Inventing Apartheid – a Chronology

The Chronology of Apartheid: 1652 – 1952

In 2017 Hélène Opperman Lewis released a “psychology” book titled “Apartheid: Britain’s Bastard Child”, the name and cover image of a Boer child emancipated by disease in a concentration camp kicked off a latent voice of Afrikaner Apartheid apologists who held it up as proof positive – the British ‘invented’ Apartheid. She has been joined lately by Albert Blake, who in 2024 in his book on Jopie Fourie used a similar argument of a latent psychological trauma the British imparted on the Afrikaner nation as the raison d’exister for Apartheid.

Despite Opperman Lewis facing serious criticism on trying to peddle a psychological book using the trauma and victim argument to claim ‘her people’ were unwittingly led to commit the crime of Apartheid – detractors noting that her argument was completely unhinged from nearly every history discipline – from historical sweep, the historical method, the chronological method, the archeological record all the way to simple economic history statistics. Despite this, these Neo Afrikaner Nationalists pointed to British Imperialism, Victorian paternal attitudes to “developing civilisations”, petty colonial segregation policies and trauma caused by British warmongering as the causes of Apartheid – not the fault of Afrikaners, the British did it – don’t you see!

Some even going as far as ignoring history completely and stating that Apartheid existed “unofficially” before 1948 anyway, and the only sin of Afrikaner Nationalists did in 1948 was simply to put down onto paper what was already there and define it as law – no foul, no harm, they just propagated what the “British started”.

So, let’s put Hélène Opperman Lewis and Albert Blake and their acolytes aside for a second, and do some proper historical sleuthing, come up with the “who done it”, who is really to blame for “Apartheid”. The chosen method is the basic historical method – the chronological method, and by using dates we will map the progression of Apartheid – from its origins to its final legal manifestations. Follow what the historians like to call “the golden thread” – the string that links the causal history together. At the end we hope to find who exactly is holding this particular “bastard child” as their own.

Nearly every historian, including all the predominant ‘Afrikaner’ historians, put the origins of Apartheid at the origins of slavery in the Cape – so, from a chronological method – let’s start there:

Apartheid – A chronology

1652 – Dutch arrive and form the Cape Colony in 1652 to service VOC shipping. Jan van Riebeeck lands his ships in Table Bay on 6 April 1652 with a small contingent of settlers.

1653 – First slave arrives at the VOC settlement from Jakarta the very next year in 1653.

1659 – First Khoikhoi–Dutch War, by 1672 – Second Khoikhoi–Dutch War, by 1677 the region and its peoples are subjugated by the Dutch. The slave trade continues to expand in the VOC settlement for the next 100 years.

Slavery in the Cape Colony. Insert: Johan Anthoniszoon “Jan” van Riebeeck

From the mid 1700’s the Dutch VOC implements the Inboekstelsil’ system  on the outer borders of the Cape settlement – a policy of indentured slavery to initially capture Khoi and San children for an ‘apprenticeship’ period into adulthood – this done to fulfil demands for labour.

1795 – the French form the Batavian Republic and dispel with the Netherlands. The Cape Colony falls under Batavian rule. Slavery and Inboekstelsel systems in the colony continue.

The British occupy the Cape for the first time in response to activation of the Batavian Republic by the French – it’s short lived as the British settle a peace term with the Batavian vassal state and Napoleonic France – the Treaty of Amiens (1802) sees the British hand the colony back to Batavia.

1802 – Batavian rule again, slavery and indentured slavery practices in the Cape Colony continue.

1806 – The British attack the Batavian fort at their Cape Colony to forestall Napoleon’s troops strengthening the Cape Colony and the British re-occupy the colony as another Napoleonic War action (The Second Occupation of the Cape 1806).

1807 – British open their ban on slavery by banning slave trade between colonies in their empire. The Slave Trade Act 1807, officially an Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade.

1814 – Dutch ‘Burghers’ dissatisfaction with the British occupation increases when the British specifically ban Dutch slave traders from entering any Cape port from 15th June 1814, squeezing labour supply.

1815 – Battle of Waterloo settles the matter of European control and occupied colonies, the Dutch sell their occupied Cape Colony to the British at the Congress of Vienna to aid in the re-establishment of their Dutch homeland in Europe for £6,000,000.1

1824 – The British negotiate territory from King Shaka to establish the Bay of Natal as a British trading post.

1829 – In the Cape Colony – the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) or in Afrikaans the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK) is now under British state authority. Puritan Burghers of Dutch/French and German decent formally request their DRC synod for separated black and white worship on he basis of a Puritan philosophy. It is denied by the DRC 1829 Synod who state:

‘Communion would be administered “simultaneously to all members without distinction of colour or origin.’

It is not a popular decision, Backhouse and Walker noted that in some parishes on the frontier:

‘the prejudices of the Dutch so strong, that some of them were much disturbed at the idea of the Hottentots coming into the “Kerk”; and they afterwards got up a protest against their being allowed to assemble there.’2

1834 – The British announced the full abolition of slavery, they also announced a universal qualified franchise vote putting a small number of ex-slaves and black male citizens who own property and have an education on the same footing as whites – some whites also find themselves on the same qualified footing as blacks. Due date – 1 Dec 1834. In the words of historian C.F.J. Muller:

‘The Afrikaans frontier farmer now got no satisfaction from Church and State.’3

1835 – Louis Tregardt is the very first Voortrekker to leave the Cape Colony in protest against the British legislation ending slavery, he is also wanted for cattle theft and gun running with the Xhosa – he also has no intention of releasing his slaves and takes them with him, one escapes and reports his position to the British authorities forcing him to ‘ditch’ the rest of his slaves and to carry on trekking north – his trek is a failure and disbands.4

1837 – Piet Retief is the most famous of the Voortrekkers, in 1837 he leaves the Cape Colony – and his manifesto is published declaring discontent with the British for abolishing slavery, the terms of compensation thereof and for implementing a colour blind franchise. Included in their decision to “trek” from the colony is dissatisfaction with the colour blind worship and language status of their Dutch Reformed Church. 

These frontier farmers remain ‘Puritans’ within a strict Calvinist dogma regardless of their Church’s position on race – and this sentiment of outrage is captured by this famous quote by Retief’s sister, Anna Steenkamp who writes:

‘and yet it is not (‘the slaves’) freedom that drives us to such lengths, as their being placed on an equal footing with Christians, contrary to the laws of God and the natural distinction of race and religion, so that it was intolerable for any decent Christian to bow down beneath such a yoke; wherefore we rather withdrew in order to preserve our doctrines in purity.’5

This quote can be regarded as the epicentre of Apartheid as it becomes defined in future. 

The Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) i.e. the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK) in the Cape Colony formally denounces the Voortrekkers – they leave anyway, The church’s next reaction is to refusal to permit of ‘any of its ministers to leave the colony with the Trekkers.’6

Voortrekkers – insert pic Piet Retief

The DRC – also known as the ‘gaatjieponders’ splits over the matter of the Great Trek and the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk (NHK) known as ‘Stoepsitters’ forms on 21 May 1837 as a ‘sister church’ of DRC to care for the puritan white Voortrekkers spiritual needs.

1838 – 6 February 1838 – Piet Retief’s party of 67 Boers and 30 of their black servants are murdered by Dingaan whilst negotiating land for a Voortrekker Republic. Later in the year – 16 December 1838, The Battle of Blood River takes place and is a resounding Boer victory.

1839 – The ‘unrecognised’ Republic of Natalia is established by Boers on 12 Oct 1839 with Pietermaritzburg as its capital. It’s ‘het publiek’ constitutional policy dissolves the Republic into administrative chaos. At war with nearly all neighbouring tribes, Zulu, Pondo and Xhosa and the British in addition, the Republic descends into further chaos.

1843 – In an ungovernable state, the Republic of Natalia’s Volksraad turn to the British for voluntary annexation when officially on 23 April 1843 it consented to Natalia becoming a British colony, on 8 August 1843 the Volksraad unanimously finalise the terms proposed by Lord Stanley, the new British ‘Natal’ colony would incorporate the Port Natal settlement and the Drakensberg is set as the northern limit.

There is a fundamental British condition in the formation of this new colonial expansion of Natal, it reads:

‘that there should not be in the eye of the law any distinction or disqualification whatever, founded on mere difference of colour, origin, language or creed.’7

Once again in countenance to Puritan Voortrekker values, unsatisfied with the political state of things, the loss of their republic and with a general dose of both Anglophobia and Afrophobia, a large group of Natalia Voortrekkers trek again over the Drankensberg into ‘Transorangia’ and into what would eventually become the Transvaal.

1848 – The British declare the area of ‘Transorangia’ i.e. the modern Free State, the area between the Orange and Vaal Rivers a ‘British Sovereignty’ (a colony) calling it the Orange River Sovereignty. They also bring with them the ‘Colour Blind’ qualification franchise as specified in the Cape and the abolition of slavery.

1852 – The Sand River Convention between the Boers and the British on 17 January 1852 establishes the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) – a combination of a number of small Voortrekker Republics in the region made up of migrating British colony citizens with varying constitutions now merged. The British delegation at the Sand River convention agree the formation of a fully independent ‘recognised’ ZAR Boer Republic on the proviso that they are not permitted to practice slavery. 

The initial ZAR constitution is ratified and it legally forbids anyone who is not a member of the Dutch Reformed Church (and related ‘sister’ Churches) from holding a voting franchise. Only ‘white’ adult males aligned to the DRC and its sister churches are allowed to vote – people of colour are specifically excluded – so too are white Jews and white Catholics. People of colour are given no political representation whatsoever, cannot vote and cannot own land, marriages are not legally recognised and they are even forbidden in the constitution from entering the ZAR’s ‘Raad’ (parliament).

The ZAR also implements the old Dutch Inboekstelsel system of indentured slavery targeted at indigenous peoples to supplement their need for real slaves and boost labour requirements for expansive farming – the average Voortrekker farm is 6,000 aches of land, in all they occupy a land mass bigger than Great Britain using a ‘grab and hold’ strategy when encroaching on native land.8 Trading of these indentured slaves on the ZAR frontiers even becomes known as ‘black gold’.  

A letter to Piet Joubert, who acquired many inboekstelsel slaves on his military campaigns as the ZAR Kommandant-General, summarises the brutality and manner of the inboekstelsel – sent to his wife it reads:

‘Please ask the General to let me have a little Malaboch kaffir, as of course there are some whose father and mother have been killed. I don’t mind if it’s a boy or a girl. I want one about seven years old, or any one that the General will give me’9

1854 – the Orange River Convention is held on 23 February 1854. Britain agrees to hand their “Orange River Sovereignty” over to Boer stewardship. The Boer Republic of the “Orange Free State” (OFS) was declared on the 23 February 1854, however a key condition for the establishment of the OFS is that it became a British Suzerainty (a British vessel or client state) – the conditions of the Suzerainty specify that the Boer Republic is ‘independent’ and responsible for its own ‘internal affairs’ in terms of self-governance whilst Britain has oversight for the ‘external affairs’ (foreign affairs) of the OFS. Issues of Black African emancipation, political representation and franchise are left to the OFS republicans to manage as an ‘internal affair’. Slavery is specified by the British as outlawed in the region and not permitted.

1856 – the ‘Colour Blind’ qualified Franchise as implemented in the Cape Colony by the British is now officially implemented by the British in the Natal Colony.10

1857 – The Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) holds a Synod in 1857 in the ZAR and makes allowances for separate worship – in a religious quandary it maintains conversion to Christianity as its goal for Black and Whites inclusively – however worship is separated on the basis of race – the “Groot Kerk” (Big Church for the Whites) and “Klein Kerk (Small Church for the Blacks). Sermons for both ‘Groot and Klein’ – Black and White services are run by the same white DRC Dominee. This decision was to have long-lasting ramifications. Unwittingly the church had provided:

‘An ecclesiological blueprint for the Nationalist policy of separate development of the races, or Apartheid’11

1858 – the ZAR State and DRC’s sister church, the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk (NHK) Church are synchronised as an Oligarchy on Theocracy lines.

1859 – the ‘Dopper’ Church – the Gereformeerde Kerke (GK) forms as an off-shoot of the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk (NHK) and a ‘sister’ church of both the Dutch Reformed Church and the NHK. Ultra Conservative – Paul Kruger is a Dopper.

Early image of Pretoria, the capital of the ZAR – insert: the ZAR coat of arms

1860 – The ZAR constitution makes clear the legalities of Black emancipation in its territory when it declares:

‘The people are not prepared to allow any equality of the non-white with the white inhabitants, either in church or state.’

In the same year the British begin an indentured labour program of their own and 342 Indians arrive on board the Truro on 16 November 1860. The fundamental difference between the British “Indentured Labour” and the Voortrekker Inboekstelsel “Indentured Slaves” lies in the use of slave “apprenticeship” policies.

The Voortrekker ZAR Inboekstelsel system allowed for the aggressive capturing of black indigenous African children and holding them in a slave/master “apprenticeship” relationship. Slave Apprenticeships for African females lasted until they were 21 years old and for males it was 25 years old, thereafter the Indentured Slave had the option of been released (although this was not observed in remote frontier districts).12

The inboekstelsel labourer on release could also remain on the farm as a contract or paid worker, and as most were displaced anyway, many indentured slaves remained on the Boer farms as a sub working class in separate ‘kraals’ with no political or property rights whatsoever. Some 10% of the ZAR population qualified as inboekstelsil.

The British Natal Indian Indentured labour system was a 5 year work contract primarily on sugar cane farms or coal mining with minimal wage under very strict and unfair labour policies – which allowed for no labour or political representation for the work contract period – the conditions of work varied and in many instances qualified as an exploitative relationship and a miserable existence for the labourer. Thereafter the labourer could leave his indentured employer and become a ‘free man’, remain in Natal and open his own business or enter employment. If having served 2 indentured work terms (10 years) the passage back to India was free of charge.13

1865 – in terms of the Cape and Natal colonies – the British Westminster Parliament issues the “Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865” which allowed the colonies to pass legislation different from that in Britain provided that it was not repugnant to any law expressly passed by the Imperial Parliament to extend to that colony. This had the effect of granting British colonies more autonomy, to legislate free of Britain, within their own ‘internal’ borders.

1869 – The DRC Synod resolves to condemn the practice of the Inboekstelsel apprenticeship slavery system and within two years (1871) the DRC concludes the system no longer exists in the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (although this is not strictly true).14

1876 – the ZAR heading into a financial crisis, facing bankruptcy due to a Voortrekker culture of non payment of taxes, and under threat from local African tribes. Led by Sekhukune I of the Pedi, a war in 1876 took place which is recorded as a Boer defeat. After losing the battle with the Pedi, the ZAR goes into confederation and protectorate negotiations with the British.

The ZAR President – Thomas Burgers and the British Representative – Sir Theophilus Shepstone, agree to the voluntary dissolving of the Republic and to the annexation of the territory by the British – the idea is a long standing British one of a Federation of loose states in Southern Africa under the British flag (paramountcy). In dissolving the ZAR ‘Raad’ Burgers points a finger at Paul Kruger and his cabal and cites the Inboekstelsil system and consistent conflict with indigenous tribes as the key causes for voluntary dissolution of the Boer republic and annexation and protection from Britain – he says:

‘It is you – you members of the Raad and the Boers – who have ruined the country, who have sold your independence for a drink. You have ill-treated the natives, you have shot them down, you have sold them into slavery, and now you have to pay the penalty.’15

1877 –  the British annex the ZAR, re-naming it “The British Colony of The Transvaal” – they open up immigration to white British settlers who become known as the “Pretoria Loyalists” and embark on a number of reforms. However, importantly, they do not immediately implement their Cape and Natal ‘colour blind’ qualified franchise in their new British Transvaal Colony.

Annexation of the ZAR by Natal Mounted Police ceremonial guard – insert picture, the ZAR President Thomas François Burgers.

1879 – under ambitions for a British led Federation across the entire region, the British regional attentions switch to fighting the Anglo-Zulu war from 11 January – 4 July 1879, a British victory over the Zulu nation. The aftermath would see Zululand eventually annexed as part of Natal in 1897.

1880 – the Afrikaner Bond is established in 1880 to forward Afrikaner political ambitions. Within it lie the origins of Afrikaner Nationalism, which is a unification of Afrikaners across the all the states from the “Zambezi to the Cape” and calls for a Afrikaner led paramountcy16 in the region under the slogan:

‘Africa for the Africander’17

Later in the ZAR the “ox-wagon incident” takes place in November – an issue as to a Boer’s backdated tax, the incident brings up simmering Boer dissatisfaction with British rule. Led by Paul Kruger the Boers rise in a revolt on the 20 December 1880 and attack the British Garrison at Bronkhorstspruit. This marks the start of The Transvaal Rebellion (the first Boer War) in the British Colony of The Transvaal.

1881 – The Transvaal Rebellion ends with a resounding Boer victory over the British relief column at the Battle of Majuba on the 27 February 1881. With Pretoria’s garrisons still in the control of the British, the British sue for peace instead of a protracted rebellion.

A compromise is struck at the Pretoria convention, held on 3 August 1881, which re-established the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) re-named as The Transvaal Republic as a British Suzerainty state (a vassal or client state of Britain). The “Triumvirate’ Presidency” (shared Presidency) was officially recognised on 8 August 1881 by the British to oversee the running of the Transvaal Republic – it was made up of Paul Kruger, Piet Joubert and Marthinus Pretorius.

Under the conditions of the Suzerainty, the Transvaal Republic is permitted ‘independence’ to run all its own internal affairs as a Republic, however Britain remains in control of all the Transvaal Republic’s ‘external’ affairs (foreign affairs), its borders and enjoys a preferred status as to trade.

On the issue of Paramountcy and Federation, the Orange River Convention in 1854 specified upfront that the Orange Free State Republic was a British Suzerainty state, so British paramountcy was regionally assured with the Transvaal Republic becoming a Suzerainty state in addition.

On the issues of franchise and qualification, political rights are devolved to ‘internal affairs’ to be run by the Transvaal Republic.

1883 – Paul Kruger is elected as the President of the Transvaal Republic on 9 May 1883, ending the Triumvirate. He beats Joubert on election promises of increased Church involvement in State, an immigration policy in favour of the white Boer citizens, a cordial stance towards Britain and that the un-enfranchised majority of Black and Coloured citizens of the Transvaal Republic remain as:

‘obedient native races in their appointed districts.’18

From 1883 onwards, as President of the Transvaal Republic/ZAR, Paul Kruger comes to define a system of government and an ideology in the Transvaal known as “Krugerism”. Krugerism, extolled an anti-modernist social and economic order. Contemporary writers at the time almost unanimously conclude that Kruger himself headed this order:

‘as the Kommandant of a medieval oligarchy. Kruger was hemmed in by the “hurrying tide of civilisation”, leaving him and his following “rooted in the seventeenth century”.’19

Krugerism deepened the role of the Dutch Reformed Church and State as a Theocracy, whilst maintaining a white Protestant oligarchy in power. Franchise rights were still not afforded to Jews and Catholics and no political rights were afforded to ‘coloured’ or ‘native’ ZAR citizens whatsoever – even legally according to the constitution a ‘white’ man could not be tried in conjunction with a ‘black’ man in a ZAR court of law. Laws for each racial group were fundamentally separated as specified in the ZAR constitution. The language policy was ‘Dutch’ only in all facets of government and law.

Krugerism entailed compulsory “Commando” military commitments for all white Boer males per the constitution with “unusual” devolved powers to appointed “veldkornets” to marshal all white citizens – this, along with increased GDP focus on munitions, state intelligence services and state police (known as ZARPS) ensured the ZAR’s oligarchy was ensconced in power along the lines of a “Police State”.

Economically, Krugerism advocated ‘local’ (Boer) controlled monopolies to encourage manufacture called  ‘konsensies’ (concessions).20 Concessions extended to all facets of economic production, including eventually the infamous “dynamite” monopoly on mining.

1884 – desirous of returning the name of the region to the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) and desirous of full sovereignty as an independent republic and the removal of the British Suzerainty, a Boer delegation, including Kruger, is sent to London to re-negotiate the terms of the Pretoria Convention.

The London Convention is signed on 27 February 1884, the Republic is re-named the ZAR, however the issue of Suzerainty becomes key – the word “Suzerainty” is dropped from the pre-amble as a sap to Paul Kruger and his report back to his ‘Raad’, however all the legal constructs of the Suzerainty remain unchanged – the ZAR is permitted self governance for its “internal affairs” only, and the British still have full oversight of all the ZAR’s “external affairs” (foreign affairs), its borders and its preferred trade with the British status – the only exception that is made is ZAR’s foreign relations with the OFS. The ZAR remains a British ‘vassal state’ and is still not fully “sovereign”.

The Boer delegation to the London Convention 1884, insert picture Queen Victoria during this period.

On “internal affairs” the ZAR assures the British that white British citizens and white Boer citizens will enjoy the same equal rights status as they held in 1877 with no change – no such emancipation or political rights are specified for Black or Coloured citizens.

The London Convention was a poorly conceived compromise and the Suzerain unclear, the treaty would cause significant political abrasion and tension between Britain and the ZAR for the next 15 years.

1886 – Significant gold deposits are discovered along a reef known as the Witwatersrand in the ZAR, triggering a “gold rush” of large numbers of foreign miners – mainly British into the ZAR, but also significant numbers of migrant Black miners and labourers. Johannesburg is established and very quickly the demographic balance between white British settlers and white Boer settlers in the ZAR changes in favour of the British.

1895 – the Jameson Raid, 29 December 1895 to 2 January 1896 takes place – it’s a botched raid to enact regime change in the ZAR. The raid is made up of British privateers led by Starr Jameson with the support of ‘The Reform Committee’ led by mining Randlords on the ZAR’s gold reef. It is supported by the mining magnate and Cape Colony Premier – Cecil John Rhodes, and although the Raid takes place without the knowledge of the British foreign office and Westminster it leads to considerable souring of the British and Boer relationship. Kruger unsuccessfully attempts to have the 1884 London Convention and the Suzerain declared null and void because of what he sees as a breach of contract.

1897 – Alfred Milner is charged by the British with bringing matters to a head with Kruger and resolving the ZAR unrest situation, on the idea of implementing the colour blind ‘Cape Franchise’ in the ZAR, he writes to Herbert Asquith (a future Prime Minister) and says:

With your great two principles that (1) we seek to restore good relations between the Dutch (Boers) and the English and (2) we should secure for the natives … adequate and sufficient protection against oppression and wrong … the object No.2 is the principle obstacle to the attainment of object No.1 … I should feel quite confident of been able to get over the Dutch-English difficulty if it were not so horribly complicated by the native question.’21

In a letter to a friend, Milner would further lament on the complication of dealing with the ‘native question’ and the ZAR and says:

‘(If I did not have) some conscience about the treatment of blacks I personally could win over the Dutch in the Colony and indeed all the South African dominion without offending the English. You have only to sacrifice ‘the nigger’ and the game is easy. Any attempt to secure fair play for them makes the Dutch fractious and almost unmanageable’.22

Kruger flouts the 1884 London Convention restrictions on foreign affairs unilaterally approaching France and Germany for support and he challenges the suzerainty. On 6 March 1897 Joseph Chamberlain writes to Kruger to remind him that the ZAR is still a British suzerain, and he is also in violation of laws concerning emigration of foreigners – in contravention of Article 14 of the 1884 Convention.23

1898 – The British historian, Professor Andrew Roberts FRHistS FRSL would summarise Krugerism at this juncture. The ZAR, although a Republic in name was in no way a democracy. Jews and Catholics were forbidden to hold office, Johannesburg was not allowed a municipal council, English was banned in all official proceedings, the Judiciary was appointed by Kruger, Kruger controlled all the government monopolies, no open air public meetings were permitted, the freedom of the press was not guaranteed and …

‘Above all, full citizenship was almost impossible to gain for non-Boers. Pretoria ran a tight, tough, quasi-police state.’24

In terms of Church and State, although ZAR is a Oligarchy, Krugerism brings Dutch Reformed ‘Churches’ closer, so much so the ZAR at times resembles a Theocracy and the Raad busies itself with passing legislation that appeases God. An example was a debate in 1895 which forbid the firing of explosives into clouds to induce rain or firing a weapon into the sky as these actions were deemed as ‘being offensive to the Almighty’.25

President Paul Kruger and his cabal.

1899 – With growing imbalance of voter demographics and tensions resulting in political instability in the ZAR, Paul Kruger would seek to consolidate power into Boer hands and unshackle the Suzerain preventing “full” Boer independence of Britain. He would do this through leveraging and denying of political rights and the franchise for white protestant British gold miners now making the ZAR their permanent domicile.

The issue of “political rights” for all the new ‘foreign’ settlers in the ZAR of all colours and creeds and “political freedom” from Britain for the Boers would play the pivot role in the Casus Belli of an upcoming war – the South African War (1899-1902).

With tensions rising over the franchise qualification period and the Milner and Kruger negotiations and breakdown thereof from 30 May to 6 June 1899, both sides start to prepare for war. Whilst in a numerical advantage, the two Boer Republics declare war on Britain on 11 October 1899 by way of an ultimatum followed by a military invasion of all neighbouring British colonies.

F.W. Reitz issues ‘A Century of Wrong’ (in conjunction with Jan Smuts) as an explanation for the Boer Casus Belli – he concludes it with the Afrikaner Bonds nationalist slogan calling for an Afrikaner led paramountcy in Southern Africa. It reads:

As in 1880, we now submit our cause with perfect confidence to the whole world. Whether the result be Victory or Death, Liberty will assuredly rise in South Africa like the sun from out the mists of the morning, just as Freedom dawned over the United States of America a little more than a century ago. Then from the Zambezi to Simon’s Bay it will be: “AFRICA FOR THE AFRICANDER.”26

1900 – from January 1900, the British ‘Army Force’ starts to land. Bloemfontein, the capital of the OFS falls to British forces on 13 March 1900. Pretoria, the capital of the ZAR falls on 5 June 1900. Thereafter the Boer Forces change strategy from conventional warfare to unconventional “hit and run” guerrilla warfare focusing primarily on extended British lines of supply and razing ‘hensopper’ (surrendering Boers taking oaths of loyalty) farmsteads, ‘Joiner’ (Boers joining British forces) farmsteads and British Loyalist farmsteads.

This in turn forces the British to focus on the localised Boer Commandos lines of supply – their ‘bittereinder’ (Boer Forces refusing surrender) farmsteads – and a controversial ‘scorched earth’ policy to raze these farmsteads is implemented – this is done along with a “refugee camp” (concentration camp) policy to deal with all the civilian displacement, comprising both loyalist civilians displaced by Boer actions and bittereinder civilians displaced by British actions.

1901 – Two vastly different types of British “refugee” camps emerge – ‘white’ Boer “concentration” camps taking in displaced white men, women and children of Bittereinders, Joiners, Hensoppers and loyalists (and the odd Black servant) – these camps are run along the lines of tented refugee camps and internees are provided rations (albeit limited), shelter and not forced to labour.

‘Black’ “concentration” camps taking in displaced native farm labour, again men, women and children, are however fundamentally different to the white Boer camps, they are more rudimentary, rations and shelters are highly limited and are purchased in exchange for work. Ultimately these camps are run along the lines of labour camps in support of British ‘Total War’ military objectives.

Black concentration camps of the Boer War – main image courtesy Dr. Garth Benneyworth, insert image colourised by Jenny B.

Both types of camps experience a high incidence of disease (contact and contamination) and civilian death rate. Over the duration of the war, 29,491 Boer Camp civilian deaths are recorded, of which 2/3 are children and infants, all attributed to disease – in the case of children this is attributed primarily to a measles epidemic which sweeps the camps 27.

Over 30,000 Black “concentration” camp civilian deaths are recorded – minimum, the complete Black death toll for the Boer War including both disease and starvation casualties in Black internment or labour camps and in key British towns like Kimberley besieged by Boer forces is projected to be as high as 50,000.28

Noteworthy here, is historian Dr. Garth Benneyworth’s research into the ‘Black’ internment camps of the Boer War, specifies that ‘Blacks’ are not merely “participants” in the war, and the Boer and Black “concentration” camps are not a “shared trauma” of “mutual suffering” at the hands of the British as:

‘The separation of internees along racial lines created fundamentally different internee experiences’29

The first round of peace talks to end The South African War open at Middleburg from 28 February to March 16 1901 between Lord Kitchener and General Louis Botha. One of the conditions of peace specified by the British is the implementation colour blind franchise as it exists in the surrounding territories in the two Boer Republics. The accompanying statement in this respect reads:

‘… the legal position of Kaffirs will be similar to that which they hold in the Cape Colony’30

The peace proposals, on all counts including the question of a colour blind franchise, are universally rejected by the Boers and the war continues.

The latter half of the South African War is marred by the ‘guerilla warfare’ phase which produces two highly undesirable results. The concentration camps become overcrowded and steadily unmanageable and the Boers implement a policy of executing any Black or Coloured person in the service of the British military on the spot, General Christiaan de Wet would inform Lord Kitchener that he personally issued the order and writes:

‘the ungovernable barbarity of the natives realises itself in practice in such a manner that we felt ourselves obliged to give quarter to no native and for these reasons we gave general instructions to our Officers to have all armed natives and native spies shot.’31

Kitchener responds to de Wet:

‘….. (I am) astonished at the barbarous instructions you (General de Wet) have given as regards the murder of natives who have behaved in my opinion, in an exemplary manner during the war.32

Black contractors in the service of British forces, insert General Christiaan de Wet

The ruthless massacres of ‘Black’, ‘Indian’ and ‘Coloured’ citizens and contractors by Boer Generals and Commandants at Tweebosch, Leliefontein, Modderfontein, Uniondale, Calvinia and many other places come to define the closing phase of the South African War.

1902 – The second round of peace talks at Vereeniging end the South African War on 31 May 1902. Joseph Chamberlain insisted the issue of the Colour Blind qualified franchise for the two former Boer Republics is included, however this turns into a deal breaker for the Boers. The British attempt to strike a compromise and the initial draft of the Vereeniging Peace treaty includes the following phrase:

‘The Franchise will not be given to NATIVES until after the Introduction of Self-Government’.

This meant it would be given to them as part of the future self-government package. The Boer delegation even reject this concept, General Jan Smuts in his capacity as a lawyer convinces the British that the Boers will address the matter ‘in the future’ after self governance is granted (here Smuts is looking to the future South African ‘Union’) and the phase is changed again to read:

‘The question of granting the franchise to Natives will not be decided until after the introduction of self-government.’

This meant that the all white parliaments of the Transvaal and Orange Free State would independently decide the colour blind qualified franchise on their own, only after self-government is granted them, and even in that instance they may or may not decide to implement it.

Historian Peter Warwick would claim that as to the future emancipation of Blacks in South Africa this was the most significant clause of the surrender33 Black leaders would look to this as been ‘sold out’ by the British, especially given their considerable military resources and man-power used to help the British win the war.

1903 – With the Boer Republics under British control – The Transvaal Colony and Orange River Colony (both “officially” established in 1902). Lord Milner commissions a study into the “native question” i.e. the black emancipation issue, called the “South African Native Affairs Commission”. It would report back two years later.

1905 – the “South African Native Affairs Commission” reports. It’s Edwardian in its outlook on social Darwinism i.e. recognising where various races lie on a social “civilisation” track – but it does make key recommendations: That the “Cape Law” i.e the Colour Blind qualified franchise is applied across the entire country. In terms property rights it recognisers that land ownership laws applicable in the Cape be extended to the rest of South Africa and to acknowledge Black rights to own land – rural and urban. It also recognisers Black aspirations for an equal education.34

1906 – another “khaki” election takes place in the United Kingdom and the Tory Imperialists of the South African war period lose the election to the Liberal Party led by Henry Campbell-Bannerman – during the South African War, as opposition, the Liberal Party had taken an “Anti-War” ticket and took a “Pro-Boer” position. Campbell-Bannerman famously accused the Tories during the South African War of using “methods of barbarism” in dealing with the white Boer civilian population.

This “anti-Imperialist” and “Pro-Boer” position would lead to this majority “Liberal” government giving concessions to Boer ‘Afrikaner’ politician’s demands ahead of any other demands from South African population or ethnic groups.35

Lord Selborne, the Liberal Party’s new man on the ground, replaced Lord Milner as High Commissioner for South Africa and Governor of the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies. Although Selborne is in favour of extending the Cape Colour Blind Qualified Franchise and land ownership and other recommendations of the “South African Native Affairs Commission” to the old Boer Republics – he is unable to do so, as it would be in violation of the terms of the Vereeniging Peace Accord which Campbell-Bannerman intends to honour. According to Godfrey Lagdon, the Transvaal Commissioner for Native Affairs:

‘(the Boers) would “bitterly resent” it, and it would likely re-ignite the war’36

The Campbell-Bannerman government later grants ‘Responsible Government’ to the Transvaal Colony on 6 December 1906 which reinstates a Boer led Parliament for the region led by General Louis Botha.

1907 – the Campbell-Bannerman government grants ‘Responsible Government’ to the Orange River Colony on 27 November 1907 which reinstates a Boer led Parliament for the region led by Abraham Fischer.

Unlike the Cape Colony and Natal Colony’s ‘Colour Blind’ franchise, the Boer led Parliaments of the Orange River Colony and Transvaal Colony implement a whites only ‘Colour Bar’ franchise.

1908 – To complete the regions ambition to “self governance” as specified in the Vereeniging Peace Accord, the leaders of the old Boer Republics (now in leadership positions in the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal Colony) and the Colonial leadership of the Cape Colony and Natal Colony as well as Rhodesia commence the “The Closer Union Convention” or “National Convention” from 12 October 1908, with the intention of bringing a federation of states together under a unitary paramountcy for shared ‘white’ control (Boer and Brit) – from ‘the Zambezi to the Cape’ – all under the British “family of nations”. The convention is a “whites only” affair for all intents and purposes.

1909 – The Closer Union Convention concludes on 11 May 1909 and agrees to a “Greater Union for South Africa” in phases. Jan Smuts’ plan for union sees Phase 1: the initial South African ‘Union’ between the Cape, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal sans the British “High Commission Territories” consisting of Bechuanaland (Botswana), Lesotho and Swaziland. Phase 2: This later phase encompasses the territorial ambitions of the Union and would see the incorporation of the “High Commission Territories”, German South West Africa (Namibia), the southern half of Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique – Delagoa bay) and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to all join the South African Union.37

The convention concludes that South Africa will be a unitary state with centralised authority. On the thorny issue of Franchise – the ‘English’ led Cape delegates are insistent the Cape ‘colour blind’ Franchise is applied across the entire country, the ‘Afrikaans’ led Free State and Transvaal delegates are immovable on a ‘colour bar’ whites only franchise for the entire country. A compromise is struck which ensures the Cape Franchise is ensconced in the new Union of South Africa constitution on a 2/3 majority for the Cape and Natal provinces, whilst the Transvaal and Orange Free State continue with the colour bar franchise until a future “independent” South African Union Parliament can resolve the matter.

Olive Schreiner, the South African author would make a startling prediction in her letter to the convention when she says:

‘The idea that a man born in this country, possibly endowed with many gifts and highly cultured, should in this, his native land, be refused any form of civic or political right on the ground that he is descended from a race with a civilisation, it may be, much older than our own, is one which must be abhorrent to every liberalised mind. I believe that an attempt to base our national life on distinctions of race and colour, as such, will, after the lapse of many years, prove fatal to us.’38

The “High Commission Territories” (Bechuanaland (Botswana), Lesotho and Swaziland) being ‘Black’ Kingdoms under British protection resolve to remain outside of the Union for the time being, fearful of the sharp racist construct of the Franchise laws in the old Boer Republics. They adopt a “wait and see” approach. As does Rhodesia which eventually opts for a plebiscite to decide of the matter of union with South Africa in 1923.

In Britain, the Pro-Boer governing Liberal Party, now under Herbert Henry Asquith agree to the Closer Union Convention’s recommendations on constitutional, legislative and economic design and they pass “The South Africa Act 1909” which establishes the South African Union as a “Responsible” Self-Governing State with ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty’ – which essentially separated the South African Parliament from Westminster and British Common Law, the South African Union now free to make laws of its own independent of Britain.

The South Africa Act goes ahead despite the “Schreiner Mission” to Britain made up of William Schreiner (the Premier of the Cape Colony), Dr. Abdurahman (the ‘Coloured’ deputation leader) and J.T. Jabavu (leader of the ‘African’ deputation and future ANC) – its mission to convince Westminster of the need to confer the right to vote upon all South Africans regardless of colour. They prophetically warn the British that the future South African Union Parliament with an independent Parliamentary Sovereignty bestowed on it would be empowered to remove the franchise from persons of colour at the Cape.

1910 – The Union of South Africa comes into official existence on 31 May 1910 with independent Parliamentary Sovereignty free of Westminster. The first Union elections are held 15 September 1910, the “Pro-Afrikaner” side of the house – The South African Party in conjunction with Orange Unie (OFS) and Het Volk (Transvaal) win the majority of the house with 66 seats.

Botha’s first cabinet of South African Party members – insert flag is the first national flag of South Africa.

1912 – The South African Native National Congress (renamed the African National Congress in 1923) is formed in Bloemfontein on 8 January 1912 in reaction to the lack of adequate Black representation in the formation of the Union of South Africa and the Closer Union Convention.

1913 – The South African Union with Parliament under the Pro-Afrikaner ‘South African Party’ (SAP) majority government led by Prime Minister Louis Botha – comprising the old ZAR and OFS Boer ‘Bittereinder’ Generals – Louis Botha himself, Koos de la Rey, Jan Smuts, Barry Hertzog, Christiaan de Wet et al – table and then pass the ‘Native Land Act 1913’. To re-affirm the South African Union’s Parliament as “independent” of Britain, the legislation is “rushed” and passed without the input or approval of the British.

This act enforces ‘segregation’ and marginalises Black South Africans economically into a role of perpetual servitude and serfdom. Roughly 20% of “good land” was in the hands of Black Africans in 1913. The Native Land Act reduced Black African land to 7%. It demarcated “Black” farmland and “White” farmland as land solely for either Blacks or Whites. The black farmers and sharecroppers were disadvantaged to the larger degree, they cannot buy land and many are disposed of their land – with little choice many simply became labour on “white” farms.39

‘The Land Act was an anti-capitalist measure aimed at preserving a semi-feudal relationship between white land owners and black “serfs” (with no claim to land ownership)’40

The South African Native National Congress and Sol Plaatjie’s efforts to protest this legislation to the British, still under the governing party of the Pro-Boer Liberal Party, falls on deaf ears.

General James ‘Barry’ Munnik Hertzog is the Orange Free State champion in South African Party, and holds a Cabinet position. However he comes to loggerheads with Prime Minister Louis Botha over ‘language policy’ – Botha and Smuts believe in a “one stream” policy which will see ‘English’ and ‘Afrikaners’ eventually merge as a unitary entity. Hertzog believes in a ‘two-stream’ policy which would see Afrikaans and English speaking whites ‘separated’ in all socialisation aspects – education, culture, religion etc. so as to develop ‘apart’ from one another, and Afrikaner ‘nationalism’ is to carry its own momentum. Known as “Hertzogism”, it divided Botha’s party and resulted in Botha removing Hertzog from his cabinet.

“Hertzogism” is also a pre-curser of Apartheid thinking as the “two stream” policy is eventually extended to exclude Blacks to develop “separately” and “apart” from “whites” in addition.

1914 – Hertzog moves to resign from Botha’s South African Party (SAP), and spits the SAP with key SAP Orange Free State ministers moving with him to establish the National Party in January 1914, effectively ending Afrikaner unity41. The National Party moves to adopt “Hertzogism” and “Krugerism” as its central ideology.

The Nationalists take their initial inspiration from the United States of America (USA), drawing inspiration from Jim Crow, they also admired the USA for having won its war of independence against Britain. They were influenced by the Irish republican movement with a reverence for the notion of popular sovereignty and ethnic self-determination – principles which they did not want to apply to Blacks.42

World War 1 (1914-1918) commences on 28 July 1914. The Union of South Africa, primarily to fulfil its territorial ambitions for German South West Africa (GSWA)43, per the Closer Union Convention, votes in a parliamentary landslide to declare war on Imperial Germany and invade GSWA – 92 votes “for” and 12 votes “against”.

This triggers the ‘Afrikaner Rebellion 1914’, a handful of senior South African Union Defence Force officers and a few ministers of Botha’s South African Party, including the Boer War ‘Volk-hero’ General Christiaan de Wet go into open treason in support of Imperial Germany and he leads the rebellion alongside Lt. Col Manie Maritz, General Christiaan Beyers and Major Jan Kemp et al.

Although Anglophobia is a cited reason for the Rebellion, Philip Sampson a commentator (and historian) at the time argues that the ‘colour blind franchise’ and human rights for ‘natives’ are also key motivations for the rebellion – the Afrikaner rebels are intent on maintaining a Afrikaner led hegemony, an oligarchy based on “Krugerism” as an ideology – which means no franchise or emancipation to anyone of colour. The declaration of war to invade GSWA presents an opportunity for these Afrikaner leaders, with the assistance of Germany, to take over the whole of South Africa and implement this Republican ideal and political construct of theirs.

This sentiment is manifest in Christiaan de Wet, who would go on to say of the Cape Colour Blind Qualified Franchise’, still upheld in the Cape Providence:

‘The ungodly policy of Botha has gone on long enough, and the South African Dutch are going to stand as one man to crush this unholy scandal.’44

To prevent a ‘Black’ uprising in resistance to the Afrikaner Rebellion and maintain white authority, Maritz would make a draconian declaration and states:

‘… an emphatic warning is issued that all coloured people and natives who are captured with arms, as well as their officers, will be made to pay the penalty with their lives.’45

The Afrikaner Rebellion is poorly supported – only 11,476 Boers join the rebellion – primarily desperate ‘bywoner’ (landless or sharecropper farmers) from the Orange Free State, promised a better life if the rebellion was successful.46Strategically, Operationally and Tactically the Rebellion is poorly conceived and poorly led. General Louis Botha is able to crush the rebellion in a matter of months. The state deals with all the rebel leaders with Kidd gloves, with the exception of Jopie Fourie who is executed for treason – Fourie would go on to become a Afrikaner Nationalist martyr and carry with his legacy an on-going and intense National Party propaganda campaign to demonise General Jan Smuts.

On Indian politics, Smuts and Gandhi settle the Indian Relief Act of 1914 abolished the Indian tax which affected indentured labourers and Indian ‘free men’ domiciled in Natal, it facilitated widespread reforms to all Indians domicile in South Africa.47

1917 – The South African Party under Botha, in collaboration with the National Party under Hertzog table the ‘Native Affairs Administration Bill – 1917’, which institutionalises “segregation” between race groups – specifically Black and White. It is debated by not passed – it’s repeatedly amended over the years and only eventually passed as the ‘Native Administration Act’ in 1927 when the National Party has commanding oversight of it.

1918 – The Broederbond is established, a Calvinist, adult white male only Afrikaner secret organisation to forward Afrikaner Nationalist aims and objects on Christian principles.48

1919 – Prime Minister Louis Botha dies suddenly of heart failure after a bout of influenza, aged just 56. Jan Smuts takes over the party leadership of the SAP and the Premiership of South Africa.

1921 – the pillars of the General Mission Committee of the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) Cape synod of 1921 were established in conjunction with delegates from the Transvaal and Orange Free State. At that meeting, it was concluded as follows:

‘The practice of the Church follows the doctrine of the State on the relation of the white and the black races to each other. That doctrine is that the white race is and must remain the ruling race. The coloured and the black sections of the population occupy a strictly subordinate position. This is not due to, as is very generally supposed, to the accident of their colour: it is due to their lower stage of cultural development.’49

1922 – the ‘Rand Rebellion 1922’ breaks out in March 1922. The Rebellion is triggered by white ‘communist’ led miners intent on maintaining a work ‘colour’ bar and preventing the Chamber of Mines from taking on cheaper unskilled and skilled Black labour from taking their jobs. Their intention is to spread worldwide Communism under a slogan:

Workers of the world, unite and fight for a white South Africa!50

Hertzog’s National Party in opposition comes out in support of these white communist mine workers, and issues a pamphlet stating:

‘The (National) party would never accept a “black industrial South Africa with a poor white South Africa”‘.51

The white miners call a general strike, however after ‘the strikers began to assault and massacre black people’ 52, the strike devolves into an armed rebellion and the rebels take up defensive positions, the rebellion in turn is brutally repressed by Prime Minister Jan Smuts, who sends the Union Defence Force into Johannesburg to quell it.

Four “English” Communist ring leaders are found guilty of treason and in two cases the murder of Black South Africans in addition, they go to the gallows singing their anthem, ‘The Red Flag’.

1923 – In sympathy with the miners rebellion, the securing of white proletariate class jobs, the idea of self-determination and in mutual opposition to ‘British Capital’ the National Party moves closer to the Labour Party, Hertzog would say of Communism and Labour:

‘We should not fear Bolshevism (Communism) …. The idea in and of itself is excellent.… If we say that we have the right to govern ourselves and we say that it is our duty to express that right, then we are in fact Bolshevists.’53

Dr. Daniël Francois (DF) Malan, the National Party’s Cape leader would also find an unusual bedfellow in Communism and the Labour movement. As Malan put it:

‘the two parties were tied together by their similar resistance against “capitalistic-monopolistic hegemony” (by which he meant the mine owners)’54

Historian and scholar, William Henry Vatcher, Jr. would say:

‘The alliance of Nationalists and Labour was a strange marriage of convenience. Essentially, it was a white man’s front against the Africans created for the purpose of raising white wages and ensuring jobs for the poor whites, the overwhelming majority of whom were Afrikaners.’55

1924 – Mutual resentment over Smuts’ handling of the Rand Rebellion meant that the National Party/Labour Party coalition was victorious at the polls and formed the ‘Pact Government’ in 1924. This would see the National Party take the reins of the country as a ruling party (in coalition with Labour) for the first time and Hertzog would oust the SAP and Smuts and become South Africa’s Prime Minister.

The Labour Party leader, Col. Frederic Creswell in going into the Pact Government ensures that Hertzog’s and the National Party’s ambitions for a white Afrikaner led South African hegemony and Republicanism are shelved,and that the country remains a British dominion with independent Parliamentary sovereignty.56

In coalition, the National Party were however able to pass three important acts which secured employment opportunities for whites and entrenched segregation in the labour market. The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, allows ‘whites’ to unionise, but specifically forbids ‘blacks’ from joining a union. The Wage Act 1925, sets up a wage board and specifically prevents black workers from undercutting “civilised” levels of wages. The Mines and Works Amendment Act of 1926, firmly established the colour bar and job reservation for whites in certain mining jobs.

1926 – Barry Hertzog as Prime Minister is the South African delegate to the Balfour Declaration of 1926. The declaration gives more autonomous powers to all British Dominion’s including South Africa. To Hertzog, the Balfour Declaration of 1926 is sufficient so as to ensure South Africa’s complete legislative independence of Westminster and therefore no need to fulfil the National Party’s ambitions for a South African Republic.

Prime Minister Hertzog, insert flag is the second South African national flag tabled by Hertzog’s National Party and adopted on 31 May 1928.

1929 – at the DRC conference in Kroonstad the Reverent J.C du Plessis makes the first recorded reference to the term “Aparthied” when he said:

‘In the fundamental idea of our missionary work and not in racial prejudice one must seek an explanation for the spirit of Apartheid that has always characterised our Church’s conduct.’57

The 1929 General Election is fought over the matter of women’s suffrage, Hertzog’s National Party win a majority Parliament, no longer requiring the Labour Party to retain a ruling party status.

1930 –  the Women’s Enfranchisement Act, No 18, of 1930 was enacted by the National Party which granted white women over the age of 21, the right to vote and stand for election. This doubles the size of the white voting bloc. Despite promises on universal female suffrage, the franchise is given to white women only – countrywide, female Black and Coloured voters under the Cape provinces’ “Colour Blind Qualification” Franchise are not given the vote.

1931 – The Free State Synod of the DRC in Kroonstad rejects gelykstelling (racial levelling) and social equality with Blacks, and with it, race degeneration and ‘bastardisation’, as ‘an abomination to every right-minded white and native’. The DRC declares Blacks should develop:

‘on their own terrain, separate and apart’.58

In Britain, the “Statute of Westminster 1931” ends the British empire and replaces it with the Commonwealth. South Africa’s self-governance and independence of Britain’s legislature is complete in all things except name.59

The National Party further entrenches and expands the ‘white vote’ when it passes the Franchise Laws Amendment Act, No. 41 of 1931, which removed all property and educational franchise qualifications applying to white men (and women) countrywide, whereas Coloured and Black men under the Cape Franchise are still subject to education and property qualifications to vote (Coloured and Black women are still not allowed to vote).

1933 – The 1933 General Election outcome forces the National Party to “fuse” with the South African Party to tackle the economic challenges of the Great Depression and a maintain an Afrikaner led hegemony in the interests of South Africa’s white population.60 Hertzog led this fusion undertaking as Prime Minister with Smuts as his deputy. Known as the United South African National Party or simply ‘United Party’ (UP), it contained within it a component of Afrikaner nationalists harbouring republican desires and a component within it of Afrikaners satisfied with Union and South Africa’s status as a British Dominion.61

Unhappy with the centre right politics of ‘Fusion’, Louis Theodor Weichardt breaks away from Hertzog’s old National Party and forms a far right Nazi Party equivalent in South Africa on 26 October 1933 called The South African Christian National Socialist Movement with a paramilitary section (modelled on Nazi Germany’s Sturmabteilung) called the ‘Gryshemde’ (Grey-shirts).

Grey-shirt leadership outside the courts in Grahamstown. Insert picture Louis Theodor Weichardt

By December 1933, the ‘Swarthemde’ (Blackshirts) are formed by Manie Wessels – also breaking away from the National Party, they are called the ‘South African National Democratic Movement’ (Nasionale Demokratiese Beweging). The ‘Black-shirts’ form in opposition to the ‘Grey-shirts’ anti-democracy position and look to a more “purified” whites only democracy free of Jewish and Capitalist influence.62 The Black-shirts themselves would splinter into another Black-shirt movement called the ‘South African National People’s Movement’ (Suid Afrikaanse Nasionale Volksbeweging), started by Chris Havemann and based in Johannesburg, these Black-shirts advanced a closer idea of National Socialism.63 

1934 – by May 1934, the ‘Grey-shirts’ combine with the South African Christian National Socialist Movement and form a new enterprise called ‘The South African National Party’ (SANP). The SANP would all keep the ‘grey-shirts’ as their dress and the caveat of ‘Grey-shirts’ – their political position is one of anti-semitism and pure national socialism (Nazism), the swastika is adopted as the party emblem. Overall, Weichardt saw democracy as an outdated system and an invention of British imperialism and Jews.64

1935 – The DRC Federal Conference declares that education for whites and blacks should remain separate within the barriers of national identity, and defines ‘Coloureds’ for the first time as a “separate nation” from both Black and White but all are equal as individuals before God.65

The mission policy at a DRC Synod held in 1931 in Kroonstad was officially promulgated in 1935 as the official DRC mission policy. It was at this conference that the DRC expressed itself unequivocally against any form of equality (gelykstelling) between blacks and whites.

The church affirmed that the natives had souls as white people have and that they possessed a soul of equal value in the eyes of God. However, in order to stick to this fundamental belief and at the same time to stick to their ‘treasured policy of inequality and separateness’.66

The 1935 DRC Federal Conference reaffirmed the 1931 Free State Synod ‘twist’ i.e. that blacks should develop ‘on their own terrain and apart’ from whites. Language, customs, culture and colour became determinants and the policy was securely aligned with that of the government of the day.67

On the political front, in 1935 the Afrikaner nationalists to the political far right are unhappy with the idea of Fusion between Hertzog and Smuts and their ex-National Party colleagues in the new United Party. The breakaway is led by the DRC theologian Dr. Daniël Francois (DF) Malan and they reconstitute themselves as the ‘Purified’ National Party (PNP).68

The ,central objective of the PNP was a complete break with Britain and the establishment of an independent oligarchy Republic under a white Afrikaner hegemony.69 Anglophobia was a critical ideology underpinning DF Malan’s PNP and Malan sought to exclude English speakers from the PNP completely.70

1936 – the arrival of the S.S. Stuttgart in Cape Town on the 27th October 1936 packed with 537 Jewish refugees on board71 sharply brought the National Party’s policies of immigration and race into focus – it defined what sort of ‘demographics’ the Pure National Party were prepared to focus on to augment the ‘white races’ in South Africa and which were the ‘undesirables’. The arrival of the SS Stuttgart was met with a mass protest of some 3,000 ‘Grey-shirts’.72

The arrival of the SS Stuttgart – insert picture Dr. H.F. Verwoerd

Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd showed his antisemitic colours when he and a deputation of four fellow minded Nationalist academics – Christiaan Schumann, Dr. Johannes Basson and Dr. Theophilus E. Dönges from Stellenbosch University and Frans Labuschagne of Potchefstroom University joined hands with the Grey-shirts and lodged protest with Hertzog’s’ government as to the immigration of Jews from Nazi Germany.73 

At this point these Afrikaner Nationalist academics were concerning themselves with the poor white problem and ‘völkisch‘ mobilisation warning that Jews were ‘unassailable‘ to the Afrikaner Volk , they met to protest the SS Stuttgart at the University of Stellenbosch on 27 October 1936 and resolved that Jews were ‘undesirable‘ on account of ‘religion’ and ‘blood mingling‘ and that ‘cultural cooperation‘ with them was impossible.74

On 4 November, Dr Theophilus E. Dönges (future NP Acting Prime Minister) would nail the Nationalists colours to the mast and said: 

“The Jew is an insoluble element in every national life.”

1937 – DS Valie Strydom of the DRC writes a paper on Apartheid titled “the policy of Apartheid here in our land and the United States of America” comparing it to American South state segregation policies on schooling, church and suburbs as a model for both Coloured and Black Africans in South Africa.75

On the political front, in the wake of the ‘Stuttgart incident’, Dr. DF Malan tables an Immigration and Naturalisation Bill which sought to exclude immigrants who were ‘unassailable‘ with Afrikaner culture and even economics of the Afrikaner Volk and deal with ‘the Jewish problem’ as he termed it. This in turn led to the ‘Aliens Bill of 1937′ 76 being passed by the Hertzog led United Party government which although a watered down version of Malan’s original proposal, still pandered to issue of cultural and economic ‘assimilation’ to prevailing ‘European’ white culture in South Africa – opening the way for the “right kind” of European immigrants (the Aryan kind) and not the wrong kind (the Jewish kind).

1938 – The ‘Baster Plakaat’ political illustration appears in the ‘Die Vaderland’, a National Party mouthpiece on 12 May 1938 and marks the trigger point where ‘Race Law’ starts to enter into National Party thinking from the political front using mass media. Building on a combination of the Nazi Nuremberg Race laws (which banned ‘mixed’ blood marriages of different races and Jews) and Jim Crow American segregation laws (the separation of blacks and whites on which the Nazi German lawyers based their Nuremberg Laws). 

The Baster Plakaat as it appeared in National Party mouthpiece broad-sheet media and election posters.

The race laws find context and expression in a ‘Pure’ Voortrekker woman, in prayer to God and in ‘pure’ white traditional kappie and dress – now “tainted” with “Kaffir” blood, the words ‘dans met Kaffirs’ (dances, i.e to have sexual relations with the black native ‘Kaffirs’) writ in blood … a warning to keep races apart and prevent intercourse lest the purity of soul and the honour of white Afrikanerdom is compromised.77

On the theological front, the Rev. Koot Vorster (the future Prime Minister’s older brother) writes:

‘The Afrikaner’s freedom lies at the foundation of our aspiration and will to keep our blood pure and not to allow our people to miscegenation (bastardise).’78

DF Malan’s Purified National Party (PNP) become the official opposition to Hertzog’s United Party ‘fusion’ after the General Election held on 18 May 1938. Malan and the Purified Nationalists at their The Union Congress of the Nationalist Party in 1938 declared:

‘This Congress regards the dominant position of the White race in the spirit of guardianship as of vital importance to the future and welfare of South Africa. It declares therefore that it must be the earnest and determined struggle of that race to preserve its racial purity, to ensure the creation of a sound relationship between it and the non-White races, and also to avoid its economic destruction.’79

Dr. Malan then proclaimed the basic slogan of the Nationalists would be:

‘We want to make sure that South Africa remains a White man’s country.’

In 1938, the Broederbond under the directive of its Chairman, Henning Klopper sought to use the centenary of Great Trek to unite the ‘Cape Afrikaners’ and the ‘Boere Afrikaners’ under the symbology of the Great trek. In this endeavour artificially creating a shared Afrikaner heritage under the pioneering symbology of the Great Trek and to literally map a “path to a South African Republic” under a white Afrikaner hegemony. Klopper started a Great Trek re-enactment with two Ox-Wagons in Cape Town on 8 August 1938, and addressed the large crowd of 20,000 spectators by saying;

‘Let us build up a monument for Afrikaner hearts. May this simple trek bind together in love those Afrikaner hearts which do not yet beat together. We dedicate these wagons to our People and to our God.80

The trek re-enactment was very successful, and Klopper managed to realign white Afrikaner identity under the Broederbond’s Christian Nationalist ideology calling on providence and declaring it a:

‘sacred happening’81

1939 – The Ossewabrandwag was formed on 4 February 1939 (OB, the Ox-Wagon Sentinel) on the back of the 1938 Great Trek Centennial celebration and tasked with spreading the Broederbond’s (and the PNP’s) ideology of Christian Nationalism like “wildfire” across the country (hence the name Ox wagon “Sentinel”).

Application of Group Areas, insert picture the Rev. Koot Vorster

The Rev. Koot Vorster crosses over from his career as a theologian studying Church Law in the DRC to politician when he Chairs the ‘Separate Neighbourhoods Organisation’ which is a think tank for Group Areas Act and the Separate Representations Act, both keystone ‘pillars’ of National Party’s future Apartheid policy.82

‘In 1939 a ‘colour petition’ organised by the Pure Nationalists and signed by 230,619 Whites was presented to Parliament but not discussed. It demanded: (1) a ban on all mixed marriages; (2) all blood-mixing of White and non-White to be punishable (3) all deurmekaarwonery (living of the various races side by side) to be ended; and (4) economic and political segregation of White and non-White.’83

Manie Maritz, the Afrikaner Rebellion 1914 leader and Afrikaner “people’s hero”, also admired German National Socialism and split from his association with Hertzog’s old National Party to join the SANP Grey-shits, after a leadership purge he joined Chris Havemann’s Black-shirts. A converted antisemite and extreme racist, Maritz blamed the South African War on a Jewish conspiracy. He publishers an autobiography “My Lewe en Strewe” (my life and purpose) in 1939 and he outlines his political purpose to bring “the protocols of the elders of Zion” (a discredited racist propaganda document) and the dangers of Freemasonry, Judaism and Bolshevism contained therein to the Afrikaner people.84

Manie Maritz and a section from My Lewe en Strewe

Dr. Nico Diederichs (future National Party ceremonial State President) on 9 May 1939, in his capacity of the Chairman of the Broederbond, would meet Herr. H. Kirchner, a Nazi foreign ministry representative in South Africa. Diederichs assures Kirchner that the divisions in Afrikanerdom had been overcome by the purging of Freemasons from Broederbond (which he had personally seen to) – he would go on to say that the Pure National Party (PNP) was a committed anti-semitic party and as policy had hung its hat on it, he assures Kirchner that Dr. DF Malan, Malan is also a committed anti-semitic. Diederichs however feels that more needs to be done to frame up National Party policies in line with National Socialism and confides in Kirchner that he does not think Dr. DF Malan is the man to do it, rather the implementation of the ‘anti-democratic’ and other national socialist principles should he left to Dr. Hans van Rensburg (future leader of the Ossewabrandwag) who he also feels would be ideal leader of the Purified National Party going forward.85

By July 1939, the Black-shirts were formally incorporated into the OB and focussed on the recruiting of ‘Christian minded National Aryans’ into the OB and starts to infuse it with National Socialist “volkisch” Nationalism.86

World War 2 breaks out when Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939, the United Party found itself in a dilemma and a parliamentary three-way debate would take place. This debate, primarily between the two factions in the United Party (Hertzog’s cabal and Smut’s cabal) and the Purified Nationalists, was whether South Africa should go to war against Germany or remain neutral.

Prime Minister Hertzog was very confident he had the majority to carry a motion of neutrality. However Smuts’ argument that to stand aside from the conflict would be to expose the whole “civilised” world to danger wins the day.87  Smuts’ amendment to Hertzog’s Motion of Neutrality was carried by 80 votes to 67 votes on the 4 September 1939 and South Africa finds itself at war against Nazi Germany. Surprised at the outcome, Hertzog promptly resigned and along with 36 of his supporters left the United Party, thereby leaving the South African Premiership and the leadership of the United Party to Smuts.88

1940 – Hertzog moved to form a new party – the “Volksparty” and successfully reconciled with the “Malanites” in the PNP to then form the “Herenigde Nasionale Volksparty” (HNP) 89 or Reunited National Party in January 1940.90 However, on 5 November 1940 at the HNP’s Convention in Bloemfontein, Hertzog reaffirmed his position on English-speakers rights, and falling on deaf ears, he grabbed his hat and walked out of the National Party forever, leaving the leadership of the HNP to Malan.

Oswald Pirow, whilst Hertzog’s old Minister of Defence met with Adolf Hitler, Hermann Göring, Benito Mussolini and Francisco Franco, and he becomes a convert to Nazism and Fascism. On 14 March 1940 Smuts forced Pirow out of his position as Minister of Defence for mismanaging his parliamentary portfolio, rendering the defence force unfit for wartime purposes and his failed “bush cart strategy”.91

Pirow gambled his career on a Nazi Germany victory and on 25 September 1940, he founded the national socialist ‘New Order’ (NO) for South Africa. He positioned it as a study group within the reformulated National Party (HNP), and based it on Hitler’s new order plans for Africa.92 During the Second World War, Pirow also positioned the NO as a defender of whites in Africa against the threat of Communism.93 In terms of the NO’s values, Pirow espoused Nazi ideals and advocated the “anti-democratic” principle an authoritarian state.94

The Rev. Koot Vorster in his guise as both a Church Leader and Ossewabrandwag ‘General’ conflates National Socialist “Führerprinzip” or Leader Principle and Afrikaner identity and the need for ‘separateness’ to succeed when on 15 September 1940 he states:

‘Hitler’s ‘Mein Kampf’ shows the way to greatness – the path of South Africa. Hitler gave the Germans a calling. He gave them a fanaticism which causes them to stand back for no one. We must follow this example because only by such holy fanaticism can the Afrikaner nation achieve its calling.’95

Hertzog, now in retirement and angered by his treatment at the hands of HNP and Malan, performs a remarkable volte-face and issued a press release in October 1941 in which he championed National Socialism.96 In the release Hertzog excoriated liberal capitalism and the democratic party system, praised Nazism as in keeping with the traditions of the Afrikaner, and argued that South Africa needed the oversight of a one-party state dictatorship.97

Manie Maritz, moving from the Black-shirts, then founded his own anti-parliamentary, pro National Socialist, antisemitic ‘Volksparty’, in Pietersburg in July 1940. 98 This evolved and merged into ‘Die Boerenasie’ (The Boer Nation), a party with National Socialist leanings originally led by J.C.C. Lass (the first Commandant General of the Ossewabrandwag) but briefly taken over by Maritz until his accidental death in December 1940.

On 30 October 1940, J.C.C. Laas resigns from the Ossewabrandwag as the Kommandant General, Malan also makes a declaration in a speech at Cradock which became known as the ‘Cradock Agreement’, defining the respective spheres of the Reunited National Party (HNP) and the Ossewabrandwag (OB). Each organization undertook not to meddle in the affairs of the other. The HNP was to do the work of Afrikanerdom in the party-political sphere, while the OB was to operate on the other (cultural) fronts of the Afrikaner “volk” (people).99

The Broederbond attempts to define Apartheid as a policy and commissions ‘think tanks’ within its structure to come up with it. However it falls short and L.J. du Plessis urges that Segregation is used rather than Apartheid as segregation was the ‘national policy’ in any event and had not reached its fullest potential as:

‘Afrikanerdom had not yet had the chance to carry it out.’.100

1941 – on 15 January 1941 the Ossewabrandwag (OB) came under the leadership of Dr. J.E.J. (Hans) van Rensburg,101 who had served as a National Party administrator of the Orange Free State. He was a strong admirer of Nazi Germany and campaigned for ‘a free Afrikaner republic based on nationalist-Socialist foundations.’ Explicitly rejecting parliamentary politics, the OB insisted that as the only mass movement it represented all Afrikaners. The OB pinned its hopes on a victory Nazi Germany and German help in establishing an Afrikaner republic. The OB had its own division of storm troopers, called the Stormjaers, who actively resisted the war by acts of sabotage and a handful of assassinations.102

Van Rensburg infused the OB with National Socialist ideology, whereafter the organisation took on a distinctive fascist appearance, with Nazi ritual, insignia, structure, oaths and salutes. Ideologically speaking the OB adopted a number of Nazi characteristics: they opposed communism, and approved of antisemitism. The OB adopted the Nazi creed of “Blut und Boden” (Blood and Soil) in terms of both racial purity and an historical bond and rights to the land. They embraced the “Führerprinzip” (Führer Principle) and the “anti-democratic” totalitarian state (rejecting “British” parliamentary democracy). They also used a derivative of the Nazi creed of “Kinder, Küche, Kirche” (Children, Kitchen, Church) as to the role of women and the role of the church in relation to state. In terms of economic policy, the OB also adopted a derivative of the Nazi German economic policy calling for the expropriation of “Jewish monopoly capital” without compensation and added “British monopoly capital” to the mix.103

Ossewabrandwag dress and bearing

On 1 January 1914, the Afrikaner nationalist mouthpiece Die Vaderland called the OB ‘the greatest Afrikaans organisation outside of the Church’ and van Rensburg was not inclined to play second fiddle to Malan, whom he despised as a hide-bound constitutionalist.104

The Rev Koot Vorster, in February 1941 is sentenced to three years hard labour by the Smuts government when he is caught red handed in acts of sedition supporting the Nazi German war effort.105

In September 1941, fearing a leadership crisis over the OB’s encroachment from the cultural realm into the political realm and the promotion of the “Führerprinzip” over D.F. Malan’s more acceptable approach to working within “parliamentary democracy”, Malan in addition fears an ‘armed uprising’ of Afrikaners, so he moves to ‘ban’ OB members from joining the HNP. 106 B.J. “John” Vorster (the future National Party Prime Minister) refuses to resign from either, so the HNP make his mind up for him and expel him.

1942 – Smuts’ delivers a keynote address to the Institute of Race Relations on 21 January 1942, his usual position on ‘black’ and ‘white’ race and patronage changes, he opposes Nazism and attacks the Afrikaner nationalists who accepted Nazism, Smuts states, ‘.. that Nazi ideology of race produces the idea of a master people, the Herrenvolk. That is going back to an old discarded idea of slavery’ … and the policy of ‘segregation had resulted in very great disappointment at the results’ … and he proposes the need for a new policy, including a more equitable territorial (land) reconfiguration and the recognition of increasing Black urbanisation and their political aspirations.’107 Smuts then states:

‘Segregation has fallen on evil days’108

Smuts’ speech rallies the Afrikaner right wing who take up a position that Smuts’ “liberal” policies intend to give Black South Africans the franchise, and that an Afrikaner who did not believe in Afrikaner Nationalism was an “an Afrikaner of another kind”, a “traitor” with a “British heart”.

Smuts addressing both Houses of Parliament in the UK, insert picture shows Jan Hofmeyr, Smuts’ protégé

On the Afrikaner Nationalist right, the firebrand nature of the Ossewabrandwag (OB) also appealed to B.J. Vorster (future National Party Prime Minister and President of South Africa) more than the National Party during the war years. In 1942 he conflates the Broederbond’s ideology of Christian Nationalism with Nazism and Fascism and publicly states:

‘We stand for Christian Nationalism which is an ally of National Socialism. You can call this anti-democratic principle dictatorship if you wish. In Italy it is called Fascism, in Germany National Socialism (Nazism) and in South Africa, Christian Nationalism.’109

In response to growing support for Nazism in the Afrikaner community, a number of Afrikaner Nationalists find themselves interned by the Smuts government for acts of sedition and treason supporting the Nazi German war effort, these include the Broederbond’s legal stalwart Kowie Marais and B.J. Vorster.110

1943 – The DRC Federal Mission Council approaches Prime Minister Jan Smuts and requests a ban on mixed marriages. The DRC mission includes a biologists report from H.B. Fantham, who:

‘maintained that the colouring of black and white intermixture displayed negative social and mental characteristics.’111

Smuts rejects their proposal stating:

‘The line between white and coloured people in many instances could not be drawn.’112

Die Burger uses ‘Apartheid’ for the first time in mass media, when it referred to Apartheid as the:

‘accepted Afrikaner viewpoint’.113

In 1943, Dr. Verwoerd, as the editor of Die Transvaler, sued the English-language newspaper The Star for libel after it accused him of being a Nazi propagandist, the case back-fired as Justice Millin, in a 25,000-word judgement found Verwoerd had indeed being complicit in promoting Nazism and concluded:

‘Dr. Verwoerd caused this large body of German propaganda to be published and that it was along the same themes as the Afrikaans Zeesen reports which was “calculated to make the Germans look on Die Transvaler as a most useful adjunct to this propaganda service”‘.114

1944 – in May 1944, Dr. D.F. Malan and Paul Sauer, offered the first extended defence of Apartheid as a concept in parliament. Malan called for a republic based on the policy of:

‘apartheid and trusteeship, made safe for the white race and the development of the non-white race, according their own aptitude and abilities.’115

1945 – The Reunited National Party adopts Apartheid as its official policy.116

Surrounded by the Red Army, Adolf Hitler commits suicide and 30 April 1945. Nazi Germany unconditionally surrenders to Allied forces on 7 May 1945.

From 20 November 1945 to 1 October 1946, the Nuremberg Trial takes place and exposes the full criminality of the Nazi Party regime and its ideology. The Nazi dogma with its focus on the bogus “protocols of the elders of Zion” to justify the holocaust is exposed as wilful genocide and deemed a crime against humanity.

1946 – having served his sentence and released from jail, the Rev. Koot Vorster champions a DRC inter-church commission on Communism. This commission’s aim was to ‘combat the communist worldview in South Africa‘ and represents another cross over of Church and Afrikaner Nationalism politics in defining the “Rooi Gevaar” (red danger) policy.117  

In light of his ‘segregation has fallen on evils days’ statement, Smuts appoints The Native Laws Commission (also known as the Fagan Commission) to look at Black African urbanisation and investigate changes to the policies of segregation. In August 1946, in agreement with the Fagan Commission recommendation to end segregation, Smuts nails his colours to the mast in opposition to Apartheid and says of it:

‘The idea that the Natives must all be removed and confined in their own kraals is in my opinion the greatest nonsense I have ever heard.’118

1947 – Malan appoints P.O. Sauer to head a party commission to turn apartheid into a comprehensive racial policy.119 The Sauer Commission was in part intended to forestall Smuts’ Native Laws Commission (the Fagan Commission) and counteract its recommendations as to any changes to segregation policies.

The Sauer Commission proposes a policy aimed at ensuring blacks develop:

‘in their own territory and in their own towns.’120

Malan also declares that it is not the state that took the lead with inventing Apartheid, it was the DRC.121 He says:

‘It was not the State but the Church who took the lead with Apartheid The State followed the principle laid down by the Church in the field of education for the native, the coloured and the Asian. The result? Friction was eliminated. The Boer church surpasses the other churches in missionary activity. It is the result of Apartheid.”

1948 – the DRC Synod of the Transvaal accepts the 1935 DRC Mission for separate education for separate nations and refers the Tower of Babel as the justification for Apartheid.122

April 1948 sees Oswald Pirow re-engage his relationship with Oswald Mosley, the discredited leader of the defunct ‘British Union of Fascists’, in order to collaborate on a Neo Nazi ‘New Order’ model for Africa as a whole. The come up with the Mosley-Pirow Proposals, which were: ‘a natural development of General Hertzog’s Segregation Policy and was foreshadowed by (his) then cabinet colleagues 15 years earlier’.123 The proposals essentially divide Africa into a large southern ‘white’ state with its labour provided by separate ‘black’ vassal states on temporary work permits. The work foreshadows the Apartheid Bantustan program and influx control policies.

The ‘Oswalds’ – Pirow left and Mosely right – collaborating in London

With Nazism now a worldwide anathema, the Grey-shirts (SANP) disbands in 1948 with most its leadership joining Malan’s HNP or aligning with it under a new entity called ‘the white workers party’ in 1949.

Dr. Malan pledges that Aryan German immigrants were necessary to cultivate a ‘broad Nordic front to counter Communism, Blacks and Jews’.124 Schalk Botha and Dr. Vera Bührmann fly to war-torn Germany on behalf of the ‘German Children’s Fund (DKF) on 27 April 1948. They aim to implement a Weimar Eugenic program and locate 10,000 healthy White, German, Protestant (Aryan) orphans and bring them to South Africa for adoption by leading Afrikaner Nationalists in order to:

‘strengthen their own Afrikaner Volk with the blood of “prestigious” German-Aryan Herrenvolk’125

Unable to meet their target due to restrictions in Germany, they secure only 87 “orphans”, the first choice of which is given to Dr. Malan who adopts a little girl.

The 1948 General Elections on 26 May 1948 are a landmark occasion in South Africa, as Malan and his HNP in coalition with the Afrikaner Party win a constitutional majority by a single seat, although not elected on a ‘majority’ popular vote they take up the mantle of ruling party citing divine providence to bring their policy of Apartheid to all South Africans.

As the new ruling party the HNP tables and passes Acts that begin to form the ‘cornerstone’ of Apartheid, these include:

  • The South West Africa Amendment Act. propagated in 1948, provided for the representation for white South West Africans citizens in the South African Parliament, ignoring International Law and the status of the Namibian mandate.
  • Asiatic Laws Amendment Act of 1948 takes away franchise and land ownership rights of South African Indians and confines them to pre-determined ‘areas’.

1949 – the DRC Synod of the Cape declares the 1857 DRC Synod which made way for separate worship as the epicentre of Apartheid – and to the 1935 DRC Church policy on the segregation of schools and education and declares:

‘”Vertical Separation” between black and white so they can each achieve their own “independence “.’126

The fundamental difference in Afrikanerdom between Smuts and Malan is seen on 16 December 1949, at the inauguration of Voortrekker Monument as a symbol of ‘the Afrikaner’s proprietary right to South Africa’. General Jan Smuts warned:

‘Let us not be fanatical about our past and romanticise it.’ Smuts then called for greater co-operation between white and Black South Africans as the ‘most difficult and final test of our civilisation’.

Malan, now the Prime Minister of South Africa, took a different view to Smuts in his speech and warned:

‘Godless communism’ was threatening the achievements of the Afrikaners and ‘there was a danger of blood mixing and disintegration of the white race. The only way of avoiding the spectre of a descent into “semi-barbarism” was a return to the Voortrekker spirit and a return to the volk, church and God.’127

1950 – Acts which constitute the ‘Pillars of Apartheid’ are passed by the National Party as the governing party, these include:

  • The Immorality Amendment Act, 1950 (Act No. 21 of 1950) prohibits sexual intercourse between white people and people of colour. The act was an amendment to the 1927 Immorality Act originally introduced by Hertzog’s governing National Party and its eventually extended to include homosexuality.
  • The Group Areas Act, 1950 (Act No. 41 of 1950) separates urban areas into racially segregated zones where members of one specific race alone could live and work. Group areas were created for the exclusive ownership and occupation of a designated group and it became a criminal offence for a member of one racial group to reside on or own land in an area set aside by proclamation for another race. 
  • The Suppression of Communism Act, 1950 (Act No. 44 of 1950) gives the Minister of Justice broad powers to suppress not only Communism but any scheme aimed at achieving change, whether economic, social, political, or industrial, “by the promotion of disturbance or disorder” or any act encouraging “feelings of hostility between the European and the non-European races … calculated to further (disorder)”
Insert – Dr. D.F. Malan

Jan Smuts passes away on the 11 September 1950 of a heart attack, aged 80.

1951 – The Reunited National Party formally Afrikaner Party are formally amalgamated to form ‘The National Party’ again, ending the long standing division caused by Hertzog and “Fusion” with Smuts back in 1933. The Afrikaner Nationalists who had splintered from the National Party into all the various shirt movements, the Ossewabrandwag and the New Order are welcomed back under a singular party.

These pro-Nazi and anti-war groupings within the National Party planted a fertile seed bed for the future authoritarianism of the Apartheid state. The constant depreciation of liberal democracy in this demographic of Afrikaners alongside an almost ‘hysterical exaltation’ for both ‘racist’ and a ‘Völkisch‘ group ethics were to have long term effects.128

Although Nazi ideology and dogma was no longer permissible in the political sphere, no solid measures were put in place by the Smuts government to prevent it from flourishing. Afrikaner Nationalists entertaining strong National Socialist ideologies and having committed treason and sedition during the war, who in European countries would have been hanged for war crimes, landed up back in mainstream party politics under the banner of the National Party and many even ended their days in Parliament.129

On the legislative front:

  • The Separate Representation of Voters Act 1941( Act No. 46 of 1951) is introduced as part of a deliberate process to remove all non-white people from the voters’ roll and revoke the Cape Qualified Franchise system, this triggers the Constitutional Crisis.

The Separate Representation Act and the Constitutional Crisis, triggers the formation of War Veterans Action Committee (WVAC), a returning ‘white’ war veterans lobby group led by Sailor Malan, which in turn becomes the first mass anti-apartheid protest movement, called The Torch Commando. In Sailor Malan’s words, The Torch Commando’s primary mission:

‘The Torch Commando was established to oppose the police state, abuse of state power, censorship, racism, the removal of the coloured vote and other oppressive manifestations of the creeping fascism of the National Party regime’.

1952 – the African National Congress (ANC) announces the start of the Defiance Campaign scheduled to begin with mass protests and defiance of Apartheid laws by the country’s black majority on 26 June 1952.

Whodunnit

As can be seen from the chronology and historiography of Apartheid, the body that ‘invents’ it is not the British and nor is it the entire white Afrikaner diaspora. It is in fact invented in the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC). The British are the “catalyst” to Apartheid in that without Britain’s abolition of slavery and Britain’s implementation of a colour blind franchise putting Dutch Reformed Church puritans on the same footing as some black slaves – the journey to ‘Apartheid’ would have taken a different path.

There has been a long standing debate in academic circles revolving around Apartheid’s origins and historiography. Two sides emerged from the debate, both agree that the origin of Apartheid is slavery in the Dutch Cape Colony, however after that the two arguments go separate ways.

One group points to the Voortrekker’s Puritan religious standpoint which brought the idea of “separate worship” for Blacks and Whites into Dutch Reformed Church policy. The epicentre is the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) NGK Synod in 1857 and subsequent Synods and Dominees come to define Apartheid along the lines of Jim Crow Laws, Darwinist Eugenics and Southern American State Segregation policies. This group, defines Apartheid as a derivative of American Segregation along ecclesiastical lines.

The other group points to the advent of National Socialism (Nazism) in the mid 1930’s as the key political driver of Apartheid’s origin, and they name the National Party’s ‘Think Tank’ Professors and academics who are all enamoured and besotted with Nazi Germany, anti-Semitism, Nuremberg Race Laws and Weimar Eugenics as the chief proponents of it. This group would define Apartheid as a derivative of National Socialism along party political and ideological lines.

Stepping into the fray to sort the argument out once and for all in 2003 was the heavy-weight Afrikaner historian – Professor Hermann Giliomee. He concluded in his work ‘the making of the Apartheid plan’ that the essence and origin of Apartheid lay along the DRC’s ecclesiastical lines and had nothing to with Nazism. He cites a famous speech by Dr. DF Malan in 1947, and taking it at face value he formats it as the crux of his argument, it’s a speech where Malan declares that it is not the state that took the lead with Apartheid, it was the Dutch Reformed Church who led it – and according to the Church, the DRC Synod in 1857 in the ZAR marks the start of it.130

What Professor Giliomee loses sight of by quoting DF Malan, is it is this very man who is front a centre in a very Weimar Eugenic based Aryan adoption program to boost the bloodline of white Afrikaners with Nazi German Herrenvolk blood and to advance an Völkisch ideology in South Africa. Malan not only opens the way for this ideology and thinking by the “Germanophiles” and wartime pro-Nazi leaders in his party, he even adopts one of the children. The German Children’s Fund (DKF) is not only inspired by National Socialist dogma, it is a vert practical and realistic application of it in South Africa.

The Malan family with their DKF adoptive child re-named Marieke Malan after Dr. Malan’s wife Maria.

Giliomee also loses sight of the fact that Malan makes this declaration in 1947, after the end of the war in 1945 and the exposure of Nazism and its ideological connection to the holocaust, and by deflecting to the Dutch Reformed Church (to which he is pre-disposed to do as a Dominee anyway) he is gaslighting for the plethora of “Germanophiles” who have been advocating National Socialism in all the various Afrikaner Nationalist cultural, media and political structures and who have all subsequently been warmly welcomed into the HNP’s fold and its leadership caucus. Especially after their 1948 election win and the merger with the Afrikaner Party to reconstitute the HNP as the “National Party” (NP). 

To be fair to Giliomee, what he does not have sight of in 2003 is all the recently uncovered archive files and materials found 20 years later. Documents on the Ossewabrandwag pointing to Nazi collusion – files, court records, letters, memos and confessions from South African Nazi renegades within Afrikaner nationalism captured and interrogated in the Rein Commission and published in the Barrett Commission findings after the war – files which were, until recently, regarded as either missing, “gate-kept” or embargoed. Even the recent findings and academic works on the Nazi German propaganda program in South Africa makes for an eye-opening historiography of Apartheid.

Previously “shielded” (gate-kept) or missing files – primary source material – have now finally put the nail into the ecclesiastical argument as the sole origin and development of Apartheid and we can now finally conclude that not only was Apartheid ‘invented’ by the Dutch Reformed Church, it was subsequently infused with National Socialism – and although not Nazism in its purest form it is indeed a derivative of Nazism.

Afrikaner Christian Nationalism vs. German National Socialism

So what’s the real difference between Apartheid and Nazism? The fundamental difference lies in the religious approach to establish a ‘Herrenvolk’ – a ‘pure’ white European race. How this is arrived at is fundamentally different to one another – the Nazis arrived at the idea of a Herrenvolk on a Nordic mythology and occultism platform, the Afrikaner Nationalists arrive at the idea of a Herrenvolk on a Calvinist puritan and ecclesiastical platform. Whichever way they arrive at it, they arrive at the same thing.

Afrikaner Nationalism and youth (left), Nazi German National Socialism and Hitler youth (right).

The ‘dominees’ base their Herrenvolk concept on a strict Calvinist Puritan dogma and an early idea of Darwinism and American eugenics based on Jim Crow and American Anti-miscegenation and segregation laws, the idea that the Afrikaner nation is ordained by God to be a morally superior nation over heathen (Kaffir) nations. The more germaphobe ‘politicians’ in the National Party build on the Herrenvolk concept with Nazi German Nuremberg Race Laws and German (Weimar) eugenics promoted by Hitler – the idea that the infusion of degenerate elements (Untermensch nations – including Blacks and Jews) into the bloodstream weaken the Herrenvolk nation so as to be morally inferior.

With the adoption of Krugerism as its core ideology and the conflating of Church and State, the National Party finds itself split in two camps over its historic sweep – on the one side are the Dutch Reformed ‘dominees’ like Dr. D.F. Malan and on the other side are the ‘politicians’ like Dr. H.F. Verwoerd.

Also, one group in the National Party sphere, like Malan and Sauer tend to favour ‘democracy’ as defined within the ‘white democratic constitution’ of South Africa to attain political objectives (as are the principles in the segregated states of the USA) – the Germaphobe inclined politicians in the National Party sphere like van Rensburg, Dönges, Vorster, Pirow, Diederichs etc. favour the ‘anti-democratic’ principle as defined by the Nazi “Führerprinzip”. This has bearing later as South Africa as they manipulate the constitution and laws to become a police state and with all opposition banned, imprisoned, deported or gagged – the Apartheid state mirrors a Nazi modus operandi and becomes a one party authoritarian state promoting a very thin veneer of wholesome ‘democracy’ to its faithful.

At the end of the day Apartheid – from a dogma standpoint, is a curious mix of Puritan Calvinism and Völkisch Nationalism. Legally it’s a curious mix of American Jim Crow segregation laws and Nürnberger Gesetze Nazi German race purity laws. Ideologically speaking Apartheid is a curious cocktail of Krugerism, Hertzogism, National Socialism and Fascism. None of which have anything to do with the British and their prevailing philosophy – which is a curious mix of monarchism and democratic liberalism.

Neo Nationalist Revisionism

As to Hélène Opperman Lewis book “Apartheid: Britain’s Bastard Child” released in 2017 blaming Apartheid as a psychological consequence of mutual trauma caused the British scorched earth and concentration camps policies of the South African War (1899-1902), and more recently reinforced by Albert Blake’s in his book “Jopie Fourie – ’n besinning” (a reflection) when he writes (my translation from Afrikaans):

Afrikaner Nationalism is increasingly seen as an attempt at self-protection – exclusively, partly to avoid repeating the unacceptable past (referring the South African War 1899-1902 and the Afrikaner Rebellion 1914-1915). This contributed to the emergence of hard-line Afrikaner nationalism which gave rise to an inflexible and, for others, an unacceptable racial policy. The Afrikaner wanted to avoid similar suffering as in the past at all costs, but by doing so overlooked the suffering of others. It became a vicious cycle from ‘abused children’ (under British rule) to ‘abusive parents’ (under apartheid) that is never broken, because there has been no healing for the unprocessed trauma.’131

Blake and Opperman Lewis are effectively extending an old National Party argument, the idea of ‘the politics of pain’ as the justification for nationalism and the identification of a ‘political’ and ‘economic’ enemy embodied therein, in the case of the Afrikaner Nationalists this led to extreme Anglophobia and the raison d’exister for Apartheid. This old Christian Nationalism dogma is largely disproven as rhetoric to drive a racially divided state. But in this case it has been given a new veneer, as in the social sciences Psychology has emerged as another method to understand history and in this case it has a tool called epigenetics.

Epigenetics states that ‘trauma’ is carried from generation to generation in the DNA and called ‘Intergenerational trauma’. So according to Elsabé Brits in her review of Albert Blake’s book titled. Op dees aarde: Oorlogstrauma en die radikale Afrikaner-psige (On this earth: War trauma and the radical Afrikaner psyche) – it was the women’s and children’s suffering in both the white and black concentration camps that was passed on from one generation to the next and although they kept it to themselves it resurfaced generations later.132 The political landscape was impacted, Apartheid instituted as a protection mechanism and mutual suffering entered Afrikaner identity along with Anglophobia. Blake argues further that this Afrikaner Nationalism driven by trauma was accelerated by the 1914 Afrikaner Rebellion and Jopie Fourie’s execution.

There are a number of problems with this Neo Nationalist Revisionism. As can be be seen from the historiography of Apartheid, and the chronology of Apartheid, this revisionist approach really has unhinged itself from the historical method. For the following glaring reasons:

  1. It denies the historical fact that Apartheid’s origins lie in slavery and the abolishment thereof and rejects all contemporary historians who advocate this.
  2. It ignores the historic sweep of all the Boer conflict with Black tribes to establish Afrikaner led hegemony’s and skips out the establishment of the Afrikaner covenant (and Afrikaner Nationalism) on the back of the Boer invasion of the Zulu Kingdom (1837-1840) and warring with “Blacks” (and not the British) – Xhosa, Zulu, Pedi, Tswana etc. In the end ‘Apartheid’ is a system of primarily repressing ‘Black’ ambitions and not the ‘White’ ones (Boer or Brit).
  3. It denies the historical fact that the Dutch Reformed Church invented Apartheid in a fully independent ZAR in 1857 when it instituted separate worship, it even rejects the Afrikaner Nationalist’s and D.F. Malan’s claim that it was the Dutch Reformed Church who invented Apartheid – proof that it has nothing to do with the ‘British’ and it rejects all the contemporary historians who advocate this.
  4. It rejects the fact that the origins of Apartheid legislature lie in the Constitution of the ZAR in 1860, legislature that has no bearing on ‘the British’ or Westminster whatsoever.
  5. It does not recognise the advent of Krugerism in 1883 as the ideological bedrock of Christian Nationalism and Apartheid.
  6. Afrikaner Nationalism as a movement seeking regional paramountcy for the Afrikaner started in 1880 with the Afrikaner Bond – long before the South African War.
  7. The British Scorched Earth policy only impacts the ZAR and OFS boers, which before the Boer War account for less than half the white Afrikaner diaspora – the majority of Afrikaners are in the Cape and they do not take up arms against the British. The idea that they have a ‘shared’ experience with their northern brethren is an artificial one put forward by the Broederbond in 1938.
  8. Even within the concentration camps themselves, it does not acknowledge that the concentration camps contained Afrikaner families with British loyalist leanings because of Boer actions traumatising them (loyalists, hensoppers and joiners) and attempts to lump these groups with Bittereinder families as all been “traumatised by the British” as a “national whole”. Again leaning to the propaganda of the Broederbond in 1938 rather than to actual historic fact and simple statistics.
  9. It also attempts to lump the Black Concentration camp experience with the White Concentration camp experience as a mutually shared trauma, when leading historians on black concentration camps have proven this is not the case.
  10. Although acknowledging the idea of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” with regards Nazi Germany, this Neo Nationalist Revisionism thinking does not adequately explain or even answer why Apartheid becomes so enamoured with National Socialist dogma, ideology, symbology and legislation – even after National Socialism is soundly defeated and exposed for what it is in 1945.

Epigenetics is a new scientific argument in the ‘nature versus nurture’ debate and a highly controversial one at that, what is currently known is that there is no real understanding as to ‘how’ the DNA signature comes about, in mice experiments it shows the phenomenon to be ‘very rare’ and trauma signatures are not transferable to the majority. It is also thought that it can be ‘un-learned’ through social conditioning and therefore the linear transference of trauma can be stopped.133

A case to consider here, is that through two World Wars and the London ‘Blitz’, more British civilians died at the hands of German Luftwaffe bombers from 1940-1941 in the London Blitz alone than the entire Boer population during the South African War 1899-1902, one would think that given “inter-generational’ trauma and ‘Post Traumatic Stress Disorder’ (PTSD) issues the modern Briton would simply “hate” the Germans and be in permanent lock-stop with all the psychological trauma caused by it all the time – and at the same time trying to conceive nationalist mechanisms to protect themselves from Germany in future. But the simple truth is, there is no such hatred for Germans in modern Britain, and that is very much a function of how modern Britons (and Germans for that matter) are socially and culturally “conditioned” – their socialisation process in effect.

The idea that Epigenetics, in the rare cases it can be found, can be ‘stopped’ through social conditioning brings up another point from a historic point of view. In the case of the Boer War, the simple fact that the vast majority of Black South Africans have no inter-generational shared trauma to the Boer War whatsoever, the legacy of the Black concentration camps is all but forgotten. In fact historians like Dr. Garth Benneyworth are having to revert to the forensic and archaeological record to account the history as it is so poorly captured in the written record and even more scarce in the verbal (spoken) record.

The reason that Black South Africans have not been conditioned as to their role in the Boer War is because it was pitched for decades by Afrikaner Nationalists as a “whites only” affair, the trauma of the Boer War almost exclusively on “white” women and children over a five decade long Broederbond ‘Christian Nationalist’ indoctrination and socialisation process – Blacks were merely “by-standers” and only “participated” here and there (and there are still some out there trying to push this narrative) – so simply put, generationally speaking, Black South Africans have “un-learned” it and have lost touch with any latent post traumatic stress (PTSD) it may or may not have caused.

What is however very existent in the Black community today is the trans-generational trauma caused by the Afrikaner Nationalists and their “Apartheid” ideology on the new generation of Black South Africans – and this is also very much a function of “conditioning” due to revolutionist and revisionist history rather than any DNA signature or for those Black South Africans “born free” any sort of latent PTSD.

To answer the question upfront, who does Apartheid’s “bastard child” belong to? Whose the parent? The uncomfortable truth is that many white Afrikaner writers and authors need to face facts – Apartheid has origin in their Church, it’s not birthed outside of it, it’s birthed inside it. The chronology and historiography of Apartheid is very clear and the responsible parent is not “the British” it’s in fact the “Dominee” and for many Afrikaners and their scribes that truism still cuts far too close to the bone to contemplate – its much easier to write to white Afrikaner popularism and appeal to a community desperately seeking absolution for Apartheid and blaming the British instead.


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

Editors Notes

Please note, there will be many who will say … what about this battle, that protest or this strike that are not included? Where’s the Bambatha Revolt, the British war on the Pedi, the ZAR civil war with the OFS, the First Chimurenga, the Sharpeville Massacre, the Battle of Deville Wood, the Gun War, the Ngcayechibi’s War, the Malaboch War, the Griqua and the diamonds, Chinese indentured labour, the mfecane …. there’s LOADS missing!

That’s the problem, to do a chronology of Apartheid we come close to doing an entire chronology of South African history and it would exceed the limits of this blog. So, I’ve had to try and look at the thread of Apartheid – track where it has been part of constitutional changes as nation states have been formed, the legalise and the key players involved. Most important is the history of the ‘vote’ – the colour blind ‘franchise’ as that is critical to the development of Apartheid. Also critical is to look at the two different lines that shape Apartheid – the Dutch and the British and where and with whom the ‘invention’ of Apartheid lies – the “whodunnit”, and here we’ve had to include the history of the Dutch Reformed Church as it is critical – certainly when it comes to the “whodunnit”.

Time has also been spent on all three of The Boer Wars – The Transvaal Revolt (1880-1881), the South African War (1899-1902) and the Afrikaner Rebellion (1914-1915) as these three events are critical to modern psychological studies on the invention of Apartheid and the advent of Afrikaner Nationalist ‘politics of pain’ and ‘identity politics’ into the historiography of Apartheid.

I have also spent a little time to show that ‘segregation’ and the emancipation of people of colour between the British and the Dutch (and subsequently the Boer nations) follows an entirely different trajectory. Whilst British Imperialism is by no means perfect, and whilst over the course of historical sweep they have also instituted or have been privy to racist thinking and philosophy (the Victorian and Edwardian thinking on ‘civilisation’ and where nation states stood in relation to it), their trajectory in general follows a ‘progressive’ path to emancipation, the Liberal Democracy blueprint of Westminster and the Magna Carta guides it, whereas the Boer Nations and Afrikaner Nationalism with Krugerism at the centre of it has consistently followed a ‘regressive’ path to emancipation and served to deepen racial segregation and Apartheid – both before and after the South African War.

I’ve also included a little on Jan Smuts to show the track of ‘segregation’ as government policy sought by his party under Botha with the Land Act, and to show how Smuts evolves, firstly in his resistance to white miner colour bars and the Miners Revolt, then when he is finally back in the pound seats as Prime Minister from 1939 to 1948 his u-turn and rejection of segregation and Apartheid – this to show the development of Apartheid is not a linear phenomenon inherent to white Afrikaners and even within this diaspora there are a great many who are not in support of it.

Included, as it’s often purposefully ignored, and becoming increasing relevant as more information and material comes to light, is the ‘Nazification of the Afrikaner Right’ – the influence of Nazi Germany and National Socialism on the outcome of Apartheid as South Africans get caught up in a global conflict and Afrikaner Nationalist leaders and followers become enamoured and influenced by Nazi ideology.

I hope I’ve done it justice and the ‘essence’, the ‘golden thread’ is clear. I’ve stopped at the advent of the National Party and Apartheid as policy after 1948, as after that it’s less about who invented Apartheid and more about a chronology of “the struggle” from 1948 – 1994, something which has been drilled into every South African by now and a chronology all on its own.

Footnotes

  1. Creswicke, South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol 1, 1 ↩︎
  2. Walker to George Richardson. 10 September 1839, Miscellaneous Letters, Box R4/5, Library of Friends; Backhouse,  Narrative, 81.  ↩︎
  3. Awake, South Africa’s Dutch Reformed Church – A House Divided, 16-19 ↩︎
  4. Binckes, The Great Trek Uncut, 192 ↩︎
  5. Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa, 14 ↩︎
  6. Awake, South Africa’s Dutch Reformed Church – A House Divided, 16-19 ↩︎
  7. Theal, History of South Africa since 1795, Vol. 2, 444 ↩︎
  8. Creswicke, South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol 1, 13 ↩︎
  9. Gordon, The growth in Boer opposition to Kruger, 8 ↩︎
  10. Plaut, Promise and Despair – review by Milton Shain ↩︎
  11. Awake, South Africa’s Dutch Reformed Church – A House Divided, 16-19 ↩︎
  12. Feinstein, An economic history of South Africa, 53 ↩︎
  13. Goolam, Power and Resistance, 299-317 ↩︎
  14. Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 184–185. ↩︎
  15. Fitzpatrick, The Transvaal from Within, Chapter 1 e-book ↩︎
  16. Farrelly, The Settlement After the War in South Africa, 76 ↩︎
  17. Farrelly, The Settlement After the War in South Africa, 294 ↩︎
  18. Meintjes, President Paul Kruger: A Biography, 130-131 ↩︎
  19. Trapido, Imperialism, Settler Identities and Colonial Capitalism, 61 ↩︎
  20. Trapido, Imperialism, Settler Identities and Colonial Capitalism, 60 ↩︎
  21. Headlam, The Milner Papers, 178 ↩︎
  22. Ash, Kruger’s War, 127 ↩︎
  23. Guyot, Boer Politics, 103 ↩︎
  24. Roberts, Salisbury: Victorian Titan, 717 ↩︎
  25. Fitzpatrick, The Transvaal from Within, Appendix D, Volksraad debates. ↩︎
  26. Reitz, A Century of Wrong, 56 ↩︎
  27. van Heyningen, et al. Measles Epidemics of Variable Lethality in the Early 20th Century, 416 ↩︎
  28. Benneyworth, Work or Starve and correspondence between Peter Dickens and Dr Benneyworth – 8 November 2024 ↩︎
  29. Benneyworth, Work or Starve, 47 ↩︎
  30. Pakenham, Boer War, 491 ↩︎
  31. Judd & Surridge, The Boer War, 235 ↩︎
  32. Judd & Surridge, The Boer War, 235 ↩︎
  33. Warwick, Black People and the South African War, 164 ↩︎
  34. O’Connor, A short history of South Africa 1902 – 1989. ↩︎
  35. O’Connor, A short history of South Africa 1902 – 1989. ↩︎
  36. O’Connor, A short history of South Africa 1902 – 1989. ↩︎
  37. Katz, General Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 – 1917, 33-36 ↩︎
  38. Schreiner, A Letter on the South African Union and the Principles of Government. ↩︎
  39. O’Connor, A short history of South Africa 1902 – 1989. ↩︎
  40. O’Connor, A short history of South Africa 1902 – 1989. ↩︎
  41. Katz, General Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 – 1917, 48 ↩︎
  42. Marks, The Rand Revolt, the Red Scare, and the Roots of Apartheid, 203-204 ↩︎
  43. Katz, General Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 – 1917, 59 ↩︎
  44. Sampson, Capture of De Wet, 148 ↩︎
  45. Sampson, Capture of De Wet, 252 ↩︎
  46. Swart, Desperate Men and Bottomly, The Orange Free State and the Rebellion of 1914, 29-73 ↩︎
  47. Meer, Portrait of Indian South Africans, 44. ↩︎
  48. Shain , A Perfect Storm, 46 ↩︎
  49. Van Donk, Land and the church, 32 ↩︎
  50. Marks, The Rand Revolt, the Red Scare, and the Roots of Apartheid, 199-200 ↩︎
  51. Marks, The Rand Revolt, the Red Scare, and the Roots of Apartheid, 203 ↩︎
  52. Marks, The Rand Revolt, the Red Scare, and the Roots of Apartheid, 200 ↩︎
  53. Marks, The Rand Revolt, the Red Scare, and the Roots of Apartheid, 205 ↩︎
  54. Marks, The Rand Revolt, the Red Scare, and the Roots of Apartheid, 206 ↩︎
  55. Marks, The Rand Revolt, the Red Scare, and the Roots of Apartheid, 206 ↩︎
  56. Marks, The Rand Revolt, the Red Scare, and the Roots of Apartheid, 206 ↩︎
  57. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 374 ↩︎
  58. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 382 ↩︎
  59. O’Connor, A short history of South Africa 1902 – 1989. ↩︎
  60. D Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa, 99. ↩︎
  61. D Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa, 99 ↩︎
  62. Shain , A Perfect Storm, 41 ↩︎
  63. Shain, A Perfect Storm, 84 ↩︎
  64. Bouwer, National Socialism and Nazism in South Africa, 18. ↩︎
  65. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 382 ↩︎
  66. Kgatla, Magwira. The defining moments for the Dutch Reformed Church mission policy ↩︎
  67. Kgatla, Magwira. The defining moments for the Dutch Reformed Church mission policy ↩︎
  68. Davenport, South Africa, A Modern History. ↩︎
  69. Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, 41 ↩︎
  70. Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa, 112 ↩︎
  71. Shain, A Perfect Storm,131 ↩︎
  72. Shain, A Perfect Storm,134 ↩︎
  73. Shain, A Perfect Storm, 132-133 ↩︎
  74. Shain, A Perfect Storm,133 ↩︎
  75. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 382 ↩︎
  76. Shain, A Perfect Storm, 143-149 ↩︎
  77. Hyslop, White Working Class Women and the Invention of Apartheid, 76 ↩︎
  78. Louw, Die Vormingsjare van die kerkleier J.D. (Koot) Vorster, 337 ↩︎
  79. Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, 80 ↩︎
  80. Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa, 103 – 106 ↩︎
  81. Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa, 103 – 106. ↩︎
  82. Louw, Die Vormingsjare van die kerkleier J.D. (Koot) Vorster, 338 ↩︎
  83. Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, 80 ↩︎
  84. Maritz, My Lewe en Stewe‘, 97-270 ↩︎
  85. Rein Commission – unpublished ↩︎
  86. Shain, A Perfect Storm, 238 ↩︎
  87. Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, 85 ↩︎
  88. Shain, A Perfect Storm, 233 ↩︎
  89. Shain , A Perfect Storm, 237 ↩︎
  90. Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 441 ↩︎
  91. Mouton, Beyond the Pale, 18 ↩︎
  92. Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, 57 ↩︎
  93. Mouton, Beyond the Pale, 20 ↩︎
  94. Monama, Wartime Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, 1939 – 1945, 62 ↩︎
  95. Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa, 133 ↩︎
  96. van den Heever , General J.B.M Hertzog, Official Biography. ↩︎
  97. Furlong, Pro-Nazi Subversion in South Africa,16. ↩︎
  98. Shain, A Perfect Storm, 230 ↩︎
  99. Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, 104 ↩︎
  100. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 379 ↩︎
  101. O’Mally Collection on-line: The leader of the Ossewabrandwag Johannes Frederik Janse Van Rensburg ↩︎
  102. Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 442 ↩︎
  103. Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, 92 – 93 ↩︎
  104. Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, 110 ↩︎
  105. Louw, Die Vormingsjare van die kerkleier J.D. (Koot) Vorster, 370 ↩︎
  106. Shain, A Perfect Storm, 248 ↩︎
  107. Hyslop, Segregation has fallen on evil days, 451 ↩︎
  108. Hyslop, Segregation has fallen on evil days, 438-460 ↩︎
  109. Bunting, The Rise of the Afrikaner Reich, 88 ↩︎
  110. Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa, 132 ↩︎
  111. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 383 ↩︎
  112. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 383 ↩︎
  113. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 374 ↩︎
  114. du Toit, The Jewish Question and Verwoerd, 83
 ↩︎
  115. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 388 ↩︎
  116. Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 476 ↩︎
  117. Louw, Die Vormingsjare van die kerkleier J.D. (Koot) Vorster, 306 ↩︎
  118. Barber, South Africa in the Twentieth Century, 134 ↩︎
  119. Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 476 ↩︎
  120. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 383 ↩︎
  121. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 383 ↩︎
  122. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 382 ↩︎
  123. British National Archives – Kew reference 2/908, 12 April 1948 – Oswald Pirow Statement. ↩︎
  124. van der Merwe. Herrenvolk Bloed vir die Afrikaner, 81  ↩︎
  125. van der Merwe. Herrenvolk Bloed vir die Afrikaner, 85  ↩︎
  126. Giliomee, The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 384 ↩︎
  127. Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 488 ↩︎
  128. Furlong. Pro-Nazi Subversion in South Africa, 1939-1941. ↩︎
  129. Furlong. Pro-Nazi Subversion in South Africa, 1939-1941 ↩︎
  130. Giliomee. The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 383 ↩︎
  131. Brits, Oorlogstrauma en die radikale Afrikaner-psige, Litnet on-line ↩︎
  132. Brits, Oorlogstrauma en die radikale Afrikaner-psige, Litnet on-line ↩︎
  133. Henriques, Can the legacy of trauma be passed down the generations? BBC on-line ↩︎

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Binckes, Robin. The Great Trek Uncut: escape from British rule, the Boer exodus from Cape Colony, 1836. Helion Limited, 2013.

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Watson, R.I. ‘I Will Gather All Nations and Tongues’: Christian Missions and Racial Integration in the Cape Colony in the Aftermath of Abolition. Kronos vol. 31 n.1. Cape Town. 2005

Romancing the Rebellion

Seems there is a lot of social media chatter surrounding Albert Blake’s new Afrikaans book on Jopie Fourie. One Afrikaner pundit after reading the book declaring anyone not familiar with the ‘truth’ about Jopie as a ‘Volksheld’ and the Rebellion is now a liar and this in his world includes any other qualified historians, other than Albert. Albert Blake himself even declaring his new work is the definitive one and the only medium to be referenced (problem is, only people who are fully literate in Afrikaans can read it).

There is undoubtably some truth in the old saying ‘history is written by the winners’, however very often the ‘plucky loser’ is a perennial favourite of propagandists, myth makers and entertainers (including Hollywood), they are often romanticised and idealised, given virtuous christian outlooks, a civilised veneer and great martial abilities – the little guy taking on the big bully. This is especially true of the 1914 Afrikaner Revolt and Jopie Fourie … and many of its local Afrikaner historians and laymen enthusiasts.

All this Boer romanticism and the portrayal of old Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) as a benign place for a freedom loving people merely wanting it back – a foreign example of this is the Confederacy in the American Civil War (1861 to 1865), and here a Royal Historical Society historian, Chris Ash made a rather humorous comment and it rings especially true:

“Until very recently, they were certainly viewed by most as the more ‘glamorous’ of the two sides… gallant, good looking Southern gen’lemen who ‘frankly didn’t give a damn’, galloping off to fight against impossible odds against a massed industrialised hordes of a faceless enemy who wanted to end their bucolically halcyon way of life. Throw in a few gorgeous Georgia Peaches – called things like Emma-Lou and Daisy-Belle – all with heaving bosoms barely contained by beautiful ball gowns, and you’ve got all the makings of a heroic myth of doomed failure… well, as long as you ignore that the South started the war, and that they were fighting to retain slavery!”

There is an old proverb, and its especially true to historians “never meet your heroes” .. because in getting to the actual historical figures, you need to analyse who they are as people, how they view the society they live in at the time, and how that society views them. In their context of their time, you as as historian need to overcome your prejudices and start to look at things in a critical way.

This is especially true if you grow up with a ‘rebel’ as a person central to your entire identity, because as true as the sun rises that ‘rebel’ is going to be controversial and for good reason – and very much of this hero will depend on what they are fighting for … and “freedom” is the usual caveat … but then you start to really meet your hero when you ask the next question “freedom for whom?” Here it is where the hero worship of the 1914 Afrikaner rebellion leaders like Christiaan de Wet, Manie Maritz, Jan Kemp, Christiaan Beyers and Jopie Fourie starts to wobble somewhat .. sure they are fighting to free themselves from British oppression – they all said so, including Fourie the day before his colleagues shot him, but he like the others – Maritz, de Wet, Kemp and Beyers are also fighting for their stated aim of the Rebellion, and that’s a completely different kettle of fish.

Insert – Christiaan de Wet on winged horse with damsel holding onto him. Main image – the movie poster from Gone with the Wind.

Now, there is a small problem with the history of the Rebellion – and one of them is the complete lack of history books in English and even less written at the time of the revolt – the complete Afrikaner romanticism of the rebellion all comes much later with the advent and rise of Afrikaner nationalism and a plethora of Afrikaner academic papers, novels and books.

For simplicity sake, there is a ‘English’ side to the 1914 Afrikaner Rebellion story – the majority in the country if we consider all races and nationalities caught up in the Rebellion and there is a ‘Afrikaans’ side of the story, a minority – driven initially by Hertzog and his breakaway cabal of pro Republican Afrikaner Nationalists from the Botha/Smuts South African Party (SAP) in 1914 and then it is heavily driven by a far right grouping of ‘pure’ nationalists after their break with the Hertzog/Smuts Fusion before World War 2 (1939-1945) – and they went about using mass media, aligned academics in ‘Afrikaans’ universities and all manner of propaganda to ‘set the Rebel story strait’ – even Radio Zeesen from Nazi Germany with its renegade Nationalist broadcasters went full tilt at glorifying Fourie, the Rebellion and demonising Smuts during World War 2.

For any historian to take a grip on the 1914 Afrikaner Revolt in 2024, the bank of both primary and secondary source becomes invaluable and it sets up the validity of what you are going to say, ensure whatever it is holds up to academic scrutiny by your peers. In respect to using both primary and secondary sources, the closest you are to the historical figure in question the more accurate and valid the work – so here we find original accounts by people involved in the events as the key.

There has only ever been one comprehensive history book written in English on the Afrikaner Revolt and luckily for us its very close to the events of 1914, it is published a year later in 1915 and its written by a journalist very closely tied to the whole 1914 Revolt having interviewed the principle characters personally and been witness to the events himself. The book is called “The Capture of De Wet” and it’s written by PJ Sampson.

Now, unlike all the Afrikaner historians writing for a Afrikaner market on the 1914 Afrikaner Rebellion who come after PJ Sampson (many come decades after him), Sampson is just not interested in presenting a counter-case for High Treason for the Rebellion – the old Afrikaner Nationalist’s “volks-veraairer” versus “land-veraairer” (traitor to your ‘people’ as opposed to traitor to your ‘country’) argument which has been going round and round Afrikaner family kitchen tables for 110 years and still rages on – nope, Sampson records none of that, in fact he sees the ‘treason’ argument as clear cut one in 1914 and the execution of Fourie as inevitable.

Sampson is not alone, I published an article on my visit to Scapa Flow where unarmed German sailors responsible for sinking their surrendered Imperial fleet were executed for sedition on the spot as they came ashore – some by way of bayonet. 1914 and World War 1 (1914-1918) veterans looked at treason and the execution of traitors very differently to the way we look at it now. Fourie is lucky he got a trial and not a drumhead trial and on the spot execution, at that time if you committed treason or sedition, with war declared and domestic state of emergency regulations in place – you got dragged through an administrative formality which lasted barely a day, then taken out back in the morning and shot – that is what happened to Fourie and that was the way of things then.

Smuts during WW1 and a young Fourie in the insert.

I’m also not alone, one of the principle characters in the Jopie Fourie story is General Jan Smuts, Jan Smuts himself would regard Fourie as having “shed more blood than any other officer.” With the rebellion lost, Beyers drowned and General de Wet surrendered … Smuts would say:

“Only Fourie’s band remained contumacious. Twelve of our men were killed at Nooitgedacht. There was no justification for that. Some of them were shot at a range of twelve yards … A court martial was appointed, strictly according to military law. One of its members told me he felt compunction about serving, because he was a friend of Fourie’s. I replied that that was an additional reason why he should be on the tribunal. On Saturday Fourie was unanimously condemned to death…”1

Smuts would go on to say:

“Had I refused to confirm the sentence, I could not have faced the parents of the young men who met their deaths through Fourie’s fault. There is something to be said for many a rebel, but in this case I conferred a great benefit on the State by carrying out my most unpleasant duty..”2

Smuts remained convinced that a fair trial had taken place, the correct legal framework in place, as to all the rebels Fourie was an exception and Smuts was unrepentant in the outcome, in fact he saw Fourie’s execution as unavoidable and it was his duty to see it through – his attitude had hardened, his son – Jannie Smuts in his biography of his father would write very little on Fourie in the entire appraisal of Jan Smuts’ life and career, Fourie is barely a footnote, a wayward rebel, nothing more.

A lot is also written about by Neo-Nationalist historians and disgruntled Afrikaner commentators on Smuts’ so-called “refusal” to entertain last minute efforts to intervene and reprieve Fourie, Jannie Smuts Junior is however dismissive of this and confident his father “would not have interfered in the course of justice” in any event. So this entire episode in the story really is a non-starter.

The execution of Fourie, the South African Policemen who executed him removed his cell-door as a keepsake to commemorate the occasion (reference Nongqai).

In fact Sampson views Fourie as somewhat deluded and misled, he even sets aside an entire appendix to demonstrate the flaws in Fourie’s understanding of history, his thinking and the flawed nature of his defence testimony, which Sampson tears apart completely and simply dismisses as unreasonable and deluded – instead Sampson takes pity on Fourie as someone who cuts a tragic figure having been misled by less scrupulous men like Maritz, his execution a foregone and unpleasant conclusion.

The main thrust of Sampson’s book is however on the objectives, mission and stated aims of the Rebellion. Although the long-standing Anglophobia caused by the Boer War is considered, it is not Sampson’s focus, simply because he, like many English commentators of his time, they understand the tragedy of the concentration camps and the pain they caused at face value, they see the deaths in context of measles and typhoid epidemics which sweep the camps due to hardship and unsanitary conditions brought about by war – a tragedy and nothing more. The ideas of ‘genocide’ and ‘murder’ of the Afrikaner nation are completely foreign to Sampson and other British historians like Amery of the time and this thinking would qualify fantastical thought at best.

Manie Maritz in this South African Union Defence Force uniform and staff prior to the 1914 Afrikaner Revolt (Maritz Revolt). Lt. Col Maritz is seated front and centre with his ‘Agterryer’ (man-servant) at his heels. It’s the man-servant’s expression and position that is most interesting as in many ways it gives away the complete disregard Maritz felt for people of colour.

Sampson is more interested in the politics of the Afrikaner Revolt and the politics of the leaders taking part in it, the political circumstances in South Africa in effect (and less so the geo-political circumstances). Here Sampson argues that the ‘colour blind franchise’ and human rights for ‘natives’ are also key motivations for the rebellion – the rebels intent on maintaining a Afrikaner led hegemony, an oligarchy based on “Krugerism” as an ideology – which means no franchise, emancipation and limited human rights (if any) to anyone of colour. The declaration of war presents an opportunity for these Afrikaner leaders, with the assistance of Germany, to take over the whole of South Africa and implement this political construct of theirs, much like the post American Civil War traitors like John Wilks Booth and his rebels in 1865 trying to “raise the South” again and reclaim slavery. Sampson refers to the animosity between the ‘Free State’ Boers like Christiaan de Wet against the ‘Transvaal Boers’ of Smuts and Botha over the colour blind franchise, de Wet fearful that Smuts and Botha are ushering it in and it’s all very unacceptable to him.

Now, to anyone paying attention to the history, the colour blind qualified franchise across the entire country (not just in the old British Cape Colony) is one of the key demands by the British for a peaceful settlement of the South African War (1899-1902) ie. Boer War 2. It is the only clause that is dropped out the Peace of Vereeniging agreement as the Boers absolutely refuse to abide it and its a deal breaker. It is only dropped on the proviso that a future Union government, when it is granted self governance, will implement it – Smuts assures the British that he is the man to see it through and all the Boer signatories to the agreement promise they will address it when a Union and self determination is declared (this includes de Wet, Kemp and de la Rey et al)

The South African Union and self determination/responsible government is granted by the British to Botha’s ’South African Party’ (SAP) in 1910. However inside the SAP, Smuts and Botha are simply unable to move on the colour blind qualified franchise as the likes of de Wet and Hertzog will have none of it, 4 Years later it’s beginning to become a problem as an entire black population waits for its emancipation (and its rewards for taking part in the Boer War, the majority of them supporting the British).

Say what! It’s not all about the hatred of the British, Concentration Camps, forced to fight for the British against friendly brethren Germans …. Its about the … blacks!

What you smoking? Yup, I’m afraid there it is, commentators at the time like Sampson were pointing to issues of race – the internal politics at play, not just the geo-politics. To set up the ‘race’ argument Sampson goes in depth into each of the leaders of the revolt by way of outlining their character and disposition to race.

Beyers is described as a very religious man, however he was inordinately vain of his personal appearance (which looking at his pandering to his hair, a monumentally stylised moustache and his disposition to fine and dandy clothing sounds about correct), and regarded as megalomaniac by the man in the street, in fact they “used a more expressive term” to describe him – one not for polite publication. Beyers after the Boer War took to entertaining “veldt Boers” coming in for ‘indabas’ in Pretoria and he earned a reputation as a Anglophobe with a “with a particularly venomous tongue.”3

De Wet is described by Sampson as a different sort of person to Beyers. De Wet too is religious but religion does not dictate his actions – politics does. He is angry with Botha and Smuts for removing Hertzog from cabinet. As a Free Stater he is unhappy with these “Transvaal Boers” entertaining the British request of ‘colour blind qualification franchise’ (which is in fact a Boer War 2 peace treaty pre-requisite). It’s here that we see a common thread in many of the rebel leaders, sheer racism and a desire to maintain an white Afrikaner led oligarchy in South Africa with no rights whatsoever to anyone of colour.

Sampson places De Wet into what he calls a “Old School” Boer whose:

“Abiding fear always has been that British government in South Africa meant that the ascendancy of the whites over the blacks would cease, and one day the kaffirs would be permitted to be on an equality with the whites.”4

Sampson cites this fear of Black ascendancy over Whites as a primary rally call for the Boer Republican armies during the South Africa War (1899-1902). He goes on to outline De Wet deep hatred for Black people as his primary motivator for going into the 1914 Rebellion, he writes:

“De Wet always has treated kaffirs with severity, regarding them as little better than animals, whom he believed he ought to have the right to thrash as he would a dog, it only needed a fine for ill-treating a native to bring on a raging brainstorm that drove him headlong into the maelstrom of rebellion. To fine him, De Wet, was the greatest outrage conceivable, and clear proof that the time had come to strike a blow for freedom!”5

This sentiment and motive for De Wet going into Rebellion as outlined by Sampson is borne out by Jan Smuts, who later uses the fine De Wet gets for assaulting the said black man with a shambok – which was 5 shillings. In broad media, Smuts belittles both De Wet and his purposes behind the revolt by calling it the “5 Shilling Rebellion”.

Christiaan de Wet would go on to say of the Colour Blind Qualified Franchise policy and the fact its still upheld in the Cape Providence:

“The ungodly policy of Botha has gone on long enough, and the South African Dutch are going to stand as one man to crush this unholy scandal.”6

Manie Maritz is also described within his deep-seated racism – he is noted as a man of:

“Enormous strength, inordinate vanity, little education, and the one, perhaps, of all the rebels most open to the influence of German gold.”7

Jopie Fourie is described by Sampson as a religious mans and a very pleasant man – however his Anglophobia seemed to have grown on him like a disease starting with his resentment because of a permanent limp, caused by a bullet wound in the knee during The South African War (1899-1902), and this:

“intensified the bitterness to one who had been a fine footballer and athlete”.8

What follows in ‘The capture of De Wet’ is the ‘Black’ part of the 1914 Afrikaner Revolt, the declaration from Maritz stating that any blacks standing in the way of the rebels will simply be executed. His declaration Maritz states:

“Several cases are known where the enemy has armed natives and coloured people to fight against us, and as this tends to arouse contempt among the black nations for the white, an emphatic warning is issued that all coloured people and natives who are captured with arms, as well as their officers, will be made to pay the penalty with their lives.”9

The killing of Allan William King, the Native representative by Fourie’s Commando. The declaration by the said ‘Natives’ to avenge King and enter the war on their own terms and wipe Fourie’s Commando out by themselves – they are held back by King’s wife who pleads with them for restraint. Sampson notes of ‘rise’ of the ‘Natives’ to avenge King:

‘The natives of the district were almost crazy with rage at the loss of their ” Father,” as they deemed Allan King …. They sent a deputation of chiefs and headmen into Pretoria to see the wife of their dead “inkosi,” to assure her of their love for him … and said to her “Say the word, and we will kill every one of these bad men, and also their wives and children !”10

But Mrs. King shook her head and forbade them to raise a finger, for well she realized the horrors that might follow if once the natives commenced reprisals. The rebels have to thank the wife of the man they so unfairly shot that all their throats were not cut that night, their wives and children assegaied, and their homes given to the flames.’11

The position of Sol Plaatje as to the revolt and Native rights also becomes important. So too is the lambasting of Christiaan de Wet and his martial abilities – and even his influence, his reputation shattered.

Not only Sampson, General Jan Smuts was highly critical of Christiaan de Wet’s fighting abilities and strategic acumen. His son Captain Jannie Smuts would record his father’s disposition, it gives an interesting insight on de Wet and his disposition to making irresponsible strategic and operational decisions – driven instead by emotion and irrational ideals, here it is:

“It might here be noted that there was considerable divergence of opinion amongst the (1914) rebel leaders on their course of action. Beyers wanted a relatively passive though armed form of resistance – the type that came to be known as a “coup” in the Second World War. He was against civil war. De Wet, more fiery and impetuous, was for vigorous action and pushing through to connect up with Maritz. In his zeal he forgot that he was poorly armed, had no field guns, and was short of ammunition. He also failed to reckon with the mobility afforded the Government by the much-extended railway system, or the advent of the petrol driven motor-car”.12

In other words, as a pivot leader of the Boer Revolt of 1914, Christiaan de Wet was flying by the seat of his pants (a trait not uncommon with his approach to the South Africa War 1899-1902) – completely unprepared he was bent on full sedition and revolt to reinstate ZAR republicanism, an oligarchy run on a Boer paramountcy and its severe laws of racial exclusivity and repression throughout the South African Union – paying little regard to the strategic ramifications, operational requirements or even modern military advancements, completely underestimating his enemy, just blindly pursuing his “impetuous” pipe dream. 

Yup, its a WHOLE different view of the Afrikaner revolt and its not one you get from your Afrikaner Christian Nationalist education and its certainly not one you get from modern day Afrikaner historians. They have been telling you it’s all about ‘the British’ for decades … and meanwhile, the one and only ‘English’ historian to write on the matter at the time is simply dismissed, completely bypassed – his work simply discarded as ‘jingoism’ – so not relevant.

One thing is a truism, and its true of many Boer War or Boer Revolt books and academic papers directed to Afrikaner consumers in the past, is that the works tend to cater to a specific Afrikaner ‘Volksgeist’, one which has little resonance outside of white Afrikaans culture. These works tend to highlight the ‘whiteness’ of the conflict, and focus primarily on Afrikaner cultural dynamics. One hopes that any new book on the 1914 Afrikaner Rebellion brings something new to the table, one in which the ‘Black’ and the ‘English’ part of the 1914 Rebellion is fully appraised, researched and understood, an in-depth appraisal of race politics of the time, the role played by Black Africans, Coloureds, Indian and even English speaking white South Africans in the revolt i.e. the majority of South Africans – their political representations, reactions and aspirations – what they were “fighting for”, their “freedom” in effect.

Without this, the majority of South Africans will find themselves, once again, as by-standers to this history and they will pay no attention to it whatsoever. The ‘new’ work having no real resonance to modern South African society – just a re-packaged, re-marketed regurgitation of the old white Afrikaner Nationalist debates targeted at a fresh new Afrikaner audience for a little commercial gain.

As a very reputed historian – Dr. Damian P. O’Connor, also pointed out recently, the problem with removing or brushing over sources, especially written accounts such as this one from the period, on the basis of ‘jingoism’ or just ‘not conveniently fitting’ into a Afrikaner nationalist political narrative or even an Afrikaner author’s bias brought about by years of nationalist identity politics and socialisation … is that once we’ve dismissed a first hand written account we are left with nothing, just pure hearsay and verbal tradition .. empty space in effect, and into that ‘empty space’ anyone can write anything they like, we can just make it up. It becomes revisionist history – pure ‘gone with the wind’ romantic drivel.


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

References:

  • The Capture of De Wet. The South African Rebellion 1914 – Sampson, Philip J. Published Edward Arnold, London. 1915
  • JC Smuts. Jan Christian Smuts by his son J.C. Smuts. Heinemann & Cassell Publisher, 1952.

Footnotes

  1. Smuts, Smuts by his son, 239 ↩︎
  2. Smuts, Smuts by his son, 240 ↩︎
  3. Sampson, Capture of De Wet, 5 ↩︎
  4. Sampson, Capture of De Wet, vii ↩︎
  5. Sampson, Capture of De Wet, vii ↩︎
  6. Sampson, Capture of De Wet, 148 ↩︎
  7. Sampson, Capture of De Wet, vii ↩︎
  8. Sampson, Capture of De Wet, vii ↩︎
  9. Sampson, Capture of De Wet, 252 ↩︎
  10. Sampson, Capture of De Wet, 191 – 193 ↩︎
  11. Sampson, Capture of De Wet, 193 ↩︎
  12. Smuts, Smuts by his son, 234 ↩︎

The ‘Rise and Fall’ of the Torch Commando

Torch Commando Series – Part 4

The Torch – a mixed bag

On the back of the successful widespread support of ‘The Steel Commando’ and determined to continue the fight to effect regime change, the ‘The Torch Commando’ took shape and it took to a more formalized structure of a central command with devolved authorities in the various regions of South Africa, using military discipline, military styled planning and lines of communication to activate.

Officially launching as the Torch Commando, Group Captain Sailor Malan, the hero of The Battle of Britain was elected National President of the Torch, Major Louis Kane-Berman, a highly respected North Africa and Italy campaign officer, was elected National Chairman. To keep a very even keel, the appointed Patron-in-Chief for the Torch Commando was Nicolaas Jacobus de Wet, the former Chief Justice of South Africa. The National Director was Major Ralph Parrott, a ‘hero’ of the Battle of Tobruk from the Transvaal Scottish who received the Military Cross for bravery. 

Group Captain Sailor Malan (left) and Major Louis Kane-Berman (right), the top two Torch leaders.

The Torch went to pains to put two English speakers and two Afrikaans speakers at the top of the organisation to reflect balance – critical where white Afrikaners, who made up 60% of the 334,000 South Africans who had volunteered to fight in the war against Nazim. Some, disillusioned with the military’s demobilization and re-integration process and been ‘politically disenfranchised’ had voted for the National Party in 1948 in protest and expecting change to their circumstances, and the Torch sought to ‘bring them back’ to centre-line politics on the ‘camaraderie’ ticket (however, this group was small and fleeting, in the main a ‘Service block’ vote emerged in the United Party’s ambit and it did not really materialize in the National Party’s ambit). 

The manifesto of the Torch Commando was released, it was a ‘rededication of service and a call to the nation,’ it read:

We, veterans of many wars, once more dedicate ourselves to our land. In the belief and with the guidance of Almighty God, we shall pursue the truth and uphold it.

We shall strive for justice, mutual trust and honour in all our affairs.

South Africans, men have died that you shall be free, let no-one rob you of your heritage.

Having met together in a spirit of mutual faith and trust, our father’s founded the Union of South Africa. In the same spirit let us go forth together, free men, free from fear, free to worship and free to speak.

South Africa Awake.

Rise of The Torch

All over the country people started to flock into devolved Torch Commando structures and almost immediately ‘joined up’. Hundreds at a time joined new branches springing up outside the major metropole branches/commands in small places like Pinetown, Paarl, Umtata, Amanzimtoti, Eshowe, Dundee, Colenso, Eliot, Strand, Fish Hoek, Sunday’s River Valley, Bedford and Ficksburg. By the end of September 1951 there was a branch in every Reef town and on most of the mines. 

The enthusiasm for ‘The Torch’ (as it became to be known) was almost sporadic and widespread, as if an immediate need of the returned war veterans to express frustration at the National Party’s policy of Apartheid and re-kindle their camaraderie had been answered in a legitimate political pressure group. Such was the support that it took Louis Kane-Berman and Sailor Malan by surprise.

The Torch Commando Executive, Louis Kane-Berman is 4th from the left, Sailor Malan is seated next to him – 5th from the left – photo courtesy the Kane-Berman family.

Within three months of the official launch of the Torch, it had almost 100 000 members enrolled in 206 branches. By the end of January 1952, there were 120 000 members in 350 branches. By mid 1952 the Torch had 250 000 members. 

Membership of The Torch was not exclusive to military service, it was open to all who supported the Torch’s cause. A significant non-veteran joining The Torch was Alan Paton (the famous author and future leader of the Liberal Party). Of its zenith membership of 250,000 members one quarter were white ex-servicemen – about 63,000.  Membership was relatively cheap and accessible – half a crown (about R 100 or £ 5 today’s money), and ‘Torch’ lapel pins and various other ‘Torch’ symbology was adopted by members to signify to others their political convictions and support of ‘The Torch’ and its ideals by way of a ‘badge’ (lapel pin).

Torch Membership – half a crown

Of major concern to the National Party was the profile of people joining The Torch Commando, members soon included five former Judges, and ten Generals, including the Lieutenant-General George Brink CB, CBE, DSO, who had a very distinguished military career, he was the Commander of the 1st South African Division during the Second World War. In 1942, Brink turned over command of the division to Dan Pienaar and Commanded the Inland Area Command in South Africa from 1942 to 1944. Other Generals joining the Torch were the highly regarded Major General R.C. Wilson and Brigadier A.H. Coy.

Another very notable General joining The Torch Commando was General Kenneth van der Spuy CBE MC, the man who pioneered the formation of South African Air Force (SAAF) under General Smuts’ directives. General Van der Spuy is regarded as the modern father and founder of the SAAF (Smuts would be the ‘Grandfather). After the war he was a key role-player in the establishment of The Springbok Legion and on the executive of the South African Legion of Military Veterans (The South African Legion), South Africa’s prima and largest veterans’ association with 52,000 registered veterans. 

Alarmed by this rapid rise in protesting whites and the profile of members joining The Torch, the National Party did what it did best, and acted ‘decisively’. It looked to the most important ‘feeder’ for the Torch Commando, the military – the Union Defence Force, and immediately instituted a ban on all permanent force members still serving as well as any public servant from joining the Torch, amending The Public Service Act.

General van der Spuy (left) and Lt. General Brink (right)

However, they had difficulty instituting this ban on the Citizen Force units and Regiments – whose members continued to join. The ban in many ways did affect membership as many still in the active employment of the government – either in the military or in the systems like the judiciary were discouraged from joining The Torch, lest they lose their livelihood. 

El Alamein Commemoration Campaign – October 1951

The Torch Commando targeted the anniversary celebrations of the Battle of El Alamein pivoting around the 26th October 1951 to draw countrywide protest and support. In all the El Alamein Commemoration Campaign drew a staggering 150,000 people into active protest against the National Party government. A coordinated protest this size had never been seen in South Africa before.

Ten Days before a mega-rally planned for Johannesburg, Sailor Malan lit a flaming torch outside the Langham Hotel in Johannesburg, the Torch was placed on a ‘Torch Truck’ which then travelled around the country driving up awareness and support and creating media hype (in all it travelled over 6,500 km drumming up support).  A huge crowd greeted the Torch Truck when it finally arrived in Johannesburg just in time for the El Alamein commemoration protest. The Johannesburg torch protest started when veterans carrying flaming Torches gathered at the square next to the City Hall, converging on them four separate mustering points elsewhere in the city came thousands of ex-servicemen and women, twelve abreast, singing the old stirring war songs of their day.

A massive crowd, tens of thousands, gathered around a dais erected among the palm trees on the square to hear speeches from Sailor Malan and Kane-Berman, who told them that the flaming torches were symbolic of the searchlights used at Alamein to guide troops to their objectives and remove the possibility of any man being lost. He said;

“These are the lights of democracy – let them be a source of comfort to the people of this country whatever their language, race, or colour. They convey a message to the people of South Africa in the name of those who fought and lived and in the name of those who fought and died.”

As to the large protests like this one, according to the Star Newspaper on 27th October 1951, the Torch Rallies for EL Alamein Commemoration brought the following numbers, Johannesburg 40,000 protestors, in Cape Town 20,000, in Durban 10,000 and in Pretoria 6,000.  But the protests did not stop at these large events, large bonfires symbolising Torches were lit across the country, some of them on the mountains above Barberton, six in Pretoria, and one at a peak high in the Drakensberg. People gathered also in Benoni, Krugersdorp, Vereeniging, Port Shepstone, Empangeni, and elsewhere. Hundreds of bonfires were lit around Kimberley in a massive ‘fire chain’. These smaller protests were often linked to a bugler playing the Last Post followed by a period of silence for the fallen. 

El Alamein Torch Commando protest poster targeted at Afrikaner ex-servicemen to bring them to the Torch’s cause – poster reads ‘Remember Alamein, we were Brothers remember?’

In all, it is estimated that a staggering 150,000 people would ultimately participate in the Torch’s El Alamein Commemoration protests. The government sat up and noticed, the Torch posed a potential military threat. Dr D.F. Malan, South Africa’s Prime Minister announced:

“People content that the Torch will go a little way and then vanish. That is not my view. The Torch Commando is to be taken seriously because it had a military or semi-military character. Private Armies of that nature cannot be tolerated …“

Officially, the government tried to gag the entire protest by way of instructing the SABC not to broadcast on any of the dates or activities, an instruction the broadcaster followed. The Torch tried to initiate the same campaign the following year in October 1952, but their permissions for gatherings were ‘banned’ – declined by Ben Schoeman (an NP Cabinet Minister).

After the El Alamein activations five guiding principles were penned crystallising the objectives of the movement by way of principals:

  • To uphold the spirit and solemn compacts entered into at Union as moral obligations of trust and honour binding upon the people
  • To secure the repeal of any legislation enacted in violation of such obligations
  • To protect the freedom of the individual in worship, language, and speech, and to ensure his right of free access to the courts
  • To eliminate all forms of totalitarianism, whether communist or fascist
  • To promote racial harmony in the Union

Rejection of Communism 

Noteworthy at this point is the Torch Commando in their objectives rejects Communism – they do this primarily because the National Party’s anti-communist legislation is so open ended. It is the legislative tool the National Party would use the Communist Party of South Africa and the Springbok Legion, it would also fundamentally undermine the activities of Torch Commando, and would even be used to curtail, arrest and even gag mainstream politicians in the Liberal Party and the Labour Party.

This was the infamous ‘The Suppression of Communism Act 44 July 1950’. The act was a sweeping act and not really targeted to Communists per se, it was intended for anyone in opposition to Apartheid regardless of political affiliation.

The Act defined communism as any scheme aimed at achieving change–whether economic, social, political, or industrial – “by the promotion of disturbance or disorder” or any act encouraging “feelings of hostility between the European and the non-European races … calculated to further (disorder)”

Thus, the Nationalist government could deem any person (liberal, humanitarian or Communist) to be a ‘communist ‘if it found that person’s aims to be aligned with these aims. After a nominal two-week appeal period, the person’s status as a communist became an un-reviewable matter of fact and subjected the person to being barred from public participation, restricted in movement or even imprisoned. In effect, it could be, and was applied to anyone from both the White community and Black community not buying into Apartheid.

Within the formation of the Torch Commando and paid-up members, were members of The Springbok Legion, and many of them had been members of the Communist Party of South Africa before and after the war. Influential and highly vocal Torchmen like Cecil Williams, Wolfie Kodesh, Jack Hodgson, Rusty Bernstein, Fred Carneson and Joe Slovo were all card carrying and outspoken members of the Communist Party.

Under the edicts of the Suppression of Communism Act 44 July 1950 the Nationalist government could have immediately such down The Torch Commando and arrested its members if it could prove it was a ‘Communist threat’ or carried with it Communist philosophy and ideology. This would force the communist members in the Torch to seek other more robust avenues to political protest like ‘The Congress of Democrats’ – some like Rusty Bernstein, Joe Slovo and Jack Hodgson are even arrested and charged with treason, alongside the likes of Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela in 1956.

This rejection of Communism not only kept The Torch Commando clear of repressive government legislation, it also opened the Torch Commando to the great many war veterans and their supporters who feared the advent of Bolshevism and Communism and other forms of socialism like National Socialism (Nazism). By rejecting Communism, The Torch would open itself up to far greater appeal and take a far safer trajectory than toeing the line of its communist members. This would cause a schism between the more robust ‘Springbok Legionnaires’ with Communist leanings would eventually even take aim at The Torch Commando and issue much critique of The Torch in the ex-servicemen’s newspapers like ‘Advance’ whose contributors included the wives of Jack Hodgson – Rica Hodgson and Joe Slovo’s wife – Ruth First, amongst others.

As irony and own goals go, even ‘Advance’ which evolved from ‘The Guardian’ and ‘the Clarion’ from November 1952 to October 1954, becoming the “New Age” in 1962 was eventually banned and closed by the National Party. Such is the nature of ‘white’ politics in South Africa, it’s never held a unitary view.

Smear Campaign

Also the National Party government, being extremely concerned about the influence this movement might have, especially under the leadership of the war hero, acted ‘decisively’ (as was its usual modus operandi) and went about discrediting the Torch Commando and its leaders through means of negative propaganda.

For the rest of his life, Sailor would be completely ridiculed by the Nationalist government. The National Party press caricatured him  ‘a flying poodle’, dressed in his leathers and flying goggles, in the service of Jan Smuts and the Jewish mine-bosses, who they referred to as the “Hochenheimers”.  The National Party openly branded Sailor Malan as an Afrikaner of a ‘different’ and ‘unpatriotic’ kind, a traitor to his country and ‘Volk’ (people).

The ‘Crisis’ Continues – 1952

Dr D.F. Malan also publicly warned Torch Commando members, that as he viewed them as being paramilitary in nature, Torch Commando members who picketed National Party rallies would be met with a violent response, and this would set a nasty tone at grass-root levels.

In the National Party heartland town – Lydenberg, the new year started badly on 11th Jan 1952, emboldened by the governments position on the Torch Commando, a Torch meeting in Lydenberg was violently broken up by Nationalists (in the clash, Charles Bekker, the Torch’s National Organiser’s arm was broken). 

The Torch announced that they would be back before the end of January in a show of strength and force. Commandant Dolf de la Rey, the old Boer War, ZAR veteran headed up the steel commando styed convoy again as hundreds of vehicles descended on Lydenberg. This time the Nationalists thought better of violence and there was no trouble, to drive the point home as to the freedom to assemble and protest a new Torch Commando branch was promptly constituted in Lydenberg. 

Video: AP footage of the Torch Commando in action, note the military styled operations room the use of leaflet drops from the air, also note the marketing materials the ‘V’ for Victory slogan which was a wartime rally call.

Whilst the Torch was focussed on small town grass-root recruitment and expanding demonstrations and branches, things started to go their way as to the ‘Constitutional Crisis’ – in a landmark decision in March 1952, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court declared the Separate Representation of Voters Act as 

“invalid, null, and void and of no legal force and effect.”

The Torch Commando’s jubilation at the ‘win’ did not last long. Dr D.F Malan declared that courts were not entitled to pass judgement on the will of Parliament. Kane-Berman would warn that 

the fecundity of a mind like that of Dr Dönges cannot be ignored”. He and his colleagues in the Broederbond would find a way “of circumventing this judgement”

And that is exactly what happened next.

The Nationalists acting very un-constitutionally and with unparalleled cynicism over time, would pass the High Court of Parliament Act, effectively removing the autonomy of the Judiciary in matters regarding the Constitution and loaded the Appellate Court with additional NP sympathetic representatives.

So, the ’Constitutional Crisis’ continued.  Sailor Malan was quick to react, of the Nationalists by-passing of the highest court in the land he said:

“The mask of respectability is there for all but the blind to see. The sheepskin has fallen off and the fascist wolf is snarling at the courts. We accuse the government of preferring jungle law to the rule of law. We accuse them of preferring unfettered dictatorship to a constitution which binds them to certain standards of procedure.”

In a co-ordinated and with military precision, Mass Torch protests in major metropoles immediately convened in Umtata – 3,500 people. Pietermaritzburg – 15,000 people, Johannesburg – 20,000 people. In Pretoria 20,000 people gathered despite being teargassed. The Torch leader in Pretoria, John Wilson, said;

Dr Malan was putting himself above the courts in the best tradition of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini”.

Torch Light protest meetings also immediately sprang up in minor metropoles – many in National Party heartland towns – from Groblersdal to Louis Trichardt, further attesting to the gradual conversion of Afrikaner voters and the pulling power of The Torch. 

As to the Constitutional Crisis, regardless of the Torch’s mass protest efforts, the Nationalists pressed ahead, they continued to load the Parliamentary system to get their majority by gerrymandering constituencies, they appointed National Party MP’s as ‘Native Representatives’ in the Senate and illegally incorporated South West African (Namibian) MP’s into the Senate (South West Africa as an ex-German colony was a National Party sympathetic block, given their right wing German sympathies during the war, and although a ‘Protectorate’ was still a separate country).

Sailor Malan at a Torch Commando rally in Pretoria, note the ‘V for Victory’ salute and his trademark flying jacket and medals.

Kane-Berman would say of it; 

“a vast section of the people of South Africa are no longer prepared to stomach the totalitarian tendencies of the present government with its piecemeal invasion of their civil liberties and its tinkering with the Constitution.”

Simply put, if the rights of the coloured people could be removed then nobody’s rights were safe. More action was needed, simple protesting by Torchlight was not working, real and meaningful change needed to occur for the Torch to remain relevant. A coalition of all opposition parties who had members who could vote needed to come together in a concerted effort using all forms of politicking to oust the Nationalists constitutionally – by the ballot box. 

This would take shape in an organisation called ‘The United Democratic Front’. 

The United Democratic Front 

The Torch’s mixed bag of moderate ‘pro-democracy’ and firebrand ‘Liberal’ and ‘Communist’ members would also ultimately swing it from an independent ex-serviceman’s popular movement to a political alliance with stated affiliations. 

However, the Torch gradually came to realise that mass protesting would not lead to effective regime change and ‘door to door’ politicking would be required to build ground-swell voter’s block and beat the National Party at the next General election.

Sailor Malan would nail the Torch’s colour’s to the United Party’s mast and say of this move to becoming more of political movement rather than a popular protest movement.

“We have no intention of affiliating with the United Party, but since the National Party was elected to power in a constitutional way, we must fight them constitutionally, and we can only do this by helping the United Party.” (the largest and most viable opposition party).

However, the ‘mixed bag’ of vastly different political views of the Torch’s members would not enable it to rally behind any single political party, Sailor Malan would also say that it would be fatal for the Torch to form a separate party in its own right – so a better vehicle was to needed to enable the Torch to politic at grass-roots across the political spectrum.

Political Cartoon in Advance shows the opposition to the National Party pulling in different directions. The Torch sitting in the back.

This came in the form of the United Democratic Front (the ‘first’ UDF – the UDF of later years was an entirely different body with the same name) – announced by Koos Strauss on 16th April 1952, the leader of the United Party (UP) as essentially an alliance between the Torch and the UP. The full-makeup of the United Front would be partnership between the Labour Party (LP), the Torch Commando, an organization called ‘The Defenders of the Constitution’ and the United Party (UP). In essence The Torch would remain independent, but it was now free to canvass votes for the UP and the LP in the upcoming 1953 General Election.

To many, the joining of the UDF and opening the Torch to the party politics of the UP and the LP would signal the point where the Torch would ‘jump tracks’ from its singular grass-roots vision of demanding the removal and/or resignation of the National Party as a political pressure group and become a vehicle on which the UP especially could rely on for its party-political aims, its messaging becoming defused as it entered mainstream politics. This would be the first signal of the end of the Torch.

A veiled threat

One area where this political dilution of the Torch occurred in mid April 1952. As an ‘ex-military’ movement it could realistically threaten the government with force, and this made the government very jittery and careful in the way it dealt with the Torch. At a Torch meeting in Greenside, Kane-Berman proposed a ‘National Day of Protest’ and said;

“We will fight constitutionally as long as we are permitted to fight constitutionally, but if this government are foolish enough to attempt unconstitutional action, then I say the Torch Commando will consider very seriously its next step.” 

In his mind the next step would be a national strike and countrywide shutdown, however he also went to give a veiled military threat and said:

“As good soldiers we must have something in reserve!”

The National Party took this statement literally to be a final threat of military force and the idea of National Strike or ‘National Shutdown’ by ‘whites’ would embolden the ‘blacks’ to join in a national revolt – in their eyes a powder-keg. The Afrikaans media jumped on it declaring the Torch as provoking national chaos and drawing ‘blacks’ into ‘white’ politics.  C.R. Swart, the NP Minister of Justice falsely declared that the government had evidence that The Torch was plotting an armed uprising. Then Die Transvaler, falsely reported that the Torch had plans for a coup d’état.

Laughable as this all was Kane-Berman responded:

“I do not doubt that there is a plot afoot, but it is not the one mentioned in the Transvaler report. The real plot is a Nationalist one and it consists of trumping up an excuse to do precisely what Hitler did in Germany – ban opposition movements.”

Foreign newspapers now started picking up on the Afrikaner newspaper news-feed that the Torch was planning a coup d’état. National Party Ministers were so spooked many of them started surrounding themselves with bodyguards – by June, 250 new plainclothes policemen had been appointed to protect National Party Ministers. The whole issue, now blown completely out of proportion was demonstrable of just how fearful of the Torch the National Party had become.

The newly formed United Democratic Front had to jump in to diffuse the situation on behalf of their now aligned Torch Commando. Koos Strauss, the UP leader almost immediately re-iterated that the United Front (the UP and the Torch) intended to fight the battle constitutionally, there would be no national shutdown and there would be no threat of arms. In this way the UP ‘blunted’ the fighting edge and military threat of The Torch and forced its leaders like Kane-Berman to toe the UP’s party-political line and agenda.

Political Cartoon by Victor Ivanoff over the United Party endeavours to use the Torch Commando to win the 1953 elections, it shows the Torch as the UP’s hinderance.

D-Day commemorations – June 1952

On 6th June 1952, a Torch Commando procession was planned around D-Day anniversary – the invasion of Europe which would see the end of Nazi Germany – a mere 8 years into its celebrations.

A staggering 45,000 people gathered in Durban for a “hands-off-our-constitution” Torch Commando meeting. The meeting was preceded by a pipe band and march into the city of 5,000 Torch members. 

In addition, 2,500 women met in the Durban city hall to dedicate themselves to unseating the Nationalist the government, so impressed by the convictions of the women, and aging Ouma Smuts, Jan Smuts’ widow and darling of ex-servicemen and women even sent them a goodwill message.

Wakkerstroom by-election – June 1952

Also, in June 1952 the National Party incumbent for Wakkerstroom died, forcing a by-election. Wakkerstroom was Jan Smuts old seat when he was ousted in 1924 and had become a National Party strong-hold. It became important because the UP wanted to show it had not lost touch with the rural vote and to the NP it became important as the African National Congress (ANC) had announced it’s ‘Defiance Campaign’ at the same time as the by-election and the NP wanted to show it still held the confidence and will of the voting people (albeit they were only white). 

Torch Commando protest – note the size and the support

Although the seat was a ‘sure win’ for the Nationalists in any event, the Torch decided that a show of unity would be necessary to assert their freedom to assemble and meet anywhere they choose.  The Torch also felt it would be an ideal opportunity to present a friendly face to the rural Afrikaners as militarily non-threatening – a moral opportunity to present themselves as ordinary decent citizens, contrary to the lies that were being told about them in the Afrikaans media. They proposed to set up a nearby ‘camp’ – have a meeting and then have a social gathering and ‘braai’ with the local farmers.

To protect their stronghold and assure themselves of the win the Nationalists announced that the United Front (the Torch in effect) would not be allowed to hold a meeting in the Wakkerstroom constituency. Local officials refused permission for the Torch to road transport equipment to the town – so the Torch charted a Dakota aircraft to fly in with all the necessary. The Police were then ordered to block any Torch Commando convoy, so the convoy simply drove around them on the open veld and entered Wakkerstroom to set up camp.

They held their meeting with no problems from the locals, asserted their right to meet anywhere and then had a braai with the locals who brought meat and vegetables with them, a nice friendly social.

By did all this goodwill and positive spin swing a vote?  Nope, the United Party was soundly beaten at the poll, embarrassingly they had lost ground to the previous vote – on aggregate they had lost more voters to the National Party, in retaining the seat, the NP received 4.9% more votes than it had attracted in the 1948 election. This was taken as a barometer of the general state of the United Party’s appeal to the rural Afrikaner vote.  

Summing up the reasons for the magnitude of the defeat, a United Party memorandum stated:

the National Party candidates and election agents ascribe their success to the existence of the Torch Commando, the Kane-Berman ‘Day of Protest’ statement and the obvious tie up to the non-European protest movement. They were able to lump us (the UP) into a ‘bonte opposisie’ the Torch Commando, the Labour Party, Kahn, Sachs, Carneson (and) the African National Congress.”

By Carneson, they referenced Fred Carneson, a military veteran, leader of the Springbok Legion and a devout Communist. Based on this, the UP executive concluded at a meeting on the 17th July 1952, that in order to re-gain the confidence of their lost rural Afrikaner voters they had little choice but to move the United Party’s platform even closer to that of the National Party. 

This would mean tapering back on the UP’s ‘liberal’ faction and their demand for a universal franchise for both black and white voters and a move towards the UP’s conservative faction who were happy the Cape Franchise for Colourds and who wanted to see an ‘eventual’ qualified franchise for black South Africans. This would spell, not only the death of the United Front, but the Torch Commando and the eventual death of the United Party itself.

On the up, in 1952, the Torch Commando continued to rise at the grass-roots level. Torch meetings attracted 3 000 in Witbank, 500 in Vryheid, 300 in Bathurst, 60 farmers in Salem, 400 at Montagu, 2,000 at Adelaide, 2 000 at Bredasdorp, and thousands again in the main metropoles of Pretoria, Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town. Torch branches were formed in Oranjemund and Port St Johns. As to rising popularity Danie Craven, the South Africa Springbok rugby stalwart even joined the Torch. 

However, in line with the fear that ‘The Torch’ was planning a military overthrow and National Party hype surrounding this, along with down-right under-handed politics – on the downside Torch rallies and meetings in the latter part of 1952 increasingly came under attack by Afrikaner Nationalists, so much so ‘Torchmen’ started to wear their ‘old tin hat’ brodie steel helmets to meetings. A Torch meeting in   Queenstown was violently broken up, in Brakpan Nationalists lined the streets and spat at a passing Torch rally. A Torch/United Front meeting in Vrededorp was so violently attacked by Nationalists banishing iron bars and nailed sticks that 100 people had to be treated by doctors on site whilst others were taken to hospital. A Torch meeting at Milner Park was attacked and stoned.

The Torch and Race 

One aspect of the Torch Commando that comes under scrutiny of modern ANC political commentators is the ‘whiteness’ of the organization.  They are quick to dismiss it as an irrelevant movement because it was not inclusive of ‘blacks’ … but that would be to completely mis-understand what the Torch was.  So, what’s with the ‘whiteness’?

Torch Commando rally – note the placard expressing fear of the National Party’s intentions to implement a ‘white only’ fascist Republic

The Torch had been formed to oppose the violation of the Constitution. Although the violations directly affected the voting rights of coloured people, this violation intended to create a “whites-only” vote – so it was a ‘Constitutional’ fight at the ballot to prevent the on-set of Apartheid in its more sinister forms. Only whites and Coloureds had the franchise, so only they could fight a constitutional fight at the polls and in the greater scheme of ‘white parliamentary constituencies’ the handful of parliamentary constituencies where coloured people were registered on the common voters roll was relatively small – however to this effect The Torch did have a few coloured branches in these constituencies – in the but it remained an almost entirely white organization.

Outside of The Cape, the vast majority in the rest of country of ‘Black’ people did not have ‘the ballot’ so they could not participate at all. Kane-Berman summed it up in October 1952 when he said that because the Torch’s fight was through the ballot box, there was no point in enrolling people who could not vote.

Coloured representation at a Torch Commando protest

Since the Torch did not want to become a political party, the best way of throwing out the NP government in 1953 was to encourage Torch supporters to vote for its two parliamentary partners in the United Front, the United Party and the Labour Party. By late 1953 this had become the key objective of The Torch Commando, and it only really involved ‘whites’ and their ballot.

To illustrate the point, even the Coloured Servicemen felt the Torch was the ‘white man’s fight’ and not theirs.  In July 1952, a letter to Sailor Malan the Kimberley Coloured War Veterans’ Association said;

“No good purpose will be served by us becoming members of your vast organisation, notwithstanding the fact that the Torch came into being on one of the most vital issues affecting the coloured people”.  Our “sincerest wishes that (the Torch) shall grow in strength to face the crisis affecting South Africa …. Coloured people made great sacrifices and paid dearly for their loyalty in assisting to uphold democracy”.

Later in 1952 a group of coloured ex-servicemen declared that they had no desire to become members of the Torch’s fight as;

“(This) constitutional fight is the white man’s fight to re-establish the integrity of his word”.

The Torch’s mixed bag broad church of Communists, Liberals, Moderates and Democrats found common cause and ‘unity’ in their horror at the NP’s plans to violate the Constitution, but in reality true ‘unity’ did not go very much further than that. Any attempt to develop hard-line, defined and detailed policies on race in a country so racially obsessed with vastly different views on it might have split the organisation, so the Torch leadership chose to avoided it as much as possible and focus on what ‘unified’. In any event, the priority was to defeat the NP party in the general election due to be held in March 1953 and they would just focus on that.

Torch Commando protest placard warning ‘they (the National Party) breed race hate’.

Dr. Maurice McGregor is a regular member of the Torch, but very active and he gives a perspective on the issue as to race and The Torch and its mission, he said; 

“I was in the Torch Commando for about two years and took part in several marches. As I remember it the commando was primarily created to protect democracy, meaning the democratic process, the right to hold political meetings, and this in effect meant protecting the United Party which was the principal opposition to a Nationalist party.”

He goes on to say on the issue of protesting against ‘Apartheid’ his position is one of a typical white United Party voter in the 1940’s and 1950’s many of whom maintained that it was important that Black South Africans be taken out of poverty first, the poverty cycle and lack of education needed to be addressed before any form of franchise is afforded to them. Maurice recalls:

“To say that they held mass protests against apartheid is correct so long as you don’t start defining too precisely what apartheid was about. For example, the torch commando would never have endorsed a vote for Africans, even a very limited vote for those with education and property. But they did oppose the specific steps involved in the application of apartheid such as the bulldozing of Sophia town and the creation of rural ghettos.”

On the racial make-up of The Torch Commando (that been an organisation for ‘white voters’ only) he points out that although predominantly ‘white’ it was not exclusively white, he says;

“(The Torch) was not only white. There were Blacks as well as coloureds in the Torch Commando. But then there were very few Blacks in the Army.”

The ANC’s Defiance Campaign and the Swart Bills

Black resistance to Apartheid was also starting to lean towards violent civilian defiance as the ANC’s Defiance Campaign, officially launched from 26th June 1952, started to descend into full blown rioting in every major metropole around the country by October 1952, this was also not a stated aim of the Torch Commando (Kane-Berman’s National Shutdown statement aside).

C.R. ‘Blakkie’ Swart as portrayed in Advance – the ‘gagger’ of free speech in front of a Nazi swastika.

It was clear from the nature of the Defiance Campaign that the ANC and The Torch were on different political trajectories. However, the Torch did take a strong position when Kane-Berman in September 1952 and now re-elected as the Chairman of The Torch Commando called on the Nationalist government “to cease its suicidal policy of fanning the flame of race hatred and to meet the non-European leaders in conference.”

The ANC’s Defiance ironically would also trigger the demise of both The Torch and The UP and spit them apart, and it’s not what you think – it would come from the National Party in the form of new statutes and because of polarising views within the United Party to them. So how is that?

In response to ANC’s Defiance Campaign, the National Party behaved ‘typically’ in January 1953, C.R Swart introduced the “Whipping Bill” (giving powers to Police to give lashes to people inciting political violence) and the “Public Safety Bill” (to prevent highly defiant political gatherings in the interests of safety and call a ‘State of Emergency’ when needed). 

ANC Defiance Campaign – commences on the 26 June 1952

Known as the ‘Swart Bills’ the Torch was bitterly opposed to these bills – and not without good reason, the ‘Swart Bills’, which gave the Minister of Justice immense powers in the event of civil unrest. Had these Bills been in place when the Steel Commando rioted in Cape Town in May 1951 the State would have had the powers to imprison and whip the Torch Commando’s executive. However, the United Party dithered over these Bills as the conservative element within the UP felt they were decisive in resolving spin off violence from the ANC’s Defiance Campaign and therefore necessary.

On the other side of the fence, the United Party would support the National Party in passing Swart Bills on the grounds of national security, concerned with the unrest the ANC’s Defiance Campaign was creating whereas the Torch insisted that the bills conflicted with their principles and were the re-curser to fascist dictatorship. 

Louis Kane-Berman argued;

“… unless the Torch Commando take the lead and the initiative in rousing public feeling against these Bills, the lead will be taken by other less responsible organisations (both European and non-European)”

Kane-Berman also, after rioting broke out, stated that;

“we (in the Torch) are not surprised, nor should be the Nationalist leaders be, that extreme elements among the natives have gone berserk.”

Torch Commando artefact, telegram to Sailor Malan from the League of Women Voters (Black Sash) urging The Torch’s vigorous opposition to the Swart Bills.

The infamous “lunch

The issue over the Swart Bills came to a head when Louis Kane-Berman attended a luncheon hosted by the Torch’s primary benefactor and UP stalwart – Harry Oppenheimer. Harry Oppenheimer pressed Kane-Berman to elaborate on the Torch’s position with regard The Swart Bills, and was highly offended, when a United Party Minister of Parliament with whom Kane-Berman had served alongside in the North African campaign during the war, rebutted Kane-Berman’s argument on the evils of the Bills and detention without trial when and he flippantly stated:

“Louis you are talking nonsense. During the war Smuts threw many Afrikaners into prison without trial and now because the government wants to imprison some …(African)… trouble-makers, you now wish to raise all manner of objections.” 

Alarmed that the United Party (UP) would support the bills, Louis Kane-Berman summoned The Torch Commandos National and Provincial executives and members of provincial executives of the Torch to Cape Town for an emergency meeting, also attended by leaders of the UP and of the Labour Party (LP). The LP was bitterly opposed to the bills. The UP representative, Pilkington-Jordan failed to convince the meeting of the UP position in support of the Swart Bills, so to conclude the meeting the Torch executives “decided unanimously there and then that if these bills went ahead, we would now call a National Day of Protest”. 

Louis Kane-Berman issued a press release reaffirming the Torch’s stance against the Swart Bills on the 8 February 1953 – the invited press gave it a standing ovation so well was it received, “to my surprise” said Kane-Berman later. The press release drew a line in the sand as to The Torch’s political intentions and it immediately put The Torch at loggerheads with the UP and with the likes of Harry Oppenheimer, the Torch’s primary financial benefactor and sponsor.

The Torch had reverted to their original threat of shutting down the country and aligning with the objects of the ANC’s defiance campaign, and almost immediately there was dissent over the call for a ‘National Day of Protest’ within the Torch at a grass-roots level from the Torch’s rank and file who supported the UP. Torch members declaring the ‘day of protest’ as not properly approved by the Torch’s structures – the organisation now fighting internally with its leadership started the slippery slope towards an implosion.

Political cartoon, shows the UP leader Koos Strauss concerned that the Torch Commando, depicted as children getting a little too close to his thatch house for comfort. Courtesy the Kane-Berman family.

The General Election – April 1953

Although Louis Kane-Berman would describe these two bills and the loss of financial support from Oppenheimer and support from the UP as the death-knoll for the Torch, its broader than just that. The real death-knoll would come in the 1953 General Election. The NP went into the election campaigning taking advantage of the unclear UP policies on black emancipation and weak leadership, promoting the ‘red danger – communist – rooi gevaar’ threat of ‘the Torch’ and ‘Springbok Legion’ and the ‘black danger – swart gevaar’ of the ANC and its defiance campaign. The ‘fear factor’ resonated with white voters fearing an uncertain future and seeking strong leadership and structure. 

Again, as in the 1948 election, the National Party did not win a majority vote – it won 45% of the vote, but more importantly it won more constitutional seats, increasing its number of seats from 86 before the election to 94 – bringing it 61% of the ‘Constituency’ vote – well up on its performance in 1948. The UP’s seats dropped from 64 to 57. Labour dropped from 6 to 5. 

Ideological Conflict – Natal

The Torch Commando dithered between two conflicting Constitutional issues, the first surrounding the Cape Coloured Franchise – which in essence called for the maintenance of the South African Union on moral grounds and the second issue, Natal’s sovereignty – which called for a break-up of the South African Union on legal grounds.  Diametrically opposing views indeed.

The ‘Apartheid-Lite’ politics of the UP to attract back the vital marginal ‘white’ voters drawn to the National Party in the 1948 election and the ‘Liberal’ UP Torch members at odds with their party’s politics would ultimately lead to downfall of the Torch (and eventually to the downfall of the UP itself). 

To illustrate the effect of this political feud in which The Torch now found itself in, after the 1953 elections the leader group of the Natal Torch Commando who were in the United Party, split from the United Party to form their own ‘Union Federal Party.’ The Party stood for full enfranchisement of Indian and Coloured voters and a qualified franchise for Black voters. As much as Sailor Malan tried to assure all that their choice was not that of The Torch and the Torch had nothing to do with it or its stated aims, key members of the Torch resigned over the matter – including The Patron in Chief.

Critical to The Torch’s strategy was that it attempted to avoid been party political and simply be a ‘mixed bag’ of political views, with the idea of re-igniting the old war time camaraderie to swing the ‘service vote’ so as to oust the National Party at the ballot box through a united front of political opposition. 

It made it clear that although a ‘militant’ movement it was not a ‘military’ one. It liked to hint at its potential to become a military threat but made it very clear that it was not an armed resistance movement or military wing of any political party, it also made it clear that it was not a ‘political party’ – it left its members to campaign and politic for any party in opposition to the National Party. This wishy-washy standpoint would lead some of its members into military resistance and others into political resistance and would count as one of the reasons for the movement’s ultimate downfall.

A heady combination of the 1953 UP Election loss, the firebrand anti-Apartheid Liberals and Communists in the Torch and the state’s legislature actions banning or politically restricting members of The Torch – would all result in the final nail in the Torch’s coffin.

Demise

In June 1953, the Torch met in Johannesburg for its second national congress and decided by a narrow majority to continue, but in reality – without meeting its first raison d’etre – the removal of the NP in 1953 General Elections – the Torch was done and it ceased to really exist.

As to the Torch’s second raison d’etre – the Removal of Coloureds from the Common Voters roll to stop the slide to more sinister Apartheid legislation and a Republic – after the 1953 elections the National Party was able to complete its strategy of loading the senate and by-passing the Judiciary and by 1956 the Colourds were removed from the voters roll. That opened the way forward for Apartheid proper and by 1960, the ‘Union’ Constitution would fall apart when a South African Republic was declared with a ‘whites only’ vote with the aid of ‘whites only’ voters in SWA (Namibia) to swing a tiny referendum majority (just 1%) to a National Party ‘Keep South Africa White’ referendum promise.

As to the United Democratic Front. After the 1953 elections, the UP’s demise was also set. It’s firebrand Torch Commando members in it would split the party and form the Liberal Party and the Progressive Party. The UP would attempt re-direct Koos Strauss’ conservative approach to include a more palatable ‘ex-services’ appeal by appointing the very popular ex-services choice – Sir De Villiers Graaf to lead it. But, it was done, the Progressive Party split, led by ‘Torchmen’ like Colin Eglin would eventually take over as official opposition and the UP would cease to exist.  The Labour Party in turn would also lose relevance in the battery of ‘Anti-Communist’ legislation, ‘whites only’ participation legislation and ‘banning’ of its members and would also cease to exist.

Dr Maurice McGregor, our eyewitness Torchman to the demise of the Torch offers a slightly different view on The Torch Commando, he did not see the collapse as been caused by suppressive actions of the National Party and he differs from the view that the Torch collapsed because the United Party tried to pull the Torch to ‘toe the line’ on with its policies creating disunity and ultimately become directionless. 

What Dr Maurice McGregor recalls is a ‘implosion’ – not because of the United Party, but because of an anathema towards Nazism – an internal moral dilemma. This is what he said;

“The torch commando eliminated itself at the peak of its power through fear of creating a paramilitary organization like the Greyshirts in Germany. I was in was actually the last March that the organization took part in. We marched in the dark to ‘protect’ a United party meeting and had to survive a shower of stones coming in over our heads. As the discussion went afterwards, we had the personnel and could very easily have put together a group to deal with such thugs, but the leadership, as indeed many of us, we’re extremely nervous of creating a private army which would take paramilitary action and considered that such an act would be an antidemocratic thing. So, the organization dissolved itself.”

He summarises the Torch very accurately, per the Torch’s initial role – that of a ‘Political Pressure Group’ and not that of a political party whose mandate is the machinery of political reform, nor that of a political movement seeking reform through social dissonance and revolution. A Political Pressure Group is defined as a special interest group which seeks to influence Government policy in a particular direction. Such groups do not seek Government control or responsibility for policy. Maurice summarised The Torch Commando as;

“It was … a history rewrite with a very definite slant … to try to define the slant … the Torch Commando was there primarily to check erosion of the democratic process, and it did try to protect the very limited coloured vote in the Cape. It also opposed various applications and extensions of Apartheid. But it kept away from advocating any real reform, saying that that such decisions should be made by a functioning democratic system.”

The Torch’s demise as a comprehensive and organised ‘whole’ of ‘whites in opposition to Apartheid would see future white political resistance terminally fractured, isolated and largely ineffective. This is the first significant mass of ‘pro-democracy’ whites against Apartheid as a ‘whole’ – it would not be given a political voice again as a ‘whole’ again until F.W. de Klerk’s Yes/No referendum in 1992.

To wrap it up Louis Kane-Berman and some colleagues would use some of the remaining funds in the Torch Commando’s financial accounts for donations – which they gave to the Memorable Order of Tin Hats (MOTH), the Black Sash and St Nicolas Home for Boys. Donations were also made to Chief Albert Luthuli, the President of the ANC and to Professor Z.K. Matthews at Fort Hare University.

Michael Fridjhon concluded his paper on The Torch Commando in 1976 stated:

The Torch became nothing. It was a bubble which burst over the South African political scene. It vanished almost as suddenly as it emerged”.  

In Conclusion

However, nothing is further from the truth, with respect to Michael Fridjhon he would have been barred from accessing information on Torch Commando and its members because of Apartheid policies banning such information an access in 1976 – he would have been unable to see ‘the golden thread’ – who from The Torch Commando did what after it folded – what happened next?  We can research this now – so, let’s pick up where he would have been unable to and ask ourselves what happens next – what legacy does the Torch Commando leave, where do the ‘dots’ connecting its thread to the armed and political struggle go?

The Torch Commando for the most part was ‘written out of history’ by The National Party and remains ‘written out’ for political expedience by the current government. It is a ‘inconvenient truth’ as it highlights a mass movement of pro-democratic white people not in alignment with Apartheid. It challenges the prevailing malaise of thinking in South Africa – that everything prior to 1994 was ‘evil’ and white South Africans must therefore share a collective ‘guilt’.

Torch Commando rally – note the demographic profile is almost exclusively middle class ‘white’.

The Torch Commando stands testament to the fact that the majority of white people in South Africa did not vote for Apartheid and as much a quarter of the entire voting bloc – 250,000 white people actively hit the streets in protest against Apartheid. It’s a prevailing and undisputed fact that the Torch Commando protests are the first mass actions against Apartheid, they pre-date the African National Congress’ Defiance Campaign – so as to a inconvenient truth to the current ANC narrative, the first significant mass actions where led by white South Africans and not black South Africans – a testament to the fact that the struggle against Apartheid was an ideological and moral struggle and not one of race.

The Torch Commando – next instalment 

What follows next is called ‘The Smoking Gun’ – please click through to this Observation Post link which covers in this phase depth.

The Torch Commando – Part 5; The Smoking Gun


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

References:

Written testimony of Dr Maurice McGregor submitted to Peter Dickens: 20th December 2016.

The Torch Commando & The Politics of White Opposition. South Africa 1951-1953, a Seminar Paper submission to Wits University – 1976 by Michael Fridjhon.

The South African Parliamentary Opposition 1948 – 1953, a Doctorate submission to Natal University – 1989 by William Barry White. 

The influence of Second World War military service on prominent White South African veterans in opposition politics 1939 – 1961. A Masters submission to Stellenbosch University – 2021 by Graeme Wesley Plint 

The Rise and Fall of The Torch Commando – Politicsweb 2018 by John Kane-Berman. Large extracts taken from the late John Kane-Berman memoirs of his father Louis Kane-Berman with the kind permission of the Kane-Berman family.

Raising Kane – The Story of the Kane-Bermans by John Kane-Berman, Private Circulation, May 2018

The White Armed Struggle against Apartheid – a Seminar Paper submission to The South African Military History Society – 10th Oct 2019 by Peter Dickens 

Sailor Malan fights his greatest Battle: Albert Flick 1952. 

Sailor Malan – By Oliver Walker 1953. 

Lazerson, Whites in the Struggle Against Apartheid.  

The White Tribe of Africa: 1981: By David Harrison

Ordinary Springboks: White Servicemen and Social Justice in South Africa, 1939-1961. By Neil Roos.

Related Work

Torch Commando Series – Part 1 The Nazification of the Afrikaner Right

Torch Commando Series – Part 2  The Steel Commando

Torch Commando Series – Part 3 The War Veterans’ Action Committee

Torch Commando – ‘New’ rare footage of The Torch Commando in action, the first mass protests against Apartheid by WW2 veterans.

The Torch Commando Series

The Smoking Gun of the White Struggle against Apartheid!

The Observation Post published 5 articles on the The Torch Commando outlining the history of the movement, this was done ahead of the 60th anniversary of the death of Sailor Malan and Yvonne Malan’ commemorative lecture on him “I fear no man”. To easily access all the key links and the respective content here they are in sequence.

In part 1, we outlined the Nazification of the Afrikaner right prior to and during World War 2 and their ascent to power in a shock election win in 1948 as the Afrikaner National Party – creating the groundswell of indignation and protest from the returning war veterans, whose entire raison d’etre for going to war was to get rid of Nazism.

For the in-depth article follow this link: The Nazification of the Afrikaner Right

In part 2, in response to National Party’s plans to amend the constitution to make way for Apartheid legislation, we outlined the political nature of the military veterans’ associations and parties and the formation of the War Veterans Action Committee (WVAC) under the leadership of Battle of Britain hero – Group Captain Sailor Malan in opposition to it.  Essentially bringing together firebrand Springbok Legionnaires and the United Party’s military veteran leaders into a moderate and centre-line steering committee with broad popular appeal across the entire veteran voting bloc. 

For the in-depth article follow this link: The War Veterans’ Action Committee

In Part 3, we cover the opening salvo of WVAC in a protest in April 1951 at the War Cenotaph in Johannesburg followed by the ratification of four demands at two mass rallies in May 1951. They take these demands to Nationalists in Parliament in a ‘Steel Commando’ convoy converging on Cape Town. Led by Group Captain Sailor Malan and another Afrikaner – Commandant Dolf de la Rey, a South African War (1899-1902) veteran of high standing their purpose is to raise support from Afrikaner and English veterans alike and they converge with a ‘Torchlight’ rally of 60,000 protestors and hand their demands to parliament. 

For the in-depth article follow this link: The Steel Commando

In Part 4, in response to the success of The Steel Commando Cape Town protest, we then look at the rise of the Torch Commando as South Africa’s largest and most significant mass protest movement in the early 1950’s pre-dating the ANC’s defiance campaign. Political dynamics within the Torch see its loyalties stretched across the South African opposition politics landscape, the Torch eventually aiding the United Party’s (UP) grassroots campaigning whilst at the same time caught up in Federal breakaway parties and the Natal issue. The introduction of the ‘Swart Bills’ in addition to ‘coloured vote constitutional crisis’ going ahead despite ineffectual protests causes a crisis within the Torch. This and the UP’s losses in by-elections in the lead up to and the 1953 General Election itself spurs the eventual demise of The Torch Commando.

For the in-depth article follow this link: The ‘Rise and Fall’ of the Torch Commando

In Part 5, we conclude the Series on The Torch Commando with ‘The Smoking Gun’. The Smoking Gun traces what the Torch Commando members do after the movement collapses, significantly two political parties spin out the Torch Commando – the Liberal Party of South Africa and the Union Federal Party. The Torch also significantly impacts the United Party and the formation of the breakaway Progressive Party who embark on formal party political resistance to Apartheid and are the precursor of the modern day Democratic Alliance. The Torch’s Communists party members take a leading role in the ANC’s armed wing MK, and the Torch’s liberals spin off the NCL and ARM armed resistance movements from the Liberal Party. We conclude with CODESA.

For an in-depth article follow this link: The Smoking Gun


The War Veterans’ Action Committee

Torch Commando Series – Part 2

War Vets Arise

Very broadly, at the end of The Second World War (1939-1945), returning white South African soldiers found themselves in three broad veteran association camps, either in an returned serviceman organisation called The Springbok Legion – which was highly politicised, steeped in ‘liberal’ and ‘labour’ politics and trade unionist in its manifesto, or as ‘Smuts-men’, they found themselves in the more sedate and larger South African Legion and Memorable Order of Tin Hats (MOTH) veteran associations with their remembrance manifestos, and they returned to the ‘centre-line’ and ‘democratic’ politics of the United Party (UP), their decision to go to war reinforced their conviction to Smuts’ brand of politics and call to arms.

In the chapter on the ‘Nazification of the Afrikaner Right’ we looked at the rise of Nazism and Fascism during the war in South Africa and the amalgamation of Pro-Nazi and Neo-Nazi movements into the Afrikaner Nationalist Party after their shock election win in 1948. The advent of ‘Apartheid’ into South African policy and moves to amend the South African constitution caused widespread angst amongst the ex-servicemen, how had just returned from eradicating the world of Nazism and fascism in WW2 and now they found a home-grown version of it had come into power.

As the National Party consolidated its power after its election win in 1948, sporadic small protests and picketing of ex-servicemen broke out around the country at by-elections and the like protesting the gradual implementation of racially divisive policies around the country. The National Party using plain thuggery drawn from the old Ossewabrandwag structures continued to violently disrupt opposition United Party (UP) and Labour Party (LP) political meetings well beyond the 1948 elections. During various by-elections, UP and LP politicians depended on ex-servicemen to aid them with canvassing and for physical protection from the National Party’s thugs disrupting their political rallies.

On one side of these picketing and ‘protection’ activities around by-elections and political meetings were members of the Springbok Legion (SL), at the time dominated by firebrand Legionnaires, with a significantly strong ‘Jewish’ veteran demographic and with equally strong Liberal and Communist leanings, and they were bent on more aggressive outcomes and military solution to advent of the National Party – whose National Socialist philosophy and whose strong anti-sematic and anti-communism politicking before and during the war posed a significant threat to many of them who had Jewish heritage and/or Communist leanings.

The Springbok Legion

The Springbok Legion (SL) was born along labour manifesto principles during World War 2 seeking (amongst others) equity for Black and White servicemen. The Springbok Legion is initially formed in 1941 within a debating society comprised of members of the 9th Recce Battalion of the South African Tank Corps, at the Kafferskraal training camp near Klerksdorp. By mid 1941, two similar soldiers’ groups formed. One called the ‘Soldiers’ Interests Committee’ formed by members of the 1 South African Brigade (1 SA Bde) in Addis Ababa. The other was the Union of Soldiers, which was also created in Egypt by soldiers of t1 SA Bde. Over time, they agreed to merge these three debating societies/committees together to form ‘The Springbok Legion’.

The aims and objectives of the Springbok Legion were enunciated in its ‘Soldiers Manifesto’. The Springbok Legion was open to all servicemen regardless of race or gender and was avowedly anti-fascist and anti-racist.

Initially led by Jock Isacowitz as the National Chairman – a previously ‘Liberal’ student at Witwatersrand University before joining the South African Army, Isacowitz would be the guiding force behind the establishment of The Torch Commando and later he also became a founding member of the Liberal Party of South Africa.

‘Liberals’ like Isacowitz and Leslie Rubin, as well as future United Party stalwarts like Vic Clapham and anti-Apartheid activists like Brian Bunting made up a significant part of the Springbok Legion, however the Springbok Legion’s membership and leadership also contains Communist Party of South Africa stalwarts who had served in the UDF during the war – key amongst them were Wolfie Kodesh, Rusty Bernstein, Joe Slovo, Cecil Williams, Fred Carneson and Jack Hodgson (all of whom would become founders of the African National Congress’ MK military wing). Cecil Williams for example had served in the Royal Navy during the war, he would become the administrative officer of the Torch Commando’s “Steel Commando”, later he would famously be arrested whilst being ‘chauffeured’ by Nelson Mandela post Sharpeville to get Mandela around to his political meetings.

Cecil Williams

Although politically very ‘firebrand’ the Springbok Legion often sought out the sage advice of General Jan Smuts, and Smuts had a soft-spot for them calling them “my boys”).

Motivations for joining The Springbok Legion as a veteran’s association differ, Fred Carneson had served as signaller and saw action in East Africa and North Africa, he was badly injured at the Battle of El Alamein. He would highlight the divide in the Afrikaner diaspora caused by the Nazi leaning Ossewabrandwag and the National Party – and would say of the formation of The Springbok Legion: 

“(the Springbok Legion) became a vehicle in the South African Army for a lot of progressive thinking, on the race issue as well, amongst white South African soldiers … We took up all sorts of issues there – not only the question of increasing family allowances and things that were hitting their pockets and their families, but on political issues calling for sterner measures against the Broederbond and against the Ossewadrandwag.”

Rare photograph of Jan Smuts addressing a Springbok Legion meeting.

Fred Carneson went on to say:

“the bulk of the South African Army were Afrikaners, not English-speaking, and they were also bloody fed up with this lot (the Ossewabrandwag et al). Some of them were being beaten up when they went to their hometowns and their dorps (villages) by these anti-war elements. The Springbok Legion organized a huge demonstration in Johannesburg which smashed up a Nationalist Party conference, again with whites turning out in force, and a hell of a lot of Afrikaners ex-servicemen. I remember one huge Afrikaner coming along there carrying a rope, and he says, ‘If I put my hands on Malan (referencing Dr. D.F. Malan, the National Party leader) I’m going to hang the bastard!’ … that was the strength of feeling that arose then against those they regarded as traitors, who tried to stab them in the back when they were fighting.”

On the returning white servicemen and women, Afrikaner and English, Carelson would offer an interesting insight on their disposition to race, an insight fundamentally at odds with the National Party and its doctrine, he said:

“… you seldom heard any anti-black sentiment amongst the white soldiers. If you’re in an army and a man’s on your side, you respect him, you see. They saw people of different races fighting together on the same side against the common enemy. This couldn’t but have an effect on their general thinking”.

Wolfie Kodesh offers a differing perspective on why he joined The Springbok Legion, Kodesh is also a combat veteran seeing action in both North Africa and Italy. He becomes politicised during the Italy campaign when he realises that it’s the poor lower class most affected by the bombing campaigns who see their houses bombed flat – whilst the rich upper class and their houses remain relatively unaffected – he identifies in a ‘class’ war and equates it with the Black and Coloured communities in South Africa. He finally decides to join the Springbok Legion and says …

I got involved in the SL to “overcome this racialism, which was like poison. After all, Hitler had been a racist against the Jews – he said he was going to do the same thing to the blacks. Here were the South African whites doing the same thing as Hitler said he would do … this is wrong … and I have to do my bit towards getting rid of it.”

Branches of the SL were established in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban. Membership to the SL was open to all races and to women (although few women joined). Black Africans, Indians and Coloureds also joined the SL, men like Peter Kay Selepe, a WW2 veteran and an organiser of the African National Congress (ANC) in Orlando (although few Black members joined – only 98). 

Joe Slovo (left) is seen in his South African Army uniform (and Signaler insignia) in the feature image with fellow South African soldiers Mike Feldman and Barney Fehler.

The Springbok Legion acted as political pressure group on issues relating to housing, equality, pensions etc and not a political party, members were encouraged to become active in their mainstream political parties – like the United Party and the Labour Party.

The South African Legion

The South African Legion – then known as ‘The South African Legion of the British Empire Services League’, it was founded by Jan Smuts in 1921 was the ‘official’ national body for all South African veterans, and it took a formal approach when dealing with the Nationalist government and its policies as they impacted Black, Indian and Cape Coloured veterans – choosing to try and negotiate with the government via the formal and non-confrontational channels made available to it as the national body for veterans. The South African Legion is South Africa’s prima and largest veterans’ association with 52,000 registered military veterans. 

Involved in both The Springbok Legion and the South African Legion is the very influential General Kenneth van der Spuy CBE MC, he is the man who pioneered the formation of South African Air Force (SAAF) under General Smuts’ directives. General Van der Spuy is regarded as the modern father and founder of the SAAF (Smuts would be the Grandfather). After the war he was a key role-player in the establishment of The Springbok Legion and on the National Executive of The South African Legion.

General van der Spuy – South African Legion

General van der Spuy became increasingly frustrated with The South African Legion position of remaining ‘apolitical’ but quietly’ supporting the anti-apartheid causes in the veteran’s community simply by opening their branches up to them, so he looked to the politically charged Springbok Legion to do what he referred to as the South African Legion’s “painfully correct whisper of polite protest” at the National Party’s policies to become a “shout” of protest instead, thereby encouraging members of the South African Legion to join hands with these concerned veterans in the SL and eventually join the Torch Commando along with General van der Spuy when it is formed.

 The United Party

On the other side of the veteran’s diaspora is the largest political Party – the United Party (UP) led by Jan Smuts during wartime, although in the 1943 General Election they come out victorious, Jan Smuts receives an unprecedented level of support, and they command 75% of the house. However, after the end of the war in 1945 the United Party becomes complacent and directionless, even more so after their shock election loss in 1948 to the National Party.  

Smuts (right) consults Hofmeyr (left) during WW2

Jan Smuts had intended that his deputy and protégé Jan H Hofmeyr, a ‘Liberal’ in every sense of the word (the nephew of the Afrikaner Bondsman “Onze Jan”), Hofmeyr was the effective PM of South Africa through most of WW2 and like Smuts was farsighted in matters on race – far more than his peers in the United Party. Tragically, he died young at 53 years in 1948. At his funeral Smuts said of him:

“Here was the wonder child of South Africa, with a record with which South Africa shows no parallel, who from his youngest years beat all records, whose achievement in a comparatively brief life shows no parallel in this land, and whose star at the end was still rising ..He has passed on, but his service and the high spirit in which he sought to serve his country and his fellow-men of all races remain our abiding possessions. This is a better and richer country for his service, and his message will not be forgotten.”

It was the first significant setback for the United Party and a more liberal outlook on race, and within two short years of Jan Hofmeyr’s death, Smuts too would pass on – this been the UP’s second and most significant setback. In essence the party had lost both of its key visionaries, and Smuts had been the ‘glue’ holding the party together and giving it direction. 

The UP was sorely in need of an injection of young blood and firebrand politics – and it found this in the returning servicemen who were highly politicised influences and equally angered with the National Party’s flirtation with Nazism prior to and during the war. In all they would form a ‘ex-services’ caucus with the United Party and Parliamentary politics.

Captain Sir de Villiers Graaf

Notably amongst this UP faction was Captain Harry Oppenheimer, who, aside from being a significant economic and political powerhouse, served as an intelligence officer in the 4th South African armoured brigade during the war. Son of the industrialist Earnest Oppenheimer, Harry became the UP Minister of Parliament for Kimberley, as a prominent South African businessman, industrialist and philanthropist. Oppenheimer was ranked as one of the wealthiest people in the world and was considered South Africa’s foremost industrialist for four decades. He would become the key financial benefactor behind the Torch Commando.

The second notable UP member was Captain Sir de Villiers Graaf, a veteran of North Africa and been taken Prisoner of War (POW) during the fall of Tobruk, given an MBE for his relief efforts amongst prisoners, he would eventually lead the UP, and although not a Torch Commando member, he would become the official liaison officer between the Torch and the UP in 1952. 

Also within the UP fold was Major Louis Kane-Berman, a veteran of both the North African and Italy campaigns and Democratic politics pioneers – Louis Kane-Berman would become the National Chairman of the Torch Commando. 

Also of significance in this group of UP members was L/Cpl. Colin Eglin who had joined the 6th South African Armoured Division fighting in the Italian Apennines around Florence as part of the Cape Town Highlanders – Colin Eglin “the egg” would become a future Progressive Party powerhouse politician, cutting his political teeth in the UP and Torch Commando. Eglin could already see the malaise and disarray the UP had landed in when he said of the UP:

 “morale was low; organisation pathetic; policy and ideology were confused and ambivalent. In this situation, the old- guard leadership looked for someone other than themselves to blame.” 

L/Cpl Colin Eglin

Finally in the UP, Lt. Vic Clapham Jr., who had served in the SA Tank Corps in WW2 as a Lieutenant, and who was the son of the famous World War 1 veteran who started the Comrades Marathon, also Vic Clapham – Vic Clapham Jr. was an ex-Springbok Legionnaire, he had resigned from the SL National Executive in 1945 and he was now United Party stalwart. Vic Clapham would act as the conduit between his old chums in the SL with his new chums in the UP, and the two groups of concerned veterans from the Springbok Legion and the United Party decided to join hands and consolidated in April 1951 to form the ‘War Veteran’s Action Committee – WVAC’ (the WVAC was to evolve into The Torch Commando). 

The leadership team of the WVAC was made up of veterans perceived as ‘moderate’ (as opposed to the more firebrand ‘Communists’ in the Springbok Legion) to present a broader appeal across the political spectrum. It’s also a balanced committee between ‘English’ and ‘Afrikaners’ – designed to address the polarisation in Afrikaner politics and bring Afrikaner voters who had served in the military during WW2 back to mainstream and moderate politics.

Lt Vic Clapham jnr.

The leaders appointed were Group Captain Adolph ‘Sailor’ Malan, Major Louis Kane-Berman, Major Ralph Parrott (a UP man who had served in the Transvaal Scottish in the South African Army and was awarded the Military Cross for bravery in the Battle of Tobruk), Major Jacob Pretorius (ex-SAAF and also a UP man) and Lt. Colonel Doreen Dunning – who during the war was the Officer Commanding the South African Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (SAWAAF). Harry Oppenheimer, not wanting to take a forward role pushed for Sailor Malan (Oppenheimer’s former Private Secretary) to take the role as the leader of the WVAC. 

In the company of greats, Lt Col. Doreen Dunning (also remembered as Doreen Hooper) is an interesting appointment, she was one of the founders of the South African Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) during the Second World War (1939-1945), she was highly respected SAAF officer, wartime heroine and a pioneering female aviator. At the outbreak of war, she had more than 2 000 flying hours to her credit. At the incredibly early age of 24 she was the youngest officer in the British Commonwealth to attain the rank she held. 

Lt Col. Doreen Dunning portrait by Neville Lewis (1941)

Fair haired and blue eyed, she had a quiet, forceful personality combined with outstanding ability and tact which made her eminently suitable for the responsible administrative post that she held both in the South African Air Force and now as secretary to The Torch Commando.

Major Louis Kane- Berman is also a significant appointment as he would go on to be the Chairman of The Torch Commando, next to Sailor Malan his history and activities would shape white service-men resistance to Apartheid. He in fact is the powerhouse behind the Torch running its daily and hands-on activities. Louis Kane- Berman was highly popular, the son of Edith Kane-Berman, Chief Commandant of the Red Cross. He attested as a signaller in the Signal’s corps of the South African Army, he would see combat in both North Africa and Italy as a company commander. Post war he gets very involved in rallying ex-servicemen to protect the UP speakers and presents himself as an ideal candidate for WVAC.

Louis Kane-Berman in his later life was also extensively involved in the National War Memorial Fund and he would remain in ‘liberal’ and ‘federal’ politics most of his life and play a key role in the Union Federal Party. 

Major Louis Kane-Berman, image courtesy the Kane-Berman family

It is important at this stage to cover Sailor Malan’s appointment, and why he is regarded as such a significant war hero and why he is forever linked to The Torch Commando as part of its public façade. Here’s some background on Sailor’s ‘metal’.

Group Captain Sailor Malan

Sailor Malan agreed to join the WVAC only on the proviso that his internal principles were adhered to. These been the political injustices suffered by people of colour in South Africa and resisting the government’s anti-constitutionalism and their drift towards a local brand of Nazism. Sailor is to be the ‘face’ of WVAC as he is highly recognisable and intensely popular across the board – he is the son of an Afrikaner father and a ‘English’ mother and sees himself as a South African first and foremost with strong Afrikaner ties and heritage. 

Group Captain Adolph ‘Sailor’ Malan DSO (Bar) DFC (Bar)

Adolph Gysbert “Sailor” Malan stemmed from Wellington in the Western Cape, an Afrikaans speaking ‘plaas japie’ he learned to shoot and hunt from a very young age. He was the younger brother to “Bull” Malan and as a result had secondary opportunities prevalent to the times when the first born received academic and career preference. 

He was also bullied at school, and in this he would forever forge a deep hatred for ‘bullies’ – he would always stand up for the ‘little guy’ and this would manifest itself in his convictions to battle against a ‘bully’ Nazi state as part of the Royal Air Force’s “Few”, a ‘no fear’ approach and he saw killing Nazi pilots and aircrew as necessary for the good of humankind. Later in life he also held no fear whatsoever of the National Party politician ‘bullies’ who had flirted with Nazism and saw them in the same light.

Named ‘Sailor’ after a stint in the Navy on the SATS General Botha and as a merchantman. He experienced the rise of authoritarianism in Germany in his frequent visits to Hamburg and Keil as a merchant sailor before 1939. Identifying Nazism as the enemy, he joined the Royal Air Force (RAF) in 1940 in preparation for the war. His British loyalism and revulsion of fascism were also shared by his brother “Bull” Malan, who participated in the invasion of Madagascar in 1942 and later killed in action. 

In his career as a naval merchantman, Sailor also becomes increasing exposed to various cultures and nationalities and takes on an embracing and tolerant view. During the Battle of Britain, the British relied on pilots from the Commonwealth to make up a critical pilot shortage and Sailor Malan was one of these pilots and with him came pilots from all over the world, of all colours and of all cultures (there was no such thing as a ‘colour bar’ in the Royal Air Force) – from commonwealth countries like India, Burma, Rhodesia, Jamaica, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada, as well as pilots from Poland, France, Czechoslovakia and the USA. They made up almost one-third of the RAF pilots involved in the Battle of Britain – a demographic fundamentally different to the image so often created of these men as a bunch of tea drinking ‘tally-ho’ young white English.

Sailor Malan with fellow fighter pilot Vincent Bunting of 611 Sq. speaking with Biggin Hill’s – January 1943

Funnily, ‘Sailor’ would however develop a rather plummy English accent, and fellow pilots thought they were dealing with a English officer until they saw his ‘South Africa’ shoulder titles on his RAF uniform, his close fellow pilots would also nickname him ‘Hitler’ as a humorous take on his real first name, Adolph, however ‘Sailor’ as a nickname generally wins out and the name by which everyone gets to know him. However, it’s his combat record, coolness under fire, promotions and decorations alone are simply astonishing. To hear Sailor in his own words during the Battle of Britain, follow this link Sailor Malan; in his own words!

He first took part in evacuation of Dunkirk.  During this battle he first exhibited his fearless and implacable fighting spirit. To demonstrate his nature, in one incident he was able to coolly change the light bulb in his gunsight while in combat and then quickly return to the fray.

When the Battle of Britain begun, 74 Squadron (known as ‘The Tigers’) was to take the full heat of the battle in what was known as ‘hell’s corner’ over Kent, the squadron was eventually based at the now famous ‘Biggin Hill’ aerodrome in the thick of the battle. Malan would famously develop “my ten rules of air fighting” which would change the RAF’s doctrine and contribute to Britains victory in the Battle of Britain – to read more on these rules, follow this link: ‘Ten of my rules for air fighting’ – Sailor Malan

Sailor Malan was given command of 74 Squadron, with the rank of Acting Squadron Leader at the height of the Battle of Britain on 8th August 1940. Three days later the Squadron was in battle. The day became forever known, “Sailor’s August the Eleventh”. The order was received at twenty minutes past seven to intercept a hostile raid approaching Dover. Little did the squadron know that they would participate in four separate air battles that day. When the Squadron returned to base after the fourth sortie, they had downed an astounding 38 enemy aircraft. Sailor Malan said later, in one of his masterly understatements: 

“Thus ended a very successful morning of combat.”

Sailor Malan also worked on public relations to keep the British morale high.  Here is a rare radio interview (follow Observation post link Sailor Malan – “in his own words”.

By D Day (i.e. Operation Overlord, the liberation of France and subsequently Western Europe), Sailor Malan was in command of 145 (Free French) Fighter Wing and was himself leading a section of the wing over the beaches during the landings in Normandy.

Sailor was a ruthless, skilful, and deadly hunter and killer, in all Sailor Malan scored 27 enemy aircraft kills, seven shared destroyed, three probably destroyed and 16 damaged. He was to receive the Distinguished Service Order decoration – not once, but twice and well as the Distinguished Flying Cross decoration, again not once – but twice.  The Citations for the DSO’s and DFC’s say everything about his combat prowess and are worth a mention and a listing given their status:

Sailor Malan’s decorations and medals

Distinguished Service Order & Bar (DSO). In Sailor’s case the two DSO are awarded for bravery. Here are the citations; 

Distinguished Service Order. Acting Squadron Leader Adolph Gysbert Malan, DFC (37604), Royal Air Force, No.74 Squadron. December 24th, 1940.

“This officer has commanded his squadron with outstanding success over an intensive period of air operations and, by his brilliant leadership, skill and determination has contributed to the success obtained. Since early in August 1940, the squadron has destroyed at least 84 enemy aircraft and damaged many more. Squadron Leader Malan has himself destroyed at least eighteen hostile aircraft and possibly another six.”

And on 22nd July, 1941:

Bar to the DSO. Acting Wing Commander Adolph Gysbert Malan, DSO, DFC (37604) Royal Air Force.

“This officer has displayed the greatest courage and disdain of the enemy whilst leading his Wing on numerous recent operations over Northern France. His cool judgement, exceptional determination and ability have enabled him to increase his confirmed victories over enemy aircraft from 19 to 28, in addition to a further 20 damaged and probably destroyed. His record and behaviour have earned for him the greatest admiration and devotion of his comrades in the Wing. During the past fortnight the Wing has scored heavily against the enemy with 42 hostile aircraft destroyed, a further 15 probably destroyed and 11 damaged.”

Distinguished Flying Cross & Bar. This this is still a ‘decoration’ and not a ‘medal’ so it’s very high on the senior level, and in Sailor’s case both times it is awarded for exceptional flying and bravery. Here are the citations for his Distinguished Flying Crosses;

Flight Lieutenant Adolph Gysbert Malan. (37604), Royal Air Force. June 11th, 1940.

“During May 1940, this officer has led his flight, and on certain occasions his squadron, on ten offensive patrols in Northern France. He has personally shot down two enemy aircraft and, probably, three others. Flight Lieutenant Malan has displayed great skill, courage and relentless determination in his attacks upon the enemy.”

Bar to the DFC. August 13th, 1940:

Flight Lieutenant Adolph Gysbert Malan. (37604), Royal Air Force.

“Since the end of May, 1940, this officer has continued to lead his flight and, on many occasions the squadron, in numerous successful engagements against the enemy. During the Dunkirk operations he shot down three enemy aircraft and assisted in destroying a further three. In June, 1940, during a night attack by enemy aircraft, he shot down two Heinkel 111’s. His magnificent leadership, skill and courage have been largely responsible for the many successes obtained by his squadron.”

British and Commonwealth Medals include:

  • 1939-45 Star with Battle of Britain clasp
  • The Air Crew Europe Star with France and Germany clasp
  • The Defence Medal
  • The War Medal (1939-1945) – with a mid Oak Leaf or MiD (Mentioned in Dispatches). The Oak Leaf on Sailor’s ribbon of this medal indicates the award of the King’s Commendation for Brave Conduct.

Foreign Decorations include:

  • Legion of Honour (France) Officer Grade
  • Croix de Guerre (France)
  • Croix de guerre (Belgium) with bronze palm. The Bronze Palm means Sailor Malan was ‘Mentioned in Dispatches’ by the War Office specifically for a performing heroic or significant deed.
  • Czecho-Slovakian Military Cross 

To read more on Sailor Malan’s medals follow this link; Sailor’s medals

To understand Sailor Malan as a military leader, Bill Skinner DFC, with whom Sailor often flew, summed up Sailor Malan very well when he said of him:

“He was a born leader and natural pilot of the first order. Complete absence of balderdash. As far as he was concerned, you either did your job properly, or you were on your way. He inspired his air crews by his dynamic and forceful personality, and by the fact that he set such a high standard in his flying.”

Sailor Malan was one of the most outstanding British Fighter Command’s fighter pilots of the 1939-45 war, by the end of 1941 was the top scorer – a record which he held for three years. But he was much more than an individual performer. He remains one of the highest scoring fighter aces to have served with Fighter Command and one of The Few as described by Sir Winston Churchill, who also incidentally became Godfather to Sailor’s new-born son – Jonathan Malan. He had assimilated the fierce and fanatical “tiger spirit” of his squadron, and this ‘Sky Tiger’ spirit he inspired in others and in so carried the Squadron to its great deeds. He literally lived and breathed the squadron’s motto – I fear no man.

The Battle of Britain and D Day moulded Sailor Malan as a champion for freedom, he simply held the view that shooting down Nazi aircraft was good for humanity, and this fearlessness translated into his personal politics. Sailor Malan left the Royal Air Force and returned to South Africa in 1946.  He joined Anglo American as Harry Oppenheimer’s personal secretary, and later it was Oppenheimer who would turn to Sailor Malan as the best candidate, given his exemplary war record, his liberal disposition, leadership and likeable personality – to lead The War Veterans Action Committee as its President.

In Sailor Malan’s own words, he would sum up his intentions and what the WVAC and The Torch Commando was all about – of its primary mission, he said:

“The Torch Commando was established to oppose the police state, abuse of state power, censorship, racism, the removal of the coloured vote and other oppressive manifestations of the creeping fascism of the National Party regime”.

Opening Shots

The opening protest by the WVAC started on a relatively small scale, on the 21st April 1951 at the cenotaph near the Johannesburg City Hall commemorating soldiers who had died in World War 1 and World War 2. The WVAC ex-servicemen present, in protest against the advent of National Party’s Apartheid policies pledged themselves to defend the values for which their comrades had died, and to demonstrate their intention they draped a coffin in the National Flag to symbolize the death of the South African constitution and placed a placard to that effect.

The ’constitutional crisis’ they referred to on the plagued is the opening shot of the National Party to implement their barrage of ‘Grand Apartheid’ laws, the crisis began earlier in 1951 when the National Party announced proposed legislation called the ‘Separate Representation Act’ to remove so-called ‘Coloureds’ from the Common Voters Roll – correctly this incorporated all franchise qualified ‘Black’ and ‘Coloured’ voters in the Western Cape – known as the Cape Franchise, in essence ‘Coloureds’ and Whites were on the same voters roll since the abolishment of slavery and ‘apprenticeships’ from 1853. To change the constitution required a 2/3 majority of MP’s at a joint sitting of both Houses of Parliament (National Assembly and the Senate). 

The constitution of the Union of South Africa was rock solid to prevent right wing racial politics of the old Boer Republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State from interfering with it. To many white South Africans this part of the Union’s Constitution was a “solemn compact” at the very core of the Union – legally and morally binding and for the time being the Cape Franchise kept an uneasy peace on issues relating ‘black’ political emancipation.

The National Party did not have the required majority by way of popular vote. However, they had a plan, they were to gerrymander, load the Senate with new National Party seats and pass legislation to get their majority and push their legislation through.

The Separate Representation Act caused significant outrage – the war veteran’s concern was that removing Coloureds from the voters roll, as they constituted a significant voting bloc, would pave the way for future and more sinister racially based Apartheid legislation, the complete marginalisation of ‘black’ political representation and a break-up of the Union’s constitution to form a ‘white Afrikaner’ Republic and breaking the ‘Union’ and British Dominion status on a ‘whites-only’ voting ticket.

The Torch Commando – next instalment 

What follows next is called ‘The Steel Commando’ – please click through to this Observation Post link which covers this phase in depth.

The Torch Commando – Part 3, The Steel Commando


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens 

References 

South African History Association (on-line) ‘Tracing the unbreakable thread’

Military History Journal , Vol 5 No 5 – June 1982, Flying High: The Story of the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force 1939-1945. By Major Marjorie Egerton Bird and Molly Botes

The Torch Commando & The Politics of White Opposition. South Africa 1951-1953, a Seminar Paper submission to Wits University – 1976 by Michael Fridjhon.

The South African Parliamentary Opposition 1948 – 1953, a Doctorate submission to Natal University – 1989 by William Barry White. 

The influence of Second World War military service on prominent White South African veterans in opposition politics 1939 – 1961. A Masters submission to Stellenbosch University – 2021 by Graeme Wesley Plint 

The Rise and Fall of The Torch Commando – Politicsweb 2018 by John Kane-Berman

The White Armed Struggle against Apartheid – a Seminar Paper submission to The South African Military History Society – 10th Oct 2019 by Peter Dickens 

Not for ourselves – a history of the South African Legion by Arthur Blake

Sailor Malan fights his greatest Battle: Albert Flick 1952. 

Sailor Malan – By Oliver Walker 1953. 

Lazerson, Whites in the Struggle Against Apartheid.  

The White Tribe of Africa: 1981: By David Harrison

Ordinary Springboks: White Servicemen and Social Justice in South Africa, 1939-1961. By Neil Roos.

Sailor Malan fights his greatest Battle: By Albert Flick 1952.

Kimberley Calls and Recalls. Life Magazine, 25 June 1951.

Related Work

Torch Commando – Steel Commando The Steel Commando

Truth Legion A search for the … Truth … Legion!

Torch Commando – ‘New’ rare footage of The Torch Commando in action, the first mass protests against Apartheid by WW2 veterans.

Sailor Malan ‘Freedom Fighter’ Sailor Malan; Fighter Ace & Freedom Fighter!

Sailor Malan – rules of air fighting ‘Ten of my rules for air fighting’ – Sailor Malan

Sailor Malan Sailor’s medals

The Torch Commando Series

The Smoking Gun of the White Struggle against Apartheid!

The Observation Post published 5 articles on the The Torch Commando outlining the history of the movement, this was done ahead of the 60th anniversary of the death of Sailor Malan and Yvonne Malan’ commemorative lecture on him “I fear no man”. To easily access all the key links and the respective content here they are in sequence.

In part 1, we outlined the Nazification of the Afrikaner right prior to and during World War 2 and their ascent to power in a shock election win in 1948 as the Afrikaner National Party – creating the groundswell of indignation and protest from the returning war veterans, whose entire raison d’etre for going to war was to get rid of Nazism.

For the in-depth article follow this link: The Nazification of the Afrikaner Right

In part 2, in response to National Party’s plans to amend the constitution to make way for Apartheid legislation, we outlined the political nature of the military veterans’ associations and parties and the formation of the War Veterans Action Committee (WVAC) under the leadership of Battle of Britain hero – Group Captain Sailor Malan in opposition to it.  Essentially bringing together firebrand Springbok Legionnaires and the United Party’s military veteran leaders into a moderate and centre-line steering committee with broad popular appeal across the entire veteran voting bloc. 

For the in-depth article follow this link: The War Veterans’ Action Committee

In Part 3, we cover the opening salvo of WVAC in a protest in April 1951 at the War Cenotaph in Johannesburg followed by the ratification of four demands at two mass rallies in May 1951. They take these demands to Nationalists in Parliament in a ‘Steel Commando’ convoy converging on Cape Town. Led by Group Captain Sailor Malan and another Afrikaner – Commandant Dolf de la Rey, a South African War (1899-1902) veteran of high standing their purpose is to raise support from Afrikaner and English veterans alike and they converge with a ‘Torchlight’ rally of 60,000 protestors and hand their demands to parliament. 

For the in-depth article follow this link: The Steel Commando

In Part 4, in response to the success of The Steel Commando Cape Town protest, we then look at the rise of the Torch Commando as South Africa’s largest and most significant mass protest movement in the early 1950’s pre-dating the ANC’s defiance campaign. Political dynamics within the Torch see its loyalties stretched across the South African opposition politics landscape, the Torch eventually aiding the United Party’s (UP) grassroots campaigning whilst at the same time caught up in Federal breakaway parties and the Natal issue. The introduction of the ‘Swart Bills’ in addition to ‘coloured vote constitutional crisis’ going ahead despite ineffectual protests causes a crisis within the Torch. This and the UP’s losses in by-elections in the lead up to and the 1953 General Election itself spurs the eventual demise of The Torch Commando.

For the in-depth article follow this link: The ‘Rise and Fall’ of the Torch Commando

In Part 5, we conclude the Series on The Torch Commando with ‘The Smoking Gun’. The Smoking Gun traces what the Torch Commando members do after the movement collapses, significantly two political parties spin out the Torch Commando – the Liberal Party of South Africa and the Union Federal Party. The Torch also significantly impacts the United Party and the formation of the breakaway Progressive Party who embark on formal party political resistance to Apartheid and are the precursor of the modern day Democratic Alliance. The Torch’s Communists party members take a leading role in the ANC’s armed wing MK, and the Torch’s liberals spin off the NCL and ARM armed resistance movements from the Liberal Party. We conclude with CODESA.

For an in-depth article follow this link: The Smoking Gun


The Nazification of the Afrikaner Right

Torch Commando Series – Part 1

Apartheid’s ‘lost’ cousin

One of the key reasons the Torch Commando’s leadership was somewhat sidelined and even gagged by the National Party, eventually resulting in the suppression of its legacy and removal from the general consciousness of South Africans is this …. the underpinning of Afrikaner Christian Nationalism with German National Socialism.

To view history in its correct context, one must see the characters in their time, see things from their view – see what issues of the day are driving their actions and thoughts and NOT to see them in the context of 21st Century social constructs and opinions. What this history will show us is that Nazism is not central to Afrikanerdom in any way, shape or form, it manifests itself on the ‘rump’ of Afrikanerdom in a small group of Afrikaner Republican zealots bent on supporting of Germany through all its manifestations from its brand of Imperialism to Nazism. 

Exactly as Nazism did in Germany, it’s a cancer and it could come to infect and destroy the liberal and moderate political constructs of Afrikaner politics and eventually destroy the pillars of democracy inherent in ‘white’ politics as a whole. Furthermore, using the same Nazi dogma of oppression, this minority of nationalist zealots would gerrymander and even violently consolidate themselves into an unassailable position verging on a one-party tyrannical state.

To the Torch Commando members and to other returning South African World War 2 veterans in various political parties and veteran associations, the accent of the National Party to power in 1948 was not so much that their policies of Apartheid sought to repress South African blacks and deny them the franchise – that was secondary to their cause, the major issue presenting itself to these war veterans was that The National Party constituted a Nazi and Fascist threat to South Africa. 

This Nazi and Fascist threat globally was a threat that had just been to war against – in 1945, just three years previously to the National Party coming into power, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini were both dead and 11,023 South Africans died in the process of making that happen – all of them comrades in arms. To say these war veterans had no tolerance for Nazism or Fascism would be an understatement, to say they feared it would be an absolute truism. 

Almost to a man, the National Party leadership and elite had either flirted with Nazism or had become full-blown National Socialists in support of Nazi Germany prior to and during the Second World War. Consider the amount of pro-Nazi and Neo-Nazi organisations that formed on the far right of white Afrikanerdom prior to and during the war, they were:

  • The ‘Ossewabrandwag’ (Ox Wagon Sentinel) – led by Dr. Hans van Rensburg.
  • The ‘Grey-shirts’ – The South African Christian National Socialist Party (SANP) – led by Louis Weichardt.
  • The ‘Democratic Movement’ – led by Manie Wessels and Chris Havemann.
  • The ‘Broederbond’ (Afrikaner Brotherhood) – led by Dr. Nico Diedericks.
  • The ‘New Order’ – led by Oswald Pirow.
  • The ‘Black-shirts’ – the Volksbeweging (People’s Movement) or ‘African Gentile Organisation’ led by H.S. Terblanche.
  • The ‘Brown-shirts’ – The ‘Bond van Nasionale Werkers’ (National Workers Union) led by Johannes Bruwer.
  • The National Socialist Rebels – led by Robey Leibbrandt.
  • The Boerenasie (Boer Nation) movement – led by Manie Maritz.

All these movements and parties were folded into the National Party after the war in one way or another, with many of their members taking up key positions in the National Party in government and related state organs and parastatals.

The ‘Malanazi’ as published in ‘Blikfakkel’ the Torch Commando’s mouthpiece in June 1952 – political cartoon by Berry – served to ridicule Dr. D.F. Malan, the Prime Minister and leader of The National Party, humorously depicted as a poor cousin of Nazism.

With the global condemnation of Nazism and the establishment of the United Nations in the wake of the war to prevent such an ideology threatening mankind again, the National Party were very quick to bury this past – they would choose to identify their resistance to Jan Smuts’ call to arms against Nazi Germany as an ‘anti-British’ one and not a pro-Nazi one (a hangover of hatred for Britain from the Boer War). Nazism in 1948 was political hot potato, in fact it was sheer political suicide and the Nationalists needed to bury their Nazi past and fast.

To do this, in July 1948, mere months after the National Party won the election. The National Party’s new head of Defence – F.C. Erasmus walked into Colonel Charles Powell’s office at the National Intelligence archive, he promptly dismissed Colonel Powell on the spot with 24 hours’ notice. He then proceeded to remove “two lorries” worth of wartime Broederbond and Ossewabrandwag intelligence documentation linking them to Nazism – never to be seen again. 

Formal complaints to the new Minister of Justice to reinstate the military intelligence archive were just ignored. Later, to the continued amazement of all, whenever there was a press conference and B.J. Vorster taken to task on any of his Nazi or Broederbond past he would often smugly turn around to any young whippersnapper journalist trying to set a record straight and simply say “prove it”.

The problem was an organisation called ‘The Torch Commando’ and the war veterans themselves, they were very aware of who in the National Party cabal had been in support of Nazi Germany and its ideology, and in all of their own press, The Springbok Legions’ newsletter ‘Advance’, the Torch Commando’s newsletter ‘Blikfakkel’ and other ‘English’ medium mainstream press, constantly published articles, opinions, letters and cartoons linking Afrikaner Nationalism to Nazism. When in the ’English liberal’ newspaper media whenever Torch Commando leaders were interviewed, they consistently highlighted the National Party’s Nazi root and called them out.

C.R. Swart as portrayed in Advance

So, where there’s smoke there is fire, let’s have a holistic and complete view of how Nazism as an ideology has played a role in the establishment of Christian Nationalism and Apartheid and who are the personalities who are in the National Party who have flirted or adopted the edicts of Nazism into their politics and policies.

The split in the Afrikaner diaspora

The Afrikaner right wing political romance with Germany starts with the South African War (1899-1902) i.e., Boer War 2 and it starts with the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR or Transvaal Republic) and Orange Free State (OFS) Republican Afrikaners – and as an Afrikaner whole they are a minority population – as Afrikaners go the Boer Republics’ Afrikaners combined do not reflect Afrikanerdom nor the views for the majority of Afrikaners in Southern Africa.

The population of South Africa in 1899 was approximately 4.7 million persons with 3.5 million Black Africans making up 74% of the total. Whites, numbering 830,000 made up only 18% of the entire population. Asians and Coloureds total 400,000 or 8%. In total 480,000 are Afrikaans-speaking whites and they total 58% of the white population. 

The Transvaal’s Afrikaners made up only 31% of the total number of Afrikaners in South Africa, with the Orange Free State having 15%. This total of 46% (approximately 219,000 people) shows that when war broke out, less than half of the total Afrikaners in South Africa were in the two republics that declared war on Great Britain. The British Cape Colony and Natal Colony, containing 54% of the Afrikaners, or 260,000 persons never rose up and declared war against the British (Cape Rebels accounted only about 10,000 persons).

The underpinning reality is that the Republics Boer Generals planning the war and the Republics Boer politicians claiming “Africa for the Afrikaner” failed to appreciate that many of the Cape Afrikaners were pretty happy under British administration for the near 100 years they are subjected to it, contented with the Cape franchise, many of them urbanised middle class and well to do and of the landed class many were very wealthy – as a demographic they are fundamentally different to their isolated and struggling frontier farming (Boer) Afrikaner brethren ‘up north’. 

Poverty, famine and hardship was not an overarching issue in the British Colonies for many ‘whites’ (Boer and Brit) in 1899 – nor does it seem that there was any fundamental discontent with their governance, representation and political disposition – and many simply did not view the ZAR’s “Krugerism” as a viable ideology or system of governance for Southern Africa – in fact Prime Minister William Schreiner, John X. Merriman and Jacobus Sauer had moved many in the Cape Colony’s branch of the Afrikaner Bond and Afrikaners in the Cape Colony in general closer to the British way of thinking.

After the Boer War ends in 1902, one of the peace terms is that independence will be guaranteed for the old republics under a British realm of influence, so in 1910, the Union of South Africa is declared as an independent country (a Dominion) with the old Boer ‘Bittereinder’ leadership – Louis Botha and Jan Smuts at the helm. This key split of Afrikaners however remains – many of the Cape, Natal and many Transvaal urbanised Afrikaners relatively happy with the idea of a ‘Union’ – the fusion of British and Afrikaner interests (and they now constitute the majority), however, here is a minority who remain Anglophobes because of the Boer War and are determined to return to the ideals of Republicanism and covert the old ZAR ‘Krugerism’ ideology. 

This schism in white Afrikanerdom is important to the eventual rise of the Broederbond, Ossewabrandwag and the National Party as they try to bring the ‘Cape Afrikaner’ and ‘Boer Afrikaner’ together into a singular identity under a Christian Nationalist banner using a white Voortrekker and Boer hegemony, all underpinned with a cocktail of Weimar Eugenics and National Socialism. This schism runs throughout Afrikaner history until 1948 and it is the key differential which The Torch Commando tries to influence through the vote in 1952.

The Adulterous Romance

The Afrikaner romance with Germany has three key points, the first is a minority of Afrikaners have German Heritage – the majority have a Dutch, Flemish or French heritage, and the German free-burgers are seen as part of the hereditary make-up and culture of white Afrikanerdom. The second is a simple telegram and the third is a rifle.

The telegram is related to the Boer War, its reputed to have been sent to President Kruger by Kaiser Wilhelm II congratulating him on dealing with the Jameson Raid in 1896 – the telegram read:

“I express to you my sincere congratulations that you and your people, without appealing to the help of friendly powers, have succeeded, by your own energetic action against the armed bands which invaded your country as disturbers of the peace, in restoring peace and in maintaining the independence of the country against attack from without.”

President Kruger then published the telegram far and wide as proof positive that Germany was in support of the Boer Republic and its claims that Britain intended to invade it. It would give the Boers the confidence and leverage in their many conflicting areas they had with the super-power Great Britain, in the belief that if there was to be an inevitable war, Germany as another super-power, will come to the aid of the Boer Republics. 

Image: Boer delegation to Germany and Kaiser Wilhelm II in his British Field Marshal uniform.

In truth, Kaiser Wilhelm II would deny personally sending the telegram, and claimed it was part of internal plot and political intrigue, he was also very angry with Kruger’s promotion of the telegram as some sort of treatise for military support, denying that he ever had intentions of establishing relations with the ZAR and he had no malice to Britain and would never support the ZAR in any war against them (see: Secret History of To-Day by Allen Upward).

The rifle is the German manufactured MAUSER model 1895 and 1896 carbine rifle (they also used the Norwegian made Krag-Jorgensen rifle). The Mauser Model 1896 became the icon it was a bolt-action rifle that fired 7x57mm rounds and was equipped with a five-round magazine. It was regarded as a more superior rifle to the British Lee-Metford rifle of the time.

In the months before the start of the Boer War in October 1899, the Boer Republics purchased 30,000 Mauser rifles, and 1,000,000 rounds of smokeless ammunition for it. Other weapons, including modern field guns and automatic weapons were purchased from the German armaments manufacturer Krupp. The rally call for Boer Republican troops became “Through God and the Mauser”.

To the average Republican mounted infantryman, this overwhelming supply of German weaponry left a legacy that Germany was their key ally, in truth German armaments manufactures, Mauser and Krupp were happy to receive orders of this magnitude, they made a lot of money from the two Boer Republics. Not one single German weapon sold to the Boer republics qualified as a subsidy or gift, and the German government made no effort to finance any of these weapons for the Boer cause.

Boer Commando – note Mauser rifles, colourised image courtesy Tinus le Roux.

Germany was just happy to sell them the weapons, as inconvenient truth goes, British arms manufacturers also sold weapons to the Boer Republics – the ZAR was minted with taxation from gold and made for a very profitable customer. 

In so far as adulterous this relationship goes, for all the benefit Germany was getting from selling arms to the Boers, they give all their support to Britain instead. Germany would even go as far as lending its military strategising to the British to help them win the Boer war – and as inconvenient truths go the strategy devised for the British by Kaiser Wilhelm II and his planners includes scorched earth and concentration camp policies (see: John C.G. Röhl: The Kaiser and England during the Boer War). 

As to manpower only a handful of Germans in their private capacity (local and foreign), 500 or so, volunteered join Boer Commando’s during the war – no assistance in fighting manpower was afforded the Boers by the German government in any way.

In fact, Kaiser Wilhelm II flatly refused to entertain any Boer delegation sent to Germany. Boer delegations did raise a little money from private donators, but that’s it – there was never any official public contribution by the German government to the Boer cause – ever. Germany wanted to avoid conflict with Britain – who by convention and legal treatise at the time held suzerainty limitations over the two Boer Republics preventing them from engaging in foreign policies and entering into foreign treaties (see: the London Convention 1881).  That … and to the Kaiser, the British Royal family were all his blood relatives – it was a family matter.

The Boer Revolt

However, all this adultery still did not resonate with many in the Boer community who almost illogically saw Germany as an Ally. This would re-materialise when the First World War 1914 – 1918 swings into action, and the newly formed South African Union declares war against Germany, not in the service of the British Empire, but in the service of South Africa’s own territorial expansions as agreed between the British and Boer delegations at the Union Conference of 1909 – the Parliamentary vote is a landslide in favour of The South African Party’s (SAP) proposal to invade German South West Africa (GSWA) and declare war on Germany. The SAP is the ‘Afrikaner’ party – it’s made up of all the old Boer War ‘Bittereinder’ Generals and the old Afrikaner Bond politicians – the opposition Imperial Party (the ‘English’ party) – also overwhelmingly in favour of it. 

The vote is 92 = For invasion of German South West Africa (GSWA) and 12 = Against. Of these 12 SAP individuals (or 18% of the SAP), only 3 of them are notable and become highly vocal anti-war campaigners demanding that South Africa remain neutral – Ministers Barry Hertzog, Koos de la Rey and Christiaan de Wet. 

In trying to raise resignations from the South African Union Defence Force in protest, Koos de la Rey would be tragically killed in a road-block misunderstanding.  General Christiaan de Wet would however join up with UDF officers – Major Jan Kemp, General Beyers and a rogue UDF commander on the GSWA border with intense pro-German, pro-white supremacy and anti-sematic sentiments by the name of Lt. Col Manie Martiz, all three would go into open sedition trying to evoke a coup d’etat using promised GSWA troops in support of their Boer Commandos. 

The Boer Revolt of 1914 was poorly planned and poorly executed, it managed to raise only 11,476 Boers who were poorly armed infantrymen against 80,500 well-armed UDF personnel (the rebels are outnumbered 8 to 1 in effect) and the Revolt drew no significant support from the Afrikaner community in the Transvaal, and virtually no support whatsoever from the Afrikaner communities in the Cape Province and Natal Province. It also drew no support from the Union Defence Force Afrikaners – who made up 60% of the force. It also gained no traction whatsoever with the ‘English’ white population (who made up 40% of the white demographic) and it drew absolutely no support from the real majority – the coloured, Indian and Black people of South Africa. 

Without support from either the broader Afrikaner diaspora or the South African population as a whole and without good military doctrine and planning backing them, the rebels were quickly crushed by the Union’s Defence Force and the revolt only lasted a couple of months. 

The Boer Revolt and its impact on Afrikaner Nationalism 

Albeit small and insignificant to the outcome of WW1 and the invasion of German South West Africa, the 1914 Boer Revolt is important in the evolution of the Afrikaner Nationalist right wing for four reasons.

Upfront is one of the primary political ramifications, of the few 18 odd very pro-Germany and pro-neutrality South African Party (SAP) Ministers of Parliament – General Barry Hertzog does not go with the sedition of his peers in revolt – instead he decides to leave the SAP and form his own political party in opposition to Botha and Smuts in the SAP, he goes mainstream and establishes the ‘National Party’.

Secondly, where the 1914 Boer Revolt did take traction was in the Orange Free State. The 11,500 strong Boer rebels were primarily made up of destitute Orange Free State Boers, 7,123 or 62% of the total force – many having come through a drought and agricultural reforms on the back of the devastation of their farms during Boer War 2 (see Sandra Swart Desperate Men: The 1914 Rebellion and the Polities of Poverty). They were simply desperate ‘Bywoners’ (landless farmers or sharecroppers) promised a better life if the rebellion was successful.

In the very next year’s General Election – the 1915 Election held during WW1, the National Party entered the political sphere for the first time, of the 130 available seats, the National Party won 26 of them, the majority of them from the Orange Free State where they dominated, winning 16 or the 17 available seats. It must be noted here, the ‘Afrikaner’ voting block is only partly split (about one third) – the SAP, the moderate Afrikaners under Botha and Smuts in support of Union and Imperialism, hold the lion’s share of seats – 54 in total, and are able to remain the governing party. Right wing Afrikaner Nationalism, in support of Republicanism, is still a minority and even have fewer seats than the official opposition – the ‘English’ Unionist Party. 

Thirdly, of the 4 main remaining rebel leaders (General Beyers drowned in action), 2 of them – ‘General’ Jan kemp and ‘General’ Manie Martiz went into Nationalist politics. Jan Kemp spent 10 months in prison for treason, then Botha and Smuts agreed to release him on the condition that he may not participate in any politics – a promise Kemp almost immediately broke entering politics as a National Party MP under Hertzog in 1920, by 1940, in opposition to South Africa entering WW2 against Nazi Germany, he joined the Reunited National Party under Dr. D.F. Malan. ‘General’ Manie Maritz, the Rebellion’s ringleader spent a couple of months in jail for treason, thereafter he was released on an amnesty given by Hertzog, he would enter politics as the leader of an antisemitic, one-party state, National Socialist (Nazi) inspired ‘Boerenasie’ party prior to World War 2 (more on this later). 

Finally, Jopie Fourie, who was sentenced to death for High Treason as he had not taken the precaution of resigning his Union Defence Force (UDF) commission before embarking on an armed revolt and was captured still wearing his UDF uniform. After his execution, Jopie Fourie would become the central martyr of the Afrikaner Nationalist cause, he would be politically pitched as the ‘true’ Afrikaner and in a bizarre twist on the definition of treason, the real traitors (Smuts and his Afrikaner cabal) had executed the hero of Afrikanerdom. Fourie’s spilled blood on his home soil would nurture Afrikaner identity and bring the Nazi creed of ‘Blut und Boden’ (Blood and Soil) into Christian Nationalism.  

His final letter would become Nationalist’s rally call, he wrote: 

“The tree which has been planted and which is wetted with my blood will grow large and bear delightful fruit”.

True Afrikaner ‘volk’ were to be demarcated as different to the treasonous Afrikaner ‘volk’ – to be a true Afrikaner was to be an avowed Afrikaner Nationalist. Jopie Fourie, British rule and the concentration camps of Boer War 2 would also become central to ‘the politics of pain’ on which the entire premise of Christian Nationalism would be established. 

The establishment of the National Party

The Nazification of Afrikaner right-wing politics, starts in earnest with the establishment of the National Party (NP) in 1914, General Hertzog’s break-away. The National Party’s founding was also rooted in disagreements of ‘Union’ among South African Party politicians, particularly because Prime Minister Louis Botha sought a ‘unitary’ Unionist state with singular purpose called ‘one-stream’ and General Hertzog who sought a ‘two-stream’ state which separated English and Afrikaners completely. Incorporated into the ‘Two-Stream’ ideology was the fierce adherence to ‘Krugerism’ – ‘Krugerism’ has the old ZAR ‘grondwet’ constitution at its centre. 

General Barry Hertzog

The racial separation and ideological purpose of the old Zuid-Afrikaanse Republic (ZAR) separating not just Afrikaner and English but also all the ‘Bantu’ (Black Africans) in addition. With an oligarchy philosophy underpinning it, and the sense of ‘Boer’ Nationalism ahead of all other races in servitude to a Boer hegemony, the religious reincorporation of the white Boer nation as the ‘Chosen People’, racially superior and with a divine right to rule all South Africa. The idea is an ‘oligarchy’ devolved from a ‘theocracy’ (not secular at all – State and Church are very linked) whose focus was on cultural prejudice (not acculturation). 

Krugerism’s oligarchy system of government would ensure no real political emancipation for non-whites, essentially Anglophobe in nature and with a discrimination outlook on minority groups – Jews in particular. The National Party’s stated aim is also the upliftment of Afrikaners, especially those dispossessed or marginalised as a result of the South African War (1899-1902) i.e., Boer War 2.

The ‘Politics of Pain’ also factored into the Nationalist ideology – i.e., the need to preserve Afrikaner identity by what was defined as a century long British tyranny, which ultimately manifested itself in the destruction of Boer farms and families during the 2nd Boer War. In essence it generated a victim mentality, and this preservation of Boer Nationalism and identity was paramount to the survival of the ‘Boer’ race – and if that required the subjugation by force of all other races and cultures threatening its ‘survival’, then so be it. 

Apartheid as an ideology had not fully taken shape at this stage, the Nationalists were pretty loose in defining exactly how they intended to implement ‘Krugerism’. They were thrust into the pound seats as the ruling party in a pact government running South Africa after the Miners’ Strike in 1922. To become the ruling party Hertzog did not have enough votes, they were still a minority party – so he had to go in coalition with the Labour Party, an ‘English’ constituted socialist party – mainly ‘Communists’ in effect representing a white working proletariat – the Labour Party’s popularity had also surged after the 1922 Miner’s Strike riding on the resentment of working-class whites of Smuts’ heavy-handed tactics when dealing with it. 

From 1924, they were able to define and tighten legislation around segregation, implement labour legislation in favour of whites and they managed to cap immigration of Jews in particular to South Africa, however they were tempered somewhat by their coalition partners. These ‘moderate’ politicians in coalition prevented the Nationalists from tampering with the constitution too much, so they found themselves supporting British Dominion and ‘Union’ and having to tolerate The Cape Franchise (Cape coloureds on the common voters roll). 

To hold onto power, Hertzog would even go into ‘Fusion’ with Smuts’ SAP and form a new entity called the United Party in 1934. This caused a breakaway called the ‘Purified National Party’ on the 5th July 1935 which stood to the far right politically, under the leadership of Dr D.F. Malan (a doctor in Divinity and a minister of the NG Church) – and it stood in abject rejection of the ideals of Union and Britain, it stood on the Krugerism ideal that God had ordained the white Afrikaner as a ‘chosen people’ to rule all of South Africa – and sought the return to Republicanism under an Afrikaner hegemony along with clearer ideologies on racial segregation. It was also a very small party at this stage. Of the 153 seats in Parliament, they won only 27 as a new entrant in the 1938 General Elections.

The 1938 Great Trek Centennial – a sacred happening

In the mid 1930’s in Europe, Nazism and Fascism were also taking hold as popular movements, in South Africa fringe Nazi movements on the far right of Afrikanerdom were also taking shape. Also operating in this sphere was a secret society called the Broederbond concerned with Afrikaner ‘advancement’, these ideologies would come together in 1938 during the 100 year centenary celebration of the Great Trek, and from it would stem political and cultural movements which would all come into conflict with a future democratic South Africa.

The Broederbond itself would fledge a ‘Christian Nationalism’ ideology using the Centennial and so too out of it would come the very right leaning, anti-British and Nazi Germany supporting Ossewabrandwag (Ox Wagon Sentinel). It would also see a polarisation of what was defined as ‘Afrikanerdom’ along racial purity lines.

Henning Klopper on his Ox-Wagon named – The ‘Piet Retief’ leave Cape Town to commence the 1938 Centenary of The Great Trek.

So, here’s some background on the centenary trek itself. On the 8th August 1938, Henning Klopper’s two Ox Wagons called the Piet Retief’ and the ‘Andries Pretorius’, stood at the foot of Jan van Riebeeck’s statue in Cape Town. As the ox-teams were harnessed a huge crowd of over 100,000 people gathered. The wagons were to replicate the ‘Great Trek’ and were to be joined by more wagons and people as it passed through towns on a trek to inaugurate the planned Voortrekker Monument outside Pretoria for a massive celebration on the one hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Blood River. The Broederbond, doing what it did so well, co-ordinated the ideas and concepts behind the Centennial Trek which would follow “Die Pad van Suid-Afrika”, a symbolic ‘road to South Africa’s nationhood’ taken by the Voortrekkers.

Image: “Die Pad van Suid-Afrika”, a symbolic ‘road to South Africa’s nationhood’ becomes an emotive call to nationhood by the Ossewabrandwag on the back of the 1938 Centenary trek

In this way the Broederbond hoped to (and did) bastardise history along Afrikaner nationalist principles – they would literally use the Great trek as the central reason for South Africa’s raison d’être’ and ignore the histories of all the other population groups and their role in establishing South Africa. They would go one step further and bastardise the Great Trek as a ‘white’ only Afrikaner exercise, and thereby ignore Afrikaner roots in the ‘brown’ (slave and Xhoi Xhoi) cultures of South Africa, it would also ignore the ‘coloured’ workers and servants who accompanied the trekkers (some references give this as a 1:1 ratio – one trekker to one African or black servant/labourer)  and split Afrikanerdom along racial lines alienating it from its actual roots and history.

To put perspective on the political hyperbole and artificial segregation offered by the Broederbond. The real history of the Afrikaner, Afrikaans and the Afrikaner culture is a critical part of South African history, the true roots of it lie in a conjoint merger of various cultures – white, slave and indigenous peoples – starting way back in the old Cape Dutch Colony – Afrikanerdom’ and the Afrikaans language has a shared heritage – Black and White, it certainly is not a Broederbond/National Party interpretation of the history; a romantic tale of a ‘all-white’ trek to freedom, flavoured with a Nationalist ideology and readily mixed with heady concoction of eugenics and religion.

Henning Klopper, would say;

“We ask the entire Afrikanerdom to take part in the festival celebration in this spirit. We long that nothing shall hinder the Afrikaner people as a whole from taking part. This movement is born from the People; may the People carry it in their hearts all the way to Pretoria and Blood River. Let us build up a monument for Afrikaner hearts. May this simple trek bind together in love those Afrikaner hearts which do not yet beat together. We dedicate these wagons to our People and to our God.”

By that he hoped to combine the ‘Cape white Afrikaners’ with the ‘Boer white Afrikaners’ in the symbology of the Great Trek under a fabricated Nationalist ideal and only meant ‘White’ Afrikaners and not really the Afrikaner people as a ‘whole’ – certainly not coloured Afrikaners, black Afrikaners or even Jewish Afrikaners. 

Klopper in a later interview went on to say;

“we never had a symbol before; the ox-wagon became that symbol” which is not altogether surprising as only a fraction of Afrikaners were proper Voortrekkers but the Ox Wagon (and the gunpowder horn) would now be the National symbology.

National Party emblem

This symbology would later be adopted by the National Party as their logo.

Towns in all parts of the country vied for the privilege of a visit from one of the wagons. Several other treks besides Henning Klopper’s were organised. In the end six more wagons threaded their way to the capital from distant points; four others went to the site of the battle at Blood River for a commemoration service on the 16th December, stopping along the way to re-name street after street in countless towns and villages after one or another Voortrekker hero, and laying imprints of the wagons wheels in freshly laid cement at many halts (there are still ‘imprints’ at my hometown in Hermanus).

This image: titled “blanke skoonheid” or “white beauty’ encapsulates the Centenary Trek perfectly, here girls from the Voortrekker School in Pietermaritzburg celebrate the arrival of the ox wagons. The “blanke skoonheid” does not just refer to the white dresses and bonnets (or ‘kappies’) but also infers that this festival was about the further assertion of white power. (The photograph taken between 18 and 20 November 1938. By Henry Murray). 

With overriding patriotism, born alongside the Centenary Trek was a new South African anthem “Die Stem van Suid-Afrika” (the voice of South Africa), the anthem now part of the South African official anthem, however when the song was amalgamated in the 90’s with Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika the “die kreun van ossewa” (the groan of Ox Wagons) bit was purposely omitted as it only reflected one culture’s history in South Africa and not the rest.

There were beards: The organizational committee of Koeberg also made their beards. “Many men grew their beards specifically for the 1938 Voortrekker Centenary as supposed proof of their masculinity as men who identified as Afrikaners.” 

Thousands of men grew beards and women made Voortrekker bonnets and garb along the way, a cultural rise took place and when the procession arrived outside Pretoria, 200,000 people greeted them. Human teams, flanked by outriders, dragged the Ox-Wagons into places of honour. Three women descendants of Voortrekker leaders of Retief, Pretorius and Potgieter then laid the foundation stone of the Voortrekker Monument. ‘A sacred event’ had taken place.

Henning Klopper was so amazed at just how successful the 1938 Centenary Trek in ‘uniting’ white ‘Afrikanerdom’ under the banner of the Voortrekkers and creating a new national identity – he would call on divine providence and call it a “Sacred Happening” – God’s will that the white Afrikaner lead South Africa as the chosen people.

The Road to War 

As noted previously, Prime Minister Barry Hertzog had merged his conservative ‘National Party’ with Jan Smuts’ more democratic ‘South African Party’ to form a “Fusion” party called the ‘United Party’, the two old Boer War Bittereinder Generals in coalition – General Hertzog remained Prime Minister and General Smuts his deputy. Dr. D.F. Malan had split from the Fusion coalition and formed the ‘Pure’ National Party to the right of Hertzog’s Afrikaner Nationalists in the United Party coalition. The ’Pure’ National Party would turn their vitriol against Hertzog, who they now regarded as traitorous as Smuts and a British puppet.

Hertzog’s United Party cabinet, a curious mix of hard conservatives like Jan Kemp and democratic progressives like Jan Smuts and Patrick Duncan.

Within the United Party, by the late 1930’s things had started to come to a head between Hertzog and Smuts. One issue was South West Africa (Namibia), now under South African Union mandate, and part of Smuts’ and the Union’s vision for ‘Greater South Africa’.

Hertzog’s right hand-man, Oswald Pirow – the National Party’s Minister of Defence and a devout Nazi supporter and admirer of Adolf Hitler had been sent by Hertzog to the Nazi German state on a number of ‘unofficial’ state visits – in doing so Pirow would meet Hitler and assure him of Afrikaner support of the Reich and that should there be war against the British – South Africa would remain neutral and should Germany win they could re-claim their old colony of South West Africa as German (something Hitler re-iterated to Pirow as a fait accompli). More on Pirow later.

Things would really come to a full head when Britain and France declared war against Nazi Germany on the 3rd of September 1939 and it would throw this entire careful political balance out the window and polarise the Afrikaner political landscape completely. 

South Africa, as a British dominion, would hold an emergency debate as to whether South Africa should remain neutral or also declare war against Hitler and Nazi Germany (as a Dominion it was free to make its own laws and free of Westminster’s laws, South Africa was not in servitude to Britain – so if South Africa wished to remain neutral by way of a Parliamentary majority – then Britain would uphold that decision).

The next day, 4th of September 1939, a three-way debate ensued primarily between the two factions in the United Party and the Pure Nationalists. As the United Party was loaded with Hertzog’s Nationalists and there was also Malan’s Nationalists in opposition, Hertzog was very confident he had the combined Afrikaner nationalist majority to carry his motion of neutrality. As was Hertzog’s position against Smuts in 1914 demanding South Africa neutrality in World War 1, siding with German’s cause, so too Hertzog’s position against the same man – Smuts, in 1939 demanding neutrality in the war against Nazi Germany in World War 2.

Prime Minister Hertzog would argue in his speech that Hitler’s invasion of Poland and annexations of Austria and Czechoslovakia was not an indication that Hitler aspired to world conquest, and Afrikaners well understood the Germans right to struggle for their own self-determination against the hostility of the outside world. Germany’s actions constituted no threat to South African security whatsoever and a policy of neutrality under these circumstances was the only logical policy to adopt.

General Smuts would reply in his speech that since the fate of South West Africa would depend on the outcome of the war, South Africa’s interests were virtually involved. Furthermore, South Africa was part of the Commonwealth whose fate now hung in the balance, to stand aside from the conflict would be to expose the whole civilised world to danger.

Smuts’ amendment to Hertzog’s Motion of Neutrality was carried by 80 votes to 67 votes on the 4th September 1939 and South Africa found itself at war against Nazi Germany. 

Surprised at the outcome, Hertzog promptly resigned, leaving the South African Premiership and the leadership of the United Party to General Jan Smuts and both he and some of his supporters left the United Party. 

An interesting lapel pin with Jan Smuts’ profile on it, it was worn by Smuts supporters to commemorate a Parliamentary debate, that is why the date on the pin is so important: 4 .9 .1939

On the 23rd November 1939 the National Party’s “Malanites” and “Hertzognites” met and tried to reconcile their differences, they could not, the stumbling block was Republicanism – the ‘Pure’ Malanite Nationalists wanted a Republic regardless, Hertzog felt that a break from Union and the declaration of Republic could only take place if both Afrikaner and English whites were in agreement with the idea. 

To the ‘Malanite’ Nationalists, the UP’s decision to go to war had vindicated their intensive segregationist policies which they had been following since 1934, and that Hertzog’s flirtation with English speakers ‘rights’ was delusional (the Malanites classified English speakers as secondary citizens, albeit they made up around 40% of the white population). 

Unable to reconcile, Dr. D.F. Malan seized the opportunity to take over leadership of all ‘Afrikanerdom’ and cast Hertzog out into the political wilderness. Hertzog tried again on 5th November 1940 at the National Party’s Convention to reaffirm his position on English-speakers rights, falling on deaf ears, he grabbed his hat and walked out of the National Party – forever.

General Barry Hertzog’s U Turn to Nazism 

In his retirement from politics, and in his private life, no longer walking ‘coalition’ and ‘fusion’ political tightropes and toeing UP party-political lines, General Hertzog felt confident to reveal his true colours. He performed an especially remarkable volte-face (U-Turn) when, just after leaving the National Party over his defence of English-speakers’ rights, he suddenly became a champion of full-blown National Socialism (Nazism).

Angered by his treatment by Dr D.F. Malan and the endless machinations of National party politicians, General Hertzog issued a press statement in October 1941 in which he excoriated “liberal capitalism” and the democratic party system, while praising National Socialism, as in keeping with the traditions of the Afrikaner, and as a system National Socialism simply had to be adapted to South African needs under the oversight of a one-party state dictatorship.

General Hertzog’s press release led to frenzied activity as the various Afrikaner pro-Nazi and anti-war factions tried to reunite. In the months following Hertzog’s pro-Nazi declaration Germany was joined by Japan, and the Axis forces won victory after victory. This was the point where Smuts was at his most perilous and the Smuts Government really feared that all could easily be lost. The National Party at this point even gave Dr. D.F. Malan dictatorial powers over his party to meet the Hertzog induced “crisis.”

According to Hertzog’s officially appointed biographer C.M. van den Heever, in his ‘General J.B.M Hertzog’ published in 1944; the following on Hertzog’s volte-face towards Nazism over this period is noted:

“Hertzog became “bitterly disappointed in the democratic system, with its capitalist foundations and press influence, for he had cause to know that the voice of the majority is not only the voice of wisdom … he was convinced that a new world order was on its way … after his retirement … he became more inclined towards National Socialism, by which he meant the adaption of the old Free State model republic to modern conditions, using the best from recent European experiments. … He regarded National Socialism as suited to the moral and religious outlook of the Afrikaner; indeed, he considered that the constitution of the old Free State Republic was based on it.”

It is also in General Hertzog’s private life that we find a compelling case as to Hertzog’s disposition to Nazism, and it’s a case of ‘like father like son’ and here we find General Hertzog’s son, Dr. Albert Hertzog who followed his fathers’ footsteps into politics. 

Dr. Albert Hertzog was a key figure in the Afrikaner Broederbond, in 1948 he stood as a National Party candidate, becoming a Minister of Parliament. Dr. Albert Hertzog’s views were extreme, he wanted to nationalise the gold mines and as devout National Socialist he looked to reforming Afrikaner and white labour unions – especially the Afrikaner Bond of Mineworkers. He even advocated state control of the entire economy. 

So extremely right wing in his views, Dr. Albert Hertzog eventually found the National Party too ‘liberal’ for his liking and came to loggerheads with them – he was removed from the party, and he moved to establish the Neo-Nazi Herstigte Nasionale Party (Reconstituted National Party) or HNP in 1969 and head it up as a breakaway to the extreme right of the NP. Joining him as his deputy was Jaap Marais, an ex-Ossewabrandwag stalwart and National Party Minister, who along with Dr Albert Hertzog harboured such extreme National Socialist views that he too was eventually removed from the National Party. 

The Split in the Afrikaner diaspora – Part 2

As with the clear 60/40 split in the white Afrikaner diaspora prior to the South African War (1899-1902) a.k.a Boer War 2, between the ‘republican’ conservative Afrikaners (the minority) and the ‘Imperial’ moderate Afrikaners (the majority), a split carried through to Union in 1910 and then through World War 1 (1914-1918) – so too does this split remain highly apparent after Smuts declares war against Nazi Germany in 1939 to commence World War 2 (1939-1945).

In 1943 (mid-way into World War 2) whilst the conservative pro-Nazi (and pro-Republic) and the opposing moderate pro-Smuts movements (and pro-Union) within Afrikanerdom are at its peak a General Election is held. The result is surprising, as it reveals literally no change and an outpouring of majority support for Smuts and a war alongside Britain against Germany – from the ‘English’ and ‘Afrikaans’ population groups alike.

The United Party under Smuts and affiliated parties in support of Dominion and Union manage 509,000 odd votes and the Afrikaner Nationalist Party and its affiliated Afrikaner party in support of Republicanism achieves 337,000 votes. In terms of ‘seats’ the pro-Union moderates in support of Britain command 2/3 of the house – nearly 75% of the vote.

This is why the 1948 elections – a mere 5 years later is such a surprise. Mid way through Smuts’ second Prime Ministership he enjoys unprecedented support and the National Party is very much a minority with a fringe ideology and no real threat to the Union’s political construct. So, what’s going on?

Hitler’s Afrikaner Nationalist propaganda campaign

On another continent Adolf Hitler and his propaganda ministry are making strong overtones to connect Nazism to Afrikaner Nationalism and tapping into Boer War mythology using just about every medium and propaganda tool available to them.

Hitler would record in his book ‘Mein Kampf’ that in his youth;

“The Boer War came, like a glow of lightning on the far horizon. Day after day I used to gaze intently at the newspapers, and I almost ‘devoured’ the telegrams and communiqués, overjoyed to think that I could witness that heroic struggle, even from so great a distance…” 

Then on the 30th January 1940, with Nazi Germany at the height of its influence and popularity, Adolf Hitler gave a speech at the Sportspalast and stated the following on The Boer War;

“They (Britain) waged war for gold mines and mastery over diamond mines”  

Hitler then went on in the same speech to say of the Boer War:

“After all, this entire blockade warfare is nothing other than a war against women and children just as once was the case in the Boer War … It was then that the concentration camps were invented. England locked up women and children in these camps. Over 20,000 Boer women (and children) died wretchedly at the time.”

Just about every sentence Hitler is uttering here is either pure falsehood or a half truth – blaming the British for “inventing” the “Konzentrationslager”, painting the camps as “locked” prisons, and implying the British wage genocide and not war. This ‘Pro-Boer’ Nationalism morphs into an entire Nazi propaganda campaign surrounding the Boer’s struggle against Britain – one which is regarded as the most influential and successful Nazi propaganda campaigns ever devised.

Hitler, giving a speech at the Sportspalast

What Hitler is also doing in his speech is using his intense ‘fame’, peaking in 1940, across Germany, Western Europe and the globe in many respects. With this statement he achieves three things:

Firstly, he demonises the British (the only real “enemy” he has left in 1940) as an enemy of the German people, but also – most importantly – an enemy to Europeans at large – and he uses the Boer War for this purpose as it is in living memory for many Europeans, this deflects the focus on Germany as the enemy to Britain as the true enemy of Europe.

Nazism and the concept of the 3rd Reich was a lot more popular in Europe in the lead up to World War 2 than most people would believe now. In fact its position as “anti-bolshevist” (anti-Communist) and as “anti-Judeo Capital” found vast popular appeal in right wing and conservative parties across Europe – especially in France, the Netherlands and Belgium, these people would see Nazi Germany as liberators – not invaders.

Secondly, Hitler is reinforcing Anglophobia and Republicanism in South Africa through propaganda and he is giving re-assurance to the Afrikaner nationalist cause from Berlin. To the home grown South African pro-Nazi movements like the Ossewabrandwag, the Broederbond and Afrikaner nationalists this is manna from heaven – to all these South African Hitler admirers and their followers, Hitler’s assurance that the British committed a Boer ‘Genocide’ is music to their ears. They all attested to the concept that the British had tried to ethnically cleanse South Africa of the Boer nation during the war – and here one of the world’s greatest leaders, a 20th Century iconoclast who agreed with them, and whose not to believe Adolf Hitler? He is a European powerhouse, he’s at the helm of a super-power like Britain and now he’s standing up to Britain and telling it as it is – if it comes from Hitler it’s a truism, the British committed Boer Genocide and stole the Boer’s gold … and it does not end there, Hitler goes further … much further.

During a press interview Hermann Göring (the spokesperson on behalf of Adolf Hitler), took a leaf out his Führer’s leader’s book on the Boer War when he deflected a challenge from Sir Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador to Berlin who protested about the German government’s use of concentration camps for the political ‘re-education’ of German’s dissonant non-believers in Nazism and opposition in 1935, and using a ‘press stunt’ Göring dramatically sprung up, walked over to a bookcase and like a thespian actor, grabbed a German encyclopedia opening it at “Konzentratinslager” he read out loud, 

“First used by the British, in the South African War”.

Although factually incorrect – the Spanish (not the British) first used concentration camps in the Cuban civil war in 1896, his action served as a skilful stroke of deflection of which Hermann Göring was a past master.

Dr. Joseph Goebbels was a propaganda mastermind, he was also a rabid, almost insane follower of his Führer, Adolf Hitler and a devout Nazi, and he would kick this affiliation between Nazism and Afrikaner nationalism up a gear. 

In printed media, the German propaganda machine would go even further on the back of Hitler’s speeches and use an image of Paul Kruger and the Boer War on propaganda posters to recruit Waffen SS troops in the Netherlands and Belgium, with whom these countries had an affinity for the Boer War. Both these countries proved highly fruitful in recruiting Waffen SS troops as they feared Bolshevism more than Nazism and for these conservative sections of the populations Nazism had an appeal (not to be confused with the SS, the Waffen SS also comprised ‘non-German’ and ‘foreign’ battalions – and later in the war they proved to be ferocious and devout combatants).

Next up in Goebbels’ propaganda arsenal was radio. Joseph Goebbels made this radio address on 19 April 1940, on the eve of Adolph Hitler’s birthday and said:

On 3 September last year (1939), two hours after English plutocracy declared war on the German Reich, the British Prime Minister Chamberlain gave a radio speech …The point of the speech was that England had no intention of waging war against the German people … get rid of the Führer or so-called Hitlerism …. At the beginning of the war, however, they sang the same old song …. Its melody was dull and worn out. British plutocracy had tried to persuade the Boers during the South African war of the same thing. Britain was only fighting Krugerism. As is well known, that did not stop them from allowing countless thousands of women and children to starve in English concentration camps”.

Radio Zeesen was also part of Goebbels’ arsenal, it was a Nazi German ‘International’ propaganda service radio station broadcasting in short wave in eighteen different foreign languages including Afrikaans, it broadcasted both Hitler’s speeches and Goebbels’ messages – and eagerly picked by devout Afrikaner Nationalists in South Africa.

Also, Goebbels loved, literally adored movies and the moving picture industry, he regarded this industry as his single most powerful propaganda tool, and he made a number of propaganda movies that came to define the Nazi legacy. However only four of his movies won the much-converted Reich Propaganda Ministry’s “Film of the Nation” rating. Movies deemed critical viewing for national identity in Nazi Germany – Heimkhehr (1941) – an anti-Polish movie, Der große König (1942) – a movie about Frederick the Great of Prussia, Die Entlassung (1942) – a movie about the dismissal of Otto von Bismarck and finally …… Ohm Krüger (1941), a movie about Paul Kruger and the Boer War. So, in forging a German national identity, the Boer War and the plight of the Afrikaner take centre stage.

Ohm Krüger (Uncle Kruger ) is a propaganda masterpiece from beginning to end. Although the plot has nothing to do with Germany, the story centres around a character which the Germans could admire, “Uncle” Paul Kruger – a man the Propaganda Minister wants to draw parallels to Adolf Hitler, who he deems is also a man with a common touch, from a simple background and one who is thrust into extraordinary circumstances due to international aggression and a conspiracy of greedy ‘foreigners’.

The film highlights Boer Nationalism on the pillars of liberty and freedom, Boer Republicanism, Boer racial superiority over ‘treacherous’ black natives, it portrays the British as underhanded and murderous, stealing Boer gold, prepared to hang Boer patriots in concentration camps, they starve Boer women to death and line up British troops to mow down innocent Boer women in their hundreds, shooting them in the back as they flee the British onslaught – you get the picture.. to see Ohm Krüger in full – with English sub titles, here is the YouTube link:

So how does this propaganda fare?

It’s a massive success, a propagandistic blockbuster, it’s by far the most expensive film produced in Nazi Germany up to that time with a 5.5 million Reich Marks budget and a massive film lot outside Berlin that resembles a mini-South Africa with 100 Longhorn cattle and African huts. Ohm Krüger offers plenty of entertainment – ‘wild west’ frontier grit alongside its vivid battle scenes, as if John Ford’s Monument Valley had been transposed onto South Africa’s Transvaal region.

It is first screened on 4th April 1941 in Germany, and it’s rolled out across Europe – it opens in Italy in September 1941, France on the 1st October 1941, Hungary on the 19th December 1941, Finland on the 15th March 1942 and it even makes it to Japan on the 2nd September 1943. It makes it way right across Europe – Bulgaria, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium etc.

Both locally and internationally, it is received to rapturous applause. It is pitched as the European cinema equivalent to ‘Gone with the wind’ and it’s a winner – literally, not only the first movie to win the converted ‘Film of the Nation’ and the award for ‘Film of Special Value in terms of state policy and art’, but importantly – it also wins the Mussolini Cup for the Best Foreign Film at the 1941 Venice Film Festival.

The movie is so popular, the Nazi propaganda machine even decided to re-release it in 1944. In the end – millions of people see it, today it is regarded as Nazi propaganda master stroke. However, as irony goes the Nazi propaganda machine ‘Bans’ the movie in 1945, not because it’s a great yarn, entertaining and an outstanding propaganda piece – but because they are concerned that the graphic massacre of Boer women at the end of the movie would upset the female population of Germany concerned about their treatment at the hands of the counter-attacking and invading Soviet Union and other Allied armies at the end of the war.

The Broederbond’s influence

As noted previously, the guiding force behind the rebirth of all his Christian Nationalist spirit in South Africa was the Afrikaner Broederbond (Association of Brothers or Afrikaner Brotherhood), as a secret society it gradually come to assume a dominant position in the affairs of the Afrikaner ‘volk’. The ‘Broederbond’ formally adopted Christian Nationalism as its basic ideology in their manifesto. 

General Jan Smuts and the Broederbond where diametrically opposed to one another, later during the Second World War he would correctly summarise the Broederbond when he banned public servants in 1944 from joining it and called it out as 

“A dangerous, cunning, political Fascist organization.”

Prior to the war and sitting in the wings of the Broederbond was Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd (the Architect of Apartheid), he was a predominant Broederbond member, National Party leader and would become a future Prime Minister of South Africa. Dutch by birth, he honed his studies in sociology and psychology in Germany and there is no doubt he was exposed to German politics and the rise of Nazism at the time. Verwoerd showed his colours early on when, the South African Nazi ‘Black shirts’ (more on them later) held a large rally and protested the arrival of the S.S. Stuttgart in Cape Town on the 27th October 1936 with 600 Jewish refugees on board. 

The arrival of the SS Stuttgart in Cape Town

The Nationalists joined hands with the Blackshirts in support of their protest and a few days later on 4 November, Dr Theophilus E. Dönges (future NP Acting Prime Minister) would nail the Nationalists colours to the mast and said: 

“The Jew is an insoluble element in every national life.”

They were joined by Dr Verwoerd and five fellow professors from Stellenbosch University who all went in deputation to the government to protest against the immigration of Jews from Nazi Germany. Frans Erasmus (the future National Party Minister of Defence) would go further on the matter and even officially thank the Blackshirts on behalf of The National Party for bringing the attention of the “Jewish problem to the Afrikaner ‘volk’.”

Dr H.F. Verwoerd

Dr Verwoerd, although he had not joined a Nazi grouping or Nazi styled resistance movement like the Ossewabrandwag during the war, was also found compliant in promoting the aims of Nazi Germany and Nazi philosophy whilst he was editor of ‘Die Transvaaler’ prior to and during the war in a landmark legal case.  Justice Millin, in a 25,000-word judgement concluded that:

 “Dr Verwoerd caused to be published a large body of matter which was on the same general lines as matter coming to the Union in the Afrikaans transmissions from Zeesen (a Nazi radio mouthpiece broadcasting in Afrikaans) and which was calculated to make the Germans look upon Die Transvaler as a most useful adjunct to this propaganda service”.

Another admirer on Nazism in the wings was Dr Nico Diedericks, the Chairman of the Broederbond during the war, a future NP State President who had studied in Nazi Germany and was reputed to have attended the Nazi’s Anti-Communist training school in Berlin whilst there. Piet Meyer, another head of the Broederbond and Ossewabrandwag General (and future Head of the SABC) so admired Nazi Germany he befriended Hitler’s chief of staff, Rudolf Hess, who even taught him to ski.

The use of media to promote the aims of Nazism to the Afrikaner ‘volk’ did not stop there.

Alongside Verwoerd as the editor of ‘Die Transvaaler’ is ‘Die Burger’ which was established by the Nationalists as their official mouthpiece in 1915 and Dr D.F. Malan (also a Broederbond member) as its first editor – an ‘anti-Smuts’ paper it was going to be from the get-go. By the mid 1930’s it had become popular in right leaning European newspapers in countries like Germany to target Jews with what is now known as “the great Jewish Capitalist conspiracy lie” – Jews were demonised as ‘fat cats’ using capital exploitation to the detriment of ‘ordinary’ non-Jewish folk and this image and symbology found itself into all visual media – including (and especially) political cartoons.

In South Africa, this trend for demonising Jews in political cartooning found favour in publications like the Die Burger, and especially in the works of D.C. Boonzaier, himself an anti-imperialist, pro-republican, pro-nationalism and anti-capitalist. He created a caricature figure called Hoggenheimer specifically for Die Burger – a derogatory figure designed to depict a fat and bloated Jewish capitalist with a play on ‘hog” or pig, the character made a number of appearances and also served to lampoon Ernest Oppenheimer, the German Jewish Mining Industrialist who made South Africa his home.

Image: This cartoon by D.C. Boonzaier was published in Die Burger, 23 May, 1938. The bloated caricature Hoggenheimer is been carried on the shoulders of JBM Hertzog and Jan Smuts following the United Party’s landslide victory over the ‘purified’ Nationalists. The caption alludes to ‘Jewish Capital’ as the real winners and the United Party was a puppet in servitude to its Jewish master.

It remains ironic, Julius Streicher, the infamous Nazi propagandist is the only German civilian executed by hanging for war times after the Nuremberg Trials, precisely for “vitriolic antisemitic propaganda” which “incited genocide” whist he was the publisher of the Newspaper ‘Der Stürmer’ – whereas no such fate awaited Dr.Hendrick Verwoerd and Albertus Lourens Geyer who published similar sentiment in ‘Die Transvaaler’ and ‘Die Burger’ nor did the publishers and editors of ‘Die Waarheid’ (the SANP mouthpiece), Die O.B. (the Ossewanbrandwag mouthpiece) and ‘Die Dappere Boodskapper’ (the Boerenasie mouthpiece) who all also published antisemitic and pro-Nazi rhetoric, instead many of them are promoted to high offices in The National Party after the war and richly rewarded for their efforts, much to the bewilderment of the Jewish community.

On the education front, using a similar tactic used by Hitler and his Nazi propaganda ministry, the Broederbond made it an aim of theirs to ‘re-educate’ the Afrikaner nation along the ideals of Afrikaner Christian Nationalism. An example of this occurred during the war when on the morning of the 13th of December 1943 a small group of military intelligence officers infiltrated the Afrikaner Teachers Training College in Bloemfontein. They placed microphones and eavesdropped on an Afrikaner educationalists congress taking place in Bloemfontein – intelligence revealed it was a front for a Broederbond meeting intent on mapping South Africa’s future under the ideology of Christian Nationalism – and outlining how they would infiltrate the education system to do it. They traced vehicle registrations of many in attendance to known Broederbond members and highlighted Albert Hertzog, Nico Diederichs, Hendrick Verwoerd and Henning Klopper as the ringleaders (a line-up of some significant heavy-weight National Party leaders).

From both inside and out the Nationalists were making a mark promoting Nazism, and none more so than the following affiliated organisations, let’s start with the biggest one – The Ossewabrandwag.

The Ossewabrandwag (OB)

The Ossewabrandwag (OB) was officially established in 1938 to commemorate the centennial of the Great Trek as devised by Henning Klopper and the Broederbond. It was intended to be a ‘cultural’ organisation on which to spread the white Afrikaner nationalist message and idealised Afrikaner hegemony proposed by the Broederbond. Its name – meaning “Ox Wagon Sentinel” was derived from the idea that Afrikaner Nationalism and Voortrekker symbology and identity would spread like a wildfire from Afrikaner heart to Afrikaner heart. The OB is set up in parallel to the National Party – in fact they are both joined at the hip.

Col Laas (left) and Dr. van Rensburg (right)

The OB is initially led by Colonel J.C.C. Laas – a Union Defence Force (UDF) officer with who held the ideals of National Socialism in high regard, so much so he would go on enter main-stream politics and establish a Neo-Nazi party called the Boerenasie, which Manie Maritz would eventually take over (more on this later).

Taking part in the 1938 Ox Wagon Centennial, leading one of the groups was Dr Johannes (Hans) van Rensburg, a lawyer who served in the Union Defence Force was the Union’s Secretary of Justice, in 1933 he had been to Germany in his capacity as Secretary and met both Hitler and Goering as well as other Nazi officials, he was deeply impressed with both the leadership and discipline offered by Nazism and became an admirer. 

Dr. van Rensburg took over the OB from Col. Laas, and under Dr. van Rensburg the OB saw unprecedented growth – by the start of World War 2 it was a massive organisation of some 300,000 members, it had evolved away from being a mere ‘cultural movement’ forwarding Nationalist Afrikaner identity, to an active domestic para-military movement with strong Nazi overtones and open channels to Nazi Germany to aid their submarine activities around South Africa.

Dr. Hans van Rensburg flanked at a OB Torch rally

When it was established relations between the National Party and the Ossewabrandwag were cordial, with most members of the Ossewabrandwag belonging to the party as well. At the higher levels, National Party leaders like P.O. Sauer and F. Erasmus. Three future National Party South African Prime Ministers/State Presidents held key leadership positions in the Ossewabrandwag. ‘Generals’ like C.R. Swart (later South Africa’s first State President) was a member of the Groot Raad (Chief Council) of the Ossewabrandwag, B.J. Vorster (later to become Prime Minister of South Africa) was a keynote OB leader and formed the OB’s Cape Branch and even PW Botha (future South African State President) joined the Ossewabrandwag and worked with Vorster to establish the OB’s Cape branch.

Other National Party stalwarts where also prominent in the Ossewabrandwag organisation, Eric Louw, for example – who later to become the National Party’s Foreign Minister. To say the National Party and the Ossewabrandwag were, to coin a phrase, “two peas in the same pod” is an absolute truism.

The relationship between the Ossewabrandwag and National Party at first was very well-defined and D.F. Malan even met with OB leaders in Bloemfontein which resulted in declaration known as the ‘Cradock Agreement’. It specified the two operating spheres of the two respective organizations. They undertook not to meddle in each other’s affairs and the National Party endeavoured to focus on Afrikanerdom in the party-political sphere, while the Ossewabrandwag was to operate on the other fronts of the ‘volk’ (white Afrikaans people’s).

Dr Van Rensburg, having now resigned his commission as an officer in the UDF, had always professed to be a National Socialist, as an open admirer of Nazi Germany and Adolph Hitler, and the ideas, uniforms and rituals of membership adopted by the OB had a distinctive Nazi leaning as a result.

Image: An Ossewabrandwag ‘Kommandant’ in full para-military uniform with lapel badges, ‘crested eagle’ epaulettes and ‘lightning bolt’ cap badge insignia. In addition he is wearing a sam-browne belt and lanyard. His ‘green’ arm band signifies his rank – using the ‘crested eagle’ again and horizontal lines for scale of seniority.

In terms of OB political thinking, Afrikaans would be the only official language in a free, independent, Christian-Nationalist Republic. The English-speaking South Africans, regarded as an “un-national” element, would be condemned to an inferior status. Anti-Communism was an important backbone of OB policy in line with Nazi aggression toward Communism. 

The emphasis of the OB was also on race and racial purity. Members were exhorted to “think with your blood”, and the Nazi creed of “Blut und Boden” (Blood and Soil) was promoted as an OB value. The Ossewabrandwag’s newsletter O.B. would state this clearly on 28 October 1942 when it said:

“Family, blood, and native soil’ – that is, next to our religion and our love of freedom, our greatest and our most sacred national heritage”. 

The OB always displayed an exaggerated interest in physical culture and the need for dictatorial discipline. Dr. van Rensburg would write:

“Give us a master! Give us bonds which tie us to a stable way of life”.

On issues of family value, the leaders of the OB proclaimed that the duty of the man was to work and fight and the duty of the woman to create and tend the home and family. In essence the OB was based on the Führer principle, fighting against the British Empire, anti-capitalist in nature – they called for the removal and expropriation of “British-Jewish” controlled capital, the communists, the Jews and the system of parliamentarism. All based on the principles of National Socialism (Nazism).

Dr Hans van Rensburg being sworn in – OB swearing in ceremony

In 1940, as South Africa was fighting in the North African theatre of operations on the side of the Allies, the OB created an elite organization known as the Stormjaers – the storm troopers of Afrikanerdom. The formation of the Stormjaers (English meaning: Assault troops) was in essence a paramilitary wing of the OB. The nature of the Stormjaers was drawn upon the lines of Nazi Germany’s army ‘Storm troopers’, as were the Nazi and fascist rituals and salutes, this is evidenced by the oath sworn in a by new recruits (in some instances a firearm was levelled at them whilst they read the oath): 

“If I retreat, kill me. If I die, avenge me. If I advance, follow me.”

The Stormjaers were deployed in variety of military operations ranging from the defence of Nationalist political platforms to pure sabotage, they dynamited post offices and railway lines and cut telephone wires. Dr. van Rensburg even wrote:

“The Ossewabrandwag regards itself as the soldiery of the (South African) Republic . . . the Ossewabrandwag is the political action front of Afrikanerdom.”

The ideologies of the Nazis were penetrating deep into right-wing Afrikaner political identity. In 1940, directly after Nazi German decisive victories in Europe, Otto du Plessis (later to become Administrator of the Cape under the National Party) published a pamphlet – The Revolution of the Twentieth Century – in which he openly espoused the Ossewabrandwag’s policy of totalitarianism.

One very predominant leader of the Ossewabrandwag was Balthazar Johannes (B.J.) Vorster, South Africa’s future Prime Minister. Along with like-minded OB colleagues he regarded the war as an opportunity to get rid of the hated domination of the United Kingdom of South Africa and welcomed the Nazis as allies in their fight.

Image: OB ‘General’ B.J. ‘John’ Vorster at a OB rally

The firebrand nature of the Ossewabrandwag appealed to Vorster more than the National Party, so while South African troops were helping to make the world safe from Hitler’s National Socialism, Vorster was appointed as a ‘General’ in the Ossewabrandwag for the Port Elizabeth district to promote the National Socialism doctrine back home. On his politics he famously announced the Ossewabrandwag’s position on Nazism and said in 1942:

‘We stand for Christian Nationalism which is an ally of National Socialism. You can call this anti-democratic principle dictatorship if you wish. In Italy it is called Fascism, in Germany National Socialism (Nazism) and in South Africa, Christian Nationalism.”

B.J. Vorster was eventually arrested under the emergency regulations in September 1942, he immediately went on hunger strike and after two months was transferred to Koffiefontein internment camp as prisoner No. 2229/42 in Hut 48, Camp 1. B.J. Vorster was eventually released on parole in January 1944 and placed under house arrest.

Interned alongside BJ Vorster was another Ossewabrandwag member Hendrik Johan van den Bergh who eventually went on to become the founder of the Bureau of State Security (B.O.S.S.), an intelligence agency created under the National Party on 16 May 1969 as a Nazi SS styled jackboot agency to enforce Apartheid. Van den Bergh was to become known as the “tall assassin” given his physical height.

The Rev. Koot Vorster (B.J. Vorster’s brother), a Dutch Reformed Church minister, and like his brother was also a predominant Ossewabrandwag leader, crystalised this idea of Afrikaner totalitarianism when he summed up the pro-Hitler and Pro-Nazi standpoint of the OBW during an address to a student group on September 15, 1940 and said:

“Hitler’s ‘Mein Kampf’ shows the way to greatness – the path of South Africa. Hitler gave the Germans a calling. He gave them a fanaticism which causes them to stand back for no one. We must follow this example because only by such holy fanaticism can the Afrikaner nation achieve its calling.”

Kowie Marais, an OB member, years later recalled in an interview the admiration he and his friends held for Hitler: 

“We thought he (Hitler) might rejuvenate western civilization…against the communist-socialist trends that were creeping in from the east. We thought it was the dawn of a new era.”

The Ossewabrandwag WW2 Insurgency campaign

The ‘subversion’ activities of the OB were not exactly irrelevant and they were not that of a ‘cultural organisation’. From the outset of the war a series of violent incidents took place between statutory force South African soldiers and the Ossewabrandwag. 

This was to cumulate on Friday 31 January 1941, when van Rensburg was due to hold a meeting at the Johannesburg City Hall when a riot broke out between OB Stormjaers and South African Union Defence Force soldiers who were determined not to allow van Rensburg to have a platform for his support of Nazi Germany – with whom they were now at war with. The battle raged in downtown Johannesburg for two days. Armoured cars were brought in to eventually quell the violence.

OB Bombing campaign

Other OB insurgency operations included a series of explosions over a large area of mines at Klerksdorp, Vereeniging, Delmas and in Potchefstroom the OB blew up power lines on the 29th  January 1942. All telegraph and telephone communication between Bloemfontein and the rest of South Africa were dislocated in one attack in February 1942. Railway, telegraph, and telephone lines in various parts of the Free State were destroyed in February 1942. Fifty-eight Stormjaers were eventually charged with high treason, and a quantity of hand grenades were found. Stormjaers also blew up two telephone poles behind the Pretoria Central Jail but were never captured.

Two other Stormjaers, Visser and van Blerk were convicted of a bombing at the Benoni Post Office, as a result of which an innocent bystander was killed, they were both sentenced to death (The sentence was commuted to life imprisonment). A few members of the OB were shot while trying to escape from internment camps or jails, the most known was the dramatic pursuit OB General, Johannes van der Walt, who was shot while on the run near Krugersdorp.

Very central to OB activities during World War 2 was also the co-ordination of spy networks and spy insurgents sent to South Africa, the most notorious of which where Hans Rooseboom – codename Peters and Lothar Sittig – codename Felix. OB members actively participated in setting up of radio broadcast stations for these spies and provided them with a network of OB members focused primarily on shipping in and out of South African ports. The information radioed to the German Abwehr (the German military-intelligence service) who in turn relayed the intelligence to the hunter submarine packs operating off South Africa’s coastline. It is not known exactly how much tonnage sunk and lives lost are attributed to the OB directly, but what is certain is that they are also responsible for it and played a role directly in Italy’s and Germany’s war efforts.

U-156 and U-507 assisting survivors sinking the Laconia in the Indian Ocean, 15 Sept 1942 – insert Lothar Sittig – codename Felix

The Nazi German wartime propaganda machine even returned the favour to the OB, viewing the activities of the Ossewabrandwag as a very positive contribution to their fight and Dr. Van Rensburg was even played up over Radio Zeesen as the real leader of the Afrikaner people.

The National Party even came out in direct support of the OB’s insurgency when the Smuts’ government resolved to detain and ban members of the OB, Dr D.F. Malan defended the OB in a speech on 5 March 1941, saying:

“The Ossewabrandwag has been accused of lending itself to subversive activities and also of encouraging them. Now I say: Carry out your threat. Ban it. Prevent it and prevent its meetings. If the Ossewabrandwag decides to be passively disobedient and refuses to be dissolved . . . I shall share the consequences with the Ossewabrandwag. At this stage I am prepared to say to you that if the government decides upon that act and the Ossewabrandwag decides not to submit, I shall keep my pledge”.

It was a clear message to Smuts’ government that the unity in the ranks of the two Afrikanerdom movements – the NP on the ‘Political’ front and the ‘OB’ on the ‘cultural’ front remained as strong as ever, even during wartime. 

Operation Weissdorn and the National Socialist Rebels

During the war, in Nazi Germany a plan is hatched with the idea of inserting a German military trained South African National Socialist zealot by the name of Sidney Robey Leibbrandt, with the expressed objective to work with the Ossewabrandwag and its Stormjaers to over-throw Smuts’ Union government through an Afrikaner Nationalist armed revolt.

Image: Robey Leibbrandt leaving Nazi Germany giving a ‘Hitler’ salute – insert Leibbrandt in German military attire

Born in Potchefstroom Leibbrandt was an Afrikaner Nationalist of both German and Irish decent. He was also a South African Olympic boxer, Leibbrandt went to Germany in 1938 to study at the Reich Academy for Gymnastics, and stayed on when war broke out. He joined the German Army, where he became the first South African to be trained as a Fallschirmjäger (paratrooper) and glider pilot. Leibbrandt was trained with the Comrades of the Brandenburgers at a sabotage training course of Abwehr II (Abwehrschool “Quenzgut”) near Brandenburg an der Havel, west of Berlin.

The German Admiral Wilhelm Canaris ordered “Operation Weissdorn” a plan for a coup d’état to overthrow the South African government of General Jan Smuts and assassinate Smuts. Central to the plan was Leibbrandt, who left Germany on 5 April 1941 to lead and execute it. 

“The signal for the coup d’ etat will shake South Africa to its very foundations. The whole world will understand it. The gigantic leading figure of General Smuts will be felled like a heavy oak tree at the psychological moment. I will commit this deed on my own. It will happen without help or support.”

Robey Leibbrandt (Berlin, March 20, 1941)

In June 1941, under the code name Walter Kempf, Leibbrandt was dropped on the Namaqualand coast north of Cape Town (Mitchell’s Bay) by a confiscated French sailboat (the Kyloe). Such was his megalomania, thuggery and aggression that even the radio operator who was earmarked to come ashore with him refused to do so, citing fear for his life and remained on-board the yacht instead (the Captain and crew were also relieved to get rid of Leibbrandt such an annoyance he had become). 

His mission was to make contact with the Ossewabrandwag, meet with Dr. van Rensburg in his role as Kommandant General of the Ossewabrandwag and inform him that Germany desired he take over OB military operations expand the OB  ‘Stormjaers’ ranks. He made his way to Pretoria and meet with Dr. van Rensburg. The equally megalomaniac van Rensburg would have none of it and refused to recognise Robey Leibbrandt outright, a row broke out and the two became irreconcilable. 

Robey Leibbrandt would find within the Ossewabrandwag supporters who staunchly followed National Socialism, start his own organisation and he would overcome the leadership crisis by getting them to swear alliance to him in person – in blood. Taking a leaf out of his hero’s book, Adolf Hitler who used a similar oath to get the German military establishment to swear sole allegiance to him as the sole and legitimate leader of the German Volk by name, so too did Robey Leibbrandt get his followers to swear allegiance to him as the only legitimate Afrikaner leader, by name.

The blood signature oath read as follows:

“I stand before God and swear this sacred oath that I, as an Afrikaner, will faithfully serve my Volk and Vaderland with my whole heart, body, soul and mind, along the lines indicated to me by the leader of the National Socialist Rebels in the person of Robey Leibbrandt and no one else, from now until death. The deep seriousness with which I recognise myself as a National Socialist Rebel finds expression in the blood with which I forever bind my person through the medium of my signature. I am nothing. My Volk is all. God be with us. The Vierkleur on High.”

OB members carrying the old ZAR republican flag on parade – “The Vierkeur on High”

Not to miss out on the legitimacy of Adolf Hitler as the supreme leader, the blood oath also partly read as follows:

“All my fight and striving is for the freedom and independence of the Afrikaner people of South Africa and for the building up of a National Socialist State in accordance with the ideas of Adolf Hitler.”

Leibbrandt’s small group of National Socialist Rebels kept the South African government on high alert by committing various sabotage acts. However, the quiet truce between Leibbrandt and van Rensburg quickly developed into open hostility. Leibbrandt, disappointed that the OB did not officially support his mission and its resultant failure began to openly attack Dr van Rensburg as an ‘agent’ of Smuts. This sealed his fate. 

Posing a significant threat to the Ossewabrandwag – both in terms of drawing members, ideology and in leadership and overall control of the Afrikaner right-wing, the Ossewabrandwag would engage the tired old philosophy of the ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’ and sell out the National Socialist Rebels and Robey Leibbrandt to the British. British Intelligence documents uncovered in the British National Archives in 2005, revealed that Hans van Rensburg sold out Robey Leibbrandt’s base of operations to the British SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) who in turn tipped off General Jan Smuts, which in turn led to Leibbrandt’s capture by the Union of South Africa’s security forces on Christmas Eve, 1941. Ironically the arresting officer was Claude Sterley, a fellow Springbok boxer and friend.

Charged and found guilty of High Treason, Robey Leibbrandt was sentenced to death on the 11 March 1943. Although Leibbrandt refused to give evidence at any stage in the trial, he claimed that he had acted “for Volk and Führer” and gave the German Salute (Hitler Salute) when he first entered the court, to which several spectators responded and calling “Sieg Heil”. After being sentenced to death, Leibbrandt shouted loudly and clearly “I greet death”.

His sentence was commuted to life in prison by General Jan Smuts, the South African premier, some sources say it was because Smuts and Leibbrandt’s father served together during the South African War (1899-1902) and Smuts had a high regard for Leibbrand’s Dad, other sources point to Smuts not wanting the blood of yet another Jopie Fourie martyr on his hands. In any event, when the National Party government came to power in 1948, Leibbrandt was officially pardoned and walked out a free man – much to the disgust of the hundreds of thousands of South African’s who had fought against Nazism and his ilk during the war.

Leibbrandt became politically active in his later life on the far right of the political spectrum, founding the organisation Anti-Kommunistiese Beskermingsfront (Anti-Communist Protection Front) in 1962, and producing a series of pamphlets titled Ontwaak Suid-Afrika (Wake up South Africa). His son, Izan (Nazi spelled backwards) became a senior officer in the South African Defence Force.

The New Order 

Oswald Pirow over his period in office under General Barry Hertzog in the South African Union holds three portfolios, he starts as the Minister of Justice, then he’s appointed Minister of Railways and Harbours, and from 1933 to 1939 he was Minister of Defence.

He is an Afrikaner Nationalist of strong German heritage (in fact at home he only uses German as a mother tongue). As Defence Minister he was sent on official visits on behalf of the Hertzog government to both Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. His mission was one of appeasement, to meet with Hitler, Ribbentrop and Goering and try to establish Anglo-German rapprochement as well as assure them of South Africa’s neutrality under the Hertzog government. In discussions with Hitler, he also assures him that a Afrikaner Nationalist would be a sympathetic government to Nazi Germany’s claim to return her previous colony of German South West Africa (Namibia). He is also after German aircraft as he was very involved in establishing South African Airways, under his watch both Heinkel bombers and Junkers transport aircraft enter South African Air Force and South African Airways fleets respectively.

Pirow’s solution to easing British and German tension prior to the war, which he proposed to Hitler, was for the British to agree with the Nazi policy of “Drang nach Osten” (meaning yearning or ‘thrust’ towards the East for ‘living space’ as Hitler put it in his book ‘Mein Kampf’) and in return Hitler should allow all the Jewish people living in Germany to leave. In reality this offer would never have happened as it would have required Britain, by way of a parliamentary agreement, to renege on its commitment to Poland as an ally.  However, Pirow also had another mission, that of building a South African partnership for a post war Nazi world.

Oswald Pirow in Nazi Germany, November 1938 in Berlin inspecting a honour guard from the German Luftwaffe (Air Force), to his left is Wilhelm Canaris, to his right Ernst Seifert.

In 1936 Pirow attended the Olympic Games in National Socialist (Nazi) Germany and in 1938 again visited Europe, including Spain, Portugal and Germany. These visits confirmed his admiration for this new style of government in Europe and, in particular, for National Socialism (Nazism). A vehement anti-communist – Pirow vowed to legislate communism out of existence, he also became an admirer of Adolf Hitler – especially after his meeting with him.

During this tours he also met Benito Mussolini, António de Oliveira Salazar and Francisco Franco and became convinced that a European war was imminent, with a resounding Nazi victory assured. The future Pirow predicted was one of global Nazism.

When General Jan Smuts committed South Africa to war against Nazi Germany, Pirow found his position in government as a Minister of Parliament and his position in the ‘Fusion’ United Party untenable. He had given his support in 1939 to Hertzog’s neutrality policy. He then resigned along with Hertzog and took no part in Smuts’ reformatted war-time government. Instead Pirow launched the South African version of the “New Order” within the D.F. Malan’s breakaway National Party, backing the idea of a Nazi style one-party state dictatorship.

His new political grouping took its name from his 1940 ‘New Order in South Africa’ pamphlet in which Pirow embraced the ideology of Nazi globalisation. To understand what the concept of the “New Order” was – the New Order (German: Neuordnung) was the political order which Nazi Germany wanted to impose on the conquered areas under its dominion, it entailed the creation of a pan-German racial state structured according to Nazi ideology to ensure the supremacy of an Aryan-Nordic master race along with territorial expansion and colonisation.

Hitler’s ‘New Order’ concept is important as it would guide Pirow’s thinking after the war, because although Hitler focussed primarily on Eastern Europe ‘Lebensraum’ (‘living space’) his plan also extend to Asia, India, South America and North America in ‘post war’ fascist dominated world, and like any plan for globalisation, Africa also played a role in the New Order.

Oswald Pirow as a special South African envoy inspecting German Infantry and military capability in 1938

Hitler’s overall intentions for the future organisation of Africa was based on a plan which divided the continent into three big parts. The northern third of Africa was to be assigned to Germany’s Axis partner – Italy. The central part of Africa would fall under German rule. The remaining southern sector would be controlled by a pro-Nazi Afrikaner state built along racial grounds.

German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop had communicated this plan with South African leaders sympathetic to Nazism, and a key channel for this communication were his meetings with Oswald Pirow whilst he was on his visits to Nazi Germany on behalf of the Hertzog government. Ribbentrop informed the Afrikaner Nationalist leaders that once Germany had won the war, Germany was to reclaim its former colony of German South-West Africa (now Namibia), then a mandate would be given to an Afrikaner Nationalist led South Africa as a sort of ‘war compensation’ which would include the territorial acquisitions of the British protectorates of  Swaziland, Basutoland (Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana) and the colony of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

Oswald Pirow ( left) at a reception of the Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop in conversation with Erhard Milch (right) and Walter Hevel on November 19, 1938

Dr. Malan initially tolerated the actions of Oswald Pirow’s South African adaption of the 3rd Reich’s ‘New Order’ however very soon Malan came to realise what the extreme ideology of The New Order was about, and he immediately saw it as a divisive influence on the Afrikaner nationalist movement. Fearful of a split in Afrikaner nationalism over support for extreme Nazism at the Nationalists Transvaal party congress of August 1941, Malan forced through a motion ending the New Order’s propaganda activities, particularly their insistence on a one-party state on a ‘Führer’ principle.

Although restricted by Dr. Malan, the New Order continued to exist and Pirow and 17 of his New Order supporters continued to be associated with the National Party and continued to attend their caucus meetings. The New Order finally broke from the National Party altogether in 1942, after both D.F. Malan and J.G. Strijdom realising the tide of war was turning against Nazi Germany publicly rejected Nazism.

Pirow returned to his legal practice, and after the war formulated a partnership with Sir Oswald Mosley. Mosley was an ex-British MP and an infamous British Nazi, he led the British Union of Fascists (BUF), a Neo-Nazi British organisation following the edicts of the ‘New Order’ in the United Kingdom. Mosley was imprisoned at the outbreak of World War 2 in 1940 for his extreme views in support of the enemy (Nazi Germany) and the BUF was outlawed. He was released in 1943.

Oswald Pirow and Mosley collaborated together in earnest when they met in London in April 1948 and they developed an idea for the division of Africa into exclusively black and white areas and the founding an anti-communist group to be known as the ‘enemies of the Soviet Union’. The two Oswalds came up with what were known as the Mosley-Pirow Proposals, which advocated the extension of the South African National Party’s Apartheid ideology and concept to include the entire continent of Africa.  

The idea they came up with was that two-thirds of sub saharan Africa would be advocated for ‘Black States’ and one-third would be for ‘White states’.  Where the two of them differed on their concept of ‘Eurafrica’ (which they conjointly coined), Pirow felt that ‘sweated labour’ would need to be forced whereas Mosley felt that unskilled Labour, needed in the ‘white states,’ was to be traded for from the ‘black states’ in return for technical assistance at some ‘later stage’.

Oswald Pirow (left) and Oswald Mosley (right) and inserted with his emblem.

The relationship with Pirow and Mosley started to break down after their ‘Eurafrica proposals’ were launched. Pirow came to realise that virtually nobody took Mosley seriously, people generally dismissed both him and his economic and political treatise out of hand as an extreme oddity.

Very famously Pirow, back in his legal guise, acted as the public prosecutor on behalf of the Apartheid State during the Treason Trial of 1956. The Treason Trial was a trial in which 156 people, including Nelson Mandela, were arrested in a raid and accused of treason in South Africa in 1956, an unsuccessful trial in the end they were found not guilty of treason (the Rivonia trial came later). 

Oswald Pirow’s influence in South African politics and Apartheid is far-reaching. The Tomlinson Commission – which investigated the validity of the idea Apartheid was not a new creation, and its findings were based in part on findings made by the Native Economic Commission in 1932 and on preparatory work done by Oswald Pirow.

The South African National Socialist Movement (SANP) and ‘the shirts’.

Now we come to the various ‘shirt’ movements of which the most significant is The South African Christian National Socialist Movement also referenced as the South African Gentile National Socialist Movement or SANP. More commonly they were also known at the time as the ‘Gryshemde’ in Afrikaans and ‘Grey-shirts’ in English.

Louis Weichardt (left) and a SANP armband right

Led by Louis Theodor Weichardt, a native of Paarl in the Western Cape and of German descent, the organisation is established on the 26thOctober 1933, he founded South Africa’s Nazi party equivalent – The South African Christian National Socialist Movement (SANP) with a paramilitary section, modelled on Nazi Germany’s brown-shirted Sturmabteilung) called the ‘Gryshemde’ (Grey shirts).

Their uniform, insignia and flags were distinctively Nazi with the swastika front and forward. Of interest, is the use of Orange, Blue and White in the Nazi swastika configuration – this was intentionally done to reflect the national colours of the South African flag at the time, the ‘Oranje-blanje-blou’ (Orange, White and Blue).

SANP bunting, flags, armbands and shirts, image courtesy Ulrich Duebe, the current owner of the collection.

Other ‘shirt’ organisations form in parallel to the Grey-shirts albeit a little smaller, they include the equally devout and Nazi ‘Black-shirts’ – the Volksbeweging (People’s Movement) or ‘African Gentile Organisation’ which is led by H.S. Terblanche. In addition, the ‘Brown-shirts’ – The ‘Bond van Nasionale Werkers’ (National Workers Union) led by Johannes Bruwer.

Central to their cause in the late 1930’s where Jewish immigrants escaping Nazi Germany to South Africa, and their numbers were growing significantly over the decade – in response the SANP launched a campaign calling for an end to Jewish immigration and arranged mass protests.  Their primary communication mouthpiece was a newspaper called “Die Waarheid” (the truth) which was nothing more than a vehicle to spread Nazi doctrine in South Africa. Die Waarheid held a Nazi swastika on its masthead.

The nature of the movement was clearly seen in March 1934 when the SANP held a rally in Aberdeen in the Eastern Cape, Harry Victor Inch – one of the Greyshirt leaders – announced that he had in his possession a ‘stolen’ document from a Port Elizabeth synagogue – signed by its Rabbi – which outlined a secret plot by the Jews to destroy the Christian religion and civilisation.

The Rabbi in question, Rabbi Abraham Levy, took the SANP Greyshirts to court in Grahamstown and in a landmark case the document was scrutinised legally, it was found to be a complete falsehood and fabricated by the SANP. As a result three Greyshirt leaders were fined and Harry Victor Inch was found guilty of perjury and was sentenced to serve six years and three months in prison for forging documents defaming the Jewish race and swearing under oath that those documents were genuine. Inch and his fellow defendants, David Hermanus Olivier and Johannes Strauss von Moltke faced other charges which grew out of the Grahamstown trial.

The result has been widely hailed here as a complete vindication of the Jewish people and of Rabbi Abraham Levy who brought the lawsuit against the Grey Shirt leaders. As the leader of the SANP, Weichardt was arrested and imprisoned during World War II at Koffiefontein detention barracks by the Smuts’ government as an ‘enemy of the state’ – along with all the other far right pro-Nazi Germany, anti-British militants and held there for the duration of the war.

Weichardt disbanded his Nazi party in 1948 and closely worked with Oswald Pirow’s ‘New Order’. Moving on, Weichardt then gave his full attention and allegiance to D.F. Malan and the National Party (NP) itself. He had a very successful political career with the NP and went on to become the National Party’s senator from Natal Province from 1956 to 1970.

The folding in of SANP leadership into the National Party’s political sphere would have a resounding impact on the future of not only the majority of ‘Black’ South Africans (who were viewed as ‘inferior’ peoples by these hard liners), but also minority white ethnic groups like South Africa’s very large Jewish community. The arrogance of this underpinning politics is seen with Louis Weichardt himself, who, on becoming an elected National Party Parliamentarian quickly covered up his dubious history as a full-blown card-carrying Nazi, and rather infamously declared that he had never been against the ‘Jewish race’ but only against the actions of certain ‘Jewish communists’. Not a single Jew, in his ‘opinion’ had suffered through his actions.

The Boerenasie (Boer Nation) movement 

As noted earlier, the Afrikaner nationalist hero and leader of the Boer Revolt in 1914, ‘General’ Manie Maritz decided to end his self-imposed exile after the 1st World War ended and returned to the Union of South Africa in 1923. The Smuts government treating him very kindly by way of reconciliation, and all things considered for a crime as serious as treason he received a short imprisonment of three years. Luckily for Maritz, Hertzog’s National party won the 1924 election and Maritz was granted full amnesty and walked free having only served three months.

Maritz took to farming, but came under the influence of National Socialism (Nazism) in 1936 and founded a ‘anti-parliamentary’(dictatorship led) party called the Volksparty (People’s Party) in 1940. Maritz also took control of another ultra-right, national socialist, pro-Nazi movement initially set up by Colonel J.C. Laas. According to Brian Bunting in the Rise of the Afrikaner Reich, Colonel J.C Laas was a cloak-and-dagger character who surrounded his activities with an atmosphere of mystery and proved himself to be unable to satisfy either his friends or his enemies. In October 1940 he was relieved of his command in the Ossewabrandwag and replaced Dr. Hans van Rensburg. Colonel Laas later established Die Boerenasie, but after a while he also abandoned it. 

The “Boerenasie” (The Boer Nation) party, was then merged the Manie Maritz’ Volksparty and it continued as a merger under Die Boerenasie banner with Maritz at the helm. Maritz became known as a very outspoken proponent of The Third Reich and admirer of Adolf Hitler. During this time, he had also developed a theory about the alleged Jewish conspiracy and interference in South African and world politics and became a fanatical Antisemite. 

Boerenasie mouthpiece (right), Manie Maritz (left)

Maritz would detail his Antisemitic and National Socialist views in his autobiography ‘My Lewe en Strewe’ (My life and Aspiration) which he published in 1939, a book regarded as lacking in objectivity, inciting racial hatred and like his hero Adolf Hitler’s book ‘Mein Kampf’ (My Struggle) Maritz’ book was full of emotional and racially driven rhetoric. He was even taken to court over all the anti-Semitic statements he made in his book, found guilty of fomenting racial hatred and he was fined £75.

Manie Maritz had served under Jan Smuts in the South African War (1899-1902) i.e Boer War 2, Maritz playing a leading role in Smuts’ Commando.  At the centre of ‘Bittereinder’ war heroes, one could not find a more vastly differing view than that of Smuts’ and Maritz’. Smuts was extremely wary of the dangers of Nazism and Adolf Hitler, who he accused of being a “false messiah” and whose Nazi symbology of the swastika Smuts called “the crooked cross” in reference to it being a corruption of true Christianity.

On antisemitism, Maritz held a polarising opposite view to Smuts, Jan Smuts was a devout Zionist, Smuts believed in the establishment of Israel as nation state, supported Jewish immigration and refugees (even controversially as Prime Minister he was involved in rescuing 200 Jewish orphans from the ‘Pogroms’ in the Ukraine in 1921, bringing them to safety in South Africa). Smuts supported the ‘Balfour Agreement’ which gave rise to Israel, he was also a personal friend of Chaim Weizmann, the President of the Zionist Organization. Weizmann went on to become the first President of Israel. Smuts is so loved and honoured in Israel that even today a kibbutz in Ramat Yohanan is named in his honour.

It is however difficult to say if Smuts would have interned Maritz again for his Nazi sympathies along with the other strong proponents of Nazism during the 2nd World War as Maritz’ life ended tragically and very early on in the war, he died in a car accident in Pretoria on the 20th December 1940. Probably, had he lived, Smuts and Maritz would have been at extreme loggerheads and Maritz back on the warpath with the Union – and very possibly back in jail.

Die Boerenasie continued after Maritz died under the leadership of S.K. Rudman, from Natal, who was known for his frenetic pronouncements on racial affairs in the columns of various Sunday Press newspapers.

The split in the Afrikaner diaspora – part 3

A mere 3 years after WW2 ended, the National Party found itself in power and there was no doubt that their wartime sympathies and even direct support of Nazi Germany and their National Socialist (Nazi) styled ‘Christian Nationalism’ philosophy was influencing National Party government policy. 

Of the 1,000,000-adult voters in the 1948 General Election (the full actual vote count is 1,065,971 voters) – more or less as numbers go – 550,000 voted against Apartheid (for Jan Smuts’ United Party and their more liberal parties – The Labour Party etc.) as opposed to 450,000 who voted in favour of Apartheid (for the Afrikaner Nationalists – the re-united National Party and Afrikaner Party coalition). The ‘coloured’ vote – the Cape Franchise has within it approximately 50,000 voters and these have almost exclusively gone with the United Party and its partners (one of the National Party’s intended aims is to remove their franchise), so we can deduce that about 500,000 whites and 50,000 coloureds have voted against Apartheid.

Coming into government in 1948 was a ‘minority’ party winning on constitutional grounds and not a popular one – the Afrikaner voting diaspora is still split over the issue of Apartheid and the majority of whites (and Coloureds) did not vote for the National Party, they voted for Smuts’ United Party. The National Party by 1948 had honed their political philosophy, Dr. Verwoerd had packaged it into legalise and called it ‘Apartheid’ and it was an intoxicating cocktail of Krugerism, Christian Nationalism, Nazism and Weimar Eugenics. 

Like the German National Socialist Party in Germany, the Afrikaner National Party had also come to power as a minority in South Africa with a flawed and unwanted ideology, and like Hitler who could not believe his luck in the July of 1932, Dr. Malan could not believe his luck in May 1948. Like the Nazi party had to do from 1933 to stay in power using repressive legislation, gerrymandering, loaded referendums to reconstruct the constitution, immediate banning of Communism (and liberal resistance), re-educate the masses to the nationalist doctrine, mould the Police and Military in their own image, and then use there powerful military and police tools of state to violently suppress opposition and political dissent under the banner of “national interests” – so too the Afrikaner Nationalists would have to do (and history shows us they would emulate their Nazi heroes perfectly).  

By the early 1950’s the South African National Party (NP) government was littered with men, who, prior to the war and during the war where strongly sympathetic to the Nazi cause,  and had actually declared themselves as full-blown National Socialists during the war as members of the following organisations, the Ossewabrandwag (OB) and its ‘Stormjaers’ (Storm Troopers) military wing, the Nazi Party of South Africa – the South African Christian National Socialist Movement (SANP) – Grey, Black and Brownshirts and the Nazi world expansionist order in South Africa – The New Order (NO) and the Boernasie Party.

Men like, B.J. Vorster (Broederdond, OB ‘General’ and future NP Prime Minister and President of South Africa), Oswald Pirow (Founder of the NO – NP Cabinet Minister and future National Prosecutor), Hendrik van den Bergh (OB – future NP head of State Security), Johannes von Moltke (leader and founder of the SANP and now NP Minister and the NP leader in SWA), P.O. Sauer (OB ‘General’ – now NP Cabinet Minister), Frans Erasmus (OB ‘General’ – now NP Cabinet Minister), Dr Hendrik Verwoerd (Broederbond and future Prime Minister), C.R. Swart (OB member – future NP State President), P.W. Botha (Broederbond, OB member – and future President of South Africa), Eric Louw (OB – future NP Cabinet Minister), Dr Nico Diedericks (Broederbond and future NP State President), Jaap Marais (OB – now NP Cabinet Minister and future co-founder of the ultra-right Herstigte Nasionale Party), Dr Albert Hertzog (now a NP minister and future co-founder of the ultra-right Herstigte Nasionale Party) and Louis Weichardt (Founder of the SANP and now a NP Minister), Piet Meyer (Broederbond, OB General and future head of SABC) to name just a few.  

This was the very philosophy the returning South African servicemen and women had been fighting against, the “war for freedom” against the anti-Judea/Christian “crooked cross” (swastika) philosophy and its false messiah as Smuts had called Germany’s National Socialism doctrine and Adolph Hitler. To the returned South African war veterans, by 1951, this flirtation with Nazim by the National Party was unforgiveable and something had to be done.

In Conclusion

The result would be the formation of the ‘War Veterans Action Committee’ (WVAC), it’s the beginning of the Torch Commando and it’s a coming together of the old ‘Smuts men’ who answered the call to go to war currently in firebrand veterans organisations like the Springbok Legion, sedate veterans organisations like the South African Legion and Memorable Order of Tin Hats (MOTH) and the military veterans who found themselves in mainstream politics in the United Party and the Labour Party after the war. 

They are all concerned veterans, the ‘Nazification’ of South African politics is something they dread and fear. With the co-ordination of Vic Clapham Jr., who had served in the SA Tank Corps in WW2 as a Lieutenant (he was also the son of the famous World War 1 veteran who started the Comrades Marathon, also Vic Clapham).  Vic Clapham Jr. was an ex-Springbok Legionnaire and now United Party stalwart, these primary two groups of concerned veterans i.e., those from the Springbok Legion and those from the United Party decided to join hands and consolidated in April 1951 to form the ‘War Veteran’s Action Committee – WVAC’ (the WVAC was to evolve into The Torch Commando). 

Vic Clapham Jnr (Left) and Vic Clapham Snr (right)

The leadership team of the WVAC was made up of veterans perceived as ‘moderate’ (as opposed to the more firebrand ‘Communists’ in the Springbok Legion) to present a broader appeal across the political spectrum. It’s also a balanced committee between ‘English’ and ‘Afrikaners’ – designed to address the polarisation in Afrikaner politics and bring Afrikaner voters who had served in the military during WW2 back to mainstream and moderate politics.

The leaders appointed were Group Captain Adolph ‘Sailor’ Malan, Major Louis Kane- Berman, Major Ralph Parrott, Major Jacob Pretorius (ex-SAAF) and Major Doreen Dunning – who during the war was the Officer Commanding the South African Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (SAWAAF). Harry Oppenheimer, the patron and financier of the committee, pushed for Sailor Malan (Oppenheimer’s former Private Secretary) to take the role as the leader of the WVAC. Sailor Malan agreed only on the proviso that his internal principles were adhered to. These been the political injustices suffered by people of colour in South Africa and resisting the government’s anti-constitutionalism and their drift towards a local brand of Nazism. 

To see what happens next – follow this link:

The Torch Commando – Part 2 The War Veterans’ Action Committee,

thereafter follow this link

 The Torch Commando – Part 3 The Steel Commando

Editor’s note

Look out for the next instalments of The Torch Commando – which will cover their rise and fall from 1951 to 1953, the political fall-out they create and what these ‘Torchmen’ do after the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960 – in both armed resistance movements and mainstream political resistance. 

As this research field includes the ‘racial constructs’ of Krugerism leading up and including Boer War 2 (1899-1902) and as an ideology and its role in establishing The National Party (and the onset of ‘Apartheid’) from 1914. In addition it also includes the ‘Nazification of the Afrikaner Right’ from 1936 and the political awakening of returning Afrikaner World War 2 veterans from 1950 because of it – the Observation Post often gets comments on both the blog and social media that it is somehow biased to the ‘British’ and ‘Afrikaner bashing’ or ‘Boer bashing’ – it is neither. 

What the Observation Post elects to highlight are the actual demographics, the economic history and not the political history peddled for political gain. It elects to highlight the progressive political deeds of Afrikaner military heroes like Dolf de la Rey and Sailor Malan, and all the Afrikaner military men in the Torch Commando whose legacies were buried by the Afrikaner Nationalists for decades and men whose truth must now ‘out’.

Given the current political assault on Afrikanerdom in modern South Africa this is key to understanding Afrikanerdom in its proper historical context – sans the National Party and now the African National Congress’ interpretation of it.

The Torch Commando – next instalment 

What follows next is called ‘The War Veterans Action Committee’ – please click through to this Observation Post link which covers this phase in depth.

The Torch Commando – Part 2, The War Veterans’ Action Committee


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens 

References:

The Torch Commando & The Politics of White Opposition. South Africa 1951-1953, a Seminar Paper submission to Wits University – 1976 by Michael Fridjhon.

The South African Parliamentary Opposition 1948 – 1953, a Doctorate submission to Natal University – 1989 by William Barry White. 

The influence of Second World War military service on prominent White South African veterans in opposition politics 1939 – 1961. A Masters submission to Stellenbosch University – 2021 by Graeme Wesley Plint 

The Rise and Fall of The Torch Commando – Politicsweb 2018 by John Kane-Berman

The White Armed Struggle against Apartheid – a Seminar Paper submission to The South African Military History Society – 10th Oct 2019 by Peter Dickens 

 Not for ourselves – a history of the South African Legion by Arthur Blake

Echoes of David Irving – The Greyshirt Trial of 1934” by David M. Scher.

Dr. Evert Kleynhans – Hitler’s Spies, Secret agents and the intelligence war in South Africa, 1939-1945. Published 2021

Dr. Garth Benneyworth – Sol Plaatje University – Correspondence 16/2/2023

Sailor Malan fights his greatest Battle: Albert Flick 1952. 

Sailor Malan – By Oliver Walker 1953. 

Lazerson, Whites in the Struggle Against Apartheid.  

Pro-Nazi Subversion in South Africa, 1939-1941: By Patrick J. Furlong.

The Rise of the South African Reich: 1964: By Brian Bunting

The White Tribe of Africa: 1981: By David Harrison

National Socialism and Nazism in South Africa: The case of L.T. Weichardt and his Greyshirt movements, 1933-1946: By Werner Bouwer

Ordinary Springboks: White Servicemen and Social Justice in South Africa, 1939-1961. By Neil Roos.

The Final Prize: The Broederbond by Norman Levy: South African History On-line (SAHO) War and the formation of Afrikaner nationalism: By Anne Samson: Great War in Africa Association.

Volk and Fuhrer. By Hans Strydom. 

 Kaapse rebelle van die Hantam-karoo. By Eben Nel

General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917. By Dr David Katz

 Desperate Men: The 1914 Rebellion and the Polities of Poverty. By Sandra Swart

John Bottomly; ‘The Orange Free State and the Rebellion of 1914: the influence of industrialisation, poverty and poor whitism’

André Wessels; Afrikaner (Boer) Rebellion (Union of South Africa) 2018.

The Kaiser and England during the Boer War. By John C.G. Röhl

Chapter XXIII The Boer Rebellion. By Sol Plaatje

The Issac Ochberg Story on-line website by Lionel Slier 07/18/201

Sailor Malan fights his greatest Battle: By Albert Flick 1952.

Kimberley Calls and Recalls. Life Magazine, 25 June 1951.

‘Very Deeply Dyed in Black’ Sir Oswald Mosley and the Resurrection of British Fascism After 1945.  By Graham Macklin. NSDAP Office of Colonial Policy.  

Ribbontrop’s proposals to South Africa, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. By William Shirer, 1974 edition.

Ohm Kruger/Uncle Kruger: The notorious of Nazi Germany’s Anti-British Statements. By Blaine Taylor

Related Work

Kruger, the man the mystery and the movie Oom Kruger, the man, the movie, the myth!

Oswald Pirow South Africa’s Nazi ‘Neuordnung’ and Oswald Pirow

Greyshirts South Africa’s Nazi Party; The ‘Gryshemde’

Boer Revolt Boer War 3 and beyond!

Jopie Fourie What about Jopie?

Ossewabrandwag “Mein Kampf shows the way to greatness for South Africa” – The Ossewabrandwag

Torch Commando – Steel Commando The Steel Commando

Broederbond and media Just whistling an innocent ‘toon’

Truth Legion A search for the … Truth … Legion!

Torch Commando – ‘New’ rare footage of The Torch Commando in action, the first mass protests against Apartheid by WW2 veterans.

Sailor Malan ‘Freedom Fighter’ Sailor Malan; Fighter Ace & Freedom Fighter!

The Torch Commando Series

The Smoking Gun of the White Struggle against Apartheid!

The Observation Post published 5 articles on the The Torch Commando outlining the history of the movement, this was done ahead of the 60th anniversary of the death of Sailor Malan and Yvonne Malan’ commemorative lecture on him “I fear no man”. To easily access all the key links and the respective content here they are in sequence.

In part 1, we outlined the Nazification of the Afrikaner right prior to and during World War 2 and their ascent to power in a shock election win in 1948 as the Afrikaner National Party – creating the groundswell of indignation and protest from the returning war veterans, whose entire raison d’etre for going to war was to get rid of Nazism.

For the in-depth article follow this link: The Nazification of the Afrikaner Right

In part 2, in response to National Party’s plans to amend the constitution to make way for Apartheid legislation, we outlined the political nature of the military veterans’ associations and parties and the formation of the War Veterans Action Committee (WVAC) under the leadership of Battle of Britain hero – Group Captain Sailor Malan in opposition to it.  Essentially bringing together firebrand Springbok Legionnaires and the United Party’s military veteran leaders into a moderate and centre-line steering committee with broad popular appeal across the entire veteran voting bloc. 

For the in-depth article follow this link: The War Veterans’ Action Committee

In Part 3, we cover the opening salvo of WVAC in a protest in April 1951 at the War Cenotaph in Johannesburg followed by the ratification of four demands at two mass rallies in May 1951. They take these demands to Nationalists in Parliament in a ‘Steel Commando’ convoy converging on Cape Town. Led by Group Captain Sailor Malan and another Afrikaner – Commandant Dolf de la Rey, a South African War (1899-1902) veteran of high standing their purpose is to raise support from Afrikaner and English veterans alike and they converge with a ‘Torchlight’ rally of 60,000 protestors and hand their demands to parliament. 

For the in-depth article follow this link: The Steel Commando

In Part 4, in response to the success of The Steel Commando Cape Town protest, we then look at the rise of the Torch Commando as South Africa’s largest and most significant mass protest movement in the early 1950’s pre-dating the ANC’s defiance campaign. Political dynamics within the Torch see its loyalties stretched across the South African opposition politics landscape, the Torch eventually aiding the United Party’s (UP) grassroots campaigning whilst at the same time caught up in Federal breakaway parties and the Natal issue. The introduction of the ‘Swart Bills’ in addition to ‘coloured vote constitutional crisis’ going ahead despite ineffectual protests causes a crisis within the Torch. This and the UP’s losses in by-elections in the lead up to and the 1953 General Election itself spurs the eventual demise of The Torch Commando.

For the in-depth article follow this link: The ‘Rise and Fall’ of the Torch Commando

In Part 5, we conclude the Series on The Torch Commando with ‘The Smoking Gun’. The Smoking Gun traces what the Torch Commando members do after the movement collapses, significantly two political parties spin out the Torch Commando – the Liberal Party of South Africa and the Union Federal Party. The Torch also significantly impacts the United Party and the formation of the breakaway Progressive Party who embark on formal party political resistance to Apartheid and are the precursor of the modern day Democratic Alliance. The Torch’s Communists party members take a leading role in the ANC’s armed wing MK, and the Torch’s liberals spin off the NCL and ARM armed resistance movements from the Liberal Party. We conclude with CODESA.

For an in-depth article follow this link: The Smoking Gun


What about Jopie

I was a discussant at a book launch of Jan Smuts’ First World War by Dr. David Brock Katz, and the minute questions were opened to the audience, the very first question was “What about Jopie?”, to which there was a universal sigh and “here we go again”.

Turns out you just cannot discuss Jan Smuts’ career as military strategist and Field Marshal, his career as lawyer, botanist, academic, philosopher, conservationist or statesman – without covering the “Jopie” base.  The interesting bit about covering the Jopie base is just how little people understand about him, the nature of events that led to his execution, or even fully understand Smuts’ role in it.

So, to ask the question … “What about Jopie?” To truthfully answer that question – we also have to ask another question, and that is … “What about William?”.

What about William?

William! Who is then heck is William and what is he in the life of Jopie? – Never heard of him! Comes the retort – ah, but here we uncover a part of the Jopie Fourie story which is often glossed over and even never mentioned in all the Nationalistic inspired dogma that surrounds Jopie Fourie, and you have to ask yourself why? So, here goes.

Our story begins with three men who had taken officer commissions in the newly fledged Union Defence Force of South Africa (the UDF) army (the South African Union was declared in 1910). They served together in the ACF (Active Citizen Force) and knew one another well, they are Captain William Allan King, Major Harry Trew and finally Captain Jopie Fourie. 

When South Africa declared war on Germany in 1914, by a landslide Parliamentary vote, those UDF officers who held a ‘Conscientious Objection’ to war against Germany were invited to resign. The Union government was well aware of the sympathies the Boer forces had to Germany during the South African War 1899-1902 and would accommodate them, in other words individual UDF members were not forced to go war against Germany, Botha (then the Prime Minister) and Smuts (then the Minister of Defence) expected a ‘handful’ of resignations from those that refused to fight Germany – and they got exactly that – ‘a handful’ (less than 1% of the UDF construct).

Key resignations from the UDF came from Major Jan Kemp, Lt. Col Manie Maritz and General Christiaan Beyers. All of whom took the precaution of resigning their UDF commissions and oaths before going into armed revolt against the lawfully elected Union government over the issue of the invasion of German South West Africa. Failure to do so in 1914 would amount to a charge of High Treason which carried with it the death sentence.  

Images: Jan Kemp, Christiaan Beyers and Manie Maritz

Captain Jopie Fourie decided to join Kemp, Maritz and Beyers in open armed revolt, however for reasons known only to him, he chose not to resign his commission and oath to serve the Union of South Africa. In other words, as an active serving UDF officer (not just a rebel) he chose to make war against the UDF and his colleagues with the intention of killing them. This in 1914 constituted treason in the highest order.

According to Major Harry Trew, Fourie was a close friend of his and was a likeable chap with a wicked sense of humour, and Fourie had a somewhat cavalier approach to things, this can be seen during the revolt when Trew recalled a commandeering note that Fourie had given to the hotelkeeper at Pienaar’s River. In the note he stated he had taken goods to the value of £10 for the use of the Republican Forces; if his side won it would be honoured by the Republican Government, if he lost: The amount was to be debited against Generals Botha and Smuts.

In another rather cavalier approach to the rebellion, and a very ill-advised one, Jopie Fourie had rather foolishly decided to fight for the rebels whist wearing his Union Defence Force Uniform (refer Military History Journal Vol 16, No.4). The wearing of your ‘enemies’ uniform in 1914 also immediately guaranteed a place in front of firing squad, its treason of the highest order. 

During the South African War 1899-1902 (or Boer War 2) there is an extensive list of Boers executed for “wearing khaki” i.e., wearing a British uniform, by 1914 and the 1st World War this sort of offence earned you a ‘drumhead’ court martial in the field and immediate execution on the spot. 

Even by World War 2, who can forget the harrowing images of the execution of German soldiers – Pernass, Billing, and Schmidt by firing squad of American GI’s for wearing American uniforms, they were condemned to death under the Hague convention concerning land warfare, article 23: “It’s especially forbidden .. to make improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy”

Unteroffizier Manfred Pernass, Oberfähnrich Günther Billing, and Gefreiter Wilhelm Schmidt were given a military trial at Henri Chapelle, sentenced to death, and executed by a firing squad on 23rd Dec 1944 for wearing American uniforms to infiltrate their lines.

Jopie Fourie took a tremendous risk choosing to continue to wear his UDF uniform whilst joining a revolt against the UDF, and there is absolutely no doubt that he knew the consequences of his actions, as a Boer War veteran and subsequently a UDF officer he knew exactly the consequence.

Captain Jopie Fourie and Captain William Allan King where also colleagues and friends. Captain William Allan King was a part-time ACF officer in the UDF, full-time he was the Sub-Commissioner of Pretoria, he was Pretoria’s ‘Native Commissioner’ responsible for the affairs of Blacks and Coloureds in the Transvaal.  His duties and responsibilities included arbitrating between the employers of labour in the Pretoria Labour District with the Black African Natives performing the labour.

According to Sol Plaatje, the first General Secretary of the African National Congress (ANC) in his book ‘Native Life in South Africa, Before and Since the European War and the Boer Rebellion’, William King is described as; 

“Without doubt the ablest native administrator in the Transvaal Civil Service … an expert on Native matters, and no commission ever sat without his being summoned to give evidence before it”.

Sol Plaatje went on to say of William King: 

“The Natives called him ‘Khoshi-ke-Nna’, which means ‘I am the Chief’. A firm but just Englishman, with a striking military gait, he would have been an ideal leader of the native contingents had the offer of native help been accepted by the Union Government.”

That William Allan King was a very popular and well-liked man in South African politics and amongst the majority communities and their representatives in South Africa would be an understatement.

Captain William Allan King, was sent to arrest Captain Jopie Fourie, presumably as they had a personal connection to talk him and his Commando into surrender as a first prize. King was also to warn Fourie that he needed to resign his commission. King’s small UDF force came into contact with Jopie Fourie and his Commando on the 23rd November 1914, just north of Pretoria near Hamaanskraal and a skirmish ensued. During the firefight Captain William Allan King attended to a wounded man. Whilst attending to the man he was shot dead by one of Fourie’s men. Again, military doctrine viewed these sorts of incidents in 1914 as outside accepted rules of engagement.

“What made it so tragic was that Jopie and King, who was Native Commissioner of Pretoria, had been good friends prior to the rebellion” recorded Major Harry Trew, Jopie Fourie’s other friend. It would now be left to Major Harry Trew to capture and arrest Fourie, which he and detachments of South African Police (SAP) and Union Defence Force (UDF) troops eventually managed to do on the 16th December 1914 at Nooitgedacht in the Rustenburg district.

It needs to be noted at the “Battle of Nooitgedacht” to arrest Fourie, Jopie Fourie and his men killed one policeman and many other policemen were injured – Dr C Louis Leipoldt was the ‘police doctor’ that day and was mentioned in dispatches for attending to all the wounded.

Images: Captain William Allan King’s headstone and newspaper notice, note the population group who erects the headstone (the Waterberg Chiefs) and his honouring as an African Chief in a native language.

It was also not the first time Fourie and his men would flout rules of engagement. In a earlier engagement, from under a white flag of truce they opened up on a UDF detachment, this time killing another popular UDF officer, who happened to be unarmed. Captain John (Koos) Nolte, an Afrikaner, was treacherously shot. The epitaph on Nolte’s grave, who was a well-known rugby player and attorney on the East Rand, states; “Gesneuveld 29 October 1914 te Treurfontein onder Witvlag met Rapport. Geboren 11de Juli 1881.”

Retribution

Captain William Allan King’s funeral was a national outpouring of grief, newspapers across the county lamented at his passing, his funeral was the largest funeral since the Union was declared in 1910. Plaatje would read his obituary and would record that he was “one loss which the Natives, judging by articles in their newspapers, will not easily forget”.

Retribution for Fourie was coming – not only from the large swaths of English’, ‘Coloured’ and ‘Black’ communities grieving for William Kings death, of all the Rebel’s Commandos – it was Fourie’s Commando which exacted the greatest number of Union Defence Force deaths. Of those most of them were Afrikaners – Prime Minister Botha insisted the ‘English’ regiments who made up the Active citizen Force (ACF) part of the UDF ‘stay out of it’ for the most part and the Afrikaner ‘Rifle Associations’ – the old Boer Republic Commandos the RA part of UDF to deal with the brunt of the revolt – so, brother against brother, this was to be the Afrikaners sorting out their seditious brethren amongst themselves. Retribution was coming for Fourie from many in the Afrikaans community and the UDF families affected by the loss of their husbands, brothers and sons – men like Captain Koos Nolte.

Unlike many of the other rebel leaders who faced a single count of treason, Captain Jopie Fourie had committed High Treason on three counts, not resigning his Army commission in the UDF, caught wearing his UDF uniform and undertaking a seditious armed revolt against his lawfully elected government and his own armed forces – the UDF. 

Also, unlike the other rebel leaders who faced a trial in a civilian court, having resigned from the UDF, that would not be the case for Jopie Fourie, as he had not resigned from the UDF he was considered as still in service in the UDF, so he faced a military court. A military court martial is fundamentally different to a civilian one as there are a whole set of laws that apply to military personnel that don’t apply to civilians. Military tribunals are almost a ‘law unto themselves’ – sentences tend to be carried out quickly and punishments harsh – very little latitude is given to appealing convictions, and military courts do not really tolerate interventions from civilian authorities and government structures. 

This is compounded further when the military is ‘in a state of war’ with a foreign power or if a state of ‘martial law’ is declared against an internal enemy, and South Africa and the UDF specifically was in both states.  During these respective states of war military law becomes even more intolerant and convictions even more punitive. Retribution from the UDF was most certainly coming for Fourie and there was very little anyone could do about it.

Retribution was also quick, South Africa was in a state of martial Law and there was no dilly-dally, from the time Jopie Fourie was captured on the 16th December 1914, he was tried by this fellow military officers, from all accounts he was given a proper military trial, he was found guilty of high treason and sentenced to death by firing squad (a military ‘death’ afforded only to military personnel – civilians are hanged).

The firing squad was comprised equally of members of the South African Police (as they were involved in his capture and he took a toll on them), members of Jopie Fourie’s own regiment – the “Botha Ruiters”, and members of the South African Mounted Rifles. The execution took place with Fourie refusing a blindfold on the 20th December 1914 …. from capture to execution, it took a mere 4 days.

Images: Authorisation Letter: Jopie Fourie Execution: 20th December 1914 and colourised image of Jopie Fourie (courtesy Jenny B Colourised Photos)

Why Smuts?

Usually in a legal and parliamentary construct like the Union of South Africa, the only person who can stay an execution or offer an amnesty is the Prime Minister and usually that is done with a consensus of cabinet ministers, so the Prime Minister is not seen to act unilaterally. The Prime Minister of South Africa in 1914 was Louis Botha, not Jan Smuts – Smuts was one of 66 South African Party Ministers of Parliament and he is one of Louis Botha’s Cabinet Ministers – holding two portfolios reporting to Botha. Jopie Fourie’s execution is on Botha’s watch – it’s his responsibility, not Smuts’.

General Jan Smuts during WW1

So why not Botha, why the focus on Smuts?

As Dr David Katz in his work ‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917) points out. Jan Smuts had been the key Minister keeping a level head and seeking reconciliation and understanding all the way through the rebellion, and when it was clear the rebellion had failed, Smuts called for a ‘Blanket Amnesty’ across the board for the Boer Rebel leaders and their troops if they laid down their arms. 

General Louis Botha, the Commander in Chief, on the other hand took a much harder and less reconciliatory line than his colleague – he was livid at the sheer betrayal, the sheer waste of lives, resources and time it took and the complete stupidity of it all – an unsupported revolt against a lawfully elected government with absolutely no chance of success. 

It was reported that Louis Botha once joking said to Jan Smuts “Let’s face it Jannie, you’re no General!” By that he meant Smuts was far too reconciliatory and soft-hearted – as far as Louis Botha was concerned, under the edicts of martial law, all rebels, officers and men alike should be tried, the most treasonous of which, the leaders, put up against a wall and shot – even if they were all his old friends.

Smuts however persevered – Botha eventually agreed to an Amnesty, but for the rank and file only, the Boer Rebel leaders would have to be prosecuted. The amnesty, excluding the Rebel leadership, was in put place from 12th to 21st November 1914, and with it the 1914 Boer Rebellion was effectively over, by the end of November General de Wet’s force alone was down to only 40 men. Rear actions and isolated and desperate battles continued to be fought for a couple of months by woefully under-strength hard liners like Jopie Fourie refusing surrender and amnesty, but by the end of January 1915 the rebellion was over.  

Even by standards of the day, at the end of the revolt Smuts would seek clemency and compassion with Botha for the rebel leaders, consider their sentences.  In private correspondence with his confidant and friend, Emily Hobhouse, Hobhouse would urge both Smuts’ and Botha’s compassion in dealing with the rebel leaders, to which Smuts agreed.

Of the main rebel leaders, General Christiaan Beyers tragically drowned in the Vaal River whilst attempting to desperately evade capture on 8th December 1914. General Christiaan de Wet was captured during the amnesty and sentenced to six years imprisonment, with a fine of £2000, he was released by Botha and Smuts after one year’s imprisonment, after giving a written promise to take no further part in politics. 

Major Jan Kemp was captured on the 2nd of February 1915 and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment, with a fine of £1000. However, a mere 10 months into his sentence Botha and Smuts agreed to release him – also on the condition that he may not participate in any politics – a promise Kemp almost immediately broke entering politics as a National Party MP under Hertzog in 1920. 

Lt. Colonel Manie Maritz would evade capture and escape into self-imposed exile, he would re-enter South Africa in 1923 and spent a couple of months in jail for treason, when General Barry Hertzog came to power later in 1924 he was given amnesty. He would enter into politics as the leader of an antisemitic, one-party state, National Socialist (Nazi) inspired ‘Boerenasie’ party prior to World War 2.

Of all the other rebel officers, men like Kmdt Daniel Flemming, who were also captured or returned from exile in GSWA. All were sentenced to short imprisonments and fines, almost all of them walking free within a year … except for just one man … Captain Jopie Fourie.

The Visit

The delegation in December 1914, headed up by Dr D.F. Malan, which decided on a last minute ‘drop in’ visit at Jan Smuts’ house and deliver a petition Malan had drafted, with the remote hope of getting clemency for Fourie, did so because they saw Smuts as the ‘weakest link’ – they knew he had a soft spot for the rebels and they would have no such luck with a no-nonsense General like Louis Botha, and how do we know this?

Simply because General Botha, as Prime Minister made no effort to stay the execution of Jopie Fourie, he did not lift a finger, he didn’t even offer an opinion on the matter or make a statement, and one can only deduce that given his very hard stance he initially held against giving the rebels any sort of amnesty, that he wanted an example made of Fourie. Botha was livid, this revolt in no way received the support of the broad Afrikaner community, it was poorly planned and poorly led and an utter waste of life – to read more on this position read Observation Post – Boer War 3 and Beyond, here’s the link Boer War 3 and beyond!

Now consider what the delegation is asking of Jan Smuts, they are asking him to make a decision he is not really mandated to do, they are asking him to override his boss’ intentions and act unilaterally of the Prime Minister. They are asking him to act unilaterally of all this fellow cabinet ministers and as a UDF General, they are also asking him to act unilaterally of the military, its laws and its tribunals. They are also asking Smuts to perform a communications miracle, considering the speed at which the Fourie trial takes place – a mere 4 days, it’s 1914 – the country is at war and Smuts has to contact a wide variety of MP’s and his Boss the PM who is on a military campaign to get any sort of consensus before the execution – and he only has about a single day to do it in.  

Future nationalists would blow this delegation and incident out the water and pay far too much attention to Smuts than he deserves, they would try and turn Smuts into a coward for not meeting the drop in delegation, stating he was ‘hiding’ in the house – in fact Smuts was visiting on the next door farm when the delegation turned up, and unlike President Paul Kruger who entertained the general public dropping in unannounced, Smuts did not.

What if?

Even if Smuts had entertained the visit, there is literally nothing he could do about Jopie Fourie – as noted, Fourie’s case was far too complicated, his crimes were far too serious and there were far too many incriminating circumstances of high treason. Smuts in even trying to get Fourie off the hook would have incurred the wrath of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the majority of the government, the Union Defence Force and all its commanders, many in the Afrikaans community, the families of the UDF slain, and finally the broader English, Coloured and Black communities, the vast majority, thanks to the death of William King at the hands of Fourie. 

This was World War 1, this was Martial Law after all, soldiers and officers were executed in front of firing squads for ‘cowardice’ or ‘leaving posts without permission’ or ‘refusing orders’ – let alone High Treason, Sedition and White Flag incidents. There was just no way anyone was going to get Fourie any form of amnesty or clemency, not in a month of Sundays.

It is very naive and a very arrogant assumption on behalf of Dr. Malan to think that Smuts could stay the execution and its smacks more of a political assassination exercise than it does of a philanthropic one, and that’s exactly what happened – Prime Minister Louis Botha, the man who was in fact responsible – the bittereinder’ hero of the Boer War – would remain relatively unscathed and still heralded as Boer hero in the Boerevolk community, whereas Smuts would unfairly take the full brunt of Afrikaner Nationalist vitriol in Botha’s place – unrelenting and for decades – he still does.

Images: Hate mail sent to Jan Smuts – Jan Smuts collection

Uneasy is the head that wears a crown

Smuts would go on to be regarded as one of the greatest Statesmen South Africa has ever produced, Jopie Fourie was a junior officer and simply not on the same playing field as Smuts (or Botha for that matter). To quote Shakespeare “uneasy is the head that wears a crown” – no ‘coward’ when it came to his convictions – in Smuts’ career, as a Boer War General during the South African War 1899 – 1902 (Boer War 2) he would personally oversee the court martial and execution by firing squad of Lambert Colyn, a Boer traitor who betrayed his Commando’s position to the British. 

After the 1922 Miners’ Strike, when Smuts was Prime Minister in his first term and had powers of amnesty, the English ‘Communist’ rebels – Samual ‘Taffy’ Long, Herbert Hull and David Lewis were all hanged singing the Red Flag song, Smuts remained unmoved. 

As Prime Minister on two separate occasions many South Africans were executed for a variety of crimes under his watch for clemency, mainly murder, none received it. The UDF in its only recorded execution during World War 2, executed one of their own during the Italy campaign – Johan Mgema (a Native Military Corps man) attached to 12 Squadron SAAF, executed by firing squad when he was found guilty of murdering an Italian woman. Again, as Prime Minister at the time Smuts granted no amnesty. 

Smuts however went one step further, and only for one man, when he was Prime Minister during World War 2, and mandated to grant amnesty and clemency, stay executions and intervene in judicial process – he stayed the execution of Robey Leibbrandt – the South African Nazi zealot inserted into South Africa by Nazi Germany to overthrow the government and assassinate Smuts. Captured and found guilty of High Treason Leibbrandt was sentenced to death – he claimed that he had acted “for Volk and Führer” (Adolph Hitler and the Afrikaner people) and gave the Hitler Salute in court, declaring “I greet death”.

Robey Leibbrandt

Smuts commuted his sentence to life in prison instead. Smuts had served with Leibbrandt’s father, Meyder Leibbrandt during Boer War 2 and admired him as a “courageous Boer warrior”. In the case of Robey Leibbrandt only did Smuts intervene as Prime Minister and exercise his powers, nobody else, again demonstrating his ‘soft spot’ for his most beloved Boere community, one in which he consistency sought reconciliation and understanding. However, even this act would not deter his most obstinate detractors. Robey Leibbrandt was subsequently released on amnesty granted by the incoming nationalists led by Dr. D.F. Malan in 1948.

The point been, for all the executions and all the variety of people of communities involved, it was only with the Boerevolk that Smuts exhibited extraordinary measures of compassion. The execution of Fourie was an extraordinary one, and considering the William Allan King incident, the white flag incident, his commission and his uniform, far too large a segment of the population sought retribution.

This is one of the key reasons why the Jopie Fourie mythology and narrative put forward by Afrikaner Nationalists never really includes William Allan King – Fourie was pitched as been of ‘pure’ Afrikaans heart, unfairly executed for it by traitorous Afrikaners, it’s all about Afrikanerdom – the English, Black and Coloured Communities’ in South Africa who Fourie also went to war against don’t count – that would make him universally unpopular and a genuine traitor – nor do all the other communities affected by government policies in dealing with treason and those executed for it count – it just doesn’t fit their insular and myopic Afrikaner Nationalist narrative.

In Conclusion

In relating the story of Jopie Fourie, it’s clear that the story of William King a.k.a. The Chief is lost. In weighing up the two, the man who died for his country, the man who is the true patriot, the member of the statutory forces representing a legal government and the broad communities of South Africa as a whole – the majority of South Africans, the man who is functioning as a legitimate commissioned officer and upholding his oath to serve his country and men, the man ‘unfairly’ killed, the man whose loss is felt across the entire nation – is Captain William King, as a South African Army officer doing his duty his sacrifice is fully deserving of the nation’s recognition. The true national hero is Captain King, and when we ask ourselves “what about Jopie?” We must also ask of ourselves … “what about William?”

We will never know what Jopie Fourie’s true reasons were for not taking the precaution of resigning his UDF commission, despite been warned to do so. Nobody knows what was going through his head when he donned on his UDF uniform to rebel against the UDF. Given the extremely grave consequences of these actions – one can only assume that the person who wanted Jopie dead, was Jopie himself and he foresaw himself as some sort of martyr.

It remains perplexing, no matter what Smuts did right, no matter all his achievements, no matter that he arbitrated the peace deal to end the Boer War, no matter that he twice put South Africa on the right side of history when Germany acted as polecat, no matter that he consolidated Afrikaners and English and established Union and a whole new country – the true father of South Africa, no matter that he established the UDF and its military doctrine, identified new botanicals, established both the Royal Air Force and the South African Air Force, wrote an accredited work of philosophy, established South Africa as an economic powerhouse, no matter that he commanded British troops in East Africa and was Churchill’s personal advisor during Operation Overlord (D-Day) and the liberation of Europe, no matter that he established the concept of the Commonwealth of Nations and wrote the pre-amble to establish United Nations – all that matters not a jot to the chap in the back of the room at any modern day Smuts related seminar who sticks up his hand and inevitably asks “what about Jopie?”.


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

Related Work:

Boer War 3 and Beyond – the 1914 Boer Rebellion Boer War 3 and beyond!

References:

Military History Journal, Vol 16 No 4 – December 2014 – Forgotten casualties of the 1914 Rebellion. By Richard Wadley

‘Native Life in South Africa, Before and Since the European War and the Boer Rebellion’. By Sol. T. Plaatje

Nongqai Vol 10, No 4 A (1) by Brigadier Hennie Heymans

‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa’ 1914 -1917. By Dr David Broc Katz

A large thank you to Stef Coetzee for his inputs on Captain William Allan King and further thanks to Admiral Arne Söderlund for his assistance, along with Brigadier Hennie Heymans

Boer War 3 and beyond!

The 1914 Boer Revolt in perspective.

Very often when I read website or social media military history commentary on the 1914 Boer Revolt – I often come across the phasing that Louis Botha (usually incorrectly referenced as Jan Smuts) went against the will of the ‘majority’ of Afrikaners and therefore the general will of the white voting population in South Africa, when he declared war against Imperial Germany in 1914 and invaded German South West Africa (GSWA) – now on the side of Britain and its main ally – France. The result is a general upsurgence of Republicanism and a desire to re-engage the Boer War (a sort of Boer War 3) in an outpouring of widespread support by the Boer nation for Germany and against Britain (a legacy hangover from the Boer War). South Africa was forced into an unwanted war to do the British Empire’s bidding and the Boere would have none of it!

The problem with the above assertion is that it is pure bunk, its unfounded, as once again Military History (doctrine, strategy and tactics) and Economic History (stats and demographics) tell a different tale entirely and once again the ‘cold facts’ rip the ‘Political’ interpretation of the history apart (this is why I just love both economic and military history). So, let’s examine these ‘cold facts’ – the hard statistics – the numbers and see how they hold up, let’s also examine military doctrine and see how that holds against the numbers. Let’s challenge the history and establish why this above assertion is purely politically inspired fantasy.

The Vote

Upfront is the vote to go to war. The arrival of World War 1 in 1914 is both a blessing and a curse for the Boer led government of the newly formed Union of South Africa. Both Botha as Prime Minister and Smuts as his ‘right hand man’ were walking a tight rope – as Boer commanders they represented a faction of the new “Union”, balancing the two small old Boer Republic’s politics and laws with those of all the British colonies and protectorates surrounding them (six large British territories and their interests in them in effect) – so they are obliged to support Britain as the major player in the region, and honour their word to them, the oath that brought about peace – that’s the ‘curse’. 

The ‘blessing’ to the Union government is that the war presents them with an ideal opportunity to realise the expansive border of ‘Greater South Africa’ as envisioned and concluded in the Union conference in 1909 – as this border also specifies the eventual inclusion of German South West Africa into South Africa in the first phase of the ‘Greater’ South Arica Union and eventually even bits of German East Africa would be included in the second phase of South Africa’s territorial advancement. 

So it’s really no surprise, that when the decision to go to war is put to the vote in the Boer led and very independent Union of South Africa Parliament (at Union, Britain takes a figurehead role, the South African Union’s Parliament and legal construct is not governed by Westminster, its fee to make its own laws) – and the result is not what your Apartheid era school history teacher plugged – it’s a staggering vote of confidence by nearly all the Boer MP’s favouring going to war alongside Britain (and France) against Germany, by a landslide – literally. Consider the result.

92 = For invasion of German South West Africa (GSWA) by the Union of South Africa

12 = Against

So, as to the ‘majority’ of Afrikaners NOT wanting war with Germany, that is simply untrue, the Afrikaner community’s representatives in Parliament were overwhelmingly in favour of war against Germany. This is also where some ‘Boer Romantic’ commentators on the 1914 Revolt make a fundamental mistake, the Union of South Africa’s decision to conquer German South West Africa (Namibia) was NOT just a service to the ‘British Empire’ – it was largely in service to the objects of The Union of South Africa and its own territorial expansion ambitions and the prescribed ‘sphere of influence’ over the Southern African region as a whole (as agreed by all Boer and British leaders involved in the Union conference in 1909).

Put another way, that’s 88% in favour of going to war alongside Britain and 12% against. In so far as the politics goes, the South African Party (SAP) headed up by Louis Botha, and comprising all the old Boer War Generals and the old Afrikaner Bond is by far the majority party, it’s the Afrikaner’s representative party in government (the National Party came later) … statistically speaking the breakdown of Parliament is as follows:

South African Party, Louis Botha leader – 66 seats

Unionist Party, Starr Jameson leader – 36 seats

Labour Party, Frederic Creswell leader – 3 seats

Simply put, to see who the “Afrikaner” representatives are and who are the “English” i.e. British affiliated parties, the SAP is the ‘Afrikaner’ party – the ‘British’ party is most certainly Starr Jameson’s Imperial Party (you may remember Starr Jameson as the leader of the infamous Jameson Raid). The Labour Party is a British (English) unionist construct, its voters are the miners on the Johannesburg gold reef mainly.

From that it can be deduced that he majority of the ‘Afrikaner’ SAP have voted FOR going to war alongside Britain against Germany – of the SAP – 54 votes, or 82% of the SAP’s ministers are pro-war alongside Britain and her allies. It is only on the very rump of this party that we find the AGAINST voters, and of these 12 individuals (or 18% of the SAP), only 3 of them are notable and become highly vocal anti-war campaigners – Barry Hertzog, Koos de la Rey and Christiaan de Wet. 

In this respect, between the three of them, although vocal they are really a small voice at odds with the legitimate elected government construct, the vast majority of South Africa’s representatives, and even most of their own peers. In truth, they are also not just “pro-German’ – at this stage they are intrinsically at odds with the idea of ‘Union’ and it’s agreed objects – seeking minority rule under a ‘Boer Republican’ hegemony instead.

Political cartoon of the day captures the Union’s territorial ambitions

The UDF Construct and its ’Afrikaner’ nature 

Jan Smuts, as the Minister of Defence at this time had also been busy amalgamating the armed forces of the republics with those of the colonial citizen force regiments to form the Union Defence Force i.e. the UDF (in much the same way as the SADF was amalgamated with other forces in 1994 to form the SANDF – with the same challenges). 

The UDF had taken shape to consist of a small contingent of Permanent Force, the Permanent Force basically comprises some 4,000 odd members and consists of a HQ, some admin and training staff and a mounted military constabulary of 5 regiments called the South African Mounted Rifles (SAMR) – these are a combination of members of the old British colonial mounted regiments like the Cape Mounted Rifles and old Boer Kommando members making the military their profession. They make up only 5% of the total UDF strength.

But the backbone would remain essentially voluntarily forces in a two-stream approach, the old ‘English’ colonial citizen force regiments – Transvaal Scottish, Royal Natal Carbineers, Royal Durban Light Infantry etc comprise what is collectively known as ‘Active Citizen Force’ (ACF) and to begin with they tend be ‘English’ speaking and led. There are 23,000 ACF members (29% of the total UDF mustering).

The greater part of the UDF backbone however is the ‘Afrikaans’ citizen force “skiet” Commandos known as the ‘Rifle Association Mounted Infantry’ working in parallel to the ACF. This is the old Transvaal and Orange Free State Boer Republic’s Boer Kommando system in effect. They are collectively called the “Rifle Associations” or RA and comprise 42,000 members (or 52% of the complete UDF strength) and they are the majority in the new UDF construct.

It was a careful construct to keep everyone happy, but the point is this, it was NOT “British” – Imperial British troops present in South Africa after the Boer War had all returned to the United Kingdom, any engagement the Union of South Africa was going to fight in World War 1 in Africa, whether foreign or domestic, was going to be made up of ‘South Africans’ and led by ‘South Africans’ – and in truth it was commanded by the old Republic’s ‘Bittereinder’ Boer Generals – primarily Botha (as Prime Minister was Commander in Chief) and Smuts (as Botha’s Minister of Defence) – and by way of construction the vast majority of the force is of ‘Afrikaans’ origin (not English) and part of a mounted infantry construct (RA and SAMR).

General Jan Smuts during WW1

Smuts is beginning to outline military doctrine for the UDF and he has a greater disposition to the Boer ‘way of fighting’ i.e. mobility which is heavily reliant on mounted infantry. The UDF is fortunate, at the end of the Boer War in 1902, the British (and Colonial forces) emerge as the singular worldwide authority on Counter Insurgency warfare (we know this today as COIN) and the old Boer Republican forces emerge as the worldwide authority on Insurgency warfare.  Thus the UDF is now being built along the lines of using effective combined arms with high degrees of mobility to deal with both conventional warfare (as is the requirement of any statutory force) in the event a Colonial Power in Africa (e.g. Portugal or Germany) invades the Union and any domestic insurgencies (initially ‘internal’ threats are defined as potential Black African uprisings and the UDF doctrine is been developed to counter-act it). 

Intrinsic in the UDF’s DNA at this point is the use of COIN in the rural warfare context (they have not been tested in the urban context, that would only really happen with the Miners’ strike in 1922). Also, a key learning for the UDF is that towards the end of Boer War 2, the British turn to highly mobile ‘Seek and Destroy’ columns known as “Commando Hunts” to put an end to the final ‘Bittereinder Kommandos’ – essentially matching mobility with mobility but with greater firepower and ‘combined arms’. This institutional knowledge will play a major role in the upcoming 1914 Boer Revolt.

Smuts is happy to cherry pick, basically he’s happy to bring all that’s great and good about the British culture of warfare – their discipline and drill (sorely lacking in the Boer army), their uniforms and rank structures (sorely lacking in the Boer army) and their very effective use of combined arms warfare and joint arms warfare (also sorely lacking in the Boer army) and combine it with the Boer culture of warfare – the use of mobility, and applying high rates of survivability thinking to tactics of assault and defence (both of which are sorely lacking in the British army). 

WW1 UDF Recruitment poster targeted at Afrikaners

 Smuts will build into the UDF the doctrine of highly mobile ‘combined arms’ – mainly the effective use of mounted infantry, armour and artillery (and other ‘arms’) all acting in unison and speed. It’s a doctrine of “manoeuvre” using the Clausewitzian concept – using superior and simultaneous advances along “exterior” lines (a concentration in space) on an enemy using “interior” lines (known as a concentration of time) of communication and supply. Under General Jan Smuts the UDF is shaping into a very effective fighting force, one that is far ahead of the old Boer Republics strategic and tactical constructs and doctrine which focused mainly on “interior lines”. This will have far reaching consequences for the Boer Revolt and the rebels.

The Afrikaner disposition to Germany

Smuts was also sensitive to the fact that many Afrikaners shared German heritage and they (falsely) believed that Germany extensively supported the Boer cause during Boer War 2 – ‘falsely’ because in fact, Germany was happy to ‘sell’ them arms (as did the British arms manufacturers) at a premium and send some medical assistance later on, however Germany withdrew their support officially – they provided no troops and no substantial funding to the Republican Boer War effort whatsoever. 

Kaiser Wilhelm II

Kaiser Wilhelm II, although sending a letter to Kruger congratulating him on the Jameson Raid victory (given the Boer nation their false sense of ‘support’), in fact refused point blank to receive any Boer representations and after the ‘Black Week’ Boer victories during Boer War 2 in late 1899, he and his Generals compiled a military strategy, not to help the Boers, but to help the British win the war (he was after all related to the British monarchy – part of the family so to speak) and shared it with them instead – Kaiser Wilhelm II even proudly proclaiming at the end of the Boer War that the British had followed his plan precisely as he had outlined it to them and it was the German plan that won the war for the British – not Field Marshal Frederick Robert’s plan and as inconvenient truths go the Kaiser’s plan involved scorched earth policies and concentration camps. (see: John C.G. Röhl: The Kaiser and England during the Boer War). 

Ethnic Germans (local and foreign) volunteering to join Boer Commandos also qualified very few (550 odd) – far more Anglo-Irish, Dutch and Flemish joined the Boers (5,500 odd). A Boer leader delegation, including Botha and de Wet visited Germany after the war in 1902, and although they received a  grand welcome and ovations, they were never officially received, Kaiser Wilhelm II flatly refused to entertain any Boer delegation sent to Germany.

Boer delegations did raise a little money from private donators and a Boer help fund, but that’s it – there was never any official public contribution by the German government to the Boer cause – ever. Germany wanted to avoid conflict with Britain – who by convention and legal treatise at the time held suzerainty limitations over the two Boer Republics preventing them from engaging in foreign policies and entering into treaties. However, all this still did not resonate with many in the Boer community who almost illogically saw Germany as an Ally. Now, I bet none of this was in your Nationalistic inspired history teachings.

Left: Boer delegation to Europe and the USA in 1900 to try and solicit help for the Republics – with very limited success. Right: Kaiser Wilhelm II in a British Field Marshal uniform – he was made a Field Marshal in the British Army in 1909 by his relative – King Edward VII just after Queen Victoria’s death.

Smuts would argue the case for war, not on the basis of warring against Germany on the side of ‘Britain’, but for supporting the other old Boer Republic’s supporters – France, Belgium and the Netherlands in their war against a hostile and aggressive Germany busy de-stabilising western and eastern Europe, and Smuts was very aware of the vast majority of Boers had Dutch, Belgian and French roots, as opposed to the ones with German roots. He would use the same argument again for his declaration of war against Germany in World War 2.

Smuts however anticipated that the decision to go to war, although largely supported by the Afrikaner political elite and leadership, would have with it a handful of resignations from the Union’s Defence Force from those strongly in favour of Germany and whose sheer hatred of the British superseded everything, and the Union government received exactly that – a “handful” – nothing that would fundamentally compromise the UDF’s fighting ability or construct, the UDF remained at its 80,000 men strong capability and it remained with its primarily strong ‘Afrikaans’ demographic skew, contrary to the thinking of wishful Boer Romantic modern-day arm-chair Generals, there was no large gravitation of Afrikaners from the ‘Rifle Associations’ (Kommandos) and other arms of the UDF over to the German cause, nor was there a large wave of resignations from the UDF, in fact there was very little, verging on none – less than 1%. 

General Christiaan Frederik Beyers

Of the handful of resignations which were received, a rather long-winded one came from General Christiaan Beyers, the UDF’s Commandant General in charge of the Active Citizen Force (ACF) and his was the most important resignation. As previously noted, prior to the decision to go to war against Germany, Smuts and Botha’s old friend and highly respected comrade, General Koos de la Rey had been one of the handful of Parliamentary Ministers vocally against the decision to invade GSWA and advocated neutrality, and because of his popularity his opinion held massive sway over the old Boer Republic’s Afrikaner electorate  – nevertheless he was persuaded by Louis Botha and Jan Smuts not to take actions which may arouse the Boers, he then held a political rally for only 800 Boers who felt strongly over the matter and took a reconciliatory approach – contrary to what the attendees expected of him.

Major Jan Kemp in UDF uniform

General De la Rey seemed torn over his decision, and he was then targeted by General Beyers to join him for meeting with Major Jan Kemp, a mid-line UDF officer who had also resigned – the purpose of the meeting; Beyers and Kemp wanted to persuade de la Rey to take a stronger stand and initiate more Union Defence Force resignations to try and compromise its fighting capability. Joining the conspiracy was another heavyweight – the significant Boer General and Parliamentary Minister, Christiaan de Wet.

What follows next is well documented, however the generally accepted and investigated history concludes; General De la Rey and General Beyers were travelling in a soft top sedan car to their meeting with Major Kemp and did not stop at a Police blockade set up to capture a notorious gang of robbers and murderers called The Foster Gang. One of the Policeman fired a warning shot into the road to get them to stop, the bullet ricocheted and hit De la Rey, killing him. 

It was tragedy – plain and simple, and both Botha and Smuts were devasted at the loss of their friend, as a signal to the inevitable accusations of ‘political assassination’ both Botha and Smuts attended De la Rey’s funeral in front of thousands of mourning Boers, they appeared without any bodyguard at the mercy of the assembly – a token of no malice intended, and there were no protests or accusations from the mourners. 

Jacobus Hercules de la Rey

Regardless, despite sound and tested enquiries and court cases, and the Nationalists having full scope and the resources at hand for 40 years to uncover a ‘plot’ – no concrete proof has emerged of a plot by Smuts to kill De la Rey whatsoever – ‘conspiracy theory’ nevertheless grew out of the incident which would plague Smuts in future years, and it still does.

It is also generally understood that with the death of De La Rey, that would probably have been the extent of Boer resistance to the war, and it would have devolved into simple political protest and peaceful demonstrations, had it not been for one single man … Lt. Colonel Manie Maritz, who had an especially strong disposition towards Germany having served in German South West Africa and he commanded a small UDF force at Upington, on the border with German South West Africa (GSWA). 

A treacherous soup

The day after de la Rey’s funeral, Kemp, Beyers and de Wet addressed a large crowd at Lichtenberg, calling on protest meetings against the decision to invade GSWA. Manie Maritz however took a far more robust position than Kemp, Beyers and de Wet, he instead went into open sedition and started ignoring Smuts’ and his other Commander’s orders been sent to him. Intel told Smuts that Maritz had joined the Germans, however contradictory to Smuts’ usual manner of decisiveness, he vacillated instead hoping to persuade Maritz not to revolt and get him to see reason. 

Lt Col Manie Maritz, front and centre in his South African Union uniform and his staff behind him – his  ‘Agter-ryer’ (man-servant) is at his heels (It’s the man-servant’s expression and position that is most interesting as in many ways it gives away Maritz who is a very outspoken racist and has no regard for people of colour).

Not dissuaded by Smuts and bent on a sedition, Maritz resigned his commission from the Union Defence Force and openly rebelled on 9 October, taking just 300 odd of his UDF soldiers with him when he went over to the Germans. Maritz arrested all the UDF officers and men under his command who were unwilling to join the Germans, and then sent them forward as prisoners into German South West Africa (GSWA).

Smuts sent Major Barend ‘Ben’ Bouwer over to deal with Maritz’ sedition and insubordination (both Bouwer and Maritz had served under Smuts in his Commando during Boer War 2 and he hoped Bouwer could reason with Maritz). Maritz however also promptly took Bouwer prisoner along with his fellow officers, he was subsequently released and sent back with the ultimatum from Maritz to the Union Government:

The ultimatum read that unless the Union Government guaranteed safe passage of his fellow plotting Generals (De Wet, Beyers, Kemp et al), to his position on the GSWA border by the 11th October he would immediately attack General Brits’ UDF forces preparing to invade GSWA and then he would invade the Union of South Africa.

Major Ben Bouwer reported that Maritz was in possession of some guns belonging to the Germans, and that he held the rank of General commanding the German troops. He also had a force of Germans under him in addition to his own rebel commando. 

To drive Maritz’ point home, Major Bouwer was shown an agreement between Maritz and the Governor of German South West Africa guaranteeing the independence of the Union as a Republic, ceding Walfish Bay and certain other portions of the Union to the Germans, and undertaking that the Germans would only invade the Union on the invitation of Maritz.

Major Bouwer was shown numerous telegrams and helio messages dating back to the beginning of September. Maritz boasted that he had ample guns, rifles, ammunition, and money from the Germans, and that he would overrun the whole of South Africa.

In response to Maritz’ action and ultimatum, on 12 October, the Union government imposed martial law across the whole of South Africa. On proclaiming martial law, Smuts, the eternal reconciler, immediately called again for “reason” and urged the rebels not to be swayed by “foreign agents influencing them”.

The ‘Boer Revolt’ or ‘Maritz Revolt’ or ‘Five Shilling Rebellion’ as it would also become known was underway, and with their sedition hand now played by Maritz in the Cape Colony, his fellow conspirators – Beyers, Kemp and de Wet had no choice, now ‘in for a penny and in for a pound’ they all broke their ties with the Union and went into open armed rebellion against their lawfully elected government – raising Commando’s primarily from the Transvaal and Orange Free State to come to Maritz’ aid.

The ‘Five Shillings Rebellion’ reference came about when de Wet, entered the town of Reitz on a recruitment drive, called together the inhabitants and said:

“I was charged before for beating a native boy. I only did it with a small shepherd’s whip, and for that I was fined 5/–”.

Hearing about the speech later, Jan Smuts referred to the rising as “the Five Shilling Rebellion” as a means of belittling the rebels, the baseless promises of wealth to the desperate and the aims of the revolt.

The stated objective: Maritz issued a proclamation by way of an objective:

 “The former South African Republic and Orange Free State as well as the Cape Province and Natal are proclaimed free from British control and independent, and every White inhabitant of the mentioned areas, of whatever nationality, are hereby called upon to take their weapons in their hands and realize the long-cherished ideal of a Free and Independent South Africa.”

In other words, to take by force, the former British Colonies and re-start the Boer War, resistance to the declaration by any “white” in the entire Union of South Africa would be treated by Maritz’ Provisional Government as treasonous. 

Sabre Waving

Generally in social media and web based articles on the Boer Revolt you get the impression that this was a significant military threat and social movement, but that’s not the case – in fact all these threats by Maritz as to invading South Africa, crushing the UDF’s intensions on invading GSWA, declaring a Afrikaner Republic under a white Boer hegemony with the aid of Germany are nothing more than ‘sabre waving’ – from a military doctrine perspective they are nothing more than unsubstantiated and baseless threats. 

So, let’s look at the military doctrine and establish what sort of threat from the rebels and Germany the South African Union defence force is facing, what’s the magnitude of the problem with regard the Boer Revolt that they have to deal with, what is the rebel forces calibre, construct and fighting capability? – Let’s look at the numbers.

To attain their objective, the Rebels raised 11,476 Boers. The South African Union Defence Force strength to ready itself for World War 1, all in, including all its reserves is 80,500 troops (without even considering the Rhodesian troops mustered for the GSWA campaign under South African command). That means the Boer Rebels are outnumbered on a ratio of 8 to 1. 

Military doctrine will always dictate that a force needs to be twice the size of the opposing force (2:1) if an effective ‘invasion’ is feasible and victory within grasp, more so (and more troops than a 2:1 advantage) if the intention is the occupation and annexation of a country. For the Boer Rebels to be successful in their object to defeat an 80,000 strong UDF they require a force of 160,000 men (that’s 3x more than the entire Boer Republican forces had in Boer War 2 which at their zenith numbered 40,000). 

Obviously, their hope and intention, albeit somewhat fanciful and arrogant, was that the UDF would capitulate with a mass walk out of all its Afrikaner demographic – estimated at some 50,000 odd people – but that simply did not happen. On an 8:1 ratio disadvantage the Boer Revolt stood absolutely no chance of success, even if this UDF number reduced sizeably there would still be at a disadvantage with almost no chance of success. 

But the intention was that Germany would combine with the Boere, the Germans in GSWA would join forces with the Boers right? We need to augment the numbers with German troops. Total German strength in GSWA is 3,000 odd well trained German Schutztruppe and 2,000 odd trained German militaria – about 5,000 in total. At best another 2,000 can be mustered from local Boere and German settlers in GSWA. If we add 7,000 German troops to the Boer Rebels’ 11,500 troops we get 18,500 troops MAX. Against the UDF’s 80,500 that still is nowhere near enough to affect a victorious outcome, they are still heavily outnumbered by 4 to 1. 

German ‘Camel Corps’ in German South West Africa

There is also no German expeditionary force from elsewhere making its way to GSWA, they are heavily committed to the European theatres of operations. Also, unlike in their East Africa colony, the German military in GSWA is unable to raise many local Askari black troops to augment their numbers, a hang-over from the Herero and Namaqua genocide which gives them no real traction with the black inhabitants of GSWA.

The idea that the Germans in GSWA could link up with a Boer Revolt (unless substantially supported) and invade South Africa is fanciful at best.

Now, let’s look at the Rebel Forces capability and make-up. It is important to note, the Rebel force was not made up entirely of first rate ex-UDF soldiers going against their counterparts, the rebel force was primarily made up of destitute Orange Free State Boers having come through a drought and agricultural reforms on the back of the devastation of their farms during Boer War 2. 

Many of these Free State Boers as has been pointed out by historians like Sandra Swart (Desperate Men: The 1914 Rebellion and the Polities of Poverty’ in South African Historical Journal, Vol 42) and John Bottomly (The Orange Free State and the Rebellion of 1914: the influence of industrialisation, poverty and poor whitism: pages 29-73), were simply desperate ‘Bywoners’ (landless farmers or share-croppers) promised a better life if the rebellion was successful.

Consider the statistics of the Boer rebels and from where they came, and you’ll see how the above statement holds true. 7,123 (62%) of the Boer Rebels came from the Orange Free State – the least populace, most rural and economically worse off province in the Union. As an aside, to gauge the extent of success of Maritz’ proclamation and its resonance across the broader Afrikaner community across the whole of South Africa, the rebel leaders were only able to motivate 1,215 (12%) of the Boer Rebels from the Cape province – the biggest province in the Union with the largest Afrikaans population. The balance coming from the Transvaal – which considering its very urbanised and significant population is negligible in the bigger scheme of the Transvaal’s demographic make-up, and no real support from Natal whatsoever.

The Potchefstroom Herald at the time best tried to explain why there was no traction behind the revolt from Cape Afrikaners and the black/brown African communities in this quote – and not surprisingly it boils down to the lack of suffrage and plain racism in the old Republics;

“When these high officers of the Defence Force in Transvaal and Orange “Free” State rebelled and joined the Germans with their commandos, the Dutchmen of the Cape (presumably because “they vote side by side with the Kafirs”) denounced the treachery in unmistakable terms. The South African party at the Cape beat up its followers to the support of the Government, and the voice of the Cape section of the Dutch Reformed Church rang from pulpit and platform in denunciation of disloyalty and treason. But in the Northern Provinces, where white men are pampered and guarded by the Government against the so-called humiliation of allowing native taxpayers to vote, there the rebellion, having been regarded with seeming approval, gained a marvellous impetus.

Plaatjie: The Boer Rebellion – snippet from the Potchefstroom Herald

As a unified, coherent, trained and fully armed force, the Rebel Boers were not. 

They were desperate and landless farmers in the main up against fully trained, motivated, even mechanised in some instances, and properly armed UDF soldiers who had an 8:1 numerical advantage. As noted earlier, in terms of doctrine the UDF under Jan Smuts’ design, command and control was focussed on effective deployment of combined arms in an enveloping role – all based on high manoeuvrability – up against this very modern military construct was a rebel force which only really consisted of ‘old school’ mounted infantry Commandos with ‘old school’ Boer command and control doctrine leading it – they had no light artillery support, no supply logistics to speak of, no armoured cars, no heavy guns, no machine guns and no motorised support – whereas the UDF had all of these. 

UDF armoured cars during GSWA campaign – 1914

In essence the Boer Rebels were using an outdated military doctrine originally intended to quell poorly armed Black African uprisings – a Commando, and it was simply complete folly to pitch such doctrine against a modern military using a doctrine of both combined arms and joint arms. The Rebels were simply no match and it quickly showed. 

Whilst still focussing much of the UDF’s resources on the invasion plans and logistics for the GSWA campaign, General Louis Botha would primarily use just the Rifle Associations to counteract the rebellion, insistent that the British ‘stay out of it’, this was going to be the Boer leaders sorting their differences out between themselves – so ‘Brother against Brother’ and in effect the UDF’s Afrikaners outnumbered the rebel Afrikaners 4 to 1. As also noted earlier, intrinsic in the UDF’s institutional memory and doctrine was the British idea of “hunting” Commandos using what was termed as a “flying column” of combined arms – a spill over of the British tactic from Boer War 2.

The long and short the rebellion was almost immediately repelled and then very quickly crushed as Botha’s UDF Rifle Associations with some Active Citizen Force elements in support used these ‘Flying Columns’ and effectively hunted the Rebel Commandos down as they tried to make their way to assist Maritz on the GSWA border. The revolt would last a couple of months only.

Image: The last pursuit of Major Kemp. A South African Union ‘Flying column’ crossing the Orange River after him.

Reconciliation

As Dr David Katz in his work ‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917) points out. Jan Smuts, eternally the one Boer General keeping a level head and seeking reconciliation and understanding, and when it was clear the rebellion had failed, Smuts called for a ‘Blanket Amnesty’ across the board for the Boer Rebel leaders and their troops if they laid down their arms. General Louis Botha, the Commander in Chief, on the other hand took a much harder and less reconciliatory line than his colleague – he was livid at the sheer betrayal, the sheer waste of lives, resources and time it took and the complete stupidity of it all – an unsupported revolt against a lawfully elected government with absolutely no chance of success. It was reported that he once joking said to Jan Smuts “Let’s face it Jannie, you’re no General!” By that he meant Smuts was far too reconciliatory and soft-hearted – as far as Louis Botha was concerned, under the edicts of martial law, all rebels, officers and men alike should be tried, the most treasonous of which, the leaders, put up against a wall and shot – even if they were all his old friends.

Smuts however persevered – Botha eventually agreed to an Amnesty, but for the rank and file only, the Boer Rebel leaders would have to be prosecuted. The amnesty, excluding the Rebel leadership, was in put place from 12th to 21st November 1914, and with it the 1914 Boer Rebellion was effectively over, by the end of November General de Wet’s force alone was down to only 40 men. Rear actions and isolated and desperate battles continued to be fought for a couple of months by woefully under-strength hard liners refusing surrender and amnesty, but by the end of January 1915 the rebellion was over.  

Of the Rebel leadership now having surrendered, Botha and Smuts would again be especially magnanimous, considering the Union was in a state of war externally and in a state of martial law internally – and this was 1914 ‘World War 1’ – people were put in front of firing squads for ‘cowardice’ and being AWOL (absent without leave) – let alone ‘sedition’ and ‘treason’. Smuts would treat the Rebels in general very kindly, literally with kid gloves, all the time urging reason, understanding and reconciliation.

General Christiaan Rudolf de Wet

Of the main rebel leaders, General Christiaan Beyers tragically drowned in the Vaal River whilst attempting to desperately evade capture on 8th December 1914. General Christiaan de Wet was captured during the amnesty and sentenced to six years imprisonment, with a fine of £2000, he was released by Botha and Smuts after one year’s imprisonment, after giving a written promise to take no further part in politics. 

Major Jan Kemp was captured on the 2nd of February 1915 and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment, with a fine of £1000. However, a mere 10 months into his sentence Botha and Smuts agreed to release him – also on the condition that he may not participate in any politics – a promise Kemp almost immediately broke entering politics as a National Party MP under Hertzog in 1920. Ironically he accompanied Hertzog and joined with Jan Smuts in the Fusion government, however by 1940, in opposition to South Africa entering WW2 against Nazi Germany, he joined the Reunited National Party until his death in 1946.

Lt. Colonel Manie Maritz would evade capture and escape into German South West Africa, at the conclusion of the GSWA campaign and the Union Defence Force’s victory and annexation of the territory (the first real victory for the Allies against Imperial Germany in WW1), Maritz would again evade capture, going into self-imposed exile in Angola, Spain, Portugal and then Mozambique. He would re-enter South Africa in 1923 and spend a couple of months in jail for treason, thereafter he would enter into politics as the leader of an antisemitic, one-party state, National Socialist (Nazi) inspired ‘Boerenasie’ party prior to World War 2. 

Jopie Fourie

Of all the other leaders – junior and mid-level rebel officers who were also captured. All were sentenced to short imprisonments and fines, almost all of them walking free within a year … except for just one man … Captain Jopie Fourie was executed for ‘High Treason’ having not resigned his UDF officers commission, captured still wearing his UDF officer’s uniform and opening fire on his fellow UDF troops whilst under a ‘white flag’ of truce – in one skirmish Jopie Fourie’s men shot dead Captain William Allan-King, the much loved and popular Native Affairs administrator, whilst he was attending to a wounded man. 

Retribution for William Allan-King was coming, many in the English, Native and Coloured communities wanted Jopie Fourie dead, the South African Union Defence Force wanted him dead, many Afrikaners related to or who had affiliation to the Afrikaner UDF men he killed wanted him dead … and this was WW1 and Martial Law after all – there was no way anyone could get him out of this one with a no-nonsense leader like General Louis Botha as Prime Minister and in charge of stays of execution – not just one but on three distinctive charges of high treason, not in a month of Sundays was this possible – a story on Jopie needs a little more space – so follow this Observation Post link to Jopie’s story: What about Jopie?

To pay for all their fines the Bloemfontein newspaper ‘Het Volksblad’ established the ‘Halfkroonfonds’ (Half-a-Crown Fund). Shop owners and other people whose property had been damaged during the rebellion were able to claim compensation, leading to the establishment of the Helpmekaar Beweging (the Help-One-Another Movement). By the end of 1917, all the debts were paid.

Of the handling of the 1914 Boer Revolt, Louis Botha would summarise Smuts role and leadership, when he said of him;

“Nobody can appreciate sufficiently the great work General Smuts has done – greater than any man throughout this unhappy period. At his post day and night, his brilliant intellect, his calm judgement, his amazing energy and his undaunted courage have been assets of inestimable value to the Union in her hour of trial.”

As a rebellion with any chance of success consider just what a small minority they represented – no Cape Province or Natal Afrikaner would really come near it (and the majority of Afrikaners lived in the Cape), of the Afrikaners in the Transvaal and OFS they were unable to raise an effective fighting force, the vast majority of Afrikaners in the armed forces remained in the UDF, the vast majority of Afrikaner political leaders remained behind Botha and Smuts and they gained no traction whatsoever to raise anything from the Black and Coloured communities (the real ‘vast’ majority) – no “Askari” troops whatsoever, and they got no support whatsoever from the white South Africans of British decent – who by way of ‘white’ population were not insignificant in size (about 40% of the white population total), the ‘English’ whites commanding massive swathes of white population groups in the Transvaal (most of Johannesburg and the reef), Natal (most of Durban) and the Cape Colony (especially in Cape Town and the Eastern Cape). 

What if?

Now we can ask the question “what if the Rebellion took traction?” What next? Assuming the UDF internally imploded and a 10,000 strong Boer army with a 7,000 strong German army in support could annex the whole of South Africa, however implausible – consider the scale of white, coloured and black population groups that would resist it.

Also consider the British reaction to it, the probability that a couple of thousand mounted infantrymen, lightly armed, could take British held ports like Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Durban or their Naval Base in Simonstown. As a modern military construct, the UDF at this stage ops out of developing a Navy of its own because the Royal Navy provides this service to the UDF on the back of operating their Simonstown Base as sovereign British territory. As a ‘joint arm’ to the UDF construct the Royal Navy is an incredibly powerful instrument.

HMS Goliath – pre-dreadnaught class, extensive use during the East Africa Campaign.

The Royal Navy is Britain’s true military might, and it’s the world’s undisputed naval power – a very big hitter, in 1914 it’s bigger than the French and American navies combined. For the British in 1914 the ‘Army’ is very secondary to the control of its trading empire worldwide – the primary tool is the Navy. Defending (and even assaulting) ports is what the Royal Navy does, it’s their speciality and just one British battleship has more firepower on it than the entire Boer Rebel army combined – think about that.

Also, to consider with the hindsight of history, what would Britain do to re-establish its influence in Southern Africa with a rebel Boer Republic (with German backing) now declared – incorporating hundreds of thousands of people who consider themselves British subjects or under British protectorate, citizens and subjects who want nothing to do with the racist constructs of Boer Republicanism. Indeed, what would Britain do … it would, when the opportunity arose, return its Expeditionary Force to South Africa and simply take the country back – only this time it would have the benefit of all the technological advances of World War 1 – tanks, chemical warfare, fighter aircraft, bomber aircraft etc. 

Also, as Germany was defeated in WW1, an unsupported Boer Republican government would not hold out and Britain would have to intervene by 1918. The question then is how would the Boer nation hold out? As a population the Boer nation was devastated by the South African War (1899-1902) and they had no armaments industry, with a renewed British military intervention and all the new technology of warfare available to them, the Boer nation would simply not survive the onslaught. 

But – you may ask, the Boere did manage to get a ‘white’ Republic for themselves in 1948 without the support of Germany, and Britain didn’t invade – so it’s possible right? Again, this is after WW1 – not WW2, Britain is still an Imperial Empire and a colonial power, at the heart of which are its ‘Dominions’ – of which South Africa is one, and a key one at that (the other ‘Dominions’ are Ireland, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). In any event, look at how Dr. H.F. Verwoerd’s ‘Keep South Africa White’ Republic worked out in the end. 

To Jan Smuts (and Louis Botha), the idea that a Boer Republic could be resurrected ended with the Boer War, South Africa was now intertwined as a British and Boer construct – Union had seen to that, and all the Boer war leaders had sworn an oath to uphold it, they had given their word (Smuts would remark that a nation who goes back on its word is not a nation at all). 

Smuts would also take an almost paternal approach to his much loved nation and try and gently try to steer the Boer nation away from inflicting more harm on itself, he would however consistently be thwarted by a minority of Afrikaners on the rump of Afrikanerdom, who against all odds are blindly bent on re-instating a Boer Republic with its intensive racially driven constructs (based on Krugerism) over the whole of South Africa and they are also wholeheartedly bent on supporting Germany – through both its Imperial and subsequent Nazi manifestations.

Conclusion 

In the end the Boer Revolt did little in terms of its military objectives, it managed to delay the invasion plans of GSWA for a couple of months only whilst the UDF dealt with it, however in the end the GSWA campaign was a decisive victory for the Union and the territory successfully annexed under ‘Greater South Africa’ in a trusteeship – as was the Union’s expressed casus belli for entering the war. 

As has been statistically proven – the Boer Revolt did NOT evoke a widespread desire from the Afrikaner community in the greater South Africa for a Boer Republic with Germany as its supporter. The Boer Revolt did NOT reflect the sentiment of the majority of the Afrikaans community nor that of the majority of its leaders. The Boer Revolt did NOT inspire the old Boer War Commando system and the majority of Afrikaner fighting men to join with it, in fact they did the opposite. The Boer Revolt also did NOT compromise the Union Defence Force in any way, shape or form whatsoever. 

From a military doctrine perspective, The Boer Revolt was poorly planned and poorly executed. The rebels were always going to be woefully outnumbered with completely insufficient firepower to do the task expected of them – in truth they had no chance of success – zero. The use of outdated mounted infantry doctrine against a modern military construct using combined and joint arms with a mobility ethos was also only ever going to end in a disaster for the rebels. In truth, not one single critical military objective of the Boer Revolt was met.

What the 1914 Boer Revolt did however do was plant the seeds for political division and is one of the key propaganda tools used by the Nationalists to create the deep split in Afrikaner outlooks. Louis Botha would look at the Rebellion as complete folly, a waste of time and an utter waste of life – a sort of Boer equivalent of the Charge of the Light Brigade, with the same disastrous consequence. Botha’s political opponents would look at it rather romantically instead – a sort of ‘Boer Last Stand’. It stands today in some Afrikaner communities, precisely because of its ‘Romanticism’ and ‘political currency’ and not because of its military prowess or even its unattainable objectives. 


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

References: 

Statistics, data and references sourced from the following:

Eben Nel; ‘Kaapse rebelle van die Hantam-karoo’

Dr David Brock Katz; ‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917’

Dr Evert Kleynhans and Dr David Brock Katz; ’20 Battles – searching for a South African Way of War 1913 – 2013’

Sandra Swart; ‘Desperate Men: The 1914 Rebellion and the Polities of Poverty’ 

John Bottomly; ‘The Orange Free State and the Rebellion of 1914: the influence of industrialisation, poverty and poor whitism’

André Wessels; Afrikaner (Boer) Rebellion (Union of South Africa) 2018.

Brian Bunting; ‘The Rise of the Afrikaner Reich’

John C.G. Röhl: ‘The Kaiser and England during the Boer War’

Plaatje: Chapter XXIII The Boer Rebellion

Related Work:

A Differing Outlook – Smuts and Maritz A differing outlook

Union to Banana Republic From Union to Banana Republic!

The Story of Jopie Fourie What about Jopie?

Colourised images with greatest thanks and appreciation to Jennifer Bosch – Jenny B Colourised online:

A differing outlook

An opposing view, a massacre, a revolt, and a Nazi.

There is an old joke in Afrikaner politics, put two Afrikaners in a room and they will come up with three political parties! 

It’s funny because throughout history it has always proven to be very true, As a nation from the get go, literally from the Great Trek serious schisms have occurred within the Afrikaner culture – from the Great Trek’s “Vlugkommando” where two trekking parties could NOT agree a overall Commando Commander for an assault on the Zulu on the 6th April 1838 and decided instead to have two equal Commanders in equal positions of authority – the result (if you’re a military vet – you guessed it) .. a Zulu victory and the death of 10 Voortrekkers including Piet and Dirkie Uys – the surviving “Vlug” Kommando (meaning “Flee” or ‘run-away’ commando) splitting ways after the battle, both accusing each other of been “Veraaiers” (traitors) and heading off on their respective treks.

So, as humorous as it is seriously tragic, nothing represents this dichotomy of views more so than this image of Jan Smut’s Commando during the South African War (1899-1902) a.k.a. The 2nd Boer War. In it are two leaders who have – right upfront – two massively differing opinions, two completely differing views of life and vastly differing outlooks on the objects of the war and the country as a whole going forward. So much so that it is a surprise that Smuts was even able to command this Commando, that his is arguably one of the most successful ‘Bittereinder’ Commanders of the war is even more surprising, and testament to Smuts’ abilities.

Image: General Jan Smuts’ Commando during the South African War 1899-1902. Smuts and Maritz are seated in the centre – photo colourised by Jennifer Bosch 

So, what’s with this leadership battle – what’s with these vastly differing views? The two people in this famous photograph are Manie Maritz and Jan Smuts, and the composition of the shot by the photographer ironically betrays their future feelings towards one another as an intense dislike of one another would emerge – and even here, almost by purpose, Smuts is seated opposite Maritz for a group portrait and both of them have their backs to one another looking the other way.

This differing view and outlook of these two men would forever taint Smuts’ commando with a mass murder of civilians – something your school history book would have conveniently glanced over – this differing outlook on Afrikanerdom would result in a serious schism in Afrikaner cultural fabric after World War 1, a schism that still exists to this day believe it or not and it would it would even add to the “Nazification” of the Afrikaner far right-wing prior to World War 2 and as a result create a diametrically opposing view of Afrikaner identity itself. 

What, Maritz, Smuts … mass murder and Nazism – you smoking your socks again right Mr. Dickens? Well, no – let me explain … and if you are a fan of the 1914 Boer Revolt and a Boer Romantic looking to this revolt as the bedrock of Boer stoicism and independence – now is the time to look away, as this next bit is going to sting a little. 

Let’s get this out upfront. General Manie Maritz, as the leader of the 1914 Boer revolt does not end up a very redeemable figure in history bathed in glory, instead he ends up as a murderer, an antisemite, a racist and a devout Nazi … the bit your Nationalist inspired school history book did not want you to know about him … the inconvenient truth.

An opposing view

Let’s start with Boer War 2, and upfront Maritz and Smuts are already at different points of view in Smuts’ Commando. It starts with Maritz’ rank, role and appointment in the Commando. Maritz would maintain Smuts gave him the rank of ‘General’ as a field commission – in the Republican Armies this was known as a “veggeneraal” or ‘fighting-general’. Deneys Reitz, Smuts’ long-time right-hand man, confidant, and friend, has a different view and claimed Maritz was only a “leader of various rebel bands” and never given a Generalship – as Reitz was also on Smuts’ staff, Reitz would have known if Martiz was made a ‘veggeneraal’or not.

The two leaders upfront also differ on leadership style, experience and philosophy. Smuts is a skilled lawyer and academic, he is a ‘Philosopher General’ and takes a very holistic view to the fighting seeking a consolidation of ‘white civilisation’ in Southern Africa between Boer and Brit as its final object. Smuts also has an outward look, seeking through the ‘consolidation of the white races’ good neighbourliness with all South Africa’s peoples, including South Africa’s ‘coloureds’ and ‘blacks’. Maritz on the other hand is a ‘Soldier’s General’, he starts his military career as a guard at the Johannesburg Fort after the Jameson Raid and subsequently becomes a ZARP Policeman. Maritz has a reputation as a “thug” he’s a devout Boer Republican, he wants nothing to do with reconciliation with the ‘hated’ British, he is inwardly focussed and views ‘coloureds’ and ‘blacks’ very suspiciously.

So, Smuts and Maritz are fundamentally different in their leadership styles, outlooks and personalities and it would come to a head towards the end of Boer War 2 in what was to become known as the ‘Leliefontein massacre’. For those who have an abiding admiration for Smuts, now is also the time to also look away, as some historians have tarnished Smuts with the title of “mass murderer” as it took place ‘under his watch’ so to speak, but the culprit is really Maritz – so what happened?

A Massacre 

Over two days, starting on the 31st January 1902, the ‘noble’ Boer bittereinder effort of the Boer War, and even Jan Smuts, would emerge forever tarnished by what is considered by some as the first massacre of innocents of the 20th Century. 

A rather dishonourable title and achievement not often emphasised by Boer War ‘Republican’ historians, journalists and commentators – rather conveniently ignored by them is the nature of this phase of the war really – the repeated targeting, pillaging and ransacking of mission stations, ‘hensopper’ farms (farms belonging to Boers who surrendered prematurely during the amnesty), ‘Joiner’ farms (farms belonging to Boers who joined the British) and even tribal villages by marauding Bittereinder groupings. This period also sees many Black and Coloureds executed by Bittereinder Boer firing squads and hangman nooses, mainly charged with “spying” for or “working” with the British. It is not such a ‘glorious’ end to a noble fight to the end, as romantic Boer war novelists would have you believe – its harsh war – bloody and revengeful, and nobody in the ‘Guerrilla’ phase of the Boer War comes out smelling of roses – not the British with their tactic of Scorched Earth and certainly not the Boers with their tactic of Marauding.

Manie Maritz

Many of these actions were of little real tangible military value in the war against the British and have more to do with retribution than anything else, and front and centre in this controversial phase is Manie Maritz, who whilst he is under Jan Smuts’ command, rides into the ‘Nama’ missionary town of Leliefontein in the far north west Cape – deep inside the British Cape Colony. Here Maritz immediately detains the Methodist missionary – Barnabas Links – who was acting in place of the absent Rev J.G. Locke. Maritz subsequently reads out a proclamation threatening death to both residents and the town’s missionaries alike if they are found guilty of aiding or abetting the British.

The Nama people (the local people made up of a mix of KhoiKhoi, Namibian and Tswana) and their missionaries are British subjects living in a British colony and fearing for their lives don’t take lightly to the proclamation threat and become steadily agitated. From here out there is a lot of conflicting account, in detaining Barnabas Links a rather strong verbal exchange over jurisdiction and authority takes place and some say Links strikes Maritz with his stick, others say Maritz strikes Links with his sjambok. Either way, a ‘fists and knives” scuffle breaks between a group of citizens and Maritz’ men, one Republican is injured, Links is also injured, and Maritz and his men manage to disentangle themselves from the melee, leaving 8 Leliefonteiners dead, and ride back to their rendezvous camp.

That night, Maritz and his men become indignant at their treatment at the hands of the Leliefonteiners and elect to exact revenge by wiping the missionary off the face of the earth. So, the next morning the Commando detachment numbering about 100 mounted Boers attacks the missionary in full force. The Nama and their missionaries are no match for a fully armed Boer commando, having some antiquated muskets they try and hold off the assault and most take refuge in the mission building. A further 27 Leliefonteiners are killed (some accounts say a total of 43) and approximately 100 are injured. 

Image: Modern day image of the Methodist Mission Church, Leliefontein (erected in 1855, it was the third church built at the mission station).

Maritz then directs all the surviving women and children, male survivors, and the wounded (including Links) be taken away in chains to the Boer positions surrounding Okiep, one account points to the local blacksmith been instructed to fashion iron shackles for this purpose. Some accounts also point to general violence been meted out by the Boers against surviving Leliefonteiners after the skirmish and ‘refugees’ been hunted down and killed.

Maritz instructs that the mission station be pillaged and then burned down – all the captured sheep and grain are to be forwarded to a Boer supply depot. The mission station is completely destroyed and the dead Leliefonteiners are left where they died – and here they remained unburied for months.

So, how does Smuts and his General Staff react to the news that a detachment of his Commando had ransacked a mission station and killed over 30 poorly armed or unarmed British civilians in a revenge attack? Deneys Reitz on arriving at the destroyed mission station described the scene as follows:

“We found the place sacked and gutted and among the rocks beyond the buried houses lay 20 or 30 dead Hottentots, still clutching their antiquated muzzleloaders. This was Maritz’s handiwork. He had ridden into the station with a few men to interview the European missionaries, when he was set upon by armed Hottentots, he and his escorts narrowly escaping with their lives. To avenge the insult, he returned the next morning with a stronger force and wiped out the settlement, which seemed to many of us a ruthless and unjustifiable act. General Smuts said nothing but I saw him walk past the boulders where the dead lay, and on his return he was moody and curt… we lived in an atmosphere of rotting corpses for some days.”

Deneys Reitz

Smuts, although clearly unimpressed with Maritz, actually comes through for Maritz in accounting the massacre in his letter to General de la Rey, he down-plays the instance as a “close shave” for Maritz and somewhat covers up the incident, citing that Maritz was attacked by a knobkerrie whilst acting as a peace envoy, it was taken as a sign of attack and only “8 hottentots” were killed due “to misunderstanding and ignorance” (Nel, Eben: Kaapse rebelle van die Hantam-karoo, p 461).

Some commentators point to this as collusion, as Maritz is completely exonerated and never held to account for the massacre – whereas similar instances of ‘murdering’ civilians in the cases of the Australian officer Lt. Harry ‘Breaker’ Morant and the Boer Commandant Gideon Scheepers landed them both in front of their respective firing squads.

To further demonstrate just how off the hinge Maritz was, the last real Boer action of the Boer War was when Jan Smuts’ Commando laid siege to the mining town of Okiep in the British Cape Colony in April, 1902. On hearing the news of the Peace Conference, Reitz writes “General Smuts set to work at once. Next morning a messenger was sent into O’Okiep, to advise the garrison that both sides were to refrain front active military operations while the Congress lasted”.

Jan Smuts then left the siege of O’okiep to take part in the final Peace talks at Vereeniging at the end of April 1902. With Smuts away Manie Maritz decided to attack Okiep with the idea of literally wiping the entire town off the map, using the commandeered Namaqua United Copper Company locomotive ‘Pioneer’ – which was used to propel a mobile bomb in the form of a wagonload of dynamite into the besieged town. The attack failed when the train derailed, snagged upon a barbed wire fence which wrapped around the points, spilling the dynamite upon the ground which burnt out harmlessly. 

The exercise could have resulted in killing large numbers of women and children (mainly coloured) who sheltered behind the defences, the failure of the operation was a blessing at a time when deliberations at the Vereeniging peace talks potentially heralded the end of the conflict. Smuts would again gloss over the incident and cover for Maritz when he stated that the railway was still intact after the incident anyway, and since there were women and children in Okiep town, all the commando was allowed to do was to give the good citizens of Okiep a “tremendous fright with a harmless explosion.”

Images: General Jan Smuts and General Christiaan Beyers at the Vereeniging Peace negotiations (left), and the locomotive ‘Pioneer’ used by Maritz to try and blow up the town of Okiep in Smuts’ absence (right).

Smuts’ disposition to treating treasonous, rebellious and insubordinate Boer commanders with ‘kid gloves’ in the hopes of placating and consolidating their views to see his way on things would be Smuts’ greatest ‘Achilles heel’ – as there would be no such quarter given in the way they would view or treat him in future. Which brings us to the next instance – The Boer revolt of 1914.

A Revolt

Much has been written on the Boer Revolt of 1914, but let’s understand the ‘differing’ view between Smuts and Maritz in the lead up and then the instigation of the revolt itself. Where Smuts was involved in negotiating the Peace at Vereeniging to end the Boer War in 1902, Maritz as part of his leader element would have none of it. When peace was made, the burghers of the erstwhile Republics were obliged to lay down their arms and sign an oath of allegiance to the British monarch – Maritz refused and instead he slipped over the border into German South West Africa (modern Namibia).

In German South West Africa (GSWA), Maritz would become embroiled in another massacre, this time the Hereto and Namaqua genocide – which as irony goes it is the first recorded case of Germans using the concentration camp system along with the resultant mass death (something ignored by both Hermann Göring and Adolf Hitler when they solely laid the blame on the British for “inventing” concentration camps and the “Genocide” of the Boers – in their book white deaths count, black deaths don’t seem to count – and these two criminals were are also happy to try and deflect Germany’s real crimes of genocide).

Returning to South Africa by sneaking back over the border, Maritz is briefly arrested in the British Colony of the Transvaal for not signing the oath of allegiance (and therefore still a combatant) – it’s a forewarning of a general dislike of his deep-seated dislike of the British. He is ultimately released and joins up again as a Transvaal Policeman.

Smuts on the other hand at this time in 1909 is concerning himself with Union, the Union conference on the back of the Peace of Vereeniging specifies an expanded Union border to incorporate Britain’s Southern Rhodesia colony as a 5th Province along with the incorporation of the British protectorates of Bechuanaland (Botswana), Lesotho and Swaziland. By doing this the Boer and the Brits agreed ‘Union’ negotiations are hoping to gain balance and reconciliation between Boer and Brit interests in the region, although now all under the “British family of nations” as specified in the Vereeniging Peace Treaty – Jan Smuts, Louis Botha and all the other significant Boer Generals – De la Rey, Hertzog etc are all consolidating to ensure this new ‘Union’ is managed by the Boers and not the Brits, which is in fact the subsequent outcome when The Union of South Africa is formed in 1910 – the South African Party, consisting of Botha, Smuts, De la Rey, Hertzog etc. win the majority seats.

Image: The borders of ‘Greater South Africa’ as outlined in the Union conference in 1909 – phase one – the Limpopo River marks the border of South Africa, phase two – Zambezi River marks the border and phase three – the Ruvuma River marks the border, this is Smuts’ map, note his personal notations ‘A’ and ‘B’.

The arrival of World War 1 in 1914 is both a blessing and a curse for the Boer led government of the newly formed Union of South Africa. Both Botha as Prime Minister and Smuts as his ‘right hand man’ were walking a tight rope – as Boer commanders they represented a faction of the new “Union”, balancing the two small old Boer Republic’s politics and laws with those of all the British colonies and protectorates surrounding them (six large British territories and their interests in them in effect) – so they are obliged to support Britain as the major player in the region, and honour their word to them, the oath that brought about peace – that’s the ‘curse’. 

The ‘blessing’ to the Union government is that the war presents them with an ideal opportunity to realise the expansive border of ‘Greater South Africa’ as envisioned and concluded in the Union conference in 1909 – as this border also specifies the eventual inclusion of German South West Africa into South Africa in the first phase of the ‘Greater’ South Arica Union and eventually even German East Africa would be included in the second phase of South Africa’s territorial advancement.

So it’s really no surprise, that when the decision to go to war is put to the vote in the Boer led and very independent Union of South Africa parliament (at Union, Britain takes a figurehead role, the South African Union’s Parliament and legal construct is not governed by Westminster, its fee to make its own laws) – and the result is not what your school history teacher plugged – it’s a staggering vote of confidence by nearly all the Boer MP’s favouring going to war alongside Britain (and France) against Germany, by a landslide – literally. Consider the result.

92 = For invasion of German South West Africa by the Union of South Africa

12 = Against

So, as to the ‘majority’ of Afrikaners NOT wanting war with Germany, that is simply untrue, the Afrikaner community’s representatives in Parliament were overwhelmingly in favour of war against Germany. This is also where some ‘Boer Romantic’ commentators on the 1914 Revolt make a fundamental mistake, the Union of South Africa’s decision to conquer German South West Africa (Namibia) was NOT just a service to the ‘British Empire’ – it was largely in service to the objects of The Union of South Africa and its own territorial expansion ambitions and the prescribed ‘sphere of influence’ over the Southern African region as a whole (as agreed by all Boer and British leaders involved in the Union conference in 1909).

Image: Political cartoon of the day captures the Union’s territorial ambitions

Smuts, as the Minister of Defence at this time had also been busy amalgamating the armed forces of the republics with those of the colonial citizen force regiments to form the Union Defence Force i.e. the UDF (in much the same way as the SADF was amalgamated with other forces in 1994 to form the SANDF – with the same challenges). 

The UDF had taken shape to consist of a small contingent of permanent force, but the backbone would remain voluntarily forces in a two-stream approach, the voluntary ‘English’ colonial citizen force regiments – Transvaal Scottish, Royal Natal Carbineers, Royal Durban Light Infantry etc and the voluntary ‘Afrikaans’ citizen force “skiet” Commandos known as the ‘Rifle Association Mounted Infantry’ in parallel to them (the old Republic’s commando system in effect). It was a careful construct to keep everyone happy, but the point is this, it was NOT “British” – Imperial British troops had returned to the United Kingdom, any engagement the Union of South Africa was going to fight in World War 1 in Africa, whether foreign or domestic, was going to be made up of ‘South Africans’ and led by ‘South Africans’ – and commanded by the old Republic’s ‘Bittereinder’ Boer Generals – primarily Botha (as Prime Minister was Commander in Chief) and Smuts (as Botha’s Minister of Defence). 

Smuts was sensitive to the fact that many Afrikaners shared German heritage and they (falsely) believed that Germany extensively supported the Boer cause during Boer War 2 – ‘falsely’ because in fact, Germany was happy to ‘sell’ them arms (as did the British arms manufacturers) at a premium and send some medical assistance later on, however Germany withdrew their support officially – they provided no troops and no substantial funding to the Republican Boer War effort whatsoever. 

Kaiser Wilhelm II

Kaiser Wilhelm II, although sending a letter to Kruger congratulating him on the Jameson Raid victory (given the Boer nation their false sense of ‘support’), in fact refused point blank to receive any Boer representations and after the ‘Black Week’ British defeats to the Boers in late 1899, he and his Generals compiled a military strategy, not to help the Boers, but to help the British win the war (he was after all related to the British monarchy – part of the family so to speak) and shared it with them instead – Kaiser Wilhelm II even proudly proclaiming at the end of the Boer War that the British had followed his plan precisely as he had outlined it to them and it was the German plan that won the war for the British – not Field Marshal Frederick Robert’s plan and as inconvenient truths go the Kaiser’s plan involved scorched earth policies and concentration camps. (see: John C.G. Röhl: The Kaiser and England during the Boer War). Now, I bet none of this was in your Nationalistic inspired history teachings.

Ethnic Germans (local and foreign) volunteering to join Boer Commandos also qualified very few (550 odd) – far more Anglo-Irish, Dutch and Flemish joined the Boers (5,500 odd). A Boer leader delegation, including Botha and de Wet visited Germany after the war in 1902, and although they received a royal welcome and ovations, they were not officially received – they did raise a little money from private donators and a Boer help fund, but that’s it. However, all this still did not resonate with many in the Boer community who almost illogically saw Germany as an Ally. 

Smuts would argue the case for war, not on the basis of warring against Germany on the side of ‘Britain’, but for supporting the other old Boer Republic’s supporters – France, Belgium and the Netherlands in their war against a hostile and aggressive Germany busy de-stabilising western and eastern Europe, and Smuts was very aware of the vast majority of Boers had Dutch, Belgian and French roots, as opposed to the ones with German roots. He would use the same argument again for his declaration of war against Germany in World War 2.

Smuts however anticipated that the decision to go to war, although largely supported by the Afrikaner political elite and leadership, would have with it a handful of resignations from the Union’s Defence Force from those strongly in favour of Germany and whose sheer hatred of the British superseded everything, and the Union government received exactly that – a “handful” – nothing that would fundamentally compromise the UDF’s fighting ability or construct. 

Of the handful of resignations which were received, a rather long-winded one came from General Christiaan Beyers, the UDF’s Commandant General in charge of the Active Citizen Force and his was the most important resignation. Prior to the decision to go to war, Smuts and Botha’s old friend and highly respected comrade, General Koos de la Rey had been one of the handful of Parliamentary Ministers vocally against the decision to invade GSWA and advocated neutrality, and because of his popularity his opinion held massive sway over the old Boer Republic’s Afrikaner electorate  – nevertheless he was persuaded by Louis Botha and Jan Smuts not to take actions which may arouse the Boers, he then held a political rally for 800 Boers and took a reconciliatory approach – contrary to what the attendees expected of him. 

Images: General Christiaan Frederik Beyers (left) and General Jacobus Herculaas de la Rey (right)

De la Rey seemed torn over his decision, and he was then targeted by General Beyers to join him for meeting with Major Jan Kemp, a mid-line UDF officer who had also resigned – the purpose of the meeting; Beyers and Kemp wanted to persuade de la Rey to take a stronger stand and initiate more Union Defence Force resignations to compromise its fighting capability. Joining the conspiracy was another heavyweight – the significant Boer General and Parliamentary Minister, Christiaan de Wet.

What follows next is well documented, however the generally accepted and investigated history concludes; General De la Rey and General Beyers were travelling in a soft top sedan car to their meeting with Major Kemp and did not stop at a Police blockade set up to capture a notorious gang of robbers and murderers called The Foster Gang. One of the Policeman fired a warning shot into the road to get them to stop, the bullet ricocheted and hit De la Rey, killing him. 

It was tragedy – plain and simple, and both Botha and Smuts were devasted at the loss of their friend, as a signal to the inevitable accusations of ‘political assassination’ both Botha and Smuts attended De la Rey’s funeral in front of thousands of mourning Boers, they appeared without any bodyguard at the mercy of the assembly – a token of no malice intended, and there were no protests or accusations from the mourners. 

Regardless, despite sound and tested enquiries and court cases, and the Nationalists having full scope and the resources at hand for 40 years to uncover a ‘plot’ – no concrete proof has emerged of a plot by Smuts to kill De la Rey whatsoever – ‘conspiracy theory’ nevertheless grew out of the incident which would plague Smuts in future years, and it still does.

It is also generally understood that with the death of De La Rey, that would probably have been the extent of Boer resistance to the war, and it would have devolved into simple political protest and peaceful demonstrations, had it not been for one man … the subject of the differing view – none other than Lt. Colonel Manie Maritz, who by now had joined the UDF and commanded a small UDF force at Upington, near the border with German South West Africa (GSWA).

The day after de la Rey’s funeral, Kemp, Beyers and de Wet addressed a large crowd at Lichtenberg, calling on protest meetings against the decision to invade GSWA. Manie Maritz however took a more robust position than Kemp, Beyers and de Wet, he instead went into open sedition and started ignoring Smuts’ and his other Commander’s orders been sent to him. Intel told Smuts that Maritz had joined the Germans, however contradictory to Smuts’ usual manner of decisiveness, he vacillated instead hoping to persuade Maritz not to revolt and get him to see reason. 

Images: General Christiaan Rudolf de Wet (left) and Major Jan Christoffel Greyling Kemp (right) in his UDF dress uniform.

Not dissuaded by Smuts and bent on a sedition, Maritz resigned his commission from the Union Defence Force and openly rebelled on 9 October, taking 300 odd of his UDF soldiers with him when he went over to the Germans.

Major Barend ‘Ben’ Bouwer was sent to deal with Maritz’ sedition and insubordination (Bouwer had also been a ‘Veggeneraal’ in Smuts’ commando during the Boer War and as irony goes was alongside Maritz when he sent the dynamite train into O’okiep). Maritz took Bouwer prisoner along with his fellow officers, he was subsequently released and sent back with the ultimatum from Maritz to the Union Government to the effect that:

That unless the Union Government guaranteed safe passage of his fellow plotting Generals (De Wet, Beyers, Kemp et al), to his position on the GSWA border by the 11th October he would immediately attack General Brits’s UDF forces preparing to invade GSWA and then he would invade the Union of South Africa.

Major Ben Bouwer reported that Maritz was in possession of some guns belonging to the Germans, and that he held the rank of General commanding the German troops. He also had a force of Germans under him in addition to his own rebel commando. Maritz arrested all the UDF officers and men under his command who were unwilling to join the Germans, and then sent them forward as prisoners into German South West Africa.

To drive Maritz’ point home, Major Bouwer was shown an agreement between Maritz and the Governor of German South West Africa guaranteeing the independence of the Union as a Republic, ceding Walfish Bay and certain other portions of the Union to the Germans, and undertaking that the Germans would only invade the Union on the invitation of Maritz.

Major Bouwer was shown numerous telegrams and helio messages dating back to the beginning of September. Maritz boasted that he had ample guns, rifles, ammunition, and money from the Germans, and that he would overrun the whole of South Africa.

Image: Rare image of Lt. Col Maritz, front and centre in his South African Union uniform and his staff behind him – his  ‘Agterryer’ (man-servant) is at his heels (It’s the man-servant’s expression and position that is most interesting as in many ways it gives away the complete disregard Maritz felt for people of colour).

In response to Maritz’ action and ultimatum, on 12 October, the Union government imposed martial law across the whole of South Africa. On proclaiming martial law, Smuts, the eternal reconciler, immediately called again for “reason” and urged the rebels not to be swayed by “foreign agents influencing them”.

The ‘Maritz Revolt’ as it would now become known was underway, and with their sedition hand now played by Maritz in the Cape Colony, his fellow conspirators – Beyers, Kemp and de Wet had no choice, now ‘in for a penny and in for a pound’ they all broke their ties with the Union Defence Force, resigned their commissions and went into open revolt against their lawfully elected government – raising Commando’s in the Transvaal and Orange Free State to come to Maritz’ aid

The revolt is well documented and carries with it a number of consequences for Jan Smuts, and we will cover these in future Observation Post articles called “Boer War 3 and Beyond” and “What about Jopie?” (look out for them). However, the long and short of it from a military historian’s perspective let’s look briefly look at the objective, the capability and strategy to achieve the objective and the outcome.

The stated objective: Maritz issued a proclamation by way of objective – “the former South African Republic and Orange Free State as well as the Cape Province and Natal are proclaimed free from British control and independent, and every White inhabitant of the mentioned areas, of whatever nationality, are hereby called upon to take their weapons in their hands and realize the long-cherished ideal of a Free and Independent South Africa.”

In other words, to take by force, the former British Colonies and re-start the Boer War, resistance to the declaration by any “white” in the entire Union of South Africa would be treated by Maritz’ Provisional Government as treasonous. 

Capability: To attain this objective, the Rebels raised 11,476 Boers. Union Defence Force strength was around 32,000 troops (so in essence the Rebels were outnumbered 3 to 1). Important to note here that of the 32,000 UDF troops, 20,000 were Afrikaners – mainly ex-Commando and most of them in the UDF’s mounted infantry ‘Rifle Associations’ (the old Commandos). General Louis Botha would primarily use the Rifle Associations to counteract the rebellion, insistent that the British ‘stay out of it’, this was going to be the Boer leaders sorting their differences out between themselves – so ‘Brother against Brother’ and in effect the UDF’s Afrikaners outnumbered the rebel Afrikaners 2 to 1.

Images: General Smuts (left) and General Botha (right) as depicted on cigarette cards during WW1.

Important also to note here as to capability, the Rebel force was not made up entirely of first rate ex-UDF soldiers going against their counterparts, the rebel force was made up primarily of destitute Orange Free State Boers having come through a drought and agricultural reforms on the back of the devastation of their farms during Boer War 2. 

Many of these Free State Boers as has been pointed out by historians like Sandra Swart (Desperate Men: The 1914 Rebellion and the Polities of Poverty’ in South African Historical Journal, Vol 42) and John Bottomly (The Orange Free State and the Rebellion of 1914: the influence of industrialisation, poverty and poor whitism: pages 29-73), were simply desperate ‘Bywoners’ (landless farmers or share-croppers) promised a better life if the rebellion was successful. 

Consider the statistics of the Boer rebels and from where they came, and you’ll see how the above statement holds true. 7,123 (62%) of the Boer Rebels came from the Orange Free State – the least populace, most rural and economically worse off province in the Union. As an aside, to gauge the extent of success of Maritz’ proclamation and its resonance across the broader Afrikaner community across the whole of South Africa, he was only able to motivate 1,215 (12%) of the Boer Rebels from the Cape province – the biggest province in the Union. The balance coming from the Transvaal, and no real support from Natal.

The Potchefstroom Herald at the time best tried to explain why there was no traction behind the revolt from Cape Afrikaners and the black/brown African communities in this quote – and not surprisingly it boils down to the lack of suffrage and plain racism in the old Republics;

“When these high officers of the Defence Force in Transvaal and Orange “Free” State rebelled and joined the Germans with their commandos, the Dutchmen of the Cape (presumably because “they vote side by side with the Kafirs”) denounced the treachery in unmistakable terms. The South African party at the Cape beat up its followers to the support of the Government, and the voice of the Cape section of the Dutch Reformed Church rang from pulpit and platform in denunciation of disloyalty and treason. But in the Northern Provinces, where white men are pampered and guarded by the Government against the so-called humiliation of allowing native taxpayers to vote, there the rebellion, having been regarded with seeming approval, gained a marvellous impetus.

Plaatjie: The Boer Rebellion – snippet from the Potchefstroom Herald

As a unified, coherent, trained and fully armed force, the Rebel Boers were not. Desperate and landless farmers in the main up against fully trained, motivated, even mechanised in some instances, and properly armed UDF soldiers on a 3:1 numerical advantage – the Rebels were no match and it quickly showed. The long and short the rebellion was almost immediately repelled and then very quickly crushed as Botha’s UDF Rifle Associations with some Regiment elements in support hunted the Rebel Commandos down as they tried to make their way to assist Maritz on the GSWA border.

Image: The last pursuit of Major Kemp. A South African Union ‘Flying column’ crossing the Orange River after him.

As Dr David Katz in his work ‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917) points out. Jan Smuts, eternally the one Boer General keeping a level head and seeking reconciliation and understanding, and when it was clear the rebellion had failed, Smuts called for a ‘Blanket Amnesty’ across the board for the Boer Rebel leaders and their troops if they laid down their arms. General Louis Botha, the Commander in Chief, on the other hand took a much harder and less reconciliatory line than his colleague Smuts – Botha agreed to an Amnesty, but for the rank and file only, the Boer Rebel leaders would have to be prosecuted. The amnesty, excluding the Rebel leadership, was in put place from 12th to 21st November 1914, and with it the 1914 Boer Rebellion was effectively over, by the end of November General de Wet’s force alone was down to only 40 men. Rear actions and isolated and desperate battles continued to be fought for a couple of months by woefully under-strength hard liners refusing surrender and amnesty, but by the end of January 1915 the rebellion was over.  

Of the Rebel leadership now having surrendered, Botha and Smuts would again be especially magnanimous, considering the Union was in a state of war externally and in a state of martial law internally – and this was 1914 ‘World War 1’ – people were put in front of firing squads for ‘cowardice’ and being AWOL (absent without leave) – let alone ‘sedition’ and ‘treason’. Smuts would treat the Rebels in general very kindly, literally with kid gloves, all the time urging reason, understanding and reconciliation.

Of the main rebel leaders, General Christiaan Beyers tragically drowned in the Vaal River whilst attempting to desperately evade capture on 8th December 1914. 

General Christiaan de Wet was captured during the amnesty and sentenced to six years imprisonment, with a fine of £2000, he was released by Botha and Smuts after one year’s imprisonment, after giving a written promise to take no further part in politics. 

Major Jan Kemp was captured on the 2nd of February 1915 and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment, with a fine of £1000. However, a mere 10 months into his sentence Botha and Smuts agreed to release him – also on the condition that he may not participate in any politics (a promise Kemp almost immediately broke entering politics as a National Party MP under Hertzog in 1920 and again under Malan’s ‘Reformed’ National Party after 1948).

Lt. Colonel Manie Maritz would evade capture and escape into German South West Africa, at the conclusion of the GSWA campaign and the Union Defence Force’s victory and annexation of the territory (the first real victory for the Allies against Imperial Germany in WW1), Maritz would again evade capture, going into self-imposed exile in Angola, Spain, Portugal and then Mozambique.

Of all the other leaders – junior and mid-level rebel officers who were also captured. All were sentenced to short imprisonments and fines, almost all of them walking free within a year … except for just one man … Captain Jopie Fourie was executed for ‘High Treason’ having not resigned his UDF officers commission, captured still wearing his UDF officer’s uniform and opening fire on his fellow UDF troops whilst under a ‘white flag’ of truce (this was WW1 after all and there was no way anyone could get him out of this one with a no-nonsense leader like Botha as Prime Minister, not in a month of Sundays  – more on him in a later article “What about Jopie?”).

To pay for all their fines the Bloemfontein newspaper ‘Het Volksblad’ established the ‘Halfkroonfonds’ (Half-a-Crown Fund). Shop owners and other people whose property had been damaged during the rebellion were able to claim compensation, leading to the establishment of the Helpmekaar Beweging (the Help-One-Another Movement). By the end of 1917, all the debts were paid.

Of the handling of the 1914 Maritz Revolt, Louis Botha would summarise Smuts role and leadership, when he said of him;

“Nobody can appreciate sufficiently the great work General Smuts has done – greater than any man throughout this unhappy period. At his post day and night, his brilliant intellect, his calm judgement, his amazing energy and his undaunted courage have been assets of inestimable value to the Union in her hour of trial.”

Prime Minister Louis Botha

As a rebellion with any chance of success consider just what a small minority they represented – no Cape Province or Natal Afrikaner would really come near it, of the Afrikaners in the Transvaal and OFS they were unable to raise an effective fighting force, the vast majority of Afrikaners in the armed forces remained in the UDF, the vast majority of Afrikaner political leaders remained behind Botha and Smuts and they gained no traction whatsoever to raise anything from the Black and Coloured communities (the real ‘vast’ majority) – no “Askari” troops whatsoever, and they got no support whatsoever from the white South Africans of British decent – who by way of ‘white’ population were not insignificant in size, commanding massive swathes of white population groups in the Transvaal (most of Johannesburg and the reef), Natal (most of Durban) and the Cape Colony (especially in Cape Town and the Eastern Cape) . 

In the end the Maritz revolt did little in terms of its military objectives, it managed to delay the invasion plans of GSWA for a couple of months only whilst the UDF dealt with it, however in the end the GSWA campaign was a decisive victory for the Union and the territory successfully annexed under ‘Greater South Africa’ in a trusteeship – as was the Union’s expressed casus belli.

Image: General Botha (right) accepts the surrender of German South-West Africa from Lt Col Francke, (left) at Kilo, 9 July 1915.

What the Rebellion did however do was plant the seeds for political division and is one of the key propaganda tools used by the Nationalists to create the deep split in Afrikaner outlooks. Louis Botha would look at the Rebellion as complete folly, a waste of time and an utter waste of life, his opponents would look at it rather romantically instead – a sort of – ‘Boer Last Stand’. It stands today in some Afrikaner communities, precisely because of its ‘Romanticism’ and ‘political currency’ and not because of its military prowess or even its unattainable objectives.  

Now, back to Maritz and Smuts, the subjects of this vastly differing outlook on Afrikanerdom, because it would manifest itself again just prior to the Second World War.

A Nazi

Manie Maritz decided to end his self-imposed exile after the 1st World War ended and returned to the Union of South Africa in 1923. The Smuts government treating him very kindly by way of reconciliation, and all things considered for a crime as serious as treason he received a short imprisonment of three years. Luckily for Maritz, Hertzog’s National party won the 1924 election and Maritz was granted full amnesty and walked free having only served three months.

Maritz took to farming, but came under the influence of National Socialism (Nazism) in 1936 and founded a ‘anti-parliamentary’(dictatorship led) party called the Volksparty (People’s Party) in 1940. Maritz also took control of another ultra-right, national socialist, pro-Nazi movement initially set up by Colonel J.C. Laas (the first Commandant-General of the Ossewabrandwag) called “Die Boerenasie” (The Boer Nation), he then merged the Volksparty with Die Boerenasie and continued under the “Die Boerenasie” banner. He became known as a very outspoken proponent of The Third Reich and admirer of Adolf Hitler. During this time, he had also developed a theory about the alleged Jewish conspiracy and interference in South African and world politics and became a fanatical Antisemite. He would detail his Antisemitic and National Socialist views in his autobiography ‘My Lewe en Strewe’ (My life and Aspiration) which he published in 1939, a book regarded as lacking in objectivity, inciting racial hatred and like his hero Adolf Hitler’s book ‘Mein Kampf’ (My Struggle) Maritz’ book was full of emotional and racially driven rhetoric. He was even taken to court over all the anti-Semitic statements he made in his book, found guilty of fomenting racial hatred and he was fined £75.

Images: Maritz’ book ‘My Lewe an Sterwe’, later political portrait and the ‘Die Dappere Bloodskapper’ second world war mouthpiece for The Ossewabrandwag and Maritz’ Boerenasie.

Die Boerenasie rose to prominence under Manie Maritz, in September 1939 Jan Smuts declared war against Nazi Germany and once again you could not find a more vastly differing view than that of Smuts and Maritz. Smuts was extremely wary of the dangers of Nazism and Adolf Hitler, who he accused of being a “false messiah” and whose Nazi symbology of the Swastika Smuts called “the crooked cross” in reference to it being a corruption of true Christianity. Smuts was so anti-Nazism that he would take the Union of South Africa to war again to fight it, and once again at ‘war’ with Maritz. 

On antisemitism, here again Smuts held a polarising opposite view to Maritz. Smuts was a devout Zionist, he believed in the establishment of Israel as nation state, supported Jewish immigration and refugees (even controversially as Prime Minister he was involved in rescuing 200 Jewish orphans from the ‘Pogroms’ in the Ukraine in 1921, bringing them to safety in South Africa). Smuts supported the ‘Balfour Agreement’ which gave rise to Israel, he was also a personal friend of Chaim Weizmann, the President of the Zionist Organization. Weizmann went on to become the first President of Israel. Smuts is so loved and honoured in Israel that even today a kibbutz in Ramat Yohanan is named in his honour.

It is however difficult to say if Smuts would have interned Maritz again for his Nazi sympathies along with the other strong proponents of Nazism during the 2nd World War as Maritz’ life ended tragically and very early on in the war, he died in a car accident in Pretoria on the 20th December 1940. Probably, had he lived, Smuts and Maritz would have been at extreme loggerheads and Maritz back on the warpath with the Union – and very possibly back in jail.

A completely differing outlook

So, back to the image of Smuts and Maritz on Commando during the South African War (1899-1902) a.k.a. The 2nd Boer War on the masthead. It is hard to think how Smuts and Maritz could find anything in common, and to think they are fighting side by side in common cause against the British, living hard in the bush on horseback and up to their necks in the blood and gore of war – brothers in arms in effect.

Both saw South Africa – from the “Limpopo to the Cape” – even incorporating all the surrounding British protectorates and German South West Africa in addition. Both saw ‘white civilization’ as the steward to develop the region – this was the era of ‘Empire’ after all. Both put their ‘Afrikanerdom’ front and centre and both believe sincerely that only an Afrikaner hegemony in Southern Africa would successfully unlock the region’s potential, and both were prepared to fight for it.

That’s where the similarity ends. Smuts believed the ‘Afrikaner’ led hegemony would only work with an outward, embracing and reconciliatory disposition – and with all the British protectorates, British colonies and British subjects living in ‘Greater South Africa’ in partnership … so, he saw that the future lay only with the co-operation of the British super-power as a steward protecting the region as part of Britain’s family of nations. Progress for Smuts would only lie in establishing peace and co-operation with Britain.

Maritz on the other hand believed in a similar hegemony, only he believed that South Africa would fall under the stewardship of white Afrikaners with Germany as the super-power providing the glue to keep the region stable and prosperous. He believed that the only way the troublesome ‘British’ subjects in the colonies and protectorates would be brought into line was with jack-boot authority – and Germany would provide the Afrikaners with the protection, money, military backing and arms to do so. 

Maritz’s political disposition had its roots in “Krugerism” – a philosophy whereby White Afrikaners were ‘pure’ with an orthodox Calvinist ‘dopper’s’ approach to religion, through God and a theocracy styled republic they had an ordained right to rule over non-Afrikaners and Africans alike – they would have limited or no basic suffrage rights whatsoever in Kruger’s Republic. Maritz’ view so inwardly directed that he demonstrated a deep seated racist and violent response to anything “non-Aryan” (non pure). By 1939 Maritz’ Afrikaner cabal consisted of far-right wing Afrikaner nationalists with Nazi leanings – all of whom adopted or supported Nazism prior to, including and some even after the war – the likes of H.F Verwoerd, F.C Erasmus, Jaap Marais, B.J. Vorster, F.C. Erasmus, Oswald Pirow, Hendrik van den Bergh, Johannes von Moltke, P.O. Sauer, C.R. Swart, P.W. Botha, Eric Louw, Louis Weichardt, Rev. Koot Vorster, Henning Klopper, Albert Hertzog, Dr Nico Diedericks, Piet Meyer, Dr Eben Dönges, Dr Hans van Rensberg etc., etc. All of whom were infusing Afrikanerdom with a heady mix of Christian Nationalism, Oligarchy Republicanism and National Socialism (Nazism).

Smuts’ political disposition on the on the other hand had it roots in “Holism” – a philosophy whereby White Afrikaners lived in an interdependent state with all the cultures and societies surrounding it, he cherished the Cape Franchise, acknowledged Black South African medieval history and although a segregationist for much of his early life, his political philosophy would focus on consolidation, reconciliation and mutual recognition. By 1939 Smuts had abandoned segregationist thinking altogether famously stating that “segregation had fallen on evil days” in 1941 – his thinking had turned to universal suffrage and human rights and his Afrikaner cabal consisted of ‘left’-leaning Afrikaners with liberal suffrage and democratic leanings in the main – they were known as “Smuts-men” and they consisted of people like Deneys Reitz , Kmdt Dolf ‘Oom’ de la Rey, Group Captain ‘Sailor’ Malan, General Dan Pienaar, Group Captain ‘Dutch’ Hugo, Uys Krige, General Kenneth van der Spuy, General George Brink, Jacob Pretorius, Jan Steytler, Captain De Villiers-Graaff, Pieter van der Byl, Dr Ernst Malherbe, Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr etc., etc.

A more vastly different and polarising view of Afrikanerdom you could not find – one inward and one outward.

In conclusion 

So how does it all work out for these two vastly different views of Afrikanerdom? Well, unfortunately we all know the history, and after Smuts’ shock electoral defeat of the Nationalist Afrikaners in 1948, these Afrikaners had a free-reign with complete control of education channels and media channels coupled with ‘gagging’ powers over opposition voices – for 40 long years – in which they also took the opportunity to resurrect Manie Maritz and the ‘Boer Rebels of 1914’  as the true Afrikaner ‘heroes’ of Afrikanerdom and paint Smuts and his Smuts-men as the ‘traitors’. 

The net result, sad to say, is Maritz’ view won out, Maritz would be directly responsible in his rebellion in creating a schism that would break the Afrikaner camp into two distinctive groups and continue to drive a schism through it all the way to the on-set of World War 2 and then Apartheid and beyond.

Thanks largely to leaders like Maritz and advent of the Broederbond’s ‘Centenary Trek’ in 1938 the modern Afrikaner is still seen in South Africa by most other societies in the context of a whites-only ‘Voortrekker’ (pioneer), ‘Boer’ (farmer) hegemony, sometimes with conservative and ‘racist’ leanings – which, as it happened in Maritz’ beloved Nazi Germany put the Afrikaner on the same footing as Nazi Germans in many people’s eyes after the Afrikaner nationalists formally gazetted their eugenically driven ideology of Apartheid in 1948.

The small difference, modern Germany goes to great extent to re-dress, re-educate, reconcile and consolidate their military history and political ideologies from both the 1st World War and the 2nd World War … so as to overcome the tremendous impact of propaganda and conditioning initiated by the National Socialists and ‘open’ minds to the truth. Whereas in South Africa no real deep-seated action of reconciliation, re-education and understanding has taken place to counteract the old Christian Nationalism conditioning and propaganda initiated by the Nationalists, and in many circles the likes of General Christiaan de Wet, General Christian Beyers, Major Jan Kemp, Captain Jopie Fourie, Lt. Col Manie Maritz in active sedition with Germany and eventually the likes of the other Afrikaners flirting with Germany and its ideologies, D.F. Malan, H.F. Verwoerd, B.J. Vorster and P.W. Botha are still held up fervently and sometimes illogically by some as the ‘true’ heroes of Afrikanerdom – as certainly is the case with Maritz.

In all honesty, the challenge for ‘white’ South Africans especially in reviewing, redressing, and balancing their history – and this massively different outlook initiated by the likes of Maritz and Smuts – is to better resurrect the ‘redeemable’ Afrikaners – the iconoclasts, the ones who held the opposing view to Apartheid, the ones who went to war against Imperial Germany and then again against Nazi Germany – Smuts and his ‘Smuts-men’ – NOT the ones who joined hands with Germany and its ideologies. Hold up the true ‘heroes’ to account Afrikanerdom, the ones who demanded suffrage and fought against racist oppression – and believe it or not, there is a very big pool to choose from. Their histories and ‘differing’ views where savagely repressed by the Nationalists and literally scrubbed from our national consciousness – and they need to come to light in order to affect a more balanced outlook on Afrikanerdom – as in truth when we look at it with the hindsight of history, they are really the true ‘ysters’ (heroes) and not the ‘veraaiers’ (traitors). Krugerism, National Socialism, Christian Nationalism, Apartheid and a ‘keep South Africa white’ Verwoerd Republicanism are an abhorrent testament to Afrikaner nationalism as an ideology and an anathema to Afrikanerdom itself.


Written and researched by Peter Dickens 

References: 

Eben Nel; ‘Kaapse rebelle van die Hantam-karoo’

Dr David Katz; ‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917’

Sandra Swart; ‘Desperate Men: The 1914 Rebellion and the Polities of Poverty’ 

John Bottomly; ‘The Orange Free State and the Rebellion of 1914: the influence of industrialisation, poverty and poor whitism’

André Wessels; Afrikaner (Boer) Rebellion (Union of South Africa) 2018.

Brian Bunting; ‘The Rise of the Afrikaner Reich’

John C.G. Röhl: ‘The Kaiser and England during the Boer War’

Plaatje: Chapter XXIII The Boer Rebellion

Colourised images with greatest thanks and appreciation to Jennifer Bosch – Jenny B Colourised on line:

Related Work:

Union to Republic: From Union to Banana Republic!

Boer War Myths: Debunking the myth that the British invented the ‘concentration camp’ and Stealing Republics, gold, diamonds and other myths!

Jan Smuts and Israeli: 200 Jewish orphans saved, the story of Jan Smuts and Issac Ochberg 

Jan Smuts and Balfour: A Kibbutz called Jan Smuts