is an interesting appointment, she was one of the founders of the South African Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) during the Second World War (1939-1945), she was highly respected SAAF officer, wartime heroine and a pioneering female aviator. At the outbreak of war, she had more than 2 000 flying hours to her credit. At the incredibly early age of 24 she was the youngest officer in the British Commonwealth to attain the rank she held. 

Lt Col. Doreen Dunning portrait by Neville Lewis (1941)

Fair haired and blue eyed, she had a quiet, forceful personality combined with outstanding ability and tact which made her eminently suitable for the responsible administrative post that she held both in the South African Air Force and now as secretary to The Torch Commando.

Major Louis Kane- Berman is also a significant appointment as he would go on to be the Chairman of The Torch Commando, next to Sailor Malan his history and activities would shape white service-men resistance to Apartheid. He in fact is the powerhouse behind the Torch running its daily and hands-on activities. Louis Kane- Berman was highly popular, the son of Edith Kane-Berman, Chief Commandant of the Red Cross. He attested as a signaller in the Signal’s corps of the South African Army, he would see combat in both North Africa and Italy as a company commander. Post war he gets very involved in rallying ex-servicemen to protect the UP speakers and presents himself as an ideal candidate for WVAC.

Louis Kane-Berman in his later life was also extensively involved in the National War Memorial Fund and he would remain in ‘liberal’ and ‘federal’ politics most of his life and play a key role in the Union Federal Party. 

Major Louis Kane-Berman, image courtesy the Kane-Berman family

It is important at this stage to cover Sailor Malan’s appointment, and why he is regarded as such a significant war hero and why he is forever linked to The Torch Commando as part of its public façade. Here’s some background on Sailor’s ‘metal’.

Group Captain Sailor Malan

Sailor Malan agreed to join the WVAC only on the proviso that his internal principles were adhered to. These been the political injustices suffered by people of colour in South Africa and resisting the government’s anti-constitutionalism and their drift towards a local brand of Nazism. Sailor is to be the ‘face’ of WVAC as he is highly recognisable and intensely popular across the board – he is the son of an Afrikaner father and a ‘English’ mother and sees himself as a South African first and foremost with strong Afrikaner ties and heritage. 

Group Captain Adolph ‘Sailor’ Malan DSO (Bar) DFC (Bar)

Adolph Gysbert “Sailor” Malan stemmed from Wellington in the Western Cape, an Afrikaans speaking ‘plaas japie’ he learned to shoot and hunt from a very young age. He was the younger brother to “Bull” Malan and as a result had secondary opportunities prevalent to the times when the first born received academic and career preference. 

He was also bullied at school, and in this he would forever forge a deep hatred for ‘bullies’ – he would always stand up for the ‘little guy’ and this would manifest itself in his convictions to battle against a ‘bully’ Nazi state as part of the Royal Air Force’s “Few”, a ‘no fear’ approach and he saw killing Nazi pilots and aircrew as necessary for the good of humankind. Later in life he also held no fear whatsoever of the National Party politician ‘bullies’ who had flirted with Nazism and saw them in the same light.

Named ‘Sailor’ after a stint in the Navy on the SATS General Botha and as a merchantman. He experienced the rise of authoritarianism in Germany in his frequent visits to Hamburg and Keil as a merchant sailor before 1939. Identifying Nazism as the enemy, he joined the Royal Air Force (RAF) in 1940 in preparation for the war. His British loyalism and revulsion of fascism were also shared by his brother “Bull” Malan, who participated in the invasion of Madagascar in 1942 and later killed in action. 

In his career as a naval merchantman, Sailor also becomes increasing exposed to various cultures and nationalities and takes on an embracing and tolerant view. During the Battle of Britain, the British relied on pilots from the Commonwealth to make up a critical pilot shortage and Sailor Malan was one of these pilots and with him came pilots from all over the world, of all colours and of all cultures (there was no such thing as a ‘colour bar’ in the Royal Air Force) – from commonwealth countries like India, Burma, Rhodesia, Jamaica, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada, as well as pilots from Poland, France, Czechoslovakia and the USA. They made up almost one-third of the RAF pilots involved in the Battle of Britain – a demographic fundamentally different to the image so often created of these men as a bunch of tea drinking ‘tally-ho’ young white English.

Sailor Malan with fellow fighter pilot Vincent Bunting of 611 Sq. speaking with Biggin Hill’s – January 1943

Funnily, ‘Sailor’ would however develop a rather plummy English accent, and fellow pilots thought they were dealing with a English officer until they saw his ‘South Africa’ shoulder titles on his RAF uniform, his close fellow pilots would also nickname him ‘Hitler’ as a humorous take on his real first name, Adolph, however ‘Sailor’ as a nickname generally wins out and the name by which everyone gets to know him. However, it’s his combat record, coolness under fire, promotions and decorations alone are simply astonishing. To hear Sailor in his own words during the Battle of Britain, follow this link Sailor Malan; in his own words!

He first took part in evacuation of Dunkirk.  During this battle he first exhibited his fearless and implacable fighting spirit. To demonstrate his nature, in one incident he was able to coolly change the light bulb in his gunsight while in combat and then quickly return to the fray.

When the Battle of Britain begun, 74 Squadron (known as ‘The Tigers’) was to take the full heat of the battle in what was known as ‘hell’s corner’ over Kent, the squadron was eventually based at the now famous ‘Biggin Hill’ aerodrome in the thick of the battle. Malan would famously develop “my ten rules of air fighting” which would change the RAF’s doctrine and contribute to Britains victory in the Battle of Britain – to read more on these rules, follow this link: ‘Ten of my rules for air fighting’ – Sailor Malan

Sailor Malan was given command of 74 Squadron, with the rank of Acting Squadron Leader at the height of the Battle of Britain on 8th August 1940. Three days later the Squadron was in battle. The day became forever known, “Sailor’s August the Eleventh”. The order was received at twenty minutes past seven to intercept a hostile raid approaching Dover. Little did the squadron know that they would participate in four separate air battles that day. When the Squadron returned to base after the fourth sortie, they had downed an astounding 38 enemy aircraft. Sailor Malan said later, in one of his masterly understatements: 

“Thus ended a very successful morning of combat.”

Sailor Malan also worked on public relations to keep the British morale high.  Here is a rare radio interview (follow Observation post link Sailor Malan – “in his own words”.

By D Day (i.e. Operation Overlord, the liberation of France and subsequently Western Europe), Sailor Malan was in command of 145 (Free French) Fighter Wing and was himself leading a section of the wing over the beaches during the landings in Normandy.

Sailor was a ruthless, skilful, and deadly hunter and killer, in all Sailor Malan scored 27 enemy aircraft kills, seven shared destroyed, three probably destroyed and 16 damaged. He was to receive the Distinguished Service Order decoration – not once, but twice and well as the Distinguished Flying Cross decoration, again not once – but twice.  The Citations for the DSO’s and DFC’s say everything about his combat prowess and are worth a mention and a listing given their status:

Sailor Malan’s decorations and medals

Distinguished Service Order & Bar (DSO). In Sailor’s case the two DSO are awarded for bravery. Here are the citations; 

Distinguished Service Order. Acting Squadron Leader Adolph Gysbert Malan, DFC (37604), Royal Air Force, No.74 Squadron. December 24th, 1940.

“This officer has commanded his squadron with outstanding success over an intensive period of air operations and, by his brilliant leadership, skill and determination has contributed to the success obtained. Since early in August 1940, the squadron has destroyed at least 84 enemy aircraft and damaged many more. Squadron Leader Malan has himself destroyed at least eighteen hostile aircraft and possibly another six.”

And on 22nd July, 1941:

Bar to the DSO. Acting Wing Commander Adolph Gysbert Malan, DSO, DFC (37604) Royal Air Force.

“This officer has displayed the greatest courage and disdain of the enemy whilst leading his Wing on numerous recent operations over Northern France. His cool judgement, exceptional determination and ability have enabled him to increase his confirmed victories over enemy aircraft from 19 to 28, in addition to a further 20 damaged and probably destroyed. His record and behaviour have earned for him the greatest admiration and devotion of his comrades in the Wing. During the past fortnight the Wing has scored heavily against the enemy with 42 hostile aircraft destroyed, a further 15 probably destroyed and 11 damaged.”

Distinguished Flying Cross & Bar. This this is still a ‘decoration’ and not a ‘medal’ so it’s very high on the senior level, and in Sailor’s case both times it is awarded for exceptional flying and bravery. Here are the citations for his Distinguished Flying Crosses;

Flight Lieutenant Adolph Gysbert Malan. (37604), Royal Air Force. June 11th, 1940.

“During May 1940, this officer has led his flight, and on certain occasions his squadron, on ten offensive patrols in Northern France. He has personally shot down two enemy aircraft and, probably, three others. Flight Lieutenant Malan has displayed great skill, courage and relentless determination in his attacks upon the enemy.”

Bar to the DFC. August 13th, 1940:

Flight Lieutenant Adolph Gysbert Malan. (37604), Royal Air Force.

“Since the end of May, 1940, this officer has continued to lead his flight and, on many occasions the squadron, in numerous successful engagements against the enemy. During the Dunkirk operations he shot down three enemy aircraft and assisted in destroying a further three. In June, 1940, during a night attack by enemy aircraft, he shot down two Heinkel 111’s. His magnificent leadership, skill and courage have been largely responsible for the many successes obtained by his squadron.”

British and Commonwealth Medals include:

  • 1939-45 Star with Battle of Britain clasp
  • The Air Crew Europe Star with France and Germany clasp
  • The Defence Medal
  • The War Medal (1939-1945) – with a mid Oak Leaf or MiD (Mentioned in Dispatches). The Oak Leaf on Sailor’s ribbon of this medal indicates the award of the King’s Commendation for Brave Conduct.

Foreign Decorations include:

  • Legion of Honour (France) Officer Grade
  • Croix de Guerre (France)
  • Croix de guerre (Belgium) with bronze palm. The Bronze Palm means Sailor Malan was ‘Mentioned in Dispatches’ by the War Office specifically for a performing heroic or significant deed.
  • Czecho-Slovakian Military Cross 

To read more on Sailor Malan’s medals follow this link; Sailor’s medals

To understand Sailor Malan as a military leader, Bill Skinner DFC, with whom Sailor often flew, summed up Sailor Malan very well when he said of him:

“He was a born leader and natural pilot of the first order. Complete absence of balderdash. As far as he was concerned, you either did your job properly, or you were on your way. He inspired his air crews by his dynamic and forceful personality, and by the fact that he set such a high standard in his flying.”

Sailor Malan was one of the most outstanding British Fighter Command’s fighter pilots of the 1939-45 war, by the end of 1941 was the top scorer – a record which he held for three years. But he was much more than an individual performer. He remains one of the highest scoring fighter aces to have served with Fighter Command and one of The Few as described by Sir Winston Churchill, who also incidentally became Godfather to Sailor’s new-born son – Jonathan Malan. He had assimilated the fierce and fanatical “tiger spirit” of his squadron, and this ‘Sky Tiger’ spirit he inspired in others and in so carried the Squadron to its great deeds. He literally lived and breathed the squadron’s motto – I fear no man.

The Battle of Britain and D Day moulded Sailor Malan as a champion for freedom, he simply held the view that shooting down Nazi aircraft was good for humanity, and this fearlessness translated into his personal politics. Sailor Malan left the Royal Air Force and returned to South Africa in 1946.  He joined Anglo American as Harry Oppenheimer’s personal secretary, and later it was Oppenheimer who would turn to Sailor Malan as the best candidate, given his exemplary war record, his liberal disposition, leadership and likeable personality – to lead The War Veterans Action Committee as its President.

In Sailor Malan’s own words, he would sum up his intentions and what the WVAC and The Torch Commando was all about – of its primary mission, he said:

“The Torch Commando was established to oppose the police state, abuse of state power, censorship, racism, the removal of the coloured vote and other oppressive manifestations of the creeping fascism of the National Party regime”.

Opening Shots

The opening protest by the WVAC started on a relatively small scale, on the 21st April 1951 at the cenotaph near the Johannesburg City Hall commemorating soldiers who had died in World War 1 and World War 2. The WVAC ex-servicemen present, in protest against the advent of National Party’s Apartheid policies pledged themselves to defend the values for which their comrades had died, and to demonstrate their intention they draped a coffin in the National Flag to symbolize the death of the South African constitution and placed a placard to that effect.

The ’constitutional crisis’ they referred to on the plagued is the opening shot of the National Party to implement their barrage of ‘Grand Apartheid’ laws, the crisis began earlier in 1951 when the National Party announced proposed legislation called the ‘Separate Representation Act’ to remove so-called ‘Coloureds’ from the Common Voters Roll – correctly this incorporated all franchise qualified ‘Black’ and ‘Coloured’ voters in the Western Cape – known as the Cape Franchise, in essence ‘Coloureds’ and Whites were on the same voters roll since the abolishment of slavery and ‘apprenticeships’ from 1853. To change the constitution required a 2/3 majority of MP’s at a joint sitting of both Houses of Parliament (National Assembly and the Senate). 

The constitution of the Union of South Africa was rock solid to prevent right wing racial politics of the old Boer Republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State from interfering with it. To many white South Africans this part of the Union’s Constitution was a “solemn compact” at the very core of the Union – legally and morally binding and for the time being the Cape Franchise kept an uneasy peace on issues relating ‘black’ political emancipation.

The National Party did not have the required majority by way of popular vote. However, they had a plan, they were to gerrymander, load the Senate with new National Party seats and pass legislation to get their majority and push their legislation through.

The Separate Representation Act caused significant outrage – the war veteran’s concern was that removing Coloureds from the voters roll, as they constituted a significant voting bloc, would pave the way for future and more sinister racially based Apartheid legislation, the complete marginalisation of ‘black’ political representation and a break-up of the Union’s constitution to form a ‘white Afrikaner’ Republic and breaking the ‘Union’ and British Dominion status on a ‘whites-only’ voting ticket.

The Torch Commando – next instalment 

What follows next is called ‘The Steel Commando’ – please click through to this Observation Post link which covers this phase in depth.

The Torch Commando – Part 3, The Steel Commando


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens 

References 

South African History Association (on-line) ‘Tracing the unbreakable thread’

Military History Journal , Vol 5 No 5 – June 1982, Flying High: The Story of the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force 1939-1945. By Major Marjorie Egerton Bird and Molly Botes

The Torch Commando & The Politics of White Opposition. South Africa 1951-1953, a Seminar Paper submission to Wits University – 1976 by Michael Fridjhon.

The South African Parliamentary Opposition 1948 – 1953, a Doctorate submission to Natal University – 1989 by William Barry White. 

The influence of Second World War military service on prominent White South African veterans in opposition politics 1939 – 1961. A Masters submission to Stellenbosch University – 2021 by Graeme Wesley Plint 

The Rise and Fall of The Torch Commando – Politicsweb 2018 by John Kane-Berman

The White Armed Struggle against Apartheid – a Seminar Paper submission to The South African Military History Society – 10th Oct 2019 by Peter Dickens 

Not for ourselves – a history of the South African Legion by Arthur Blake

Sailor Malan fights his greatest Battle: Albert Flick 1952. 

Sailor Malan – By Oliver Walker 1953. 

Lazerson, Whites in the Struggle Against Apartheid.  

The White Tribe of Africa: 1981: By David Harrison

Ordinary Springboks: White Servicemen and Social Justice in South Africa, 1939-1961. By Neil Roos.

Sailor Malan fights his greatest Battle: By Albert Flick 1952.

Kimberley Calls and Recalls. Life Magazine, 25 June 1951.

Related Work

Torch Commando – Steel Commando The Steel Commando

Truth Legion A search for the … Truth … Legion!

Torch Commando – ‘New’ rare footage of The Torch Commando in action, the first mass protests against Apartheid by WW2 veterans.

Sailor Malan ‘Freedom Fighter’ Sailor Malan; Fighter Ace & Freedom Fighter!

Sailor Malan – rules of air fighting ‘Ten of my rules for air fighting’ – Sailor Malan

Sailor Malan Sailor’s medals

The Torch Commando Series

The Smoking Gun of the White Struggle against Apartheid!

The Observation Post published 5 articles on the The Torch Commando outlining the history of the movement, this was done ahead of the 60th anniversary of the death of Sailor Malan and Yvonne Malan’ commemorative lecture on him “I fear no man”. To easily access all the key links and the respective content here they are in sequence.

In part 1, we outlined the Nazification of the Afrikaner right prior to and during World War 2 and their ascent to power in a shock election win in 1948 as the Afrikaner National Party – creating the groundswell of indignation and protest from the returning war veterans, whose entire raison d’etre for going to war was to get rid of Nazism.

For the in-depth article follow this link: The Nazification of the Afrikaner Right

In part 2, in response to National Party’s plans to amend the constitution to make way for Apartheid legislation, we outlined the political nature of the military veterans’ associations and parties and the formation of the War Veterans Action Committee (WVAC) under the leadership of Battle of Britain hero – Group Captain Sailor Malan in opposition to it.  Essentially bringing together firebrand Springbok Legionnaires and the United Party’s military veteran leaders into a moderate and centre-line steering committee with broad popular appeal across the entire veteran voting bloc. 

For the in-depth article follow this link: The War Veterans’ Action Committee

In Part 3, we cover the opening salvo of WVAC in a protest in April 1951 at the War Cenotaph in Johannesburg followed by the ratification of four demands at two mass rallies in May 1951. They take these demands to Nationalists in Parliament in a ‘Steel Commando’ convoy converging on Cape Town. Led by Group Captain Sailor Malan and another Afrikaner – Commandant Dolf de la Rey, a South African War (1899-1902) veteran of high standing their purpose is to raise support from Afrikaner and English veterans alike and they converge with a ‘Torchlight’ rally of 60,000 protestors and hand their demands to parliament. 

For the in-depth article follow this link: The Steel Commando

In Part 4, in response to the success of The Steel Commando Cape Town protest, we then look at the rise of the Torch Commando as South Africa’s largest and most significant mass protest movement in the early 1950’s pre-dating the ANC’s defiance campaign. Political dynamics within the Torch see its loyalties stretched across the South African opposition politics landscape, the Torch eventually aiding the United Party’s (UP) grassroots campaigning whilst at the same time caught up in Federal breakaway parties and the Natal issue. The introduction of the ‘Swart Bills’ in addition to ‘coloured vote constitutional crisis’ going ahead despite ineffectual protests causes a crisis within the Torch. This and the UP’s losses in by-elections in the lead up to and the 1953 General Election itself spurs the eventual demise of The Torch Commando.

For the in-depth article follow this link: The ‘Rise and Fall’ of the Torch Commando

In Part 5, we conclude the Series on The Torch Commando with ‘The Smoking Gun’. The Smoking Gun traces what the Torch Commando members do after the movement collapses, significantly two political parties spin out the Torch Commando – the Liberal Party of South Africa and the Union Federal Party. The Torch also significantly impacts the United Party and the formation of the breakaway Progressive Party who embark on formal party political resistance to Apartheid and are the precursor of the modern day Democratic Alliance. The Torch’s Communists party members take a leading role in the ANC’s armed wing MK, and the Torch’s liberals spin off the NCL and ARM armed resistance movements from the Liberal Party. We conclude with CODESA.

For an in-depth article follow this link: The Smoking Gun


The Nazification of the Afrikaner Right

Torch Commando Series – Part 1

Apartheid’s ‘lost’ cousin

One of the key reasons the Torch Commando’s leadership was somewhat sidelined and even gagged by the National Party, eventually resulting in the suppression of its legacy and removal from the general consciousness of South Africans is this …. the underpinning of Afrikaner Christian Nationalism with German National Socialism.

To view history in its correct context, one must see the characters in their time, see things from their view – see what issues of the day are driving their actions and thoughts and NOT to see them in the context of 21st Century social constructs and opinions. What this history will show us is that Nazism is not central to Afrikanerdom in any way, shape or form, it manifests itself on the ‘rump’ of Afrikanerdom in a small group of Afrikaner Republican zealots bent on supporting of Germany through all its manifestations from its brand of Imperialism to Nazism. 

Exactly as Nazism did in Germany, it’s a cancer and it could come to infect and destroy the liberal and moderate political constructs of Afrikaner politics and eventually destroy the pillars of democracy inherent in ‘white’ politics as a whole. Furthermore, using the same Nazi dogma of oppression, this minority of nationalist zealots would gerrymander and even violently consolidate themselves into an unassailable position verging on a one-party tyrannical state.

To the Torch Commando members and to other returning South African World War 2 veterans in various political parties and veteran associations, the accent of the National Party to power in 1948 was not so much that their policies of Apartheid sought to repress South African blacks and deny them the franchise – that was secondary to their cause, the major issue presenting itself to these war veterans was that The National Party constituted a Nazi and Fascist threat to South Africa. 

This Nazi and Fascist threat globally was a threat that had just been to war against – in 1945, just three years previously to the National Party coming into power, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini were both dead and 11,023 South Africans died in the process of making that happen – all of them comrades in arms. To say these war veterans had no tolerance for Nazism or Fascism would be an understatement, to say they feared it would be an absolute truism. 

Almost to a man, the National Party leadership and elite had either flirted with Nazism or had become full-blown National Socialists in support of Nazi Germany prior to and during the Second World War. Consider the amount of pro-Nazi and Neo-Nazi organisations that formed on the far right of white Afrikanerdom prior to and during the war, they were:

  • The ‘Ossewabrandwag’ (Ox Wagon Sentinel) – led by Dr. Hans van Rensburg.
  • The ‘Grey-shirts’ – The South African Christian National Socialist Party (SANP) – led by Louis Weichardt.
  • The ‘Democratic Movement’ – led by Manie Wessels and Chris Havemann.
  • The ‘Broederbond’ (Afrikaner Brotherhood) – led by Dr. Nico Diedericks.
  • The ‘New Order’ – led by Oswald Pirow.
  • The ‘Black-shirts’ – the Volksbeweging (People’s Movement) or ‘African Gentile Organisation’ led by H.S. Terblanche.
  • The ‘Brown-shirts’ – The ‘Bond van Nasionale Werkers’ (National Workers Union) led by Johannes Bruwer.
  • The National Socialist Rebels – led by Robey Leibbrandt.
  • The Boerenasie (Boer Nation) movement – led by Manie Maritz.

All these movements and parties were folded into the National Party after the war in one way or another, with many of their members taking up key positions in the National Party in government and related state organs and parastatals.

The ‘Malanazi’ as published in ‘Blikfakkel’ the Torch Commando’s mouthpiece in June 1952 – political cartoon by Berry – served to ridicule Dr. D.F. Malan, the Prime Minister and leader of The National Party, humorously depicted as a poor cousin of Nazism.

With the global condemnation of Nazism and the establishment of the United Nations in the wake of the war to prevent such an ideology threatening mankind again, the National Party were very quick to bury this past – they would choose to identify their resistance to Jan Smuts’ call to arms against Nazi Germany as an ‘anti-British’ one and not a pro-Nazi one (a hangover of hatred for Britain from the Boer War). Nazism in 1948 was political hot potato, in fact it was sheer political suicide and the Nationalists needed to bury their Nazi past and fast.

To do this, in July 1948, mere months after the National Party won the election. The National Party’s new head of Defence – F.C. Erasmus walked into Colonel Charles Powell’s office at the National Intelligence archive, he promptly dismissed Colonel Powell on the spot with 24 hours’ notice. He then proceeded to remove “two lorries” worth of wartime Broederbond and Ossewabrandwag intelligence documentation linking them to Nazism – never to be seen again. 

Formal complaints to the new Minister of Justice to reinstate the military intelligence archive were just ignored. Later, to the continued amazement of all, whenever there was a press conference and B.J. Vorster taken to task on any of his Nazi or Broederbond past he would often smugly turn around to any young whippersnapper journalist trying to set a record straight and simply say “prove it”.

The problem was an organisation called ‘The Torch Commando’ and the war veterans themselves, they were very aware of who in the National Party cabal had been in support of Nazi Germany and its ideology, and in all of their own press, The Springbok Legions’ newsletter ‘Advance’, the Torch Commando’s newsletter ‘Blikfakkel’ and other ‘English’ medium mainstream press, constantly published articles, opinions, letters and cartoons linking Afrikaner Nationalism to Nazism. When in the ’English liberal’ newspaper media whenever Torch Commando leaders were interviewed, they consistently highlighted the National Party’s Nazi root and called them out.

C.R. Swart as portrayed in Advance

So, where there’s smoke there is fire, let’s have a holistic and complete view of how Nazism as an ideology has played a role in the establishment of Christian Nationalism and Apartheid and who are the personalities who are in the National Party who have flirted or adopted the edicts of Nazism into their politics and policies.

The split in the Afrikaner diaspora

The Afrikaner right wing political romance with Germany starts with the South African War (1899-1902) i.e., Boer War 2 and it starts with the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR or Transvaal Republic) and Orange Free State (OFS) Republican Afrikaners – and as an Afrikaner whole they are a minority population – as Afrikaners go the Boer Republics’ Afrikaners combined do not reflect Afrikanerdom nor the views for the majority of Afrikaners in Southern Africa.

The population of South Africa in 1899 was approximately 4.7 million persons with 3.5 million Black Africans making up 74% of the total. Whites, numbering 830,000 made up only 18% of the entire population. Asians and Coloureds total 400,000 or 8%. In total 480,000 are Afrikaans-speaking whites and they total 58% of the white population. 

The Transvaal’s Afrikaners made up only 31% of the total number of Afrikaners in South Africa, with the Orange Free State having 15%. This total of 46% (approximately 219,000 people) shows that when war broke out, less than half of the total Afrikaners in South Africa were in the two republics that declared war on Great Britain. The British Cape Colony and Natal Colony, containing 54% of the Afrikaners, or 260,000 persons never rose up and declared war against the British (Cape Rebels accounted only about 10,000 persons).

The underpinning reality is that the Republics Boer Generals planning the war and the Republics Boer politicians claiming “Africa for the Afrikaner” failed to appreciate that many of the Cape Afrikaners were pretty happy under British administration for the near 100 years they are subjected to it, contented with the Cape franchise, many of them urbanised middle class and well to do and of the landed class many were very wealthy – as a demographic they are fundamentally different to their isolated and struggling frontier farming (Boer) Afrikaner brethren ‘up north’. 

Poverty, famine and hardship was not an overarching issue in the British Colonies for many ‘whites’ (Boer and Brit) in 1899 – nor does it seem that there was any fundamental discontent with their governance, representation and political disposition – and many simply did not view the ZAR’s “Krugerism” as a viable ideology or system of governance for Southern Africa – in fact Prime Minister William Schreiner, John X. Merriman and Jacobus Sauer had moved many in the Cape Colony’s branch of the Afrikaner Bond and Afrikaners in the Cape Colony in general closer to the British way of thinking.

After the Boer War ends in 1902, one of the peace terms is that independence will be guaranteed for the old republics under a British realm of influence, so in 1910, the Union of South Africa is declared as an independent country (a Dominion) with the old Boer ‘Bittereinder’ leadership – Louis Botha and Jan Smuts at the helm. This key split of Afrikaners however remains – many of the Cape, Natal and many Transvaal urbanised Afrikaners relatively happy with the idea of a ‘Union’ – the fusion of British and Afrikaner interests (and they now constitute the majority), however, here is a minority who remain Anglophobes because of the Boer War and are determined to return to the ideals of Republicanism and covert the old ZAR ‘Krugerism’ ideology. 

This schism in white Afrikanerdom is important to the eventual rise of the Broederbond, Ossewabrandwag and the National Party as they try to bring the ‘Cape Afrikaner’ and ‘Boer Afrikaner’ together into a singular identity under a Christian Nationalist banner using a white Voortrekker and Boer hegemony, all underpinned with a cocktail of Weimar Eugenics and National Socialism. This schism runs throughout Afrikaner history until 1948 and it is the key differential which The Torch Commando tries to influence through the vote in 1952.

The Adulterous Romance

The Afrikaner romance with Germany has three key points, the first is a minority of Afrikaners have German Heritage – the majority have a Dutch, Flemish or French heritage, and the German free-burgers are seen as part of the hereditary make-up and culture of white Afrikanerdom. The second is a simple telegram and the third is a rifle.

The telegram is related to the Boer War, its reputed to have been sent to President Kruger by Kaiser Wilhelm II congratulating him on dealing with the Jameson Raid in 1896 – the telegram read:

“I express to you my sincere congratulations that you and your people, without appealing to the help of friendly powers, have succeeded, by your own energetic action against the armed bands which invaded your country as disturbers of the peace, in restoring peace and in maintaining the independence of the country against attack from without.”

President Kruger then published the telegram far and wide as proof positive that Germany was in support of the Boer Republic and its claims that Britain intended to invade it. It would give the Boers the confidence and leverage in their many conflicting areas they had with the super-power Great Britain, in the belief that if there was to be an inevitable war, Germany as another super-power, will come to the aid of the Boer Republics. 

Image: Boer delegation to Germany and Kaiser Wilhelm II in his British Field Marshal uniform.

In truth, Kaiser Wilhelm II would deny personally sending the telegram, and claimed it was part of internal plot and political intrigue, he was also very angry with Kruger’s promotion of the telegram as some sort of treatise for military support, denying that he ever had intentions of establishing relations with the ZAR and he had no malice to Britain and would never support the ZAR in any war against them (see: Secret History of To-Day by Allen Upward).

The rifle is the German manufactured MAUSER model 1895 and 1896 carbine rifle (they also used the Norwegian made Krag-Jorgensen rifle). The Mauser Model 1896 became the icon it was a bolt-action rifle that fired 7x57mm rounds and was equipped with a five-round magazine. It was regarded as a more superior rifle to the British Lee-Metford rifle of the time.

In the months before the start of the Boer War in October 1899, the Boer Republics purchased 30,000 Mauser rifles, and 1,000,000 rounds of smokeless ammunition for it. Other weapons, including modern field guns and automatic weapons were purchased from the German armaments manufacturer Krupp. The rally call for Boer Republican troops became “Through God and the Mauser”.

To the average Republican mounted infantryman, this overwhelming supply of German weaponry left a legacy that Germany was their key ally, in truth German armaments manufactures, Mauser and Krupp were happy to receive orders of this magnitude, they made a lot of money from the two Boer Republics. Not one single German weapon sold to the Boer republics qualified as a subsidy or gift, and the German government made no effort to finance any of these weapons for the Boer cause.

Boer Commando – note Mauser rifles, colourised image courtesy Tinus le Roux.

Germany was just happy to sell them the weapons, as inconvenient truth goes, British arms manufacturers also sold weapons to the Boer Republics – the ZAR was minted with taxation from gold and made for a very profitable customer. 

In so far as adulterous this relationship goes, for all the benefit Germany was getting from selling arms to the Boers, they give all their support to Britain instead. Germany would even go as far as lending its military strategising to the British to help them win the Boer war – and as inconvenient truths go the strategy devised for the British by Kaiser Wilhelm II and his planners includes scorched earth and concentration camp policies (see: John C.G. Röhl: The Kaiser and England during the Boer War). 

As to manpower only a handful of Germans in their private capacity (local and foreign), 500 or so, volunteered join Boer Commando’s during the war – no assistance in fighting manpower was afforded the Boers by the German government in any way.

In fact, Kaiser Wilhelm II flatly refused to entertain any Boer delegation sent to Germany. Boer delegations did raise a little money from private donators, but that’s it – there was never any official public contribution by the German government to the Boer cause – ever. Germany wanted to avoid conflict with Britain – who by convention and legal treatise at the time held suzerainty limitations over the two Boer Republics preventing them from engaging in foreign policies and entering into foreign treaties (see: the London Convention 1881).  That … and to the Kaiser, the British Royal family were all his blood relatives – it was a family matter.

The Boer Revolt

However, all this adultery still did not resonate with many in the Boer community who almost illogically saw Germany as an Ally. This would re-materialise when the First World War 1914 – 1918 swings into action, and the newly formed South African Union declares war against Germany, not in the service of the British Empire, but in the service of South Africa’s own territorial expansions as agreed between the British and Boer delegations at the Union Conference of 1909 – the Parliamentary vote is a landslide in favour of The South African Party’s (SAP) proposal to invade German South West Africa (GSWA) and declare war on Germany. The SAP is the ‘Afrikaner’ party – it’s made up of all the old Boer War ‘Bittereinder’ Generals and the old Afrikaner Bond politicians – the opposition Imperial Party (the ‘English’ party) – also overwhelmingly in favour of it. 

The vote is 92 = For invasion of German South West Africa (GSWA) and 12 = Against. Of these 12 SAP individuals (or 18% of the SAP), only 3 of them are notable and become highly vocal anti-war campaigners demanding that South Africa remain neutral – Ministers Barry Hertzog, Koos de la Rey and Christiaan de Wet. 

In trying to raise resignations from the South African Union Defence Force in protest, Koos de la Rey would be tragically killed in a road-block misunderstanding.  General Christiaan de Wet would however join up with UDF officers – Major Jan Kemp, General Beyers and a rogue UDF commander on the GSWA border with intense pro-German, pro-white supremacy and anti-sematic sentiments by the name of Lt. Col Manie Martiz, all three would go into open sedition trying to evoke a coup d’etat using promised GSWA troops in support of their Boer Commandos. 

The Boer Revolt of 1914 was poorly planned and poorly executed, it managed to raise only 11,476 Boers who were poorly armed infantrymen against 80,500 well-armed UDF personnel (the rebels are outnumbered 8 to 1 in effect) and the Revolt drew no significant support from the Afrikaner community in the Transvaal, and virtually no support whatsoever from the Afrikaner communities in the Cape Province and Natal Province. It also drew no support from the Union Defence Force Afrikaners – who made up 60% of the force. It also gained no traction whatsoever with the ‘English’ white population (who made up 40% of the white demographic) and it drew absolutely no support from the real majority – the coloured, Indian and Black people of South Africa. 

Without support from either the broader Afrikaner diaspora or the South African population as a whole and without good military doctrine and planning backing them, the rebels were quickly crushed by the Union’s Defence Force and the revolt only lasted a couple of months. 

The Boer Revolt and its impact on Afrikaner Nationalism 

Albeit small and insignificant to the outcome of WW1 and the invasion of German South West Africa, the 1914 Boer Revolt is important in the evolution of the Afrikaner Nationalist right wing for four reasons.

Upfront is one of the primary political ramifications, of the few 18 odd very pro-Germany and pro-neutrality South African Party (SAP) Ministers of Parliament – General Barry Hertzog does not go with the sedition of his peers in revolt – instead he decides to leave the SAP and form his own political party in opposition to Botha and Smuts in the SAP, he goes mainstream and establishes the ‘National Party’.

Secondly, where the 1914 Boer Revolt did take traction was in the Orange Free State. The 11,500 strong Boer rebels were primarily made up of destitute Orange Free State Boers, 7,123 or 62% of the total force – many having come through a drought and agricultural reforms on the back of the devastation of their farms during Boer War 2 (see Sandra Swart Desperate Men: The 1914 Rebellion and the Polities of Poverty). They were simply desperate ‘Bywoners’ (landless farmers or sharecroppers) promised a better life if the rebellion was successful.

In the very next year’s General Election – the 1915 Election held during WW1, the National Party entered the political sphere for the first time, of the 130 available seats, the National Party won 26 of them, the majority of them from the Orange Free State where they dominated, winning 16 or the 17 available seats. It must be noted here, the ‘Afrikaner’ voting block is only partly split (about one third) – the SAP, the moderate Afrikaners under Botha and Smuts in support of Union and Imperialism, hold the lion’s share of seats – 54 in total, and are able to remain the governing party. Right wing Afrikaner Nationalism, in support of Republicanism, is still a minority and even have fewer seats than the official opposition – the ‘English’ Unionist Party. 

Thirdly, of the 4 main remaining rebel leaders (General Beyers drowned in action), 2 of them – ‘General’ Jan kemp and ‘General’ Manie Martiz went into Nationalist politics. Jan Kemp spent 10 months in prison for treason, then Botha and Smuts agreed to release him on the condition that he may not participate in any politics – a promise Kemp almost immediately broke entering politics as a National Party MP under Hertzog in 1920, by 1940, in opposition to South Africa entering WW2 against Nazi Germany, he joined the Reunited National Party under Dr. D.F. Malan. ‘General’ Manie Maritz, the Rebellion’s ringleader spent a couple of months in jail for treason, thereafter he was released on an amnesty given by Hertzog, he would enter politics as the leader of an antisemitic, one-party state, National Socialist (Nazi) inspired ‘Boerenasie’ party prior to World War 2 (more on this later). 

Finally, Jopie Fourie, who was sentenced to death for High Treason as he had not taken the precaution of resigning his Union Defence Force (UDF) commission before embarking on an armed revolt and was captured still wearing his UDF uniform. After his execution, Jopie Fourie would become the central martyr of the Afrikaner Nationalist cause, he would be politically pitched as the ‘true’ Afrikaner and in a bizarre twist on the definition of treason, the real traitors (Smuts and his Afrikaner cabal) had executed the hero of Afrikanerdom. Fourie’s spilled blood on his home soil would nurture Afrikaner identity and bring the Nazi creed of ‘Blut und Boden’ (Blood and Soil) into Christian Nationalism.  

His final letter would become Nationalist’s rally call, he wrote: 

“The tree which has been planted and which is wetted with my blood will grow large and bear delightful fruit”.

True Afrikaner ‘volk’ were to be demarcated as different to the treasonous Afrikaner ‘volk’ – to be a true Afrikaner was to be an avowed Afrikaner Nationalist. Jopie Fourie, British rule and the concentration camps of Boer War 2 would also become central to ‘the politics of pain’ on which the entire premise of Christian Nationalism would be established. 

The establishment of the National Party

The Nazification of Afrikaner right-wing politics, starts in earnest with the establishment of the National Party (NP) in 1914, General Hertzog’s break-away. The National Party’s founding was also rooted in disagreements of ‘Union’ among South African Party politicians, particularly because Prime Minister Louis Botha sought a ‘unitary’ Unionist state with singular purpose called ‘one-stream’ and General Hertzog who sought a ‘two-stream’ state which separated English and Afrikaners completely. Incorporated into the ‘Two-Stream’ ideology was the fierce adherence to ‘Krugerism’ – ‘Krugerism’ has the old ZAR ‘grondwet’ constitution at its centre. 

General Barry Hertzog

The racial separation and ideological purpose of the old Zuid-Afrikaanse Republic (ZAR) separating not just Afrikaner and English but also all the ‘Bantu’ (Black Africans) in addition. With an oligarchy philosophy underpinning it, and the sense of ‘Boer’ Nationalism ahead of all other races in servitude to a Boer hegemony, the religious reincorporation of the white Boer nation as the ‘Chosen People’, racially superior and with a divine right to rule all South Africa. The idea is an ‘oligarchy’ devolved from a ‘theocracy’ (not secular at all – State and Church are very linked) whose focus was on cultural prejudice (not acculturation). 

Krugerism’s oligarchy system of government would ensure no real political emancipation for non-whites, essentially Anglophobe in nature and with a discrimination outlook on minority groups – Jews in particular. The National Party’s stated aim is also the upliftment of Afrikaners, especially those dispossessed or marginalised as a result of the South African War (1899-1902) i.e., Boer War 2.

The ‘Politics of Pain’ also factored into the Nationalist ideology – i.e., the need to preserve Afrikaner identity by what was defined as a century long British tyranny, which ultimately manifested itself in the destruction of Boer farms and families during the 2nd Boer War. In essence it generated a victim mentality, and this preservation of Boer Nationalism and identity was paramount to the survival of the ‘Boer’ race – and if that required the subjugation by force of all other races and cultures threatening its ‘survival’, then so be it. 

Apartheid as an ideology had not fully taken shape at this stage, the Nationalists were pretty loose in defining exactly how they intended to implement ‘Krugerism’. They were thrust into the pound seats as the ruling party in a pact government running South Africa after the Miners’ Strike in 1922. To become the ruling party Hertzog did not have enough votes, they were still a minority party – so he had to go in coalition with the Labour Party, an ‘English’ constituted socialist party – mainly ‘Communists’ in effect representing a white working proletariat – the Labour Party’s popularity had also surged after the 1922 Miner’s Strike riding on the resentment of working-class whites of Smuts’ heavy-handed tactics when dealing with it. 

From 1924, they were able to define and tighten legislation around segregation, implement labour legislation in favour of whites and they managed to cap immigration of Jews in particular to South Africa, however they were tempered somewhat by their coalition partners. These ‘moderate’ politicians in coalition prevented the Nationalists from tampering with the constitution too much, so they found themselves supporting British Dominion and ‘Union’ and having to tolerate The Cape Franchise (Cape coloureds on the common voters roll). 

To hold onto power, Hertzog would even go into ‘Fusion’ with Smuts’ SAP and form a new entity called the United Party in 1934. This caused a breakaway called the ‘Purified National Party’ on the 5th July 1935 which stood to the far right politically, under the leadership of Dr D.F. Malan (a doctor in Divinity and a minister of the NG Church) – and it stood in abject rejection of the ideals of Union and Britain, it stood on the Krugerism ideal that God had ordained the white Afrikaner as a ‘chosen people’ to rule all of South Africa – and sought the return to Republicanism under an Afrikaner hegemony along with clearer ideologies on racial segregation. It was also a very small party at this stage. Of the 153 seats in Parliament, they won only 27 as a new entrant in the 1938 General Elections.

The 1938 Great Trek Centennial – a sacred happening

In the mid 1930’s in Europe, Nazism and Fascism were also taking hold as popular movements, in South Africa fringe Nazi movements on the far right of Afrikanerdom were also taking shape. Also operating in this sphere was a secret society called the Broederbond concerned with Afrikaner ‘advancement’, these ideologies would come together in 1938 during the 100 year centenary celebration of the Great Trek, and from it would stem political and cultural movements which would all come into conflict with a future democratic South Africa.

The Broederbond itself would fledge a ‘Christian Nationalism’ ideology using the Centennial and so too out of it would come the very right leaning, anti-British and Nazi Germany supporting Ossewabrandwag (Ox Wagon Sentinel). It would also see a polarisation of what was defined as ‘Afrikanerdom’ along racial purity lines.

Henning Klopper on his Ox-Wagon named – The ‘Piet Retief’ leave Cape Town to commence the 1938 Centenary of The Great Trek.

So, here’s some background on the centenary trek itself. On the 8th August 1938, Henning Klopper’s two Ox Wagons called the Piet Retief’ and the ‘Andries Pretorius’, stood at the foot of Jan van Riebeeck’s statue in Cape Town. As the ox-teams were harnessed a huge crowd of over 100,000 people gathered. The wagons were to replicate the ‘Great Trek’ and were to be joined by more wagons and people as it passed through towns on a trek to inaugurate the planned Voortrekker Monument outside Pretoria for a massive celebration on the one hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Blood River. The Broederbond, doing what it did so well, co-ordinated the ideas and concepts behind the Centennial Trek which would follow “Die Pad van Suid-Afrika”, a symbolic ‘road to South Africa’s nationhood’ taken by the Voortrekkers.

Image: “Die Pad van Suid-Afrika”, a symbolic ‘road to South Africa’s nationhood’ becomes an emotive call to nationhood by the Ossewabrandwag on the back of the 1938 Centenary trek

In this way the Broederbond hoped to (and did) bastardise history along Afrikaner nationalist principles – they would literally use the Great trek as the central reason for South Africa’s raison d’être’ and ignore the histories of all the other population groups and their role in establishing South Africa. They would go one step further and bastardise the Great Trek as a ‘white’ only Afrikaner exercise, and thereby ignore Afrikaner roots in the ‘brown’ (slave and Xhoi Xhoi) cultures of South Africa, it would also ignore the ‘coloured’ workers and servants who accompanied the trekkers (some references give this as a 1:1 ratio – one trekker to one African or black servant/labourer)  and split Afrikanerdom along racial lines alienating it from its actual roots and history.

To put perspective on the political hyperbole and artificial segregation offered by the Broederbond. The real history of the Afrikaner, Afrikaans and the Afrikaner culture is a critical part of South African history, the true roots of it lie in a conjoint merger of various cultures – white, slave and indigenous peoples – starting way back in the old Cape Dutch Colony – Afrikanerdom’ and the Afrikaans language has a shared heritage – Black and White, it certainly is not a Broederbond/National Party interpretation of the history; a romantic tale of a ‘all-white’ trek to freedom, flavoured with a Nationalist ideology and readily mixed with heady concoction of eugenics and religion.

Henning Klopper, would say;

“We ask the entire Afrikanerdom to take part in the festival celebration in this spirit. We long that nothing shall hinder the Afrikaner people as a whole from taking part. This movement is born from the People; may the People carry it in their hearts all the way to Pretoria and Blood River. Let us build up a monument for Afrikaner hearts. May this simple trek bind together in love those Afrikaner hearts which do not yet beat together. We dedicate these wagons to our People and to our God.”

By that he hoped to combine the ‘Cape white Afrikaners’ with the ‘Boer white Afrikaners’ in the symbology of the Great Trek under a fabricated Nationalist ideal and only meant ‘White’ Afrikaners and not really the Afrikaner people as a ‘whole’ – certainly not coloured Afrikaners, black Afrikaners or even Jewish Afrikaners. 

Klopper in a later interview went on to say;

“we never had a symbol before; the ox-wagon became that symbol” which is not altogether surprising as only a fraction of Afrikaners were proper Voortrekkers but the Ox Wagon (and the gunpowder horn) would now be the National symbology.

National Party emblem

This symbology would later be adopted by the National Party as their logo.

Towns in all parts of the country vied for the privilege of a visit from one of the wagons. Several other treks besides Henning Klopper’s were organised. In the end six more wagons threaded their way to the capital from distant points; four others went to the site of the battle at Blood River for a commemoration service on the 16th December, stopping along the way to re-name street after street in countless towns and villages after one or another Voortrekker hero, and laying imprints of the wagons wheels in freshly laid cement at many halts (there are still ‘imprints’ at my hometown in Hermanus).

This image: titled “blanke skoonheid” or “white beauty’ encapsulates the Centenary Trek perfectly, here girls from the Voortrekker School in Pietermaritzburg celebrate the arrival of the ox wagons. The “blanke skoonheid” does not just refer to the white dresses and bonnets (or ‘kappies’) but also infers that this festival was about the further assertion of white power. (The photograph taken between 18 and 20 November 1938. By Henry Murray). 

With overriding patriotism, born alongside the Centenary Trek was a new South African anthem “Die Stem van Suid-Afrika” (the voice of South Africa), the anthem now part of the South African official anthem, however when the song was amalgamated in the 90’s with Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika the “die kreun van ossewa” (the groan of Ox Wagons) bit was purposely omitted as it only reflected one culture’s history in South Africa and not the rest.

There were beards: The organizational committee of Koeberg also made their beards. “Many men grew their beards specifically for the 1938 Voortrekker Centenary as supposed proof of their masculinity as men who identified as Afrikaners.” 

Thousands of men grew beards and women made Voortrekker bonnets and garb along the way, a cultural rise took place and when the procession arrived outside Pretoria, 200,000 people greeted them. Human teams, flanked by outriders, dragged the Ox-Wagons into places of honour. Three women descendants of Voortrekker leaders of Retief, Pretorius and Potgieter then laid the foundation stone of the Voortrekker Monument. ‘A sacred event’ had taken place.

Henning Klopper was so amazed at just how successful the 1938 Centenary Trek in ‘uniting’ white ‘Afrikanerdom’ under the banner of the Voortrekkers and creating a new national identity – he would call on divine providence and call it a “Sacred Happening” – God’s will that the white Afrikaner lead South Africa as the chosen people.

The Road to War 

As noted previously, Prime Minister Barry Hertzog had merged his conservative ‘National Party’ with Jan Smuts’ more democratic ‘South African Party’ to form a “Fusion” party called the ‘United Party’, the two old Boer War Bittereinder Generals in coalition – General Hertzog remained Prime Minister and General Smuts his deputy. Dr. D.F. Malan had split from the Fusion coalition and formed the ‘Pure’ National Party to the right of Hertzog’s Afrikaner Nationalists in the United Party coalition. The ’Pure’ National Party would turn their vitriol against Hertzog, who they now regarded as traitorous as Smuts and a British puppet.

Hertzog’s United Party cabinet, a curious mix of hard conservatives like Jan Kemp and democratic progressives like Jan Smuts and Patrick Duncan.

Within the United Party, by the late 1930’s things had started to come to a head between Hertzog and Smuts. One issue was South West Africa (Namibia), now under South African Union mandate, and part of Smuts’ and the Union’s vision for ‘Greater South Africa’.

Hertzog’s right hand-man, Oswald Pirow – the National Party’s Minister of Defence and a devout Nazi supporter and admirer of Adolf Hitler had been sent by Hertzog to the Nazi German state on a number of ‘unofficial’ state visits – in doing so Pirow would meet Hitler and assure him of Afrikaner support of the Reich and that should there be war against the British – South Africa would remain neutral and should Germany win they could re-claim their old colony of South West Africa as German (something Hitler re-iterated to Pirow as a fait accompli). More on Pirow later.

Things would really come to a full head when Britain and France declared war against Nazi Germany on the 3rd of September 1939 and it would throw this entire careful political balance out the window and polarise the Afrikaner political landscape completely. 

South Africa, as a British dominion, would hold an emergency debate as to whether South Africa should remain neutral or also declare war against Hitler and Nazi Germany (as a Dominion it was free to make its own laws and free of Westminster’s laws, South Africa was not in servitude to Britain – so if South Africa wished to remain neutral by way of a Parliamentary majority – then Britain would uphold that decision).

The next day, 4th of September 1939, a three-way debate ensued primarily between the two factions in the United Party and the Pure Nationalists. As the United Party was loaded with Hertzog’s Nationalists and there was also Malan’s Nationalists in opposition, Hertzog was very confident he had the combined Afrikaner nationalist majority to carry his motion of neutrality. As was Hertzog’s position against Smuts in 1914 demanding South Africa neutrality in World War 1, siding with German’s cause, so too Hertzog’s position against the same man – Smuts, in 1939 demanding neutrality in the war against Nazi Germany in World War 2.

Prime Minister Hertzog would argue in his speech that Hitler’s invasion of Poland and annexations of Austria and Czechoslovakia was not an indication that Hitler aspired to world conquest, and Afrikaners well understood the Germans right to struggle for their own self-determination against the hostility of the outside world. Germany’s actions constituted no threat to South African security whatsoever and a policy of neutrality under these circumstances was the only logical policy to adopt.

General Smuts would reply in his speech that since the fate of South West Africa would depend on the outcome of the war, South Africa’s interests were virtually involved. Furthermore, South Africa was part of the Commonwealth whose fate now hung in the balance, to stand aside from the conflict would be to expose the whole civilised world to danger.

Smuts’ amendment to Hertzog’s Motion of Neutrality was carried by 80 votes to 67 votes on the 4th September 1939 and South Africa found itself at war against Nazi Germany. 

Surprised at the outcome, Hertzog promptly resigned, leaving the South African Premiership and the leadership of the United Party to General Jan Smuts and both he and some of his supporters left the United Party. 

An interesting lapel pin with Jan Smuts’ profile on it, it was worn by Smuts supporters to commemorate a Parliamentary debate, that is why the date on the pin is so important: 4 .9 .1939

On the 23rd November 1939 the National Party’s “Malanites” and “Hertzognites” met and tried to reconcile their differences, they could not, the stumbling block was Republicanism – the ‘Pure’ Malanite Nationalists wanted a Republic regardless, Hertzog felt that a break from Union and the declaration of Republic could only take place if both Afrikaner and English whites were in agreement with the idea. 

To the ‘Malanite’ Nationalists, the UP’s decision to go to war had vindicated their intensive segregationist policies which they had been following since 1934, and that Hertzog’s flirtation with English speakers ‘rights’ was delusional (the Malanites classified English speakers as secondary citizens, albeit they made up around 40% of the white population). 

Unable to reconcile, Dr. D.F. Malan seized the opportunity to take over leadership of all ‘Afrikanerdom’ and cast Hertzog out into the political wilderness. Hertzog tried again on 5th November 1940 at the National Party’s Convention to reaffirm his position on English-speakers rights, falling on deaf ears, he grabbed his hat and walked out of the National Party – forever.

General Barry Hertzog’s U Turn to Nazism 

In his retirement from politics, and in his private life, no longer walking ‘coalition’ and ‘fusion’ political tightropes and toeing UP party-political lines, General Hertzog felt confident to reveal his true colours. He performed an especially remarkable volte-face (U-Turn) when, just after leaving the National Party over his defence of English-speakers’ rights, he suddenly became a champion of full-blown National Socialism (Nazism).

Angered by his treatment by Dr D.F. Malan and the endless machinations of National party politicians, General Hertzog issued a press statement in October 1941 in which he excoriated “liberal capitalism” and the democratic party system, while praising National Socialism, as in keeping with the traditions of the Afrikaner, and as a system National Socialism simply had to be adapted to South African needs under the oversight of a one-party state dictatorship.

General Hertzog’s press release led to frenzied activity as the various Afrikaner pro-Nazi and anti-war factions tried to reunite. In the months following Hertzog’s pro-Nazi declaration Germany was joined by Japan, and the Axis forces won victory after victory. This was the point where Smuts was at his most perilous and the Smuts Government really feared that all could easily be lost. The National Party at this point even gave Dr. D.F. Malan dictatorial powers over his party to meet the Hertzog induced “crisis.”

According to Hertzog’s officially appointed biographer C.M. van den Heever, in his ‘General J.B.M Hertzog’ published in 1944; the following on Hertzog’s volte-face towards Nazism over this period is noted:

“Hertzog became “bitterly disappointed in the democratic system, with its capitalist foundations and press influence, for he had cause to know that the voice of the majority is not only the voice of wisdom … he was convinced that a new world order was on its way … after his retirement … he became more inclined towards National Socialism, by which he meant the adaption of the old Free State model republic to modern conditions, using the best from recent European experiments. … He regarded National Socialism as suited to the moral and religious outlook of the Afrikaner; indeed, he considered that the constitution of the old Free State Republic was based on it.”

It is also in General Hertzog’s private life that we find a compelling case as to Hertzog’s disposition to Nazism, and it’s a case of ‘like father like son’ and here we find General Hertzog’s son, Dr. Albert Hertzog who followed his fathers’ footsteps into politics. 

Dr. Albert Hertzog was a key figure in the Afrikaner Broederbond, in 1948 he stood as a National Party candidate, becoming a Minister of Parliament. Dr. Albert Hertzog’s views were extreme, he wanted to nationalise the gold mines and as devout National Socialist he looked to reforming Afrikaner and white labour unions – especially the Afrikaner Bond of Mineworkers. He even advocated state control of the entire economy. 

So extremely right wing in his views, Dr. Albert Hertzog eventually found the National Party too ‘liberal’ for his liking and came to loggerheads with them – he was removed from the party, and he moved to establish the Neo-Nazi Herstigte Nasionale Party (Reconstituted National Party) or HNP in 1969 and head it up as a breakaway to the extreme right of the NP. Joining him as his deputy was Jaap Marais, an ex-Ossewabrandwag stalwart and National Party Minister, who along with Dr Albert Hertzog harboured such extreme National Socialist views that he too was eventually removed from the National Party. 

The Split in the Afrikaner diaspora – Part 2

As with the clear 60/40 split in the white Afrikaner diaspora prior to the South African War (1899-1902) a.k.a Boer War 2, between the ‘republican’ conservative Afrikaners (the minority) and the ‘Imperial’ moderate Afrikaners (the majority), a split carried through to Union in 1910 and then through World War 1 (1914-1918) – so too does this split remain highly apparent after Smuts declares war against Nazi Germany in 1939 to commence World War 2 (1939-1945).

In 1943 (mid-way into World War 2) whilst the conservative pro-Nazi (and pro-Republic) and the opposing moderate pro-Smuts movements (and pro-Union) within Afrikanerdom are at its peak a General Election is held. The result is surprising, as it reveals literally no change and an outpouring of majority support for Smuts and a war alongside Britain against Germany – from the ‘English’ and ‘Afrikaans’ population groups alike.

The United Party under Smuts and affiliated parties in support of Dominion and Union manage 509,000 odd votes and the Afrikaner Nationalist Party and its affiliated Afrikaner party in support of Republicanism achieves 337,000 votes. In terms of ‘seats’ the pro-Union moderates in support of Britain command 2/3 of the house – nearly 75% of the vote.

This is why the 1948 elections – a mere 5 years later is such a surprise. Mid way through Smuts’ second Prime Ministership he enjoys unprecedented support and the National Party is very much a minority with a fringe ideology and no real threat to the Union’s political construct. So, what’s going on?

Hitler’s Afrikaner Nationalist propaganda campaign

On another continent Adolf Hitler and his propaganda ministry are making strong overtones to connect Nazism to Afrikaner Nationalism and tapping into Boer War mythology using just about every medium and propaganda tool available to them.

Hitler would record in his book ‘Mein Kampf’ that in his youth;

“The Boer War came, like a glow of lightning on the far horizon. Day after day I used to gaze intently at the newspapers, and I almost ‘devoured’ the telegrams and communiqués, overjoyed to think that I could witness that heroic struggle, even from so great a distance…” 

Then on the 30th January 1940, with Nazi Germany at the height of its influence and popularity, Adolf Hitler gave a speech at the Sportspalast and stated the following on The Boer War;

“They (Britain) waged war for gold mines and mastery over diamond mines”  

Hitler then went on in the same speech to say of the Boer War:

“After all, this entire blockade warfare is nothing other than a war against women and children just as once was the case in the Boer War … It was then that the concentration camps were invented. England locked up women and children in these camps. Over 20,000 Boer women (and children) died wretchedly at the time.”

Just about every sentence Hitler is uttering here is either pure falsehood or a half truth – blaming the British for “inventing” the “Konzentrationslager”, painting the camps as “locked” prisons, and implying the British wage genocide and not war. This ‘Pro-Boer’ Nationalism morphs into an entire Nazi propaganda campaign surrounding the Boer’s struggle against Britain – one which is regarded as the most influential and successful Nazi propaganda campaigns ever devised.

Hitler, giving a speech at the Sportspalast

What Hitler is also doing in his speech is using his intense ‘fame’, peaking in 1940, across Germany, Western Europe and the globe in many respects. With this statement he achieves three things:

Firstly, he demonises the British (the only real “enemy” he has left in 1940) as an enemy of the German people, but also – most importantly – an enemy to Europeans at large – and he uses the Boer War for this purpose as it is in living memory for many Europeans, this deflects the focus on Germany as the enemy to Britain as the true enemy of Europe.

Nazism and the concept of the 3rd Reich was a lot more popular in Europe in the lead up to World War 2 than most people would believe now. In fact its position as “anti-bolshevist” (anti-Communist) and as “anti-Judeo Capital” found vast popular appeal in right wing and conservative parties across Europe – especially in France, the Netherlands and Belgium, these people would see Nazi Germany as liberators – not invaders.

Secondly, Hitler is reinforcing Anglophobia and Republicanism in South Africa through propaganda and he is giving re-assurance to the Afrikaner nationalist cause from Berlin. To the home grown South African pro-Nazi movements like the Ossewabrandwag, the Broederbond and Afrikaner nationalists this is manna from heaven – to all these South African Hitler admirers and their followers, Hitler’s assurance that the British committed a Boer ‘Genocide’ is music to their ears. They all attested to the concept that the British had tried to ethnically cleanse South Africa of the Boer nation during the war – and here one of the world’s greatest leaders, a 20th Century iconoclast who agreed with them, and whose not to believe Adolf Hitler? He is a European powerhouse, he’s at the helm of a super-power like Britain and now he’s standing up to Britain and telling it as it is – if it comes from Hitler it’s a truism, the British committed Boer Genocide and stole the Boer’s gold … and it does not end there, Hitler goes further … much further.

During a press interview Hermann Göring (the spokesperson on behalf of Adolf Hitler), took a leaf out his Führer’s leader’s book on the Boer War when he deflected a challenge from Sir Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador to Berlin who protested about the German government’s use of concentration camps for the political ‘re-education’ of German’s dissonant non-believers in Nazism and opposition in 1935, and using a ‘press stunt’ Göring dramatically sprung up, walked over to a bookcase and like a thespian actor, grabbed a German encyclopedia opening it at “Konzentratinslager” he read out loud, 

“First used by the British, in the South African War”.

Although factually incorrect – the Spanish (not the British) first used concentration camps in the Cuban civil war in 1896, his action served as a skilful stroke of deflection of which Hermann Göring was a past master.

Dr. Joseph Goebbels was a propaganda mastermind, he was also a rabid, almost insane follower of his Führer, Adolf Hitler and a devout Nazi, and he would kick this affiliation between Nazism and Afrikaner nationalism up a gear. 

In printed media, the German propaganda machine would go even further on the back of Hitler’s speeches and use an image of Paul Kruger and the Boer War on propaganda posters to recruit Waffen SS troops in the Netherlands and Belgium, with whom these countries had an affinity for the Boer War. Both these countries proved highly fruitful in recruiting Waffen SS troops as they feared Bolshevism more than Nazism and for these conservative sections of the populations Nazism had an appeal (not to be confused with the SS, the Waffen SS also comprised ‘non-German’ and ‘foreign’ battalions – and later in the war they proved to be ferocious and devout combatants).

Next up in Goebbels’ propaganda arsenal was radio. Joseph Goebbels made this radio address on 19 April 1940, on the eve of Adolph Hitler’s birthday and said:

On 3 September last year (1939), two hours after English plutocracy declared war on the German Reich, the British Prime Minister Chamberlain gave a radio speech …The point of the speech was that England had no intention of waging war against the German people … get rid of the Führer or so-called Hitlerism …. At the beginning of the war, however, they sang the same old song …. Its melody was dull and worn out. British plutocracy had tried to persuade the Boers during the South African war of the same thing. Britain was only fighting Krugerism. As is well known, that did not stop them from allowing countless thousands of women and children to starve in English concentration camps”.

Radio Zeesen was also part of Goebbels’ arsenal, it was a Nazi German ‘International’ propaganda service radio station broadcasting in short wave in eighteen different foreign languages including Afrikaans, it broadcasted both Hitler’s speeches and Goebbels’ messages – and eagerly picked by devout Afrikaner Nationalists in South Africa.

Also, Goebbels loved, literally adored movies and the moving picture industry, he regarded this industry as his single most powerful propaganda tool, and he made a number of propaganda movies that came to define the Nazi legacy. However only four of his movies won the much-converted Reich Propaganda Ministry’s “Film of the Nation” rating. Movies deemed critical viewing for national identity in Nazi Germany – Heimkhehr (1941) – an anti-Polish movie, Der große König (1942) – a movie about Frederick the Great of Prussia, Die Entlassung (1942) – a movie about the dismissal of Otto von Bismarck and finally …… Ohm Krüger (1941), a movie about Paul Kruger and the Boer War. So, in forging a German national identity, the Boer War and the plight of the Afrikaner take centre stage.

Ohm Krüger (Uncle Kruger ) is a propaganda masterpiece from beginning to end. Although the plot has nothing to do with Germany, the story centres around a character which the Germans could admire, “Uncle” Paul Kruger – a man the Propaganda Minister wants to draw parallels to Adolf Hitler, who he deems is also a man with a common touch, from a simple background and one who is thrust into extraordinary circumstances due to international aggression and a conspiracy of greedy ‘foreigners’.

The film highlights Boer Nationalism on the pillars of liberty and freedom, Boer Republicanism, Boer racial superiority over ‘treacherous’ black natives, it portrays the British as underhanded and murderous, stealing Boer gold, prepared to hang Boer patriots in concentration camps, they starve Boer women to death and line up British troops to mow down innocent Boer women in their hundreds, shooting them in the back as they flee the British onslaught – you get the picture.. to see Ohm Krüger in full – with English sub titles, here is the YouTube link:

So how does this propaganda fare?

It’s a massive success, a propagandistic blockbuster, it’s by far the most expensive film produced in Nazi Germany up to that time with a 5.5 million Reich Marks budget and a massive film lot outside Berlin that resembles a mini-South Africa with 100 Longhorn cattle and African huts. Ohm Krüger offers plenty of entertainment – ‘wild west’ frontier grit alongside its vivid battle scenes, as if John Ford’s Monument Valley had been transposed onto South Africa’s Transvaal region.

It is first screened on 4th April 1941 in Germany, and it’s rolled out across Europe – it opens in Italy in September 1941, France on the 1st October 1941, Hungary on the 19th December 1941, Finland on the 15th March 1942 and it even makes it to Japan on the 2nd September 1943. It makes it way right across Europe – Bulgaria, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium etc.

Both locally and internationally, it is received to rapturous applause. It is pitched as the European cinema equivalent to ‘Gone with the wind’ and it’s a winner – literally, not only the first movie to win the converted ‘Film of the Nation’ and the award for ‘Film of Special Value in terms of state policy and art’, but importantly – it also wins the Mussolini Cup for the Best Foreign Film at the 1941 Venice Film Festival.

The movie is so popular, the Nazi propaganda machine even decided to re-release it in 1944. In the end – millions of people see it, today it is regarded as Nazi propaganda master stroke. However, as irony goes the Nazi propaganda machine ‘Bans’ the movie in 1945, not because it’s a great yarn, entertaining and an outstanding propaganda piece – but because they are concerned that the graphic massacre of Boer women at the end of the movie would upset the female population of Germany concerned about their treatment at the hands of the counter-attacking and invading Soviet Union and other Allied armies at the end of the war.

The Broederbond’s influence

As noted previously, the guiding force behind the rebirth of all his Christian Nationalist spirit in South Africa was the Afrikaner Broederbond (Association of Brothers or Afrikaner Brotherhood), as a secret society it gradually come to assume a dominant position in the affairs of the Afrikaner ‘volk’. The ‘Broederbond’ formally adopted Christian Nationalism as its basic ideology in their manifesto. 

General Jan Smuts and the Broederbond where diametrically opposed to one another, later during the Second World War he would correctly summarise the Broederbond when he banned public servants in 1944 from joining it and called it out as 

“A dangerous, cunning, political Fascist organization.”

Prior to the war and sitting in the wings of the Broederbond was Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd (the Architect of Apartheid), he was a predominant Broederbond member, National Party leader and would become a future Prime Minister of South Africa. Dutch by birth, he honed his studies in sociology and psychology in Germany and there is no doubt he was exposed to German politics and the rise of Nazism at the time. Verwoerd showed his colours early on when, the South African Nazi ‘Black shirts’ (more on them later) held a large rally and protested the arrival of the S.S. Stuttgart in Cape Town on the 27th October 1936 with 600 Jewish refugees on board. 

The arrival of the SS Stuttgart in Cape Town

The Nationalists joined hands with the Blackshirts in support of their protest and a few days later on 4 November, Dr Theophilus E. Dönges (future NP Acting Prime Minister) would nail the Nationalists colours to the mast and said: 

“The Jew is an insoluble element in every national life.”

They were joined by Dr Verwoerd and five fellow professors from Stellenbosch University who all went in deputation to the government to protest against the immigration of Jews from Nazi Germany. Frans Erasmus (the future National Party Minister of Defence) would go further on the matter and even officially thank the Blackshirts on behalf of The National Party for bringing the attention of the “Jewish problem to the Afrikaner ‘volk’.”

Dr H.F. Verwoerd

Dr Verwoerd, although he had not joined a Nazi grouping or Nazi styled resistance movement like the Ossewabrandwag during the war, was also found compliant in promoting the aims of Nazi Germany and Nazi philosophy whilst he was editor of ‘Die Transvaaler’ prior to and during the war in a landmark legal case.  Justice Millin, in a 25,000-word judgement concluded that:

 “Dr Verwoerd caused to be published a large body of matter which was on the same general lines as matter coming to the Union in the Afrikaans transmissions from Zeesen (a Nazi radio mouthpiece broadcasting in Afrikaans) and which was calculated to make the Germans look upon Die Transvaler as a most useful adjunct to this propaganda service”.

Another admirer on Nazism in the wings was Dr Nico Diedericks, the Chairman of the Broederbond during the war, a future NP State President who had studied in Nazi Germany and was reputed to have attended the Nazi’s Anti-Communist training school in Berlin whilst there. Piet Meyer, another head of the Broederbond and Ossewabrandwag General (and future Head of the SABC) so admired Nazi Germany he befriended Hitler’s chief of staff, Rudolf Hess, who even taught him to ski.

The use of media to promote the aims of Nazism to the Afrikaner ‘volk’ did not stop there.

Alongside Verwoerd as the editor of ‘Die Transvaaler’ is ‘Die Burger’ which was established by the Nationalists as their official mouthpiece in 1915 and Dr D.F. Malan (also a Broederbond member) as its first editor – an ‘anti-Smuts’ paper it was going to be from the get-go. By the mid 1930’s it had become popular in right leaning European newspapers in countries like Germany to target Jews with what is now known as “the great Jewish Capitalist conspiracy lie” – Jews were demonised as ‘fat cats’ using capital exploitation to the detriment of ‘ordinary’ non-Jewish folk and this image and symbology found itself into all visual media – including (and especially) political cartoons.

In South Africa, this trend for demonising Jews in political cartooning found favour in publications like the Die Burger, and especially in the works of D.C. Boonzaier, himself an anti-imperialist, pro-republican, pro-nationalism and anti-capitalist. He created a caricature figure called Hoggenheimer specifically for Die Burger – a derogatory figure designed to depict a fat and bloated Jewish capitalist with a play on ‘hog” or pig, the character made a number of appearances and also served to lampoon Ernest Oppenheimer, the German Jewish Mining Industrialist who made South Africa his home.

Image: This cartoon by D.C. Boonzaier was published in Die Burger, 23 May, 1938. The bloated caricature Hoggenheimer is been carried on the shoulders of JBM Hertzog and Jan Smuts following the United Party’s landslide victory over the ‘purified’ Nationalists. The caption alludes to ‘Jewish Capital’ as the real winners and the United Party was a puppet in servitude to its Jewish master.

It remains ironic, Julius Streicher, the infamous Nazi propagandist is the only German civilian executed by hanging for war times after the Nuremberg Trials, precisely for “vitriolic antisemitic propaganda” which “incited genocide” whist he was the publisher of the Newspaper ‘Der Stürmer’ – whereas no such fate awaited Dr.Hendrick Verwoerd and Albertus Lourens Geyer who published similar sentiment in ‘Die Transvaaler’ and ‘Die Burger’ nor did the publishers and editors of ‘Die Waarheid’ (the SANP mouthpiece), Die O.B. (the Ossewanbrandwag mouthpiece) and ‘Die Dappere Boodskapper’ (the Boerenasie mouthpiece) who all also published antisemitic and pro-Nazi rhetoric, instead many of them are promoted to high offices in The National Party after the war and richly rewarded for their efforts, much to the bewilderment of the Jewish community.

On the education front, using a similar tactic used by Hitler and his Nazi propaganda ministry, the Broederbond made it an aim of theirs to ‘re-educate’ the Afrikaner nation along the ideals of Afrikaner Christian Nationalism. An example of this occurred during the war when on the morning of the 13th of December 1943 a small group of military intelligence officers infiltrated the Afrikaner Teachers Training College in Bloemfontein. They placed microphones and eavesdropped on an Afrikaner educationalists congress taking place in Bloemfontein – intelligence revealed it was a front for a Broederbond meeting intent on mapping South Africa’s future under the ideology of Christian Nationalism – and outlining how they would infiltrate the education system to do it. They traced vehicle registrations of many in attendance to known Broederbond members and highlighted Albert Hertzog, Nico Diederichs, Hendrick Verwoerd and Henning Klopper as the ringleaders (a line-up of some significant heavy-weight National Party leaders).

From both inside and out the Nationalists were making a mark promoting Nazism, and none more so than the following affiliated organisations, let’s start with the biggest one – The Ossewabrandwag.

The Ossewabrandwag (OB)

The Ossewabrandwag (OB) was officially established in 1938 to commemorate the centennial of the Great Trek as devised by Henning Klopper and the Broederbond. It was intended to be a ‘cultural’ organisation on which to spread the white Afrikaner nationalist message and idealised Afrikaner hegemony proposed by the Broederbond. Its name – meaning “Ox Wagon Sentinel” was derived from the idea that Afrikaner Nationalism and Voortrekker symbology and identity would spread like a wildfire from Afrikaner heart to Afrikaner heart. The OB is set up in parallel to the National Party – in fact they are both joined at the hip.

Col Laas (left) and Dr. van Rensburg (right)

The OB is initially led by Colonel J.C.C. Laas – a Union Defence Force (UDF) officer with who held the ideals of National Socialism in high regard, so much so he would go on enter main-stream politics and establish a Neo-Nazi party called the Boerenasie, which Manie Maritz would eventually take over (more on this later).

Taking part in the 1938 Ox Wagon Centennial, leading one of the groups was Dr Johannes (Hans) van Rensburg, a lawyer who served in the Union Defence Force was the Union’s Secretary of Justice, in 1933 he had been to Germany in his capacity as Secretary and met both Hitler and Goering as well as other Nazi officials, he was deeply impressed with both the leadership and discipline offered by Nazism and became an admirer. 

Dr. van Rensburg took over the OB from Col. Laas, and under Dr. van Rensburg the OB saw unprecedented growth – by the start of World War 2 it was a massive organisation of some 300,000 members, it had evolved away from being a mere ‘cultural movement’ forwarding Nationalist Afrikaner identity, to an active domestic para-military movement with strong Nazi overtones and open channels to Nazi Germany to aid their submarine activities around South Africa.

Dr. Hans van Rensburg flanked at a OB Torch rally

When it was established relations between the National Party and the Ossewabrandwag were cordial, with most members of the Ossewabrandwag belonging to the party as well. At the higher levels, National Party leaders like P.O. Sauer and F. Erasmus. Three future National Party South African Prime Ministers/State Presidents held key leadership positions in the Ossewabrandwag. ‘Generals’ like C.R. Swart (later South Africa’s first State President) was a member of the Groot Raad (Chief Council) of the Ossewabrandwag, B.J. Vorster (later to become Prime Minister of South Africa) was a keynote OB leader and formed the OB’s Cape Branch and even PW Botha (future South African State President) joined the Ossewabrandwag and worked with Vorster to establish the OB’s Cape branch.

Other National Party stalwarts where also prominent in the Ossewabrandwag organisation, Eric Louw, for example – who later to become the National Party’s Foreign Minister. To say the National Party and the Ossewabrandwag were, to coin a phrase, “two peas in the same pod” is an absolute truism.

The relationship between the Ossewabrandwag and National Party at first was very well-defined and D.F. Malan even met with OB leaders in Bloemfontein which resulted in declaration known as the ‘Cradock Agreement’. It specified the two operating spheres of the two respective organizations. They undertook not to meddle in each other’s affairs and the National Party endeavoured to focus on Afrikanerdom in the party-political sphere, while the Ossewabrandwag was to operate on the other fronts of the ‘volk’ (white Afrikaans people’s).

Dr Van Rensburg, having now resigned his commission as an officer in the UDF, had always professed to be a National Socialist, as an open admirer of Nazi Germany and Adolph Hitler, and the ideas, uniforms and rituals of membership adopted by the OB had a distinctive Nazi leaning as a result.

Image: An Ossewabrandwag ‘Kommandant’ in full para-military uniform with lapel badges, ‘crested eagle’ epaulettes and ‘lightning bolt’ cap badge insignia. In addition he is wearing a sam-browne belt and lanyard. His ‘green’ arm band signifies his rank – using the ‘crested eagle’ again and horizontal lines for scale of seniority.

In terms of OB political thinking, Afrikaans would be the only official language in a free, independent, Christian-Nationalist Republic. The English-speaking South Africans, regarded as an “un-national” element, would be condemned to an inferior status. Anti-Communism was an important backbone of OB policy in line with Nazi aggression toward Communism. 

The emphasis of the OB was also on race and racial purity. Members were exhorted to “think with your blood”, and the Nazi creed of “Blut und Boden” (Blood and Soil) was promoted as an OB value. The Ossewabrandwag’s newsletter O.B. would state this clearly on 28 October 1942 when it said:

“Family, blood, and native soil’ – that is, next to our religion and our love of freedom, our greatest and our most sacred national heritage”. 

The OB always displayed an exaggerated interest in physical culture and the need for dictatorial discipline. Dr. van Rensburg would write:

“Give us a master! Give us bonds which tie us to a stable way of life”.

On issues of family value, the leaders of the OB proclaimed that the duty of the man was to work and fight and the duty of the woman to create and tend the home and family. In essence the OB was based on the Führer principle, fighting against the British Empire, anti-capitalist in nature – they called for the removal and expropriation of “British-Jewish” controlled capital, the communists, the Jews and the system of parliamentarism. All based on the principles of National Socialism (Nazism).

Dr Hans van Rensburg being sworn in – OB swearing in ceremony

In 1940, as South Africa was fighting in the North African theatre of operations on the side of the Allies, the OB created an elite organization known as the Stormjaers – the storm troopers of Afrikanerdom. The formation of the Stormjaers (English meaning: Assault troops) was in essence a paramilitary wing of the OB. The nature of the Stormjaers was drawn upon the lines of Nazi Germany’s army ‘Storm troopers’, as were the Nazi and fascist rituals and salutes, this is evidenced by the oath sworn in a by new recruits (in some instances a firearm was levelled at them whilst they read the oath): 

“If I retreat, kill me. If I die, avenge me. If I advance, follow me.”

The Stormjaers were deployed in variety of military operations ranging from the defence of Nationalist political platforms to pure sabotage, they dynamited post offices and railway lines and cut telephone wires. Dr. van Rensburg even wrote:

“The Ossewabrandwag regards itself as the soldiery of the (South African) Republic . . . the Ossewabrandwag is the political action front of Afrikanerdom.”

The ideologies of the Nazis were penetrating deep into right-wing Afrikaner political identity. In 1940, directly after Nazi German decisive victories in Europe, Otto du Plessis (later to become Administrator of the Cape under the National Party) published a pamphlet – The Revolution of the Twentieth Century – in which he openly espoused the Ossewabrandwag’s policy of totalitarianism.

One very predominant leader of the Ossewabrandwag was Balthazar Johannes (B.J.) Vorster, South Africa’s future Prime Minister. Along with like-minded OB colleagues he regarded the war as an opportunity to get rid of the hated domination of the United Kingdom of South Africa and welcomed the Nazis as allies in their fight.

Image: OB ‘General’ B.J. ‘John’ Vorster at a OB rally

The firebrand nature of the Ossewabrandwag appealed to Vorster more than the National Party, so while South African troops were helping to make the world safe from Hitler’s National Socialism, Vorster was appointed as a ‘General’ in the Ossewabrandwag for the Port Elizabeth district to promote the National Socialism doctrine back home. On his politics he famously announced the Ossewabrandwag’s position on Nazism and said in 1942:

‘We stand for Christian Nationalism which is an ally of National Socialism. You can call this anti-democratic principle dictatorship if you wish. In Italy it is called Fascism, in Germany National Socialism (Nazism) and in South Africa, Christian Nationalism.”

B.J. Vorster was eventually arrested under the emergency regulations in September 1942, he immediately went on hunger strike and after two months was transferred to Koffiefontein internment camp as prisoner No. 2229/42 in Hut 48, Camp 1. B.J. Vorster was eventually released on parole in January 1944 and placed under house arrest.

Interned alongside BJ Vorster was another Ossewabrandwag member Hendrik Johan van den Bergh who eventually went on to become the founder of the Bureau of State Security (B.O.S.S.), an intelligence agency created under the National Party on 16 May 1969 as a Nazi SS styled jackboot agency to enforce Apartheid. Van den Bergh was to become known as the “tall assassin” given his physical height.

The Rev. Koot Vorster (B.J. Vorster’s brother), a Dutch Reformed Church minister, and like his brother was also a predominant Ossewabrandwag leader, crystalised this idea of Afrikaner totalitarianism when he summed up the pro-Hitler and Pro-Nazi standpoint of the OBW during an address to a student group on September 15, 1940 and said:

“Hitler’s ‘Mein Kampf’ shows the way to greatness – the path of South Africa. Hitler gave the Germans a calling. He gave them a fanaticism which causes them to stand back for no one. We must follow this example because only by such holy fanaticism can the Afrikaner nation achieve its calling.”

Kowie Marais, an OB member, years later recalled in an interview the admiration he and his friends held for Hitler: 

“We thought he (Hitler) might rejuvenate western civilization…against the communist-socialist trends that were creeping in from the east. We thought it was the dawn of a new era.”

The Ossewabrandwag WW2 Insurgency campaign

The ‘subversion’ activities of the OB were not exactly irrelevant and they were not that of a ‘cultural organisation’. From the outset of the war a series of violent incidents took place between statutory force South African soldiers and the Ossewabrandwag. 

This was to cumulate on Friday 31 January 1941, when van Rensburg was due to hold a meeting at the Johannesburg City Hall when a riot broke out between OB Stormjaers and South African Union Defence Force soldiers who were determined not to allow van Rensburg to have a platform for his support of Nazi Germany – with whom they were now at war with. The battle raged in downtown Johannesburg for two days. Armoured cars were brought in to eventually quell the violence.

OB Bombing campaign

Other OB insurgency operations included a series of explosions over a large area of mines at Klerksdorp, Vereeniging, Delmas and in Potchefstroom the OB blew up power lines on the 29th  January 1942. All telegraph and telephone communication between Bloemfontein and the rest of South Africa were dislocated in one attack in February 1942. Railway, telegraph, and telephone lines in various parts of the Free State were destroyed in February 1942. Fifty-eight Stormjaers were eventually charged with high treason, and a quantity of hand grenades were found. Stormjaers also blew up two telephone poles behind the Pretoria Central Jail but were never captured.

Two other Stormjaers, Visser and van Blerk were convicted of a bombing at the Benoni Post Office, as a result of which an innocent bystander was killed, they were both sentenced to death (The sentence was commuted to life imprisonment). A few members of the OB were shot while trying to escape from internment camps or jails, the most known was the dramatic pursuit OB General, Johannes van der Walt, who was shot while on the run near Krugersdorp.

Very central to OB activities during World War 2 was also the co-ordination of spy networks and spy insurgents sent to South Africa, the most notorious of which where Hans Rooseboom – codename Peters and Lothar Sittig – codename Felix. OB members actively participated in setting up of radio broadcast stations for these spies and provided them with a network of OB members focused primarily on shipping in and out of South African ports. The information radioed to the German Abwehr (the German military-intelligence service) who in turn relayed the intelligence to the hunter submarine packs operating off South Africa’s coastline. It is not known exactly how much tonnage sunk and lives lost are attributed to the OB directly, but what is certain is that they are also responsible for it and played a role directly in Italy’s and Germany’s war efforts.

U-156 and U-507 assisting survivors sinking the Laconia in the Indian Ocean, 15 Sept 1942 – insert Lothar Sittig – codename Felix

The Nazi German wartime propaganda machine even returned the favour to the OB, viewing the activities of the Ossewabrandwag as a very positive contribution to their fight and Dr. Van Rensburg was even played up over Radio Zeesen as the real leader of the Afrikaner people.

The National Party even came out in direct support of the OB’s insurgency when the Smuts’ government resolved to detain and ban members of the OB, Dr D.F. Malan defended the OB in a speech on 5 March 1941, saying:

“The Ossewabrandwag has been accused of lending itself to subversive activities and also of encouraging them. Now I say: Carry out your threat. Ban it. Prevent it and prevent its meetings. If the Ossewabrandwag decides to be passively disobedient and refuses to be dissolved . . . I shall share the consequences with the Ossewabrandwag. At this stage I am prepared to say to you that if the government decides upon that act and the Ossewabrandwag decides not to submit, I shall keep my pledge”.

It was a clear message to Smuts’ government that the unity in the ranks of the two Afrikanerdom movements – the NP on the ‘Political’ front and the ‘OB’ on the ‘cultural’ front remained as strong as ever, even during wartime. 

Operation Weissdorn and the National Socialist Rebels

During the war, in Nazi Germany a plan is hatched with the idea of inserting a German military trained South African National Socialist zealot by the name of Sidney Robey Leibbrandt, with the expressed objective to work with the Ossewabrandwag and its Stormjaers to over-throw Smuts’ Union government through an Afrikaner Nationalist armed revolt.

Image: Robey Leibbrandt leaving Nazi Germany giving a ‘Hitler’ salute – insert Leibbrandt in German military attire

Born in Potchefstroom Leibbrandt was an Afrikaner Nationalist of both German and Irish decent. He was also a South African Olympic boxer, Leibbrandt went to Germany in 1938 to study at the Reich Academy for Gymnastics, and stayed on when war broke out. He joined the German Army, where he became the first South African to be trained as a Fallschirmjäger (paratrooper) and glider pilot. Leibbrandt was trained with the Comrades of the Brandenburgers at a sabotage training course of Abwehr II (Abwehrschool “Quenzgut”) near Brandenburg an der Havel, west of Berlin.

The German Admiral Wilhelm Canaris ordered “Operation Weissdorn” a plan for a coup d’état to overthrow the South African government of General Jan Smuts and assassinate Smuts. Central to the plan was Leibbrandt, who left Germany on 5 April 1941 to lead and execute it. 

“The signal for the coup d’ etat will shake South Africa to its very foundations. The whole world will understand it. The gigantic leading figure of General Smuts will be felled like a heavy oak tree at the psychological moment. I will commit this deed on my own. It will happen without help or support.”

Robey Leibbrandt (Berlin, March 20, 1941)

In June 1941, under the code name Walter Kempf, Leibbrandt was dropped on the Namaqualand coast north of Cape Town (Mitchell’s Bay) by a confiscated French sailboat (the Kyloe). Such was his megalomania, thuggery and aggression that even the radio operator who was earmarked to come ashore with him refused to do so, citing fear for his life and remained on-board the yacht instead (the Captain and crew were also relieved to get rid of Leibbrandt such an annoyance he had become). 

His mission was to make contact with the Ossewabrandwag, meet with Dr. van Rensburg in his role as Kommandant General of the Ossewabrandwag and inform him that Germany desired he take over OB military operations expand the OB  ‘Stormjaers’ ranks. He made his way to Pretoria and meet with Dr. van Rensburg. The equally megalomaniac van Rensburg would have none of it and refused to recognise Robey Leibbrandt outright, a row broke out and the two became irreconcilable. 

Robey Leibbrandt would find within the Ossewabrandwag supporters who staunchly followed National Socialism, start his own organisation and he would overcome the leadership crisis by getting them to swear alliance to him in person – in blood. Taking a leaf out of his hero’s book, Adolf Hitler who used a similar oath to get the German military establishment to swear sole allegiance to him as the sole and legitimate leader of the German Volk by name, so too did Robey Leibbrandt get his followers to swear allegiance to him as the only legitimate Afrikaner leader, by name.

The blood signature oath read as follows:

“I stand before God and swear this sacred oath that I, as an Afrikaner, will faithfully serve my Volk and Vaderland with my whole heart, body, soul and mind, along the lines indicated to me by the leader of the National Socialist Rebels in the person of Robey Leibbrandt and no one else, from now until death. The deep seriousness with which I recognise myself as a National Socialist Rebel finds expression in the blood with which I forever bind my person through the medium of my signature. I am nothing. My Volk is all. God be with us. The Vierkleur on High.”

OB members carrying the old ZAR republican flag on parade – “The Vierkeur on High”

Not to miss out on the legitimacy of Adolf Hitler as the supreme leader, the blood oath also partly read as follows:

“All my fight and striving is for the freedom and independence of the Afrikaner people of South Africa and for the building up of a National Socialist State in accordance with the ideas of Adolf Hitler.”

Leibbrandt’s small group of National Socialist Rebels kept the South African government on high alert by committing various sabotage acts. However, the quiet truce between Leibbrandt and van Rensburg quickly developed into open hostility. Leibbrandt, disappointed that the OB did not officially support his mission and its resultant failure began to openly attack Dr van Rensburg as an ‘agent’ of Smuts. This sealed his fate. 

Posing a significant threat to the Ossewabrandwag – both in terms of drawing members, ideology and in leadership and overall control of the Afrikaner right-wing, the Ossewabrandwag would engage the tired old philosophy of the ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’ and sell out the National Socialist Rebels and Robey Leibbrandt to the British. British Intelligence documents uncovered in the British National Archives in 2005, revealed that Hans van Rensburg sold out Robey Leibbrandt’s base of operations to the British SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) who in turn tipped off General Jan Smuts, which in turn led to Leibbrandt’s capture by the Union of South Africa’s security forces on Christmas Eve, 1941. Ironically the arresting officer was Claude Sterley, a fellow Springbok boxer and friend.

Charged and found guilty of High Treason, Robey Leibbrandt was sentenced to death on the 11 March 1943. Although Leibbrandt refused to give evidence at any stage in the trial, he claimed that he had acted “for Volk and Führer” and gave the German Salute (Hitler Salute) when he first entered the court, to which several spectators responded and calling “Sieg Heil”. After being sentenced to death, Leibbrandt shouted loudly and clearly “I greet death”.

His sentence was commuted to life in prison by General Jan Smuts, the South African premier, some sources say it was because Smuts and Leibbrandt’s father served together during the South African War (1899-1902) and Smuts had a high regard for Leibbrand’s Dad, other sources point to Smuts not wanting the blood of yet another Jopie Fourie martyr on his hands. In any event, when the National Party government came to power in 1948, Leibbrandt was officially pardoned and walked out a free man – much to the disgust of the hundreds of thousands of South African’s who had fought against Nazism and his ilk during the war.

Leibbrandt became politically active in his later life on the far right of the political spectrum, founding the organisation Anti-Kommunistiese Beskermingsfront (Anti-Communist Protection Front) in 1962, and producing a series of pamphlets titled Ontwaak Suid-Afrika (Wake up South Africa). His son, Izan (Nazi spelled backwards) became a senior officer in the South African Defence Force.

The New Order 

Oswald Pirow over his period in office under General Barry Hertzog in the South African Union holds three portfolios, he starts as the Minister of Justice, then he’s appointed Minister of Railways and Harbours, and from 1933 to 1939 he was Minister of Defence.

He is an Afrikaner Nationalist of strong German heritage (in fact at home he only uses German as a mother tongue). As Defence Minister he was sent on official visits on behalf of the Hertzog government to both Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. His mission was one of appeasement, to meet with Hitler, Ribbentrop and Goering and try to establish Anglo-German rapprochement as well as assure them of South Africa’s neutrality under the Hertzog government. In discussions with Hitler, he also assures him that a Afrikaner Nationalist would be a sympathetic government to Nazi Germany’s claim to return her previous colony of German South West Africa (Namibia). He is also after German aircraft as he was very involved in establishing South African Airways, under his watch both Heinkel bombers and Junkers transport aircraft enter South African Air Force and South African Airways fleets respectively.

Pirow’s solution to easing British and German tension prior to the war, which he proposed to Hitler, was for the British to agree with the Nazi policy of “Drang nach Osten” (meaning yearning or ‘thrust’ towards the East for ‘living space’ as Hitler put it in his book ‘Mein Kampf’) and in return Hitler should allow all the Jewish people living in Germany to leave. In reality this offer would never have happened as it would have required Britain, by way of a parliamentary agreement, to renege on its commitment to Poland as an ally.  However, Pirow also had another mission, that of building a South African partnership for a post war Nazi world.

Oswald Pirow in Nazi Germany, November 1938 in Berlin inspecting a honour guard from the German Luftwaffe (Air Force), to his left is Wilhelm Canaris, to his right Ernst Seifert.

In 1936 Pirow attended the Olympic Games in National Socialist (Nazi) Germany and in 1938 again visited Europe, including Spain, Portugal and Germany. These visits confirmed his admiration for this new style of government in Europe and, in particular, for National Socialism (Nazism). A vehement anti-communist – Pirow vowed to legislate communism out of existence, he also became an admirer of Adolf Hitler – especially after his meeting with him.

During this tours he also met Benito Mussolini, António de Oliveira Salazar and Francisco Franco and became convinced that a European war was imminent, with a resounding Nazi victory assured. The future Pirow predicted was one of global Nazism.

When General Jan Smuts committed South Africa to war against Nazi Germany, Pirow found his position in government as a Minister of Parliament and his position in the ‘Fusion’ United Party untenable. He had given his support in 1939 to Hertzog’s neutrality policy. He then resigned along with Hertzog and took no part in Smuts’ reformatted war-time government. Instead Pirow launched the South African version of the “New Order” within the D.F. Malan’s breakaway National Party, backing the idea of a Nazi style one-party state dictatorship.

His new political grouping took its name from his 1940 ‘New Order in South Africa’ pamphlet in which Pirow embraced the ideology of Nazi globalisation. To understand what the concept of the “New Order” was – the New Order (German: Neuordnung) was the political order which Nazi Germany wanted to impose on the conquered areas under its dominion, it entailed the creation of a pan-German racial state structured according to Nazi ideology to ensure the supremacy of an Aryan-Nordic master race along with territorial expansion and colonisation.

Hitler’s ‘New Order’ concept is important as it would guide Pirow’s thinking after the war, because although Hitler focussed primarily on Eastern Europe ‘Lebensraum’ (‘living space’) his plan also extend to Asia, India, South America and North America in ‘post war’ fascist dominated world, and like any plan for globalisation, Africa also played a role in the New Order.

Oswald Pirow as a special South African envoy inspecting German Infantry and military capability in 1938

Hitler’s overall intentions for the future organisation of Africa was based on a plan which divided the continent into three big parts. The northern third of Africa was to be assigned to Germany’s Axis partner – Italy. The central part of Africa would fall under German rule. The remaining southern sector would be controlled by a pro-Nazi Afrikaner state built along racial grounds.

German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop had communicated this plan with South African leaders sympathetic to Nazism, and a key channel for this communication were his meetings with Oswald Pirow whilst he was on his visits to Nazi Germany on behalf of the Hertzog government. Ribbentrop informed the Afrikaner Nationalist leaders that once Germany had won the war, Germany was to reclaim its former colony of German South-West Africa (now Namibia), then a mandate would be given to an Afrikaner Nationalist led South Africa as a sort of ‘war compensation’ which would include the territorial acquisitions of the British protectorates of  Swaziland, Basutoland (Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana) and the colony of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

Oswald Pirow ( left) at a reception of the Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop in conversation with Erhard Milch (right) and Walter Hevel on November 19, 1938

Dr. Malan initially tolerated the actions of Oswald Pirow’s South African adaption of the 3rd Reich’s ‘New Order’ however very soon Malan came to realise what the extreme ideology of The New Order was about, and he immediately saw it as a divisive influence on the Afrikaner nationalist movement. Fearful of a split in Afrikaner nationalism over support for extreme Nazism at the Nationalists Transvaal party congress of August 1941, Malan forced through a motion ending the New Order’s propaganda activities, particularly their insistence on a one-party state on a ‘Führer’ principle.

Although restricted by Dr. Malan, the New Order continued to exist and Pirow and 17 of his New Order supporters continued to be associated with the National Party and continued to attend their caucus meetings. The New Order finally broke from the National Party altogether in 1942, after both D.F. Malan and J.G. Strijdom realising the tide of war was turning against Nazi Germany publicly rejected Nazism.

Pirow returned to his legal practice, and after the war formulated a partnership with Sir Oswald Mosley. Mosley was an ex-British MP and an infamous British Nazi, he led the British Union of Fascists (BUF), a Neo-Nazi British organisation following the edicts of the ‘New Order’ in the United Kingdom. Mosley was imprisoned at the outbreak of World War 2 in 1940 for his extreme views in support of the enemy (Nazi Germany) and the BUF was outlawed. He was released in 1943.

Oswald Pirow and Mosley collaborated together in earnest when they met in London in April 1948 and they developed an idea for the division of Africa into exclusively black and white areas and the founding an anti-communist group to be known as the ‘enemies of the Soviet Union’. The two Oswalds came up with what were known as the Mosley-Pirow Proposals, which advocated the extension of the South African National Party’s Apartheid ideology and concept to include the entire continent of Africa.  

The idea they came up with was that two-thirds of sub saharan Africa would be advocated for ‘Black States’ and one-third would be for ‘White states’.  Where the two of them differed on their concept of ‘Eurafrica’ (which they conjointly coined), Pirow felt that ‘sweated labour’ would need to be forced whereas Mosley felt that unskilled Labour, needed in the ‘white states,’ was to be traded for from the ‘black states’ in return for technical assistance at some ‘later stage’.

Oswald Pirow (left) and Oswald Mosley (right) and inserted with his emblem.

The relationship with Pirow and Mosley started to break down after their ‘Eurafrica proposals’ were launched. Pirow came to realise that virtually nobody took Mosley seriously, people generally dismissed both him and his economic and political treatise out of hand as an extreme oddity.

Very famously Pirow, back in his legal guise, acted as the public prosecutor on behalf of the Apartheid State during the Treason Trial of 1956. The Treason Trial was a trial in which 156 people, including Nelson Mandela, were arrested in a raid and accused of treason in South Africa in 1956, an unsuccessful trial in the end they were found not guilty of treason (the Rivonia trial came later). 

Oswald Pirow’s influence in South African politics and Apartheid is far-reaching. The Tomlinson Commission – which investigated the validity of the idea Apartheid was not a new creation, and its findings were based in part on findings made by the Native Economic Commission in 1932 and on preparatory work done by Oswald Pirow.

The South African National Socialist Movement (SANP) and ‘the shirts’.

Now we come to the various ‘shirt’ movements of which the most significant is The South African Christian National Socialist Movement also referenced as the South African Gentile National Socialist Movement or SANP. More commonly they were also known at the time as the ‘Gryshemde’ in Afrikaans and ‘Grey-shirts’ in English.

Louis Weichardt (left) and a SANP armband right

Led by Louis Theodor Weichardt, a native of Paarl in the Western Cape and of German descent, the organisation is established on the 26thOctober 1933, he founded South Africa’s Nazi party equivalent – The South African Christian National Socialist Movement (SANP) with a paramilitary section, modelled on Nazi Germany’s brown-shirted Sturmabteilung) called the ‘Gryshemde’ (Grey shirts).

Their uniform, insignia and flags were distinctively Nazi with the swastika front and forward. Of interest, is the use of Orange, Blue and White in the Nazi swastika configuration – this was intentionally done to reflect the national colours of the South African flag at the time, the ‘Oranje-blanje-blou’ (Orange, White and Blue).

SANP bunting, flags, armbands and shirts, image courtesy Ulrich Duebe, the current owner of the collection.

Other ‘shirt’ organisations form in parallel to the Grey-shirts albeit a little smaller, they include the equally devout and Nazi ‘Black-shirts’ – the Volksbeweging (People’s Movement) or ‘African Gentile Organisation’ which is led by H.S. Terblanche. In addition, the ‘Brown-shirts’ – The ‘Bond van Nasionale Werkers’ (National Workers Union) led by Johannes Bruwer.

Central to their cause in the late 1930’s where Jewish immigrants escaping Nazi Germany to South Africa, and their numbers were growing significantly over the decade – in response the SANP launched a campaign calling for an end to Jewish immigration and arranged mass protests.  Their primary communication mouthpiece was a newspaper called “Die Waarheid” (the truth) which was nothing more than a vehicle to spread Nazi doctrine in South Africa. Die Waarheid held a Nazi swastika on its masthead.

The nature of the movement was clearly seen in March 1934 when the SANP held a rally in Aberdeen in the Eastern Cape, Harry Victor Inch – one of the Greyshirt leaders – announced that he had in his possession a ‘stolen’ document from a Port Elizabeth synagogue – signed by its Rabbi – which outlined a secret plot by the Jews to destroy the Christian religion and civilisation.

The Rabbi in question, Rabbi Abraham Levy, took the SANP Greyshirts to court in Grahamstown and in a landmark case the document was scrutinised legally, it was found to be a complete falsehood and fabricated by the SANP. As a result three Greyshirt leaders were fined and Harry Victor Inch was found guilty of perjury and was sentenced to serve six years and three months in prison for forging documents defaming the Jewish race and swearing under oath that those documents were genuine. Inch and his fellow defendants, David Hermanus Olivier and Johannes Strauss von Moltke faced other charges which grew out of the Grahamstown trial.

The result has been widely hailed here as a complete vindication of the Jewish people and of Rabbi Abraham Levy who brought the lawsuit against the Grey Shirt leaders. As the leader of the SANP, Weichardt was arrested and imprisoned during World War II at Koffiefontein detention barracks by the Smuts’ government as an ‘enemy of the state’ – along with all the other far right pro-Nazi Germany, anti-British militants and held there for the duration of the war.

Weichardt disbanded his Nazi party in 1948 and closely worked with Oswald Pirow’s ‘New Order’. Moving on, Weichardt then gave his full attention and allegiance to D.F. Malan and the National Party (NP) itself. He had a very successful political career with the NP and went on to become the National Party’s senator from Natal Province from 1956 to 1970.

The folding in of SANP leadership into the National Party’s political sphere would have a resounding impact on the future of not only the majority of ‘Black’ South Africans (who were viewed as ‘inferior’ peoples by these hard liners), but also minority white ethnic groups like South Africa’s very large Jewish community. The arrogance of this underpinning politics is seen with Louis Weichardt himself, who, on becoming an elected National Party Parliamentarian quickly covered up his dubious history as a full-blown card-carrying Nazi, and rather infamously declared that he had never been against the ‘Jewish race’ but only against the actions of certain ‘Jewish communists’. Not a single Jew, in his ‘opinion’ had suffered through his actions.

The Boerenasie (Boer Nation) movement 

As noted earlier, the Afrikaner nationalist hero and leader of the Boer Revolt in 1914, ‘General’ Manie Maritz decided to end his self-imposed exile after the 1st World War ended and returned to the Union of South Africa in 1923. The Smuts government treating him very kindly by way of reconciliation, and all things considered for a crime as serious as treason he received a short imprisonment of three years. Luckily for Maritz, Hertzog’s National party won the 1924 election and Maritz was granted full amnesty and walked free having only served three months.

Maritz took to farming, but came under the influence of National Socialism (Nazism) in 1936 and founded a ‘anti-parliamentary’(dictatorship led) party called the Volksparty (People’s Party) in 1940. Maritz also took control of another ultra-right, national socialist, pro-Nazi movement initially set up by Colonel J.C. Laas. According to Brian Bunting in the Rise of the Afrikaner Reich, Colonel J.C Laas was a cloak-and-dagger character who surrounded his activities with an atmosphere of mystery and proved himself to be unable to satisfy either his friends or his enemies. In October 1940 he was relieved of his command in the Ossewabrandwag and replaced Dr. Hans van Rensburg. Colonel Laas later established Die Boerenasie, but after a while he also abandoned it. 

The “Boerenasie” (The Boer Nation) party, was then merged the Manie Maritz’ Volksparty and it continued as a merger under Die Boerenasie banner with Maritz at the helm. Maritz became known as a very outspoken proponent of The Third Reich and admirer of Adolf Hitler. During this time, he had also developed a theory about the alleged Jewish conspiracy and interference in South African and world politics and became a fanatical Antisemite. 

Boerenasie mouthpiece (right), Manie Maritz (left)

Maritz would detail his Antisemitic and National Socialist views in his autobiography ‘My Lewe en Strewe’ (My life and Aspiration) which he published in 1939, a book regarded as lacking in objectivity, inciting racial hatred and like his hero Adolf Hitler’s book ‘Mein Kampf’ (My Struggle) Maritz’ book was full of emotional and racially driven rhetoric. He was even taken to court over all the anti-Semitic statements he made in his book, found guilty of fomenting racial hatred and he was fined £75.

Manie Maritz had served under Jan Smuts in the South African War (1899-1902) i.e Boer War 2, Maritz playing a leading role in Smuts’ Commando.  At the centre of ‘Bittereinder’ war heroes, one could not find a more vastly differing view than that of Smuts’ and Maritz’. Smuts was extremely wary of the dangers of Nazism and Adolf Hitler, who he accused of being a “false messiah” and whose Nazi symbology of the swastika Smuts called “the crooked cross” in reference to it being a corruption of true Christianity.

On antisemitism, Maritz held a polarising opposite view to Smuts, Jan Smuts was a devout Zionist, Smuts believed in the establishment of Israel as nation state, supported Jewish immigration and refugees (even controversially as Prime Minister he was involved in rescuing 200 Jewish orphans from the ‘Pogroms’ in the Ukraine in 1921, bringing them to safety in South Africa). Smuts supported the ‘Balfour Agreement’ which gave rise to Israel, he was also a personal friend of Chaim Weizmann, the President of the Zionist Organization. Weizmann went on to become the first President of Israel. Smuts is so loved and honoured in Israel that even today a kibbutz in Ramat Yohanan is named in his honour.

It is however difficult to say if Smuts would have interned Maritz again for his Nazi sympathies along with the other strong proponents of Nazism during the 2nd World War as Maritz’ life ended tragically and very early on in the war, he died in a car accident in Pretoria on the 20th December 1940. Probably, had he lived, Smuts and Maritz would have been at extreme loggerheads and Maritz back on the warpath with the Union – and very possibly back in jail.

Die Boerenasie continued after Maritz died under the leadership of S.K. Rudman, from Natal, who was known for his frenetic pronouncements on racial affairs in the columns of various Sunday Press newspapers.

The split in the Afrikaner diaspora – part 3

A mere 3 years after WW2 ended, the National Party found itself in power and there was no doubt that their wartime sympathies and even direct support of Nazi Germany and their National Socialist (Nazi) styled ‘Christian Nationalism’ philosophy was influencing National Party government policy. 

Of the 1,000,000-adult voters in the 1948 General Election (the full actual vote count is 1,065,971 voters) – more or less as numbers go – 550,000 voted against Apartheid (for Jan Smuts’ United Party and their more liberal parties – The Labour Party etc.) as opposed to 450,000 who voted in favour of Apartheid (for the Afrikaner Nationalists – the re-united National Party and Afrikaner Party coalition). The ‘coloured’ vote – the Cape Franchise has within it approximately 50,000 voters and these have almost exclusively gone with the United Party and its partners (one of the National Party’s intended aims is to remove their franchise), so we can deduce that about 500,000 whites and 50,000 coloureds have voted against Apartheid.

Coming into government in 1948 was a ‘minority’ party winning on constitutional grounds and not a popular one – the Afrikaner voting diaspora is still split over the issue of Apartheid and the majority of whites (and Coloureds) did not vote for the National Party, they voted for Smuts’ United Party. The National Party by 1948 had honed their political philosophy, Dr. Verwoerd had packaged it into legalise and called it ‘Apartheid’ and it was an intoxicating cocktail of Krugerism, Christian Nationalism, Nazism and Weimar Eugenics. 

Like the German National Socialist Party in Germany, the Afrikaner National Party had also come to power as a minority in South Africa with a flawed and unwanted ideology, and like Hitler who could not believe his luck in the July of 1932, Dr. Malan could not believe his luck in May 1948. Like the Nazi party had to do from 1933 to stay in power using repressive legislation, gerrymandering, loaded referendums to reconstruct the constitution, immediate banning of Communism (and liberal resistance), re-educate the masses to the nationalist doctrine, mould the Police and Military in their own image, and then use there powerful military and police tools of state to violently suppress opposition and political dissent under the banner of “national interests” – so too the Afrikaner Nationalists would have to do (and history shows us they would emulate their Nazi heroes perfectly).  

By the early 1950’s the South African National Party (NP) government was littered with men, who, prior to the war and during the war where strongly sympathetic to the Nazi cause,  and had actually declared themselves as full-blown National Socialists during the war as members of the following organisations, the Ossewabrandwag (OB) and its ‘Stormjaers’ (Storm Troopers) military wing, the Nazi Party of South Africa – the South African Christian National Socialist Movement (SANP) – Grey, Black and Brownshirts and the Nazi world expansionist order in South Africa – The New Order (NO) and the Boernasie Party.

Men like, B.J. Vorster (Broederdond, OB ‘General’ and future NP Prime Minister and President of South Africa), Oswald Pirow (Founder of the NO – NP Cabinet Minister and future National Prosecutor), Hendrik van den Bergh (OB – future NP head of State Security), Johannes von Moltke (leader and founder of the SANP and now NP Minister and the NP leader in SWA), P.O. Sauer (OB ‘General’ – now NP Cabinet Minister), Frans Erasmus (OB ‘General’ – now NP Cabinet Minister), Dr Hendrik Verwoerd (Broederbond and future Prime Minister), C.R. Swart (OB member – future NP State President), P.W. Botha (Broederbond, OB member – and future President of South Africa), Eric Louw (OB – future NP Cabinet Minister), Dr Nico Diedericks (Broederbond and future NP State President), Jaap Marais (OB – now NP Cabinet Minister and future co-founder of the ultra-right Herstigte Nasionale Party), Dr Albert Hertzog (now a NP minister and future co-founder of the ultra-right Herstigte Nasionale Party) and Louis Weichardt (Founder of the SANP and now a NP Minister), Piet Meyer (Broederbond, OB General and future head of SABC) to name just a few.  

This was the very philosophy the returning South African servicemen and women had been fighting against, the “war for freedom” against the anti-Judea/Christian “crooked cross” (swastika) philosophy and its false messiah as Smuts had called Germany’s National Socialism doctrine and Adolph Hitler. To the returned South African war veterans, by 1951, this flirtation with Nazim by the National Party was unforgiveable and something had to be done.

In Conclusion

The result would be the formation of the ‘War Veterans Action Committee’ (WVAC), it’s the beginning of the Torch Commando and it’s a coming together of the old ‘Smuts men’ who answered the call to go to war currently in firebrand veterans organisations like the Springbok Legion, sedate veterans organisations like the South African Legion and Memorable Order of Tin Hats (MOTH) and the military veterans who found themselves in mainstream politics in the United Party and the Labour Party after the war. 

They are all concerned veterans, the ‘Nazification’ of South African politics is something they dread and fear. With the co-ordination of Vic Clapham Jr., who had served in the SA Tank Corps in WW2 as a Lieutenant (he was also the son of the famous World War 1 veteran who started the Comrades Marathon, also Vic Clapham).  Vic Clapham Jr. was an ex-Springbok Legionnaire and now United Party stalwart, these primary two groups of concerned veterans i.e., those from the Springbok Legion and those from the United Party decided to join hands and consolidated in April 1951 to form the ‘War Veteran’s Action Committee – WVAC’ (the WVAC was to evolve into The Torch Commando). 

Vic Clapham Jnr (Left) and Vic Clapham Snr (right)

The leadership team of the WVAC was made up of veterans perceived as ‘moderate’ (as opposed to the more firebrand ‘Communists’ in the Springbok Legion) to present a broader appeal across the political spectrum. It’s also a balanced committee between ‘English’ and ‘Afrikaners’ – designed to address the polarisation in Afrikaner politics and bring Afrikaner voters who had served in the military during WW2 back to mainstream and moderate politics.

The leaders appointed were Group Captain Adolph ‘Sailor’ Malan, Major Louis Kane- Berman, Major Ralph Parrott, Major Jacob Pretorius (ex-SAAF) and Major Doreen Dunning – who during the war was the Officer Commanding the South African Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (SAWAAF). Harry Oppenheimer, the patron and financier of the committee, pushed for Sailor Malan (Oppenheimer’s former Private Secretary) to take the role as the leader of the WVAC. Sailor Malan agreed only on the proviso that his internal principles were adhered to. These been the political injustices suffered by people of colour in South Africa and resisting the government’s anti-constitutionalism and their drift towards a local brand of Nazism. 

To see what happens next – follow this link:

The Torch Commando – Part 2 The War Veterans’ Action Committee,

thereafter follow this link

 The Torch Commando – Part 3 The Steel Commando

Editor’s note

Look out for the next instalments of The Torch Commando – which will cover their rise and fall from 1951 to 1953, the political fall-out they create and what these ‘Torchmen’ do after the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960 – in both armed resistance movements and mainstream political resistance. 

As this research field includes the ‘racial constructs’ of Krugerism leading up and including Boer War 2 (1899-1902) and as an ideology and its role in establishing The National Party (and the onset of ‘Apartheid’) from 1914. In addition it also includes the ‘Nazification of the Afrikaner Right’ from 1936 and the political awakening of returning Afrikaner World War 2 veterans from 1950 because of it – the Observation Post often gets comments on both the blog and social media that it is somehow biased to the ‘British’ and ‘Afrikaner bashing’ or ‘Boer bashing’ – it is neither. 

What the Observation Post elects to highlight are the actual demographics, the economic history and not the political history peddled for political gain. It elects to highlight the progressive political deeds of Afrikaner military heroes like Dolf de la Rey and Sailor Malan, and all the Afrikaner military men in the Torch Commando whose legacies were buried by the Afrikaner Nationalists for decades and men whose truth must now ‘out’.

Given the current political assault on Afrikanerdom in modern South Africa this is key to understanding Afrikanerdom in its proper historical context – sans the National Party and now the African National Congress’ interpretation of it.

The Torch Commando – next instalment 

What follows next is called ‘The War Veterans Action Committee’ – please click through to this Observation Post link which covers this phase in depth.

The Torch Commando – Part 2, The War Veterans’ Action Committee


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens 

References:

The Torch Commando & The Politics of White Opposition. South Africa 1951-1953, a Seminar Paper submission to Wits University – 1976 by Michael Fridjhon.

The South African Parliamentary Opposition 1948 – 1953, a Doctorate submission to Natal University – 1989 by William Barry White. 

The influence of Second World War military service on prominent White South African veterans in opposition politics 1939 – 1961. A Masters submission to Stellenbosch University – 2021 by Graeme Wesley Plint 

The Rise and Fall of The Torch Commando – Politicsweb 2018 by John Kane-Berman

The White Armed Struggle against Apartheid – a Seminar Paper submission to The South African Military History Society – 10th Oct 2019 by Peter Dickens 

 Not for ourselves – a history of the South African Legion by Arthur Blake

Echoes of David Irving – The Greyshirt Trial of 1934” by David M. Scher.

Dr. Evert Kleynhans – Hitler’s Spies, Secret agents and the intelligence war in South Africa, 1939-1945. Published 2021

Dr. Garth Benneyworth – Sol Plaatje University – Correspondence 16/2/2023

Sailor Malan fights his greatest Battle: Albert Flick 1952. 

Sailor Malan – By Oliver Walker 1953. 

Lazerson, Whites in the Struggle Against Apartheid.  

Pro-Nazi Subversion in South Africa, 1939-1941: By Patrick J. Furlong.

The Rise of the South African Reich: 1964: By Brian Bunting

The White Tribe of Africa: 1981: By David Harrison

National Socialism and Nazism in South Africa: The case of L.T. Weichardt and his Greyshirt movements, 1933-1946: By Werner Bouwer

Ordinary Springboks: White Servicemen and Social Justice in South Africa, 1939-1961. By Neil Roos.

The Final Prize: The Broederbond by Norman Levy: South African History On-line (SAHO) War and the formation of Afrikaner nationalism: By Anne Samson: Great War in Africa Association.

Volk and Fuhrer. By Hans Strydom. 

 Kaapse rebelle van die Hantam-karoo. By Eben Nel

General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917. By Dr David Katz

 Desperate Men: The 1914 Rebellion and the Polities of Poverty. By Sandra Swart

John Bottomly; ‘The Orange Free State and the Rebellion of 1914: the influence of industrialisation, poverty and poor whitism’

André Wessels; Afrikaner (Boer) Rebellion (Union of South Africa) 2018.

The Kaiser and England during the Boer War. By John C.G. Röhl

Chapter XXIII The Boer Rebellion. By Sol Plaatje

The Issac Ochberg Story on-line website by Lionel Slier 07/18/201

Sailor Malan fights his greatest Battle: By Albert Flick 1952.

Kimberley Calls and Recalls. Life Magazine, 25 June 1951.

‘Very Deeply Dyed in Black’ Sir Oswald Mosley and the Resurrection of British Fascism After 1945.  By Graham Macklin. NSDAP Office of Colonial Policy.  

Ribbontrop’s proposals to South Africa, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. By William Shirer, 1974 edition.

Ohm Kruger/Uncle Kruger: The notorious of Nazi Germany’s Anti-British Statements. By Blaine Taylor

Related Work

Kruger, the man the mystery and the movie Oom Kruger, the man, the movie, the myth!

Oswald Pirow South Africa’s Nazi ‘Neuordnung’ and Oswald Pirow

Greyshirts South Africa’s Nazi Party; The ‘Gryshemde’

Boer Revolt Boer War 3 and beyond!

Jopie Fourie What about Jopie?

Ossewabrandwag “Mein Kampf shows the way to greatness for South Africa” – The Ossewabrandwag

Torch Commando – Steel Commando The Steel Commando

Broederbond and media Just whistling an innocent ‘toon’

Truth Legion A search for the … Truth … Legion!

Torch Commando – ‘New’ rare footage of The Torch Commando in action, the first mass protests against Apartheid by WW2 veterans.

Sailor Malan ‘Freedom Fighter’ Sailor Malan; Fighter Ace & Freedom Fighter!

The Torch Commando Series

The Smoking Gun of the White Struggle against Apartheid!

The Observation Post published 5 articles on the The Torch Commando outlining the history of the movement, this was done ahead of the 60th anniversary of the death of Sailor Malan and Yvonne Malan’ commemorative lecture on him “I fear no man”. To easily access all the key links and the respective content here they are in sequence.

In part 1, we outlined the Nazification of the Afrikaner right prior to and during World War 2 and their ascent to power in a shock election win in 1948 as the Afrikaner National Party – creating the groundswell of indignation and protest from the returning war veterans, whose entire raison d’etre for going to war was to get rid of Nazism.

For the in-depth article follow this link: The Nazification of the Afrikaner Right

In part 2, in response to National Party’s plans to amend the constitution to make way for Apartheid legislation, we outlined the political nature of the military veterans’ associations and parties and the formation of the War Veterans Action Committee (WVAC) under the leadership of Battle of Britain hero – Group Captain Sailor Malan in opposition to it.  Essentially bringing together firebrand Springbok Legionnaires and the United Party’s military veteran leaders into a moderate and centre-line steering committee with broad popular appeal across the entire veteran voting bloc. 

For the in-depth article follow this link: The War Veterans’ Action Committee

In Part 3, we cover the opening salvo of WVAC in a protest in April 1951 at the War Cenotaph in Johannesburg followed by the ratification of four demands at two mass rallies in May 1951. They take these demands to Nationalists in Parliament in a ‘Steel Commando’ convoy converging on Cape Town. Led by Group Captain Sailor Malan and another Afrikaner – Commandant Dolf de la Rey, a South African War (1899-1902) veteran of high standing their purpose is to raise support from Afrikaner and English veterans alike and they converge with a ‘Torchlight’ rally of 60,000 protestors and hand their demands to parliament. 

For the in-depth article follow this link: The Steel Commando

In Part 4, in response to the success of The Steel Commando Cape Town protest, we then look at the rise of the Torch Commando as South Africa’s largest and most significant mass protest movement in the early 1950’s pre-dating the ANC’s defiance campaign. Political dynamics within the Torch see its loyalties stretched across the South African opposition politics landscape, the Torch eventually aiding the United Party’s (UP) grassroots campaigning whilst at the same time caught up in Federal breakaway parties and the Natal issue. The introduction of the ‘Swart Bills’ in addition to ‘coloured vote constitutional crisis’ going ahead despite ineffectual protests causes a crisis within the Torch. This and the UP’s losses in by-elections in the lead up to and the 1953 General Election itself spurs the eventual demise of The Torch Commando.

For the in-depth article follow this link: The ‘Rise and Fall’ of the Torch Commando

In Part 5, we conclude the Series on The Torch Commando with ‘The Smoking Gun’. The Smoking Gun traces what the Torch Commando members do after the movement collapses, significantly two political parties spin out the Torch Commando – the Liberal Party of South Africa and the Union Federal Party. The Torch also significantly impacts the United Party and the formation of the breakaway Progressive Party who embark on formal party political resistance to Apartheid and are the precursor of the modern day Democratic Alliance. The Torch’s Communists party members take a leading role in the ANC’s armed wing MK, and the Torch’s liberals spin off the NCL and ARM armed resistance movements from the Liberal Party. We conclude with CODESA.

For an in-depth article follow this link: The Smoking Gun


What about Jopie?

I was a discussant at a book launch of Jan Smuts’ First World War by Dr. David Brock Katz, and the minute questions were opened to the audience, the very first question was “What about Jopie?”, to which there was a universal sigh and “here we go again”.

Turns out you just cannot discuss Jan Smuts’ career as military strategist and Field Marshal, his career as lawyer, botanist, academic, philosopher, conservationist or statesman – without covering the “Jopie” base.  The interesting bit about covering the Jopie base is just how little people understand about him, the nature of events that led to his execution, or even fully understand Smuts’ role in it.

So, to ask the question … “What about Jopie?” To truthfully answer that question – we also have to ask another question, and that is … “What about William?”.

What about William?

William! Who is then heck is William and what is he in the life of Jopie? – Never heard of him! Comes the retort – ah, but here we uncover a part of the Jopie Fourie story which is often glossed over and even never mentioned in all the Nationalistic inspired dogma that surrounds Jopie Fourie, and you have to ask yourself why? So, here goes.

Our story begins with three men who had taken officer commissions in the newly fledged Union Defence Force of South Africa (the UDF) army (the South African Union was declared in 1910). They served together in the ACF (Active Citizen Force) and knew one another well, they are Captain William Allan King, Major Harry Trew and finally Captain Jopie Fourie. 

When South Africa declared war on Germany in 1914, by a landslide Parliamentary vote, those UDF officers who held a ‘Conscientious Objection’ to war against Germany were invited to resign. The Union government was well aware of the sympathies the Boer forces had to Germany during the South African War 1899-1902 and would accommodate them, in other words individual UDF members were not forced to go war against Germany, Botha (then the Prime Minister) and Smuts (then the Minister of Defence) expected a ‘handful’ of resignations from those that refused to fight Germany – and they got exactly that – ‘a handful’ (less than 1% of the UDF construct).

Key resignations from the UDF came from Major Jan Kemp, Lt. Col Manie Maritz and General Christiaan Beyers. All of whom took the precaution of resigning their UDF commissions and oaths before going into armed revolt against the lawfully elected Union government over the issue of the invasion of German South West Africa. Failure to do so in 1914 would amount to a charge of High Treason which carried with it the death sentence.  

Images: Jan Kemp, Christiaan Beyers and Manie Maritz

Captain Jopie Fourie decided to join Kemp, Maritz and Beyers in open armed revolt, however for reasons known only to him, he chose not to resign his commission and oath to serve the Union of South Africa. In other words, as an active serving UDF officer (not just a rebel) he chose to make war against the UDF and his colleagues with the intention of killing them. This in 1914 constituted treason in the highest order.

According to Major Harry Trew, Fourie was a close friend of his and was a likeable chap with a wicked sense of humour, and Fourie had a somewhat cavalier approach to things, this can be seen during the revolt when Trew recalled a commandeering note that Fourie had given to the hotelkeeper at Pienaar’s River. In the note he stated he had taken goods to the value of £10 for the use of the Republican Forces; if his side won it would be honoured by the Republican Government, if he lost: The amount was to be debited against Generals Botha and Smuts.

In another rather cavalier approach to the rebellion, and a very ill-advised one, Jopie Fourie had rather foolishly decided to fight for the rebels whist wearing his Union Defence Force Uniform (refer Military History Journal Vol 16, No.4). The wearing of your ‘enemies’ uniform in 1914 also immediately guaranteed a place in front of firing squad, its treason of the highest order. 

During the South African War 1899-1902 (or Boer War 2) there is an extensive list of Boers executed for “wearing khaki” i.e., wearing a British uniform, by 1914 and the 1st World War this sort of offence earned you a ‘drumhead’ court martial in the field and immediate execution on the spot. 

Even by World War 2, who can forget the harrowing images of the execution of German soldiers – Pernass, Billing, and Schmidt by firing squad of American GI’s for wearing American uniforms, they were condemned to death under the Hague convention concerning land warfare, article 23: “It’s especially forbidden .. to make improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy”

Unteroffizier Manfred Pernass, Oberfähnrich Günther Billing, and Gefreiter Wilhelm Schmidt were given a military trial at Henri Chapelle, sentenced to death, and executed by a firing squad on 23rd Dec 1944 for wearing American uniforms to infiltrate their lines.

Jopie Fourie took a tremendous risk choosing to continue to wear his UDF uniform whilst joining a revolt against the UDF, and there is absolutely no doubt that he knew the consequences of his actions, as a Boer War veteran and subsequently a UDF officer he knew exactly the consequence.

Captain Jopie Fourie and Captain William Allan King where also colleagues and friends. Captain William Allan King was a part-time ACF officer in the UDF, full-time he was the Sub-Commissioner of Pretoria, he was Pretoria’s ‘Native Commissioner’ responsible for the affairs of Blacks and Coloureds in the Transvaal.  His duties and responsibilities included arbitrating between the employers of labour in the Pretoria Labour District with the Black African Natives performing the labour.

According to Sol Plaatje, the first General Secretary of the African National Congress (ANC) in his book ‘Native Life in South Africa, Before and Since the European War and the Boer Rebellion’, William King is described as; 

“Without doubt the ablest native administrator in the Transvaal Civil Service … an expert on Native matters, and no commission ever sat without his being summoned to give evidence before it”.

Sol Plaatje went on to say of William King: 

“The Natives called him ‘Khoshi-ke-Nna’, which means ‘I am the Chief’. A firm but just Englishman, with a striking military gait, he would have been an ideal leader of the native contingents had the offer of native help been accepted by the Union Government.”

That William Allan King was a very popular and well-liked man in South African politics and amongst the majority communities and their representatives in South Africa would be an understatement.

Captain William Allan King, was sent to arrest Captain Jopie Fourie, presumably as they had a personal connection to talk him and his Commando into surrender as a first prize. King was also to warn Fourie that he needed to resign his commission. King’s small UDF force came into contact with Jopie Fourie and his Commando on the 23rd November 1914, just north of Pretoria near Hamaanskraal and a skirmish ensued. During the firefight Captain William Allan King attended to a wounded man. Whilst attending to the man he was shot dead by one of Fourie’s men. Again, military doctrine viewed these sorts of incidents in 1914 as outside accepted rules of engagement.

“What made it so tragic was that Jopie and King, who was Native Commissioner of Pretoria, had been good friends prior to the rebellion” recorded Major Harry Trew, Jopie Fourie’s other friend. It would now be left to Major Harry Trew to capture and arrest Fourie, which he and detachments of South African Police (SAP) and Union Defence Force (UDF) troops eventually managed to do on the 16th December 1914 at Nooitgedacht in the Rustenburg district.

It needs to be noted at the “Battle of Nooitgedacht” to arrest Fourie, Jopie Fourie and his men killed one policeman and many other policemen were injured – Dr C Louis Leipoldt was the ‘police doctor’ that day and was mentioned in dispatches for attending to all the wounded.

Images: Captain William Allan King’s headstone and newspaper notice, note the population group who erects the headstone (the Waterberg Chiefs) and his honouring as an African Chief in a native language.

It was also not the first time Fourie and his men would flout rules of engagement. In a earlier engagement, from under a white flag of truce they opened up on a UDF detachment, this time killing another popular UDF officer, who happened to be unarmed. Captain John (Koos) Nolte, an Afrikaner, was treacherously shot. The epitaph on Nolte’s grave, who was a well-known rugby player and attorney on the East Rand, states; “Gesneuveld 29 October 1914 te Treurfontein onder Witvlag met Rapport. Geboren 11de Juli 1881.”

Retribution

Captain William Allan King’s funeral was a national outpouring of grief, newspapers across the county lamented at his passing, his funeral was the largest funeral since the Union was declared in 1910. Plaatje would read his obituary and would record that he was “one loss which the Natives, judging by articles in their newspapers, will not easily forget”.

Retribution for Fourie was coming – not only from the large swaths of English’, ‘Coloured’ and ‘Black’ communities grieving for William Kings death, of all the Rebel’s Commandos – it was Fourie’s Commando which exacted the greatest number of Union Defence Force deaths. Of those most of them were Afrikaners – Prime Minister Botha insisted the ‘English’ regiments who made up the Active citizen Force (ACF) part of the UDF ‘stay out of it’ for the most part and the Afrikaner ‘Rifle Associations’ – the old Boer Republic Commandos the RA part of UDF to deal with the brunt of the revolt – so, brother against brother, this was to be the Afrikaners sorting out their seditious brethren amongst themselves. Retribution was coming for Fourie from many in the Afrikaans community and the UDF families affected by the loss of their husbands, brothers and sons – men like Captain Koos Nolte.

Unlike many of the other rebel leaders who faced a single count of treason, Captain Jopie Fourie had committed High Treason on three counts, not resigning his Army commission in the UDF, caught wearing his UDF uniform and undertaking a seditious armed revolt against his lawfully elected government and his own armed forces – the UDF. 

Also, unlike the other rebel leaders who faced a trial in a civilian court, having resigned from the UDF, that would not be the case for Jopie Fourie, as he had not resigned from the UDF he was considered as still in service in the UDF, so he faced a military court. A military court martial is fundamentally different to a civilian one as there are a whole set of laws that apply to military personnel that don’t apply to civilians. Military tribunals are almost a ‘law unto themselves’ – sentences tend to be carried out quickly and punishments harsh – very little latitude is given to appealing convictions, and military courts do not really tolerate interventions from civilian authorities and government structures. 

This is compounded further when the military is ‘in a state of war’ with a foreign power or if a state of ‘martial law’ is declared against an internal enemy, and South Africa and the UDF specifically was in both states.  During these respective states of war military law becomes even more intolerant and convictions even more punitive. Retribution from the UDF was most certainly coming for Fourie and there was very little anyone could do about it.

Retribution was also quick, South Africa was in a state of martial Law and there was no dilly-dally, from the time Jopie Fourie was captured on the 16th December 1914, he was tried by this fellow military officers, from all accounts he was given a proper military trial, he was found guilty of high treason and sentenced to death by firing squad (a military ‘death’ afforded only to military personnel – civilians are hanged).

The firing squad was comprised equally of members of the South African Police (as they were involved in his capture and he took a toll on them), members of Jopie Fourie’s own regiment – the “Botha Ruiters”, and members of the South African Mounted Rifles. The execution took place with Fourie refusing a blindfold on the 20th December 1914 …. from capture to execution, it took a mere 4 days.

Images: Authorisation Letter: Jopie Fourie Execution: 20th December 1914 and colourised image of Jopie Fourie (courtesy Jenny B Colourised Photos)

Why Smuts?

Usually in a legal and parliamentary construct like the Union of South Africa, the only person who can stay an execution or offer an amnesty is the Prime Minister and usually that is done with a consensus of cabinet ministers, so the Prime Minister is not seen to act unilaterally. The Prime Minister of South Africa in 1914 was Louis Botha, not Jan Smuts – Smuts was one of 66 South African Party Ministers of Parliament and he is one of Louis Botha’s Cabinet Ministers – holding two portfolios reporting to Botha. Jopie Fourie’s execution is on Botha’s watch – it’s his responsibility, not Smuts’.

General Jan Smuts during WW1

So why not Botha, why the focus on Smuts?

As Dr David Katz in his work ‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917) points out. Jan Smuts had been the key Minister keeping a level head and seeking reconciliation and understanding all the way through the rebellion, and when it was clear the rebellion had failed, Smuts called for a ‘Blanket Amnesty’ across the board for the Boer Rebel leaders and their troops if they laid down their arms. 

General Louis Botha, the Commander in Chief, on the other hand took a much harder and less reconciliatory line than his colleague – he was livid at the sheer betrayal, the sheer waste of lives, resources and time it took and the complete stupidity of it all – an unsupported revolt against a lawfully elected government with absolutely no chance of success. 

It was reported that Louis Botha once joking said to Jan Smuts “Let’s face it Jannie, you’re no General!” By that he meant Smuts was far too reconciliatory and soft-hearted – as far as Louis Botha was concerned, under the edicts of martial law, all rebels, officers and men alike should be tried, the most treasonous of which, the leaders, put up against a wall and shot – even if they were all his old friends.

Smuts however persevered – Botha eventually agreed to an Amnesty, but for the rank and file only, the Boer Rebel leaders would have to be prosecuted. The amnesty, excluding the Rebel leadership, was in put place from 12th to 21st November 1914, and with it the 1914 Boer Rebellion was effectively over, by the end of November General de Wet’s force alone was down to only 40 men. Rear actions and isolated and desperate battles continued to be fought for a couple of months by woefully under-strength hard liners like Jopie Fourie refusing surrender and amnesty, but by the end of January 1915 the rebellion was over.  

Even by standards of the day, at the end of the revolt Smuts would seek clemency and compassion with Botha for the rebel leaders, consider their sentences.  In private correspondence with his confidant and friend, Emily Hobhouse, Hobhouse would urge both Smuts’ and Botha’s compassion in dealing with the rebel leaders, to which Smuts agreed.

Of the main rebel leaders, General Christiaan Beyers tragically drowned in the Vaal River whilst attempting to desperately evade capture on 8th December 1914. General Christiaan de Wet was captured during the amnesty and sentenced to six years imprisonment, with a fine of £2000, he was released by Botha and Smuts after one year’s imprisonment, after giving a written promise to take no further part in politics. 

Major Jan Kemp was captured on the 2nd of February 1915 and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment, with a fine of £1000. However, a mere 10 months into his sentence Botha and Smuts agreed to release him – also on the condition that he may not participate in any politics – a promise Kemp almost immediately broke entering politics as a National Party MP under Hertzog in 1920. 

Lt. Colonel Manie Maritz would evade capture and escape into self-imposed exile, he would re-enter South Africa in 1923 and spent a couple of months in jail for treason, when General Barry Hertzog came to power later in 1924 he was given amnesty. He would enter into politics as the leader of an antisemitic, one-party state, National Socialist (Nazi) inspired ‘Boerenasie’ party prior to World War 2.

Of all the other rebel officers, men like Kmdt Daniel Flemming, who were also captured or returned from exile in GSWA. All were sentenced to short imprisonments and fines, almost all of them walking free within a year … except for just one man … Captain Jopie Fourie.

The Visit

The delegation in December 1914, headed up by Dr D.F. Malan, which decided on a last minute ‘drop in’ visit at Jan Smuts’ house and deliver a petition Malan had drafted, with the remote hope of getting clemency for Fourie, did so because they saw Smuts as the ‘weakest link’ – they knew he had a soft spot for the rebels and they would have no such luck with a no-nonsense General like Louis Botha, and how do we know this?

Simply because General Botha, as Prime Minister made no effort to stay the execution of Jopie Fourie, he did not lift a finger, he didn’t even offer an opinion on the matter or make a statement, and one can only deduce that given his very hard stance he initially held against giving the rebels any sort of amnesty, that he wanted an example made of Fourie. Botha was livid, this revolt in no way received the support of the broad Afrikaner community, it was poorly planned and poorly led and an utter waste of life – to read more on this position read Observation Post – Boer War 3 and Beyond, here’s the link Boer War 3 and beyond!

Now consider what the delegation is asking of Jan Smuts, they are asking him to make a decision he is not really mandated to do, they are asking him to override his boss’ intentions and act unilaterally of the Prime Minister. They are asking him to act unilaterally of all this fellow cabinet ministers and as a UDF General, they are also asking him to act unilaterally of the military, its laws and its tribunals. They are also asking Smuts to perform a communications miracle, considering the speed at which the Fourie trial takes place – a mere 4 days, it’s 1914 – the country is at war and Smuts has to contact a wide variety of MP’s and his Boss the PM who is on a military campaign to get any sort of consensus before the execution – and he only has about a single day to do it in.  

Future nationalists would blow this delegation and incident out the water and pay far too much attention to Smuts than he deserves, they would try and turn Smuts into a coward for not meeting the drop in delegation, stating he was ‘hiding’ in the house – in fact Smuts was visiting on the next door farm when the delegation turned up, and unlike President Paul Kruger who entertained the general public dropping in unannounced, Smuts did not.

What if?

Even if Smuts had entertained the visit, there is literally nothing he could do about Jopie Fourie – as noted, Fourie’s case was far too complicated, his crimes were far too serious and there were far too many incriminating circumstances of high treason. Smuts in even trying to get Fourie off the hook would have incurred the wrath of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the majority of the government, the Union Defence Force and all its commanders, many in the Afrikaans community, the families of the UDF slain, and finally the broader English, Coloured and Black communities, the vast majority, thanks to the death of William King at the hands of Fourie. 

This was World War 1, this was Martial Law after all, soldiers and officers were executed in front of firing squads for ‘cowardice’ or ‘leaving posts without permission’ or ‘refusing orders’ – let alone High Treason, Sedition and White Flag incidents. There was just no way anyone was going to get Fourie any form of amnesty or clemency, not in a month of Sundays.

It is very naive and a very arrogant assumption on behalf of Dr. Malan to think that Smuts could stay the execution and its smacks more of a political assassination exercise than it does of a philanthropic one, and that’s exactly what happened – Prime Minister Louis Botha, the man who was in fact responsible – the bittereinder’ hero of the Boer War – would remain relatively unscathed and still heralded as Boer hero in the Boerevolk community, whereas Smuts would unfairly take the full brunt of Afrikaner Nationalist vitriol in Botha’s place – unrelenting and for decades – he still does.

Images: Hate mail sent to Jan Smuts – Jan Smuts collection

Uneasy is the head that wears a crown

Smuts would go on to be regarded as one of the greatest Statesmen South Africa has ever produced, Jopie Fourie was a junior officer and simply not on the same playing field as Smuts (or Botha for that matter). To quote Shakespeare “uneasy is the head that wears a crown” – no ‘coward’ when it came to his convictions – in Smuts’ career, as a Boer War General during the South African War 1899 – 1902 (Boer War 2) he would personally oversee the court martial and execution by firing squad of Lambert Colyn, a Boer traitor who betrayed his Commando’s position to the British. 

After the 1922 Miners’ Strike, when Smuts was Prime Minister in his first term and had powers of amnesty, the English ‘Communist’ rebels – Samual ‘Taffy’ Long, Herbert Hull and David Lewis were all hanged singing the Red Flag song, Smuts remained unmoved. 

As Prime Minister on two separate occasions many South Africans were executed for a variety of crimes under his watch for clemency, mainly murder, none received it. The UDF in its only recorded execution during World War 2, executed one of their own during the Italy campaign – Johan Mgema (a Native Military Corps man) attached to 12 Squadron SAAF, executed by firing squad when he was found guilty of murdering an Italian woman. Again, as Prime Minister at the time Smuts granted no amnesty. 

Smuts however went one step further, and only for one man, when he was Prime Minister during World War 2, and mandated to grant amnesty and clemency, stay executions and intervene in judicial process – he stayed the execution of Robey Leibbrandt – the South African Nazi zealot inserted into South Africa by Nazi Germany to overthrow the government and assassinate Smuts. Captured and found guilty of High Treason Leibbrandt was sentenced to death – he claimed that he had acted “for Volk and Führer” (Adolph Hitler and the Afrikaner people) and gave the Hitler Salute in court, declaring “I greet death”.

Robey Leibbrandt

Smuts commuted his sentence to life in prison instead. Smuts had served with Leibbrandt’s father, Meyder Leibbrandt during Boer War 2 and admired him as a “courageous Boer warrior”. In the case of Robey Leibbrandt only did Smuts intervene as Prime Minister and exercise his powers, nobody else, again demonstrating his ‘soft spot’ for his most beloved Boere community, one in which he consistency sought reconciliation and understanding. However, even this act would not deter his most obstinate detractors. Robey Leibbrandt was subsequently released on amnesty granted by the incoming nationalists led by Dr. D.F. Malan in 1948.

The point been, for all the executions and all the variety of people of communities involved, it was only with the Boerevolk that Smuts exhibited extraordinary measures of compassion. The execution of Fourie was an extraordinary one, and considering the William Allan King incident, the white flag incident, his commission and his uniform, far too large a segment of the population sought retribution.

This is one of the key reasons why the Jopie Fourie mythology and narrative put forward by Afrikaner Nationalists never really includes William Allan King – Fourie was pitched as been of ‘pure’ Afrikaans heart, unfairly executed for it by traitorous Afrikaners, it’s all about Afrikanerdom – the English, Black and Coloured Communities’ in South Africa who Fourie also went to war against don’t count – that would make him universally unpopular and a genuine traitor – nor do all the other communities affected by government policies in dealing with treason and those executed for it count – it just doesn’t fit their insular and myopic Afrikaner Nationalist narrative.

In Conclusion

In relating the story of Jopie Fourie, it’s clear that the story of William King a.k.a. The Chief is lost. In weighing up the two, the man who died for his country, the man who is the true patriot, the member of the statutory forces representing a legal government and the broad communities of South Africa as a whole – the majority of South Africans, the man who is functioning as a legitimate commissioned officer and upholding his oath to serve his country and men, the man ‘unfairly’ killed, the man whose loss is felt across the entire nation – is Captain William King, as a South African Army officer doing his duty his sacrifice is fully deserving of the nation’s recognition. The true national hero is Captain King, and when we ask ourselves “what about Jopie?” We must also ask of ourselves … “what about William?”

We will never know what Jopie Fourie’s true reasons were for not taking the precaution of resigning his UDF commission, despite been warned to do so. Nobody knows what was going through his head when he donned on his UDF uniform to rebel against the UDF. Given the extremely grave consequences of these actions – one can only assume that the person who wanted Jopie dead, was Jopie himself and he foresaw himself as some sort of martyr.

It remains perplexing, no matter what Smuts did right, no matter all his achievements, no matter that he arbitrated the peace deal to end the Boer War, no matter that he twice put South Africa on the right side of history when Germany acted as polecat, no matter that he consolidated Afrikaners and English and established Union and a whole new country – the true father of South Africa, no matter that he established the UDF and its military doctrine, identified new botanicals, established both the Royal Air Force and the South African Air Force, wrote an accredited work of philosophy, established South Africa as an economic powerhouse, no matter that he commanded British troops in East Africa and was Churchill’s personal advisor during Operation Overlord (D-Day) and the liberation of Europe, no matter that he established the concept of the Commonwealth of Nations and wrote the pre-amble to establish United Nations – all that matters not a jot to the chap in the back of the room at any modern day Smuts related seminar who sticks up his hand and inevitably asks “what about Jopie?”.


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

Related Work:

Boer War 3 and Beyond – the 1914 Boer Rebellion Boer War 3 and beyond!

References:

Military History Journal, Vol 16 No 4 – December 2014 – Forgotten casualties of the 1914 Rebellion. By Richard Wadley

‘Native Life in South Africa, Before and Since the European War and the Boer Rebellion’. By Sol. T. Plaatje

Nongqai Vol 10, No 4 A (1) by Brigadier Hennie Heymans

‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa’ 1914 -1917. By Dr David Broc Katz

A large thank you to Stef Coetzee for his inputs on Captain William Allan King and further thanks to Admiral Arne Söderlund for his assistance, along with Brigadier Hennie Heymans

The Steel Commando

Torch Commando Series – Part 3

Forging a ‘Steel’ Commando

In researching The Torch Commando, quite often the word ‘Steel Commando’ comes in. Now, what exactly was The Steel Commando – some have incorrectly ventured that it was an equivalent to the ‘Greyshirts’ i.e. the strongmen enforcers within a political party – this is not the case, in fact the Steel Commando has an interesting origin, both in history and name. Central to the Steel Commando is the idea of winning hearts and minds – in the Steel Commando’s case it’s very much the Afrikaner ‘heart and mind’ they are after.

So, quick re-cap to my favourite area of research – The Torch Commando, a post-World War 2 mass-movement of ‘white’ ex-military servicemen, a political pressure group against the accent of the National Party into power in 1948 and their first submissions of Grand Apartheid legislation from 1950. It was not an insignificant movement, at its zenith The Torch Commando boasted 250,000 paid up members and as inconvenient truth goes, when it was formed it becomes the first mass anti-Apartheid protest movement, starting in April 1951, its origin pre-dates the African National Congress’ (ANC) ‘Defiance Campaign’ – which is their first mass mobilised protest against Apartheid and started in June 1952. The part that also does not sit with the current ‘struggle’ ANC rhetoric, the Torch Commando was almost exclusively ‘white’.

The dynamics behind the National Party’s ascent to power without a majority vote in 1948 have been vastly researched but suffice it to say that for returning War Veterans from WW2, fighting against Nazism, the advent of a political party with numerous leaders who had been directly and/or indirectly flirting with Nazism during the war as a net result of organisations like the Ox Wagon Sentinel (Ossewabrandwag) and other Neo Nazi factions merging with The National Party was an abhorrent idea and an insult to the sacrifice of their comrades in arms.

The outrage to this and the implementation of the first Acts and Bills that would become ‘Apartheid’ would result in a merger of war veteran members of the Springbok Legion veteran’s association and war veterans predominant in the United Party’s political structures in April 1951 – the ‘War Veteran’s Action Committee WVAC (the WVAC was to eventually evolve into The Torch Commando) under the leadership of the charismatic war-time fighter ace – Adolph Gysbert Malan, DSO & Bar, DFC & Bar, better known as Sailor Malan, a veteran with Afrikaans heritage. The WVAC is careful to balance its demography to reflect the views of both Afrikaners and English-speaking whites who had participated in all South Africa’s Wars and it is balanced 50/50 Afrikaans/English in its make-up. Now, the question is why did they have to do that – why the focus? 

Sailor Malan during The Battle of Britain – note his ‘South Africa’ shoulder flash on his RAF uniform

The answer to this question has its origins in the way the South African Union Defence Force has been constructed and the way the South African public voting bloc – those eligible to vote is constructed and its dynamics. So, let’s look at the Defence Force.

The Union Defence Force

The South African Union Defence Force (UDF) from its origins in 1914 was carefully constructed by Jan Smuts to have an Afrikaner and English ratio of 60% Afrikaners and 40% English speaking whites, a proportional representation of the actual demographic of South Africa  – at first – for World War 1 starting in 1914, the Afrikaners primarily exist in the ‘Rifle Associations’ which are effectively the old Boer Republic’s Commandos and the English speaking South Africans exist in the ACF ‘Active Citizen Force’ Regiments – like the Royal Natal Carbineers, South African Light Horse and Durban Light Infantry, most of whom have origin in the old Natal and Cape Colony ‘Colonial Forces’ during the Boer War.

By the time the Second World War swings around in 1939 the UDF is a slightly different beast, but it still has its 60/40 ratio of Afrikaans to English, with Afrikaners in the majority, Jan Smuts calls out for volunteers, joining the Union Defence Force from the adult ‘white’ base of approximately 1,000,000 people in 1940 is 211,000 whites (with 120,000 Black, Coloured and Indian service personnel in addition).  

It’s an extraordinary response to a call-up to military service on voluntary lines, South Africa is one of the few participating countries in the Allied war effort not to implement conscription and as a population ratio – nearly a quarter of all white South African adults actively seeking service. 

Contrary to the myth asserted by the old National Party. The idea that 2nd World War was primarily fought by the ‘English’ white South Africans who had an affinity to Britain, Smuts had somehow turned ‘British’ and true ‘Afrikaners’ sat out the war as members of organisations like the Ossewabrandwag and the National Party either desiring neutrality due to a universal disgust with all things British (a hang-over from the Boer War) or in active support of Germany. However, this is a myth – it’s simply untrue.

The truth is that Smuts’ call had as much resonance with white Afrikaners as it did with white ‘English’ – of the white population volunteering for service, the pool reflects the national demographic split of the 60/40. So, approximately 127,000 Afrikaners and 84,000 ‘English’ – the Afrikaners are still the majority. Smuts’ call is simply broadly accepted by both white communities and extremely popular – fact, this is again where Economic History starts to tear gaping holes into ‘Political’ history narratives.

The voting bloc

Now let’s look at the white and coloured voting bloc and its dynamics. After the war ends in 1945, the National Party rather surprisingly wins the General Election in 1948, NOT by a majority, it’s a minority government winning on ‘constitutional’ grounds (number of seats) and NOT a popular one. 

Of the 1,000,000-adult voters in 1948 (the full actual vote count is 1,065,971 voters) – more or less as numbers go – 550,000 voted against Apartheid (for Jan Smuts’ United Party and their more liberal parties – The Labour Party etc.) as opposed to 450,000 who voted in favour of Apartheid (for the Afrikaner Nationalists – the re-united National Party and Afrikaner Party coalition). The ‘coloured’ vote – the Cape Franchise has within it approximately 50,000 voters and these have almost exclusively gone with the United Party and its partners (one of the National Party’s intended aims is to remove their franchise), so we can deduce that about 500,000 whites and 50,000 coloureds have voted against Apartheid.  

Dr D.F. Malan (left) leader of the National Party and General Jan Smuts (right) leader of the United Party

This alone qualifies an inconvenient truth. So much for the rather incorrect modern argument put forward by the ANC and other Black Nationalists that ‘white’ people in South Africa as a coherent whole voted to maintain their ‘privilege’ and are therefore responsible for Apartheid and the renumeration of black society hobbled by it. That agreement is simply not true – the majority of whites did not vote for Apartheid – the proof is in the statistics.

Albeit not a majority, clearly some Afrikaner ex-servicemen in the military veteran ‘service’ voting bloc have been moved to support Afrikaner Nationalism – prior to the election the National Party did a large degree of “swart gevaar” (Black Danger) fear mongering around Jan Smuts’ declaration that “segregation had fallen on evil days” and this has resonated with some Afrikaner servicemen, disillusioned in their discharge from the UDF, feeling vulnerable and seeking fundamental reforms within an Afrikaner hegemony.

What the War Veterans Action Committee (WVAC) aims to do is woo these white Afrikaans ex-servicemen voters back to either the United Party or the Labour Party. They also want to encourage ex-Afrikaner servicemen from Boer War 2 and World War 1 to join hands with the World War 2 veterans as a show of unified strength that many in Afrikaans community are simply not in favour of Apartheid – even some of the old highly regarded and much-loved Republican Boer War veterans who are still around.

The opening shots

The War Veterans Action Committee (WVAC) kicked off their mission with a protest at the Johannesburg Cenotaph on 21st April 1951 during a commemoration service – laying a coffin draped in the national flag as a symbol to depict the death of the Constitution.

The first protest action of the WVAC

So, after the Cenotaph parade, the War Veterans Action Committee (WVAC) elected to ‘ramp-up’ their resistance and hold bigger protests using military precision and planning to activate the significant ‘ex-services’ vote and its supporters, so as to bring about regime change through the ballot box. 

On the 4th May 1951, two political rallies were held, one Durban attracted 6,000 people and a second larger one 25,000 people strong, attended by Sailor Malan was held in Johannesburg. The protest marches were held at night and flaming torches were carried for effect – the Torches became symbols of ‘hope’, ‘freedom’ and ‘light’ – and would ultimately be the trademark of the movement with carriers known as “Torch-men”. The proposed idea to the audience was to initiate a ‘crusade’ against the Afrikaner Nationalists in the same spirit as their ‘crusade’ against Hitler and for the same reasons.

The Johannesburg rally saw more than 5,000 veterans ‘on-parade’ carrying Torches march from Noord Street near the railway station to the Johannesburg City Hall. They we joined by approximately 15,000 civilians as they gathered outside the City Hall. Sailor Malan was to outline this intention to crusade when he referred to the ideals for which the Second World War was fought:

“The strength of this gathering is evidence that the men and women who fought in the war for freedom still cherish what they fought for. We are determined not to be denied the fruits of that victory.”

Sailor Malan

At these meetings on 4th May the following resolutions were taken and unanimously agreed:

  1. We ex-servicemen and women and other citizens assembled here protest in the strongest possible terms against the action of the present government in proposing to violate the spirit of the Constitution.
  2. We solemnly pledge ourselves to take every constitutional step in the interests of our country to enforce an immediate General Election.
  3. We call on other ex-servicemen and women, ex-service organisations and democratic South Africans to pledge themselves to this cause.
  4.  We resolve that the foregoing resolutions be forwarded to the Prime Minister and the leaders of the other political parties.

A further meeting was held in Port Elizabeth, attended by 5,000 people, at this meeting the following resolution was outlined;

“This meeting condemns the present government for violating the liberties for which the wars of 1914 – 1918 and 1939 – 1945 were fought and for disregarding the moral undertakings enshrined in our Constitution. We pledge ourselves to continue the struggle to ensure we and our children live in true democracy.”

A manifesto would be released on the 13th May and the war veterans resolved to form a ‘Steel Commando’ to send these four resolutions of protest directly to Parliament in Cape Town. A jeep convoy was put together with precision from all major metropoles to convene in Cape Town on the 28th May 1951. But why the term “Steel Commando” – what resonance would that have and what were the objects of using this concept? Here again – this has a distinctive Afrikaner heritage and appeal. So, here’s some background.

The Steel Commando – an Afrikaner root

Just prior to World War 2, the Broederbond under the directive of its Chairman, Henning Klopper conceived a travelling carnival to celebrate the 100-year anniversary of the Great Trek – it was known as the 1938 Great Trek Centenary its purpose was the establishment of a unified Afrikaner identity under a white ‘Voortrekker’ hegemony – the underpinning of Afrikanerdom with a Christian Nationalism ideology. The long and short, this travelling caravan of Voortrekker wagons traversing to the most rural parts of South Africa on their way to the Blood River battle-ground and the future site of the Voortrekker monument outside Pretoria to lay its cornerstone … it was a massive success, resonating with Afrikaners country-wide and bringing together the impossible – the Boer Afrikaner and the Cape Afrikaner under a ‘white’ Voortrekker’s “path for South Africa” banner.

Henning Klopper’s Ox-Wagons named – The ‘Piet Retief’ and the ‘Andries Pretorius, leave Cape Town from the foot of Jan van Riebeeck’s statue to commence the 1938 Centenary of The Great Trek.

Two years later, during World War 2, the recruitment of white Afrikaners to volunteer for war service became paramount to Union’s Defence Force wartime objectives. Dr Ernie Malherbe and a group of academics, notably Alfred Hoernle and Leo Marquard, persuaded General Smuts to set up, under Malherbe, a corps of information officers to counter subversion in the armed forces generated by the likes of the Ossewabrandwag and the Broederbond and to stimulate the Afrikaner troops and potential white Afrikaner recruits to consider what they were actually fighting for.

Colonel Malherbe would take a leaf out of the Broederbond’s 1938 Centenary Trek used to ‘unify’ the Afrikaner – a round the country travelling carnival covering just about every town and village in the remotest areas. Only this time Colonel Malherbe intended that the travelling carnival ‘unify’ the Afrikaner behind Smuts’ call to arms to fight with Britain and France on the side of the Allies. He would use armoured cars instead of ox-wagons and his message was almost diametrically opposite to that of the Broederbonds’.

Colonel Malherbe would call his countrywide travelling carnival – The Steel Commando, added to this would be a propaganda and recruitment pamphlet dropping campaign from SAAF aircraft called the Air Commando.  The Steel Commando would consist of vehicle to carry a full military band, various armoured cars and a truck converted into a mobile recruitment station. 

Critical to the Steel Commando would be a contingent of old Republican Boer War veterans (South African War 1899-1902) to give it a sense of ‘Afrikanerdom’ and ‘duty’ to South Africa. The term ‘Commando’ would be given to the convoy – solely because it resonated with old Republics ‘Kommandos’ of the Boer war and as a result had Afrikaner appeal. 

This convoy would enter small rural and farming towns with the fanfare of the marching band ahead of it, flanked by the Boer War Republican veterans and the recruiting station behind. Was it effective in capturing the Afrikaner hearts and minds as the Centenary Trek had been?  The truthful answer is – yes. In all the South African standing forces in WW2, Malherbe was satisfied in the objects of The Steel Commando – the single majority ethnic group in the South African Union’s Defence Force during World War 2 were white Afrikaners (126,600 of them).

Images: World War 2 recruitment posters targeted at white Afrikaners – note the poster drawing on the ‘the road to South Africa’ commencing from The Battle of Blood River to the Boer War Commandos to the South African Union Army – the title “Still loyal to the path of South Africa” is a direct play on the 1938 Centennial Trek which the Broederbond pitched as “Die Pad van Suid-Afrika,” a symbolic ‘path’ to South Africa’s nationhood taken by the Voortrekkers. This poster attests that joining the Smuts appeal to war is the true path to nationhood.

To see the effect of a Steel Commando parade, this video outlines one addressed by Smuts as a demonstration of the achievements of recruitment is very telling – note the extensive use of Boer Commando veterans.

What the Steel Commando and Colonel Malherbe’s recruitment drive also did was literally split the Afrikaner ‘hearts and minds’ in two, one half supporting the National Party’s call to neutrality or the Ossewabrandwag’s call to directly support Nazi Germany – and the other half of white ‘Afrikanerdom’ – supporting the ideals of Union between English and Afrikaans, General Smuts’ policies and the Allied war against Nazi Germany. 

The Steel Commando … repurposed 

So, to whip up support for their Anti-Apartheid cause, and how to whip up the planned mega-torchlight rally in Cape Town to hand over the demands? The War Veterans Action Committee took a leaf out of Colonel Malherbe’s Union Defence Force ‘Steel Commando’ recruitment drive. They would not even change the name, the WVAC’s ‘Steel Commando’ would be run along the same lines with military precision. All around the country from far flung places vehicles would converge with the Steel Commando and the Commando itself would drive through multiple towns and villages whipping up publicity and support. 

To balance the authority of the Steel Commando been both for ‘English’ and ‘Afrikaners’ alike and give it a high appeal, leading the ‘Steel Commando’ convoy to Cape Town a big hitting Afrikaner war hero – Kommandant Dolf de la Rey, a South African War (1899-1902) i.e. Boer War 2 veteran of high standing in the old Republican Forces of the Boer War. Part of Commandant Dolf de la Rey’s legacy was that he was reputed to have been involved in the actions around Ladysmith which resulted in the capture of Winston Churchill. Kommandant de la Rey was also affectionally given the term ‘Oom’ by the publicity machine to conjure up respect from the Afrikaner community.  

The ‘Steel Commando’ convoy gathered media attention and grew in size as it converged on Cape Town on the 28th May, a crowd of 4,000 greeted it as it converged in Somerset West before heading to Cape Town that evening.

This is a rare News reel of The Steel Commando drive – Note Kmdt Dolf de la Rey and the Republican Boer War veterans with him.

One newspaper correspondent wrote of it: 

“Cape Town staged a fantastic welcome for Kmdt de la Rey and Group Captain Malan, he related the enthusiasm of the crowd to the same that liberation armies received in Europe.”

The Johannesburg Star said: 

“The Commando formed the most democratic contingent ever to march together in the Union. Civil servants found themselves alongside the coloured men who swept the streets they were marching so proudly upon. In the front jeep rode Oom Dolf de la Rey, a white-haired old Boer of seventy-four, who looked so startlingly like the late General Jan Smuts that people looked twice at him and then cheered wildly. Oom (Uncle Dolf) was the man who, as a young burgher on commando fifty years before, had captured Winston Churchill, then a war correspondent with the Imperial forces in South Africa. In the second jeep stood a younger man with tousled brown hair, his hazel eyes cold and angry, the man who had been the most famed fighter pilot in all the RAF — Adolph Gysbert Malan, known all over the world as Sailor. He was the real hero of the hour. The people tried to mob him. Men and women, white as well as brown, crowded round his jeep and stretched out their hands to touch him”.

In Cape Town, the Steel Commando arrived to a packed crowd of protesters on The Grand Parade outside the City Hall of between 55,000 to 65,000 people – consisting of whites and coloureds, supporters and veterans alike (veterans were estimated at 10,000). Many holding burning torches as had now become the trademark of the movement. Spooked by it all the National Party were convinced that a military coup was on and as a precautionary measure placed manned machine gun positions around the rooftop of the nearby Houses of Parliament.

Sailor Malan was literally carried on shoulders by cheering crowds to give his speech. Joined by Dolf de la Rey and even future Afrikaner anti-apartheid activist and fellow war veteran Mattheus Uys Krige as well as the English speaking South African war-time soprano and heroine who led them in song – Perla Gibson. In Sailor Malan’s speech to the crowd famously accused the national party government at this rally of; 

“Depriving us of our freedom, with a fascist arrogance that we have not experienced since Hitler and Mussolini met their fate”.

Sailor Malan

During the rally in Cape Town, Dolf de la Rey took the microphone and laid into the National Party, as a respected Boer War vet he pulled no punches. Also, this is an inconvenient truth, Dolf de la Rey headed up an entire contingent of Boer War, Boer Republican Afrikaner veterans, on the Steel Commando – all of whom did not feel that Apartheid as outlined by the National Party was reflective of them as Afrikaners.

After the speeches formalities of the protest were closed, a group of mainly ‘coloured’ protestors and some ‘torch-men’ veterans rose-up in violent resistance and surged up the hill to the Houses of Parliament and clashed with the Police, the resultant violence left about 160 people injured and damaged the windows and railings of the ‘Groote Kerk.’

Now that there had been a clash with Police, the Afrikaner changed their tune and stance towards the War Veterans accusing them of starting violent riots and insurrection – threating a military coup. Johannes ‘Hans’ Strydom (National Party Minister and future NP Prime Minister) finally warned the war veterans that he would use the South African security forces against; 

“Those who are playing with fire and speaking of civil war and rebellion”.

Hans Strydom

Although the violence was dismissed by the War Veterans as not being of their making and unplanned, the Nationalists fear of violent military insurrection was not unfounded, both John Lang and Jock Isacowitz would later admit that the intention of many of the ‘torch-men’ on protest that day was always to surge on to Parliament and “throw out the Nationalists.”

The Nationalists continued to position the Torch as a national threat attempting a violent overthrow. This statement was equally quickly rebutted as nothing but shameful rhetoric by the National Party’s official opposition – the United Party. So, the Nationalists went further and targeted the personalities of Malan and de la Rey, bottom line is they did not want young Afrikaners influenced by these two national war heroes.

Sailor Malan was an easy target, he was the product of a Afrikaans father and English mother – he quickly became “the King’s poodle” and “an Afrikaner of a different kind” – not welcome in the Afrikaner laager. But, problem with ‘Oom Dolf’, here was a Afrikaner Boer War hero pure and applied, beyond the National Party’s criticism and reproach, so what did they do? They quietly dismissed him on his ‘Oom’ status, a senile old man, positioning him as somehow irrelevant, a patronising .. Ja Oom!

Formation of the Torch Commando

On the back of the successful widespread support of ‘The Steel Commando’ and determined to continue the fight to effect regime change, the ‘The Torch Commando’ took shape and it took to a more formalized structure of a central command with devolved authorities in the various regions of South Africa, using military discipline, military styled planning and lines of communication to activate.

Officially launching as the Torch Commando, Group Captain Sailor Malan was elected National President of the Torch, Major Louis Kane-Berman was elected National Chairman. To keep with the Afrikaner appeal and skew, the appointed Patron-in-Chief for the Torch Commando was Nicolaas Jacobus de Wet, the former Chief Justice of South Africa. Finally, the National Director was Major Ralph Parrott, a ‘hero’ of the Battle of Tobruk from the Transvaal Scottish who received the Military Cross for bravery. 

The Torch Commando is yet another demonstration of the rich tapestry of Afrikaner war veterans not in support of Apartheid – Afrikaners either joining or supporting the likes of Dolf de la Rey and Adolph ‘Sailor’ Malan in The Torch Commando would include many heavy-weight Afrikaner hitters, people like Mattheus Uys Krige – 2nd World War, correspondent and POW, poet and novelist, Torch Commando member and life-long anti-Apartheid campaigner. General Kenneth Reid van der Spuy – 1st World War and 2nd World War veteran and regional leader in the Torch Commando. General George Brink – 1st World War and 2nd World War veteran and a regional leader in the Torch Commando. Major Jacob Pretorius – 2nd World War and leader in the Torch Commando. Pvt Pieter Beyleveld –  2nd World War veteran, Labour Party and Springbok Legion, Torch Commando activist and life-long anti-apartheid campaigner.

Other Afrikaners would support the Torch, people like Lieutenant (Dr) Jan Steytler –  2nd World War veteran founder of the Progressive Party and Liberal politician. Captain (Sir) De-villiers Graaff – 2nd World War veteran, opposition United Party leader and New Republic Party founder, life-long anti-apartheid campaigner and supporter of the Torch Commando (in fact he hosted Sailor Malan on his ‘Steel Commando’ protest drive). Lt Harold Strachan – 2nd World War veteran, member of the Liberal Party, Congress of Democrats and Communist Party (he also became a founding member of MK). Major Pieter van der Byl – 1st World War veteran, South African Party, United Party and anti-Apartheid opposition stalwart and finally Colonel Ernst Gideon Malherbe – 2nd World War veteran, educator and famous South African academic.

The Commando would grow from strength to strength over the next couple of years, reaching a zenith of 250,000 members – nearly a quarter of the voting bloc and a significant threat to the National Party – do look out for the next Observation Post on The Torch Commando which will cover its rise.

In Conclusion

It is a very incorrect assumption to go with the old National Party rhetoric that they represented the interests of the majority of whites in South Africa, and to be a true Afrikaner you had to be an Afrikaner Nationalist. It is also very incorrect to connect Afrikaner identity to the white Voortrekker hegemony as devised by the Broederbond in their ‘Christian Nationalism’ construct in 1938, and most importantly – it is very incorrect to believe that Afrikaners are a homogeneous group with a homogeneous identity and as a group are all collectively responsible for Apartheid from 1948.  The Torch Commando and the nature of Afrikanerdom prior to the National Party coming into power in 1948 is proof positive, that the majority of whites and a significant part of the Afrikaner nation were simply not on board with the idea of Apartheid.

Editors Note:

As this research field includes the ‘racial constructs’ of Krugerism leading up and including Boer War 2 (1899-1902) and as an ideology and its role in establishing The National Party (and the onset of ‘Apartheid’) from 1914. In addition it also includes the ‘Nazification of the Afrikaner Right’ from 1936 and the political awakening of returning Afrikaner World War 2 veterans from 1950 because of it – the Observation Post often gets comments on both the blog and social media that it is somehow biased to the ‘British’ and ‘Afrikaner bashing’ or ‘Boer bashing’ – it is neither. 

What the Observation Post elects to highlight are the actual demographics, the economic history and not the political history peddled for political gain. It elects to highlight the progressive political deeds of Afrikaner military heroes like Dolf de la Rey and Sailor Malan, and all the Afrikaner military men in the Torch Commando whose legacies were buried by the Afrikaner Nationalists for decades and men whose truth must now ‘out’.

Given the current political assault on Afrikanerdom in modern South Africa this is key to understanding Afrikanerdom in its proper historical context – sans the National Party and now the African National Congress’ interpretation of it.

The Torch Commando – next instalment 

What follows next is called ‘The Rise and Fall of the Torch Commando’ – please click through to this Observation Post link which covers in this phase depth.

The Torch Commando – Part 4, The ‘Rise and Fall’ of the Torch Commando


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

References:

The Torch Commando & The Politics of White Opposition. South Africa 1951-1953, a Seminar Paper submission to Wits University – 1976 by Michael Fridjhon.

The South African Parliamentary Opposition 1948 – 1953, a Doctorate submission to Natal University – 1989 by William Barry White. 

The influence of Second World War military service on prominent White South African veterans in opposition politics 1939 – 1961. A Masters submission to Stellenbosch University – 2021 by Graeme Wesley Plint 

The Rise and Fall of The Torch Commando – Politicsweb 2018 by John Kane-Berman

The White Armed Struggle against Apartheid – a Seminar Paper submission to The South African Military History Society – 10th Oct 2019 by Peter Dickens 

Sailor Malan fights his greatest Battle: Albert Flick 1952.

Sailor Malan – Oliver Walker 1953.

You-tube AP video footage of The Torch Commando.

Lazerson, Whites in the Struggle Against Apartheid.

Neil Roos. Ordinary Springboks: White Servicemen and Social Justice in South Africa, 1939-1961.

“Not for ourselves” – a history of the South African Legion by Arthur Blake.  

Pro-Nazi Subversion in South Africa, 1939-1941: By Patrick J. Furlong.

The Rise of the South African Reich: 1964: By Brian Bunting

The White Tribe of Africa: 1981: By David Harrison 

National Socialism and Nazism in South Africa: The case of L.T. Weichardt and his Greyshirt movements, 1933-1946: By Werner Bouwer

The Final Prize: The Broederbond by Norman Levy: South African History On-line (SAHO) War and the formation of Afrikaner nationalism: By Anne Samson: Great War in Africa Association 

Colourised photo of Sailor Malan – thanks to Photos Redux

Related Work

This work falls part of preparation work for a seminar on Sailor Malan called ‘I fear no man’ by Dr Yvonne Malan, scheduled for 16th September 2023 in Kimberley, here’s the link “I Fear No Man” – Sailor Malan Memorial Lecture

The Torch Commando Series

The Smoking Gun of the White Struggle against Apartheid!

The Observation Post published 5 articles on the The Torch Commando outlining the history of the movement, this was done ahead of the 60th anniversary of the death of Sailor Malan and Yvonne Malan’ commemorative lecture on him “I fear no man”. To easily access all the key links and the respective content here they are in sequence.

In part 1, we outlined the Nazification of the Afrikaner right prior to and during World War 2 and their ascent to power in a shock election win in 1948 as the Afrikaner National Party – creating the groundswell of indignation and protest from the returning war veterans, whose entire raison d’etre for going to war was to get rid of Nazism.

For the in-depth article follow this link: The Nazification of the Afrikaner Right

In part 2, in response to National Party’s plans to amend the constitution to make way for Apartheid legislation, we outlined the political nature of the military veterans’ associations and parties and the formation of the War Veterans Action Committee (WVAC) under the leadership of Battle of Britain hero – Group Captain Sailor Malan in opposition to it.  Essentially bringing together firebrand Springbok Legionnaires and the United Party’s military veteran leaders into a moderate and centre-line steering committee with broad popular appeal across the entire veteran voting bloc. 

For the in-depth article follow this link: The War Veterans’ Action Committee

In Part 3, we cover the opening salvo of WVAC in a protest in April 1951 at the War Cenotaph in Johannesburg followed by the ratification of four demands at two mass rallies in May 1951. They take these demands to Nationalists in Parliament in a ‘Steel Commando’ convoy converging on Cape Town. Led by Group Captain Sailor Malan and another Afrikaner – Commandant Dolf de la Rey, a South African War (1899-1902) veteran of high standing their purpose is to raise support from Afrikaner and English veterans alike and they converge with a ‘Torchlight’ rally of 60,000 protestors and hand their demands to parliament. 

For the in-depth article follow this link: The Steel Commando

In Part 4, in response to the success of The Steel Commando Cape Town protest, we then look at the rise of the Torch Commando as South Africa’s largest and most significant mass protest movement in the early 1950’s pre-dating the ANC’s defiance campaign. Political dynamics within the Torch see its loyalties stretched across the South African opposition politics landscape, the Torch eventually aiding the United Party’s (UP) grassroots campaigning whilst at the same time caught up in Federal breakaway parties and the Natal issue. The introduction of the ‘Swart Bills’ in addition to ‘coloured vote constitutional crisis’ going ahead despite ineffectual protests causes a crisis within the Torch. This and the UP’s losses in by-elections in the lead up to and the 1953 General Election itself spurs the eventual demise of The Torch Commando.

For the in-depth article follow this link: The ‘Rise and Fall’ of the Torch Commando

In Part 5, we conclude the Series on The Torch Commando with ‘The Smoking Gun’. The Smoking Gun traces what the Torch Commando members do after the movement collapses, significantly two political parties spin out the Torch Commando – the Liberal Party of South Africa and the Union Federal Party. The Torch also significantly impacts the United Party and the formation of the breakaway Progressive Party who embark on formal party political resistance to Apartheid and are the precursor of the modern day Democratic Alliance. The Torch’s Communists party members take a leading role in the ANC’s armed wing MK, and the Torch’s liberals spin off the NCL and ARM armed resistance movements from the Liberal Party. We conclude with CODESA.

For an in-depth article follow this link: The Smoking Gun


Boer War 3 and beyond!

The 1914 Boer Revolt in perspective.

Very often when I read website or social media military history commentary on the 1914 Boer Revolt – I often come across the phasing that Louis Botha (usually incorrectly referenced as Jan Smuts) went against the will of the ‘majority’ of Afrikaners and therefore the general will of the white voting population in South Africa, when he declared war against Imperial Germany in 1914 and invaded German South West Africa (GSWA) – now on the side of Britain and its main ally – France. The result is a general upsurgence of Republicanism and a desire to re-engage the Boer War (a sort of Boer War 3) in an outpouring of widespread support by the Boer nation for Germany and against Britain (a legacy hangover from the Boer War). South Africa was forced into an unwanted war to do the British Empire’s bidding and the Boere would have none of it!

The problem with the above assertion is that it is pure bunk, its unfounded, as once again Military History (doctrine, strategy and tactics) and Economic History (stats and demographics) tell a different tale entirely and once again the ‘cold facts’ rip the ‘Political’ interpretation of the history apart (this is why I just love both economic and military history). So, let’s examine these ‘cold facts’ – the hard statistics – the numbers and see how they hold up, let’s also examine military doctrine and see how that holds against the numbers. Let’s challenge the history and establish why this above assertion is purely politically inspired fantasy.

The Vote

Upfront is the vote to go to war. The arrival of World War 1 in 1914 is both a blessing and a curse for the Boer led government of the newly formed Union of South Africa. Both Botha as Prime Minister and Smuts as his ‘right hand man’ were walking a tight rope – as Boer commanders they represented a faction of the new “Union”, balancing the two small old Boer Republic’s politics and laws with those of all the British colonies and protectorates surrounding them (six large British territories and their interests in them in effect) – so they are obliged to support Britain as the major player in the region, and honour their word to them, the oath that brought about peace – that’s the ‘curse’. 

The ‘blessing’ to the Union government is that the war presents them with an ideal opportunity to realise the expansive border of ‘Greater South Africa’ as envisioned and concluded in the Union conference in 1909 – as this border also specifies the eventual inclusion of German South West Africa into South Africa in the first phase of the ‘Greater’ South Arica Union and eventually even bits of German East Africa would be included in the second phase of South Africa’s territorial advancement. 

So it’s really no surprise, that when the decision to go to war is put to the vote in the Boer led and very independent Union of South Africa Parliament (at Union, Britain takes a figurehead role, the South African Union’s Parliament and legal construct is not governed by Westminster, its fee to make its own laws) – and the result is not what your Apartheid era school history teacher plugged – it’s a staggering vote of confidence by nearly all the Boer MP’s favouring going to war alongside Britain (and France) against Germany, by a landslide – literally. Consider the result.

92 = For invasion of German South West Africa (GSWA) by the Union of South Africa

12 = Against

So, as to the ‘majority’ of Afrikaners NOT wanting war with Germany, that is simply untrue, the Afrikaner community’s representatives in Parliament were overwhelmingly in favour of war against Germany. This is also where some ‘Boer Romantic’ commentators on the 1914 Revolt make a fundamental mistake, the Union of South Africa’s decision to conquer German South West Africa (Namibia) was NOT just a service to the ‘British Empire’ – it was largely in service to the objects of The Union of South Africa and its own territorial expansion ambitions and the prescribed ‘sphere of influence’ over the Southern African region as a whole (as agreed by all Boer and British leaders involved in the Union conference in 1909).

Put another way, that’s 88% in favour of going to war alongside Britain and 12% against. In so far as the politics goes, the South African Party (SAP) headed up by Louis Botha, and comprising all the old Boer War Generals and the old Afrikaner Bond is by far the majority party, it’s the Afrikaner’s representative party in government (the National Party came later) … statistically speaking the breakdown of Parliament is as follows:

South African Party, Louis Botha leader – 66 seats

Unionist Party, Starr Jameson leader – 36 seats

Labour Party, Frederic Creswell leader – 3 seats

Simply put, to see who the “Afrikaner” representatives are and who are the “English” i.e. British affiliated parties, the SAP is the ‘Afrikaner’ party – the ‘British’ party is most certainly Starr Jameson’s Imperial Party (you may remember Starr Jameson as the leader of the infamous Jameson Raid). The Labour Party is a British (English) unionist construct, its voters are the miners on the Johannesburg gold reef mainly.

From that it can be deduced that he majority of the ‘Afrikaner’ SAP have voted FOR going to war alongside Britain against Germany – of the SAP – 54 votes, or 82% of the SAP’s ministers are pro-war alongside Britain and her allies. It is only on the very rump of this party that we find the AGAINST voters, and of these 12 individuals (or 18% of the SAP), only 3 of them are notable and become highly vocal anti-war campaigners – Barry Hertzog, Koos de la Rey and Christiaan de Wet. 

In this respect, between the three of them, although vocal they are really a small voice at odds with the legitimate elected government construct, the vast majority of South Africa’s representatives, and even most of their own peers. In truth, they are also not just “pro-German’ – at this stage they are intrinsically at odds with the idea of ‘Union’ and it’s agreed objects – seeking minority rule under a ‘Boer Republican’ hegemony instead.

Political cartoon of the day captures the Union’s territorial ambitions

The UDF Construct and its ’Afrikaner’ nature 

Jan Smuts, as the Minister of Defence at this time had also been busy amalgamating the armed forces of the republics with those of the colonial citizen force regiments to form the Union Defence Force i.e. the UDF (in much the same way as the SADF was amalgamated with other forces in 1994 to form the SANDF – with the same challenges). 

The UDF had taken shape to consist of a small contingent of Permanent Force, the Permanent Force basically comprises some 4,000 odd members and consists of a HQ, some admin and training staff and a mounted military constabulary of 5 regiments called the South African Mounted Rifles (SAMR) – these are a combination of members of the old British colonial mounted regiments like the Cape Mounted Rifles and old Boer Kommando members making the military their profession. They make up only 5% of the total UDF strength.

But the backbone would remain essentially voluntarily forces in a two-stream approach, the old ‘English’ colonial citizen force regiments – Transvaal Scottish, Royal Natal Carbineers, Royal Durban Light Infantry etc comprise what is collectively known as ‘Active Citizen Force’ (ACF) and to begin with they tend be ‘English’ speaking and led. There are 23,000 ACF members (29% of the total UDF mustering).

The greater part of the UDF backbone however is the ‘Afrikaans’ citizen force “skiet” Commandos known as the ‘Rifle Association Mounted Infantry’ working in parallel to the ACF. This is the old Transvaal and Orange Free State Boer Republic’s Boer Kommando system in effect. They are collectively called the “Rifle Associations” or RA and comprise 42,000 members (or 52% of the complete UDF strength) and they are the majority in the new UDF construct.

It was a careful construct to keep everyone happy, but the point is this, it was NOT “British” – Imperial British troops present in South Africa after the Boer War had all returned to the United Kingdom, any engagement the Union of South Africa was going to fight in World War 1 in Africa, whether foreign or domestic, was going to be made up of ‘South Africans’ and led by ‘South Africans’ – and in truth it was commanded by the old Republic’s ‘Bittereinder’ Boer Generals – primarily Botha (as Prime Minister was Commander in Chief) and Smuts (as Botha’s Minister of Defence) – and by way of construction the vast majority of the force is of ‘Afrikaans’ origin (not English) and part of a mounted infantry construct (RA and SAMR).

General Jan Smuts during WW1

Smuts is beginning to outline military doctrine for the UDF and he has a greater disposition to the Boer ‘way of fighting’ i.e. mobility which is heavily reliant on mounted infantry. The UDF is fortunate, at the end of the Boer War in 1902, the British (and Colonial forces) emerge as the singular worldwide authority on Counter Insurgency warfare (we know this today as COIN) and the old Boer Republican forces emerge as the worldwide authority on Insurgency warfare.  Thus the UDF is now being built along the lines of using effective combined arms with high degrees of mobility to deal with both conventional warfare (as is the requirement of any statutory force) in the event a Colonial Power in Africa (e.g. Portugal or Germany) invades the Union and any domestic insurgencies (initially ‘internal’ threats are defined as potential Black African uprisings and the UDF doctrine is been developed to counter-act it). 

Intrinsic in the UDF’s DNA at this point is the use of COIN in the rural warfare context (they have not been tested in the urban context, that would only really happen with the Miners’ strike in 1922). Also, a key learning for the UDF is that towards the end of Boer War 2, the British turn to highly mobile ‘Seek and Destroy’ columns known as “Commando Hunts” to put an end to the final ‘Bittereinder Kommandos’ – essentially matching mobility with mobility but with greater firepower and ‘combined arms’. This institutional knowledge will play a major role in the upcoming 1914 Boer Revolt.

Smuts is happy to cherry pick, basically he’s happy to bring all that’s great and good about the British culture of warfare – their discipline and drill (sorely lacking in the Boer army), their uniforms and rank structures (sorely lacking in the Boer army) and their very effective use of combined arms warfare and joint arms warfare (also sorely lacking in the Boer army) and combine it with the Boer culture of warfare – the use of mobility, and applying high rates of survivability thinking to tactics of assault and defence (both of which are sorely lacking in the British army). 

WW1 UDF Recruitment poster targeted at Afrikaners

 Smuts will build into the UDF the doctrine of highly mobile ‘combined arms’ – mainly the effective use of mounted infantry, armour and artillery (and other ‘arms’) all acting in unison and speed. It’s a doctrine of “manoeuvre” using the Clausewitzian concept – using superior and simultaneous advances along “exterior” lines (a concentration in space) on an enemy using “interior” lines (known as a concentration of time) of communication and supply. Under General Jan Smuts the UDF is shaping into a very effective fighting force, one that is far ahead of the old Boer Republics strategic and tactical constructs and doctrine which focused mainly on “interior lines”. This will have far reaching consequences for the Boer Revolt and the rebels.

The Afrikaner disposition to Germany

Smuts was also sensitive to the fact that many Afrikaners shared German heritage and they (falsely) believed that Germany extensively supported the Boer cause during Boer War 2 – ‘falsely’ because in fact, Germany was happy to ‘sell’ them arms (as did the British arms manufacturers) at a premium and send some medical assistance later on, however Germany withdrew their support officially – they provided no troops and no substantial funding to the Republican Boer War effort whatsoever. 

Kaiser Wilhelm II

Kaiser Wilhelm II, although sending a letter to Kruger congratulating him on the Jameson Raid victory (given the Boer nation their false sense of ‘support’), in fact refused point blank to receive any Boer representations and after the ‘Black Week’ Boer victories during Boer War 2 in late 1899, he and his Generals compiled a military strategy, not to help the Boers, but to help the British win the war (he was after all related to the British monarchy – part of the family so to speak) and shared it with them instead – Kaiser Wilhelm II even proudly proclaiming at the end of the Boer War that the British had followed his plan precisely as he had outlined it to them and it was the German plan that won the war for the British – not Field Marshal Frederick Robert’s plan and as inconvenient truths go the Kaiser’s plan involved scorched earth policies and concentration camps. (see: John C.G. Röhl: The Kaiser and England during the Boer War). 

Ethnic Germans (local and foreign) volunteering to join Boer Commandos also qualified very few (550 odd) – far more Anglo-Irish, Dutch and Flemish joined the Boers (5,500 odd). A Boer leader delegation, including Botha and de Wet visited Germany after the war in 1902, and although they received a  grand welcome and ovations, they were never officially received, Kaiser Wilhelm II flatly refused to entertain any Boer delegation sent to Germany.

Boer delegations did raise a little money from private donators and a Boer help fund, but that’s it – there was never any official public contribution by the German government to the Boer cause – ever. Germany wanted to avoid conflict with Britain – who by convention and legal treatise at the time held suzerainty limitations over the two Boer Republics preventing them from engaging in foreign policies and entering into treaties. However, all this still did not resonate with many in the Boer community who almost illogically saw Germany as an Ally. Now, I bet none of this was in your Nationalistic inspired history teachings.

Left: Boer delegation to Europe and the USA in 1900 to try and solicit help for the Republics – with very limited success. Right: Kaiser Wilhelm II in a British Field Marshal uniform – he was made a Field Marshal in the British Army in 1909 by his relative – King Edward VII just after Queen Victoria’s death.

Smuts would argue the case for war, not on the basis of warring against Germany on the side of ‘Britain’, but for supporting the other old Boer Republic’s supporters – France, Belgium and the Netherlands in their war against a hostile and aggressive Germany busy de-stabilising western and eastern Europe, and Smuts was very aware of the vast majority of Boers had Dutch, Belgian and French roots, as opposed to the ones with German roots. He would use the same argument again for his declaration of war against Germany in World War 2.

Smuts however anticipated that the decision to go to war, although largely supported by the Afrikaner political elite and leadership, would have with it a handful of resignations from the Union’s Defence Force from those strongly in favour of Germany and whose sheer hatred of the British superseded everything, and the Union government received exactly that – a “handful” – nothing that would fundamentally compromise the UDF’s fighting ability or construct, the UDF remained at its 80,000 men strong capability and it remained with its primarily strong ‘Afrikaans’ demographic skew, contrary to the thinking of wishful Boer Romantic modern-day arm-chair Generals, there was no large gravitation of Afrikaners from the ‘Rifle Associations’ (Kommandos) and other arms of the UDF over to the German cause, nor was there a large wave of resignations from the UDF, in fact there was very little, verging on none – less than 1%. 

General Christiaan Frederik Beyers

Of the handful of resignations which were received, a rather long-winded one came from General Christiaan Beyers, the UDF’s Commandant General in charge of the Active Citizen Force (ACF) and his was the most important resignation. As previously noted, prior to the decision to go to war against Germany, Smuts and Botha’s old friend and highly respected comrade, General Koos de la Rey had been one of the handful of Parliamentary Ministers vocally against the decision to invade GSWA and advocated neutrality, and because of his popularity his opinion held massive sway over the old Boer Republic’s Afrikaner electorate  – nevertheless he was persuaded by Louis Botha and Jan Smuts not to take actions which may arouse the Boers, he then held a political rally for only 800 Boers who felt strongly over the matter and took a reconciliatory approach – contrary to what the attendees expected of him.

Major Jan Kemp in UDF uniform

General De la Rey seemed torn over his decision, and he was then targeted by General Beyers to join him for meeting with Major Jan Kemp, a mid-line UDF officer who had also resigned – the purpose of the meeting; Beyers and Kemp wanted to persuade de la Rey to take a stronger stand and initiate more Union Defence Force resignations to try and compromise its fighting capability. Joining the conspiracy was another heavyweight – the significant Boer General and Parliamentary Minister, Christiaan de Wet.

What follows next is well documented, however the generally accepted and investigated history concludes; General De la Rey and General Beyers were travelling in a soft top sedan car to their meeting with Major Kemp and did not stop at a Police blockade set up to capture a notorious gang of robbers and murderers called The Foster Gang. One of the Policeman fired a warning shot into the road to get them to stop, the bullet ricocheted and hit De la Rey, killing him. 

It was tragedy – plain and simple, and both Botha and Smuts were devasted at the loss of their friend, as a signal to the inevitable accusations of ‘political assassination’ both Botha and Smuts attended De la Rey’s funeral in front of thousands of mourning Boers, they appeared without any bodyguard at the mercy of the assembly – a token of no malice intended, and there were no protests or accusations from the mourners. 

Jacobus Hercules de la Rey

Regardless, despite sound and tested enquiries and court cases, and the Nationalists having full scope and the resources at hand for 40 years to uncover a ‘plot’ – no concrete proof has emerged of a plot by Smuts to kill De la Rey whatsoever – ‘conspiracy theory’ nevertheless grew out of the incident which would plague Smuts in future years, and it still does.

It is also generally understood that with the death of De La Rey, that would probably have been the extent of Boer resistance to the war, and it would have devolved into simple political protest and peaceful demonstrations, had it not been for one single man … Lt. Colonel Manie Maritz, who had an especially strong disposition towards Germany having served in German South West Africa and he commanded a small UDF force at Upington, on the border with German South West Africa (GSWA). 

A treacherous soup

The day after de la Rey’s funeral, Kemp, Beyers and de Wet addressed a large crowd at Lichtenberg, calling on protest meetings against the decision to invade GSWA. Manie Maritz however took a far more robust position than Kemp, Beyers and de Wet, he instead went into open sedition and started ignoring Smuts’ and his other Commander’s orders been sent to him. Intel told Smuts that Maritz had joined the Germans, however contradictory to Smuts’ usual manner of decisiveness, he vacillated instead hoping to persuade Maritz not to revolt and get him to see reason. 

Lt Col Manie Maritz, front and centre in his South African Union uniform and his staff behind him – his  ‘Agter-ryer’ (man-servant) is at his heels (It’s the man-servant’s expression and position that is most interesting as in many ways it gives away Maritz who is a very outspoken racist and has no regard for people of colour).

Not dissuaded by Smuts and bent on a sedition, Maritz resigned his commission from the Union Defence Force and openly rebelled on 9 October, taking just 300 odd of his UDF soldiers with him when he went over to the Germans. Maritz arrested all the UDF officers and men under his command who were unwilling to join the Germans, and then sent them forward as prisoners into German South West Africa (GSWA).

Smuts sent Major Barend ‘Ben’ Bouwer over to deal with Maritz’ sedition and insubordination (both Bouwer and Maritz had served under Smuts in his Commando during Boer War 2 and he hoped Bouwer could reason with Maritz). Maritz however also promptly took Bouwer prisoner along with his fellow officers, he was subsequently released and sent back with the ultimatum from Maritz to the Union Government:

The ultimatum read that unless the Union Government guaranteed safe passage of his fellow plotting Generals (De Wet, Beyers, Kemp et al), to his position on the GSWA border by the 11th October he would immediately attack General Brits’ UDF forces preparing to invade GSWA and then he would invade the Union of South Africa.

Major Ben Bouwer reported that Maritz was in possession of some guns belonging to the Germans, and that he held the rank of General commanding the German troops. He also had a force of Germans under him in addition to his own rebel commando. 

To drive Maritz’ point home, Major Bouwer was shown an agreement between Maritz and the Governor of German South West Africa guaranteeing the independence of the Union as a Republic, ceding Walfish Bay and certain other portions of the Union to the Germans, and undertaking that the Germans would only invade the Union on the invitation of Maritz.

Major Bouwer was shown numerous telegrams and helio messages dating back to the beginning of September. Maritz boasted that he had ample guns, rifles, ammunition, and money from the Germans, and that he would overrun the whole of South Africa.

In response to Maritz’ action and ultimatum, on 12 October, the Union government imposed martial law across the whole of South Africa. On proclaiming martial law, Smuts, the eternal reconciler, immediately called again for “reason” and urged the rebels not to be swayed by “foreign agents influencing them”.

The ‘Boer Revolt’ or ‘Maritz Revolt’ or ‘Five Shilling Rebellion’ as it would also become known was underway, and with their sedition hand now played by Maritz in the Cape Colony, his fellow conspirators – Beyers, Kemp and de Wet had no choice, now ‘in for a penny and in for a pound’ they all broke their ties with the Union and went into open armed rebellion against their lawfully elected government – raising Commando’s primarily from the Transvaal and Orange Free State to come to Maritz’ aid.

The ‘Five Shillings Rebellion’ reference came about when de Wet, entered the town of Reitz on a recruitment drive, called together the inhabitants and said:

“I was charged before for beating a native boy. I only did it with a small shepherd’s whip, and for that I was fined 5/–”.

Hearing about the speech later, Jan Smuts referred to the rising as “the Five Shilling Rebellion” as a means of belittling the rebels, the baseless promises of wealth to the desperate and the aims of the revolt.

The stated objective: Maritz issued a proclamation by way of an objective:

 “The former South African Republic and Orange Free State as well as the Cape Province and Natal are proclaimed free from British control and independent, and every White inhabitant of the mentioned areas, of whatever nationality, are hereby called upon to take their weapons in their hands and realize the long-cherished ideal of a Free and Independent South Africa.”

In other words, to take by force, the former British Colonies and re-start the Boer War, resistance to the declaration by any “white” in the entire Union of South Africa would be treated by Maritz’ Provisional Government as treasonous. 

Sabre Waving

Generally in social media and web based articles on the Boer Revolt you get the impression that this was a significant military threat and social movement, but that’s not the case – in fact all these threats by Maritz as to invading South Africa, crushing the UDF’s intensions on invading GSWA, declaring a Afrikaner Republic under a white Boer hegemony with the aid of Germany are nothing more than ‘sabre waving’ – from a military doctrine perspective they are nothing more than unsubstantiated and baseless threats. 

So, let’s look at the military doctrine and establish what sort of threat from the rebels and Germany the South African Union defence force is facing, what’s the magnitude of the problem with regard the Boer Revolt that they have to deal with, what is the rebel forces calibre, construct and fighting capability? – Let’s look at the numbers.

To attain their objective, the Rebels raised 11,476 Boers. The South African Union Defence Force strength to ready itself for World War 1, all in, including all its reserves is 80,500 troops (without even considering the Rhodesian troops mustered for the GSWA campaign under South African command). That means the Boer Rebels are outnumbered on a ratio of 8 to 1. 

Military doctrine will always dictate that a force needs to be twice the size of the opposing force (2:1) if an effective ‘invasion’ is feasible and victory within grasp, more so (and more troops than a 2:1 advantage) if the intention is the occupation and annexation of a country. For the Boer Rebels to be successful in their object to defeat an 80,000 strong UDF they require a force of 160,000 men (that’s 3x more than the entire Boer Republican forces had in Boer War 2 which at their zenith numbered 40,000). 

Obviously, their hope and intention, albeit somewhat fanciful and arrogant, was that the UDF would capitulate with a mass walk out of all its Afrikaner demographic – estimated at some 50,000 odd people – but that simply did not happen. On an 8:1 ratio disadvantage the Boer Revolt stood absolutely no chance of success, even if this UDF number reduced sizeably there would still be at a disadvantage with almost no chance of success. 

But the intention was that Germany would combine with the Boere, the Germans in GSWA would join forces with the Boers right? We need to augment the numbers with German troops. Total German strength in GSWA is 3,000 odd well trained German Schutztruppe and 2,000 odd trained German militaria – about 5,000 in total. At best another 2,000 can be mustered from local Boere and German settlers in GSWA. If we add 7,000 German troops to the Boer Rebels’ 11,500 troops we get 18,500 troops MAX. Against the UDF’s 80,500 that still is nowhere near enough to affect a victorious outcome, they are still heavily outnumbered by 4 to 1. 

German ‘Camel Corps’ in German South West Africa

There is also no German expeditionary force from elsewhere making its way to GSWA, they are heavily committed to the European theatres of operations. Also, unlike in their East Africa colony, the German military in GSWA is unable to raise many local Askari black troops to augment their numbers, a hang-over from the Herero and Namaqua genocide which gives them no real traction with the black inhabitants of GSWA.

The idea that the Germans in GSWA could link up with a Boer Revolt (unless substantially supported) and invade South Africa is fanciful at best.

Now, let’s look at the Rebel Forces capability and make-up. It is important to note, the Rebel force was not made up entirely of first rate ex-UDF soldiers going against their counterparts, the rebel force was primarily made up of destitute Orange Free State Boers having come through a drought and agricultural reforms on the back of the devastation of their farms during Boer War 2. 

Many of these Free State Boers as has been pointed out by historians like Sandra Swart (Desperate Men: The 1914 Rebellion and the Polities of Poverty’ in South African Historical Journal, Vol 42) and John Bottomly (The Orange Free State and the Rebellion of 1914: the influence of industrialisation, poverty and poor whitism: pages 29-73), were simply desperate ‘Bywoners’ (landless farmers or share-croppers) promised a better life if the rebellion was successful.

Consider the statistics of the Boer rebels and from where they came, and you’ll see how the above statement holds true. 7,123 (62%) of the Boer Rebels came from the Orange Free State – the least populace, most rural and economically worse off province in the Union. As an aside, to gauge the extent of success of Maritz’ proclamation and its resonance across the broader Afrikaner community across the whole of South Africa, the rebel leaders were only able to motivate 1,215 (12%) of the Boer Rebels from the Cape province – the biggest province in the Union with the largest Afrikaans population. The balance coming from the Transvaal – which considering its very urbanised and significant population is negligible in the bigger scheme of the Transvaal’s demographic make-up, and no real support from Natal whatsoever.

The Potchefstroom Herald at the time best tried to explain why there was no traction behind the revolt from Cape Afrikaners and the black/brown African communities in this quote – and not surprisingly it boils down to the lack of suffrage and plain racism in the old Republics;

“When these high officers of the Defence Force in Transvaal and Orange “Free” State rebelled and joined the Germans with their commandos, the Dutchmen of the Cape (presumably because “they vote side by side with the Kafirs”) denounced the treachery in unmistakable terms. The South African party at the Cape beat up its followers to the support of the Government, and the voice of the Cape section of the Dutch Reformed Church rang from pulpit and platform in denunciation of disloyalty and treason. But in the Northern Provinces, where white men are pampered and guarded by the Government against the so-called humiliation of allowing native taxpayers to vote, there the rebellion, having been regarded with seeming approval, gained a marvellous impetus.

Plaatjie: The Boer Rebellion – snippet from the Potchefstroom Herald

As a unified, coherent, trained and fully armed force, the Rebel Boers were not. 

They were desperate and landless farmers in the main up against fully trained, motivated, even mechanised in some instances, and properly armed UDF soldiers who had an 8:1 numerical advantage. As noted earlier, in terms of doctrine the UDF under Jan Smuts’ design, command and control was focussed on effective deployment of combined arms in an enveloping role – all based on high manoeuvrability – up against this very modern military construct was a rebel force which only really consisted of ‘old school’ mounted infantry Commandos with ‘old school’ Boer command and control doctrine leading it – they had no light artillery support, no supply logistics to speak of, no armoured cars, no heavy guns, no machine guns and no motorised support – whereas the UDF had all of these. 

UDF armoured cars during GSWA campaign – 1914

In essence the Boer Rebels were using an outdated military doctrine originally intended to quell poorly armed Black African uprisings – a Commando, and it was simply complete folly to pitch such doctrine against a modern military using a doctrine of both combined arms and joint arms. The Rebels were simply no match and it quickly showed. 

Whilst still focussing much of the UDF’s resources on the invasion plans and logistics for the GSWA campaign, General Louis Botha would primarily use just the Rifle Associations to counteract the rebellion, insistent that the British ‘stay out of it’, this was going to be the Boer leaders sorting their differences out between themselves – so ‘Brother against Brother’ and in effect the UDF’s Afrikaners outnumbered the rebel Afrikaners 4 to 1. As also noted earlier, intrinsic in the UDF’s institutional memory and doctrine was the British idea of “hunting” Commandos using what was termed as a “flying column” of combined arms – a spill over of the British tactic from Boer War 2.

The long and short the rebellion was almost immediately repelled and then very quickly crushed as Botha’s UDF Rifle Associations with some Active Citizen Force elements in support used these ‘Flying Columns’ and effectively hunted the Rebel Commandos down as they tried to make their way to assist Maritz on the GSWA border. The revolt would last a couple of months only.

Image: The last pursuit of Major Kemp. A South African Union ‘Flying column’ crossing the Orange River after him.

Reconciliation

As Dr David Katz in his work ‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917) points out. Jan Smuts, eternally the one Boer General keeping a level head and seeking reconciliation and understanding, and when it was clear the rebellion had failed, Smuts called for a ‘Blanket Amnesty’ across the board for the Boer Rebel leaders and their troops if they laid down their arms. General Louis Botha, the Commander in Chief, on the other hand took a much harder and less reconciliatory line than his colleague – he was livid at the sheer betrayal, the sheer waste of lives, resources and time it took and the complete stupidity of it all – an unsupported revolt against a lawfully elected government with absolutely no chance of success. It was reported that he once joking said to Jan Smuts “Let’s face it Jannie, you’re no General!” By that he meant Smuts was far too reconciliatory and soft-hearted – as far as Louis Botha was concerned, under the edicts of martial law, all rebels, officers and men alike should be tried, the most treasonous of which, the leaders, put up against a wall and shot – even if they were all his old friends.

Smuts however persevered – Botha eventually agreed to an Amnesty, but for the rank and file only, the Boer Rebel leaders would have to be prosecuted. The amnesty, excluding the Rebel leadership, was in put place from 12th to 21st November 1914, and with it the 1914 Boer Rebellion was effectively over, by the end of November General de Wet’s force alone was down to only 40 men. Rear actions and isolated and desperate battles continued to be fought for a couple of months by woefully under-strength hard liners refusing surrender and amnesty, but by the end of January 1915 the rebellion was over.  

Of the Rebel leadership now having surrendered, Botha and Smuts would again be especially magnanimous, considering the Union was in a state of war externally and in a state of martial law internally – and this was 1914 ‘World War 1’ – people were put in front of firing squads for ‘cowardice’ and being AWOL (absent without leave) – let alone ‘sedition’ and ‘treason’. Smuts would treat the Rebels in general very kindly, literally with kid gloves, all the time urging reason, understanding and reconciliation.

General Christiaan Rudolf de Wet

Of the main rebel leaders, General Christiaan Beyers tragically drowned in the Vaal River whilst attempting to desperately evade capture on 8th December 1914. General Christiaan de Wet was captured during the amnesty and sentenced to six years imprisonment, with a fine of £2000, he was released by Botha and Smuts after one year’s imprisonment, after giving a written promise to take no further part in politics. 

Major Jan Kemp was captured on the 2nd of February 1915 and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment, with a fine of £1000. However, a mere 10 months into his sentence Botha and Smuts agreed to release him – also on the condition that he may not participate in any politics – a promise Kemp almost immediately broke entering politics as a National Party MP under Hertzog in 1920. Ironically he accompanied Hertzog and joined with Jan Smuts in the Fusion government, however by 1940, in opposition to South Africa entering WW2 against Nazi Germany, he joined the Reunited National Party until his death in 1946.

Lt. Colonel Manie Maritz would evade capture and escape into German South West Africa, at the conclusion of the GSWA campaign and the Union Defence Force’s victory and annexation of the territory (the first real victory for the Allies against Imperial Germany in WW1), Maritz would again evade capture, going into self-imposed exile in Angola, Spain, Portugal and then Mozambique. He would re-enter South Africa in 1923 and spend a couple of months in jail for treason, thereafter he would enter into politics as the leader of an antisemitic, one-party state, National Socialist (Nazi) inspired ‘Boerenasie’ party prior to World War 2. 

Jopie Fourie

Of all the other leaders – junior and mid-level rebel officers who were also captured. All were sentenced to short imprisonments and fines, almost all of them walking free within a year … except for just one man … Captain Jopie Fourie was executed for ‘High Treason’ having not resigned his UDF officers commission, captured still wearing his UDF officer’s uniform and opening fire on his fellow UDF troops whilst under a ‘white flag’ of truce – in one skirmish Jopie Fourie’s men shot dead Captain William Allan-King, the much loved and popular Native Affairs administrator, whilst he was attending to a wounded man. 

Retribution for William Allan-King was coming, many in the English, Native and Coloured communities wanted Jopie Fourie dead, the South African Union Defence Force wanted him dead, many Afrikaners related to or who had affiliation to the Afrikaner UDF men he killed wanted him dead … and this was WW1 and Martial Law after all – there was no way anyone could get him out of this one with a no-nonsense leader like General Louis Botha as Prime Minister and in charge of stays of execution – not just one but on three distinctive charges of high treason, not in a month of Sundays was this possible – a story on Jopie needs a little more space – so follow this Observation Post link to Jopie’s story: What about Jopie?

To pay for all their fines the Bloemfontein newspaper ‘Het Volksblad’ established the ‘Halfkroonfonds’ (Half-a-Crown Fund). Shop owners and other people whose property had been damaged during the rebellion were able to claim compensation, leading to the establishment of the Helpmekaar Beweging (the Help-One-Another Movement). By the end of 1917, all the debts were paid.

Of the handling of the 1914 Boer Revolt, Louis Botha would summarise Smuts role and leadership, when he said of him;

“Nobody can appreciate sufficiently the great work General Smuts has done – greater than any man throughout this unhappy period. At his post day and night, his brilliant intellect, his calm judgement, his amazing energy and his undaunted courage have been assets of inestimable value to the Union in her hour of trial.”

As a rebellion with any chance of success consider just what a small minority they represented – no Cape Province or Natal Afrikaner would really come near it (and the majority of Afrikaners lived in the Cape), of the Afrikaners in the Transvaal and OFS they were unable to raise an effective fighting force, the vast majority of Afrikaners in the armed forces remained in the UDF, the vast majority of Afrikaner political leaders remained behind Botha and Smuts and they gained no traction whatsoever to raise anything from the Black and Coloured communities (the real ‘vast’ majority) – no “Askari” troops whatsoever, and they got no support whatsoever from the white South Africans of British decent – who by way of ‘white’ population were not insignificant in size (about 40% of the white population total), the ‘English’ whites commanding massive swathes of white population groups in the Transvaal (most of Johannesburg and the reef), Natal (most of Durban) and the Cape Colony (especially in Cape Town and the Eastern Cape). 

What if?

Now we can ask the question “what if the Rebellion took traction?” What next? Assuming the UDF internally imploded and a 10,000 strong Boer army with a 7,000 strong German army in support could annex the whole of South Africa, however implausible – consider the scale of white, coloured and black population groups that would resist it.

Also consider the British reaction to it, the probability that a couple of thousand mounted infantrymen, lightly armed, could take British held ports like Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Durban or their Naval Base in Simonstown. As a modern military construct, the UDF at this stage ops out of developing a Navy of its own because the Royal Navy provides this service to the UDF on the back of operating their Simonstown Base as sovereign British territory. As a ‘joint arm’ to the UDF construct the Royal Navy is an incredibly powerful instrument.

HMS Goliath – pre-dreadnaught class, extensive use during the East Africa Campaign.

The Royal Navy is Britain’s true military might, and it’s the world’s undisputed naval power – a very big hitter, in 1914 it’s bigger than the French and American navies combined. For the British in 1914 the ‘Army’ is very secondary to the control of its trading empire worldwide – the primary tool is the Navy. Defending (and even assaulting) ports is what the Royal Navy does, it’s their speciality and just one British battleship has more firepower on it than the entire Boer Rebel army combined – think about that.

Also, to consider with the hindsight of history, what would Britain do to re-establish its influence in Southern Africa with a rebel Boer Republic (with German backing) now declared – incorporating hundreds of thousands of people who consider themselves British subjects or under British protectorate, citizens and subjects who want nothing to do with the racist constructs of Boer Republicanism. Indeed, what would Britain do … it would, when the opportunity arose, return its Expeditionary Force to South Africa and simply take the country back – only this time it would have the benefit of all the technological advances of World War 1 – tanks, chemical warfare, fighter aircraft, bomber aircraft etc. 

Also, as Germany was defeated in WW1, an unsupported Boer Republican government would not hold out and Britain would have to intervene by 1918. The question then is how would the Boer nation hold out? As a population the Boer nation was devastated by the South African War (1899-1902) and they had no armaments industry, with a renewed British military intervention and all the new technology of warfare available to them, the Boer nation would simply not survive the onslaught. 

But – you may ask, the Boere did manage to get a ‘white’ Republic for themselves in 1948 without the support of Germany, and Britain didn’t invade – so it’s possible right? Again, this is after WW1 – not WW2, Britain is still an Imperial Empire and a colonial power, at the heart of which are its ‘Dominions’ – of which South Africa is one, and a key one at that (the other ‘Dominions’ are Ireland, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). In any event, look at how Dr. H.F. Verwoerd’s ‘Keep South Africa White’ Republic worked out in the end. 

To Jan Smuts (and Louis Botha), the idea that a Boer Republic could be resurrected ended with the Boer War, South Africa was now intertwined as a British and Boer construct – Union had seen to that, and all the Boer war leaders had sworn an oath to uphold it, they had given their word (Smuts would remark that a nation who goes back on its word is not a nation at all). 

Smuts would also take an almost paternal approach to his much loved nation and try and gently try to steer the Boer nation away from inflicting more harm on itself, he would however consistently be thwarted by a minority of Afrikaners on the rump of Afrikanerdom, who against all odds are blindly bent on re-instating a Boer Republic with its intensive racially driven constructs (based on Krugerism) over the whole of South Africa and they are also wholeheartedly bent on supporting Germany – through both its Imperial and subsequent Nazi manifestations.

Conclusion 

In the end the Boer Revolt did little in terms of its military objectives, it managed to delay the invasion plans of GSWA for a couple of months only whilst the UDF dealt with it, however in the end the GSWA campaign was a decisive victory for the Union and the territory successfully annexed under ‘Greater South Africa’ in a trusteeship – as was the Union’s expressed casus belli for entering the war. 

As has been statistically proven – the Boer Revolt did NOT evoke a widespread desire from the Afrikaner community in the greater South Africa for a Boer Republic with Germany as its supporter. The Boer Revolt did NOT reflect the sentiment of the majority of the Afrikaans community nor that of the majority of its leaders. The Boer Revolt did NOT inspire the old Boer War Commando system and the majority of Afrikaner fighting men to join with it, in fact they did the opposite. The Boer Revolt also did NOT compromise the Union Defence Force in any way, shape or form whatsoever. 

From a military doctrine perspective, The Boer Revolt was poorly planned and poorly executed. The rebels were always going to be woefully outnumbered with completely insufficient firepower to do the task expected of them – in truth they had no chance of success – zero. The use of outdated mounted infantry doctrine against a modern military construct using combined and joint arms with a mobility ethos was also only ever going to end in a disaster for the rebels. In truth, not one single critical military objective of the Boer Revolt was met.

What the 1914 Boer Revolt did however do was plant the seeds for political division and is one of the key propaganda tools used by the Nationalists to create the deep split in Afrikaner outlooks. Louis Botha would look at the Rebellion as complete folly, a waste of time and an utter waste of life – a sort of Boer equivalent of the Charge of the Light Brigade, with the same disastrous consequence. Botha’s political opponents would look at it rather romantically instead – a sort of ‘Boer Last Stand’. It stands today in some Afrikaner communities, precisely because of its ‘Romanticism’ and ‘political currency’ and not because of its military prowess or even its unattainable objectives. 


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

References: 

Statistics, data and references sourced from the following:

Eben Nel; ‘Kaapse rebelle van die Hantam-karoo’

Dr David Brock Katz; ‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917’

Dr Evert Kleynhans and Dr David Brock Katz; ’20 Battles – searching for a South African Way of War 1913 – 2013’

Sandra Swart; ‘Desperate Men: The 1914 Rebellion and the Polities of Poverty’ 

John Bottomly; ‘The Orange Free State and the Rebellion of 1914: the influence of industrialisation, poverty and poor whitism’

André Wessels; Afrikaner (Boer) Rebellion (Union of South Africa) 2018.

Brian Bunting; ‘The Rise of the Afrikaner Reich’

John C.G. Röhl: ‘The Kaiser and England during the Boer War’

Plaatje: Chapter XXIII The Boer Rebellion

Related Work:

A Differing Outlook – Smuts and Maritz A differing outlook

Union to Banana Republic From Union to Banana Republic!

The Story of Jopie Fourie What about Jopie?

Colourised images with greatest thanks and appreciation to Jennifer Bosch – Jenny B Colourised online:

A rare spot!

The rarely spotted … giraffe camouflage.

A while back, as the Chairman of the South African Legion in the United Kingdom, I was involved in the return of Peter McAleese’s South African Defence Force nutria ‘Slangvel’ (parabat smock) to him. For jump qualified ‘Parabats’ (Airborne Infantry) this smock is a prize item, and the South African one, the ‘slangvel’ (snake-skin) as it is fondly known, is a little unique because of reinforced sections sewn onto it – elbows and shoulders mainly to deal with all the chute and other strappings, keeping them tight and to prevent wear. The ‘brown’ nutria slangvel is a collectors favourite and very sought after.

Nutria was the preferred uniform of the SADF, basically just ‘brown’ – the developers of nutria argued that in the harsh African sun after 50 meters you are an un-definable blob to the naked eye anyway, ‘nutria’ brown as a single colour was versatile enough in the African surrounds to provide sufficient camouflage when needed – so no need for camouflage stripes or dots – and so the SADF was just about everything ‘brown’, including vehicle camouflage – one colour, and that made economic sense.

Images: Peter McAleese in his SADF nutria ‘slangvel’ and Sean Renard returning it to him.

Somehow Peter’s ‘nutria’ ‘slangvel’ smock found itself in the wild and and fellow South African Legion – Legionnaire, Sean Renard found it in Europe on auction, bought it and on the 16th July 2015 decided to give it back to Peter at his book launch at the Oriental Club in London with the aid of Cameron Kinnear – another Legionnaire. Sean proudly and selflessly handing it over to him – the epitome of the Legion in action and its members.

Now, not only is that a rare spot, but Peter McAleese is also a rare spot for collectors of militia – and that’s because he’s also seen wearing a very rare ‘Giraffe Patten’ Camouflage uniform in some of his SADF period photos whilst with the SA Army’s 44 Parachute Brigade and Pathfinder Reconnaissance Unit. The ‘Giraffe’ slangvel smock he is seen wearing (as opposed to his nutria one) is incredibly rare.

Images: Peter McAleese in the rare experimental ‘Giraffe Patten’ camo

In fact it’s a holy grail for people collecting military items like uniform pieces, badges, headgear, rank and insignia .. it’s even considered one of the rarest examples of a camouflage used by any military force in the world .. it’s that rare.

So, what’s the fuss all about?

When and why the SADF come up with this ‘holy grail’ camouflage uniform. Not everything here is confirmed, this uniform was developed in a shroud of secrecy for special forces units alone. The South Africa special forces units tended to have a little more latitude in their choice of weapons, equipment and uniform (and even bearing) and many of their operations are still clouded in secrecy – so not surprisingly folklore and unsubstantiated stories have come to surround them. I may be wrong but here’s what we know about this uniform.

About 80 or so ‘Giraffe Patten’ camouflage uniforms were issued between 1980 and 1982 to the Pathfinders of the 1 Parachute Battalion of the 44 Parachute Brigade. The camouflage is a two-tone colour – one brown, one off white and draws inspiration from the Reticulated Giraffe. In testing the patten proved unremarkable and not effective enough and therefore did not enter broad service. It was however used by special forces and some rare photos exist of it being used in the field. Rumour has it that Colonel Jan Breytenbach, then the Officer Commander of the 44 Parachute Brigade, ordered that all the uniforms be destroyed .. except one. This one uniform ultimately landed up with a Private collector in the USA (via a Private collector in France).

However, at some stage, a limited array of uniform items – about 12 uniforms consisting of bush-hats, slangvels, shirts and pants were re-printed using the Giraffe Patten, in the correct SADF style, and these made it into ‘collectors’ circulation – although not original, the person who manufactured and sold the items decided to keep them limited to keep collectors value – so they are pretty rare and sought after too.

Images: Rare use of the giraffe camo and the Reticulated Giraffe

No mean soldier

Now to someone very rare and who is very genuine – the subject of the camouflage – Peter McAleese, Peter is a legend in South African military circles.

Born 7 September 1942, he served in the British Army’s Parachute Regiment and Special Air Service (SAS), the Rhodesian Special Air Service and British South Africa Police, and then subsequently as a Sergeant Major in South Africa’s 44 Parachute Brigade during the Border War. As a mercenary or contractor, he worked in countries including South Africa, Angola, Colombia, Russia, Algeria and Iraq.

He’s written two books ‘No Mean Soldier’ and ‘Beyond No Mean Soldier’ (both available on-line) – there are precious few like him around today, a real soldier’s soldier and it was a privilege for me to meet him, and for the South African Legion to recover his nutria smock for him.


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

Swart Gevaar …  Wit Gevaar 

This article has been a long time in coming because it’s really a simple soldier’s story … it’s mine … and I’m a real son-of-a-bitch to consolidate myself with and as such this has been very hard to put together. However, I hope it gives some insight into what it was like to serve in the South African Defence Force (SADF) from the unbanning of the ANC and release of Nelson Mandela on 11 February 1990 to the landmark year for the transformation of South Africa’s democracy in April 1994. 

It’s also a testament and a cathartic exercise, as … ta da! No surprise to anyone who knows me personally and what I went through with Covid 19, but I was diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). So, no surprise on the Covid front, but it’s the root of the PTSD that’s the real problem, and it boils down to my time in the SADF from 1990 to 1994, it settled on ‘Trust’ or lack thereof really.

“Ag Fok man! No more PTSD G3/K3 Fucked Up Kak” some of my fellow veteran buddies may jump to, heck at one stage I felt the same. But bear with me ‘manne’, this is not a ‘outreach’ or a ‘call for help’ .. I’m solid, in good spirits and very stable (more on this later). What my therapy disclosed is in fact a very interesting bit of history not often held up in the narrative of 1994 and it possesses a load of inconvenient truths, that’s what this story is really all about. So, here goes;

Wit en Swart Gevaar (White and Black Danger)

In 1990 Whilst the now ‘unbanned’ African National Congress (ANC) was finding its political feet and locating itself to ‘Shell House’ near Bree Street in Johannesburg, I was located at Witwatersrand Command’s new HQ Building – also in Bree Street a block away – the nearby old HQ at the bottom of Twist Street called the ‘Drill Hall’ had been all but abandoned after it was bombed by a ‘lone’ ANC cadre – who oddly was a ‘white Afrikaner’ from a top Upper Middle Class Afrikaans school, Linden High School, and who had some serious ‘Daddy issues’ with his Conservative father and upbringing. With the building now declared ‘unsafe’ the HQ had moved next door. Here begins my problem in trying to define the enemy – as we had been conditioned by the old Afrikaner Nationalists and in the SADF that the ‘enemy’ was a ‘Swart Gevaar’ (Black Danger) and a ‘Rooi Gevaar’ (Communist Red Danger) – not a ‘Wit Gevaar’ (White Danger) with a Upper Middle-Class sense of Liberalism as the bomber in question, Hein Grosskopf, was.

So, here I am, a freshy minted National Serviceman ‘one-pip’ Loot ( 2nd Lieutenant or Subaltern) seconded to Wit (Witwatersrand) Command Operations (Ops) from my initial placement at D-Ops (Directive Operations) located in a underground circular shafted ‘nuclear proof’ building in Pretoria called Blenny, the building whose Top Secret Ops room looked like a scene out of Dr Strangelove had its entry bunker located near the Pretoria Prison. This underground building is now falling derelict as a SAAF HQ, in my time the personnel stationed there were known as the ‘Blenny rats’ for obvious reasons, and funnily I can count myself as one.  

My job at Wit Command (not ‘Wits’ Command mind – that designation was for the nearby University) was to provide Operation Support and send Top Secret daily SITREP (situation reports) from Wit Command to D Ops at Blenny, or just been a ‘Bicycle’ as my fellow senior officers called ‘one pip’ 2nd Lieutenants (you can ‘trap’ i.e. peddle/stamp on a bicycle), the lowest rung on the officer rank profile. 

Whilst parking in my cushy post in the Ops room in September 1990 processing a whack of casualties reported on Johannesburg’s railway lines as the ANC dealt with ‘sellouts’ by throwing them off the commuter trains, the Railways Police and Army Group 18 collecting the corpses and sending reports to me for the daily SITREP and suddenly ‘bang’ another bomb blast (more like a muffled ‘thump’ actually), this one a couple of city blocks away in nearby Doornfontein and the target is the old Beeld Newspaper Offices, the bomb later turned out to be placed by the Orde Boerevolk – one of the spin-off militant White Supremacist Groups. Swart Gevaar suddenly turned Wit Gevaar again. Luckily nobody killed.

This ‘White’ Danger did not end there for me that month. Being a ‘bicycle’, 2nd Lieutenant I was given the shift nobody wanted, the weekend shift in the Ops room, the ‘Commandants’ (Lt. Colonels – and there were loads of them in Army Ops), were all at home enjoying their braai’s and brander’s. It was a 24 hour on – 48 hour off gig with no brass around so I enjoyed it. Late on a Saturday night, its all quite and I’m stretched out on a cot behind the signaller’s station watching TV and enjoying my lekker time in the ‘Mag’ when a white Ford Cortina pulled up in Bree Street, four white men in the car, out step two, one of them wearing a AWB arm band hangs back standing watch and the other walks up to the entrance of Wit Command and calmy shoots a 21 Battalion sentry on duty in the reception in the head.  

21 (Two-One) Battalion was a ethnic Black Battalion – the SADF was ethnically funny that way, so this was basically a white extremist shooting a black SADF troop as a terror attack. I hear the gunshot, then get a frantic call from the guard room. There is no medic support and only one other officer on the base, so I grab a hand-held radio and the emergency medic bag and give instructions to the signaller to stay on the radio and relay messages. The troopie is fortunately alive, the bullet having passed through his jaw as he flinched away from his attacker’s gun. I patch him up with bandages from the medical kit bag and radio the signaller to call an emergency medical evacuation. I then issue an order to the 21 Battalion Guard Commander to double the guard, take note from witnesses as to what happened and then back to my post to disturb my senior officer’s weekend. ‘Wit Gevaar’ had struck Wit Command again.

Image : AWB Clandestine paramilitary

Given the general carnage in the country created by the AWB, the Inkata Freedom Party (IFP) and African National Congress (ANC) at this time it did not take long for the ANC version of ‘Swart Gevaar’ and it would hit me directly again about two weeks later in October 1990 when I received a desperate call over the Ops room phone from an ANC informant, his cover blown and an angry ANC mob had turned up outside his house in Soweto. I was unable to get an extraction to him in the time that it took for the mob to break down the door and the line go dead after I had to listen to his desperate pleading to me for help, the Police picked up his body later.  The dismissive and rather racist attitude of one of the other officers present to the whole incident  .. “just another kaffir.”

Shortly after that in October ANC ‘danger’ turned to IFP ‘danger,’ same scenario I’m sat on the weekend in the Ops room enjoying my cushy 24 hours on 48 hours off. This incident strangely happened on a Sunday afternoon, so again the Command is relatively silent manned only by a skeleton staff. Odd for a Sunday, but a small group of IFP supporters banishing traditional weapons (deadly spears and pangas in reality) had made its way down Twist Street from Hillbrow and was making its way past the old Drill Hall to Bree Street, which, as it was still a SADF installation had a group of 21 Battalion guards staying in it.  One troop was casually standing outside having a smoke, and I don’t know if it was a ethnic retaliation of Zulu sentiment for a Black SADF troop, but in any event, he got attacked – hit by a panga as he lifted his arms to prevent a killing blow.  

Same drill as previous – no medics around and only 2 officers on the base, grab radio to relay instructions, grab bomb bandages, immediately double the guard, relay instructions to my signaller. I get to the troop and start bandaging him up, however as the panga had severed veins and done other general carnage in both his arms it took some bomb bandages and applied pressure to get it the bleeding under control before an ambulance arrived. 

Image: Inkata Freedom Party member taunts a black SADF soldier

He lived, but the strange bit for me, next morning – Monday early, I had been up all night and my uniform was covered in blood. The Commandant, whose lekker branders and braai weekend I had once again disturbed, came in earlier than expected at 06:30am, called me in ‘on orders’, and whilst ‘kakking me out’ from high told me I was derelict in my duty for not wearing barrier gloves when treating a casualty, who, as he was a black man (and to his racially ‘verkrampt’ mind) he would likely have AIDS, thus I was endangering myself as government property. That there were no barrier gloves around was not an excuse – and as some sort of punitive measure, he then instructed me to attend the morning parade on the open ground on the Command’s car park (as Ops Officers we had usually been excluded from it). I objected on the basis that I could not change my uniform in time, but he would have none of it.  

So, there I stood, an officer on parade covered in blood from saving yet another lowly regarded ‘black’ troopie, watching the sun come up over a Johannesburg skyline on a crisp clear day (if you’ve lived in Johannesburg, you’ll know what this is like, it’s the town’s only redeeming factor – it’s stunning) all the time thinking to my myself “this is one fucked up institution.”  

There were more instances of the random nature of violence at the time, I was called to and attended to the stabbing of a woman (later criticised by a Commandant for calling a emergency ambulance for a mere ‘civilian’) – she had a very deep stab wound about two inches above her mons pubis into her lower intestines which looked pretty bad to me, so I called it and I have no regrets. I was also called to help with a off duty white troop who staggered into the Command late Saturday night with a blunt trauma to the back of the skull and subsequently pissed himself and went into shock.

Oh, and if the general populace wasn’t bad enough, then there were the ‘own team’ military ‘idiots’ which posed a danger all of their own, my first ‘Padre’ call out as an Ops officer was for a troop shot dead by his buddy playing around with his 9mm side-arm, and some months later on after a morning parade walking back to the Bree Street building I had to deal with an accidental discharge gunshot in the guardroom of the old Drill Hall which saw two troops with severe gunshot wounds (a conscript Corporal in counter-intelligence decided to check R4 assault rifles standing on their bi-pods on the ground, one discharged taking off a big chunk of his calf muscle which was in front of the muzzle, the bullet then entering both legs of a 21 Battalion guard standing opposite him).

One thing was very certain to me … everyone, black and white .. from white right wing Afrikaners to left wing English and Afrikaner whites .. to militant and angry Zulus, Tswanas and Xhosas and just about everyone in between was a threat to my life whilst in uniform. These instances whilst serving as an Ops officer would later serve as the basis of stressor trigger during my Covid experience. To me in 1990 there was no such thing as a ‘friendly’, extreme racism, danger and hate coursed in all directions and the old Nationalist idea of the ‘Gevaar’ was a crock of shit.

Wit Command Citizen Force

On finishing my National Service (NS) stint, I immediately landed up in my designated Citizen Force Unit, 15 Reception Depot (15 OVD/RCD) which was part of Wit Command and basically handled the bi-annual National Service intakes and call-ups (reserve forces included). It also provided surplus personnel to assist in Wit Command’s administration, and that included Operations and Intelligence work. By 1991, I was back doing ‘camps’ and had impressed my new Commanding Officer (CO) enough to earn my second ‘pip’ and now I was a substantiated Full Lieutenant, an officer good and proper. I had previously keenly jumped at a role as a Convoy Commander escorting raw SADF recruits to their allocated training bases. 

Images of Nasrec NSM intakes circa 1990-1993. Photo of Lt. Col Mannie Alho (then a Captain) and Miss South Africa, Michelle Bruce at an intake courtesy Mannie Alho.

These were ‘fully armed’ operations as NSM intakes were regarded as a ‘soft’ and very ‘public’ target, of much value for an act of terrorism. As such each convoy needed an armed escort with a lot of Intelligence and logistics support. If you need to know how dangerous – consider how many times a recruitment station has been bombed in the Iraq and/or Afghanistan conflicts. I volunteered for the furthest and most difficult escort as the Convoy Commander – the bi-annual call up to 8 South African Infantry Battalion in Upington (8 SAI). My ‘escort’ troops were made up of Wit Command reservists, some from Personal Services but most of them with Infantry Battalion backgrounds, Border War veterans in the main and highly experienced. 

1994

By 1994 I had really earned my spurs doing ‘long distance’ Convoy Command. In early 1993 my CO – Lt. Col Mannie Alho had seen enough potential in me to kick me off to do a ‘Captain’s Course’ at Personal Services School at Voortrekkerhoogte in Pretoria. At the beginning of 1994 Colonel Alho called me in, handed me a promotion to Captain and gave me his old Captain’s ‘bush pips’ epaulettes he had in his drawer – a gesture and epaulettes I treasure to this day.

Images: … erm, me – in case anyone is wondering why the ‘Bokkop’ (Infantry beret), I started off at 5 SAI, then PSC, then back in an infantry role in Ops.

At this time around Wit Command, a number of significant things happened involving all of us in 15 RCD to some degree or other – some less so, others more so. It was a BIG year. In all, these instances would really question who the enemy was in any soldier’s mind serving in the ‘old’ SADF at that time. 

The Reserve Call-Up – 1994

Firstly, the call up of the SADF Reserve in the Witwatersrand area to secure the country for its democratic transformation. Generally, in 1994 the SADF was running out of National Servicemen – the ‘backbone’ of the SADF, the annual January and July intake of ‘white’ conscripts had dwindled alarmingly. Generally, the white public saw the writing on the wall as to the end of Apartheid and the end of whites-only conscription program and simply refused to abide their national service call-ups. 

As to the ‘Permanent Force’ (PF), the professional career element of the SADF, many senior officers (and a great many Commandants) along with warrant officers and some senior NCO’s took an early retirement package. They had seen the writing on the wall as to their role in the Apartheid security machine and felt they had been ‘sold out’ by the very apparatus they had sworn their allegiance to. Some would head into politics in the Conservative Party, others would join the AWB structure and other ‘Boerevolk’ resistance movements and some took their Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) amnesty’s and quietly retired. Others would just bow out honourably, their time done. Nearly all of them totally fed up with FW De Klerk and his cabal and feeling utterly betrayed by them – even to this day, and I meet many in military veteran circles. 

As to the other part of the SADF ‘backbone’ of which I was one – the Citizen Force, then made up almost exclusively of ‘white’ ex-National Service members now undertaking their ten odd years of ‘camp’ commitments. In 1994, it was on the cards that a future ‘whites only’ conscription would be stopped, but the problem was a great many soldiers would be needed to stop the country falling into a violent abyss and continuing its journey to a free fully democratic election. To keep up with resourcing requirements, the government contested that ‘whites only’ conscripts who had completed their National Service and were now serving in citizen force Regiments and Commandos must continue to do so and attend their call ups (or risk being fined). 

Many were simply sick and tired of the situation; they had done their ‘Border Duty’ and ‘Townships’ and had seen the writing on the wall. They knew the Citizen Force structures would be toothless trying to enforce the camp call-ups and ‘fines’. Many just didn’t bother with a camp call up and just wanted to get on with their professional and family lives. A small few however split their loyalty on political grounds and made their way into the AWB and other Boerevolk Armed Resistance movements instead.

Images: AWB Training – note the use of parts of SADF ‘Browns’ uniform

However, and this is a truism, a great many of these active reservists (the vast majority) stayed on out of sheer loyalty to serve their country no matter what, and to serve their comrades (a powerful bond of brotherhood develops when you serve) and to execute their mandates as well trained and professional military personnel. It was to this element of the Citizen Force that the government would ultimately turn to for help and implore them to volunteer to steer the country to democracy. Even the old ‘End Conscription Campaign’ anti-apartheid movement moved to support the ‘camper call up’ for the 1994 general elections.

Personally, I found the SADF military personnel moving to join the AWB and other White Supremist groupings very disappointing as I honestly believe they were hoodwinked and misled. Whilst serving in the SADF, the AWB presented itself as a very distinct enemy and they had no problems targeting the SADF – of that I had first-hand experience, so very little doubt. I find myself often in military veteran circles in contact with some of these veterans and must say I still find it difficult to reconcile with them.  

The country’s military also can’t just ‘sommer’ fall apart when a new political party is elected, the loyalty and oath on my officer’s commission is not party political it’s to the State. As a soldier, acting against the State is an act of sedition and all it did was show up these SADF soldiers as loyal to political causes, in this case the National Party’s Apartheid policy and not to the country per se, the military, or their fellow comrades-in-arms still in the military. Having any of them on the ‘inside’ at this time simply qualified them in my eyes as yet another form of ‘Wit Gevaar’.

To secure the transition of the country to its new democratic epoch, CODESA (the Committee overseeing the establishment of a new constitution and transition of power) proposed the National Peacekeeping Force (NPK), a hastily assembled force consisting of SADF soldiers, some ‘Bantustan’ Defence Force soldiers and ANC MK cadres, to conduct peace-keeping security operations and secure the 1994 election. The NPK was a disaster, SADF officers complained of the very poor battle form and discipline, especially of the ANC ‘cadres’ and pointed to basic cowardice. All this materialised in the accidental shooting and killing of the world renown press photographer, Ken Oosterbroek by a NPK member nervously taking cover behind journalists advancing on a IFP stronghold. The NPK was finally confined to barracks in disgrace and quietly forgotten about (even to this day).

Images: National Peacekeeping Force in Johannesburg and surrounds

So, it was the old SADF that would have to do the job of taking the country into democracy. I was at the Command when this news came in on the NPK, and I must say I was very relieved, I felt we had been held back ‘chomping at the bit’ literally, and this was our opportunity to shine. It was the opportunity for all involved in the SADF at the time to redeem its image so badly battered by its association to Apartheid and the controversial decision in the mid 80’s to deploy the SADF in the Townships against an ‘internal enemy’ (protesting South African citizens in reality) as opposed to the ‘Rooi Gevaar’ enemy on the Namibia/Angola border (MPLA, SWAPO and Cuban Troops). Added to this were the emerging confessions of political assassinations by Civil Co-Operation Bureau (CCB) members, a SADF clandestine ‘black-ops’ group off the hinge and operating outside the law. 

The decreasing pools of experienced SADF soldiers, the increasing violence between ANC and IFP supporters, the substantial increase in attacks and bombings by armed ‘Boerevolk’ white supremacist movements like the AWB and others, and the disaster that was the ‘National Peacekeeping Force’ and its disbandment; all forced CODESA and the FW de Klerk government to call-up the SADF’s National Reservists. This was done to boost troop numbers and inject experience into the ranks, take over where the NPK left off, and secure the country’s democratic transition and elections.

A Reception Depots primary role is ‘mustering’ and this does not matter if it’s a citizen recruit for Military Service – conscript or volunteer or the mustering of the country’s National Citizen Force Reserve. The mustering of the SADF Reserve in Johannesburg took place at Group 18 (Doornkop) Army Base near Soweto and as 15 Reception Depot I was there with our officer group to process the call-ups, see to their uniform and kit needs and forward these Reservists to their designated units to make them ‘Operational’. 

Operational Citizen Force members in Johannesburg and surrounds during 1994

Swaggering around the hanger rammed full of reservists, as a newly minted Captain and trying to look important, I was tasked with dealing with a handful of reservists who had abided the call-up but turned up wearing civilian clothes and no ‘balsak’ kitbag and uniforms in sight. The Army regulations at time allowed National Servicemen to demobilise but they had to keep their uniforms in case they are called back. I was to send them to the Quarter Master Hanger to get them kitted out again but had to ask what they did with their uniforms. Expecting a “I got fat and grew out of it” or “the gardener needed it more” I got a response I did not expect. They all destroyed or disposed of their SADF uniforms – three said they had even ceremonially burned their uniforms when they left the SADF they hated serving in it so much. All of them said; despite this, for this occasion, the securing of a new dawn democracy, for this they would gladly return and serve again, they just needed new browns. It got me thinking, and I felt we were really standing on the precipice of history and as ‘men of the hour’ we were going a great thing.  We were the men who, at an hour of great need, had heeded the call to serve the country, and we were to advance human kind and deliver full political emancipation to all South Africans, regardless of race, sex or culture…. heady stuff indeed! 

Images: SADF Citizen Force members guarding polling stations and securing ballots during the 1994 election.

A very ‘Noble Call’ and I felt very privileged and excited at the time that I was involved in such an undertaking, I felt like my old ‘Pops’ (Grandfather) did when the country called for volunteers to fight Nazism in World War 2. We were most certainly on a great precipice.

I don’t want to get into the “look at it now” as I type this in 2022 during Stage 5 loadshedding. That was not the issue in 1994, the ANC miss-management and plundering of the country of its finances decades later was not on the cards then, what was on the cards was the disbandment of an oppressive political regime looking after a tiny sect of Afrikaner Nationalists and in the interests of a minority of white people only, and one which was trampling on the rights of just about everyone else. The idea of a country, a ‘rainbow nation’ with one of the most liberated constitutions in the world was paramount at the time, and I’m very proud of my role in this (albeit small), my UNITAS medal for my role in all this still sits proudly on my medal rack.

Newspaper at the time capturing the mutual confidence in the future of a ‘new South Africa’ and avoiding ‘the abyss.’

These ‘white’ ex-conscript reservists guarded election booths, gave armed escort to ballot boxes, patrolled the ‘townships’ keeping APLA, ANC, IFP and AWB insurgents away from killing people – black and white in the hopes of disrupting the election. If you think this was a rather ‘safe’ walk in the park gig, the ‘war’ or ‘struggle’ was over, think again. I accompanied Group 42 soldiers later in an armoured convoy into Soweto and it was hair raising to say the least. Which brings me to the next incident in 1994.

The Shell House Massacre – 1994

As noted, earlier Shell House was located a block away from Wit Command and was the ANC’s Head Office in the early 90’s (Letuli House came later). On the 28 March 1994, IFP supporters 20,000 in number marched on the ANC Head Office in protest against the 1994 elections scheduled for the next month. A dozen ANC members opened fire on the IFP crowd killing 19 people, ostensibly on the orders of Nelson Mandela.  SADF soldiers from Wit Command mainly reservists and national servicemen were called to the scene, on arrival, to save lives they put themselves between the ANC shooters and the IFP supporters and along with the South African Police brought about calm and an end to the massacre. 

I was not there that day, but some of my colleagues at Wit Command were and all of them would experience ‘elevated’ stress and take a hard line, fully armed response when it came to dealing with protests, especially on how quickly they could go pear shaped. This would permeate to all of us in our dealings with this kind of protesting (more on this later). If you think this incident was yet another in many at this time, note the photo of the dead IFP Zulu man, shot by an ANC gunman, his shoes taken off for his journey to the after-life, and then note the three very nervous but determined SADF servicemen from Wit Command putting themselves in harm’s way to prevent more death.

Images: Shell House Massacre

The Bree Street bombing and 1994 Johannesburg terrorist spree

Not even a few weeks after the Shell House Massacre, the ANC HQ on the same little patch on Bree Street as Wit Command was to be hit again, and this time it was as destruction outside Shell House was on an epic level. 

The bomb went off on 24th April 1994 near Shell-house on Bree Street and was (and still is) regarded as the largest act of bombing terrorism in Johannesburg’s history’. It was part of a bombing spree focussed mainly around Johannesburg which left 21 people dead and over 100 people with injuries between April 24 and April 27, 1994. The worst and most deadly campaign of terrorist bombings in the history of the city. 

And … it was not the ANC, nope, my old enemy in 1990 had reappeared with vengeance, it was ‘Wit Gevaar,’ it was the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) again. Luckily, I was not at our HQ at Wit Command when the bomb went off, however I was there afterward to see the carnage – the whole city block was sheer destruction – everywhere.

The thunderous blast of a 150 pounds of explosives set off at 09:50 am left a waist-deep crater in the street about midway between the national and regional headquarters of the African National Congress, shattered glass and building structures for blocks and lacerated scores of passers-by on the quiet Sunday streets and residents in the surrounding high-rise buildings. It was the deadliest blast of its kind in South Africa since 1983.

Images: AWB Bree Street Bombing

A total of 7 people were dead in Bree Street, mostly by-standers and civilians from all racial and ethnic groups and 92 people in total were injured.  The only reason behind the low death toll is that the bomb went off (and was planned) for a Sunday when the streets were relatively empty. Even though it was a Sunday, members of the Army from Wit Command, SAP and especially SADF Medics quickly moved in to secure the bomb blast area and treat the wounded.

The AWB bombing campaign did not stop there, it continued at pace, the very next day on April 25 a bomb was placed in a trailer allegedly belonging to the AWB leader, Eugene Terre’Blanche (the AWB later claimed it had lost the trailer during its disastrous Bophuthatswana campaign). The Trailer was towed to Germiston where it was left and then detonated in Odendaal Street near the taxi rank at about 8.45am. Again, civilian by-standers took the toll, 10 people were killed and over 100 injured.

Later in the day on April 25 at 11.45am, a pipe bomb detonated at a taxi rank on the Westonaria-Carletonville road, injuring 5 people. Earlier, at about 7.45am, a pipe bomb went off at a taxi rank on the corner of Third and Park streets in Randfontein, injuring 6 people. At 8.30pm on the same day, a pipe bomb attack at a restaurant on the corner of Bloed Street and 7th Avenue in Pretoria killed 3 and injured 4. 

To prevent more bomb-blasts in Johannesburg’s city centre on the election day and the lead up to it, Johannesburg’s city centre was locked down by the SADF using reams of razor wire and armed guards.  The election booths themselves in the high-density parts of the city became small fortresses with a heavy armed SADF presence, all done so people in the city centre could vote in the full knowledge they were safe to do so.

Then, just two short days later, on the Election Day itself, 27th April 1994 the final AWB election bombing campaign attack came in the form of a car bomb at the then Jan Smuts International Airport (now OR Tambo International). The bomb was placed at this high-profile target so as to create fear on the Election Day itself. The blast left the concourse outside the airport’s International Departures terminal damaged along with a number of parked vehicles on the concourse. Ten people were injured in this blast.  If the AWB was going to make an international statement on their objection to the 1994 Election Day itself, this was it.

Images: AWB Jan Smuts Airport Bombing

To try and understand my context, this was violence in the ‘white danger’ context of the ‘Struggle’ it was on top of such a general surge of violence at the time I was serving that was the ‘black danger’, the townships of Johannesburg burned as the IFP and ANC went at one another hammer and tongs leaving thousands dead and wounded. The Human Rights Committee (HRC) estimated that between July 1990 and June 1993, some 4 756 people were killed in politically in mainly IFP and ANC related violence in Gauteng alone. In the period immediately following the announcement of an election date, the death toll in Gauteng rose to four times its previous levels.

Armed ANC, APLA and IFP driven unrest in Johannesburg Townships 1994

I often look at the SADF conscripts from this period – the post 1989 intakes, as having more violent exposure than the majority of SADF veterans called up for the Border War which ended in 1989. Our experience ‘the post 1989 intakes’ was fundamentally different to that experienced by the Border War veterans who stopped doing camps after 1989, and I stand by that. I see this difference in old SADF social media groups especially, if a Border War vet posts a picture showing the war against the MPLA and PLAN prior to 1989 that’s fine, post a picture of the elections showing the AWB mobilising or the MK amalgamation in 1994 and its too ‘political’ for them – our war doesn’t count, it’s all a little too ‘blurred’ for them – no clear cut Rooi-Gevaar and Swart-Gevaar see – no clear cut ‘enemy’, it just doesn’t make sense to them.

The elections, as we all know went ahead, history marched on, but I must smile at the inconvenient truth of it all, it was the SADF, and more specifically the white conscripts serving their camp commitments, who brought the final vehicle of full democracy to South Africa – the vote itself.  There was not an ANC MK cadre in sight at the election doing any sort of security, they played no role whatsoever, in fact at the time they were part of the problem and not part of the solution, and their efforts in the NPK deemed too inexperienced, so they were sidelined. The ANC and PAC military wings fell at the last hurdle, they didn’t make it over the finish line of Apartheid bathed in glory, in fact they came over the line a bloody disgrace. To watch them in their misguided sense of heroism today just brings up a wry smile from me.

Integrated Military Intakes

Later in 1994, as a Mustering Depot, we naturally became involved in implementing the newly developed ‘Voluntary Military Service’ program. This was the first multi-racial intake of male and female SANDF recruits. The Voluntary Military System (VMS) was originally established as a substitute for the defunct ‘whites only’ involuntary national service system (NS) and the ‘Indian’ and ‘coloured’ voluntary national service. Also, out the window where the ethnic intakes into ‘Black’ battalions.

In terms of the VMS, volunteers had to undergo ten months basic military training, followed by a further obligation of eight annual commitments of 30 days in the Regiments and Commandos (the Reservist Conventional Forces). The objective was to create a feeder system for the Reservist Conventional forces and eventually balance the ethnic make-up of Reservist Regiments (up to this point they were a near ‘all-white’ affair with black troops and officers gradually joining them). 

Our first VMS intake at Nasrec in early January 1995 was historic and very telling.  In 15 RCD, some of our battle hardened and experienced escorts had to re-programmed a little. We introduced a policy of minimal force, we were no longer at war and we had to change mindset. We replaced our pre-intake shooting range manoeuvres with ‘hand to hand’ self-defence training instead. The photo on this article shows our escorts getting this training – it was very necessary and vital, times had changed.

Image: 15 RCD Hand to Hand Training NASREC – My photo.

Our intelligence had picked up chatter that the local ANC structures planned to disrupt the intake by spreading the word that the army was now employing – ‘Jobs’, ‘Jobs’, Jobs’ after all was an ANC election promise in 1994 and this a first opportunity for delivery on their promise, you merely had to turn up at Nasrec and a ‘job in the defence’ was yours. Anyone with a brain knows a political party cannot promise jobs, an economy creates jobs – but this did not (and still does not) deter the ANC on trying to fulfil their own propaganda.

And so it happened, two sets of people turned up, one set with ‘call-up’ papers, vetted by the military before mustering and one set, just turning up. The job seekers naturally started to get very upset, angry and uneasy with being turned away and a potentially violent situation began to brew with a large and growingly angry crowd. A couple of other officers and I were called to the situation, and it suddenly occurred to me, as comic as it is serious, that the 9mm Star pistol issued to me was a piece of shit and one of the two issued magazines had a faulty spring – so pretty useless if things go south – and angry crowds for whatever reason in South Africa, even lack of electricity or a delayed train, can get very violent. So much for Denel’s (Armscor) best, but the SADF was like that when it came to issuing weapons and ammo – uber self-confident, during my basic training at 5 SAI and Junior Leaders (JL’s) training at Voortrekkerhoogte, the standard operation procedure (SOP) was only 5 rounds (bullets) per guard – I often wonder how MK would have reacted if their Intel knew just how underprepared and over-confident the SADF was sometimes.

Images: NASREC response, 1995 VMS Intake: My photos

We got to the ‘flashpoint’, and to this day I can kiss Staff Sergeant Diesel, who jumped up onto a Mamba Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC), two of which had been brought up, grabbed a loud hailer an told them calmly to go to Wit Command and then he quickly handed out a stack of application forms. His mannerism as a larger-than-life guy and likeability as a person immediately diffusing the situation as they all set off – either home or to Wit Command armed with the correct information.

The intake went on without any further incidence and I have the privilege of having the only photographs of this historic day. I asked VMS recruits what their expectations where, for many ‘white’ VMS recruits their parents (and fathers specifically) wanted them to have the military discipline and camaraderie they had experienced in the old SADF as a life purpose, the ‘black’ VMS recruits were different, they immediately wanted to sign up as permanent force members and make the military a full-time career – they saw the VMS system as a ‘In’.

The First Multiracial Intake: My Photos – Peter Dickens copyright

The VMS system of mustering also went ahead for the first multi-racial female intake, so as to address the balance of female personnel and officers, black and white in the Reserve forces, again I was proud to be involved in that ‘call up’ and again hold the only historic pictures of it.  However, again, the general sense that I picked up was these women were holding out for full time military careers, but nevertheless it was critical that militarily trained females were sorely in need to modernise the South African military.

First Integrated Female Intake circa 1998: My Photos – Peter Dickens copyright

For the latter reason, the objective of the VMS was not initially met, many VMS service personnel, after doing their basic training, were in fact able to secure these permanent force contracts as the force experienced a contraction of trained personnel after 1994 and the VMS personnel proved an easy and trained recruiting pool. By 2006 the VMS system had all but served its role and was disbanded, the Reserve Force Regiments would recruit directly under a newly constructed training programme, and with that came the bigger changes that integration required.

Also, I don’t really want to hear the ‘it was the beginning of the end’ bit so many vets now feel, the SADF had to change, ‘whites only’ conscription had to change and Apartheid as an ideology was simply unsustainable and had to go. The SADF had to change – dividing units on colour and ethnicity was not practical, segregation had fallen on evil days to quote Field Marshal Jan Smuts. The Defence Force had to become reflective of the country at large – the extreme lack of Black African commissioned officers in 1994, in an African Defence Force nogal, was alone reflective of a system of extreme racial bias.

SANDF VMS Intake circa 1997, my photos

Remember, in 1994 nobody could predict the future, many held a belief that structured and balanced politics would happen, the Mandela Magic was everywhere, from 1990 to 1994 the violence was extreme and as a nation we had narrowly skirted ‘the abyss’ with a miracle settlement. In 1994, nobody foresaw Jacob Zuma and the ANC’s pilfering of the state from 2009, nor did they see the ANC’s extreme restructuring of the SANDF in their likeness, the ‘rot’ starting as early as 1999 when General Georg Meiring, a SADF stalwart and now the Chief of the SANDF, was dismissed on trumpeted up allegations of presenting a false coupe, making way for General Siphiwe Nyanda, a ANC MK cadre whose subsequent career as Jacob Zuma’s Communications Minister is a corruption riddled disgrace.

The MK Intake – 1994 to 1996

Finally on the 1994 line-up, the amalgamation of the Defence Structures with non-statute forces, the ‘Swart Gevaar’ terrorists. From 1994, 15 Reception Depot became involved to a degree with the mustering of ANC and PAC political armies into the newly SANDF. At this stage I was a SSO3 (Senior Staff Officer 3IC) at 15 Reception Depot and had the privilege to work closely with Sergeant Major Cyril Lane Blake, the unit’s Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) who had been involved with the non-statutory force intake from an Intelligence standpoint. Mustering of MK and APLA took place at Personnel Services School, a military base in Voortrekkerhoogte and at Wallmannstal military base, many of these MK members were then destined to go to De Brug army base for training and integration.

Of interest was the intake itself, of the ANC Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) veterans, only half of them really qualified as trained soldiers, these were the MK members trained overseas – mainly in Angola, they were made up mainly of the old cadres (old guard) of Mandela’s period, trained by the ex-WW2 veterans like Joe Slovo, and they were recruited to MK after the Sharpeville Massacre (a very small contingent) and then the Seventy Sixes (the big contingent), those who were recruited after the 1976 Riots, added to this was a trickle from the 1980’s riots who made it to their Angolan training camps.  Out of 32,000 odd MK veterans, there were only about 12,000 MK veterans who were accepted as proper military veterans (about half of them), the rest were ‘stone throwers’ (as some sarcastically called them) recruited rapidly into the ANC MK ranks in 1990 the very minute they were ‘unbanned’ and they just constituted political dissidents with little military experience if any and no formalised military training whatsoever.  

Images: MK Intake into the SANDF issued with old SADF ‘Browns’ – Copyright Reuters, RSM Cyril Lane-Blake, my photo and finally ANC supporters appearing in ‘uniform’ as MK at Mandela’s inauguration in 1994.

Of the ‘Untrained’ MK veterans, many of these were the ‘MK’ cadres from the so called ‘self-defence units’ in the townships who had regularly gone about holding ‘peoples courts’ and sentencing people to death with ‘necklaces’ (placing a car tyre around the persons neck, dousing it in petrol and setting it alight).  

Also, but not unsurprisingly there were MK ‘chances’ – people joining the intake pretending to be MK so they could get a ‘job in the defence’, BMATT (British Military Advisory Training Team), the British Military task force assigned to the integration, and even the ‘proper’ MK cadres themselves, had a heck of a job trying to identify these chance takers, and a great many ‘slipped’ through with falsified CV’s. 

This would later result in what BMATT politely called a ‘hardening of attitudes’ in their report to Parliament, when it come to the way statutory force members viewed these ‘non-statutory’ force members and MK generally, an attitude which in my opinion is getting ‘even harder’ as the years go on as some of these MK vets really show their colours to all of South Africa – involved in corrupt and outright criminal behaviour, degenerating and demeaning themselves, their organisation and their ‘victory’ now well tarnished.

What amazed me was just how structured the MK was when it came to the their proper military veterans, I had been conditioned by the SADF that they were a rag-tag outfit and incompetent at best, but that wasn’t completely true, they had a highly structured command and very defined specialised units ranging from a Chief of Staff, Operations, Ordnance, Intelligence, Engineering, Anti-Aircraft, Artillery to Counter Intelligence/Communications (propaganda), and attached to nearly to all of it was a very detailed Soviet styled military Political Commissar structure. They even had unit designations, and many out of the half of them that had been trained, had decent military training.

I don’t want to get to the Pan African Congress’ APLA veterans, I was told they generally treated their SADF escorts with utter disdain. 

Their problem (MK and APLA) is that they were asked to identify and verify all their members for their military credentials, and they quickly pointed out who was and who was not a trained military veteran, and this caused the huge division in the MK veteran structures we see today.  The split of the Umkhonto weSizwe Military Veterans Association (MKMVA) and the MK Council recently is a case in point – the MK Council are the ones with the military ‘struggle’ credentials and the MKMVA have all the members who do not have any meaningful military ‘struggle’ credentials at all, they’ve all joined Jacob Zuma’s RET hence the reason the current ANC no longer wants to recognise them. 

This makes me laugh uncontrollably when the MKMVA used to wheel out Carl Niehaus in his purchased PEP store MK camouflage fatigues pretending to be a military veteran, when in truth he is anything but one, and it makes me cry when the Department of Military Veterans squander all their time and money on the 12,000 odd MK ‘non-veterans’ trying to give them and their families un-earned veteran benefits and bring harmony to the ANC and they almost completely ignore their primary mandate – the 500,000 odd statutory force veterans, proper military veterans – solely because many of them (the majority mind) served in the old SADF and of that a great majority where conscripts.

In 1999, I was assigned to escort Joe Modise, the ex MK Commander in Chief, and Paratus (the SADF/SANDF) mouthpiece published it, yes, I admit it – I even shook his hand (we’ll there is a published photo to prove it – so no point hiding the fact), but again, at this stage in the SANDF we were still confident in the country, little did I know he would be dead two years later and embroiled in yet another ANC corruption and arms buying controversy. I did some more VMS work after that, but that signalled the beginning of the end of my service, reception depots had outgrown their use after 2002 and mothballed – in fact they are still mothballed, waiting for the day to muster the general populace in the event the country goes to war again.

Image: Joe Modise and myself – Peter Dickens copyright

Oh, and if this sounds a bit personal, it is, here’s a big “Fuck You” middle finger to the politically motivated pressure groups in ANC led government departments currently trying to delist the old SADF ‘conscripts’ as military veterans on the basis that they ‘served Apartheid’ and not recognising their role in bringing democracy to South Africa, whereas their ‘heroes’ in MK did. The historic record stands, there’s no changing it and as things go even this missive is now primary documentation for future generations of South Africans to read and assimilate – from someone ‘who was there’ and is a genuine ‘military veteran’ – true reconciliation comes with facing the truth comrades, just saying.

Back to PTSD

So, enough to do with the ANC and their Parliament of Clowns, the old ‘Swart Gevaar’ fast becoming a newly reinvigorated ‘Swart Gevaar’ of their own making and back to the serious stuff and all the ‘Wit Gevaar and Swart Gevaar’ from 1990 to 1994 forming my general mental mistrust of just about everything. 

Whilst in hospital with Covid I had a psychological mistrust of efforts been made by Doctors, Nurses and medical assistants (Black and White), I was convinced they were out to kill me and efforts to pump lifesaving high pressure oxygen into me were met with an unnatural resistance and a self-induced gag reflex. To give you an idea of how bad this ‘mistrust’ was, if personnel so much as tried to ‘turn’ me to change bedding or wash me I would go into a panic attack, which resulted in rapid rapid thoracic breathing upsetting my body’s oxygen levels to the point of oxygen starvation and renal nerve release (I’d literally piss myself) – a simple ‘turn’ would become a life and death matter – and nobody could make sense of it, me included. So, in desperation .. enter stage right … the hospital Psychologist … and stage left my lifelong confidant, a solid Free State ‘Bittereinder Boertjie’ with the mental tenacity of a Ratel (an African Honey Badger) … my wife.  

To define and understand PTSD, as it’s a much-brandished word nowadays with anyone having experienced a high stress incident claiming it, many using it as an excuse. PTSD is best explained a stressor bucket in your head, you’re born with it and its empty. In life stressful events are sometimes internalised and start to fill your bucket, your bucket usually makes it underfilled to the end of your life and you don’t have a mental meltdown and things make sense and you’re stable, the bucket is very resilient. What happens to military personnel especially is that the stressors they experience are often far beyond normal and it fills the bucket up at an early stage, right up to the ‘nearly full’ mark in some extreme cases, after some significant stressors are added to it later in life, anything really but usually the D’s – Disease, Debt, Divorce and Death. For Military veterans these ‘D’s’ can then ‘tip’ the bucket over and you start to psychologically have a meltdown. This is the reason why PTSD is gradually becoming more and more apparent in ex-SADF conscripts and PF members as they get older.

In extreme cases in the military, you can have that meltdown whilst serving, the old battle fatigue syndrome, repeated life and death experiences unrelentingly occurring end on end filling up the stressor bucket and finally your last one tips the bucket, produces meltdown and you’re withdrawn from the line. Refer to Spike Milligan’s autobiography ‘Mussolini, his part in my downfall’ of his time as a gunner in WW2 and you’ll see how this plays out in a serving combatant.

In therapy trying to get to the bottom on what initially filled my bucket up, and on this the Psychologist and my wife and I settled on ‘mistrust’ initially rooted deep in in my psyche whilst I was in the Army. Mistrust as I could not distinguish foe from friend, ‘swart gevaar from wit gevaar,’ and to me everyone was a ‘enemy’ – that enemy or ‘gevaar’ now included most hospital staff – black and white, and I was the only one who could fight my way out – no help required thanks.  

To say my Covid condition was bad and a PTSD issue on its own would be an understatement, I had even died to be brought back with CPR on one occasion and knocked on the Pearly Gates a great deal more with more near death experiences than I can shake a stick at. I was intubated on a ventilator and placed in an induced coma for a full month. This was followed up with two collapsed lungs and a battery of deadly infections, two serious bouts of bronchitis and then bronchial pneumonia. To my knowledge, I walked into history as one of a mere handful of Covid patients to survive the disease with the number of infections and complications I had – 4 months in ICU, 2 months in High Care and another 2 months of Step Down therapy as I even had to learn to simply take a shit in a toilet and even walk again – a total of 8 months spent in hospital and a further 4 months as a oxygen supplement dependent outpatient, before been given an ‘all clear’ a full year later and taken off all drugs and supplemental oxygen. 

This is pretty big story for another day, and a lot of people are very intrigued by it, so I am writing a book on it called ‘I’m not dead yet’ – my dark military sense of humour aside, do look out for it. 

Images: Me recovering from a coma, giving my best army ‘salute’ just before both lungs collapsed and me sitting up for the first time once lungs drains were removed – copyright Peter Dickens

It took all that to ‘tip my stressor bucket’ – and no doubt I had a massive life and death fight on my hands, but I would have to say this in all honesty, I was substantially compromised by a latent mistrust I picked up as a young man in the Army, especially in 1990. Unlocking that, helped unlock the gag reflexes, which unlocked the fear and ultimately set me on a journey to a healthy recovery – physically and mentally.

Dragon Slaying

Many years after my service, a fellow military veteran, Norman Sander (and ex Sergeant Major in the Natal Carbineers) and I had lunch in London with an ex-BMATT officer, Colonel Paul Davis who had been involved in the South African Forces integration and at one stage headed up the BMATT delegation. He said something interesting, according to the Colonel, the South African Defence Force training modules where draconian at best and styled on the old Nazi Waffen SS model, which demanded absolute iron cast discipline, absolute obedience and absolute goal driven determination to function across multiple voluntary and conscripted outfits often ethnically separated. Notwithstanding his view, I’ve attested to this before, had I not undergone this “draconian” training as an SADF officer I would not have survived my Covid experience, no matter how bad it got I knew I had more in the tank, I’d pushed these limits whilst ‘pissing blood for my pips’ in the SADF as a young man and understood my breaking point from a early age, without this intrinsic knowledge and iron cast focus I would be dead, of that there is absolutely no doubt.

My Commission signed by President F.W. de Klerk, one of his last acts of office

In Conclusion

Now, I’m no ‘Grensvegter’ (Border Warrior), I’m a simple pen pusher, my service pales into insignificance compared to a great many veterans, many I’ve had the privilege to serve with, true soldiers fighting a brutal war in a brutal manner. Nope, I’m not one of those, and nor can I ever be, and nor do I pretend to be, to them the kudos of valour and I mean it.  

Here’s a simple thought on my time as a Military Conscript and then a Volunteer, this quote from Czech author Milan Kundera and it resonates with me the most; 

“The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting.” 

What this means to us SADF conscripts turned volunteers in 1994, we were on a journey, a ‘struggle’ if you will, to take our fellow citizens out of political oppression into political emancipation and liberty. If we forget our stories in this great struggle, discard them as irrelevant because we are no longer politically convenient, vanquished as ‘SADF’ baby killing monsters, and passed over as fighting for some sort of WOKE idea of ‘white privilege’ – if we don’t resist this and choose ‘forgetting’ instead, then we ultimately betray ourselves, we’ve lost.

On PTSD, it’s manageable for most, but you must get to those internalised ‘stressors’ and truly understand what they are and what caused them. Un-internalising the stressors is a first big step to ridding yourself of PTSD, and that’s why I can say in all honesty I’m happy and stable.

So, I thank all you who have made it to this last part of my ‘story,’ it really is a simple soldier’s small tale with a great deal of political ‘struggle’, and I really hope you’ve picked up some interesting historical snippets on the way, especially the ones which are not really in the broad ANC narrative today of ‘the struggle’ leading to 1994. The ‘truth’ will eventually ‘out’ and I sincerely believe that, and I believe its cathartic and from a cognitive therapy perspective a very necessary ‘out’.

A memoir: By Capt. Peter Albert Dickens (Happily Retired)


I got him! I got him! I got him!

This is a very rare audio clip of a SADF crew in a Ratel ZT3 Infantry Fighting Vehicle converted into a anti-tank role taking out Cuban/FAPLA coalition soviet T55 tanks during the Battle on the Lomba River in Angola – Operation Modular in 1987.

Please excuse a little of the “blue” language but this is a ratel crew at the height of combat, listen out for the sounds of the Ratel’s missiles been fired and finding their targets and for the crew members yelps of jubilation and frustrations, also listen to the Ratel manoeuvre itself in an out of danger as it takes up firing positions – and the co-ordination and teamwork of crew members to do so. Also listen out for the intense sounds of explosions in and around the Ratel as they engage the FAPLA/Cuban tanks (click play on the link below).

This is combat at its fiercest in what was arguably one of the most decisive mechanised battles fought on African soil since the Second World War and one which turned the fortunes of the “Cold War” coalition of Cuban and Soviet interests in Southern Africa for the worse.

These men – fighting in inferiorly armoured Infantry fighting vehicles against heavily armoured tanks knew that victory would boil down to strategy, innovation, decisiveness, leadership, teamwork, discipline and training – and not superior equipment or numbers, all of this becomes very apparent in this audio clip.

Burining tank (best)

Burning FAPLA armour as seen from the South African position on the Lomba

The backdrop to this battle was the Cuban/FAPLA advance on Mavinga – a UNITA stronghold, in what was to become a manoeuvre called the ‘Battle of the Lomba’ the SADF 61 Mechanised Battalion Group, supported by other formations and SAAF fighter aircraft literally destroyed the entire FAPLA/Cuban 47 Armoured Brigade and stopped the advance in its tracks.

SADF_61_Mech_flash_badgeThe Operation was Modular, the battle ground was the Lomba River in Angola and Commandant Kobus Smit was the Operational Commander in charge of the SADF’s 61 Mechanised Battle Group. Three combat groups – Alpha under the Command of Cmdt Kobus Smit himself, Bravo under the command of Cmdt Robbie Hartslief, Charlie, under command of Maj Dawid Lotter. All supported by 20 Artillery Regiment (Cmdt Jan van der Westhuizen) – Papa battery from 32 Battalion, Quebec battery from 4 SAI and Sierra battery from 61 Mech Battalion Group.

Fapla crosses the Lomba River

On the 9 September 1987, Fapla’s 21 Brigade began to cross the Lomba River about twelve kilometres east of its confluence with the Cunzumbia.  They were engaged by the South African mechanised armour of Combat Group Bravo with 101 Battalion of the South West African territorial force, destroying a FALPA BTR-60, but they were forced back by a FAPLA artillery counter-attack.

A detached unit of Combat Group Bravo returned on 10 September to the fording site on the Lomba River and again attacked elements of 21 Brigade, but the Angolans’ counter-attacked sending in three tanks. The SADF Ratel-90 Infantry Fighting Vehicles failed to stop the tanks’ advance, so the South Africans brought in their new Ratel ZT3s into the battle.

The ZT3 and it’s launch system was developed under the codename ‘Project Raleigh’ in the 1980s as a “long-range indigenous antitank guided missile”. Essentially a highly manoeuvrable Ratel (honey badger) IFV with anti-tank capabilities, these were untested pre-production models which mounted a triple launcher on top of the Ratel IFV – at the time they were considered state of the art in anti-tank warfare, and their first combat engagement delivered battlefield success to a staggering effect.

ZT3 (camo) - good

Concealed ZT3 during Ops Modular

The ZT3’s firing seven missiles in total at 21 Brigades armour with four successful strikes on the tanks. Soviet built MiG aircraft then arrived over the battle site and forced the South African units to withdraw but, it was game over for the Cuban/Fapla coalition – they had stopped 21 Brigade’s advances, it would be downhill for the Cubans and Angolans from that point out.

Major Hannes Nortman and 12A

SADF_32_Battalion_SSIMajor Hannes Nortman from 32 Battalion arrived on the battle scene at the Lomba on the morning of 10 September, the ZT3 Ratel, code 1-2, one of 32 Battalion’s ZT3’s had taken up position under the initial command of Lt Ian Robertson,  Lt Robertson was injured when he jumping out of the ratel to give fire guidance to the 90mm Ratel next to his ZT3 Ratel. Unfortunately, he landed at the same spot as one of the incoming mortars and took a large piece of shrapnel in his head. The crew of the ZT3 were busy with the casevac of their injured commander, when three T55 Soviet made, heavily armoured enemy tanks rolled up.  Major Hannes Nortman came running up, taking charge of the ZT3 Ratel 1-2 and the attack.

The newly developed Ratel ZT3 had a ‘black box’ which recorded crew actions when the missile system was selected – and this stunning bit of history of South African servicemen in action was forever recorded.

387218_10150449413890688_1158957022_n

Ratel combat during the Battle of the Lomba

The SADF’s ZT3”s were positioned in a tree-line just short of the Lomba River’s adjacent ‘shona’. The first two missiles fired by 1-2 where fired by a young and very over excited gunner, Darryn Richard Nelson – whose commentary is heard throughout the recording.  The first missiles pulled up vertically at around 200 meters. The third did not fire.

The gunner now fired his fourth missile which hit the lead tank in its tracks, stopping it dead. A fifth missile finally destroyed Tank 1 and the gunner his jubilant “I got him! I got him! I got him! Now very excited the young gunner focussed on the second tank, which was retreating back towards the river, his first shot at tank 2 missed as the missile hit the ground just in front of the tank.

Here’s where Major Nortman demonstrated years of senior military experience in combat, he quickly brought the excitement into focus in a time-honoured way – by giving the young gunner a sharp crack to the back of his head. This calmed him down and the sixth missile hit the tank on the rear plate blowing the turret about 25 meters away. Maj Nortman ordered the ZT3 to withdraw and reload, he then maneuverer into a new firing position to fire at the last tank which was still advancing. the Ratel hit tank 3 with two missiles.

three

The destroyed Soviet FAPLA T55 Tanks – from left to right Tank 1, Tank 2 and Tank 3

With that the crew of 1-2 march into history, a South African ‘light’ armoured fighting vehicle made by Sandock Austral (now Denel), taking out heavy armour T55 Soviet made ‘heavy’ battle tanks.  The only Ratel IFV to ever achieve his – before or since.

The action of this motley crew of English and Afrikaner, senior and junior, permanent force and conscripts, all in a single Ratel, had now played a decisive role in the outcome of the entire battle to come.

four

Major Nortman and the crew, Johan Jacobs, Neels Claasen, Darren Nelson, 32 Battalion September 1987

The Battle heats up

According to Cmdt Smit, “21 Brigade utilized all forces at its disposal and its T54 tanks and D 30 used several tons of ammunition to support its forces in crossing the river initially, and later in the day to cover the withdrawal of its forces to the northern side of the river.”

“21 Brigade was forced to abandon its efforts to cross the river and was in need of re-supply before another attempt could be made to cross the river.”

47 Brigade re-deployed it’s tactical group to attack a nearby UNITA base, this was met by the SADF’s Combat Group Bravo on the 13th September 1987, however the terrain was  crisscrossed with the UNITA bases’ trenches making manoeuvrability difficult Combat Group Bravo and Cmdt Hartslief withdrew his forces for replenishment and repair, Col Ferreira ordered combat group Charlie to move forward and prevent further movement of 47 Brigade’s 1 Tactical Group to the east.

two

Missiles been loaded onto a ZT3 during Operation Modular

Major Dawid Lotter moved to the west and hit contact with FAPLA forces the same evening, destroying a number of FAPLA vehicles, contact was broken the next day.

Combat group Alpha was deployed to making contact with 47 Brigade on the 16 September. At the same time Charlie squadron made contact with FAPLA infantry and tanks, even as close as 50 meters.  After a fierce firefight the SADF withdrew to consolidate, leaving UNITA to hold the positions.

47 Brigade was now under threat from two flanks and all The FAPLA brigades were ordered back to consolidate their positions on the northern banks of the Lomba.

47 Brigade was ordered to advance over the Lomba River again and established a bridgehead.  The South African 61 Mechanised Battle Group assembled to attack them again on the 3rd October, this time Charlie Squadron took the lead commanded by Major Philip van Wyk.  Making contact later the same day with 47 Brigade.  A tank battle ensued; the largest tank battle ever fought on southern African soil.

The FAPLA infantry soldiers were observed fleeing the battlefield and to keep momentum 61 Mechanised ordered in the reserve squadrons and combat groups, with fresh forces FAPLA’s resistance finally crumbled and the remaining forces fled the battlefield.  The South African’s had won the day with the loss of only 3 SADF personnel and a further 6 wounded, one Ratel was lost.

47 Brigade destroyed

47 Brigade was decimated with the majority of its equipment either captured or destroyed, amongst which were 18 x T55 and T54 tanks, 22 x BTR60 and 85 trucks. 47 Brigade for all practical purposes had ceased to exist.  The remaining Cuban and FAPLA forces withdrew to their initial positions and The South African objective for Operation Modular – to halt the FAPLA advance and prevent the capture of Mavinga –  was decisively achieved.

390186_10150449428385688_1649001498_n

Ratel 1-2, now marked 12A taken after Operation Modular – note the ‘kill’ markings on the turret.

History made

The remarkable efforts of Major Nortman and the crew of ZT3 Ratel 1-2 are now to be seen at the South African Museum of Military History in Johannesburg (later marked 23), the ratel on display is updated composite of various demobilised ratels when upgrades were made, however a part of it comes from Ratel 1-2, therefore the tank ‘kill’ markings were retained on this version and are clearly painted on the side of its missile system.

3 kills


Researched by Peter Dickens and published with much thanks to Johannes “Hannes” Noortman and the crew of this Ratel – and to the 61 Mechanised Veterans Fraternity, with special thanks again to Dawid Lotter and Kobus Smit

The last soldier to die in the Border War

There is something deeply disturbing when you read about the ‘last soldier to die’ in a war, it’s a complete sense of futility, a young life that is snuffed out for this or that political conflict. The South African Border War (1966 – 1989) along the now Namibian border with Angola carries with it the same sense of pointlessness when you read about the first soldier lost and the last soldier lost as it was with the 1st World War.

D

Pvt Parr (Left) and Pvt Ellison (Right)

During World War 1, the first British soldier to die was Private John Henry Parr on 21st August 1914, Killed in Action near Mons – Belgium.  The last British serviceman to die in  WW1 was Private George Edwin Ellison, killed in action near Mons – Belgium on Armistice Day itself – 11 November 1918.  The irony, both died in a foreign country and they are buried in the same graveyard in Belgium facing one another – a few meters separate them.  The futility, for 4 years millions of more casualties separate them, in the end – all with no tangible military ‘gain’.

One cannot avoid thinking whether this same sense of waste of young life has a parallel in the South Africa’s Border War on the Namibian/Angola border.  The sad truth is that it does.

Lieutenant Freddie Zeelie from 1 Reconnaissance Regiment is regarded as the first SADF combat casualty of The Namibian Border War. Killed in Action on 23 June 1974 while engaged on anti-insurgent operations in Southern Angola. On hitting contact with insurgents he bravely stormed their machine gun position regrettably losing his life in the process. He was only 22 years old.

The last soldier to die in combat in this Border War was Corporal Hermann Carstens, also from 1 Reconnaissance Regiment, Killed in Action on 04 April 1989 during fierce close-quarter fighting with a numerically superior force of heavily armed SWAPO PLAN insurgents near Eenhana. He was only 20 years old.

The irony, Lt Zeelie and Cpl Carstens both died in a foreign country – defending the same stretch of border between the same two countries – South West Africa (Namibia) and Angola, both fighting the same insurgents. The futility, for 15 years separating their respective deaths there would be thousands of casualties. In the end – all with no tangible military ‘gain’.

B

Lt Zeelie (Left) and Cpl Carstens (Right)

It’s a sad thought indeed, however their actions and losses are not entirely futile, as with the First World War, the Border War resulted in changed ideologies – changes which were necessary to attain peace, and our modern freedoms as we have them now is because of their sacrifice.

So let’s have a look at the ‘last’ soldier to die during the Namibian Border War’, and I must thank both Tinus de Klerk and Leon Bezuidenhout whose work this is, and who have shared it with us:

The last soldier to die in the Namibian Border War- Corporal Hermann Carstens, 1 Reconnaissance Regiment.

Written by Tinus de Klerk and Leon Bezuidenhout

56691524_2221069961443660_1197724391530561536_n

Corporal Hermann  Carstens, 1RR, Operators Badge and Wings on his chest

A short background: Introduction to 23 years of war, 1966–1989

South Africa administered the former German colony of German South West Africa since 1920 after the First World War (1914–1918). Initially, South Africa wanted to incorporate the territory as a fifth province of the country. The incorporation into South Africa never materialised, however, and since the 1960s more and more states wanted to declare the then South West Africa (SWA) an independent state, Namibia.

In 1966 the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) started an armed insurgency against the South African administrators through its military wing, the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). The war would last for 23 years, and eventually it would also escalate into Angola and, for some time, into Zambia.

In essence, the Namibian Border War (also known as the South African Border War) became a cold war by proxy. By the early 1970s, the United Nations (UN) adopted Resolution 435 to lay the foundation for Namibian independence. By 1988 the Cold War drew to a close and the South Africans, Cubans and Angolans were ready to engage in negotiations to withdraw their troops from the SWA/Angolan border. These negotiations opened the way for Namibian independence.

One of the issues agreed upon in the trilateral negotiations was that the South African troops would be reduced to 1 500 men and would be confined to base. SWAPO would withdraw to 150 km north of the border. Resolution 435 made it clear, however, that with its implementation (which would be on 1 April 1989), SWAPO would also remain at their bases. If they therefore had established bases on SWA soil, they would also be confined to these bases. SWAPO saw this as a loophole, and secretly planned a massive invasion for 31 March/1 April 1989. The sole intention was to establish bases in northern SWA.

The South Africans, however, did not trust SWAPO, and even less so the influx of foreign troops of the United Nation’s Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). This force would supervise the transition period and comprised peacekeepers from several UN states, including Finland, Britain, Australia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Kenya. South Africa continued operating their intelligence sources. The South West African Police (SWAPOL) and its Security Branch were tasked to keep up their system of informers and spies.

To help monitor the situation and assist in gathering information, about 30 men from the South African Special Forces (colloquially known as the Recces) and several South African Military Intelligence operators were placed in SWAPOL. As part of the Recce contingent, several Swahili-speaking operators were also included to monitor the Kenyan soldiers of UNTAG. This military operation was known as Operation Saga. The deployed Special Forces contingent would only use the Police as cover and still send their information directly to the Senior Operational Special Forces Officer in Windhoek.

The man: Hermann Carstens

7

Hermann as band major, Hoërskool Voortrekkerhoogte

Hermann Carstens was born on 30 September 1968. He was the son of a South African military officer and went to Laerskool Uniefees (English: Uniefees Primary School), 25 km north of Pretoria. He later attended Voortrekkerhoogte Hoërskool (English: Voortrekkerhoogte High School), which mainly comprised children of military personnel.

 

It was in this environment that the young Carstens soon proved himself as a man destined for a bright military career. Among other, he was the band major of the school’s military band; as an athlete, he excelled in field and track events, and was a very good long jumper.

After completing his school career in 1986, he joined the South African Defence Force (SADF), like all young white men of that age. But he would not remain an ordinary soldier. He had a vision. He was driven. He wanted to be with the best. He volunteered for selection to the elite South African Parachute Battalion and passed the course. But even that was not good enough, and when the Recces visited, he volunteered again.

This time he was among the big fish. Special Forces all over the world usually comprise older soldiers; not 18- or 19-year-olds. But he was one of the exceptions. Hermann passed the selection, continued with the course and passed the course. He was not even 20 years old.

When the teams from the reconnaissance regiments were selected for Operation Saga, it was decided that all of them would first complete an advanced medical course, as this would be their cover: They would be medical personnel. Hermann was too late, however, and did not partake in the medical course. He was later sent to join those who had already been selected for the operation. This was fate – and he would be destined to be behind the exposed guns of a Casspir on 4 April 1989. The other Recce in the ambush that day was inside another Casspir – as the operational medical orderly (“ops medic”).

4

Hermann during Recce training

Operation Saga: Corporal Hermann Carstens

Operation Saga, an independent Special Forces operation, was planned as a long-term intelligence-gathering operation in northern SWA. This operation and other combined operations were aimed at painting a real-time intelligence picture of events that were unfolding as UNTAG and the SWAPO exiles started arriving. Their cover was also changed from medical personnel to members of the SWAPOL Security Police, as this would ensure more freedom of movement without raising suspicion.

At the start of February 1989, the operators from the Special Forces contingent arrived in Oshakati after spending a week preparing at the SWAPOL Security Police farm on the outskirts of Windhoek. They used the cover of the Security Police and also received police ranks. Another few days of preparation followed in Oshakati at the Security Police Headquarters before they were deployed. The 4 Reconnaissance (“Recce”) Regiment (4RR) was deployed to the Kavango and Caprivi regions, while the 1 “Recce” Regiment (1RR), supported by some operators and intelligence personnel from 5 “Recce” Regiment (5RR), was deployed in the central and eastern areas. The 1RR and 5RR area of operations stretched from Nkongo in eastern Ovamboland and west to Opuwa in the Kaokoland. The operators were posted at Security Police bases. Constables (Corporals) Pieter du Plessis and Hermann Carstens were deployed to the Security Police base at Okatope in Ovamboland.

3

Throughout March, in terms of the agreed-upon UN Resolution 435, UNTAG soldiers arrived in dribs and drabs to become the interim authority on 1 April 1989.

On Friday 31 March 1989, Koevoet (the SWAPOL Counter-Insurgency Unit, or SWAPOL TIN) and SWAPOL Security Police patrols were placed on high alert along the border in anticipation of a possible SWAPO invasion. Earlier, police informers had brought information regarding the execution of a SWAPO invasion plan on 31 March 1989.

On the Saturday morning of 1 April 1989 events took a turn for the worse as heavily-armed SWAPO insurgents began to invade SWA. The police were under pressure as heavy fighting broke out. Koevoet bore the brunt, as all the South African Defence Force (SADF) units had either been disbanded or were confined to base.

For the time, before the army could be mobilised, SWAPOL used everyone at its disposal. Security Police teams also deployed on 1 April 1989. Over the next four days, the bloodiest fighting of the war took place on SWA soil. The SWAPO groups were large, with up to 250 insurgents in a group. As the groups were attacked, they scattered and splintered off into smaller units.

On 4 April 1989 near Eenhana, Call Sign 21C – the Okatope Security Police team of which Pieter and Hermann were members – left their temporary base near the SADF’s Okankolo base just after 08:00 to patrol the area. Because he had not been on the advanced medic course, Hermann was appointed as one of the vehicle commanders, which entailed manning the mounted machine guns. Pieter, in the absence of the team medic who was on leave, acted as the Ops Medic in the other Casspir.

At approximately 11:45 four sets of tracks, about three hours old, were discovered. After following the tracks for a while, they noticed that more SWAPOs had joined, bringing the total number to more than 10.

5

Hermann in the Operational Area, Northern Namibia 1988

The Security Police team entered a belt of thick vegetation, followed by grassland and then a mahango field and a kraal. About 3 km south of Eenhana, SWAPO initiated an ambush with AK-74 and RPG7 rocket grenade launchers. At this stage, Hermann’s Casspir was ahead of the rest of the team, busy with voorsny[English: tracking ahead]. Voorsnyis a term used when some of the vehicles drive ahead to see whether they can perhaps pick up the tracks further ahead. When they can identify indeed tracks further ahead, the rest of the team is informed per radio to also come to the newer tracks. This means that a part of the tracking can be avoided, and the insurgents be caught up with quicker.

It was during this voorsny that Hermann’s Casspir entered the ambush. Standing up, he shot back with the twin Three Os Brownings from the machine gun turret at an angle behind the driver. It was possibly just after the start of the ambush that an insurgent fired a projectile at the Casspir with a RPG7 rocket grenade launcher. The projectile entered the Casspir on the left, about 800 mm above the gear box, in line with the firing holes below the front side window of the passenger compartment. The red-hot metal shrapnel caused devastation inside and hit Hermann from behind where he was firing the guns. His back was littered with shrapnel. A large piece of shrapnel hit him in the back of his head, and he died instantly.

The rest of the team fought through the ambush and started to maal[English: to mill]. This is a tactical move used and perfected by Koevoet, and was also used by the SWAPOL Security Teams and 101 Battalion. It entails all the vehicles fighting through the ambush and thereafter driving in different directions through the contact area to confuse the enemy, thus presenting a difficult target and engaging the enemy from every direction. Sometimes it even happened that the insurgents were overrun and killed with the Casspir’s wheels.

Pieter still remembers when his Casspir drove past Hermann’s Casspir; he saw Hermann slumped forward in the machine gun turret. The right rear wheel of Hermann’s Casspir had been shot out and the vehicle came to a standstill. In the ensuing contact 12 SWAPO’s were killed (one perished under a Casspir’s wheels during the maal, while two blew themselves up). More than 20 insurgents were part of the ambush.

About three minutes later when the contact had died down, Pieter made his way over to Hermann, and saw he had a wound behind his ear; all his vital signs indicated that he was dead. Hermann’s body and a wounded yet walking Special Constable Matheus Gabriel was casevaced by helicopter. Gabriel had shrapnel in his throat. A Koevoet team arrived, reported (and by doing so effectively claimed) the deaths and followed the tracks of the remaining SWAPOs who had escaped and later that afternoon killed another seven of them.

The legacy: The last man to die

It took nine days to stop the treacherous SWAPO incursion. When the last shot was fired, more than 300 of the estimated 1 500 insurgents had been killed. Between the SADF, which had since been released from their bases, and the initially under-gunned and under-strength police force, 31 people from the Security Forces died. Lt. Els of the Special Service Battalion was wounded on 3 April. He died of his wounds on 4 April. Several SWAPOL and South African Counter-Insurgency policemen would also be killed in action on 4 April 1989; however, the last soldier to be killed in action was the brave Corporal Hermann Carstens. He was, like most South Africans who had died in that war, a very young 19 or 20 years old. But this young man was destined to be there. As a young man he set high standards, and against all odds became the Recce he wanted to be. Hermann Carstens was a man who pursued his dream, and then started to live it.

6

After his death, Hermann’s fellow operators sent his boots, covered in gold, back to his parents.One of the boots is now in Duxford, England, with Renier Jansen, his close friend from high school. The bond between the two young men always remained. The other boot is with Hermann’s father in Pretoria

Hermann was buried with full military honours in April 1989, in the Heroes Acre at the Warmbad Cemetery. The town is now known as Bela-Bela. His bravery will be remembered forever by a special stone on his grave.

On 23 June 1974, Lt. Fred Zeelie became the first South African soldier to die in action in the Namibian Border War. He was from 1RR. On 4 April 1989, Corporal Hermann Carstens of 1RR became the last South African soldier to die in action during the Border War. Between the deaths of Fred Zeelie and Hermann Carstens, 61 more members of the South African Special Forces made the ultimate sacrifice. The contribution of the South African Special Forces in this war, and the cost in lives that they paid, is significantly higher than the average casualties of any other unit.

C

Freddie Zeelie (left) and Hermann Carstens (right)

Hermann Carstens will be remembered during the 13thAfriforum Springbok Vasbyt 10 & 25 km Road Race in 2019, and his name will be given a special place among the previously-unknown soldiers honoured by this event.


Published with the kind permission of  Tinus de Klerk and Leon Bezuidenhout

Copyright: Tinus de Klerk & Leon Bezuidenhout
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT FOR COMMERCIAL USE, OR TO BE SOLD IN ANY FORM Renier Jansen reserves the copyright of all photos

Introduction and Edited by Peter Dickens