The Nazification of the Afrikaner Right

Torch Commando Series – Part 1

Apartheid’s ‘lost’ cousin

One of the key reasons the Torch Commando’s leadership was somewhat sidelined and even gagged by the National Party, eventually resulting in the suppression of its legacy and removal from the general consciousness of South Africans is this …. the underpinning of Afrikaner Christian Nationalism with German National Socialism.

To view history in its correct context, one must see the characters in their time, see things from their view – see what issues of the day are driving their actions and thoughts and NOT to see them in the context of 21st Century social constructs and opinions. What this history will show us is that Nazism is not central to Afrikanerdom in any way, shape or form, it manifests itself on the ‘rump’ of Afrikanerdom in a small group of Afrikaner Republican zealots bent on supporting of Germany through all its manifestations from its brand of Imperialism to Nazism. 

Exactly as Nazism did in Germany, it’s a cancer and it could come to infect and destroy the liberal and moderate political constructs of Afrikaner politics and eventually destroy the pillars of democracy inherent in ‘white’ politics as a whole. Furthermore, using the same Nazi dogma of oppression, this minority of nationalist zealots would gerrymander and even violently consolidate themselves into an unassailable position verging on a one-party tyrannical state.

To the Torch Commando members and to other returning South African World War 2 veterans in various political parties and veteran associations, the accent of the National Party to power in 1948 was not so much that their policies of Apartheid sought to repress South African blacks and deny them the franchise – that was secondary to their cause, the major issue presenting itself to these war veterans was that The National Party constituted a Nazi and Fascist threat to South Africa. 

This Nazi and Fascist threat globally was a threat that had just been to war against – in 1945, just three years previously to the National Party coming into power, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini were both dead and 11,023 South Africans died in the process of making that happen – all of them comrades in arms. To say these war veterans had no tolerance for Nazism or Fascism would be an understatement, to say they feared it would be an absolute truism. 

Almost to a man, the National Party leadership and elite had either flirted with Nazism or had become full-blown National Socialists in support of Nazi Germany prior to and during the Second World War. Consider the amount of pro-Nazi and Neo-Nazi organisations that formed on the far right of white Afrikanerdom prior to and during the war, they were:

  • The ‘Ossewabrandwag’ (Ox Wagon Sentinel) – led by Dr. Hans van Rensburg.
  • The ‘Grey-shirts’ – The South African Christian National Socialist Party (SANP) – led by Louis Weichardt.
  • The ‘Democratic Movement’ – led by Manie Wessels and Chris Havemann.
  • The ‘Broederbond’ (Afrikaner Brotherhood) – led by Dr. Nico Diedericks.
  • The ‘New Order’ – led by Oswald Pirow.
  • The ‘Black-shirts’ – the Volksbeweging (People’s Movement) or ‘African Gentile Organisation’ led by H.S. Terblanche.
  • The ‘Brown-shirts’ – The ‘Bond van Nasionale Werkers’ (National Workers Union) led by Johannes Bruwer.
  • The National Socialist Rebels – led by Robey Leibbrandt.
  • The Boerenasie (Boer Nation) movement – led by Manie Maritz.

All these movements and parties were folded into the National Party after the war in one way or another, with many of their members taking up key positions in the National Party in government and related state organs and parastatals.

The ‘Malanazi’ as published in ‘Blikfakkel’ the Torch Commando’s mouthpiece in June 1952 – political cartoon by Berry – served to ridicule Dr. D.F. Malan, the Prime Minister and leader of The National Party, humorously depicted as a poor cousin of Nazism.

With the global condemnation of Nazism and the establishment of the United Nations in the wake of the war to prevent such an ideology threatening mankind again, the National Party were very quick to bury this past – they would choose to identify their resistance to Jan Smuts’ call to arms against Nazi Germany as an ‘anti-British’ one and not a pro-Nazi one (a hangover of hatred for Britain from the Boer War). Nazism in 1948 was political hot potato, in fact it was sheer political suicide and the Nationalists needed to bury their Nazi past and fast.

To do this, in July 1948, mere months after the National Party won the election. The National Party’s new head of Defence – F.C. Erasmus walked into Colonel Charles Powell’s office at the National Intelligence archive, he promptly dismissed Colonel Powell on the spot with 24 hours’ notice. He then proceeded to remove “two lorries” worth of wartime Broederbond and Ossewabrandwag intelligence documentation linking them to Nazism – never to be seen again. 

Formal complaints to the new Minister of Justice to reinstate the military intelligence archive were just ignored. Later, to the continued amazement of all, whenever there was a press conference and B.J. Vorster taken to task on any of his Nazi or Broederbond past he would often smugly turn around to any young whippersnapper journalist trying to set a record straight and simply say “prove it”.

The problem was an organisation called ‘The Torch Commando’ and the war veterans themselves, they were very aware of who in the National Party cabal had been in support of Nazi Germany and its ideology, and in all of their own press, The Springbok Legions’ newsletter ‘Advance’, the Torch Commando’s newsletter ‘Blikfakkel’ and other ‘English’ medium mainstream press, constantly published articles, opinions, letters and cartoons linking Afrikaner Nationalism to Nazism. When in the ’English liberal’ newspaper media whenever Torch Commando leaders were interviewed, they consistently highlighted the National Party’s Nazi root and called them out.

C.R. Swart as portrayed in Advance

So, where there’s smoke there is fire, let’s have a holistic and complete view of how Nazism as an ideology has played a role in the establishment of Christian Nationalism and Apartheid and who are the personalities who are in the National Party who have flirted or adopted the edicts of Nazism into their politics and policies.

The split in the Afrikaner diaspora

The Afrikaner right wing political romance with Germany starts with the South African War (1899-1902) i.e., Boer War 2 and it starts with the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR or Transvaal Republic) and Orange Free State (OFS) Republican Afrikaners – and as an Afrikaner whole they are a minority population – as Afrikaners go the Boer Republics’ Afrikaners combined do not reflect Afrikanerdom nor the views for the majority of Afrikaners in Southern Africa.

The population of South Africa in 1899 was approximately 4.7 million persons with 3.5 million Black Africans making up 74% of the total. Whites, numbering 830,000 made up only 18% of the entire population. Asians and Coloureds total 400,000 or 8%. In total 480,000 are Afrikaans-speaking whites and they total 58% of the white population. 

The Transvaal’s Afrikaners made up only 31% of the total number of Afrikaners in South Africa, with the Orange Free State having 15%. This total of 46% (approximately 219,000 people) shows that when war broke out, less than half of the total Afrikaners in South Africa were in the two republics that declared war on Great Britain. The British Cape Colony and Natal Colony, containing 54% of the Afrikaners, or 260,000 persons never rose up and declared war against the British (Cape Rebels accounted only about 10,000 persons).

The underpinning reality is that the Republics Boer Generals planning the war and the Republics Boer politicians claiming “Africa for the Afrikaner” failed to appreciate that many of the Cape Afrikaners were pretty happy under British administration for the near 100 years they are subjected to it, contented with the Cape franchise, many of them urbanised middle class and well to do and of the landed class many were very wealthy – as a demographic they are fundamentally different to their isolated and struggling frontier farming (Boer) Afrikaner brethren ‘up north’. 

Poverty, famine and hardship was not an overarching issue in the British Colonies for many ‘whites’ (Boer and Brit) in 1899 – nor does it seem that there was any fundamental discontent with their governance, representation and political disposition – and many simply did not view the ZAR’s “Krugerism” as a viable ideology or system of governance for Southern Africa – in fact Prime Minister William Schreiner, John X. Merriman and Jacobus Sauer had moved many in the Cape Colony’s branch of the Afrikaner Bond and Afrikaners in the Cape Colony in general closer to the British way of thinking.

After the Boer War ends in 1902, one of the peace terms is that independence will be guaranteed for the old republics under a British realm of influence, so in 1910, the Union of South Africa is declared as an independent country (a Dominion) with the old Boer ‘Bittereinder’ leadership – Louis Botha and Jan Smuts at the helm. This key split of Afrikaners however remains – many of the Cape, Natal and many Transvaal urbanised Afrikaners relatively happy with the idea of a ‘Union’ – the fusion of British and Afrikaner interests (and they now constitute the majority), however, here is a minority who remain Anglophobes because of the Boer War and are determined to return to the ideals of Republicanism and covert the old ZAR ‘Krugerism’ ideology. 

This schism in white Afrikanerdom is important to the eventual rise of the Broederbond, Ossewabrandwag and the National Party as they try to bring the ‘Cape Afrikaner’ and ‘Boer Afrikaner’ together into a singular identity under a Christian Nationalist banner using a white Voortrekker and Boer hegemony, all underpinned with a cocktail of Weimar Eugenics and National Socialism. This schism runs throughout Afrikaner history until 1948 and it is the key differential which The Torch Commando tries to influence through the vote in 1952.

The Adulterous Romance

The Afrikaner romance with Germany has three key points, the first is a minority of Afrikaners have German Heritage – the majority have a Dutch, Flemish or French heritage, and the German free-burgers are seen as part of the hereditary make-up and culture of white Afrikanerdom. The second is a simple telegram and the third is a rifle.

The telegram is related to the Boer War, its reputed to have been sent to President Kruger by Kaiser Wilhelm II congratulating him on dealing with the Jameson Raid in 1896 – the telegram read:

“I express to you my sincere congratulations that you and your people, without appealing to the help of friendly powers, have succeeded, by your own energetic action against the armed bands which invaded your country as disturbers of the peace, in restoring peace and in maintaining the independence of the country against attack from without.”

President Kruger then published the telegram far and wide as proof positive that Germany was in support of the Boer Republic and its claims that Britain intended to invade it. It would give the Boers the confidence and leverage in their many conflicting areas they had with the super-power Great Britain, in the belief that if there was to be an inevitable war, Germany as another super-power, will come to the aid of the Boer Republics. 

Image: Boer delegation to Germany and Kaiser Wilhelm II in his British Field Marshal uniform.

In truth, Kaiser Wilhelm II would deny personally sending the telegram, and claimed it was part of internal plot and political intrigue, he was also very angry with Kruger’s promotion of the telegram as some sort of treatise for military support, denying that he ever had intentions of establishing relations with the ZAR and he had no malice to Britain and would never support the ZAR in any war against them (see: Secret History of To-Day by Allen Upward).

The rifle is the German manufactured MAUSER model 1895 and 1896 carbine rifle (they also used the Norwegian made Krag-Jorgensen rifle). The Mauser Model 1896 became the icon it was a bolt-action rifle that fired 7x57mm rounds and was equipped with a five-round magazine. It was regarded as a more superior rifle to the British Lee-Metford rifle of the time.

In the months before the start of the Boer War in October 1899, the Boer Republics purchased 30,000 Mauser rifles, and 1,000,000 rounds of smokeless ammunition for it. Other weapons, including modern field guns and automatic weapons were purchased from the German armaments manufacturer Krupp. The rally call for Boer Republican troops became “Through God and the Mauser”.

To the average Republican mounted infantryman, this overwhelming supply of German weaponry left a legacy that Germany was their key ally, in truth German armaments manufactures, Mauser and Krupp were happy to receive orders of this magnitude, they made a lot of money from the two Boer Republics. Not one single German weapon sold to the Boer republics qualified as a subsidy or gift, and the German government made no effort to finance any of these weapons for the Boer cause.

Boer Commando – note Mauser rifles, colourised image courtesy Tinus le Roux.

Germany was just happy to sell them the weapons, as inconvenient truth goes, British arms manufacturers also sold weapons to the Boer Republics – the ZAR was minted with taxation from gold and made for a very profitable customer. 

In so far as adulterous this relationship goes, for all the benefit Germany was getting from selling arms to the Boers, they give all their support to Britain instead. Germany would even go as far as lending its military strategising to the British to help them win the Boer war – and as inconvenient truths go the strategy devised for the British by Kaiser Wilhelm II and his planners includes scorched earth and concentration camp policies (see: John C.G. Röhl: The Kaiser and England during the Boer War). 

As to manpower only a handful of Germans in their private capacity (local and foreign), 500 or so, volunteered join Boer Commando’s during the war – no assistance in fighting manpower was afforded the Boers by the German government in any way.

In fact, Kaiser Wilhelm II flatly refused to entertain any Boer delegation sent to Germany. Boer delegations did raise a little money from private donators, but that’s it – there was never any official public contribution by the German government to the Boer cause – ever. Germany wanted to avoid conflict with Britain – who by convention and legal treatise at the time held suzerainty limitations over the two Boer Republics preventing them from engaging in foreign policies and entering into foreign treaties (see: the London Convention 1881).  That … and to the Kaiser, the British Royal family were all his blood relatives – it was a family matter.

The Boer Revolt

However, all this adultery still did not resonate with many in the Boer community who almost illogically saw Germany as an Ally. This would re-materialise when the First World War 1914 – 1918 swings into action, and the newly formed South African Union declares war against Germany, not in the service of the British Empire, but in the service of South Africa’s own territorial expansions as agreed between the British and Boer delegations at the Union Conference of 1909 – the Parliamentary vote is a landslide in favour of The South African Party’s (SAP) proposal to invade German South West Africa (GSWA) and declare war on Germany. The SAP is the ‘Afrikaner’ party – it’s made up of all the old Boer War ‘Bittereinder’ Generals and the old Afrikaner Bond politicians – the opposition Imperial Party (the ‘English’ party) – also overwhelmingly in favour of it. 

The vote is 92 = For invasion of German South West Africa (GSWA) and 12 = Against. Of these 12 SAP individuals (or 18% of the SAP), only 3 of them are notable and become highly vocal anti-war campaigners demanding that South Africa remain neutral – Ministers Barry Hertzog, Koos de la Rey and Christiaan de Wet. 

In trying to raise resignations from the South African Union Defence Force in protest, Koos de la Rey would be tragically killed in a road-block misunderstanding.  General Christiaan de Wet would however join up with UDF officers – Major Jan Kemp, General Beyers and a rogue UDF commander on the GSWA border with intense pro-German, pro-white supremacy and anti-sematic sentiments by the name of Lt. Col Manie Martiz, all three would go into open sedition trying to evoke a coup d’etat using promised GSWA troops in support of their Boer Commandos. 

The Boer Revolt of 1914 was poorly planned and poorly executed, it managed to raise only 11,476 Boers who were poorly armed infantrymen against 80,500 well-armed UDF personnel (the rebels are outnumbered 8 to 1 in effect) and the Revolt drew no significant support from the Afrikaner community in the Transvaal, and virtually no support whatsoever from the Afrikaner communities in the Cape Province and Natal Province. It also drew no support from the Union Defence Force Afrikaners – who made up 60% of the force. It also gained no traction whatsoever with the ‘English’ white population (who made up 40% of the white demographic) and it drew absolutely no support from the real majority – the coloured, Indian and Black people of South Africa. 

Without support from either the broader Afrikaner diaspora or the South African population as a whole and without good military doctrine and planning backing them, the rebels were quickly crushed by the Union’s Defence Force and the revolt only lasted a couple of months. 

The Boer Revolt and its impact on Afrikaner Nationalism 

Albeit small and insignificant to the outcome of WW1 and the invasion of German South West Africa, the 1914 Boer Revolt is important in the evolution of the Afrikaner Nationalist right wing for four reasons.

Upfront is one of the primary political ramifications, of the few 18 odd very pro-Germany and pro-neutrality South African Party (SAP) Ministers of Parliament – General Barry Hertzog does not go with the sedition of his peers in revolt – instead he decides to leave the SAP and form his own political party in opposition to Botha and Smuts in the SAP, he goes mainstream and establishes the ‘National Party’.

Secondly, where the 1914 Boer Revolt did take traction was in the Orange Free State. The 11,500 strong Boer rebels were primarily made up of destitute Orange Free State Boers, 7,123 or 62% of the total force – many having come through a drought and agricultural reforms on the back of the devastation of their farms during Boer War 2 (see Sandra Swart Desperate Men: The 1914 Rebellion and the Polities of Poverty). They were simply desperate ‘Bywoners’ (landless farmers or sharecroppers) promised a better life if the rebellion was successful.

In the very next year’s General Election – the 1915 Election held during WW1, the National Party entered the political sphere for the first time, of the 130 available seats, the National Party won 26 of them, the majority of them from the Orange Free State where they dominated, winning 16 or the 17 available seats. It must be noted here, the ‘Afrikaner’ voting block is only partly split (about one third) – the SAP, the moderate Afrikaners under Botha and Smuts in support of Union and Imperialism, hold the lion’s share of seats – 54 in total, and are able to remain the governing party. Right wing Afrikaner Nationalism, in support of Republicanism, is still a minority and even have fewer seats than the official opposition – the ‘English’ Unionist Party. 

Thirdly, of the 4 main remaining rebel leaders (General Beyers drowned in action), 2 of them – ‘General’ Jan kemp and ‘General’ Manie Martiz went into Nationalist politics. Jan Kemp spent 10 months in prison for treason, then Botha and Smuts agreed to release him on the condition that he may not participate in any politics – a promise Kemp almost immediately broke entering politics as a National Party MP under Hertzog in 1920, by 1940, in opposition to South Africa entering WW2 against Nazi Germany, he joined the Reunited National Party under Dr. D.F. Malan. ‘General’ Manie Maritz, the Rebellion’s ringleader spent a couple of months in jail for treason, thereafter he was released on an amnesty given by Hertzog, he would enter politics as the leader of an antisemitic, one-party state, National Socialist (Nazi) inspired ‘Boerenasie’ party prior to World War 2 (more on this later). 

Finally, Jopie Fourie, who was sentenced to death for High Treason as he had not taken the precaution of resigning his Union Defence Force (UDF) commission before embarking on an armed revolt and was captured still wearing his UDF uniform. After his execution, Jopie Fourie would become the central martyr of the Afrikaner Nationalist cause, he would be politically pitched as the ‘true’ Afrikaner and in a bizarre twist on the definition of treason, the real traitors (Smuts and his Afrikaner cabal) had executed the hero of Afrikanerdom. Fourie’s spilled blood on his home soil would nurture Afrikaner identity and bring the Nazi creed of ‘Blut und Boden’ (Blood and Soil) into Christian Nationalism.  

His final letter would become Nationalist’s rally call, he wrote: 

“The tree which has been planted and which is wetted with my blood will grow large and bear delightful fruit”.

True Afrikaner ‘volk’ were to be demarcated as different to the treasonous Afrikaner ‘volk’ – to be a true Afrikaner was to be an avowed Afrikaner Nationalist. Jopie Fourie, British rule and the concentration camps of Boer War 2 would also become central to ‘the politics of pain’ on which the entire premise of Christian Nationalism would be established. 

The establishment of the National Party

The Nazification of Afrikaner right-wing politics, starts in earnest with the establishment of the National Party (NP) in 1914, General Hertzog’s break-away. The National Party’s founding was also rooted in disagreements of ‘Union’ among South African Party politicians, particularly because Prime Minister Louis Botha sought a ‘unitary’ Unionist state with singular purpose called ‘one-stream’ and General Hertzog who sought a ‘two-stream’ state which separated English and Afrikaners completely. Incorporated into the ‘Two-Stream’ ideology was the fierce adherence to ‘Krugerism’ – ‘Krugerism’ has the old ZAR ‘grondwet’ constitution at its centre. 

General Barry Hertzog

The racial separation and ideological purpose of the old Zuid-Afrikaanse Republic (ZAR) separating not just Afrikaner and English but also all the ‘Bantu’ (Black Africans) in addition. With an oligarchy philosophy underpinning it, and the sense of ‘Boer’ Nationalism ahead of all other races in servitude to a Boer hegemony, the religious reincorporation of the white Boer nation as the ‘Chosen People’, racially superior and with a divine right to rule all South Africa. The idea is an ‘oligarchy’ devolved from a ‘theocracy’ (not secular at all – State and Church are very linked) whose focus was on cultural prejudice (not acculturation). 

Krugerism’s oligarchy system of government would ensure no real political emancipation for non-whites, essentially Anglophobe in nature and with a discrimination outlook on minority groups – Jews in particular. The National Party’s stated aim is also the upliftment of Afrikaners, especially those dispossessed or marginalised as a result of the South African War (1899-1902) i.e., Boer War 2.

The ‘Politics of Pain’ also factored into the Nationalist ideology – i.e., the need to preserve Afrikaner identity by what was defined as a century long British tyranny, which ultimately manifested itself in the destruction of Boer farms and families during the 2nd Boer War. In essence it generated a victim mentality, and this preservation of Boer Nationalism and identity was paramount to the survival of the ‘Boer’ race – and if that required the subjugation by force of all other races and cultures threatening its ‘survival’, then so be it. 

Apartheid as an ideology had not fully taken shape at this stage, the Nationalists were pretty loose in defining exactly how they intended to implement ‘Krugerism’. They were thrust into the pound seats as the ruling party in a pact government running South Africa after the Miners’ Strike in 1922. To become the ruling party Hertzog did not have enough votes, they were still a minority party – so he had to go in coalition with the Labour Party, an ‘English’ constituted socialist party – mainly ‘Communists’ in effect representing a white working proletariat – the Labour Party’s popularity had also surged after the 1922 Miner’s Strike riding on the resentment of working-class whites of Smuts’ heavy-handed tactics when dealing with it. 

From 1924, they were able to define and tighten legislation around segregation, implement labour legislation in favour of whites and they managed to cap immigration of Jews in particular to South Africa, however they were tempered somewhat by their coalition partners. These ‘moderate’ politicians in coalition prevented the Nationalists from tampering with the constitution too much, so they found themselves supporting British Dominion and ‘Union’ and having to tolerate The Cape Franchise (Cape coloureds on the common voters roll). 

To hold onto power, Hertzog would even go into ‘Fusion’ with Smuts’ SAP and form a new entity called the United Party in 1934. This caused a breakaway called the ‘Purified National Party’ on the 5th July 1935 which stood to the far right politically, under the leadership of Dr D.F. Malan (a doctor in Divinity and a minister of the NG Church) – and it stood in abject rejection of the ideals of Union and Britain, it stood on the Krugerism ideal that God had ordained the white Afrikaner as a ‘chosen people’ to rule all of South Africa – and sought the return to Republicanism under an Afrikaner hegemony along with clearer ideologies on racial segregation. It was also a very small party at this stage. Of the 153 seats in Parliament, they won only 27 as a new entrant in the 1938 General Elections.

The 1938 Great Trek Centennial – a sacred happening

In the mid 1930’s in Europe, Nazism and Fascism were also taking hold as popular movements, in South Africa fringe Nazi movements on the far right of Afrikanerdom were also taking shape. Also operating in this sphere was a secret society called the Broederbond concerned with Afrikaner ‘advancement’, these ideologies would come together in 1938 during the 100 year centenary celebration of the Great Trek, and from it would stem political and cultural movements which would all come into conflict with a future democratic South Africa.

The Broederbond itself would fledge a ‘Christian Nationalism’ ideology using the Centennial and so too out of it would come the very right leaning, anti-British and Nazi Germany supporting Ossewabrandwag (Ox Wagon Sentinel). It would also see a polarisation of what was defined as ‘Afrikanerdom’ along racial purity lines.

Henning Klopper on his Ox-Wagon named – The ‘Piet Retief’ leave Cape Town to commence the 1938 Centenary of The Great Trek.

So, here’s some background on the centenary trek itself. On the 8th August 1938, Henning Klopper’s two Ox Wagons called the Piet Retief’ and the ‘Andries Pretorius’, stood at the foot of Jan van Riebeeck’s statue in Cape Town. As the ox-teams were harnessed a huge crowd of over 100,000 people gathered. The wagons were to replicate the ‘Great Trek’ and were to be joined by more wagons and people as it passed through towns on a trek to inaugurate the planned Voortrekker Monument outside Pretoria for a massive celebration on the one hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Blood River. The Broederbond, doing what it did so well, co-ordinated the ideas and concepts behind the Centennial Trek which would follow “Die Pad van Suid-Afrika”, a symbolic ‘road to South Africa’s nationhood’ taken by the Voortrekkers.

Image: “Die Pad van Suid-Afrika”, a symbolic ‘road to South Africa’s nationhood’ becomes an emotive call to nationhood by the Ossewabrandwag on the back of the 1938 Centenary trek

In this way the Broederbond hoped to (and did) bastardise history along Afrikaner nationalist principles – they would literally use the Great trek as the central reason for South Africa’s raison d’être’ and ignore the histories of all the other population groups and their role in establishing South Africa. They would go one step further and bastardise the Great Trek as a ‘white’ only Afrikaner exercise, and thereby ignore Afrikaner roots in the ‘brown’ (slave and Xhoi Xhoi) cultures of South Africa, it would also ignore the ‘coloured’ workers and servants who accompanied the trekkers (some references give this as a 1:1 ratio – one trekker to one African or black servant/labourer)  and split Afrikanerdom along racial lines alienating it from its actual roots and history.

To put perspective on the political hyperbole and artificial segregation offered by the Broederbond. The real history of the Afrikaner, Afrikaans and the Afrikaner culture is a critical part of South African history, the true roots of it lie in a conjoint merger of various cultures – white, slave and indigenous peoples – starting way back in the old Cape Dutch Colony – Afrikanerdom’ and the Afrikaans language has a shared heritage – Black and White, it certainly is not a Broederbond/National Party interpretation of the history; a romantic tale of a ‘all-white’ trek to freedom, flavoured with a Nationalist ideology and readily mixed with heady concoction of eugenics and religion.

Henning Klopper, would say;

“We ask the entire Afrikanerdom to take part in the festival celebration in this spirit. We long that nothing shall hinder the Afrikaner people as a whole from taking part. This movement is born from the People; may the People carry it in their hearts all the way to Pretoria and Blood River. Let us build up a monument for Afrikaner hearts. May this simple trek bind together in love those Afrikaner hearts which do not yet beat together. We dedicate these wagons to our People and to our God.”

By that he hoped to combine the ‘Cape white Afrikaners’ with the ‘Boer white Afrikaners’ in the symbology of the Great Trek under a fabricated Nationalist ideal and only meant ‘White’ Afrikaners and not really the Afrikaner people as a ‘whole’ – certainly not coloured Afrikaners, black Afrikaners or even Jewish Afrikaners. 

Klopper in a later interview went on to say;

“we never had a symbol before; the ox-wagon became that symbol” which is not altogether surprising as only a fraction of Afrikaners were proper Voortrekkers but the Ox Wagon (and the gunpowder horn) would now be the National symbology.

National Party emblem

This symbology would later be adopted by the National Party as their logo.

Towns in all parts of the country vied for the privilege of a visit from one of the wagons. Several other treks besides Henning Klopper’s were organised. In the end six more wagons threaded their way to the capital from distant points; four others went to the site of the battle at Blood River for a commemoration service on the 16th December, stopping along the way to re-name street after street in countless towns and villages after one or another Voortrekker hero, and laying imprints of the wagons wheels in freshly laid cement at many halts (there are still ‘imprints’ at my hometown in Hermanus).

This image: titled “blanke skoonheid” or “white beauty’ encapsulates the Centenary Trek perfectly, here girls from the Voortrekker School in Pietermaritzburg celebrate the arrival of the ox wagons. The “blanke skoonheid” does not just refer to the white dresses and bonnets (or ‘kappies’) but also infers that this festival was about the further assertion of white power. (The photograph taken between 18 and 20 November 1938. By Henry Murray). 

With overriding patriotism, born alongside the Centenary Trek was a new South African anthem “Die Stem van Suid-Afrika” (the voice of South Africa), the anthem now part of the South African official anthem, however when the song was amalgamated in the 90’s with Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika the “die kreun van ossewa” (the groan of Ox Wagons) bit was purposely omitted as it only reflected one culture’s history in South Africa and not the rest.

There were beards: The organizational committee of Koeberg also made their beards. “Many men grew their beards specifically for the 1938 Voortrekker Centenary as supposed proof of their masculinity as men who identified as Afrikaners.” 

Thousands of men grew beards and women made Voortrekker bonnets and garb along the way, a cultural rise took place and when the procession arrived outside Pretoria, 200,000 people greeted them. Human teams, flanked by outriders, dragged the Ox-Wagons into places of honour. Three women descendants of Voortrekker leaders of Retief, Pretorius and Potgieter then laid the foundation stone of the Voortrekker Monument. ‘A sacred event’ had taken place.

Henning Klopper was so amazed at just how successful the 1938 Centenary Trek in ‘uniting’ white ‘Afrikanerdom’ under the banner of the Voortrekkers and creating a new national identity – he would call on divine providence and call it a “Sacred Happening” – God’s will that the white Afrikaner lead South Africa as the chosen people.

The Road to War 

As noted previously, Prime Minister Barry Hertzog had merged his conservative ‘National Party’ with Jan Smuts’ more democratic ‘South African Party’ to form a “Fusion” party called the ‘United Party’, the two old Boer War Bittereinder Generals in coalition – General Hertzog remained Prime Minister and General Smuts his deputy. Dr. D.F. Malan had split from the Fusion coalition and formed the ‘Pure’ National Party to the right of Hertzog’s Afrikaner Nationalists in the United Party coalition. The ’Pure’ National Party would turn their vitriol against Hertzog, who they now regarded as traitorous as Smuts and a British puppet.

Hertzog’s United Party cabinet, a curious mix of hard conservatives like Jan Kemp and democratic progressives like Jan Smuts and Patrick Duncan.

Within the United Party, by the late 1930’s things had started to come to a head between Hertzog and Smuts. One issue was South West Africa (Namibia), now under South African Union mandate, and part of Smuts’ and the Union’s vision for ‘Greater South Africa’.

Hertzog’s right hand-man, Oswald Pirow – the National Party’s Minister of Defence and a devout Nazi supporter and admirer of Adolf Hitler had been sent by Hertzog to the Nazi German state on a number of ‘unofficial’ state visits – in doing so Pirow would meet Hitler and assure him of Afrikaner support of the Reich and that should there be war against the British – South Africa would remain neutral and should Germany win they could re-claim their old colony of South West Africa as German (something Hitler re-iterated to Pirow as a fait accompli). More on Pirow later.

Things would really come to a full head when Britain and France declared war against Nazi Germany on the 3rd of September 1939 and it would throw this entire careful political balance out the window and polarise the Afrikaner political landscape completely. 

South Africa, as a British dominion, would hold an emergency debate as to whether South Africa should remain neutral or also declare war against Hitler and Nazi Germany (as a Dominion it was free to make its own laws and free of Westminster’s laws, South Africa was not in servitude to Britain – so if South Africa wished to remain neutral by way of a Parliamentary majority – then Britain would uphold that decision).

The next day, 4th of September 1939, a three-way debate ensued primarily between the two factions in the United Party and the Pure Nationalists. As the United Party was loaded with Hertzog’s Nationalists and there was also Malan’s Nationalists in opposition, Hertzog was very confident he had the combined Afrikaner nationalist majority to carry his motion of neutrality. As was Hertzog’s position against Smuts in 1914 demanding South Africa neutrality in World War 1, siding with German’s cause, so too Hertzog’s position against the same man – Smuts, in 1939 demanding neutrality in the war against Nazi Germany in World War 2.

Prime Minister Hertzog would argue in his speech that Hitler’s invasion of Poland and annexations of Austria and Czechoslovakia was not an indication that Hitler aspired to world conquest, and Afrikaners well understood the Germans right to struggle for their own self-determination against the hostility of the outside world. Germany’s actions constituted no threat to South African security whatsoever and a policy of neutrality under these circumstances was the only logical policy to adopt.

General Smuts would reply in his speech that since the fate of South West Africa would depend on the outcome of the war, South Africa’s interests were virtually involved. Furthermore, South Africa was part of the Commonwealth whose fate now hung in the balance, to stand aside from the conflict would be to expose the whole civilised world to danger.

Smuts’ amendment to Hertzog’s Motion of Neutrality was carried by 80 votes to 67 votes on the 4th September 1939 and South Africa found itself at war against Nazi Germany. 

Surprised at the outcome, Hertzog promptly resigned, leaving the South African Premiership and the leadership of the United Party to General Jan Smuts and both he and some of his supporters left the United Party. 

An interesting lapel pin with Jan Smuts’ profile on it, it was worn by Smuts supporters to commemorate a Parliamentary debate, that is why the date on the pin is so important: 4 .9 .1939

On the 23rd November 1939 the National Party’s “Malanites” and “Hertzognites” met and tried to reconcile their differences, they could not, the stumbling block was Republicanism – the ‘Pure’ Malanite Nationalists wanted a Republic regardless, Hertzog felt that a break from Union and the declaration of Republic could only take place if both Afrikaner and English whites were in agreement with the idea. 

To the ‘Malanite’ Nationalists, the UP’s decision to go to war had vindicated their intensive segregationist policies which they had been following since 1934, and that Hertzog’s flirtation with English speakers ‘rights’ was delusional (the Malanites classified English speakers as secondary citizens, albeit they made up around 40% of the white population). 

Unable to reconcile, Dr. D.F. Malan seized the opportunity to take over leadership of all ‘Afrikanerdom’ and cast Hertzog out into the political wilderness. Hertzog tried again on 5th November 1940 at the National Party’s Convention to reaffirm his position on English-speakers rights, falling on deaf ears, he grabbed his hat and walked out of the National Party – forever.

General Barry Hertzog’s U Turn to Nazism 

In his retirement from politics, and in his private life, no longer walking ‘coalition’ and ‘fusion’ political tightropes and toeing UP party-political lines, General Hertzog felt confident to reveal his true colours. He performed an especially remarkable volte-face (U-Turn) when, just after leaving the National Party over his defence of English-speakers’ rights, he suddenly became a champion of full-blown National Socialism (Nazism).

Angered by his treatment by Dr D.F. Malan and the endless machinations of National party politicians, General Hertzog issued a press statement in October 1941 in which he excoriated “liberal capitalism” and the democratic party system, while praising National Socialism, as in keeping with the traditions of the Afrikaner, and as a system National Socialism simply had to be adapted to South African needs under the oversight of a one-party state dictatorship.

General Hertzog’s press release led to frenzied activity as the various Afrikaner pro-Nazi and anti-war factions tried to reunite. In the months following Hertzog’s pro-Nazi declaration Germany was joined by Japan, and the Axis forces won victory after victory. This was the point where Smuts was at his most perilous and the Smuts Government really feared that all could easily be lost. The National Party at this point even gave Dr. D.F. Malan dictatorial powers over his party to meet the Hertzog induced “crisis.”

According to Hertzog’s officially appointed biographer C.M. van den Heever, in his ‘General J.B.M Hertzog’ published in 1944; the following on Hertzog’s volte-face towards Nazism over this period is noted:

“Hertzog became “bitterly disappointed in the democratic system, with its capitalist foundations and press influence, for he had cause to know that the voice of the majority is not only the voice of wisdom … he was convinced that a new world order was on its way … after his retirement … he became more inclined towards National Socialism, by which he meant the adaption of the old Free State model republic to modern conditions, using the best from recent European experiments. … He regarded National Socialism as suited to the moral and religious outlook of the Afrikaner; indeed, he considered that the constitution of the old Free State Republic was based on it.”

It is also in General Hertzog’s private life that we find a compelling case as to Hertzog’s disposition to Nazism, and it’s a case of ‘like father like son’ and here we find General Hertzog’s son, Dr. Albert Hertzog who followed his fathers’ footsteps into politics. 

Dr. Albert Hertzog was a key figure in the Afrikaner Broederbond, in 1948 he stood as a National Party candidate, becoming a Minister of Parliament. Dr. Albert Hertzog’s views were extreme, he wanted to nationalise the gold mines and as devout National Socialist he looked to reforming Afrikaner and white labour unions – especially the Afrikaner Bond of Mineworkers. He even advocated state control of the entire economy. 

So extremely right wing in his views, Dr. Albert Hertzog eventually found the National Party too ‘liberal’ for his liking and came to loggerheads with them – he was removed from the party, and he moved to establish the Neo-Nazi Herstigte Nasionale Party (Reconstituted National Party) or HNP in 1969 and head it up as a breakaway to the extreme right of the NP. Joining him as his deputy was Jaap Marais, an ex-Ossewabrandwag stalwart and National Party Minister, who along with Dr Albert Hertzog harboured such extreme National Socialist views that he too was eventually removed from the National Party. 

The Split in the Afrikaner diaspora – Part 2

As with the clear 60/40 split in the white Afrikaner diaspora prior to the South African War (1899-1902) a.k.a Boer War 2, between the ‘republican’ conservative Afrikaners (the minority) and the ‘Imperial’ moderate Afrikaners (the majority), a split carried through to Union in 1910 and then through World War 1 (1914-1918) – so too does this split remain highly apparent after Smuts declares war against Nazi Germany in 1939 to commence World War 2 (1939-1945).

In 1943 (mid-way into World War 2) whilst the conservative pro-Nazi (and pro-Republic) and the opposing moderate pro-Smuts movements (and pro-Union) within Afrikanerdom are at its peak a General Election is held. The result is surprising, as it reveals literally no change and an outpouring of majority support for Smuts and a war alongside Britain against Germany – from the ‘English’ and ‘Afrikaans’ population groups alike.

The United Party under Smuts and affiliated parties in support of Dominion and Union manage 509,000 odd votes and the Afrikaner Nationalist Party and its affiliated Afrikaner party in support of Republicanism achieves 337,000 votes. In terms of ‘seats’ the pro-Union moderates in support of Britain command 2/3 of the house – nearly 75% of the vote.

This is why the 1948 elections – a mere 5 years later is such a surprise. Mid way through Smuts’ second Prime Ministership he enjoys unprecedented support and the National Party is very much a minority with a fringe ideology and no real threat to the Union’s political construct. So, what’s going on?

Hitler’s Afrikaner Nationalist propaganda campaign

On another continent Adolf Hitler and his propaganda ministry are making strong overtones to connect Nazism to Afrikaner Nationalism and tapping into Boer War mythology using just about every medium and propaganda tool available to them.

Hitler would record in his book ‘Mein Kampf’ that in his youth;

“The Boer War came, like a glow of lightning on the far horizon. Day after day I used to gaze intently at the newspapers, and I almost ‘devoured’ the telegrams and communiqués, overjoyed to think that I could witness that heroic struggle, even from so great a distance…” 

Then on the 30th January 1940, with Nazi Germany at the height of its influence and popularity, Adolf Hitler gave a speech at the Sportspalast and stated the following on The Boer War;

“They (Britain) waged war for gold mines and mastery over diamond mines”  

Hitler then went on in the same speech to say of the Boer War:

“After all, this entire blockade warfare is nothing other than a war against women and children just as once was the case in the Boer War … It was then that the concentration camps were invented. England locked up women and children in these camps. Over 20,000 Boer women (and children) died wretchedly at the time.”

Just about every sentence Hitler is uttering here is either pure falsehood or a half truth – blaming the British for “inventing” the “Konzentrationslager”, painting the camps as “locked” prisons, and implying the British wage genocide and not war. This ‘Pro-Boer’ Nationalism morphs into an entire Nazi propaganda campaign surrounding the Boer’s struggle against Britain – one which is regarded as the most influential and successful Nazi propaganda campaigns ever devised.

Hitler, giving a speech at the Sportspalast

What Hitler is also doing in his speech is using his intense ‘fame’, peaking in 1940, across Germany, Western Europe and the globe in many respects. With this statement he achieves three things:

Firstly, he demonises the British (the only real “enemy” he has left in 1940) as an enemy of the German people, but also – most importantly – an enemy to Europeans at large – and he uses the Boer War for this purpose as it is in living memory for many Europeans, this deflects the focus on Germany as the enemy to Britain as the true enemy of Europe.

Nazism and the concept of the 3rd Reich was a lot more popular in Europe in the lead up to World War 2 than most people would believe now. In fact its position as “anti-bolshevist” (anti-Communist) and as “anti-Judeo Capital” found vast popular appeal in right wing and conservative parties across Europe – especially in France, the Netherlands and Belgium, these people would see Nazi Germany as liberators – not invaders.

Secondly, Hitler is reinforcing Anglophobia and Republicanism in South Africa through propaganda and he is giving re-assurance to the Afrikaner nationalist cause from Berlin. To the home grown South African pro-Nazi movements like the Ossewabrandwag, the Broederbond and Afrikaner nationalists this is manna from heaven – to all these South African Hitler admirers and their followers, Hitler’s assurance that the British committed a Boer ‘Genocide’ is music to their ears. They all attested to the concept that the British had tried to ethnically cleanse South Africa of the Boer nation during the war – and here one of the world’s greatest leaders, a 20th Century iconoclast who agreed with them, and whose not to believe Adolf Hitler? He is a European powerhouse, he’s at the helm of a super-power like Britain and now he’s standing up to Britain and telling it as it is – if it comes from Hitler it’s a truism, the British committed Boer Genocide and stole the Boer’s gold … and it does not end there, Hitler goes further … much further.

During a press interview Hermann Göring (the spokesperson on behalf of Adolf Hitler), took a leaf out his Führer’s leader’s book on the Boer War when he deflected a challenge from Sir Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador to Berlin who protested about the German government’s use of concentration camps for the political ‘re-education’ of German’s dissonant non-believers in Nazism and opposition in 1935, and using a ‘press stunt’ Göring dramatically sprung up, walked over to a bookcase and like a thespian actor, grabbed a German encyclopedia opening it at “Konzentratinslager” he read out loud, 

“First used by the British, in the South African War”.

Although factually incorrect – the Spanish (not the British) first used concentration camps in the Cuban civil war in 1896, his action served as a skilful stroke of deflection of which Hermann Göring was a past master.

Dr. Joseph Goebbels was a propaganda mastermind, he was also a rabid, almost insane follower of his Führer, Adolf Hitler and a devout Nazi, and he would kick this affiliation between Nazism and Afrikaner nationalism up a gear. 

In printed media, the German propaganda machine would go even further on the back of Hitler’s speeches and use an image of Paul Kruger and the Boer War on propaganda posters to recruit Waffen SS troops in the Netherlands and Belgium, with whom these countries had an affinity for the Boer War. Both these countries proved highly fruitful in recruiting Waffen SS troops as they feared Bolshevism more than Nazism and for these conservative sections of the populations Nazism had an appeal (not to be confused with the SS, the Waffen SS also comprised ‘non-German’ and ‘foreign’ battalions – and later in the war they proved to be ferocious and devout combatants).

Next up in Goebbels’ propaganda arsenal was radio. Joseph Goebbels made this radio address on 19 April 1940, on the eve of Adolph Hitler’s birthday and said:

On 3 September last year (1939), two hours after English plutocracy declared war on the German Reich, the British Prime Minister Chamberlain gave a radio speech …The point of the speech was that England had no intention of waging war against the German people … get rid of the Führer or so-called Hitlerism …. At the beginning of the war, however, they sang the same old song …. Its melody was dull and worn out. British plutocracy had tried to persuade the Boers during the South African war of the same thing. Britain was only fighting Krugerism. As is well known, that did not stop them from allowing countless thousands of women and children to starve in English concentration camps”.

Radio Zeesen was also part of Goebbels’ arsenal, it was a Nazi German ‘International’ propaganda service radio station broadcasting in short wave in eighteen different foreign languages including Afrikaans, it broadcasted both Hitler’s speeches and Goebbels’ messages – and eagerly picked by devout Afrikaner Nationalists in South Africa.

Also, Goebbels loved, literally adored movies and the moving picture industry, he regarded this industry as his single most powerful propaganda tool, and he made a number of propaganda movies that came to define the Nazi legacy. However only four of his movies won the much-converted Reich Propaganda Ministry’s “Film of the Nation” rating. Movies deemed critical viewing for national identity in Nazi Germany – Heimkhehr (1941) – an anti-Polish movie, Der große König (1942) – a movie about Frederick the Great of Prussia, Die Entlassung (1942) – a movie about the dismissal of Otto von Bismarck and finally …… Ohm Krüger (1941), a movie about Paul Kruger and the Boer War. So, in forging a German national identity, the Boer War and the plight of the Afrikaner take centre stage.

Ohm Krüger (Uncle Kruger ) is a propaganda masterpiece from beginning to end. Although the plot has nothing to do with Germany, the story centres around a character which the Germans could admire, “Uncle” Paul Kruger – a man the Propaganda Minister wants to draw parallels to Adolf Hitler, who he deems is also a man with a common touch, from a simple background and one who is thrust into extraordinary circumstances due to international aggression and a conspiracy of greedy ‘foreigners’.

The film highlights Boer Nationalism on the pillars of liberty and freedom, Boer Republicanism, Boer racial superiority over ‘treacherous’ black natives, it portrays the British as underhanded and murderous, stealing Boer gold, prepared to hang Boer patriots in concentration camps, they starve Boer women to death and line up British troops to mow down innocent Boer women in their hundreds, shooting them in the back as they flee the British onslaught – you get the picture.. to see Ohm Krüger in full – with English sub titles, here is the YouTube link:

So how does this propaganda fare?

It’s a massive success, a propagandistic blockbuster, it’s by far the most expensive film produced in Nazi Germany up to that time with a 5.5 million Reich Marks budget and a massive film lot outside Berlin that resembles a mini-South Africa with 100 Longhorn cattle and African huts. Ohm Krüger offers plenty of entertainment – ‘wild west’ frontier grit alongside its vivid battle scenes, as if John Ford’s Monument Valley had been transposed onto South Africa’s Transvaal region.

It is first screened on 4th April 1941 in Germany, and it’s rolled out across Europe – it opens in Italy in September 1941, France on the 1st October 1941, Hungary on the 19th December 1941, Finland on the 15th March 1942 and it even makes it to Japan on the 2nd September 1943. It makes it way right across Europe – Bulgaria, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium etc.

Both locally and internationally, it is received to rapturous applause. It is pitched as the European cinema equivalent to ‘Gone with the wind’ and it’s a winner – literally, not only the first movie to win the converted ‘Film of the Nation’ and the award for ‘Film of Special Value in terms of state policy and art’, but importantly – it also wins the Mussolini Cup for the Best Foreign Film at the 1941 Venice Film Festival.

The movie is so popular, the Nazi propaganda machine even decided to re-release it in 1944. In the end – millions of people see it, today it is regarded as Nazi propaganda master stroke. However, as irony goes the Nazi propaganda machine ‘Bans’ the movie in 1945, not because it’s a great yarn, entertaining and an outstanding propaganda piece – but because they are concerned that the graphic massacre of Boer women at the end of the movie would upset the female population of Germany concerned about their treatment at the hands of the counter-attacking and invading Soviet Union and other Allied armies at the end of the war.

The Broederbond’s influence

As noted previously, the guiding force behind the rebirth of all his Christian Nationalist spirit in South Africa was the Afrikaner Broederbond (Association of Brothers or Afrikaner Brotherhood), as a secret society it gradually come to assume a dominant position in the affairs of the Afrikaner ‘volk’. The ‘Broederbond’ formally adopted Christian Nationalism as its basic ideology in their manifesto. 

General Jan Smuts and the Broederbond where diametrically opposed to one another, later during the Second World War he would correctly summarise the Broederbond when he banned public servants in 1944 from joining it and called it out as 

“A dangerous, cunning, political Fascist organization.”

Prior to the war and sitting in the wings of the Broederbond was Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd (the Architect of Apartheid), he was a predominant Broederbond member, National Party leader and would become a future Prime Minister of South Africa. Dutch by birth, he honed his studies in sociology and psychology in Germany and there is no doubt he was exposed to German politics and the rise of Nazism at the time. Verwoerd showed his colours early on when, the South African Nazi ‘Black shirts’ (more on them later) held a large rally and protested the arrival of the S.S. Stuttgart in Cape Town on the 27th October 1936 with 600 Jewish refugees on board. 

The arrival of the SS Stuttgart in Cape Town

The Nationalists joined hands with the Blackshirts in support of their protest and a few days later on 4 November, Dr Theophilus E. Dönges (future NP Acting Prime Minister) would nail the Nationalists colours to the mast and said: 

“The Jew is an insoluble element in every national life.”

They were joined by Dr Verwoerd and five fellow professors from Stellenbosch University who all went in deputation to the government to protest against the immigration of Jews from Nazi Germany. Frans Erasmus (the future National Party Minister of Defence) would go further on the matter and even officially thank the Blackshirts on behalf of The National Party for bringing the attention of the “Jewish problem to the Afrikaner ‘volk’.”

Dr H.F. Verwoerd

Dr Verwoerd, although he had not joined a Nazi grouping or Nazi styled resistance movement like the Ossewabrandwag during the war, was also found compliant in promoting the aims of Nazi Germany and Nazi philosophy whilst he was editor of ‘Die Transvaaler’ prior to and during the war in a landmark legal case.  Justice Millin, in a 25,000-word judgement concluded that:

 “Dr Verwoerd caused to be published a large body of matter which was on the same general lines as matter coming to the Union in the Afrikaans transmissions from Zeesen (a Nazi radio mouthpiece broadcasting in Afrikaans) and which was calculated to make the Germans look upon Die Transvaler as a most useful adjunct to this propaganda service”.

Another admirer on Nazism in the wings was Dr Nico Diedericks, the Chairman of the Broederbond during the war, a future NP State President who had studied in Nazi Germany and was reputed to have attended the Nazi’s Anti-Communist training school in Berlin whilst there. Piet Meyer, another head of the Broederbond and Ossewabrandwag General (and future Head of the SABC) so admired Nazi Germany he befriended Hitler’s chief of staff, Rudolf Hess, who even taught him to ski.

The use of media to promote the aims of Nazism to the Afrikaner ‘volk’ did not stop there.

Alongside Verwoerd as the editor of ‘Die Transvaaler’ is ‘Die Burger’ which was established by the Nationalists as their official mouthpiece in 1915 and Dr D.F. Malan (also a Broederbond member) as its first editor – an ‘anti-Smuts’ paper it was going to be from the get-go. By the mid 1930’s it had become popular in right leaning European newspapers in countries like Germany to target Jews with what is now known as “the great Jewish Capitalist conspiracy lie” – Jews were demonised as ‘fat cats’ using capital exploitation to the detriment of ‘ordinary’ non-Jewish folk and this image and symbology found itself into all visual media – including (and especially) political cartoons.

In South Africa, this trend for demonising Jews in political cartooning found favour in publications like the Die Burger, and especially in the works of D.C. Boonzaier, himself an anti-imperialist, pro-republican, pro-nationalism and anti-capitalist. He created a caricature figure called Hoggenheimer specifically for Die Burger – a derogatory figure designed to depict a fat and bloated Jewish capitalist with a play on ‘hog” or pig, the character made a number of appearances and also served to lampoon Ernest Oppenheimer, the German Jewish Mining Industrialist who made South Africa his home.

Image: This cartoon by D.C. Boonzaier was published in Die Burger, 23 May, 1938. The bloated caricature Hoggenheimer is been carried on the shoulders of JBM Hertzog and Jan Smuts following the United Party’s landslide victory over the ‘purified’ Nationalists. The caption alludes to ‘Jewish Capital’ as the real winners and the United Party was a puppet in servitude to its Jewish master.

It remains ironic, Julius Streicher, the infamous Nazi propagandist is the only German civilian executed by hanging for war times after the Nuremberg Trials, precisely for “vitriolic antisemitic propaganda” which “incited genocide” whist he was the publisher of the Newspaper ‘Der Stürmer’ – whereas no such fate awaited Dr.Hendrick Verwoerd and Albertus Lourens Geyer who published similar sentiment in ‘Die Transvaaler’ and ‘Die Burger’ nor did the publishers and editors of ‘Die Waarheid’ (the SANP mouthpiece), Die O.B. (the Ossewanbrandwag mouthpiece) and ‘Die Dappere Boodskapper’ (the Boerenasie mouthpiece) who all also published antisemitic and pro-Nazi rhetoric, instead many of them are promoted to high offices in The National Party after the war and richly rewarded for their efforts, much to the bewilderment of the Jewish community.

On the education front, using a similar tactic used by Hitler and his Nazi propaganda ministry, the Broederbond made it an aim of theirs to ‘re-educate’ the Afrikaner nation along the ideals of Afrikaner Christian Nationalism. An example of this occurred during the war when on the morning of the 13th of December 1943 a small group of military intelligence officers infiltrated the Afrikaner Teachers Training College in Bloemfontein. They placed microphones and eavesdropped on an Afrikaner educationalists congress taking place in Bloemfontein – intelligence revealed it was a front for a Broederbond meeting intent on mapping South Africa’s future under the ideology of Christian Nationalism – and outlining how they would infiltrate the education system to do it. They traced vehicle registrations of many in attendance to known Broederbond members and highlighted Albert Hertzog, Nico Diederichs, Hendrick Verwoerd and Henning Klopper as the ringleaders (a line-up of some significant heavy-weight National Party leaders).

From both inside and out the Nationalists were making a mark promoting Nazism, and none more so than the following affiliated organisations, let’s start with the biggest one – The Ossewabrandwag.

The Ossewabrandwag (OB)

The Ossewabrandwag (OB) was officially established in 1938 to commemorate the centennial of the Great Trek as devised by Henning Klopper and the Broederbond. It was intended to be a ‘cultural’ organisation on which to spread the white Afrikaner nationalist message and idealised Afrikaner hegemony proposed by the Broederbond. Its name – meaning “Ox Wagon Sentinel” was derived from the idea that Afrikaner Nationalism and Voortrekker symbology and identity would spread like a wildfire from Afrikaner heart to Afrikaner heart. The OB is set up in parallel to the National Party – in fact they are both joined at the hip.

Col Laas (left) and Dr. van Rensburg (right)

The OB is initially led by Colonel J.C.C. Laas – a Union Defence Force (UDF) officer with who held the ideals of National Socialism in high regard, so much so he would go on enter main-stream politics and establish a Neo-Nazi party called the Boerenasie, which Manie Maritz would eventually take over (more on this later).

Taking part in the 1938 Ox Wagon Centennial, leading one of the groups was Dr Johannes (Hans) van Rensburg, a lawyer who served in the Union Defence Force was the Union’s Secretary of Justice, in 1933 he had been to Germany in his capacity as Secretary and met both Hitler and Goering as well as other Nazi officials, he was deeply impressed with both the leadership and discipline offered by Nazism and became an admirer. 

Dr. van Rensburg took over the OB from Col. Laas, and under Dr. van Rensburg the OB saw unprecedented growth – by the start of World War 2 it was a massive organisation of some 300,000 members, it had evolved away from being a mere ‘cultural movement’ forwarding Nationalist Afrikaner identity, to an active domestic para-military movement with strong Nazi overtones and open channels to Nazi Germany to aid their submarine activities around South Africa.

Dr. Hans van Rensburg flanked at a OB Torch rally

When it was established relations between the National Party and the Ossewabrandwag were cordial, with most members of the Ossewabrandwag belonging to the party as well. At the higher levels, National Party leaders like P.O. Sauer and F. Erasmus. Three future National Party South African Prime Ministers/State Presidents held key leadership positions in the Ossewabrandwag. ‘Generals’ like C.R. Swart (later South Africa’s first State President) was a member of the Groot Raad (Chief Council) of the Ossewabrandwag, B.J. Vorster (later to become Prime Minister of South Africa) was a keynote OB leader and formed the OB’s Cape Branch and even PW Botha (future South African State President) joined the Ossewabrandwag and worked with Vorster to establish the OB’s Cape branch.

Other National Party stalwarts where also prominent in the Ossewabrandwag organisation, Eric Louw, for example – who later to become the National Party’s Foreign Minister. To say the National Party and the Ossewabrandwag were, to coin a phrase, “two peas in the same pod” is an absolute truism.

The relationship between the Ossewabrandwag and National Party at first was very well-defined and D.F. Malan even met with OB leaders in Bloemfontein which resulted in declaration known as the ‘Cradock Agreement’. It specified the two operating spheres of the two respective organizations. They undertook not to meddle in each other’s affairs and the National Party endeavoured to focus on Afrikanerdom in the party-political sphere, while the Ossewabrandwag was to operate on the other fronts of the ‘volk’ (white Afrikaans people’s).

Dr Van Rensburg, having now resigned his commission as an officer in the UDF, had always professed to be a National Socialist, as an open admirer of Nazi Germany and Adolph Hitler, and the ideas, uniforms and rituals of membership adopted by the OB had a distinctive Nazi leaning as a result.

Image: An Ossewabrandwag ‘Kommandant’ in full para-military uniform with lapel badges, ‘crested eagle’ epaulettes and ‘lightning bolt’ cap badge insignia. In addition he is wearing a sam-browne belt and lanyard. His ‘green’ arm band signifies his rank – using the ‘crested eagle’ again and horizontal lines for scale of seniority.

In terms of OB political thinking, Afrikaans would be the only official language in a free, independent, Christian-Nationalist Republic. The English-speaking South Africans, regarded as an “un-national” element, would be condemned to an inferior status. Anti-Communism was an important backbone of OB policy in line with Nazi aggression toward Communism. 

The emphasis of the OB was also on race and racial purity. Members were exhorted to “think with your blood”, and the Nazi creed of “Blut und Boden” (Blood and Soil) was promoted as an OB value. The Ossewabrandwag’s newsletter O.B. would state this clearly on 28 October 1942 when it said:

“Family, blood, and native soil’ – that is, next to our religion and our love of freedom, our greatest and our most sacred national heritage”. 

The OB always displayed an exaggerated interest in physical culture and the need for dictatorial discipline. Dr. van Rensburg would write:

“Give us a master! Give us bonds which tie us to a stable way of life”.

On issues of family value, the leaders of the OB proclaimed that the duty of the man was to work and fight and the duty of the woman to create and tend the home and family. In essence the OB was based on the Führer principle, fighting against the British Empire, anti-capitalist in nature – they called for the removal and expropriation of “British-Jewish” controlled capital, the communists, the Jews and the system of parliamentarism. All based on the principles of National Socialism (Nazism).

Dr Hans van Rensburg being sworn in – OB swearing in ceremony

In 1940, as South Africa was fighting in the North African theatre of operations on the side of the Allies, the OB created an elite organization known as the Stormjaers – the storm troopers of Afrikanerdom. The formation of the Stormjaers (English meaning: Assault troops) was in essence a paramilitary wing of the OB. The nature of the Stormjaers was drawn upon the lines of Nazi Germany’s army ‘Storm troopers’, as were the Nazi and fascist rituals and salutes, this is evidenced by the oath sworn in a by new recruits (in some instances a firearm was levelled at them whilst they read the oath): 

“If I retreat, kill me. If I die, avenge me. If I advance, follow me.”

The Stormjaers were deployed in variety of military operations ranging from the defence of Nationalist political platforms to pure sabotage, they dynamited post offices and railway lines and cut telephone wires. Dr. van Rensburg even wrote:

“The Ossewabrandwag regards itself as the soldiery of the (South African) Republic . . . the Ossewabrandwag is the political action front of Afrikanerdom.”

The ideologies of the Nazis were penetrating deep into right-wing Afrikaner political identity. In 1940, directly after Nazi German decisive victories in Europe, Otto du Plessis (later to become Administrator of the Cape under the National Party) published a pamphlet – The Revolution of the Twentieth Century – in which he openly espoused the Ossewabrandwag’s policy of totalitarianism.

One very predominant leader of the Ossewabrandwag was Balthazar Johannes (B.J.) Vorster, South Africa’s future Prime Minister. Along with like-minded OB colleagues he regarded the war as an opportunity to get rid of the hated domination of the United Kingdom of South Africa and welcomed the Nazis as allies in their fight.

Image: OB ‘General’ B.J. ‘John’ Vorster at a OB rally

The firebrand nature of the Ossewabrandwag appealed to Vorster more than the National Party, so while South African troops were helping to make the world safe from Hitler’s National Socialism, Vorster was appointed as a ‘General’ in the Ossewabrandwag for the Port Elizabeth district to promote the National Socialism doctrine back home. On his politics he famously announced the Ossewabrandwag’s position on Nazism and said in 1942:

‘We stand for Christian Nationalism which is an ally of National Socialism. You can call this anti-democratic principle dictatorship if you wish. In Italy it is called Fascism, in Germany National Socialism (Nazism) and in South Africa, Christian Nationalism.”

B.J. Vorster was eventually arrested under the emergency regulations in September 1942, he immediately went on hunger strike and after two months was transferred to Koffiefontein internment camp as prisoner No. 2229/42 in Hut 48, Camp 1. B.J. Vorster was eventually released on parole in January 1944 and placed under house arrest.

Interned alongside BJ Vorster was another Ossewabrandwag member Hendrik Johan van den Bergh who eventually went on to become the founder of the Bureau of State Security (B.O.S.S.), an intelligence agency created under the National Party on 16 May 1969 as a Nazi SS styled jackboot agency to enforce Apartheid. Van den Bergh was to become known as the “tall assassin” given his physical height.

The Rev. Koot Vorster (B.J. Vorster’s brother), a Dutch Reformed Church minister, and like his brother was also a predominant Ossewabrandwag leader, crystalised this idea of Afrikaner totalitarianism when he summed up the pro-Hitler and Pro-Nazi standpoint of the OBW during an address to a student group on September 15, 1940 and said:

“Hitler’s ‘Mein Kampf’ shows the way to greatness – the path of South Africa. Hitler gave the Germans a calling. He gave them a fanaticism which causes them to stand back for no one. We must follow this example because only by such holy fanaticism can the Afrikaner nation achieve its calling.”

Kowie Marais, an OB member, years later recalled in an interview the admiration he and his friends held for Hitler: 

“We thought he (Hitler) might rejuvenate western civilization…against the communist-socialist trends that were creeping in from the east. We thought it was the dawn of a new era.”

The Ossewabrandwag WW2 Insurgency campaign

The ‘subversion’ activities of the OB were not exactly irrelevant and they were not that of a ‘cultural organisation’. From the outset of the war a series of violent incidents took place between statutory force South African soldiers and the Ossewabrandwag. 

This was to cumulate on Friday 31 January 1941, when van Rensburg was due to hold a meeting at the Johannesburg City Hall when a riot broke out between OB Stormjaers and South African Union Defence Force soldiers who were determined not to allow van Rensburg to have a platform for his support of Nazi Germany – with whom they were now at war with. The battle raged in downtown Johannesburg for two days. Armoured cars were brought in to eventually quell the violence.

OB Bombing campaign

Other OB insurgency operations included a series of explosions over a large area of mines at Klerksdorp, Vereeniging, Delmas and in Potchefstroom the OB blew up power lines on the 29th  January 1942. All telegraph and telephone communication between Bloemfontein and the rest of South Africa were dislocated in one attack in February 1942. Railway, telegraph, and telephone lines in various parts of the Free State were destroyed in February 1942. Fifty-eight Stormjaers were eventually charged with high treason, and a quantity of hand grenades were found. Stormjaers also blew up two telephone poles behind the Pretoria Central Jail but were never captured.

Two other Stormjaers, Visser and van Blerk were convicted of a bombing at the Benoni Post Office, as a result of which an innocent bystander was killed, they were both sentenced to death (The sentence was commuted to life imprisonment). A few members of the OB were shot while trying to escape from internment camps or jails, the most known was the dramatic pursuit OB General, Johannes van der Walt, who was shot while on the run near Krugersdorp.

Very central to OB activities during World War 2 was also the co-ordination of spy networks and spy insurgents sent to South Africa, the most notorious of which where Hans Rooseboom – codename Peters and Lothar Sittig – codename Felix. OB members actively participated in setting up of radio broadcast stations for these spies and provided them with a network of OB members focused primarily on shipping in and out of South African ports. The information radioed to the German Abwehr (the German military-intelligence service) who in turn relayed the intelligence to the hunter submarine packs operating off South Africa’s coastline. It is not known exactly how much tonnage sunk and lives lost are attributed to the OB directly, but what is certain is that they are also responsible for it and played a role directly in Italy’s and Germany’s war efforts.

U-156 and U-507 assisting survivors sinking the Laconia in the Indian Ocean, 15 Sept 1942 – insert Lothar Sittig – codename Felix

The Nazi German wartime propaganda machine even returned the favour to the OB, viewing the activities of the Ossewabrandwag as a very positive contribution to their fight and Dr. Van Rensburg was even played up over Radio Zeesen as the real leader of the Afrikaner people.

The National Party even came out in direct support of the OB’s insurgency when the Smuts’ government resolved to detain and ban members of the OB, Dr D.F. Malan defended the OB in a speech on 5 March 1941, saying:

“The Ossewabrandwag has been accused of lending itself to subversive activities and also of encouraging them. Now I say: Carry out your threat. Ban it. Prevent it and prevent its meetings. If the Ossewabrandwag decides to be passively disobedient and refuses to be dissolved . . . I shall share the consequences with the Ossewabrandwag. At this stage I am prepared to say to you that if the government decides upon that act and the Ossewabrandwag decides not to submit, I shall keep my pledge”.

It was a clear message to Smuts’ government that the unity in the ranks of the two Afrikanerdom movements – the NP on the ‘Political’ front and the ‘OB’ on the ‘cultural’ front remained as strong as ever, even during wartime. 

Operation Weissdorn and the National Socialist Rebels

During the war, in Nazi Germany a plan is hatched with the idea of inserting a German military trained South African National Socialist zealot by the name of Sidney Robey Leibbrandt, with the expressed objective to work with the Ossewabrandwag and its Stormjaers to over-throw Smuts’ Union government through an Afrikaner Nationalist armed revolt.

Image: Robey Leibbrandt leaving Nazi Germany giving a ‘Hitler’ salute – insert Leibbrandt in German military attire

Born in Potchefstroom Leibbrandt was an Afrikaner Nationalist of both German and Irish decent. He was also a South African Olympic boxer, Leibbrandt went to Germany in 1938 to study at the Reich Academy for Gymnastics, and stayed on when war broke out. He joined the German Army, where he became the first South African to be trained as a Fallschirmjäger (paratrooper) and glider pilot. Leibbrandt was trained with the Comrades of the Brandenburgers at a sabotage training course of Abwehr II (Abwehrschool “Quenzgut”) near Brandenburg an der Havel, west of Berlin.

The German Admiral Wilhelm Canaris ordered “Operation Weissdorn” a plan for a coup d’état to overthrow the South African government of General Jan Smuts and assassinate Smuts. Central to the plan was Leibbrandt, who left Germany on 5 April 1941 to lead and execute it. 

“The signal for the coup d’ etat will shake South Africa to its very foundations. The whole world will understand it. The gigantic leading figure of General Smuts will be felled like a heavy oak tree at the psychological moment. I will commit this deed on my own. It will happen without help or support.”

Robey Leibbrandt (Berlin, March 20, 1941)

In June 1941, under the code name Walter Kempf, Leibbrandt was dropped on the Namaqualand coast north of Cape Town (Mitchell’s Bay) by a confiscated French sailboat (the Kyloe). Such was his megalomania, thuggery and aggression that even the radio operator who was earmarked to come ashore with him refused to do so, citing fear for his life and remained on-board the yacht instead (the Captain and crew were also relieved to get rid of Leibbrandt such an annoyance he had become). 

His mission was to make contact with the Ossewabrandwag, meet with Dr. van Rensburg in his role as Kommandant General of the Ossewabrandwag and inform him that Germany desired he take over OB military operations expand the OB  ‘Stormjaers’ ranks. He made his way to Pretoria and meet with Dr. van Rensburg. The equally megalomaniac van Rensburg would have none of it and refused to recognise Robey Leibbrandt outright, a row broke out and the two became irreconcilable. 

Robey Leibbrandt would find within the Ossewabrandwag supporters who staunchly followed National Socialism, start his own organisation and he would overcome the leadership crisis by getting them to swear alliance to him in person – in blood. Taking a leaf out of his hero’s book, Adolf Hitler who used a similar oath to get the German military establishment to swear sole allegiance to him as the sole and legitimate leader of the German Volk by name, so too did Robey Leibbrandt get his followers to swear allegiance to him as the only legitimate Afrikaner leader, by name.

The blood signature oath read as follows:

“I stand before God and swear this sacred oath that I, as an Afrikaner, will faithfully serve my Volk and Vaderland with my whole heart, body, soul and mind, along the lines indicated to me by the leader of the National Socialist Rebels in the person of Robey Leibbrandt and no one else, from now until death. The deep seriousness with which I recognise myself as a National Socialist Rebel finds expression in the blood with which I forever bind my person through the medium of my signature. I am nothing. My Volk is all. God be with us. The Vierkleur on High.”

OB members carrying the old ZAR republican flag on parade – “The Vierkeur on High”

Not to miss out on the legitimacy of Adolf Hitler as the supreme leader, the blood oath also partly read as follows:

“All my fight and striving is for the freedom and independence of the Afrikaner people of South Africa and for the building up of a National Socialist State in accordance with the ideas of Adolf Hitler.”

Leibbrandt’s small group of National Socialist Rebels kept the South African government on high alert by committing various sabotage acts. However, the quiet truce between Leibbrandt and van Rensburg quickly developed into open hostility. Leibbrandt, disappointed that the OB did not officially support his mission and its resultant failure began to openly attack Dr van Rensburg as an ‘agent’ of Smuts. This sealed his fate. 

Posing a significant threat to the Ossewabrandwag – both in terms of drawing members, ideology and in leadership and overall control of the Afrikaner right-wing, the Ossewabrandwag would engage the tired old philosophy of the ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’ and sell out the National Socialist Rebels and Robey Leibbrandt to the British. British Intelligence documents uncovered in the British National Archives in 2005, revealed that Hans van Rensburg sold out Robey Leibbrandt’s base of operations to the British SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) who in turn tipped off General Jan Smuts, which in turn led to Leibbrandt’s capture by the Union of South Africa’s security forces on Christmas Eve, 1941. Ironically the arresting officer was Claude Sterley, a fellow Springbok boxer and friend.

Charged and found guilty of High Treason, Robey Leibbrandt was sentenced to death on the 11 March 1943. Although Leibbrandt refused to give evidence at any stage in the trial, he claimed that he had acted “for Volk and Führer” and gave the German Salute (Hitler Salute) when he first entered the court, to which several spectators responded and calling “Sieg Heil”. After being sentenced to death, Leibbrandt shouted loudly and clearly “I greet death”.

His sentence was commuted to life in prison by General Jan Smuts, the South African premier, some sources say it was because Smuts and Leibbrandt’s father served together during the South African War (1899-1902) and Smuts had a high regard for Leibbrand’s Dad, other sources point to Smuts not wanting the blood of yet another Jopie Fourie martyr on his hands. In any event, when the National Party government came to power in 1948, Leibbrandt was officially pardoned and walked out a free man – much to the disgust of the hundreds of thousands of South African’s who had fought against Nazism and his ilk during the war.

Leibbrandt became politically active in his later life on the far right of the political spectrum, founding the organisation Anti-Kommunistiese Beskermingsfront (Anti-Communist Protection Front) in 1962, and producing a series of pamphlets titled Ontwaak Suid-Afrika (Wake up South Africa). His son, Izan (Nazi spelled backwards) became a senior officer in the South African Defence Force.

The New Order 

Oswald Pirow over his period in office under General Barry Hertzog in the South African Union holds three portfolios, he starts as the Minister of Justice, then he’s appointed Minister of Railways and Harbours, and from 1933 to 1939 he was Minister of Defence.

He is an Afrikaner Nationalist of strong German heritage (in fact at home he only uses German as a mother tongue). As Defence Minister he was sent on official visits on behalf of the Hertzog government to both Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. His mission was one of appeasement, to meet with Hitler, Ribbentrop and Goering and try to establish Anglo-German rapprochement as well as assure them of South Africa’s neutrality under the Hertzog government. In discussions with Hitler, he also assures him that a Afrikaner Nationalist would be a sympathetic government to Nazi Germany’s claim to return her previous colony of German South West Africa (Namibia). He is also after German aircraft as he was very involved in establishing South African Airways, under his watch both Heinkel bombers and Junkers transport aircraft enter South African Air Force and South African Airways fleets respectively.

Pirow’s solution to easing British and German tension prior to the war, which he proposed to Hitler, was for the British to agree with the Nazi policy of “Drang nach Osten” (meaning yearning or ‘thrust’ towards the East for ‘living space’ as Hitler put it in his book ‘Mein Kampf’) and in return Hitler should allow all the Jewish people living in Germany to leave. In reality this offer would never have happened as it would have required Britain, by way of a parliamentary agreement, to renege on its commitment to Poland as an ally.  However, Pirow also had another mission, that of building a South African partnership for a post war Nazi world.

Oswald Pirow in Nazi Germany, November 1938 in Berlin inspecting a honour guard from the German Luftwaffe (Air Force), to his left is Wilhelm Canaris, to his right Ernst Seifert.

In 1936 Pirow attended the Olympic Games in National Socialist (Nazi) Germany and in 1938 again visited Europe, including Spain, Portugal and Germany. These visits confirmed his admiration for this new style of government in Europe and, in particular, for National Socialism (Nazism). A vehement anti-communist – Pirow vowed to legislate communism out of existence, he also became an admirer of Adolf Hitler – especially after his meeting with him.

During this tours he also met Benito Mussolini, António de Oliveira Salazar and Francisco Franco and became convinced that a European war was imminent, with a resounding Nazi victory assured. The future Pirow predicted was one of global Nazism.

When General Jan Smuts committed South Africa to war against Nazi Germany, Pirow found his position in government as a Minister of Parliament and his position in the ‘Fusion’ United Party untenable. He had given his support in 1939 to Hertzog’s neutrality policy. He then resigned along with Hertzog and took no part in Smuts’ reformatted war-time government. Instead Pirow launched the South African version of the “New Order” within the D.F. Malan’s breakaway National Party, backing the idea of a Nazi style one-party state dictatorship.

His new political grouping took its name from his 1940 ‘New Order in South Africa’ pamphlet in which Pirow embraced the ideology of Nazi globalisation. To understand what the concept of the “New Order” was – the New Order (German: Neuordnung) was the political order which Nazi Germany wanted to impose on the conquered areas under its dominion, it entailed the creation of a pan-German racial state structured according to Nazi ideology to ensure the supremacy of an Aryan-Nordic master race along with territorial expansion and colonisation.

Hitler’s ‘New Order’ concept is important as it would guide Pirow’s thinking after the war, because although Hitler focussed primarily on Eastern Europe ‘Lebensraum’ (‘living space’) his plan also extend to Asia, India, South America and North America in ‘post war’ fascist dominated world, and like any plan for globalisation, Africa also played a role in the New Order.

Oswald Pirow as a special South African envoy inspecting German Infantry and military capability in 1938

Hitler’s overall intentions for the future organisation of Africa was based on a plan which divided the continent into three big parts. The northern third of Africa was to be assigned to Germany’s Axis partner – Italy. The central part of Africa would fall under German rule. The remaining southern sector would be controlled by a pro-Nazi Afrikaner state built along racial grounds.

German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop had communicated this plan with South African leaders sympathetic to Nazism, and a key channel for this communication were his meetings with Oswald Pirow whilst he was on his visits to Nazi Germany on behalf of the Hertzog government. Ribbentrop informed the Afrikaner Nationalist leaders that once Germany had won the war, Germany was to reclaim its former colony of German South-West Africa (now Namibia), then a mandate would be given to an Afrikaner Nationalist led South Africa as a sort of ‘war compensation’ which would include the territorial acquisitions of the British protectorates of  Swaziland, Basutoland (Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana) and the colony of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

Oswald Pirow ( left) at a reception of the Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop in conversation with Erhard Milch (right) and Walter Hevel on November 19, 1938

Dr. Malan initially tolerated the actions of Oswald Pirow’s South African adaption of the 3rd Reich’s ‘New Order’ however very soon Malan came to realise what the extreme ideology of The New Order was about, and he immediately saw it as a divisive influence on the Afrikaner nationalist movement. Fearful of a split in Afrikaner nationalism over support for extreme Nazism at the Nationalists Transvaal party congress of August 1941, Malan forced through a motion ending the New Order’s propaganda activities, particularly their insistence on a one-party state on a ‘Führer’ principle.

Although restricted by Dr. Malan, the New Order continued to exist and Pirow and 17 of his New Order supporters continued to be associated with the National Party and continued to attend their caucus meetings. The New Order finally broke from the National Party altogether in 1942, after both D.F. Malan and J.G. Strijdom realising the tide of war was turning against Nazi Germany publicly rejected Nazism.

Pirow returned to his legal practice, and after the war formulated a partnership with Sir Oswald Mosley. Mosley was an ex-British MP and an infamous British Nazi, he led the British Union of Fascists (BUF), a Neo-Nazi British organisation following the edicts of the ‘New Order’ in the United Kingdom. Mosley was imprisoned at the outbreak of World War 2 in 1940 for his extreme views in support of the enemy (Nazi Germany) and the BUF was outlawed. He was released in 1943.

Oswald Pirow and Mosley collaborated together in earnest when they met in London in April 1948 and they developed an idea for the division of Africa into exclusively black and white areas and the founding an anti-communist group to be known as the ‘enemies of the Soviet Union’. The two Oswalds came up with what were known as the Mosley-Pirow Proposals, which advocated the extension of the South African National Party’s Apartheid ideology and concept to include the entire continent of Africa.  

The idea they came up with was that two-thirds of sub saharan Africa would be advocated for ‘Black States’ and one-third would be for ‘White states’.  Where the two of them differed on their concept of ‘Eurafrica’ (which they conjointly coined), Pirow felt that ‘sweated labour’ would need to be forced whereas Mosley felt that unskilled Labour, needed in the ‘white states,’ was to be traded for from the ‘black states’ in return for technical assistance at some ‘later stage’.

Oswald Pirow (left) and Oswald Mosley (right) and inserted with his emblem.

The relationship with Pirow and Mosley started to break down after their ‘Eurafrica proposals’ were launched. Pirow came to realise that virtually nobody took Mosley seriously, people generally dismissed both him and his economic and political treatise out of hand as an extreme oddity.

Very famously Pirow, back in his legal guise, acted as the public prosecutor on behalf of the Apartheid State during the Treason Trial of 1956. The Treason Trial was a trial in which 156 people, including Nelson Mandela, were arrested in a raid and accused of treason in South Africa in 1956, an unsuccessful trial in the end they were found not guilty of treason (the Rivonia trial came later). 

Oswald Pirow’s influence in South African politics and Apartheid is far-reaching. The Tomlinson Commission – which investigated the validity of the idea Apartheid was not a new creation, and its findings were based in part on findings made by the Native Economic Commission in 1932 and on preparatory work done by Oswald Pirow.

The South African National Socialist Movement (SANP) and ‘the shirts’.

Now we come to the various ‘shirt’ movements of which the most significant is The South African Christian National Socialist Movement also referenced as the South African Gentile National Socialist Movement or SANP. More commonly they were also known at the time as the ‘Gryshemde’ in Afrikaans and ‘Grey-shirts’ in English.

Louis Weichardt (left) and a SANP armband right

Led by Louis Theodor Weichardt, a native of Paarl in the Western Cape and of German descent, the organisation is established on the 26thOctober 1933, he founded South Africa’s Nazi party equivalent – The South African Christian National Socialist Movement (SANP) with a paramilitary section, modelled on Nazi Germany’s brown-shirted Sturmabteilung) called the ‘Gryshemde’ (Grey shirts).

Their uniform, insignia and flags were distinctively Nazi with the swastika front and forward. Of interest, is the use of Orange, Blue and White in the Nazi swastika configuration – this was intentionally done to reflect the national colours of the South African flag at the time, the ‘Oranje-blanje-blou’ (Orange, White and Blue).

SANP bunting, flags, armbands and shirts, image courtesy Ulrich Duebe, the current owner of the collection.

Other ‘shirt’ organisations form in parallel to the Grey-shirts albeit a little smaller, they include the equally devout and Nazi ‘Black-shirts’ – the Volksbeweging (People’s Movement) or ‘African Gentile Organisation’ which is led by H.S. Terblanche. In addition, the ‘Brown-shirts’ – The ‘Bond van Nasionale Werkers’ (National Workers Union) led by Johannes Bruwer.

Central to their cause in the late 1930’s where Jewish immigrants escaping Nazi Germany to South Africa, and their numbers were growing significantly over the decade – in response the SANP launched a campaign calling for an end to Jewish immigration and arranged mass protests.  Their primary communication mouthpiece was a newspaper called “Die Waarheid” (the truth) which was nothing more than a vehicle to spread Nazi doctrine in South Africa. Die Waarheid held a Nazi swastika on its masthead.

The nature of the movement was clearly seen in March 1934 when the SANP held a rally in Aberdeen in the Eastern Cape, Harry Victor Inch – one of the Greyshirt leaders – announced that he had in his possession a ‘stolen’ document from a Port Elizabeth synagogue – signed by its Rabbi – which outlined a secret plot by the Jews to destroy the Christian religion and civilisation.

The Rabbi in question, Rabbi Abraham Levy, took the SANP Greyshirts to court in Grahamstown and in a landmark case the document was scrutinised legally, it was found to be a complete falsehood and fabricated by the SANP. As a result three Greyshirt leaders were fined and Harry Victor Inch was found guilty of perjury and was sentenced to serve six years and three months in prison for forging documents defaming the Jewish race and swearing under oath that those documents were genuine. Inch and his fellow defendants, David Hermanus Olivier and Johannes Strauss von Moltke faced other charges which grew out of the Grahamstown trial.

The result has been widely hailed here as a complete vindication of the Jewish people and of Rabbi Abraham Levy who brought the lawsuit against the Grey Shirt leaders. As the leader of the SANP, Weichardt was arrested and imprisoned during World War II at Koffiefontein detention barracks by the Smuts’ government as an ‘enemy of the state’ – along with all the other far right pro-Nazi Germany, anti-British militants and held there for the duration of the war.

Weichardt disbanded his Nazi party in 1948 and closely worked with Oswald Pirow’s ‘New Order’. Moving on, Weichardt then gave his full attention and allegiance to D.F. Malan and the National Party (NP) itself. He had a very successful political career with the NP and went on to become the National Party’s senator from Natal Province from 1956 to 1970.

The folding in of SANP leadership into the National Party’s political sphere would have a resounding impact on the future of not only the majority of ‘Black’ South Africans (who were viewed as ‘inferior’ peoples by these hard liners), but also minority white ethnic groups like South Africa’s very large Jewish community. The arrogance of this underpinning politics is seen with Louis Weichardt himself, who, on becoming an elected National Party Parliamentarian quickly covered up his dubious history as a full-blown card-carrying Nazi, and rather infamously declared that he had never been against the ‘Jewish race’ but only against the actions of certain ‘Jewish communists’. Not a single Jew, in his ‘opinion’ had suffered through his actions.

The Boerenasie (Boer Nation) movement 

As noted earlier, the Afrikaner nationalist hero and leader of the Boer Revolt in 1914, ‘General’ Manie Maritz decided to end his self-imposed exile after the 1st World War ended and returned to the Union of South Africa in 1923. The Smuts government treating him very kindly by way of reconciliation, and all things considered for a crime as serious as treason he received a short imprisonment of three years. Luckily for Maritz, Hertzog’s National party won the 1924 election and Maritz was granted full amnesty and walked free having only served three months.

Maritz took to farming, but came under the influence of National Socialism (Nazism) in 1936 and founded a ‘anti-parliamentary’(dictatorship led) party called the Volksparty (People’s Party) in 1940. Maritz also took control of another ultra-right, national socialist, pro-Nazi movement initially set up by Colonel J.C. Laas. According to Brian Bunting in the Rise of the Afrikaner Reich, Colonel J.C Laas was a cloak-and-dagger character who surrounded his activities with an atmosphere of mystery and proved himself to be unable to satisfy either his friends or his enemies. In October 1940 he was relieved of his command in the Ossewabrandwag and replaced Dr. Hans van Rensburg. Colonel Laas later established Die Boerenasie, but after a while he also abandoned it. 

The “Boerenasie” (The Boer Nation) party, was then merged the Manie Maritz’ Volksparty and it continued as a merger under Die Boerenasie banner with Maritz at the helm. Maritz became known as a very outspoken proponent of The Third Reich and admirer of Adolf Hitler. During this time, he had also developed a theory about the alleged Jewish conspiracy and interference in South African and world politics and became a fanatical Antisemite. 

Boerenasie mouthpiece (right), Manie Maritz (left)

Maritz would detail his Antisemitic and National Socialist views in his autobiography ‘My Lewe en Strewe’ (My life and Aspiration) which he published in 1939, a book regarded as lacking in objectivity, inciting racial hatred and like his hero Adolf Hitler’s book ‘Mein Kampf’ (My Struggle) Maritz’ book was full of emotional and racially driven rhetoric. He was even taken to court over all the anti-Semitic statements he made in his book, found guilty of fomenting racial hatred and he was fined £75.

Manie Maritz had served under Jan Smuts in the South African War (1899-1902) i.e Boer War 2, Maritz playing a leading role in Smuts’ Commando.  At the centre of ‘Bittereinder’ war heroes, one could not find a more vastly differing view than that of Smuts’ and Maritz’. Smuts was extremely wary of the dangers of Nazism and Adolf Hitler, who he accused of being a “false messiah” and whose Nazi symbology of the swastika Smuts called “the crooked cross” in reference to it being a corruption of true Christianity.

On antisemitism, Maritz held a polarising opposite view to Smuts, Jan Smuts was a devout Zionist, Smuts believed in the establishment of Israel as nation state, supported Jewish immigration and refugees (even controversially as Prime Minister he was involved in rescuing 200 Jewish orphans from the ‘Pogroms’ in the Ukraine in 1921, bringing them to safety in South Africa). Smuts supported the ‘Balfour Agreement’ which gave rise to Israel, he was also a personal friend of Chaim Weizmann, the President of the Zionist Organization. Weizmann went on to become the first President of Israel. Smuts is so loved and honoured in Israel that even today a kibbutz in Ramat Yohanan is named in his honour.

It is however difficult to say if Smuts would have interned Maritz again for his Nazi sympathies along with the other strong proponents of Nazism during the 2nd World War as Maritz’ life ended tragically and very early on in the war, he died in a car accident in Pretoria on the 20th December 1940. Probably, had he lived, Smuts and Maritz would have been at extreme loggerheads and Maritz back on the warpath with the Union – and very possibly back in jail.

Die Boerenasie continued after Maritz died under the leadership of S.K. Rudman, from Natal, who was known for his frenetic pronouncements on racial affairs in the columns of various Sunday Press newspapers.

The split in the Afrikaner diaspora – part 3

A mere 3 years after WW2 ended, the National Party found itself in power and there was no doubt that their wartime sympathies and even direct support of Nazi Germany and their National Socialist (Nazi) styled ‘Christian Nationalism’ philosophy was influencing National Party government policy. 

Of the 1,000,000-adult voters in the 1948 General Election (the full actual vote count is 1,065,971 voters) – more or less as numbers go – 550,000 voted against Apartheid (for Jan Smuts’ United Party and their more liberal parties – The Labour Party etc.) as opposed to 450,000 who voted in favour of Apartheid (for the Afrikaner Nationalists – the re-united National Party and Afrikaner Party coalition). The ‘coloured’ vote – the Cape Franchise has within it approximately 50,000 voters and these have almost exclusively gone with the United Party and its partners (one of the National Party’s intended aims is to remove their franchise), so we can deduce that about 500,000 whites and 50,000 coloureds have voted against Apartheid.

Coming into government in 1948 was a ‘minority’ party winning on constitutional grounds and not a popular one – the Afrikaner voting diaspora is still split over the issue of Apartheid and the majority of whites (and Coloureds) did not vote for the National Party, they voted for Smuts’ United Party. The National Party by 1948 had honed their political philosophy, Dr. Verwoerd had packaged it into legalise and called it ‘Apartheid’ and it was an intoxicating cocktail of Krugerism, Christian Nationalism, Nazism and Weimar Eugenics. 

Like the German National Socialist Party in Germany, the Afrikaner National Party had also come to power as a minority in South Africa with a flawed and unwanted ideology, and like Hitler who could not believe his luck in the July of 1932, Dr. Malan could not believe his luck in May 1948. Like the Nazi party had to do from 1933 to stay in power using repressive legislation, gerrymandering, loaded referendums to reconstruct the constitution, immediate banning of Communism (and liberal resistance), re-educate the masses to the nationalist doctrine, mould the Police and Military in their own image, and then use there powerful military and police tools of state to violently suppress opposition and political dissent under the banner of “national interests” – so too the Afrikaner Nationalists would have to do (and history shows us they would emulate their Nazi heroes perfectly).  

By the early 1950’s the South African National Party (NP) government was littered with men, who, prior to the war and during the war where strongly sympathetic to the Nazi cause,  and had actually declared themselves as full-blown National Socialists during the war as members of the following organisations, the Ossewabrandwag (OB) and its ‘Stormjaers’ (Storm Troopers) military wing, the Nazi Party of South Africa – the South African Christian National Socialist Movement (SANP) – Grey, Black and Brownshirts and the Nazi world expansionist order in South Africa – The New Order (NO) and the Boernasie Party.

Men like, B.J. Vorster (Broederdond, OB ‘General’ and future NP Prime Minister and President of South Africa), Oswald Pirow (Founder of the NO – NP Cabinet Minister and future National Prosecutor), Hendrik van den Bergh (OB – future NP head of State Security), Johannes von Moltke (leader and founder of the SANP and now NP Minister and the NP leader in SWA), P.O. Sauer (OB ‘General’ – now NP Cabinet Minister), Frans Erasmus (OB ‘General’ – now NP Cabinet Minister), Dr Hendrik Verwoerd (Broederbond and future Prime Minister), C.R. Swart (OB member – future NP State President), P.W. Botha (Broederbond, OB member – and future President of South Africa), Eric Louw (OB – future NP Cabinet Minister), Dr Nico Diedericks (Broederbond and future NP State President), Jaap Marais (OB – now NP Cabinet Minister and future co-founder of the ultra-right Herstigte Nasionale Party), Dr Albert Hertzog (now a NP minister and future co-founder of the ultra-right Herstigte Nasionale Party) and Louis Weichardt (Founder of the SANP and now a NP Minister), Piet Meyer (Broederbond, OB General and future head of SABC) to name just a few.  

This was the very philosophy the returning South African servicemen and women had been fighting against, the “war for freedom” against the anti-Judea/Christian “crooked cross” (swastika) philosophy and its false messiah as Smuts had called Germany’s National Socialism doctrine and Adolph Hitler. To the returned South African war veterans, by 1951, this flirtation with Nazim by the National Party was unforgiveable and something had to be done.

In Conclusion

The result would be the formation of the ‘War Veterans Action Committee’ (WVAC), it’s the beginning of the Torch Commando and it’s a coming together of the old ‘Smuts men’ who answered the call to go to war currently in firebrand veterans organisations like the Springbok Legion, sedate veterans organisations like the South African Legion and Memorable Order of Tin Hats (MOTH) and the military veterans who found themselves in mainstream politics in the United Party and the Labour Party after the war. 

They are all concerned veterans, the ‘Nazification’ of South African politics is something they dread and fear. With the co-ordination of Vic Clapham Jr., who had served in the SA Tank Corps in WW2 as a Lieutenant (he was also the son of the famous World War 1 veteran who started the Comrades Marathon, also Vic Clapham).  Vic Clapham Jr. was an ex-Springbok Legionnaire and now United Party stalwart, these primary two groups of concerned veterans i.e., those from the Springbok Legion and those from the United Party decided to join hands and consolidated in April 1951 to form the ‘War Veteran’s Action Committee – WVAC’ (the WVAC was to evolve into The Torch Commando). 

Vic Clapham Jnr (Left) and Vic Clapham Snr (right)

The leadership team of the WVAC was made up of veterans perceived as ‘moderate’ (as opposed to the more firebrand ‘Communists’ in the Springbok Legion) to present a broader appeal across the political spectrum. It’s also a balanced committee between ‘English’ and ‘Afrikaners’ – designed to address the polarisation in Afrikaner politics and bring Afrikaner voters who had served in the military during WW2 back to mainstream and moderate politics.

The leaders appointed were Group Captain Adolph ‘Sailor’ Malan, Major Louis Kane- Berman, Major Ralph Parrott, Major Jacob Pretorius (ex-SAAF) and Major Doreen Dunning – who during the war was the Officer Commanding the South African Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (SAWAAF). Harry Oppenheimer, the patron and financier of the committee, pushed for Sailor Malan (Oppenheimer’s former Private Secretary) to take the role as the leader of the WVAC. Sailor Malan agreed only on the proviso that his internal principles were adhered to. These been the political injustices suffered by people of colour in South Africa and resisting the government’s anti-constitutionalism and their drift towards a local brand of Nazism. 

To see what happens next – follow this link:

The Torch Commando – Part 2 The War Veterans’ Action Committee,

thereafter follow this link

 The Torch Commando – Part 3 The Steel Commando

Editor’s note

Look out for the next instalments of The Torch Commando – which will cover their rise and fall from 1951 to 1953, the political fall-out they create and what these ‘Torchmen’ do after the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960 – in both armed resistance movements and mainstream political resistance. 

As this research field includes the ‘racial constructs’ of Krugerism leading up and including Boer War 2 (1899-1902) and as an ideology and its role in establishing The National Party (and the onset of ‘Apartheid’) from 1914. In addition it also includes the ‘Nazification of the Afrikaner Right’ from 1936 and the political awakening of returning Afrikaner World War 2 veterans from 1950 because of it – the Observation Post often gets comments on both the blog and social media that it is somehow biased to the ‘British’ and ‘Afrikaner bashing’ or ‘Boer bashing’ – it is neither. 

What the Observation Post elects to highlight are the actual demographics, the economic history and not the political history peddled for political gain. It elects to highlight the progressive political deeds of Afrikaner military heroes like Dolf de la Rey and Sailor Malan, and all the Afrikaner military men in the Torch Commando whose legacies were buried by the Afrikaner Nationalists for decades and men whose truth must now ‘out’.

Given the current political assault on Afrikanerdom in modern South Africa this is key to understanding Afrikanerdom in its proper historical context – sans the National Party and now the African National Congress’ interpretation of it.

The Torch Commando – next instalment 

What follows next is called ‘The War Veterans Action Committee’ – please click through to this Observation Post link which covers this phase in depth.

The Torch Commando – Part 2, The War Veterans’ Action Committee


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens 

References:

The Torch Commando & The Politics of White Opposition. South Africa 1951-1953, a Seminar Paper submission to Wits University – 1976 by Michael Fridjhon.

The South African Parliamentary Opposition 1948 – 1953, a Doctorate submission to Natal University – 1989 by William Barry White. 

The influence of Second World War military service on prominent White South African veterans in opposition politics 1939 – 1961. A Masters submission to Stellenbosch University – 2021 by Graeme Wesley Plint 

The Rise and Fall of The Torch Commando – Politicsweb 2018 by John Kane-Berman

The White Armed Struggle against Apartheid – a Seminar Paper submission to The South African Military History Society – 10th Oct 2019 by Peter Dickens 

 Not for ourselves – a history of the South African Legion by Arthur Blake

Echoes of David Irving – The Greyshirt Trial of 1934” by David M. Scher.

Dr. Evert Kleynhans – Hitler’s Spies, Secret agents and the intelligence war in South Africa, 1939-1945. Published 2021

Dr. Garth Benneyworth – Sol Plaatje University – Correspondence 16/2/2023

Sailor Malan fights his greatest Battle: Albert Flick 1952. 

Sailor Malan – By Oliver Walker 1953. 

Lazerson, Whites in the Struggle Against Apartheid.  

Pro-Nazi Subversion in South Africa, 1939-1941: By Patrick J. Furlong.

The Rise of the South African Reich: 1964: By Brian Bunting

The White Tribe of Africa: 1981: By David Harrison

National Socialism and Nazism in South Africa: The case of L.T. Weichardt and his Greyshirt movements, 1933-1946: By Werner Bouwer

Ordinary Springboks: White Servicemen and Social Justice in South Africa, 1939-1961. By Neil Roos.

The Final Prize: The Broederbond by Norman Levy: South African History On-line (SAHO) War and the formation of Afrikaner nationalism: By Anne Samson: Great War in Africa Association.

Volk and Fuhrer. By Hans Strydom. 

 Kaapse rebelle van die Hantam-karoo. By Eben Nel

General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917. By Dr David Katz

 Desperate Men: The 1914 Rebellion and the Polities of Poverty. By Sandra Swart

John Bottomly; ‘The Orange Free State and the Rebellion of 1914: the influence of industrialisation, poverty and poor whitism’

André Wessels; Afrikaner (Boer) Rebellion (Union of South Africa) 2018.

The Kaiser and England during the Boer War. By John C.G. Röhl

Chapter XXIII The Boer Rebellion. By Sol Plaatje

The Issac Ochberg Story on-line website by Lionel Slier 07/18/201

Sailor Malan fights his greatest Battle: By Albert Flick 1952.

Kimberley Calls and Recalls. Life Magazine, 25 June 1951.

‘Very Deeply Dyed in Black’ Sir Oswald Mosley and the Resurrection of British Fascism After 1945.  By Graham Macklin. NSDAP Office of Colonial Policy.  

Ribbontrop’s proposals to South Africa, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. By William Shirer, 1974 edition.

Ohm Kruger/Uncle Kruger: The notorious of Nazi Germany’s Anti-British Statements. By Blaine Taylor

Related Work

Kruger, the man the mystery and the movie Oom Kruger, the man, the movie, the myth!

Oswald Pirow South Africa’s Nazi ‘Neuordnung’ and Oswald Pirow

Greyshirts South Africa’s Nazi Party; The ‘Gryshemde’

Boer Revolt Boer War 3 and beyond!

Jopie Fourie What about Jopie?

Ossewabrandwag “Mein Kampf shows the way to greatness for South Africa” – The Ossewabrandwag

Torch Commando – Steel Commando The Steel Commando

Broederbond and media Just whistling an innocent ‘toon’

Truth Legion A search for the … Truth … Legion!

Torch Commando – ‘New’ rare footage of The Torch Commando in action, the first mass protests against Apartheid by WW2 veterans.

Sailor Malan ‘Freedom Fighter’ Sailor Malan; Fighter Ace & Freedom Fighter!

The Torch Commando Series

The Smoking Gun of the White Struggle against Apartheid!

The Observation Post published 5 articles on the The Torch Commando outlining the history of the movement, this was done ahead of the 60th anniversary of the death of Sailor Malan and Yvonne Malan’ commemorative lecture on him “I fear no man”. To easily access all the key links and the respective content here they are in sequence.

In part 1, we outlined the Nazification of the Afrikaner right prior to and during World War 2 and their ascent to power in a shock election win in 1948 as the Afrikaner National Party – creating the groundswell of indignation and protest from the returning war veterans, whose entire raison d’etre for going to war was to get rid of Nazism.

For the in-depth article follow this link: The Nazification of the Afrikaner Right

In part 2, in response to National Party’s plans to amend the constitution to make way for Apartheid legislation, we outlined the political nature of the military veterans’ associations and parties and the formation of the War Veterans Action Committee (WVAC) under the leadership of Battle of Britain hero – Group Captain Sailor Malan in opposition to it.  Essentially bringing together firebrand Springbok Legionnaires and the United Party’s military veteran leaders into a moderate and centre-line steering committee with broad popular appeal across the entire veteran voting bloc. 

For the in-depth article follow this link: The War Veterans’ Action Committee

In Part 3, we cover the opening salvo of WVAC in a protest in April 1951 at the War Cenotaph in Johannesburg followed by the ratification of four demands at two mass rallies in May 1951. They take these demands to Nationalists in Parliament in a ‘Steel Commando’ convoy converging on Cape Town. Led by Group Captain Sailor Malan and another Afrikaner – Commandant Dolf de la Rey, a South African War (1899-1902) veteran of high standing their purpose is to raise support from Afrikaner and English veterans alike and they converge with a ‘Torchlight’ rally of 60,000 protestors and hand their demands to parliament. 

For the in-depth article follow this link: The Steel Commando

In Part 4, in response to the success of The Steel Commando Cape Town protest, we then look at the rise of the Torch Commando as South Africa’s largest and most significant mass protest movement in the early 1950’s pre-dating the ANC’s defiance campaign. Political dynamics within the Torch see its loyalties stretched across the South African opposition politics landscape, the Torch eventually aiding the United Party’s (UP) grassroots campaigning whilst at the same time caught up in Federal breakaway parties and the Natal issue. The introduction of the ‘Swart Bills’ in addition to ‘coloured vote constitutional crisis’ going ahead despite ineffectual protests causes a crisis within the Torch. This and the UP’s losses in by-elections in the lead up to and the 1953 General Election itself spurs the eventual demise of The Torch Commando.

For the in-depth article follow this link: The ‘Rise and Fall’ of the Torch Commando

In Part 5, we conclude the Series on The Torch Commando with ‘The Smoking Gun’. The Smoking Gun traces what the Torch Commando members do after the movement collapses, significantly two political parties spin out the Torch Commando – the Liberal Party of South Africa and the Union Federal Party. The Torch also significantly impacts the United Party and the formation of the breakaway Progressive Party who embark on formal party political resistance to Apartheid and are the precursor of the modern day Democratic Alliance. The Torch’s Communists party members take a leading role in the ANC’s armed wing MK, and the Torch’s liberals spin off the NCL and ARM armed resistance movements from the Liberal Party. We conclude with CODESA.

For an in-depth article follow this link: The Smoking Gun


What about Jopie

I was a discussant at a book launch of Jan Smuts’ First World War by Dr. David Brock Katz, and the minute questions were opened to the audience, the very first question was “What about Jopie?”, to which there was a universal sigh and “here we go again”.

Turns out you just cannot discuss Jan Smuts’ career as military strategist and Field Marshal, his career as lawyer, botanist, academic, philosopher, conservationist or statesman – without covering the “Jopie” base.  The interesting bit about covering the Jopie base is just how little people understand about him, the nature of events that led to his execution, or even fully understand Smuts’ role in it.

So, to ask the question … “What about Jopie?” To truthfully answer that question – we also have to ask another question, and that is … “What about William?”.

What about William?

William! Who is then heck is William and what is he in the life of Jopie? – Never heard of him! Comes the retort – ah, but here we uncover a part of the Jopie Fourie story which is often glossed over and even never mentioned in all the Nationalistic inspired dogma that surrounds Jopie Fourie, and you have to ask yourself why? So, here goes.

Our story begins with three men who had taken officer commissions in the newly fledged Union Defence Force of South Africa (the UDF) army (the South African Union was declared in 1910). They served together in the ACF (Active Citizen Force) and knew one another well, they are Captain William Allan King, Major Harry Trew and finally Captain Jopie Fourie. 

When South Africa declared war on Germany in 1914, by a landslide Parliamentary vote, those UDF officers who held a ‘Conscientious Objection’ to war against Germany were invited to resign. The Union government was well aware of the sympathies the Boer forces had to Germany during the South African War 1899-1902 and would accommodate them, in other words individual UDF members were not forced to go war against Germany, Botha (then the Prime Minister) and Smuts (then the Minister of Defence) expected a ‘handful’ of resignations from those that refused to fight Germany – and they got exactly that – ‘a handful’ (less than 1% of the UDF construct).

Key resignations from the UDF came from Major Jan Kemp, Lt. Col Manie Maritz and General Christiaan Beyers. All of whom took the precaution of resigning their UDF commissions and oaths before going into armed revolt against the lawfully elected Union government over the issue of the invasion of German South West Africa. Failure to do so in 1914 would amount to a charge of High Treason which carried with it the death sentence.  

Images: Jan Kemp, Christiaan Beyers and Manie Maritz

Captain Jopie Fourie decided to join Kemp, Maritz and Beyers in open armed revolt, however for reasons known only to him, he chose not to resign his commission and oath to serve the Union of South Africa. In other words, as an active serving UDF officer (not just a rebel) he chose to make war against the UDF and his colleagues with the intention of killing them. This in 1914 constituted treason in the highest order.

According to Major Harry Trew, Fourie was a close friend of his and was a likeable chap with a wicked sense of humour, and Fourie had a somewhat cavalier approach to things, this can be seen during the revolt when Trew recalled a commandeering note that Fourie had given to the hotelkeeper at Pienaar’s River. In the note he stated he had taken goods to the value of £10 for the use of the Republican Forces; if his side won it would be honoured by the Republican Government, if he lost: The amount was to be debited against Generals Botha and Smuts.

In another rather cavalier approach to the rebellion, and a very ill-advised one, Jopie Fourie had rather foolishly decided to fight for the rebels whist wearing his Union Defence Force Uniform (refer Military History Journal Vol 16, No.4). The wearing of your ‘enemies’ uniform in 1914 also immediately guaranteed a place in front of firing squad, its treason of the highest order. 

During the South African War 1899-1902 (or Boer War 2) there is an extensive list of Boers executed for “wearing khaki” i.e., wearing a British uniform, by 1914 and the 1st World War this sort of offence earned you a ‘drumhead’ court martial in the field and immediate execution on the spot. 

Even by World War 2, who can forget the harrowing images of the execution of German soldiers – Pernass, Billing, and Schmidt by firing squad of American GI’s for wearing American uniforms, they were condemned to death under the Hague convention concerning land warfare, article 23: “It’s especially forbidden .. to make improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy”

Unteroffizier Manfred Pernass, Oberfähnrich Günther Billing, and Gefreiter Wilhelm Schmidt were given a military trial at Henri Chapelle, sentenced to death, and executed by a firing squad on 23rd Dec 1944 for wearing American uniforms to infiltrate their lines.

Jopie Fourie took a tremendous risk choosing to continue to wear his UDF uniform whilst joining a revolt against the UDF, and there is absolutely no doubt that he knew the consequences of his actions, as a Boer War veteran and subsequently a UDF officer he knew exactly the consequence.

Captain Jopie Fourie and Captain William Allan King where also colleagues and friends. Captain William Allan King was a part-time ACF officer in the UDF, full-time he was the Sub-Commissioner of Pretoria, he was Pretoria’s ‘Native Commissioner’ responsible for the affairs of Blacks and Coloureds in the Transvaal.  His duties and responsibilities included arbitrating between the employers of labour in the Pretoria Labour District with the Black African Natives performing the labour.

According to Sol Plaatje, the first General Secretary of the African National Congress (ANC) in his book ‘Native Life in South Africa, Before and Since the European War and the Boer Rebellion’, William King is described as; 

“Without doubt the ablest native administrator in the Transvaal Civil Service … an expert on Native matters, and no commission ever sat without his being summoned to give evidence before it”.

Sol Plaatje went on to say of William King: 

“The Natives called him ‘Khoshi-ke-Nna’, which means ‘I am the Chief’. A firm but just Englishman, with a striking military gait, he would have been an ideal leader of the native contingents had the offer of native help been accepted by the Union Government.”

That William Allan King was a very popular and well-liked man in South African politics and amongst the majority communities and their representatives in South Africa would be an understatement.

Captain William Allan King, was sent to arrest Captain Jopie Fourie, presumably as they had a personal connection to talk him and his Commando into surrender as a first prize. King was also to warn Fourie that he needed to resign his commission. King’s small UDF force came into contact with Jopie Fourie and his Commando on the 23rd November 1914, just north of Pretoria near Hamaanskraal and a skirmish ensued. During the firefight Captain William Allan King attended to a wounded man. Whilst attending to the man he was shot dead by one of Fourie’s men. Again, military doctrine viewed these sorts of incidents in 1914 as outside accepted rules of engagement.

“What made it so tragic was that Jopie and King, who was Native Commissioner of Pretoria, had been good friends prior to the rebellion” recorded Major Harry Trew, Jopie Fourie’s other friend. It would now be left to Major Harry Trew to capture and arrest Fourie, which he and detachments of South African Police (SAP) and Union Defence Force (UDF) troops eventually managed to do on the 16th December 1914 at Nooitgedacht in the Rustenburg district.

It needs to be noted at the “Battle of Nooitgedacht” to arrest Fourie, Jopie Fourie and his men killed one policeman and many other policemen were injured – Dr C Louis Leipoldt was the ‘police doctor’ that day and was mentioned in dispatches for attending to all the wounded.

Images: Captain William Allan King’s headstone and newspaper notice, note the population group who erects the headstone (the Waterberg Chiefs) and his honouring as an African Chief in a native language.

It was also not the first time Fourie and his men would flout rules of engagement. In a earlier engagement, from under a white flag of truce they opened up on a UDF detachment, this time killing another popular UDF officer, who happened to be unarmed. Captain John (Koos) Nolte, an Afrikaner, was treacherously shot. The epitaph on Nolte’s grave, who was a well-known rugby player and attorney on the East Rand, states; “Gesneuveld 29 October 1914 te Treurfontein onder Witvlag met Rapport. Geboren 11de Juli 1881.”

Retribution

Captain William Allan King’s funeral was a national outpouring of grief, newspapers across the county lamented at his passing, his funeral was the largest funeral since the Union was declared in 1910. Plaatje would read his obituary and would record that he was “one loss which the Natives, judging by articles in their newspapers, will not easily forget”.

Retribution for Fourie was coming – not only from the large swaths of English’, ‘Coloured’ and ‘Black’ communities grieving for William Kings death, of all the Rebel’s Commandos – it was Fourie’s Commando which exacted the greatest number of Union Defence Force deaths. Of those most of them were Afrikaners – Prime Minister Botha insisted the ‘English’ regiments who made up the Active citizen Force (ACF) part of the UDF ‘stay out of it’ for the most part and the Afrikaner ‘Rifle Associations’ – the old Boer Republic Commandos the RA part of UDF to deal with the brunt of the revolt – so, brother against brother, this was to be the Afrikaners sorting out their seditious brethren amongst themselves. Retribution was coming for Fourie from many in the Afrikaans community and the UDF families affected by the loss of their husbands, brothers and sons – men like Captain Koos Nolte.

Unlike many of the other rebel leaders who faced a single count of treason, Captain Jopie Fourie had committed High Treason on three counts, not resigning his Army commission in the UDF, caught wearing his UDF uniform and undertaking a seditious armed revolt against his lawfully elected government and his own armed forces – the UDF. 

Also, unlike the other rebel leaders who faced a trial in a civilian court, having resigned from the UDF, that would not be the case for Jopie Fourie, as he had not resigned from the UDF he was considered as still in service in the UDF, so he faced a military court. A military court martial is fundamentally different to a civilian one as there are a whole set of laws that apply to military personnel that don’t apply to civilians. Military tribunals are almost a ‘law unto themselves’ – sentences tend to be carried out quickly and punishments harsh – very little latitude is given to appealing convictions, and military courts do not really tolerate interventions from civilian authorities and government structures. 

This is compounded further when the military is ‘in a state of war’ with a foreign power or if a state of ‘martial law’ is declared against an internal enemy, and South Africa and the UDF specifically was in both states.  During these respective states of war military law becomes even more intolerant and convictions even more punitive. Retribution from the UDF was most certainly coming for Fourie and there was very little anyone could do about it.

Retribution was also quick, South Africa was in a state of martial Law and there was no dilly-dally, from the time Jopie Fourie was captured on the 16th December 1914, he was tried by this fellow military officers, from all accounts he was given a proper military trial, he was found guilty of high treason and sentenced to death by firing squad (a military ‘death’ afforded only to military personnel – civilians are hanged).

The firing squad was comprised equally of members of the South African Police (as they were involved in his capture and he took a toll on them), members of Jopie Fourie’s own regiment – the “Botha Ruiters”, and members of the South African Mounted Rifles. The execution took place with Fourie refusing a blindfold on the 20th December 1914 …. from capture to execution, it took a mere 4 days.

Images: Authorisation Letter: Jopie Fourie Execution: 20th December 1914 and colourised image of Jopie Fourie (courtesy Jenny B Colourised Photos)

Why Smuts?

Usually in a legal and parliamentary construct like the Union of South Africa, the only person who can stay an execution or offer an amnesty is the Prime Minister and usually that is done with a consensus of cabinet ministers, so the Prime Minister is not seen to act unilaterally. The Prime Minister of South Africa in 1914 was Louis Botha, not Jan Smuts – Smuts was one of 66 South African Party Ministers of Parliament and he is one of Louis Botha’s Cabinet Ministers – holding two portfolios reporting to Botha. Jopie Fourie’s execution is on Botha’s watch – it’s his responsibility, not Smuts’.

General Jan Smuts during WW1

So why not Botha, why the focus on Smuts?

As Dr David Katz in his work ‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917) points out. Jan Smuts had been the key Minister keeping a level head and seeking reconciliation and understanding all the way through the rebellion, and when it was clear the rebellion had failed, Smuts called for a ‘Blanket Amnesty’ across the board for the Boer Rebel leaders and their troops if they laid down their arms. 

General Louis Botha, the Commander in Chief, on the other hand took a much harder and less reconciliatory line than his colleague – he was livid at the sheer betrayal, the sheer waste of lives, resources and time it took and the complete stupidity of it all – an unsupported revolt against a lawfully elected government with absolutely no chance of success. 

It was reported that Louis Botha once joking said to Jan Smuts “Let’s face it Jannie, you’re no General!” By that he meant Smuts was far too reconciliatory and soft-hearted – as far as Louis Botha was concerned, under the edicts of martial law, all rebels, officers and men alike should be tried, the most treasonous of which, the leaders, put up against a wall and shot – even if they were all his old friends.

Smuts however persevered – Botha eventually agreed to an Amnesty, but for the rank and file only, the Boer Rebel leaders would have to be prosecuted. The amnesty, excluding the Rebel leadership, was in put place from 12th to 21st November 1914, and with it the 1914 Boer Rebellion was effectively over, by the end of November General de Wet’s force alone was down to only 40 men. Rear actions and isolated and desperate battles continued to be fought for a couple of months by woefully under-strength hard liners like Jopie Fourie refusing surrender and amnesty, but by the end of January 1915 the rebellion was over.  

Even by standards of the day, at the end of the revolt Smuts would seek clemency and compassion with Botha for the rebel leaders, consider their sentences.  In private correspondence with his confidant and friend, Emily Hobhouse, Hobhouse would urge both Smuts’ and Botha’s compassion in dealing with the rebel leaders, to which Smuts agreed.

Of the main rebel leaders, General Christiaan Beyers tragically drowned in the Vaal River whilst attempting to desperately evade capture on 8th December 1914. General Christiaan de Wet was captured during the amnesty and sentenced to six years imprisonment, with a fine of £2000, he was released by Botha and Smuts after one year’s imprisonment, after giving a written promise to take no further part in politics. 

Major Jan Kemp was captured on the 2nd of February 1915 and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment, with a fine of £1000. However, a mere 10 months into his sentence Botha and Smuts agreed to release him – also on the condition that he may not participate in any politics – a promise Kemp almost immediately broke entering politics as a National Party MP under Hertzog in 1920. 

Lt. Colonel Manie Maritz would evade capture and escape into self-imposed exile, he would re-enter South Africa in 1923 and spent a couple of months in jail for treason, when General Barry Hertzog came to power later in 1924 he was given amnesty. He would enter into politics as the leader of an antisemitic, one-party state, National Socialist (Nazi) inspired ‘Boerenasie’ party prior to World War 2.

Of all the other rebel officers, men like Kmdt Daniel Flemming, who were also captured or returned from exile in GSWA. All were sentenced to short imprisonments and fines, almost all of them walking free within a year … except for just one man … Captain Jopie Fourie.

The Visit

The delegation in December 1914, headed up by Dr D.F. Malan, which decided on a last minute ‘drop in’ visit at Jan Smuts’ house and deliver a petition Malan had drafted, with the remote hope of getting clemency for Fourie, did so because they saw Smuts as the ‘weakest link’ – they knew he had a soft spot for the rebels and they would have no such luck with a no-nonsense General like Louis Botha, and how do we know this?

Simply because General Botha, as Prime Minister made no effort to stay the execution of Jopie Fourie, he did not lift a finger, he didn’t even offer an opinion on the matter or make a statement, and one can only deduce that given his very hard stance he initially held against giving the rebels any sort of amnesty, that he wanted an example made of Fourie. Botha was livid, this revolt in no way received the support of the broad Afrikaner community, it was poorly planned and poorly led and an utter waste of life – to read more on this position read Observation Post – Boer War 3 and Beyond, here’s the link Boer War 3 and beyond!

Now consider what the delegation is asking of Jan Smuts, they are asking him to make a decision he is not really mandated to do, they are asking him to override his boss’ intentions and act unilaterally of the Prime Minister. They are asking him to act unilaterally of all this fellow cabinet ministers and as a UDF General, they are also asking him to act unilaterally of the military, its laws and its tribunals. They are also asking Smuts to perform a communications miracle, considering the speed at which the Fourie trial takes place – a mere 4 days, it’s 1914 – the country is at war and Smuts has to contact a wide variety of MP’s and his Boss the PM who is on a military campaign to get any sort of consensus before the execution – and he only has about a single day to do it in.  

Future nationalists would blow this delegation and incident out the water and pay far too much attention to Smuts than he deserves, they would try and turn Smuts into a coward for not meeting the drop in delegation, stating he was ‘hiding’ in the house – in fact Smuts was visiting on the next door farm when the delegation turned up, and unlike President Paul Kruger who entertained the general public dropping in unannounced, Smuts did not.

What if?

Even if Smuts had entertained the visit, there is literally nothing he could do about Jopie Fourie – as noted, Fourie’s case was far too complicated, his crimes were far too serious and there were far too many incriminating circumstances of high treason. Smuts in even trying to get Fourie off the hook would have incurred the wrath of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the majority of the government, the Union Defence Force and all its commanders, many in the Afrikaans community, the families of the UDF slain, and finally the broader English, Coloured and Black communities, the vast majority, thanks to the death of William King at the hands of Fourie. 

This was World War 1, this was Martial Law after all, soldiers and officers were executed in front of firing squads for ‘cowardice’ or ‘leaving posts without permission’ or ‘refusing orders’ – let alone High Treason, Sedition and White Flag incidents. There was just no way anyone was going to get Fourie any form of amnesty or clemency, not in a month of Sundays.

It is very naive and a very arrogant assumption on behalf of Dr. Malan to think that Smuts could stay the execution and its smacks more of a political assassination exercise than it does of a philanthropic one, and that’s exactly what happened – Prime Minister Louis Botha, the man who was in fact responsible – the bittereinder’ hero of the Boer War – would remain relatively unscathed and still heralded as Boer hero in the Boerevolk community, whereas Smuts would unfairly take the full brunt of Afrikaner Nationalist vitriol in Botha’s place – unrelenting and for decades – he still does.

Images: Hate mail sent to Jan Smuts – Jan Smuts collection

Uneasy is the head that wears a crown

Smuts would go on to be regarded as one of the greatest Statesmen South Africa has ever produced, Jopie Fourie was a junior officer and simply not on the same playing field as Smuts (or Botha for that matter). To quote Shakespeare “uneasy is the head that wears a crown” – no ‘coward’ when it came to his convictions – in Smuts’ career, as a Boer War General during the South African War 1899 – 1902 (Boer War 2) he would personally oversee the court martial and execution by firing squad of Lambert Colyn, a Boer traitor who betrayed his Commando’s position to the British. 

After the 1922 Miners’ Strike, when Smuts was Prime Minister in his first term and had powers of amnesty, the English ‘Communist’ rebels – Samual ‘Taffy’ Long, Herbert Hull and David Lewis were all hanged singing the Red Flag song, Smuts remained unmoved. 

As Prime Minister on two separate occasions many South Africans were executed for a variety of crimes under his watch for clemency, mainly murder, none received it. The UDF in its only recorded execution during World War 2, executed one of their own during the Italy campaign – Johan Mgema (a Native Military Corps man) attached to 12 Squadron SAAF, executed by firing squad when he was found guilty of murdering an Italian woman. Again, as Prime Minister at the time Smuts granted no amnesty. 

Smuts however went one step further, and only for one man, when he was Prime Minister during World War 2, and mandated to grant amnesty and clemency, stay executions and intervene in judicial process – he stayed the execution of Robey Leibbrandt – the South African Nazi zealot inserted into South Africa by Nazi Germany to overthrow the government and assassinate Smuts. Captured and found guilty of High Treason Leibbrandt was sentenced to death – he claimed that he had acted “for Volk and Führer” (Adolph Hitler and the Afrikaner people) and gave the Hitler Salute in court, declaring “I greet death”.

Robey Leibbrandt

Smuts commuted his sentence to life in prison instead. Smuts had served with Leibbrandt’s father, Meyder Leibbrandt during Boer War 2 and admired him as a “courageous Boer warrior”. In the case of Robey Leibbrandt only did Smuts intervene as Prime Minister and exercise his powers, nobody else, again demonstrating his ‘soft spot’ for his most beloved Boere community, one in which he consistency sought reconciliation and understanding. However, even this act would not deter his most obstinate detractors. Robey Leibbrandt was subsequently released on amnesty granted by the incoming nationalists led by Dr. D.F. Malan in 1948.

The point been, for all the executions and all the variety of people of communities involved, it was only with the Boerevolk that Smuts exhibited extraordinary measures of compassion. The execution of Fourie was an extraordinary one, and considering the William Allan King incident, the white flag incident, his commission and his uniform, far too large a segment of the population sought retribution.

This is one of the key reasons why the Jopie Fourie mythology and narrative put forward by Afrikaner Nationalists never really includes William Allan King – Fourie was pitched as been of ‘pure’ Afrikaans heart, unfairly executed for it by traitorous Afrikaners, it’s all about Afrikanerdom – the English, Black and Coloured Communities’ in South Africa who Fourie also went to war against don’t count – that would make him universally unpopular and a genuine traitor – nor do all the other communities affected by government policies in dealing with treason and those executed for it count – it just doesn’t fit their insular and myopic Afrikaner Nationalist narrative.

In Conclusion

In relating the story of Jopie Fourie, it’s clear that the story of William King a.k.a. The Chief is lost. In weighing up the two, the man who died for his country, the man who is the true patriot, the member of the statutory forces representing a legal government and the broad communities of South Africa as a whole – the majority of South Africans, the man who is functioning as a legitimate commissioned officer and upholding his oath to serve his country and men, the man ‘unfairly’ killed, the man whose loss is felt across the entire nation – is Captain William King, as a South African Army officer doing his duty his sacrifice is fully deserving of the nation’s recognition. The true national hero is Captain King, and when we ask ourselves “what about Jopie?” We must also ask of ourselves … “what about William?”

We will never know what Jopie Fourie’s true reasons were for not taking the precaution of resigning his UDF commission, despite been warned to do so. Nobody knows what was going through his head when he donned on his UDF uniform to rebel against the UDF. Given the extremely grave consequences of these actions – one can only assume that the person who wanted Jopie dead, was Jopie himself and he foresaw himself as some sort of martyr.

It remains perplexing, no matter what Smuts did right, no matter all his achievements, no matter that he arbitrated the peace deal to end the Boer War, no matter that he twice put South Africa on the right side of history when Germany acted as polecat, no matter that he consolidated Afrikaners and English and established Union and a whole new country – the true father of South Africa, no matter that he established the UDF and its military doctrine, identified new botanicals, established both the Royal Air Force and the South African Air Force, wrote an accredited work of philosophy, established South Africa as an economic powerhouse, no matter that he commanded British troops in East Africa and was Churchill’s personal advisor during Operation Overlord (D-Day) and the liberation of Europe, no matter that he established the concept of the Commonwealth of Nations and wrote the pre-amble to establish United Nations – all that matters not a jot to the chap in the back of the room at any modern day Smuts related seminar who sticks up his hand and inevitably asks “what about Jopie?”.


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

Related Work:

Boer War 3 and Beyond – the 1914 Boer Rebellion Boer War 3 and beyond!

References:

Military History Journal, Vol 16 No 4 – December 2014 – Forgotten casualties of the 1914 Rebellion. By Richard Wadley

‘Native Life in South Africa, Before and Since the European War and the Boer Rebellion’. By Sol. T. Plaatje

Nongqai Vol 10, No 4 A (1) by Brigadier Hennie Heymans

‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa’ 1914 -1917. By Dr David Broc Katz

A large thank you to Stef Coetzee for his inputs on Captain William Allan King and further thanks to Admiral Arne Söderlund for his assistance, along with Brigadier Hennie Heymans

The Steel Commando

Torch Commando Series – Part 3

Forging a ‘Steel’ Commando

In researching The Torch Commando, quite often the word ‘Steel Commando’ comes in. Now, what exactly was The Steel Commando – some have incorrectly ventured that it was an equivalent to the ‘Greyshirts’ i.e. the strongmen enforcers within a political party – this is not the case, in fact the Steel Commando has an interesting origin, both in history and name. Central to the Steel Commando is the idea of winning hearts and minds – in the Steel Commando’s case it’s very much the Afrikaner ‘heart and mind’ they are after.

So, quick re-cap to my favourite area of research – The Torch Commando, a post-World War 2 mass-movement of ‘white’ ex-military servicemen, a political pressure group against the accent of the National Party into power in 1948 and their first submissions of Grand Apartheid legislation from 1950. It was not an insignificant movement, at its zenith The Torch Commando boasted 250,000 paid up members and as inconvenient truth goes, when it was formed it becomes the first mass anti-Apartheid protest movement, starting in April 1951, its origin pre-dates the African National Congress’ (ANC) ‘Defiance Campaign’ – which is their first mass mobilised protest against Apartheid and started in June 1952. The part that also does not sit with the current ‘struggle’ ANC rhetoric, the Torch Commando was almost exclusively ‘white’.

The dynamics behind the National Party’s ascent to power without a majority vote in 1948 have been vastly researched but suffice it to say that for returning War Veterans from WW2, fighting against Nazism, the advent of a political party with numerous leaders who had been directly and/or indirectly flirting with Nazism during the war as a net result of organisations like the Ox Wagon Sentinel (Ossewabrandwag) and other Neo Nazi factions merging with The National Party was an abhorrent idea and an insult to the sacrifice of their comrades in arms.

The outrage to this and the implementation of the first Acts and Bills that would become ‘Apartheid’ would result in a merger of war veteran members of the Springbok Legion veteran’s association and war veterans predominant in the United Party’s political structures in April 1951 – the ‘War Veteran’s Action Committee WVAC (the WVAC was to eventually evolve into The Torch Commando) under the leadership of the charismatic war-time fighter ace – Adolph Gysbert Malan, DSO & Bar, DFC & Bar, better known as Sailor Malan, a veteran with Afrikaans heritage. The WVAC is careful to balance its demography to reflect the views of both Afrikaners and English-speaking whites who had participated in all South Africa’s Wars and it is balanced 50/50 Afrikaans/English in its make-up. Now, the question is why did they have to do that – why the focus? 

Sailor Malan during The Battle of Britain – note his ‘South Africa’ shoulder flash on his RAF uniform

The answer to this question has its origins in the way the South African Union Defence Force has been constructed and the way the South African public voting bloc – those eligible to vote is constructed and its dynamics. So, let’s look at the Defence Force.

The Union Defence Force

The South African Union Defence Force (UDF) from its origins in 1914 was carefully constructed by Jan Smuts to have an Afrikaner and English ratio of 60% Afrikaners and 40% English speaking whites, a proportional representation of the actual demographic of South Africa  – at first – for World War 1 starting in 1914, the Afrikaners primarily exist in the ‘Rifle Associations’ which are effectively the old Boer Republic’s Commandos and the English speaking South Africans exist in the ACF ‘Active Citizen Force’ Regiments – like the Royal Natal Carbineers, South African Light Horse and Durban Light Infantry, most of whom have origin in the old Natal and Cape Colony ‘Colonial Forces’ during the Boer War.

By the time the Second World War swings around in 1939 the UDF is a slightly different beast, but it still has its 60/40 ratio of Afrikaans to English, with Afrikaners in the majority, Jan Smuts calls out for volunteers, joining the Union Defence Force from the adult ‘white’ base of approximately 1,000,000 people in 1940 is 211,000 whites (with 120,000 Black, Coloured and Indian service personnel in addition).  

It’s an extraordinary response to a call-up to military service on voluntary lines, South Africa is one of the few participating countries in the Allied war effort not to implement conscription and as a population ratio – nearly a quarter of all white South African adults actively seeking service. 

Contrary to the myth asserted by the old National Party. The idea that 2nd World War was primarily fought by the ‘English’ white South Africans who had an affinity to Britain, Smuts had somehow turned ‘British’ and true ‘Afrikaners’ sat out the war as members of organisations like the Ossewabrandwag and the National Party either desiring neutrality due to a universal disgust with all things British (a hang-over from the Boer War) or in active support of Germany. However, this is a myth – it’s simply untrue.

The truth is that Smuts’ call had as much resonance with white Afrikaners as it did with white ‘English’ – of the white population volunteering for service, the pool reflects the national demographic split of the 60/40. So, approximately 127,000 Afrikaners and 84,000 ‘English’ – the Afrikaners are still the majority. Smuts’ call is simply broadly accepted by both white communities and extremely popular – fact, this is again where Economic History starts to tear gaping holes into ‘Political’ history narratives.

The voting bloc

Now let’s look at the white and coloured voting bloc and its dynamics. After the war ends in 1945, the National Party rather surprisingly wins the General Election in 1948, NOT by a majority, it’s a minority government winning on ‘constitutional’ grounds (number of seats) and NOT a popular one. 

Of the 1,000,000-adult voters in 1948 (the full actual vote count is 1,065,971 voters) – more or less as numbers go – 550,000 voted against Apartheid (for Jan Smuts’ United Party and their more liberal parties – The Labour Party etc.) as opposed to 450,000 who voted in favour of Apartheid (for the Afrikaner Nationalists – the re-united National Party and Afrikaner Party coalition). The ‘coloured’ vote – the Cape Franchise has within it approximately 50,000 voters and these have almost exclusively gone with the United Party and its partners (one of the National Party’s intended aims is to remove their franchise), so we can deduce that about 500,000 whites and 50,000 coloureds have voted against Apartheid.  

Dr D.F. Malan (left) leader of the National Party and General Jan Smuts (right) leader of the United Party

This alone qualifies an inconvenient truth. So much for the rather incorrect modern argument put forward by the ANC and other Black Nationalists that ‘white’ people in South Africa as a coherent whole voted to maintain their ‘privilege’ and are therefore responsible for Apartheid and the renumeration of black society hobbled by it. That agreement is simply not true – the majority of whites did not vote for Apartheid – the proof is in the statistics.

Albeit not a majority, clearly some Afrikaner ex-servicemen in the military veteran ‘service’ voting bloc have been moved to support Afrikaner Nationalism – prior to the election the National Party did a large degree of “swart gevaar” (Black Danger) fear mongering around Jan Smuts’ declaration that “segregation had fallen on evil days” and this has resonated with some Afrikaner servicemen, disillusioned in their discharge from the UDF, feeling vulnerable and seeking fundamental reforms within an Afrikaner hegemony.

What the War Veterans Action Committee (WVAC) aims to do is woo these white Afrikaans ex-servicemen voters back to either the United Party or the Labour Party. They also want to encourage ex-Afrikaner servicemen from Boer War 2 and World War 1 to join hands with the World War 2 veterans as a show of unified strength that many in Afrikaans community are simply not in favour of Apartheid – even some of the old highly regarded and much-loved Republican Boer War veterans who are still around.

The opening shots

The War Veterans Action Committee (WVAC) kicked off their mission with a protest at the Johannesburg Cenotaph on 21st April 1951 during a commemoration service – laying a coffin draped in the national flag as a symbol to depict the death of the Constitution.

The first protest action of the WVAC

So, after the Cenotaph parade, the War Veterans Action Committee (WVAC) elected to ‘ramp-up’ their resistance and hold bigger protests using military precision and planning to activate the significant ‘ex-services’ vote and its supporters, so as to bring about regime change through the ballot box. 

On the 4th May 1951, two political rallies were held, one Durban attracted 6,000 people and a second larger one 25,000 people strong, attended by Sailor Malan was held in Johannesburg. The protest marches were held at night and flaming torches were carried for effect – the Torches became symbols of ‘hope’, ‘freedom’ and ‘light’ – and would ultimately be the trademark of the movement with carriers known as “Torch-men”. The proposed idea to the audience was to initiate a ‘crusade’ against the Afrikaner Nationalists in the same spirit as their ‘crusade’ against Hitler and for the same reasons.

The Johannesburg rally saw more than 5,000 veterans ‘on-parade’ carrying Torches march from Noord Street near the railway station to the Johannesburg City Hall. They we joined by approximately 15,000 civilians as they gathered outside the City Hall. Sailor Malan was to outline this intention to crusade when he referred to the ideals for which the Second World War was fought:

“The strength of this gathering is evidence that the men and women who fought in the war for freedom still cherish what they fought for. We are determined not to be denied the fruits of that victory.”

Sailor Malan

At these meetings on 4th May the following resolutions were taken and unanimously agreed:

  1. We ex-servicemen and women and other citizens assembled here protest in the strongest possible terms against the action of the present government in proposing to violate the spirit of the Constitution.
  2. We solemnly pledge ourselves to take every constitutional step in the interests of our country to enforce an immediate General Election.
  3. We call on other ex-servicemen and women, ex-service organisations and democratic South Africans to pledge themselves to this cause.
  4.  We resolve that the foregoing resolutions be forwarded to the Prime Minister and the leaders of the other political parties.

A further meeting was held in Port Elizabeth, attended by 5,000 people, at this meeting the following resolution was outlined;

“This meeting condemns the present government for violating the liberties for which the wars of 1914 – 1918 and 1939 – 1945 were fought and for disregarding the moral undertakings enshrined in our Constitution. We pledge ourselves to continue the struggle to ensure we and our children live in true democracy.”

A manifesto would be released on the 13th May and the war veterans resolved to form a ‘Steel Commando’ to send these four resolutions of protest directly to Parliament in Cape Town. A jeep convoy was put together with precision from all major metropoles to convene in Cape Town on the 28th May 1951. But why the term “Steel Commando” – what resonance would that have and what were the objects of using this concept? Here again – this has a distinctive Afrikaner heritage and appeal. So, here’s some background.

The Steel Commando – an Afrikaner root

Just prior to World War 2, the Broederbond under the directive of its Chairman, Henning Klopper conceived a travelling carnival to celebrate the 100-year anniversary of the Great Trek – it was known as the 1938 Great Trek Centenary its purpose was the establishment of a unified Afrikaner identity under a white ‘Voortrekker’ hegemony – the underpinning of Afrikanerdom with a Christian Nationalism ideology. The long and short, this travelling caravan of Voortrekker wagons traversing to the most rural parts of South Africa on their way to the Blood River battle-ground and the future site of the Voortrekker monument outside Pretoria to lay its cornerstone … it was a massive success, resonating with Afrikaners country-wide and bringing together the impossible – the Boer Afrikaner and the Cape Afrikaner under a ‘white’ Voortrekker’s “path for South Africa” banner.

Henning Klopper’s Ox-Wagons named – The ‘Piet Retief’ and the ‘Andries Pretorius, leave Cape Town from the foot of Jan van Riebeeck’s statue to commence the 1938 Centenary of The Great Trek.

Two years later, during World War 2, the recruitment of white Afrikaners to volunteer for war service became paramount to Union’s Defence Force wartime objectives. Dr Ernie Malherbe and a group of academics, notably Alfred Hoernle and Leo Marquard, persuaded General Smuts to set up, under Malherbe, a corps of information officers to counter subversion in the armed forces generated by the likes of the Ossewabrandwag and the Broederbond and to stimulate the Afrikaner troops and potential white Afrikaner recruits to consider what they were actually fighting for.

Colonel Malherbe would take a leaf out of the Broederbond’s 1938 Centenary Trek used to ‘unify’ the Afrikaner – a round the country travelling carnival covering just about every town and village in the remotest areas. Only this time Colonel Malherbe intended that the travelling carnival ‘unify’ the Afrikaner behind Smuts’ call to arms to fight with Britain and France on the side of the Allies. He would use armoured cars instead of ox-wagons and his message was almost diametrically opposite to that of the Broederbonds’.

Colonel Malherbe would call his countrywide travelling carnival – The Steel Commando, added to this would be a propaganda and recruitment pamphlet dropping campaign from SAAF aircraft called the Air Commando.  The Steel Commando would consist of vehicle to carry a full military band, various armoured cars and a truck converted into a mobile recruitment station. 

Critical to the Steel Commando would be a contingent of old Republican Boer War veterans (South African War 1899-1902) to give it a sense of ‘Afrikanerdom’ and ‘duty’ to South Africa. The term ‘Commando’ would be given to the convoy – solely because it resonated with old Republics ‘Kommandos’ of the Boer war and as a result had Afrikaner appeal. 

This convoy would enter small rural and farming towns with the fanfare of the marching band ahead of it, flanked by the Boer War Republican veterans and the recruiting station behind. Was it effective in capturing the Afrikaner hearts and minds as the Centenary Trek had been?  The truthful answer is – yes. In all the South African standing forces in WW2, Malherbe was satisfied in the objects of The Steel Commando – the single majority ethnic group in the South African Union’s Defence Force during World War 2 were white Afrikaners (126,600 of them).

Images: World War 2 recruitment posters targeted at white Afrikaners – note the poster drawing on the ‘the road to South Africa’ commencing from The Battle of Blood River to the Boer War Commandos to the South African Union Army – the title “Still loyal to the path of South Africa” is a direct play on the 1938 Centennial Trek which the Broederbond pitched as “Die Pad van Suid-Afrika,” a symbolic ‘path’ to South Africa’s nationhood taken by the Voortrekkers. This poster attests that joining the Smuts appeal to war is the true path to nationhood.

To see the effect of a Steel Commando parade, this video outlines one addressed by Smuts as a demonstration of the achievements of recruitment is very telling – note the extensive use of Boer Commando veterans.

What the Steel Commando and Colonel Malherbe’s recruitment drive also did was literally split the Afrikaner ‘hearts and minds’ in two, one half supporting the National Party’s call to neutrality or the Ossewabrandwag’s call to directly support Nazi Germany – and the other half of white ‘Afrikanerdom’ – supporting the ideals of Union between English and Afrikaans, General Smuts’ policies and the Allied war against Nazi Germany. 

The Steel Commando … repurposed 

So, to whip up support for their Anti-Apartheid cause, and how to whip up the planned mega-torchlight rally in Cape Town to hand over the demands? The War Veterans Action Committee took a leaf out of Colonel Malherbe’s Union Defence Force ‘Steel Commando’ recruitment drive. They would not even change the name, the WVAC’s ‘Steel Commando’ would be run along the same lines with military precision. All around the country from far flung places vehicles would converge with the Steel Commando and the Commando itself would drive through multiple towns and villages whipping up publicity and support. 

To balance the authority of the Steel Commando been both for ‘English’ and ‘Afrikaners’ alike and give it a high appeal, leading the ‘Steel Commando’ convoy to Cape Town a big hitting Afrikaner war hero – Kommandant Dolf de la Rey, a South African War (1899-1902) i.e. Boer War 2 veteran of high standing in the old Republican Forces of the Boer War. Part of Commandant Dolf de la Rey’s legacy was that he was reputed to have been involved in the actions around Ladysmith which resulted in the capture of Winston Churchill. Kommandant de la Rey was also affectionally given the term ‘Oom’ by the publicity machine to conjure up respect from the Afrikaner community.  

The ‘Steel Commando’ convoy gathered media attention and grew in size as it converged on Cape Town on the 28th May, a crowd of 4,000 greeted it as it converged in Somerset West before heading to Cape Town that evening.

This is a rare News reel of The Steel Commando drive – Note Kmdt Dolf de la Rey and the Republican Boer War veterans with him.

One newspaper correspondent wrote of it: 

“Cape Town staged a fantastic welcome for Kmdt de la Rey and Group Captain Malan, he related the enthusiasm of the crowd to the same that liberation armies received in Europe.”

The Johannesburg Star said: 

“The Commando formed the most democratic contingent ever to march together in the Union. Civil servants found themselves alongside the coloured men who swept the streets they were marching so proudly upon. In the front jeep rode Oom Dolf de la Rey, a white-haired old Boer of seventy-four, who looked so startlingly like the late General Jan Smuts that people looked twice at him and then cheered wildly. Oom (Uncle Dolf) was the man who, as a young burgher on commando fifty years before, had captured Winston Churchill, then a war correspondent with the Imperial forces in South Africa. In the second jeep stood a younger man with tousled brown hair, his hazel eyes cold and angry, the man who had been the most famed fighter pilot in all the RAF — Adolph Gysbert Malan, known all over the world as Sailor. He was the real hero of the hour. The people tried to mob him. Men and women, white as well as brown, crowded round his jeep and stretched out their hands to touch him”.

In Cape Town, the Steel Commando arrived to a packed crowd of protesters on The Grand Parade outside the City Hall of between 55,000 to 65,000 people – consisting of whites and coloureds, supporters and veterans alike (veterans were estimated at 10,000). Many holding burning torches as had now become the trademark of the movement. Spooked by it all the National Party were convinced that a military coup was on and as a precautionary measure placed manned machine gun positions around the rooftop of the nearby Houses of Parliament.

Sailor Malan was literally carried on shoulders by cheering crowds to give his speech. Joined by Dolf de la Rey and even future Afrikaner anti-apartheid activist and fellow war veteran Mattheus Uys Krige as well as the English speaking South African war-time soprano and heroine who led them in song – Perla Gibson. In Sailor Malan’s speech to the crowd famously accused the national party government at this rally of; 

“Depriving us of our freedom, with a fascist arrogance that we have not experienced since Hitler and Mussolini met their fate”.

Sailor Malan

During the rally in Cape Town, Dolf de la Rey took the microphone and laid into the National Party, as a respected Boer War vet he pulled no punches. Also, this is an inconvenient truth, Dolf de la Rey headed up an entire contingent of Boer War, Boer Republican Afrikaner veterans, on the Steel Commando – all of whom did not feel that Apartheid as outlined by the National Party was reflective of them as Afrikaners.

After the speeches formalities of the protest were closed, a group of mainly ‘coloured’ protestors and some ‘torch-men’ veterans rose-up in violent resistance and surged up the hill to the Houses of Parliament and clashed with the Police, the resultant violence left about 160 people injured and damaged the windows and railings of the ‘Groote Kerk.’

Now that there had been a clash with Police, the Afrikaner changed their tune and stance towards the War Veterans accusing them of starting violent riots and insurrection – threating a military coup. Johannes ‘Hans’ Strydom (National Party Minister and future NP Prime Minister) finally warned the war veterans that he would use the South African security forces against; 

“Those who are playing with fire and speaking of civil war and rebellion”.

Hans Strydom

Although the violence was dismissed by the War Veterans as not being of their making and unplanned, the Nationalists fear of violent military insurrection was not unfounded, both John Lang and Jock Isacowitz would later admit that the intention of many of the ‘torch-men’ on protest that day was always to surge on to Parliament and “throw out the Nationalists.”

The Nationalists continued to position the Torch as a national threat attempting a violent overthrow. This statement was equally quickly rebutted as nothing but shameful rhetoric by the National Party’s official opposition – the United Party. So, the Nationalists went further and targeted the personalities of Malan and de la Rey, bottom line is they did not want young Afrikaners influenced by these two national war heroes.

Sailor Malan was an easy target, he was the product of a Afrikaans father and English mother – he quickly became “the King’s poodle” and “an Afrikaner of a different kind” – not welcome in the Afrikaner laager. But, problem with ‘Oom Dolf’, here was a Afrikaner Boer War hero pure and applied, beyond the National Party’s criticism and reproach, so what did they do? They quietly dismissed him on his ‘Oom’ status, a senile old man, positioning him as somehow irrelevant, a patronising .. Ja Oom!

Formation of the Torch Commando

On the back of the successful widespread support of ‘The Steel Commando’ and determined to continue the fight to effect regime change, the ‘The Torch Commando’ took shape and it took to a more formalized structure of a central command with devolved authorities in the various regions of South Africa, using military discipline, military styled planning and lines of communication to activate.

Officially launching as the Torch Commando, Group Captain Sailor Malan was elected National President of the Torch, Major Louis Kane-Berman was elected National Chairman. To keep with the Afrikaner appeal and skew, the appointed Patron-in-Chief for the Torch Commando was Nicolaas Jacobus de Wet, the former Chief Justice of South Africa. Finally, the National Director was Major Ralph Parrott, a ‘hero’ of the Battle of Tobruk from the Transvaal Scottish who received the Military Cross for bravery. 

The Torch Commando is yet another demonstration of the rich tapestry of Afrikaner war veterans not in support of Apartheid – Afrikaners either joining or supporting the likes of Dolf de la Rey and Adolph ‘Sailor’ Malan in The Torch Commando would include many heavy-weight Afrikaner hitters, people like Mattheus Uys Krige – 2nd World War, correspondent and POW, poet and novelist, Torch Commando member and life-long anti-Apartheid campaigner. General Kenneth Reid van der Spuy – 1st World War and 2nd World War veteran and regional leader in the Torch Commando. General George Brink – 1st World War and 2nd World War veteran and a regional leader in the Torch Commando. Major Jacob Pretorius – 2nd World War and leader in the Torch Commando. Pvt Pieter Beyleveld –  2nd World War veteran, Labour Party and Springbok Legion, Torch Commando activist and life-long anti-apartheid campaigner.

Other Afrikaners would support the Torch, people like Lieutenant (Dr) Jan Steytler –  2nd World War veteran founder of the Progressive Party and Liberal politician. Captain (Sir) De-villiers Graaff – 2nd World War veteran, opposition United Party leader and New Republic Party founder, life-long anti-apartheid campaigner and supporter of the Torch Commando (in fact he hosted Sailor Malan on his ‘Steel Commando’ protest drive). Lt Harold Strachan – 2nd World War veteran, member of the Liberal Party, Congress of Democrats and Communist Party (he also became a founding member of MK). Major Pieter van der Byl – 1st World War veteran, South African Party, United Party and anti-Apartheid opposition stalwart and finally Colonel Ernst Gideon Malherbe – 2nd World War veteran, educator and famous South African academic.

The Commando would grow from strength to strength over the next couple of years, reaching a zenith of 250,000 members – nearly a quarter of the voting bloc and a significant threat to the National Party – do look out for the next Observation Post on The Torch Commando which will cover its rise.

In Conclusion

It is a very incorrect assumption to go with the old National Party rhetoric that they represented the interests of the majority of whites in South Africa, and to be a true Afrikaner you had to be an Afrikaner Nationalist. It is also very incorrect to connect Afrikaner identity to the white Voortrekker hegemony as devised by the Broederbond in their ‘Christian Nationalism’ construct in 1938, and most importantly – it is very incorrect to believe that Afrikaners are a homogeneous group with a homogeneous identity and as a group are all collectively responsible for Apartheid from 1948.  The Torch Commando and the nature of Afrikanerdom prior to the National Party coming into power in 1948 is proof positive, that the majority of whites and a significant part of the Afrikaner nation were simply not on board with the idea of Apartheid.

Editors Note:

As this research field includes the ‘racial constructs’ of Krugerism leading up and including Boer War 2 (1899-1902) and as an ideology and its role in establishing The National Party (and the onset of ‘Apartheid’) from 1914. In addition it also includes the ‘Nazification of the Afrikaner Right’ from 1936 and the political awakening of returning Afrikaner World War 2 veterans from 1950 because of it – the Observation Post often gets comments on both the blog and social media that it is somehow biased to the ‘British’ and ‘Afrikaner bashing’ or ‘Boer bashing’ – it is neither. 

What the Observation Post elects to highlight are the actual demographics, the economic history and not the political history peddled for political gain. It elects to highlight the progressive political deeds of Afrikaner military heroes like Dolf de la Rey and Sailor Malan, and all the Afrikaner military men in the Torch Commando whose legacies were buried by the Afrikaner Nationalists for decades and men whose truth must now ‘out’.

Given the current political assault on Afrikanerdom in modern South Africa this is key to understanding Afrikanerdom in its proper historical context – sans the National Party and now the African National Congress’ interpretation of it.

The Torch Commando – next instalment 

What follows next is called ‘The Rise and Fall of the Torch Commando’ – please click through to this Observation Post link which covers in this phase depth.

The Torch Commando – Part 4, The ‘Rise and Fall’ of the Torch Commando


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

References:

The Torch Commando & The Politics of White Opposition. South Africa 1951-1953, a Seminar Paper submission to Wits University – 1976 by Michael Fridjhon.

The South African Parliamentary Opposition 1948 – 1953, a Doctorate submission to Natal University – 1989 by William Barry White. 

The influence of Second World War military service on prominent White South African veterans in opposition politics 1939 – 1961. A Masters submission to Stellenbosch University – 2021 by Graeme Wesley Plint 

The Rise and Fall of The Torch Commando – Politicsweb 2018 by John Kane-Berman

The White Armed Struggle against Apartheid – a Seminar Paper submission to The South African Military History Society – 10th Oct 2019 by Peter Dickens 

Sailor Malan fights his greatest Battle: Albert Flick 1952.

Sailor Malan – Oliver Walker 1953.

You-tube AP video footage of The Torch Commando.

Lazerson, Whites in the Struggle Against Apartheid.

Neil Roos. Ordinary Springboks: White Servicemen and Social Justice in South Africa, 1939-1961.

“Not for ourselves” – a history of the South African Legion by Arthur Blake.  

Pro-Nazi Subversion in South Africa, 1939-1941: By Patrick J. Furlong.

The Rise of the South African Reich: 1964: By Brian Bunting

The White Tribe of Africa: 1981: By David Harrison 

National Socialism and Nazism in South Africa: The case of L.T. Weichardt and his Greyshirt movements, 1933-1946: By Werner Bouwer

The Final Prize: The Broederbond by Norman Levy: South African History On-line (SAHO) War and the formation of Afrikaner nationalism: By Anne Samson: Great War in Africa Association 

Colourised photo of Sailor Malan – thanks to Photos Redux

Related Work

This work falls part of preparation work for a seminar on Sailor Malan called ‘I fear no man’ by Dr Yvonne Malan, scheduled for 16th September 2023 in Kimberley, here’s the link “I Fear No Man” – Sailor Malan Memorial Lecture

The Torch Commando Series

The Smoking Gun of the White Struggle against Apartheid!

The Observation Post published 5 articles on the The Torch Commando outlining the history of the movement, this was done ahead of the 60th anniversary of the death of Sailor Malan and Yvonne Malan’ commemorative lecture on him “I fear no man”. To easily access all the key links and the respective content here they are in sequence.

In part 1, we outlined the Nazification of the Afrikaner right prior to and during World War 2 and their ascent to power in a shock election win in 1948 as the Afrikaner National Party – creating the groundswell of indignation and protest from the returning war veterans, whose entire raison d’etre for going to war was to get rid of Nazism.

For the in-depth article follow this link: The Nazification of the Afrikaner Right

In part 2, in response to National Party’s plans to amend the constitution to make way for Apartheid legislation, we outlined the political nature of the military veterans’ associations and parties and the formation of the War Veterans Action Committee (WVAC) under the leadership of Battle of Britain hero – Group Captain Sailor Malan in opposition to it.  Essentially bringing together firebrand Springbok Legionnaires and the United Party’s military veteran leaders into a moderate and centre-line steering committee with broad popular appeal across the entire veteran voting bloc. 

For the in-depth article follow this link: The War Veterans’ Action Committee

In Part 3, we cover the opening salvo of WVAC in a protest in April 1951 at the War Cenotaph in Johannesburg followed by the ratification of four demands at two mass rallies in May 1951. They take these demands to Nationalists in Parliament in a ‘Steel Commando’ convoy converging on Cape Town. Led by Group Captain Sailor Malan and another Afrikaner – Commandant Dolf de la Rey, a South African War (1899-1902) veteran of high standing their purpose is to raise support from Afrikaner and English veterans alike and they converge with a ‘Torchlight’ rally of 60,000 protestors and hand their demands to parliament. 

For the in-depth article follow this link: The Steel Commando

In Part 4, in response to the success of The Steel Commando Cape Town protest, we then look at the rise of the Torch Commando as South Africa’s largest and most significant mass protest movement in the early 1950’s pre-dating the ANC’s defiance campaign. Political dynamics within the Torch see its loyalties stretched across the South African opposition politics landscape, the Torch eventually aiding the United Party’s (UP) grassroots campaigning whilst at the same time caught up in Federal breakaway parties and the Natal issue. The introduction of the ‘Swart Bills’ in addition to ‘coloured vote constitutional crisis’ going ahead despite ineffectual protests causes a crisis within the Torch. This and the UP’s losses in by-elections in the lead up to and the 1953 General Election itself spurs the eventual demise of The Torch Commando.

For the in-depth article follow this link: The ‘Rise and Fall’ of the Torch Commando

In Part 5, we conclude the Series on The Torch Commando with ‘The Smoking Gun’. The Smoking Gun traces what the Torch Commando members do after the movement collapses, significantly two political parties spin out the Torch Commando – the Liberal Party of South Africa and the Union Federal Party. The Torch also significantly impacts the United Party and the formation of the breakaway Progressive Party who embark on formal party political resistance to Apartheid and are the precursor of the modern day Democratic Alliance. The Torch’s Communists party members take a leading role in the ANC’s armed wing MK, and the Torch’s liberals spin off the NCL and ARM armed resistance movements from the Liberal Party. We conclude with CODESA.

For an in-depth article follow this link: The Smoking Gun


Boer War 3 and beyond!

The 1914 Boer Revolt in perspective.

Very often when I read website or social media military history commentary on the 1914 Boer Revolt – I often come across the phasing that Louis Botha (usually incorrectly referenced as Jan Smuts) went against the will of the ‘majority’ of Afrikaners and therefore the general will of the white voting population in South Africa, when he declared war against Imperial Germany in 1914 and invaded German South West Africa (GSWA) – now on the side of Britain and its main ally – France. The result is a general upsurgence of Republicanism and a desire to re-engage the Boer War (a sort of Boer War 3) in an outpouring of widespread support by the Boer nation for Germany and against Britain (a legacy hangover from the Boer War). South Africa was forced into an unwanted war to do the British Empire’s bidding and the Boere would have none of it!

The problem with the above assertion is that it is pure bunk, its unfounded, as once again Military History (doctrine, strategy and tactics) and Economic History (stats and demographics) tell a different tale entirely and once again the ‘cold facts’ rip the ‘Political’ interpretation of the history apart (this is why I just love both economic and military history). So, let’s examine these ‘cold facts’ – the hard statistics – the numbers and see how they hold up, let’s also examine military doctrine and see how that holds against the numbers. Let’s challenge the history and establish why this above assertion is purely politically inspired fantasy.

The Vote

Upfront is the vote to go to war. The arrival of World War 1 in 1914 is both a blessing and a curse for the Boer led government of the newly formed Union of South Africa. Both Botha as Prime Minister and Smuts as his ‘right hand man’ were walking a tight rope – as Boer commanders they represented a faction of the new “Union”, balancing the two small old Boer Republic’s politics and laws with those of all the British colonies and protectorates surrounding them (six large British territories and their interests in them in effect) – so they are obliged to support Britain as the major player in the region, and honour their word to them, the oath that brought about peace – that’s the ‘curse’. 

The ‘blessing’ to the Union government is that the war presents them with an ideal opportunity to realise the expansive border of ‘Greater South Africa’ as envisioned and concluded in the Union conference in 1909 – as this border also specifies the eventual inclusion of German South West Africa into South Africa in the first phase of the ‘Greater’ South Arica Union and eventually even bits of German East Africa would be included in the second phase of South Africa’s territorial advancement. 

So it’s really no surprise, that when the decision to go to war is put to the vote in the Boer led and very independent Union of South Africa Parliament (at Union, Britain takes a figurehead role, the South African Union’s Parliament and legal construct is not governed by Westminster, its fee to make its own laws) – and the result is not what your Apartheid era school history teacher plugged – it’s a staggering vote of confidence by nearly all the Boer MP’s favouring going to war alongside Britain (and France) against Germany, by a landslide – literally. Consider the result.

92 = For invasion of German South West Africa (GSWA) by the Union of South Africa

12 = Against

So, as to the ‘majority’ of Afrikaners NOT wanting war with Germany, that is simply untrue, the Afrikaner community’s representatives in Parliament were overwhelmingly in favour of war against Germany. This is also where some ‘Boer Romantic’ commentators on the 1914 Revolt make a fundamental mistake, the Union of South Africa’s decision to conquer German South West Africa (Namibia) was NOT just a service to the ‘British Empire’ – it was largely in service to the objects of The Union of South Africa and its own territorial expansion ambitions and the prescribed ‘sphere of influence’ over the Southern African region as a whole (as agreed by all Boer and British leaders involved in the Union conference in 1909).

Put another way, that’s 88% in favour of going to war alongside Britain and 12% against. In so far as the politics goes, the South African Party (SAP) headed up by Louis Botha, and comprising all the old Boer War Generals and the old Afrikaner Bond is by far the majority party, it’s the Afrikaner’s representative party in government (the National Party came later) … statistically speaking the breakdown of Parliament is as follows:

South African Party, Louis Botha leader – 66 seats

Unionist Party, Starr Jameson leader – 36 seats

Labour Party, Frederic Creswell leader – 3 seats

Simply put, to see who the “Afrikaner” representatives are and who are the “English” i.e. British affiliated parties, the SAP is the ‘Afrikaner’ party – the ‘British’ party is most certainly Starr Jameson’s Imperial Party (you may remember Starr Jameson as the leader of the infamous Jameson Raid). The Labour Party is a British (English) unionist construct, its voters are the miners on the Johannesburg gold reef mainly.

From that it can be deduced that he majority of the ‘Afrikaner’ SAP have voted FOR going to war alongside Britain against Germany – of the SAP – 54 votes, or 82% of the SAP’s ministers are pro-war alongside Britain and her allies. It is only on the very rump of this party that we find the AGAINST voters, and of these 12 individuals (or 18% of the SAP), only 3 of them are notable and become highly vocal anti-war campaigners – Barry Hertzog, Koos de la Rey and Christiaan de Wet. 

In this respect, between the three of them, although vocal they are really a small voice at odds with the legitimate elected government construct, the vast majority of South Africa’s representatives, and even most of their own peers. In truth, they are also not just “pro-German’ – at this stage they are intrinsically at odds with the idea of ‘Union’ and it’s agreed objects – seeking minority rule under a ‘Boer Republican’ hegemony instead.

Political cartoon of the day captures the Union’s territorial ambitions

The UDF Construct and its ’Afrikaner’ nature 

Jan Smuts, as the Minister of Defence at this time had also been busy amalgamating the armed forces of the republics with those of the colonial citizen force regiments to form the Union Defence Force i.e. the UDF (in much the same way as the SADF was amalgamated with other forces in 1994 to form the SANDF – with the same challenges). 

The UDF had taken shape to consist of a small contingent of Permanent Force, the Permanent Force basically comprises some 4,000 odd members and consists of a HQ, some admin and training staff and a mounted military constabulary of 5 regiments called the South African Mounted Rifles (SAMR) – these are a combination of members of the old British colonial mounted regiments like the Cape Mounted Rifles and old Boer Kommando members making the military their profession. They make up only 5% of the total UDF strength.

But the backbone would remain essentially voluntarily forces in a two-stream approach, the old ‘English’ colonial citizen force regiments – Transvaal Scottish, Royal Natal Carbineers, Royal Durban Light Infantry etc comprise what is collectively known as ‘Active Citizen Force’ (ACF) and to begin with they tend be ‘English’ speaking and led. There are 23,000 ACF members (29% of the total UDF mustering).

The greater part of the UDF backbone however is the ‘Afrikaans’ citizen force “skiet” Commandos known as the ‘Rifle Association Mounted Infantry’ working in parallel to the ACF. This is the old Transvaal and Orange Free State Boer Republic’s Boer Kommando system in effect. They are collectively called the “Rifle Associations” or RA and comprise 42,000 members (or 52% of the complete UDF strength) and they are the majority in the new UDF construct.

It was a careful construct to keep everyone happy, but the point is this, it was NOT “British” – Imperial British troops present in South Africa after the Boer War had all returned to the United Kingdom, any engagement the Union of South Africa was going to fight in World War 1 in Africa, whether foreign or domestic, was going to be made up of ‘South Africans’ and led by ‘South Africans’ – and in truth it was commanded by the old Republic’s ‘Bittereinder’ Boer Generals – primarily Botha (as Prime Minister was Commander in Chief) and Smuts (as Botha’s Minister of Defence) – and by way of construction the vast majority of the force is of ‘Afrikaans’ origin (not English) and part of a mounted infantry construct (RA and SAMR).

General Jan Smuts during WW1

Smuts is beginning to outline military doctrine for the UDF and he has a greater disposition to the Boer ‘way of fighting’ i.e. mobility which is heavily reliant on mounted infantry. The UDF is fortunate, at the end of the Boer War in 1902, the British (and Colonial forces) emerge as the singular worldwide authority on Counter Insurgency warfare (we know this today as COIN) and the old Boer Republican forces emerge as the worldwide authority on Insurgency warfare.  Thus the UDF is now being built along the lines of using effective combined arms with high degrees of mobility to deal with both conventional warfare (as is the requirement of any statutory force) in the event a Colonial Power in Africa (e.g. Portugal or Germany) invades the Union and any domestic insurgencies (initially ‘internal’ threats are defined as potential Black African uprisings and the UDF doctrine is been developed to counter-act it). 

Intrinsic in the UDF’s DNA at this point is the use of COIN in the rural warfare context (they have not been tested in the urban context, that would only really happen with the Miners’ strike in 1922). Also, a key learning for the UDF is that towards the end of Boer War 2, the British turn to highly mobile ‘Seek and Destroy’ columns known as “Commando Hunts” to put an end to the final ‘Bittereinder Kommandos’ – essentially matching mobility with mobility but with greater firepower and ‘combined arms’. This institutional knowledge will play a major role in the upcoming 1914 Boer Revolt.

Smuts is happy to cherry pick, basically he’s happy to bring all that’s great and good about the British culture of warfare – their discipline and drill (sorely lacking in the Boer army), their uniforms and rank structures (sorely lacking in the Boer army) and their very effective use of combined arms warfare and joint arms warfare (also sorely lacking in the Boer army) and combine it with the Boer culture of warfare – the use of mobility, and applying high rates of survivability thinking to tactics of assault and defence (both of which are sorely lacking in the British army). 

WW1 UDF Recruitment poster targeted at Afrikaners

 Smuts will build into the UDF the doctrine of highly mobile ‘combined arms’ – mainly the effective use of mounted infantry, armour and artillery (and other ‘arms’) all acting in unison and speed. It’s a doctrine of “manoeuvre” using the Clausewitzian concept – using superior and simultaneous advances along “exterior” lines (a concentration in space) on an enemy using “interior” lines (known as a concentration of time) of communication and supply. Under General Jan Smuts the UDF is shaping into a very effective fighting force, one that is far ahead of the old Boer Republics strategic and tactical constructs and doctrine which focused mainly on “interior lines”. This will have far reaching consequences for the Boer Revolt and the rebels.

The Afrikaner disposition to Germany

Smuts was also sensitive to the fact that many Afrikaners shared German heritage and they (falsely) believed that Germany extensively supported the Boer cause during Boer War 2 – ‘falsely’ because in fact, Germany was happy to ‘sell’ them arms (as did the British arms manufacturers) at a premium and send some medical assistance later on, however Germany withdrew their support officially – they provided no troops and no substantial funding to the Republican Boer War effort whatsoever. 

Kaiser Wilhelm II

Kaiser Wilhelm II, although sending a letter to Kruger congratulating him on the Jameson Raid victory (given the Boer nation their false sense of ‘support’), in fact refused point blank to receive any Boer representations and after the ‘Black Week’ Boer victories during Boer War 2 in late 1899, he and his Generals compiled a military strategy, not to help the Boers, but to help the British win the war (he was after all related to the British monarchy – part of the family so to speak) and shared it with them instead – Kaiser Wilhelm II even proudly proclaiming at the end of the Boer War that the British had followed his plan precisely as he had outlined it to them and it was the German plan that won the war for the British – not Field Marshal Frederick Robert’s plan and as inconvenient truths go the Kaiser’s plan involved scorched earth policies and concentration camps. (see: John C.G. Röhl: The Kaiser and England during the Boer War). 

Ethnic Germans (local and foreign) volunteering to join Boer Commandos also qualified very few (550 odd) – far more Anglo-Irish, Dutch and Flemish joined the Boers (5,500 odd). A Boer leader delegation, including Botha and de Wet visited Germany after the war in 1902, and although they received a  grand welcome and ovations, they were never officially received, Kaiser Wilhelm II flatly refused to entertain any Boer delegation sent to Germany.

Boer delegations did raise a little money from private donators and a Boer help fund, but that’s it – there was never any official public contribution by the German government to the Boer cause – ever. Germany wanted to avoid conflict with Britain – who by convention and legal treatise at the time held suzerainty limitations over the two Boer Republics preventing them from engaging in foreign policies and entering into treaties. However, all this still did not resonate with many in the Boer community who almost illogically saw Germany as an Ally. Now, I bet none of this was in your Nationalistic inspired history teachings.

Left: Boer delegation to Europe and the USA in 1900 to try and solicit help for the Republics – with very limited success. Right: Kaiser Wilhelm II in a British Field Marshal uniform – he was made a Field Marshal in the British Army in 1909 by his relative – King Edward VII just after Queen Victoria’s death.

Smuts would argue the case for war, not on the basis of warring against Germany on the side of ‘Britain’, but for supporting the other old Boer Republic’s supporters – France, Belgium and the Netherlands in their war against a hostile and aggressive Germany busy de-stabilising western and eastern Europe, and Smuts was very aware of the vast majority of Boers had Dutch, Belgian and French roots, as opposed to the ones with German roots. He would use the same argument again for his declaration of war against Germany in World War 2.

Smuts however anticipated that the decision to go to war, although largely supported by the Afrikaner political elite and leadership, would have with it a handful of resignations from the Union’s Defence Force from those strongly in favour of Germany and whose sheer hatred of the British superseded everything, and the Union government received exactly that – a “handful” – nothing that would fundamentally compromise the UDF’s fighting ability or construct, the UDF remained at its 80,000 men strong capability and it remained with its primarily strong ‘Afrikaans’ demographic skew, contrary to the thinking of wishful Boer Romantic modern-day arm-chair Generals, there was no large gravitation of Afrikaners from the ‘Rifle Associations’ (Kommandos) and other arms of the UDF over to the German cause, nor was there a large wave of resignations from the UDF, in fact there was very little, verging on none – less than 1%. 

General Christiaan Frederik Beyers

Of the handful of resignations which were received, a rather long-winded one came from General Christiaan Beyers, the UDF’s Commandant General in charge of the Active Citizen Force (ACF) and his was the most important resignation. As previously noted, prior to the decision to go to war against Germany, Smuts and Botha’s old friend and highly respected comrade, General Koos de la Rey had been one of the handful of Parliamentary Ministers vocally against the decision to invade GSWA and advocated neutrality, and because of his popularity his opinion held massive sway over the old Boer Republic’s Afrikaner electorate  – nevertheless he was persuaded by Louis Botha and Jan Smuts not to take actions which may arouse the Boers, he then held a political rally for only 800 Boers who felt strongly over the matter and took a reconciliatory approach – contrary to what the attendees expected of him.

Major Jan Kemp in UDF uniform

General De la Rey seemed torn over his decision, and he was then targeted by General Beyers to join him for meeting with Major Jan Kemp, a mid-line UDF officer who had also resigned – the purpose of the meeting; Beyers and Kemp wanted to persuade de la Rey to take a stronger stand and initiate more Union Defence Force resignations to try and compromise its fighting capability. Joining the conspiracy was another heavyweight – the significant Boer General and Parliamentary Minister, Christiaan de Wet.

What follows next is well documented, however the generally accepted and investigated history concludes; General De la Rey and General Beyers were travelling in a soft top sedan car to their meeting with Major Kemp and did not stop at a Police blockade set up to capture a notorious gang of robbers and murderers called The Foster Gang. One of the Policeman fired a warning shot into the road to get them to stop, the bullet ricocheted and hit De la Rey, killing him. 

It was tragedy – plain and simple, and both Botha and Smuts were devasted at the loss of their friend, as a signal to the inevitable accusations of ‘political assassination’ both Botha and Smuts attended De la Rey’s funeral in front of thousands of mourning Boers, they appeared without any bodyguard at the mercy of the assembly – a token of no malice intended, and there were no protests or accusations from the mourners. 

Jacobus Hercules de la Rey

Regardless, despite sound and tested enquiries and court cases, and the Nationalists having full scope and the resources at hand for 40 years to uncover a ‘plot’ – no concrete proof has emerged of a plot by Smuts to kill De la Rey whatsoever – ‘conspiracy theory’ nevertheless grew out of the incident which would plague Smuts in future years, and it still does.

It is also generally understood that with the death of De La Rey, that would probably have been the extent of Boer resistance to the war, and it would have devolved into simple political protest and peaceful demonstrations, had it not been for one single man … Lt. Colonel Manie Maritz, who had an especially strong disposition towards Germany having served in German South West Africa and he commanded a small UDF force at Upington, on the border with German South West Africa (GSWA). 

A treacherous soup

The day after de la Rey’s funeral, Kemp, Beyers and de Wet addressed a large crowd at Lichtenberg, calling on protest meetings against the decision to invade GSWA. Manie Maritz however took a far more robust position than Kemp, Beyers and de Wet, he instead went into open sedition and started ignoring Smuts’ and his other Commander’s orders been sent to him. Intel told Smuts that Maritz had joined the Germans, however contradictory to Smuts’ usual manner of decisiveness, he vacillated instead hoping to persuade Maritz not to revolt and get him to see reason. 

Lt Col Manie Maritz, front and centre in his South African Union uniform and his staff behind him – his  ‘Agter-ryer’ (man-servant) is at his heels (It’s the man-servant’s expression and position that is most interesting as in many ways it gives away Maritz who is a very outspoken racist and has no regard for people of colour).

Not dissuaded by Smuts and bent on a sedition, Maritz resigned his commission from the Union Defence Force and openly rebelled on 9 October, taking just 300 odd of his UDF soldiers with him when he went over to the Germans. Maritz arrested all the UDF officers and men under his command who were unwilling to join the Germans, and then sent them forward as prisoners into German South West Africa (GSWA).

Smuts sent Major Barend ‘Ben’ Bouwer over to deal with Maritz’ sedition and insubordination (both Bouwer and Maritz had served under Smuts in his Commando during Boer War 2 and he hoped Bouwer could reason with Maritz). Maritz however also promptly took Bouwer prisoner along with his fellow officers, he was subsequently released and sent back with the ultimatum from Maritz to the Union Government:

The ultimatum read that unless the Union Government guaranteed safe passage of his fellow plotting Generals (De Wet, Beyers, Kemp et al), to his position on the GSWA border by the 11th October he would immediately attack General Brits’ UDF forces preparing to invade GSWA and then he would invade the Union of South Africa.

Major Ben Bouwer reported that Maritz was in possession of some guns belonging to the Germans, and that he held the rank of General commanding the German troops. He also had a force of Germans under him in addition to his own rebel commando. 

To drive Maritz’ point home, Major Bouwer was shown an agreement between Maritz and the Governor of German South West Africa guaranteeing the independence of the Union as a Republic, ceding Walfish Bay and certain other portions of the Union to the Germans, and undertaking that the Germans would only invade the Union on the invitation of Maritz.

Major Bouwer was shown numerous telegrams and helio messages dating back to the beginning of September. Maritz boasted that he had ample guns, rifles, ammunition, and money from the Germans, and that he would overrun the whole of South Africa.

In response to Maritz’ action and ultimatum, on 12 October, the Union government imposed martial law across the whole of South Africa. On proclaiming martial law, Smuts, the eternal reconciler, immediately called again for “reason” and urged the rebels not to be swayed by “foreign agents influencing them”.

The ‘Boer Revolt’ or ‘Maritz Revolt’ or ‘Five Shilling Rebellion’ as it would also become known was underway, and with their sedition hand now played by Maritz in the Cape Colony, his fellow conspirators – Beyers, Kemp and de Wet had no choice, now ‘in for a penny and in for a pound’ they all broke their ties with the Union and went into open armed rebellion against their lawfully elected government – raising Commando’s primarily from the Transvaal and Orange Free State to come to Maritz’ aid.

The ‘Five Shillings Rebellion’ reference came about when de Wet, entered the town of Reitz on a recruitment drive, called together the inhabitants and said:

“I was charged before for beating a native boy. I only did it with a small shepherd’s whip, and for that I was fined 5/–”.

Hearing about the speech later, Jan Smuts referred to the rising as “the Five Shilling Rebellion” as a means of belittling the rebels, the baseless promises of wealth to the desperate and the aims of the revolt.

The stated objective: Maritz issued a proclamation by way of an objective:

 “The former South African Republic and Orange Free State as well as the Cape Province and Natal are proclaimed free from British control and independent, and every White inhabitant of the mentioned areas, of whatever nationality, are hereby called upon to take their weapons in their hands and realize the long-cherished ideal of a Free and Independent South Africa.”

In other words, to take by force, the former British Colonies and re-start the Boer War, resistance to the declaration by any “white” in the entire Union of South Africa would be treated by Maritz’ Provisional Government as treasonous. 

Sabre Waving

Generally in social media and web based articles on the Boer Revolt you get the impression that this was a significant military threat and social movement, but that’s not the case – in fact all these threats by Maritz as to invading South Africa, crushing the UDF’s intensions on invading GSWA, declaring a Afrikaner Republic under a white Boer hegemony with the aid of Germany are nothing more than ‘sabre waving’ – from a military doctrine perspective they are nothing more than unsubstantiated and baseless threats. 

So, let’s look at the military doctrine and establish what sort of threat from the rebels and Germany the South African Union defence force is facing, what’s the magnitude of the problem with regard the Boer Revolt that they have to deal with, what is the rebel forces calibre, construct and fighting capability? – Let’s look at the numbers.

To attain their objective, the Rebels raised 11,476 Boers. The South African Union Defence Force strength to ready itself for World War 1, all in, including all its reserves is 80,500 troops (without even considering the Rhodesian troops mustered for the GSWA campaign under South African command). That means the Boer Rebels are outnumbered on a ratio of 8 to 1. 

Military doctrine will always dictate that a force needs to be twice the size of the opposing force (2:1) if an effective ‘invasion’ is feasible and victory within grasp, more so (and more troops than a 2:1 advantage) if the intention is the occupation and annexation of a country. For the Boer Rebels to be successful in their object to defeat an 80,000 strong UDF they require a force of 160,000 men (that’s 3x more than the entire Boer Republican forces had in Boer War 2 which at their zenith numbered 40,000). 

Obviously, their hope and intention, albeit somewhat fanciful and arrogant, was that the UDF would capitulate with a mass walk out of all its Afrikaner demographic – estimated at some 50,000 odd people – but that simply did not happen. On an 8:1 ratio disadvantage the Boer Revolt stood absolutely no chance of success, even if this UDF number reduced sizeably there would still be at a disadvantage with almost no chance of success. 

But the intention was that Germany would combine with the Boere, the Germans in GSWA would join forces with the Boers right? We need to augment the numbers with German troops. Total German strength in GSWA is 3,000 odd well trained German Schutztruppe and 2,000 odd trained German militaria – about 5,000 in total. At best another 2,000 can be mustered from local Boere and German settlers in GSWA. If we add 7,000 German troops to the Boer Rebels’ 11,500 troops we get 18,500 troops MAX. Against the UDF’s 80,500 that still is nowhere near enough to affect a victorious outcome, they are still heavily outnumbered by 4 to 1. 

German ‘Camel Corps’ in German South West Africa

There is also no German expeditionary force from elsewhere making its way to GSWA, they are heavily committed to the European theatres of operations. Also, unlike in their East Africa colony, the German military in GSWA is unable to raise many local Askari black troops to augment their numbers, a hang-over from the Herero and Namaqua genocide which gives them no real traction with the black inhabitants of GSWA.

The idea that the Germans in GSWA could link up with a Boer Revolt (unless substantially supported) and invade South Africa is fanciful at best.

Now, let’s look at the Rebel Forces capability and make-up. It is important to note, the Rebel force was not made up entirely of first rate ex-UDF soldiers going against their counterparts, the rebel force was primarily made up of destitute Orange Free State Boers having come through a drought and agricultural reforms on the back of the devastation of their farms during Boer War 2. 

Many of these Free State Boers as has been pointed out by historians like Sandra Swart (Desperate Men: The 1914 Rebellion and the Polities of Poverty’ in South African Historical Journal, Vol 42) and John Bottomly (The Orange Free State and the Rebellion of 1914: the influence of industrialisation, poverty and poor whitism: pages 29-73), were simply desperate ‘Bywoners’ (landless farmers or share-croppers) promised a better life if the rebellion was successful.

Consider the statistics of the Boer rebels and from where they came, and you’ll see how the above statement holds true. 7,123 (62%) of the Boer Rebels came from the Orange Free State – the least populace, most rural and economically worse off province in the Union. As an aside, to gauge the extent of success of Maritz’ proclamation and its resonance across the broader Afrikaner community across the whole of South Africa, the rebel leaders were only able to motivate 1,215 (12%) of the Boer Rebels from the Cape province – the biggest province in the Union with the largest Afrikaans population. The balance coming from the Transvaal – which considering its very urbanised and significant population is negligible in the bigger scheme of the Transvaal’s demographic make-up, and no real support from Natal whatsoever.

The Potchefstroom Herald at the time best tried to explain why there was no traction behind the revolt from Cape Afrikaners and the black/brown African communities in this quote – and not surprisingly it boils down to the lack of suffrage and plain racism in the old Republics;

“When these high officers of the Defence Force in Transvaal and Orange “Free” State rebelled and joined the Germans with their commandos, the Dutchmen of the Cape (presumably because “they vote side by side with the Kafirs”) denounced the treachery in unmistakable terms. The South African party at the Cape beat up its followers to the support of the Government, and the voice of the Cape section of the Dutch Reformed Church rang from pulpit and platform in denunciation of disloyalty and treason. But in the Northern Provinces, where white men are pampered and guarded by the Government against the so-called humiliation of allowing native taxpayers to vote, there the rebellion, having been regarded with seeming approval, gained a marvellous impetus.

Plaatjie: The Boer Rebellion – snippet from the Potchefstroom Herald

As a unified, coherent, trained and fully armed force, the Rebel Boers were not. 

They were desperate and landless farmers in the main up against fully trained, motivated, even mechanised in some instances, and properly armed UDF soldiers who had an 8:1 numerical advantage. As noted earlier, in terms of doctrine the UDF under Jan Smuts’ design, command and control was focussed on effective deployment of combined arms in an enveloping role – all based on high manoeuvrability – up against this very modern military construct was a rebel force which only really consisted of ‘old school’ mounted infantry Commandos with ‘old school’ Boer command and control doctrine leading it – they had no light artillery support, no supply logistics to speak of, no armoured cars, no heavy guns, no machine guns and no motorised support – whereas the UDF had all of these. 

UDF armoured cars during GSWA campaign – 1914

In essence the Boer Rebels were using an outdated military doctrine originally intended to quell poorly armed Black African uprisings – a Commando, and it was simply complete folly to pitch such doctrine against a modern military using a doctrine of both combined arms and joint arms. The Rebels were simply no match and it quickly showed. 

Whilst still focussing much of the UDF’s resources on the invasion plans and logistics for the GSWA campaign, General Louis Botha would primarily use just the Rifle Associations to counteract the rebellion, insistent that the British ‘stay out of it’, this was going to be the Boer leaders sorting their differences out between themselves – so ‘Brother against Brother’ and in effect the UDF’s Afrikaners outnumbered the rebel Afrikaners 4 to 1. As also noted earlier, intrinsic in the UDF’s institutional memory and doctrine was the British idea of “hunting” Commandos using what was termed as a “flying column” of combined arms – a spill over of the British tactic from Boer War 2.

The long and short the rebellion was almost immediately repelled and then very quickly crushed as Botha’s UDF Rifle Associations with some Active Citizen Force elements in support used these ‘Flying Columns’ and effectively hunted the Rebel Commandos down as they tried to make their way to assist Maritz on the GSWA border. The revolt would last a couple of months only.

Image: The last pursuit of Major Kemp. A South African Union ‘Flying column’ crossing the Orange River after him.

Reconciliation

As Dr David Katz in his work ‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917) points out. Jan Smuts, eternally the one Boer General keeping a level head and seeking reconciliation and understanding, and when it was clear the rebellion had failed, Smuts called for a ‘Blanket Amnesty’ across the board for the Boer Rebel leaders and their troops if they laid down their arms. General Louis Botha, the Commander in Chief, on the other hand took a much harder and less reconciliatory line than his colleague – he was livid at the sheer betrayal, the sheer waste of lives, resources and time it took and the complete stupidity of it all – an unsupported revolt against a lawfully elected government with absolutely no chance of success. It was reported that he once joking said to Jan Smuts “Let’s face it Jannie, you’re no General!” By that he meant Smuts was far too reconciliatory and soft-hearted – as far as Louis Botha was concerned, under the edicts of martial law, all rebels, officers and men alike should be tried, the most treasonous of which, the leaders, put up against a wall and shot – even if they were all his old friends.

Smuts however persevered – Botha eventually agreed to an Amnesty, but for the rank and file only, the Boer Rebel leaders would have to be prosecuted. The amnesty, excluding the Rebel leadership, was in put place from 12th to 21st November 1914, and with it the 1914 Boer Rebellion was effectively over, by the end of November General de Wet’s force alone was down to only 40 men. Rear actions and isolated and desperate battles continued to be fought for a couple of months by woefully under-strength hard liners refusing surrender and amnesty, but by the end of January 1915 the rebellion was over.  

Of the Rebel leadership now having surrendered, Botha and Smuts would again be especially magnanimous, considering the Union was in a state of war externally and in a state of martial law internally – and this was 1914 ‘World War 1’ – people were put in front of firing squads for ‘cowardice’ and being AWOL (absent without leave) – let alone ‘sedition’ and ‘treason’. Smuts would treat the Rebels in general very kindly, literally with kid gloves, all the time urging reason, understanding and reconciliation.

General Christiaan Rudolf de Wet

Of the main rebel leaders, General Christiaan Beyers tragically drowned in the Vaal River whilst attempting to desperately evade capture on 8th December 1914. General Christiaan de Wet was captured during the amnesty and sentenced to six years imprisonment, with a fine of £2000, he was released by Botha and Smuts after one year’s imprisonment, after giving a written promise to take no further part in politics. 

Major Jan Kemp was captured on the 2nd of February 1915 and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment, with a fine of £1000. However, a mere 10 months into his sentence Botha and Smuts agreed to release him – also on the condition that he may not participate in any politics – a promise Kemp almost immediately broke entering politics as a National Party MP under Hertzog in 1920. Ironically he accompanied Hertzog and joined with Jan Smuts in the Fusion government, however by 1940, in opposition to South Africa entering WW2 against Nazi Germany, he joined the Reunited National Party until his death in 1946.

Lt. Colonel Manie Maritz would evade capture and escape into German South West Africa, at the conclusion of the GSWA campaign and the Union Defence Force’s victory and annexation of the territory (the first real victory for the Allies against Imperial Germany in WW1), Maritz would again evade capture, going into self-imposed exile in Angola, Spain, Portugal and then Mozambique. He would re-enter South Africa in 1923 and spend a couple of months in jail for treason, thereafter he would enter into politics as the leader of an antisemitic, one-party state, National Socialist (Nazi) inspired ‘Boerenasie’ party prior to World War 2. 

Jopie Fourie

Of all the other leaders – junior and mid-level rebel officers who were also captured. All were sentenced to short imprisonments and fines, almost all of them walking free within a year … except for just one man … Captain Jopie Fourie was executed for ‘High Treason’ having not resigned his UDF officers commission, captured still wearing his UDF officer’s uniform and opening fire on his fellow UDF troops whilst under a ‘white flag’ of truce – in one skirmish Jopie Fourie’s men shot dead Captain William Allan-King, the much loved and popular Native Affairs administrator, whilst he was attending to a wounded man. 

Retribution for William Allan-King was coming, many in the English, Native and Coloured communities wanted Jopie Fourie dead, the South African Union Defence Force wanted him dead, many Afrikaners related to or who had affiliation to the Afrikaner UDF men he killed wanted him dead … and this was WW1 and Martial Law after all – there was no way anyone could get him out of this one with a no-nonsense leader like General Louis Botha as Prime Minister and in charge of stays of execution – not just one but on three distinctive charges of high treason, not in a month of Sundays was this possible – a story on Jopie needs a little more space – so follow this Observation Post link to Jopie’s story: What about Jopie?

To pay for all their fines the Bloemfontein newspaper ‘Het Volksblad’ established the ‘Halfkroonfonds’ (Half-a-Crown Fund). Shop owners and other people whose property had been damaged during the rebellion were able to claim compensation, leading to the establishment of the Helpmekaar Beweging (the Help-One-Another Movement). By the end of 1917, all the debts were paid.

Of the handling of the 1914 Boer Revolt, Louis Botha would summarise Smuts role and leadership, when he said of him;

“Nobody can appreciate sufficiently the great work General Smuts has done – greater than any man throughout this unhappy period. At his post day and night, his brilliant intellect, his calm judgement, his amazing energy and his undaunted courage have been assets of inestimable value to the Union in her hour of trial.”

As a rebellion with any chance of success consider just what a small minority they represented – no Cape Province or Natal Afrikaner would really come near it (and the majority of Afrikaners lived in the Cape), of the Afrikaners in the Transvaal and OFS they were unable to raise an effective fighting force, the vast majority of Afrikaners in the armed forces remained in the UDF, the vast majority of Afrikaner political leaders remained behind Botha and Smuts and they gained no traction whatsoever to raise anything from the Black and Coloured communities (the real ‘vast’ majority) – no “Askari” troops whatsoever, and they got no support whatsoever from the white South Africans of British decent – who by way of ‘white’ population were not insignificant in size (about 40% of the white population total), the ‘English’ whites commanding massive swathes of white population groups in the Transvaal (most of Johannesburg and the reef), Natal (most of Durban) and the Cape Colony (especially in Cape Town and the Eastern Cape). 

What if?

Now we can ask the question “what if the Rebellion took traction?” What next? Assuming the UDF internally imploded and a 10,000 strong Boer army with a 7,000 strong German army in support could annex the whole of South Africa, however implausible – consider the scale of white, coloured and black population groups that would resist it.

Also consider the British reaction to it, the probability that a couple of thousand mounted infantrymen, lightly armed, could take British held ports like Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Durban or their Naval Base in Simonstown. As a modern military construct, the UDF at this stage ops out of developing a Navy of its own because the Royal Navy provides this service to the UDF on the back of operating their Simonstown Base as sovereign British territory. As a ‘joint arm’ to the UDF construct the Royal Navy is an incredibly powerful instrument.

HMS Goliath – pre-dreadnaught class, extensive use during the East Africa Campaign.

The Royal Navy is Britain’s true military might, and it’s the world’s undisputed naval power – a very big hitter, in 1914 it’s bigger than the French and American navies combined. For the British in 1914 the ‘Army’ is very secondary to the control of its trading empire worldwide – the primary tool is the Navy. Defending (and even assaulting) ports is what the Royal Navy does, it’s their speciality and just one British battleship has more firepower on it than the entire Boer Rebel army combined – think about that.

Also, to consider with the hindsight of history, what would Britain do to re-establish its influence in Southern Africa with a rebel Boer Republic (with German backing) now declared – incorporating hundreds of thousands of people who consider themselves British subjects or under British protectorate, citizens and subjects who want nothing to do with the racist constructs of Boer Republicanism. Indeed, what would Britain do … it would, when the opportunity arose, return its Expeditionary Force to South Africa and simply take the country back – only this time it would have the benefit of all the technological advances of World War 1 – tanks, chemical warfare, fighter aircraft, bomber aircraft etc. 

Also, as Germany was defeated in WW1, an unsupported Boer Republican government would not hold out and Britain would have to intervene by 1918. The question then is how would the Boer nation hold out? As a population the Boer nation was devastated by the South African War (1899-1902) and they had no armaments industry, with a renewed British military intervention and all the new technology of warfare available to them, the Boer nation would simply not survive the onslaught. 

But – you may ask, the Boere did manage to get a ‘white’ Republic for themselves in 1948 without the support of Germany, and Britain didn’t invade – so it’s possible right? Again, this is after WW1 – not WW2, Britain is still an Imperial Empire and a colonial power, at the heart of which are its ‘Dominions’ – of which South Africa is one, and a key one at that (the other ‘Dominions’ are Ireland, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). In any event, look at how Dr. H.F. Verwoerd’s ‘Keep South Africa White’ Republic worked out in the end. 

To Jan Smuts (and Louis Botha), the idea that a Boer Republic could be resurrected ended with the Boer War, South Africa was now intertwined as a British and Boer construct – Union had seen to that, and all the Boer war leaders had sworn an oath to uphold it, they had given their word (Smuts would remark that a nation who goes back on its word is not a nation at all). 

Smuts would also take an almost paternal approach to his much loved nation and try and gently try to steer the Boer nation away from inflicting more harm on itself, he would however consistently be thwarted by a minority of Afrikaners on the rump of Afrikanerdom, who against all odds are blindly bent on re-instating a Boer Republic with its intensive racially driven constructs (based on Krugerism) over the whole of South Africa and they are also wholeheartedly bent on supporting Germany – through both its Imperial and subsequent Nazi manifestations.

Conclusion 

In the end the Boer Revolt did little in terms of its military objectives, it managed to delay the invasion plans of GSWA for a couple of months only whilst the UDF dealt with it, however in the end the GSWA campaign was a decisive victory for the Union and the territory successfully annexed under ‘Greater South Africa’ in a trusteeship – as was the Union’s expressed casus belli for entering the war. 

As has been statistically proven – the Boer Revolt did NOT evoke a widespread desire from the Afrikaner community in the greater South Africa for a Boer Republic with Germany as its supporter. The Boer Revolt did NOT reflect the sentiment of the majority of the Afrikaans community nor that of the majority of its leaders. The Boer Revolt did NOT inspire the old Boer War Commando system and the majority of Afrikaner fighting men to join with it, in fact they did the opposite. The Boer Revolt also did NOT compromise the Union Defence Force in any way, shape or form whatsoever. 

From a military doctrine perspective, The Boer Revolt was poorly planned and poorly executed. The rebels were always going to be woefully outnumbered with completely insufficient firepower to do the task expected of them – in truth they had no chance of success – zero. The use of outdated mounted infantry doctrine against a modern military construct using combined and joint arms with a mobility ethos was also only ever going to end in a disaster for the rebels. In truth, not one single critical military objective of the Boer Revolt was met.

What the 1914 Boer Revolt did however do was plant the seeds for political division and is one of the key propaganda tools used by the Nationalists to create the deep split in Afrikaner outlooks. Louis Botha would look at the Rebellion as complete folly, a waste of time and an utter waste of life – a sort of Boer equivalent of the Charge of the Light Brigade, with the same disastrous consequence. Botha’s political opponents would look at it rather romantically instead – a sort of ‘Boer Last Stand’. It stands today in some Afrikaner communities, precisely because of its ‘Romanticism’ and ‘political currency’ and not because of its military prowess or even its unattainable objectives. 


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

References: 

Statistics, data and references sourced from the following:

Eben Nel; ‘Kaapse rebelle van die Hantam-karoo’

Dr David Brock Katz; ‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917’

Dr Evert Kleynhans and Dr David Brock Katz; ’20 Battles – searching for a South African Way of War 1913 – 2013’

Sandra Swart; ‘Desperate Men: The 1914 Rebellion and the Polities of Poverty’ 

John Bottomly; ‘The Orange Free State and the Rebellion of 1914: the influence of industrialisation, poverty and poor whitism’

André Wessels; Afrikaner (Boer) Rebellion (Union of South Africa) 2018.

Brian Bunting; ‘The Rise of the Afrikaner Reich’

John C.G. Röhl: ‘The Kaiser and England during the Boer War’

Plaatje: Chapter XXIII The Boer Rebellion

Related Work:

A Differing Outlook – Smuts and Maritz A differing outlook

Union to Banana Republic From Union to Banana Republic!

The Story of Jopie Fourie What about Jopie?

Colourised images with greatest thanks and appreciation to Jennifer Bosch – Jenny B Colourised online:

South Africa’s ‘missing’ Victoria Cross

The story of Alexander Young VC.

A lot has been written on the extreme sacrifice at the Battle of Delville Wood during the Somme offensive of 1916, and lets also remember the extreme courage of these South Africans, a young country, the Union of South Africa formed just 6 years prior in 1910 after the devastation of the South African War (1899-1902) i.e. Boer War 2 … and here Afrikaner and English heritage South Africans were fighting shoulder to shoulder in one of the most most desperate engagements in the history of World War 1, and the most heroic and desperate battle in South African’s entire military history – then and even now, and that’s saying something as there have been quite a few notable actions in between.

If there was courage to be rewarded from this desperate South African action on the Somme, the Battle of Delville Wood saw one South African individual rise above to an unprecedented level of gallantry and was awarded The Victoria Cross (VC) – the highest award for valour in the British and Imperial Forces (later Commonwealth) – that was Cpl William Faulds serving in the 1st South African Infantry Brigade. For his full story follow the link to this Observation Post Delville Wood’s Victoria Cross – William Faulds

Cpl William Faulds and an artists impression of his heroic deed at Delville Wood 18th July 1916

However, there is a missing South African Victoria Cross from the Somme Offensive and Battle of Delville Wood, one not usually recognised or known about in South Africa, and one that is not often referenced in the narrative of Delville Wood, his name is Lt. Alexander Young VC of the 4th South African Infantry Brigade (South African Scottish).

The ‘missing’ story of Lt. Alexander Young VC – 4th South African Infantry 

Lieutenant Alexander Young VC is ‘missing’ in more ways than one, not only from our general conciseness as South Africans, but he is also literally missing too – his body has never been found.

You can however find him today on the ‘Thiepval Memorial to the Missing in the Somme’ in France – his name is on Pier 4, Face C, alongside all the other missing South Africans from the Somme Offensive and Battle of Delville Wood who have no known grave.

Thiepval Memorial – Pier 4, Face C – South African section names – my photo, Peter Dickens copyright

So, why don’t we as South Africans know much about this missing South African Victoria Cross? Well, the first reason is that the Irish regard it as their Victoria Cross as Alexander Young was born in Ireland, the second reason is his Victoria Cross was awarded to him for actions, as a Cape Colony colonialist serving in the Cape Colony Police, during The South African War (1899-1902) i.e. Boer War 2 – and not World War 1 (1914-1918) which took place after the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910.

All that aside, Alexander Young VC was a South African to his bones and an incredibly brave one at that – not only fighting for the British Army, but also fighting as Cape Colony Mounted Policeman as their Regimental Sergeant Major and then ultimately fighting as a Commissioned Officer in the Union of South Africa’s forces during World War 1. He saw action and served in India, Egypt, Sudan, Zululand, South Africa, German South West Africa, East Africa and France – his impressive array of decorations and medals include: The Victoria Cross, The Queen’s South Africa medal, The King’s South Africa medal, The Zulu Rebellion medal and then his three WW1 medals – The 1914-1915 Star, British War Medal, and the Victory Medal.

That he was a very remarkable South African is beyond doubt, and this is his story and the story of his Victoria Cross (large extracts courtesy The South African War Graves Project):

Ireland and British Army (early years)

Alexander Young was the son of William and Annie Young, of Ballinamana, Co. Galway. He was born in Ballinona, Galway, Ireland on the 27th January 1873. Educated at the Model School in Galway, Young showed great prowess as a horse rider in his youth and when he was only seventeen, he joined the Queen’s Bays at Renmore. He soon gained the attention of his superiors, was sent to India as a riding instructor, and then served as a sergeant major with Lord Kitchener during the 2nd Sudan War (1896-1898).

South African War (1899-1902)

Sgt Maj Alexander Young became recognised as one of the best horseman in the British Army and as a rough rider was unexcelled. It was after he had been injured by a horse that he retired from the British Army and came to the Cape Colony in August 1899 when The South African War (1899-1902) i.e. Boer War 2 broke out, here he joined colonial forces, attesting in the Cape Mounted Police, and as a skilled horseman he was soon picked to form one of a mounted bodyguard for Lord Milner on an official visit to the Transkei. 

Now this is an interesting photograph of these Cape Mounted Policeman escorting Lord Milner from Grahamstown to King Williamstown in 1899 – in just this single tiny detachment of Policemen there are three future recipients of the Victoria Cross. It says a lot for the calibre of soldier South Africa has bred (The three men are: Colonel J. Sherwood-Kelly VC, CMG DSO, received his VC during the First World War, Lieutenant W. Bloomfield VC, also First World War and finally our man, Sergeant Major Alexander Young VC, who received his during the South African War).

Now stationed at King William’s Town, Sgt Maj. Young saw action whilst serving with General W. F. Gatacre at Stormberg Junction (December 1899) which was routed by Boers, he escaped and was mentioned in dispatches for his coolness in saving Bethulie bridge in March 1900. 

Alexander Young’s day in the military history annuals for the highest valour would come on the 31st August 1901 when he took part in the engagement at Ruiterskraal and led a small body of men against a hill held by Republican forces under Commandant J.L.P. Erasmus. 

When the Boers tried to escape, he closed in on them, succeeded in taking prisoner Erasmus (who had fired at him point-blank three times) and was awarded the Victoria Cross for his heroic deed. His Citation in the London Gazette on 8thNovember 1901 reads:

“Towards the close of the action at Ruiter’s Kraal on the 13th August, 1901, Sergeant-Major Young, with a handful of men, rushed some kopjes which were being; held by Commandant Erasmus and about 20 Boers. On reaching these kopjes the enemy were seen galloping back to another kopje held by the Boers. Sergeant-Major Young then galloped on some 50 yards ahead of his party and closing with the enemy shot one of them and captured Commandant Erasmus, the latter firing at him three times at point blank range before being taken prisoner.”

German South West Africa and Bambatha Rebellion

Young remained with the Cape Mounted Police until 1906, when he joined the German forces in German South-West Africa and saw service during the Herero uprising (January 1904 to March 1907). For this he was decorated by Kaiser Wilhelm II. During the last phase of the Bambatha Rebellion (February-June 1906) he served in Natal and Zululand, after which he turned to farming. 

1st World War

When the First World War (1914-1918) broke out he took up his old position of Regimental Sergeant-Major in the Cape Mounted Police, and served under General Louis Botha in German South-West Africa campaign, thereafter he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant and was subsequently active again during the East Africa campaign under General Jan Smuts, joining the Natal Light Horse.

He was amongst the first to respond to the call for South African troops to head to Europe and he transferred his commission to the 4th South African Infantry (the South African Scottish), he would however first see action against the Senussi in Egypt, he was again in the thick of it with the 4th South African Infantry in France during the Somme Offensive of 1916 and was later wounded in the crucible which was the Battle of Deville Wood in July 1916.

On recovering, he returned to take part in the later stages of the Somme Offensive under Captain T. H. Ross, he was tragically Killed in Action just before the battle of Warlencourt by German bombs and flame-throwers during an attack on his ‘Snag Trench’ on the 19th October 1916. 

His body has never been identified and his mortal remains are known only to his God. Thiepval Memorial is unique in that it is both a British and South African monument, recorded on its walls are all the ‘missing’ during all the battles of the Somme offensive – a staggering: United Kingdom 71,341, South Africa 832. Total 72,173. 

The Thiepval Memorial is one of the most visited Commonwealth War Graves Commission sites in the world. On the first day of the Battle of the Somme (1 July 1916) almost 20,000 men under British command died. By the time the battle was over, 141 days later, more than a million people on all sides were killed, wounded, or went missing. 

For the British and South Africans with no known grave, the Thiepval Memorial stands in their honour.

In Conclusion

I had the privilege of officiating and commanding the remembrance parade at Thiepval Memorial to mark the centenary of the Battle of Delville Wood. During my speech I referenced Lt. Alexander Young VC and pointed out the panel on which his name is recorded. 

It is with deep appreciation and honour, that on the 10th July 2016, South African military veterans of The South African Legion, Memorable Order of Tin Hats, The Royal British Legion – South African Branch and just about every single CMVO Registered South African Veterans Association, with Rhodesian veterans in addition could ‘stand-to’ on top of Thiepval Memorial 100 years later – with banners flying and heads bowed – whilst we remembered the sheer sacrifice and the many brave South African men, men like Alexander Young VC.

To see the full Thiepval 100th Centenary South African service, video, speeches and photographs, follow this Observation Post link: ‘Springbok Valour’… Somme 100 & the Delville Wood Centenary


Researched and Written by Peter Dickens

References and extracts from The South African War Graves Project

Commonwealth War Graves Commission

Thank you to Brigadier Hennie Heymans for this remarkable photograph artefact of the Cape Mounted Police. 

The artist`s impression of the action at Deville Wood for which William Faulds was awarded the Victoria Cross. From the book “Deeds that thrill the Empire” Vol 5

Thiepval 2016 photos thanks to Theo Fernandes

Related Work:

William Faulds VC: Delville Wood’s Victoria Cross – William Faulds

Sherwood-Kelly VC: “…. a Herculean of Irish-South African origin with a quite remarkable disregard for danger”.

Thiepval Memorial: ‘Springbok Valour’… Somme 100 & the Delville Wood Centenary

Delville Wood: Delville Wood’s ‘Weeping Cross’

Delville Wood: The Black Watch and the Delville Wood Lament

Deville Wood: A South African soldier’s diary captures the horror of Delville Wood

General Hertzog’s volte-face towards Nazism

I’m currently researching the Torch Commando for an academic seminar I’m involved in on Sailor Malan to be held in Kimberley in September 2023, part of this is researching the ‘Nazification of the Afrikaner Right’ which triggered the returning South African WW2 veterans into mass protest when the National Party came to power in 1948. In doing this we uncover more “inconvenient history” and nothing more inconvenient to our general understanding is the sudden conversion of the much loved (in white South African circles at least) Prime Minister, General J.B.M. Hertzog … to Nazism. 

What! No way, we’ve heard about all the ‘Pure’ Afrikaner Nationalists flirting with Nazim, how now General James Barry Munnik Hertzog? He was all about the South African ‘Union’ with Jan Smuts! This was no ‘Nazi ‘surely!

But I’m afraid here’s some more history that your Apartheid period schoolteacher either glossed over or had no clue about. But let’s cover a little of Hertzog’s background to this infamous U-turn first.

Hertzog’s political career in a nutshell

Much is written about General Barry Hertzog. A complex character, his popularity amongst Afrikaners was cemented when as a ‘Bittereinder’ Boer War General, he played a pivot role alongside Generals Louis Botha, Koos de la Rey and Jan Smuts in the Peace agreement that ended the Boer War. He joined Botha, and Smuts to form the South African Party (SAP) and was key to the establishment of ‘Union’ which saw a South African Union formed out of the two old Boer Republics and two primary British Colonies under the British family of nations, established in 1910, with Louis Botha as the country’s first Prime Minister.  

Issues within the SAP would however start to come to head between Hertzog and Botha when Hertzog chose neutrality when the First World War broke out with Imperial Germany in 1914, Hertzog then joined a small minority of Ministers who voted against invading German South West Africa (the vote was 92: In Favour and 12: Against – going to war against Imperial Germany).

He would ultimately break away from the SAP later in 1914, found and head up the National Party after a disagreement with Prime Minister Botha, who favoured a ‘one-stream’ policy (English and Afrikaners together policy) as opposed to Hertzog’s ‘Two-Stream’ which sought a separate development of English and Afrikaans to protect Afrikaans culture (an early form of Apartheid). He would state of British Imperialism at this time, that he would remain committed to it, on the proviso that it benefited the white Afrikaner, the minute it did not, he would happily break with it.

After the Miner’s Strike (Rebellion) in 1922, Jan Smuts’ Prime Ministership and the reign of the SAP was lost, and Hertzog was able to come into power under the National Party banner by climbing into bed with the Labour Party (‘English’ white ‘Bolsheviks’ in effect) in a very uneasy coalition. Although clipped somewhat by the Labour Party as to the maintenance of Union under the British flag (Hertzog leaned to Republicanism) the ‘majority’ National Party was now able to pass extensive ‘segregation’ based legislation, and even change the national flag from the ‘Red Duster’ to the OBB (Orange, White and Blue) incorporating the old Boer Republic flags.

With respect to the South African Union, despite at times harbouring deep wishes for the re-establishment of Boer Republicanism and the possible unbundling of the Union. After the Belfour Declaration of 1926, of which Hertzog was the South African representative and signatory, he remained committed to Union, and to South Africa’s status as a British Dominion. Having played a key role in the agreement he believed that the Balfour Declaration of 1926 had granted sufficient autonomy to British dominions and negated any idea of any overt British Imperialism or influence playing any sort of significant role in South Africa’s future. South Africa (like Canada and Australia) had ‘figurehead’ British monarchist representation, but could crack on with its own laws and independence, completely free of Westminster.

The Balfour Declaration 1924: King George V (front, centre) with his prime ministers at the 1926 Imperial Conference – Monroe (Newfoundland), Coates (New Zealand), Bruce (Australia), Hertzog (South Africa), Cosgrave (Irish Free State), Mackenzie King (Canada) and Baldwin (United Kingdom).

The Balfour Declaration of 1926 would be Hertzog’s crowning achievement and personal pride. However dynamics within the electorate in by 1934, would see the Hertzog’s National Party out of its coalition with Labour and into “Fusion” with Jan Smuts’ opposition South African Party to maintain its authority and Hertzog’s Premiership over South Africa. The decision in this “Fusion” would see Hertzog and Smuts shelve their respective parties and form a new entity called The United Party (UP) – essentially to consolidate a white hegemony in South Africa with a better balance between white English and Afrikaans speakers.

By this stage Hertzog would become the longest serving South Africa Premier in history, presiding over no less than 4 governments. Hertzog’s mantra as Prime Minister revolved around the reconciliation of white Afrikaans and English speakers as the only viable path for South Africa, in this respect he became an intense supporter of “English Rights” and he continued his commitment to South Africa remaining a British Dominion. Hertzog and his Nationalist cabal within the UP are however still able to continue to with segregationist and race-based policies, albeit these were ‘softened’ significantly by the more liberal Smuts and his cabal. 

Hertzog’s United Party cabinet, a curious mix of hard conservatives like Jan Kemp and democratic progressives like Jan Smuts and Patrick Duncan.

A small group of disgruntled nationalists ‘on the rump’ of the party would however break away from Hertzog’s nationalists and form the ‘Pure’ National Party or Herenigde Nasionale Party (Reunited National Party) – under the leadership of Dr. D.F. Malan. They would turn their vitriol against Hertzog, who they now regarded as traitorous as Smuts and a British puppet.

On the other hand, within The United Party, by the late 1930’s things had started to come to a head between Hertzog and Smuts. One issue was South West Africa (Namibia), now under South African Union mandate, and part of Smuts’ and the Union’s vision for ‘Greater South Africa’.

Hertzog’s right hand-man, Oswald Pirow – the National Party’s Minister of Defence and a devout Nazi supporter and admirer of Adolf Hitler had been sent by Hertzog to the Nazi German state on a number of ‘unofficial’ state visits – in doing so Pirow would meet Hitler and assure him of Afrikaner support of the Reich and that should there be war against the British – South Africa would remain neutral and should Germany win they could re-claim their old colony of South West Africa as German (something Hitler re-iterated to Pirow as a fait accompli).

Oswald Pirow in Nazi Germany, November 1938  in Berlin inspecting a honour guard from the German Luftwaffe (Air Force), to his left is Wilhelm Canaris, to his right Ernst Seifert.

Things would really come to a full head when Britain and France declared war against Nazi Germany in 1939. A Parliamentary three-way debate would take place at the beginning of September 1939 primarily between the two factions in the United Party and the Pure Nationalists now in opposition, as to whether South Africa should go to war against Germany or remain neutral. As the United Party was loaded with Hertzog’s Nationalists and there was also Malan’s Nationalists in opposition, Hertzog was very confident he had the majority to carry his motion of neutrality.

Prime Minister Hertzog would argue in his speech that Hitler’s invasion of Poland and annexations of Austria and Czechoslovakia was not an indication that Hitler aspired to world conquest, and Afrikaners well understood the Germans right to struggle for their own self-determination against the hostility of the outside world. Germany’s actions constituted no threat to South African security whatsoever and a policy of neutrality under these circumstances was the only logical policy to adopt.

General Smuts would reply in his speech that since the fate of South West Africa would depend on the outcome of the war, South Africa’s interests were virtually involved. Furthermore, South Africa was part of the Commonwealth whose fate now hung in the balance, to stand aside from the conflict would be to expose the whole civilised world to danger.

Smuts’ amendment to Hertzog’s Motion of Neutrality was carried by 80 votes to 67 votes on the 4th September 1939 and South Africa found itself at war against Nazi Germany. Surprised at the outcome, Hertzog promptly resigned, leaving the South African Premiership and the leadership of the United Party to General Jan Smuts and both he and some of his supporters left the United Party.

Field Marshal Smuts with a ‘V’ for Victory and the pin commemorating his win over Hertzog’s motion of neutrality on the 4-9-1939

On the 23rd November 1939 the National Party’s “Malanites” and “Hertzognites” met and tried to reconcile their differences, they could not, the stumbling block was Republicanism – the ‘Pure’ Malanite Nationalists wanted a Republic regardless, Hertzog felt that a break from Union and the declaration of Republic could only take place if both Afrikaner and English whites were in agreement with the idea. 

To the ‘Malanite’ Nationalists, the UP’s decision to go to war had vindicated their intensive segregationist policies which they had been following since 1934, and that Hertzog’s flirtation with English speakers ‘rights’ was delusional (the Malanites classified English speakers as secondary citizens, albeit they made up around 40% of the white population). Unable to reconcile, Dr. D.F. Malan seized the opportunity to take over leadership of all ‘Afrikanerdom’ and cast Hertzog out into the political wilderness. Hertzog tried again on 5th November 1940 at the National Party’s Convention to reaffirm his position on English-speakers rights, falling on deaf ears, he grabbed his hat and walked out of the National Party – forever.

In his retirement from politics, and in his private life, no longer walking ‘coalition’ and ‘fusion’ political tightropes and toeing UP party-political lines, Hertzog felt confident to reveal his true colours. He performed an especially remarkable volte-face (U-Turn) when, just after leaving the National Party over his defence of English-speakers’ rights, he suddenly became a champion of full-blown National Socialism (Nazism).

Angered by his treatment by Dr D.F. Malan and the endless machinations of National party politicians, General Hertzog issued a press statement in October 1941 in which he excoriated “liberal capitalism” and the democratic party system, while praising National Socialism, as in keeping with the traditions of the Afrikaner, and as a system National Socialism simply had to be adapted to South African needs under the oversight of a one-party state dictatorship.

General Hertzog’s press release led to frenzied activity as the various Afrikaner pro-Nazi and anti-war factions tried to reunite. In the months following Hertzog’s pro-Nazi declaration Germany was joined by Japan, and the Axis forces won victory after victory. This was the point where Smuts was at his most perilous and the Smuts Government really feared that all could easily be lost. The National Party at this point even gave Dr. D.F. Malan dictatorial powers over his party to meet the Hertzog induced “crisis.”

The United Party’s Secretary Louis Esselen even wrote to Sidney Waterson, the wartime Minister of Transport that General Hertzog was ready to be proclaimed saviour of the Afrikaner volk once the war was lost.

According to Hertzog’s officially appointed biographer C.M. van den Heever, in his ‘General J.B.M Hertzog’ published in 1944; the following on Hertzog’s volte-face towards Nazism over this period is noted:

“Hertzog became “bitterly disappointed in the democratic system, with its capitalist foundations and press influence, for he had cause to know that the voice of the majority is not only the voice of wisdom … he was convinced that a new world order was on its way … after his retirement … he became more inclined towards National Socialism, by which he meant the adaption of the old Free State model republic to modern conditions, using the best from recent European experiments. … He regarded National Socialism as suited to the moral and religious outlook of the Afrikaner; indeed, he considered that the constitution of the old Free State Republic was based on it.”

As it happened the Malan’s Nationalists were not able to reconcile with all the pro-Nazi Afrikaner factions – the Ossewabrandwag, the Greyshirts (and the other ‘shirt’ movements), the New Order and the Boerenasie. The ‘Greyshirts’ – The South African Christian National Socialist Movement (SANP) themselves were unable to convince anyone to accept their rather opportunistic leader Louis Weichardt to be appointed as Führer under Hertzog’s ceremonial patronage. Dr. D.F. Malan was certainly unwilling to be usurped by anybody as the leader of “Afrikanerdom” – he had fought very hard to get to this position and rid the party of Hertzog, and even the Ossewabrandwag leader Dr Hans van Rensberg, a man who also converted the idea of Führer for himself, would ultimately find himself on the wrong side of Malan.

Also, according to C.M. van den Heever, Hertzog became increasingly private and isolated. Also noted is that Hertzog started to become seriously ill a year later in 1942 passing away on the 21st November 1942 aged 74. Some apologists to Hertzog’s volte-face and sojourn with Nazism point to his illness and him becoming ‘senile’ – however he was also considered by many to have been well within his faculties a year before in 1941 when he published his pro-National Socialist press release.

That said, his turn to Nazism, given his entire political career and his strong position on ‘Fusion’ and equality between English and Afrikaans speakers along with ‘Union’ – his turn to Nazism seems a little out of character – his illness and realisation that he was closing in on his twilight years may have played a role in that he may have wanted ‘to get it off his chest’, or he may have genuinely become completely mentally discombobulated. 

Like father like son?

Barry and Albert Hertzog

However, it’s in his private life and not in his public life that we find a more compelling clue, and in retirement especially he was very much focussed on his family. They say ‘the apple does not fall far from the tree’ and here we find General Hertzog’s son, Dr. Albert Hertzog who followed his fathers’ footsteps into politics.

Dr. Albert Hertzog was a key figure in the Afrikaner Broederbond, in 1948 he stood as a National Party candidate, becoming a Minister of Parliament. Dr. Albert Hertzog’s views were extreme, he wanted to nationalise the gold mines and as devout National Socialist he looked to reforming Afrikaner and white labour unions – especially the Afrikaner Bond of Mineworkers. He even advocated state control of the entire economy. 

So extremely right wing in his views, Dr. Albert Hertzog eventually found the National Party too ‘liberal’ for his liking and came to loggerheads with them – he was removed from the party, and he moved to establish the Herstigte Nasionale Party (Reconstituted National Party) or HNP in 1969 and head it up as a breakaway to the extreme right of the NP. Joining him as his deputy was Jaap Marais, an ex-Ossewabrandwag stalwart and National Party Minister, who along with Dr Albert Hertzog harboured such extreme National Socialist views that he too was removed from the NP.

The HNP bordered on a Neo-Nazi party in its mandate, advocating complete racial segregation with ‘Pure’ white Afrikaners in full control, dictatorial government, ‘Blood and Land’ ideals and the only official language in South Africa was to be Afrikaans. The party would see the likes of Eugène Terre’Blanche emerge from it (forming the neo-Nazi – afrikaner weerstandsbeweging – AWB) and believe it or not the HNP still exists in modern South Africa today with a mandate to revert to Verwoerdian Apartheid – such is our free democracy, but how they realistically intend to do this is anyone’s guess.  

Legacy

General Hertzog was a much-loved leader, and that’s attested by his oversight over 4 governments, he carefully balanced Smuts’ ‘liberals’ against the more conservative Nationalists and as a result had a tenure over South Africa that even exceeded Smuts’ – and this has not been matched by a South African premier since – even in the modern democratic era. His disposition to ‘reconciliation’ of Afrikaners and English with Smuts alongside him was his downfall in the face of the extreme Afrikaner Nationalists advocating a return to ‘Krugerism’, and an all-encompassing Afrikaner ‘white’ Republic, with the emerging Broederbond advocating a Weimar Eugenics and National Socialist infused definition of Afrikaner ‘Christian Nationalism’ in addition. 

Had it remained there, history would have been kinder to General Barry Hertzog.  Unfortunately, his volte-face to accept National Socialism (Nazism) at the very end of his career will forever tarnish his legacy, as there is literally no way it can be shaken off.  In this respect he joins the likes of all the other National Party members who embraced National Socialism as an ideology prior to and during the war (some even after the war) – B.J. Vorster, Oswald Pirow, Hendrik van den Bergh, Johannes von Moltke, P.O. Sauer, Frans Erasmus, C.R. Swart, P.W. Botha, Eric Louw, General Manie Maritz, Jaap Marais, Louis Weichardt, The Rev. Koot Vorster, Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, Henning Klopper, Dr. Nico Diedericks, Piet Meyer, General Rudolph Hiemstra, Dr. Eben Dönges, Dr. Hans van Rensberg and even his own son …  Dr. Albert Hertzog.

The Springbok Legion and the Torch Commando, consisting of returning World War 2 veterans repeatedly warned that the under the thin veneer of Afrikaner Nationalism dwelt full blown National Socialism (Nazism), and they pointed repeatedly at the likes of Pirow, Vorster, Erasmus, Verwoerd and Swart. At the helm of the National Party during the 1950’s was Dr. D.F. Malan, and he was just about the only Afrikaner Nationalist in the NP’s leader element who had not either partly or fully embraced Nazism as a political ideology prior to and during World War 2. 

The ‘Malanazi’ as published in ‘Blikfakkel’ the Torch Commando’s mouthpiece in June 1952 – political cartoon by Berry – served to ridicule Dr. D.F. Malan, the Prime Minister and leader of The National Party, humorously depicted as a poor cousin of Nazism.

The National Party spent years covering up its National Socialist affiliations, declaring they were just “anti-British” during WW2 and promoted “neutrality” and not war with Nazi Germany – a “no, Nazi to be seen here .. move on!” approach. But this argument starts to really fall about when you look at General Hertzog’s conversion to Nazism in addition to the rest, the National Party’s founder, its most successful premier and cornerstone for the party for over three decades. 


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

References:

Pro-Nazi Subversion in South Africa, 1939-1941: By Patrick J. Furlong.

General J.B.M Hertzog: Official biography published 1944: By C.M. van den Heever.

The Rise of the South African Reich: 1964: By Brian Bunting

The White Tribe of Africa: 1981: By David Harrison 

National Socialism and Nazism in South Africa: The case of L.T. Weichardt and his Greyshirt movements, 1933-1946: By Werner Bouwer

The Final Prize: The Broederbond by Norman Levy: South African History On-line (SAHO) War and the formation of Afrikaner nationalism: By Anne Samson: Great War in Africa Association 

Colourised photo of Smuts contract Photos Redux

Related work:

Robey Leibbrand’s National Socialist Rebels Blood Oaths on the Führer principle

Oswald Pirow’s New Order: South Africa’s Nazi ‘Neuordnung’ and Oswald Pirow

Ossewabrandwag: “Mein Kampf shows the way to greatness for South Africa” – The Ossewabrandwag

Greyshirts: South Africa’s Nazi Party; The ‘Gryshemde’

Manie Martiz Boerenasie : A differing outlook

A differing outlook

An opposing view, a massacre, a revolt, and a Nazi.

There is an old joke in Afrikaner politics, put two Afrikaners in a room and they will come up with three political parties! 

It’s funny because throughout history it has always proven to be very true, As a nation from the get go, literally from the Great Trek serious schisms have occurred within the Afrikaner culture – from the Great Trek’s “Vlugkommando” where two trekking parties could NOT agree a overall Commando Commander for an assault on the Zulu on the 6th April 1838 and decided instead to have two equal Commanders in equal positions of authority – the result (if you’re a military vet – you guessed it) .. a Zulu victory and the death of 10 Voortrekkers including Piet and Dirkie Uys – the surviving “Vlug” Kommando (meaning “Flee” or ‘run-away’ commando) splitting ways after the battle, both accusing each other of been “Veraaiers” (traitors) and heading off on their respective treks.

So, as humorous as it is seriously tragic, nothing represents this dichotomy of views more so than this image of Jan Smut’s Commando during the South African War (1899-1902) a.k.a. The 2nd Boer War. In it are two leaders who have – right upfront – two massively differing opinions, two completely differing views of life and vastly differing outlooks on the objects of the war and the country as a whole going forward. So much so that it is a surprise that Smuts was even able to command this Commando, that his is arguably one of the most successful ‘Bittereinder’ Commanders of the war is even more surprising, and testament to Smuts’ abilities.

Image: General Jan Smuts’ Commando during the South African War 1899-1902. Smuts and Maritz are seated in the centre – photo colourised by Jennifer Bosch 

So, what’s with this leadership battle – what’s with these vastly differing views? The two people in this famous photograph are Manie Maritz and Jan Smuts, and the composition of the shot by the photographer ironically betrays their future feelings towards one another as an intense dislike of one another would emerge – and even here, almost by purpose, Smuts is seated opposite Maritz for a group portrait and both of them have their backs to one another looking the other way.

This differing view and outlook of these two men would forever taint Smuts’ commando with a mass murder of civilians – something your school history book would have conveniently glanced over – this differing outlook on Afrikanerdom would result in a serious schism in Afrikaner cultural fabric after World War 1, a schism that still exists to this day believe it or not and it would it would even add to the “Nazification” of the Afrikaner far right-wing prior to World War 2 and as a result create a diametrically opposing view of Afrikaner identity itself. 

What, Maritz, Smuts … mass murder and Nazism – you smoking your socks again right Mr. Dickens? Well, no – let me explain … and if you are a fan of the 1914 Boer Revolt and a Boer Romantic looking to this revolt as the bedrock of Boer stoicism and independence – now is the time to look away, as this next bit is going to sting a little. 

Let’s get this out upfront. General Manie Maritz, as the leader of the 1914 Boer revolt does not end up a very redeemable figure in history bathed in glory, instead he ends up as a murderer, an antisemite, a racist and a devout Nazi … the bit your Nationalist inspired school history book did not want you to know about him … the inconvenient truth.

An opposing view

Let’s start with Boer War 2, and upfront Maritz and Smuts are already at different points of view in Smuts’ Commando. It starts with Maritz’ rank, role and appointment in the Commando. Maritz would maintain Smuts gave him the rank of ‘General’ as a field commission – in the Republican Armies this was known as a “veggeneraal” or ‘fighting-general’. Deneys Reitz, Smuts’ long-time right-hand man, confidant, and friend, has a different view and claimed Maritz was only a “leader of various rebel bands” and never given a Generalship – as Reitz was also on Smuts’ staff, Reitz would have known if Martiz was made a ‘veggeneraal’or not.

The two leaders upfront also differ on leadership style, experience and philosophy. Smuts is a skilled lawyer and academic, he is a ‘Philosopher General’ and takes a very holistic view to the fighting seeking a consolidation of ‘white civilisation’ in Southern Africa between Boer and Brit as its final object. Smuts also has an outward look, seeking through the ‘consolidation of the white races’ good neighbourliness with all South Africa’s peoples, including South Africa’s ‘coloureds’ and ‘blacks’. Maritz on the other hand is a ‘Soldier’s General’, he starts his military career as a guard at the Johannesburg Fort after the Jameson Raid and subsequently becomes a ZARP Policeman. Maritz has a reputation as a “thug” he’s a devout Boer Republican, he wants nothing to do with reconciliation with the ‘hated’ British, he is inwardly focussed and views ‘coloureds’ and ‘blacks’ very suspiciously.

So, Smuts and Maritz are fundamentally different in their leadership styles, outlooks and personalities and it would come to a head towards the end of Boer War 2 in what was to become known as the ‘Leliefontein massacre’. For those who have an abiding admiration for Smuts, now is also the time to also look away, as some historians have tarnished Smuts with the title of “mass murderer” as it took place ‘under his watch’ so to speak, but the culprit is really Maritz – so what happened?

A Massacre 

Over two days, starting on the 31st January 1902, the ‘noble’ Boer bittereinder effort of the Boer War, and even Jan Smuts, would emerge forever tarnished by what is considered by some as the first massacre of innocents of the 20th Century. 

A rather dishonourable title and achievement not often emphasised by Boer War ‘Republican’ historians, journalists and commentators – rather conveniently ignored by them is the nature of this phase of the war really – the repeated targeting, pillaging and ransacking of mission stations, ‘hensopper’ farms (farms belonging to Boers who surrendered prematurely during the amnesty), ‘Joiner’ farms (farms belonging to Boers who joined the British) and even tribal villages by marauding Bittereinder groupings. This period also sees many Black and Coloureds executed by Bittereinder Boer firing squads and hangman nooses, mainly charged with “spying” for or “working” with the British. It is not such a ‘glorious’ end to a noble fight to the end, as romantic Boer war novelists would have you believe – its harsh war – bloody and revengeful, and nobody in the ‘Guerrilla’ phase of the Boer War comes out smelling of roses – not the British with their tactic of Scorched Earth and certainly not the Boers with their tactic of Marauding.

Manie Maritz

Many of these actions were of little real tangible military value in the war against the British and have more to do with retribution than anything else, and front and centre in this controversial phase is Manie Maritz, who whilst he is under Jan Smuts’ command, rides into the ‘Nama’ missionary town of Leliefontein in the far north west Cape – deep inside the British Cape Colony. Here Maritz immediately detains the Methodist missionary – Barnabas Links – who was acting in place of the absent Rev J.G. Locke. Maritz subsequently reads out a proclamation threatening death to both residents and the town’s missionaries alike if they are found guilty of aiding or abetting the British.

The Nama people (the local people made up of a mix of KhoiKhoi, Namibian and Tswana) and their missionaries are British subjects living in a British colony and fearing for their lives don’t take lightly to the proclamation threat and become steadily agitated. From here out there is a lot of conflicting account, in detaining Barnabas Links a rather strong verbal exchange over jurisdiction and authority takes place and some say Links strikes Maritz with his stick, others say Maritz strikes Links with his sjambok. Either way, a ‘fists and knives” scuffle breaks between a group of citizens and Maritz’ men, one Republican is injured, Links is also injured, and Maritz and his men manage to disentangle themselves from the melee, leaving 8 Leliefonteiners dead, and ride back to their rendezvous camp.

That night, Maritz and his men become indignant at their treatment at the hands of the Leliefonteiners and elect to exact revenge by wiping the missionary off the face of the earth. So, the next morning the Commando detachment numbering about 100 mounted Boers attacks the missionary in full force. The Nama and their missionaries are no match for a fully armed Boer commando, having some antiquated muskets they try and hold off the assault and most take refuge in the mission building. A further 27 Leliefonteiners are killed (some accounts say a total of 43) and approximately 100 are injured. 

Image: Modern day image of the Methodist Mission Church, Leliefontein (erected in 1855, it was the third church built at the mission station).

Maritz then directs all the surviving women and children, male survivors, and the wounded (including Links) be taken away in chains to the Boer positions surrounding Okiep, one account points to the local blacksmith been instructed to fashion iron shackles for this purpose. Some accounts also point to general violence been meted out by the Boers against surviving Leliefonteiners after the skirmish and ‘refugees’ been hunted down and killed.

Maritz instructs that the mission station be pillaged and then burned down – all the captured sheep and grain are to be forwarded to a Boer supply depot. The mission station is completely destroyed and the dead Leliefonteiners are left where they died – and here they remained unburied for months.

So, how does Smuts and his General Staff react to the news that a detachment of his Commando had ransacked a mission station and killed over 30 poorly armed or unarmed British civilians in a revenge attack? Deneys Reitz on arriving at the destroyed mission station described the scene as follows:

“We found the place sacked and gutted and among the rocks beyond the buried houses lay 20 or 30 dead Hottentots, still clutching their antiquated muzzleloaders. This was Maritz’s handiwork. He had ridden into the station with a few men to interview the European missionaries, when he was set upon by armed Hottentots, he and his escorts narrowly escaping with their lives. To avenge the insult, he returned the next morning with a stronger force and wiped out the settlement, which seemed to many of us a ruthless and unjustifiable act. General Smuts said nothing but I saw him walk past the boulders where the dead lay, and on his return he was moody and curt… we lived in an atmosphere of rotting corpses for some days.”

Deneys Reitz

Smuts, although clearly unimpressed with Maritz, actually comes through for Maritz in accounting the massacre in his letter to General de la Rey, he down-plays the instance as a “close shave” for Maritz and somewhat covers up the incident, citing that Maritz was attacked by a knobkerrie whilst acting as a peace envoy, it was taken as a sign of attack and only “8 hottentots” were killed due “to misunderstanding and ignorance” (Nel, Eben: Kaapse rebelle van die Hantam-karoo, p 461).

Some commentators point to this as collusion, as Maritz is completely exonerated and never held to account for the massacre – whereas similar instances of ‘murdering’ civilians in the cases of the Australian officer Lt. Harry ‘Breaker’ Morant and the Boer Commandant Gideon Scheepers landed them both in front of their respective firing squads.

To further demonstrate just how off the hinge Maritz was, the last real Boer action of the Boer War was when Jan Smuts’ Commando laid siege to the mining town of Okiep in the British Cape Colony in April, 1902. On hearing the news of the Peace Conference, Reitz writes “General Smuts set to work at once. Next morning a messenger was sent into O’Okiep, to advise the garrison that both sides were to refrain front active military operations while the Congress lasted”.

Jan Smuts then left the siege of O’okiep to take part in the final Peace talks at Vereeniging at the end of April 1902. With Smuts away Manie Maritz decided to attack Okiep with the idea of literally wiping the entire town off the map, using the commandeered Namaqua United Copper Company locomotive ‘Pioneer’ – which was used to propel a mobile bomb in the form of a wagonload of dynamite into the besieged town. The attack failed when the train derailed, snagged upon a barbed wire fence which wrapped around the points, spilling the dynamite upon the ground which burnt out harmlessly. 

The exercise could have resulted in killing large numbers of women and children (mainly coloured) who sheltered behind the defences, the failure of the operation was a blessing at a time when deliberations at the Vereeniging peace talks potentially heralded the end of the conflict. Smuts would again gloss over the incident and cover for Maritz when he stated that the railway was still intact after the incident anyway, and since there were women and children in Okiep town, all the commando was allowed to do was to give the good citizens of Okiep a “tremendous fright with a harmless explosion.”

Images: General Jan Smuts and General Christiaan Beyers at the Vereeniging Peace negotiations (left), and the locomotive ‘Pioneer’ used by Maritz to try and blow up the town of Okiep in Smuts’ absence (right).

Smuts’ disposition to treating treasonous, rebellious and insubordinate Boer commanders with ‘kid gloves’ in the hopes of placating and consolidating their views to see his way on things would be Smuts’ greatest ‘Achilles heel’ – as there would be no such quarter given in the way they would view or treat him in future. Which brings us to the next instance – The Boer revolt of 1914.

A Revolt

Much has been written on the Boer Revolt of 1914, but let’s understand the ‘differing’ view between Smuts and Maritz in the lead up and then the instigation of the revolt itself. Where Smuts was involved in negotiating the Peace at Vereeniging to end the Boer War in 1902, Maritz as part of his leader element would have none of it. When peace was made, the burghers of the erstwhile Republics were obliged to lay down their arms and sign an oath of allegiance to the British monarch – Maritz refused and instead he slipped over the border into German South West Africa (modern Namibia).

In German South West Africa (GSWA), Maritz would become embroiled in another massacre, this time the Hereto and Namaqua genocide – which as irony goes it is the first recorded case of Germans using the concentration camp system along with the resultant mass death (something ignored by both Hermann Göring and Adolf Hitler when they solely laid the blame on the British for “inventing” concentration camps and the “Genocide” of the Boers – in their book white deaths count, black deaths don’t seem to count – and these two criminals were are also happy to try and deflect Germany’s real crimes of genocide).

Returning to South Africa by sneaking back over the border, Maritz is briefly arrested in the British Colony of the Transvaal for not signing the oath of allegiance (and therefore still a combatant) – it’s a forewarning of a general dislike of his deep-seated dislike of the British. He is ultimately released and joins up again as a Transvaal Policeman.

Smuts on the other hand at this time in 1909 is concerning himself with Union, the Union conference on the back of the Peace of Vereeniging specifies an expanded Union border to incorporate Britain’s Southern Rhodesia colony as a 5th Province along with the incorporation of the British protectorates of Bechuanaland (Botswana), Lesotho and Swaziland. By doing this the Boer and the Brits agreed ‘Union’ negotiations are hoping to gain balance and reconciliation between Boer and Brit interests in the region, although now all under the “British family of nations” as specified in the Vereeniging Peace Treaty – Jan Smuts, Louis Botha and all the other significant Boer Generals – De la Rey, Hertzog etc are all consolidating to ensure this new ‘Union’ is managed by the Boers and not the Brits, which is in fact the subsequent outcome when The Union of South Africa is formed in 1910 – the South African Party, consisting of Botha, Smuts, De la Rey, Hertzog etc. win the majority seats.

Image: The borders of ‘Greater South Africa’ as outlined in the Union conference in 1909 – phase one – the Limpopo River marks the border of South Africa, phase two – Zambezi River marks the border and phase three – the Ruvuma River marks the border, this is Smuts’ map, note his personal notations ‘A’ and ‘B’.

The arrival of World War 1 in 1914 is both a blessing and a curse for the Boer led government of the newly formed Union of South Africa. Both Botha as Prime Minister and Smuts as his ‘right hand man’ were walking a tight rope – as Boer commanders they represented a faction of the new “Union”, balancing the two small old Boer Republic’s politics and laws with those of all the British colonies and protectorates surrounding them (six large British territories and their interests in them in effect) – so they are obliged to support Britain as the major player in the region, and honour their word to them, the oath that brought about peace – that’s the ‘curse’. 

The ‘blessing’ to the Union government is that the war presents them with an ideal opportunity to realise the expansive border of ‘Greater South Africa’ as envisioned and concluded in the Union conference in 1909 – as this border also specifies the eventual inclusion of German South West Africa into South Africa in the first phase of the ‘Greater’ South Arica Union and eventually even German East Africa would be included in the second phase of South Africa’s territorial advancement.

So it’s really no surprise, that when the decision to go to war is put to the vote in the Boer led and very independent Union of South Africa parliament (at Union, Britain takes a figurehead role, the South African Union’s Parliament and legal construct is not governed by Westminster, its fee to make its own laws) – and the result is not what your school history teacher plugged – it’s a staggering vote of confidence by nearly all the Boer MP’s favouring going to war alongside Britain (and France) against Germany, by a landslide – literally. Consider the result.

92 = For invasion of German South West Africa by the Union of South Africa

12 = Against

So, as to the ‘majority’ of Afrikaners NOT wanting war with Germany, that is simply untrue, the Afrikaner community’s representatives in Parliament were overwhelmingly in favour of war against Germany. This is also where some ‘Boer Romantic’ commentators on the 1914 Revolt make a fundamental mistake, the Union of South Africa’s decision to conquer German South West Africa (Namibia) was NOT just a service to the ‘British Empire’ – it was largely in service to the objects of The Union of South Africa and its own territorial expansion ambitions and the prescribed ‘sphere of influence’ over the Southern African region as a whole (as agreed by all Boer and British leaders involved in the Union conference in 1909).

Image: Political cartoon of the day captures the Union’s territorial ambitions

Smuts, as the Minister of Defence at this time had also been busy amalgamating the armed forces of the republics with those of the colonial citizen force regiments to form the Union Defence Force i.e. the UDF (in much the same way as the SADF was amalgamated with other forces in 1994 to form the SANDF – with the same challenges). 

The UDF had taken shape to consist of a small contingent of permanent force, but the backbone would remain voluntarily forces in a two-stream approach, the voluntary ‘English’ colonial citizen force regiments – Transvaal Scottish, Royal Natal Carbineers, Royal Durban Light Infantry etc and the voluntary ‘Afrikaans’ citizen force “skiet” Commandos known as the ‘Rifle Association Mounted Infantry’ in parallel to them (the old Republic’s commando system in effect). It was a careful construct to keep everyone happy, but the point is this, it was NOT “British” – Imperial British troops had returned to the United Kingdom, any engagement the Union of South Africa was going to fight in World War 1 in Africa, whether foreign or domestic, was going to be made up of ‘South Africans’ and led by ‘South Africans’ – and commanded by the old Republic’s ‘Bittereinder’ Boer Generals – primarily Botha (as Prime Minister was Commander in Chief) and Smuts (as Botha’s Minister of Defence). 

Smuts was sensitive to the fact that many Afrikaners shared German heritage and they (falsely) believed that Germany extensively supported the Boer cause during Boer War 2 – ‘falsely’ because in fact, Germany was happy to ‘sell’ them arms (as did the British arms manufacturers) at a premium and send some medical assistance later on, however Germany withdrew their support officially – they provided no troops and no substantial funding to the Republican Boer War effort whatsoever. 

Kaiser Wilhelm II

Kaiser Wilhelm II, although sending a letter to Kruger congratulating him on the Jameson Raid victory (given the Boer nation their false sense of ‘support’), in fact refused point blank to receive any Boer representations and after the ‘Black Week’ British defeats to the Boers in late 1899, he and his Generals compiled a military strategy, not to help the Boers, but to help the British win the war (he was after all related to the British monarchy – part of the family so to speak) and shared it with them instead – Kaiser Wilhelm II even proudly proclaiming at the end of the Boer War that the British had followed his plan precisely as he had outlined it to them and it was the German plan that won the war for the British – not Field Marshal Frederick Robert’s plan and as inconvenient truths go the Kaiser’s plan involved scorched earth policies and concentration camps. (see: John C.G. Röhl: The Kaiser and England during the Boer War). Now, I bet none of this was in your Nationalistic inspired history teachings.

Ethnic Germans (local and foreign) volunteering to join Boer Commandos also qualified very few (550 odd) – far more Anglo-Irish, Dutch and Flemish joined the Boers (5,500 odd). A Boer leader delegation, including Botha and de Wet visited Germany after the war in 1902, and although they received a royal welcome and ovations, they were not officially received – they did raise a little money from private donators and a Boer help fund, but that’s it. However, all this still did not resonate with many in the Boer community who almost illogically saw Germany as an Ally. 

Smuts would argue the case for war, not on the basis of warring against Germany on the side of ‘Britain’, but for supporting the other old Boer Republic’s supporters – France, Belgium and the Netherlands in their war against a hostile and aggressive Germany busy de-stabilising western and eastern Europe, and Smuts was very aware of the vast majority of Boers had Dutch, Belgian and French roots, as opposed to the ones with German roots. He would use the same argument again for his declaration of war against Germany in World War 2.

Smuts however anticipated that the decision to go to war, although largely supported by the Afrikaner political elite and leadership, would have with it a handful of resignations from the Union’s Defence Force from those strongly in favour of Germany and whose sheer hatred of the British superseded everything, and the Union government received exactly that – a “handful” – nothing that would fundamentally compromise the UDF’s fighting ability or construct. 

Of the handful of resignations which were received, a rather long-winded one came from General Christiaan Beyers, the UDF’s Commandant General in charge of the Active Citizen Force and his was the most important resignation. Prior to the decision to go to war, Smuts and Botha’s old friend and highly respected comrade, General Koos de la Rey had been one of the handful of Parliamentary Ministers vocally against the decision to invade GSWA and advocated neutrality, and because of his popularity his opinion held massive sway over the old Boer Republic’s Afrikaner electorate  – nevertheless he was persuaded by Louis Botha and Jan Smuts not to take actions which may arouse the Boers, he then held a political rally for 800 Boers and took a reconciliatory approach – contrary to what the attendees expected of him. 

Images: General Christiaan Frederik Beyers (left) and General Jacobus Herculaas de la Rey (right)

De la Rey seemed torn over his decision, and he was then targeted by General Beyers to join him for meeting with Major Jan Kemp, a mid-line UDF officer who had also resigned – the purpose of the meeting; Beyers and Kemp wanted to persuade de la Rey to take a stronger stand and initiate more Union Defence Force resignations to compromise its fighting capability. Joining the conspiracy was another heavyweight – the significant Boer General and Parliamentary Minister, Christiaan de Wet.

What follows next is well documented, however the generally accepted and investigated history concludes; General De la Rey and General Beyers were travelling in a soft top sedan car to their meeting with Major Kemp and did not stop at a Police blockade set up to capture a notorious gang of robbers and murderers called The Foster Gang. One of the Policeman fired a warning shot into the road to get them to stop, the bullet ricocheted and hit De la Rey, killing him. 

It was tragedy – plain and simple, and both Botha and Smuts were devasted at the loss of their friend, as a signal to the inevitable accusations of ‘political assassination’ both Botha and Smuts attended De la Rey’s funeral in front of thousands of mourning Boers, they appeared without any bodyguard at the mercy of the assembly – a token of no malice intended, and there were no protests or accusations from the mourners. 

Regardless, despite sound and tested enquiries and court cases, and the Nationalists having full scope and the resources at hand for 40 years to uncover a ‘plot’ – no concrete proof has emerged of a plot by Smuts to kill De la Rey whatsoever – ‘conspiracy theory’ nevertheless grew out of the incident which would plague Smuts in future years, and it still does.

It is also generally understood that with the death of De La Rey, that would probably have been the extent of Boer resistance to the war, and it would have devolved into simple political protest and peaceful demonstrations, had it not been for one man … the subject of the differing view – none other than Lt. Colonel Manie Maritz, who by now had joined the UDF and commanded a small UDF force at Upington, near the border with German South West Africa (GSWA).

The day after de la Rey’s funeral, Kemp, Beyers and de Wet addressed a large crowd at Lichtenberg, calling on protest meetings against the decision to invade GSWA. Manie Maritz however took a more robust position than Kemp, Beyers and de Wet, he instead went into open sedition and started ignoring Smuts’ and his other Commander’s orders been sent to him. Intel told Smuts that Maritz had joined the Germans, however contradictory to Smuts’ usual manner of decisiveness, he vacillated instead hoping to persuade Maritz not to revolt and get him to see reason. 

Images: General Christiaan Rudolf de Wet (left) and Major Jan Christoffel Greyling Kemp (right) in his UDF dress uniform.

Not dissuaded by Smuts and bent on a sedition, Maritz resigned his commission from the Union Defence Force and openly rebelled on 9 October, taking 300 odd of his UDF soldiers with him when he went over to the Germans.

Major Barend ‘Ben’ Bouwer was sent to deal with Maritz’ sedition and insubordination (Bouwer had also been a ‘Veggeneraal’ in Smuts’ commando during the Boer War and as irony goes was alongside Maritz when he sent the dynamite train into O’okiep). Maritz took Bouwer prisoner along with his fellow officers, he was subsequently released and sent back with the ultimatum from Maritz to the Union Government to the effect that:

That unless the Union Government guaranteed safe passage of his fellow plotting Generals (De Wet, Beyers, Kemp et al), to his position on the GSWA border by the 11th October he would immediately attack General Brits’s UDF forces preparing to invade GSWA and then he would invade the Union of South Africa.

Major Ben Bouwer reported that Maritz was in possession of some guns belonging to the Germans, and that he held the rank of General commanding the German troops. He also had a force of Germans under him in addition to his own rebel commando. Maritz arrested all the UDF officers and men under his command who were unwilling to join the Germans, and then sent them forward as prisoners into German South West Africa.

To drive Maritz’ point home, Major Bouwer was shown an agreement between Maritz and the Governor of German South West Africa guaranteeing the independence of the Union as a Republic, ceding Walfish Bay and certain other portions of the Union to the Germans, and undertaking that the Germans would only invade the Union on the invitation of Maritz.

Major Bouwer was shown numerous telegrams and helio messages dating back to the beginning of September. Maritz boasted that he had ample guns, rifles, ammunition, and money from the Germans, and that he would overrun the whole of South Africa.

Image: Rare image of Lt. Col Maritz, front and centre in his South African Union uniform and his staff behind him – his  ‘Agterryer’ (man-servant) is at his heels (It’s the man-servant’s expression and position that is most interesting as in many ways it gives away the complete disregard Maritz felt for people of colour).

In response to Maritz’ action and ultimatum, on 12 October, the Union government imposed martial law across the whole of South Africa. On proclaiming martial law, Smuts, the eternal reconciler, immediately called again for “reason” and urged the rebels not to be swayed by “foreign agents influencing them”.

The ‘Maritz Revolt’ as it would now become known was underway, and with their sedition hand now played by Maritz in the Cape Colony, his fellow conspirators – Beyers, Kemp and de Wet had no choice, now ‘in for a penny and in for a pound’ they all broke their ties with the Union Defence Force, resigned their commissions and went into open revolt against their lawfully elected government – raising Commando’s in the Transvaal and Orange Free State to come to Maritz’ aid

The revolt is well documented and carries with it a number of consequences for Jan Smuts, and we will cover these in future Observation Post articles called “Boer War 3 and Beyond” and “What about Jopie?” (look out for them). However, the long and short of it from a military historian’s perspective let’s look briefly look at the objective, the capability and strategy to achieve the objective and the outcome.

The stated objective: Maritz issued a proclamation by way of objective – “the former South African Republic and Orange Free State as well as the Cape Province and Natal are proclaimed free from British control and independent, and every White inhabitant of the mentioned areas, of whatever nationality, are hereby called upon to take their weapons in their hands and realize the long-cherished ideal of a Free and Independent South Africa.”

In other words, to take by force, the former British Colonies and re-start the Boer War, resistance to the declaration by any “white” in the entire Union of South Africa would be treated by Maritz’ Provisional Government as treasonous. 

Capability: To attain this objective, the Rebels raised 11,476 Boers. Union Defence Force strength was around 32,000 troops (so in essence the Rebels were outnumbered 3 to 1). Important to note here that of the 32,000 UDF troops, 20,000 were Afrikaners – mainly ex-Commando and most of them in the UDF’s mounted infantry ‘Rifle Associations’ (the old Commandos). General Louis Botha would primarily use the Rifle Associations to counteract the rebellion, insistent that the British ‘stay out of it’, this was going to be the Boer leaders sorting their differences out between themselves – so ‘Brother against Brother’ and in effect the UDF’s Afrikaners outnumbered the rebel Afrikaners 2 to 1.

Images: General Smuts (left) and General Botha (right) as depicted on cigarette cards during WW1.

Important also to note here as to capability, the Rebel force was not made up entirely of first rate ex-UDF soldiers going against their counterparts, the rebel force was made up primarily of destitute Orange Free State Boers having come through a drought and agricultural reforms on the back of the devastation of their farms during Boer War 2. 

Many of these Free State Boers as has been pointed out by historians like Sandra Swart (Desperate Men: The 1914 Rebellion and the Polities of Poverty’ in South African Historical Journal, Vol 42) and John Bottomly (The Orange Free State and the Rebellion of 1914: the influence of industrialisation, poverty and poor whitism: pages 29-73), were simply desperate ‘Bywoners’ (landless farmers or share-croppers) promised a better life if the rebellion was successful. 

Consider the statistics of the Boer rebels and from where they came, and you’ll see how the above statement holds true. 7,123 (62%) of the Boer Rebels came from the Orange Free State – the least populace, most rural and economically worse off province in the Union. As an aside, to gauge the extent of success of Maritz’ proclamation and its resonance across the broader Afrikaner community across the whole of South Africa, he was only able to motivate 1,215 (12%) of the Boer Rebels from the Cape province – the biggest province in the Union. The balance coming from the Transvaal, and no real support from Natal.

The Potchefstroom Herald at the time best tried to explain why there was no traction behind the revolt from Cape Afrikaners and the black/brown African communities in this quote – and not surprisingly it boils down to the lack of suffrage and plain racism in the old Republics;

“When these high officers of the Defence Force in Transvaal and Orange “Free” State rebelled and joined the Germans with their commandos, the Dutchmen of the Cape (presumably because “they vote side by side with the Kafirs”) denounced the treachery in unmistakable terms. The South African party at the Cape beat up its followers to the support of the Government, and the voice of the Cape section of the Dutch Reformed Church rang from pulpit and platform in denunciation of disloyalty and treason. But in the Northern Provinces, where white men are pampered and guarded by the Government against the so-called humiliation of allowing native taxpayers to vote, there the rebellion, having been regarded with seeming approval, gained a marvellous impetus.

Plaatjie: The Boer Rebellion – snippet from the Potchefstroom Herald

As a unified, coherent, trained and fully armed force, the Rebel Boers were not. Desperate and landless farmers in the main up against fully trained, motivated, even mechanised in some instances, and properly armed UDF soldiers on a 3:1 numerical advantage – the Rebels were no match and it quickly showed. The long and short the rebellion was almost immediately repelled and then very quickly crushed as Botha’s UDF Rifle Associations with some Regiment elements in support hunted the Rebel Commandos down as they tried to make their way to assist Maritz on the GSWA border.

Image: The last pursuit of Major Kemp. A South African Union ‘Flying column’ crossing the Orange River after him.

As Dr David Katz in his work ‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917) points out. Jan Smuts, eternally the one Boer General keeping a level head and seeking reconciliation and understanding, and when it was clear the rebellion had failed, Smuts called for a ‘Blanket Amnesty’ across the board for the Boer Rebel leaders and their troops if they laid down their arms. General Louis Botha, the Commander in Chief, on the other hand took a much harder and less reconciliatory line than his colleague Smuts – Botha agreed to an Amnesty, but for the rank and file only, the Boer Rebel leaders would have to be prosecuted. The amnesty, excluding the Rebel leadership, was in put place from 12th to 21st November 1914, and with it the 1914 Boer Rebellion was effectively over, by the end of November General de Wet’s force alone was down to only 40 men. Rear actions and isolated and desperate battles continued to be fought for a couple of months by woefully under-strength hard liners refusing surrender and amnesty, but by the end of January 1915 the rebellion was over.  

Of the Rebel leadership now having surrendered, Botha and Smuts would again be especially magnanimous, considering the Union was in a state of war externally and in a state of martial law internally – and this was 1914 ‘World War 1’ – people were put in front of firing squads for ‘cowardice’ and being AWOL (absent without leave) – let alone ‘sedition’ and ‘treason’. Smuts would treat the Rebels in general very kindly, literally with kid gloves, all the time urging reason, understanding and reconciliation.

Of the main rebel leaders, General Christiaan Beyers tragically drowned in the Vaal River whilst attempting to desperately evade capture on 8th December 1914. 

General Christiaan de Wet was captured during the amnesty and sentenced to six years imprisonment, with a fine of £2000, he was released by Botha and Smuts after one year’s imprisonment, after giving a written promise to take no further part in politics. 

Major Jan Kemp was captured on the 2nd of February 1915 and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment, with a fine of £1000. However, a mere 10 months into his sentence Botha and Smuts agreed to release him – also on the condition that he may not participate in any politics (a promise Kemp almost immediately broke entering politics as a National Party MP under Hertzog in 1920 and again under Malan’s ‘Reformed’ National Party after 1948).

Lt. Colonel Manie Maritz would evade capture and escape into German South West Africa, at the conclusion of the GSWA campaign and the Union Defence Force’s victory and annexation of the territory (the first real victory for the Allies against Imperial Germany in WW1), Maritz would again evade capture, going into self-imposed exile in Angola, Spain, Portugal and then Mozambique.

Of all the other leaders – junior and mid-level rebel officers who were also captured. All were sentenced to short imprisonments and fines, almost all of them walking free within a year … except for just one man … Captain Jopie Fourie was executed for ‘High Treason’ having not resigned his UDF officers commission, captured still wearing his UDF officer’s uniform and opening fire on his fellow UDF troops whilst under a ‘white flag’ of truce (this was WW1 after all and there was no way anyone could get him out of this one with a no-nonsense leader like Botha as Prime Minister, not in a month of Sundays  – more on him in a later article “What about Jopie?”).

To pay for all their fines the Bloemfontein newspaper ‘Het Volksblad’ established the ‘Halfkroonfonds’ (Half-a-Crown Fund). Shop owners and other people whose property had been damaged during the rebellion were able to claim compensation, leading to the establishment of the Helpmekaar Beweging (the Help-One-Another Movement). By the end of 1917, all the debts were paid.

Of the handling of the 1914 Maritz Revolt, Louis Botha would summarise Smuts role and leadership, when he said of him;

“Nobody can appreciate sufficiently the great work General Smuts has done – greater than any man throughout this unhappy period. At his post day and night, his brilliant intellect, his calm judgement, his amazing energy and his undaunted courage have been assets of inestimable value to the Union in her hour of trial.”

Prime Minister Louis Botha

As a rebellion with any chance of success consider just what a small minority they represented – no Cape Province or Natal Afrikaner would really come near it, of the Afrikaners in the Transvaal and OFS they were unable to raise an effective fighting force, the vast majority of Afrikaners in the armed forces remained in the UDF, the vast majority of Afrikaner political leaders remained behind Botha and Smuts and they gained no traction whatsoever to raise anything from the Black and Coloured communities (the real ‘vast’ majority) – no “Askari” troops whatsoever, and they got no support whatsoever from the white South Africans of British decent – who by way of ‘white’ population were not insignificant in size, commanding massive swathes of white population groups in the Transvaal (most of Johannesburg and the reef), Natal (most of Durban) and the Cape Colony (especially in Cape Town and the Eastern Cape) . 

In the end the Maritz revolt did little in terms of its military objectives, it managed to delay the invasion plans of GSWA for a couple of months only whilst the UDF dealt with it, however in the end the GSWA campaign was a decisive victory for the Union and the territory successfully annexed under ‘Greater South Africa’ in a trusteeship – as was the Union’s expressed casus belli.

Image: General Botha (right) accepts the surrender of German South-West Africa from Lt Col Francke, (left) at Kilo, 9 July 1915.

What the Rebellion did however do was plant the seeds for political division and is one of the key propaganda tools used by the Nationalists to create the deep split in Afrikaner outlooks. Louis Botha would look at the Rebellion as complete folly, a waste of time and an utter waste of life, his opponents would look at it rather romantically instead – a sort of – ‘Boer Last Stand’. It stands today in some Afrikaner communities, precisely because of its ‘Romanticism’ and ‘political currency’ and not because of its military prowess or even its unattainable objectives.  

Now, back to Maritz and Smuts, the subjects of this vastly differing outlook on Afrikanerdom, because it would manifest itself again just prior to the Second World War.

A Nazi

Manie Maritz decided to end his self-imposed exile after the 1st World War ended and returned to the Union of South Africa in 1923. The Smuts government treating him very kindly by way of reconciliation, and all things considered for a crime as serious as treason he received a short imprisonment of three years. Luckily for Maritz, Hertzog’s National party won the 1924 election and Maritz was granted full amnesty and walked free having only served three months.

Maritz took to farming, but came under the influence of National Socialism (Nazism) in 1936 and founded a ‘anti-parliamentary’(dictatorship led) party called the Volksparty (People’s Party) in 1940. Maritz also took control of another ultra-right, national socialist, pro-Nazi movement initially set up by Colonel J.C. Laas (the first Commandant-General of the Ossewabrandwag) called “Die Boerenasie” (The Boer Nation), he then merged the Volksparty with Die Boerenasie and continued under the “Die Boerenasie” banner. He became known as a very outspoken proponent of The Third Reich and admirer of Adolf Hitler. During this time, he had also developed a theory about the alleged Jewish conspiracy and interference in South African and world politics and became a fanatical Antisemite. He would detail his Antisemitic and National Socialist views in his autobiography ‘My Lewe en Strewe’ (My life and Aspiration) which he published in 1939, a book regarded as lacking in objectivity, inciting racial hatred and like his hero Adolf Hitler’s book ‘Mein Kampf’ (My Struggle) Maritz’ book was full of emotional and racially driven rhetoric. He was even taken to court over all the anti-Semitic statements he made in his book, found guilty of fomenting racial hatred and he was fined £75.

Images: Maritz’ book ‘My Lewe an Sterwe’, later political portrait and the ‘Die Dappere Bloodskapper’ second world war mouthpiece for The Ossewabrandwag and Maritz’ Boerenasie.

Die Boerenasie rose to prominence under Manie Maritz, in September 1939 Jan Smuts declared war against Nazi Germany and once again you could not find a more vastly differing view than that of Smuts and Maritz. Smuts was extremely wary of the dangers of Nazism and Adolf Hitler, who he accused of being a “false messiah” and whose Nazi symbology of the Swastika Smuts called “the crooked cross” in reference to it being a corruption of true Christianity. Smuts was so anti-Nazism that he would take the Union of South Africa to war again to fight it, and once again at ‘war’ with Maritz. 

On antisemitism, here again Smuts held a polarising opposite view to Maritz. Smuts was a devout Zionist, he believed in the establishment of Israel as nation state, supported Jewish immigration and refugees (even controversially as Prime Minister he was involved in rescuing 200 Jewish orphans from the ‘Pogroms’ in the Ukraine in 1921, bringing them to safety in South Africa). Smuts supported the ‘Balfour Agreement’ which gave rise to Israel, he was also a personal friend of Chaim Weizmann, the President of the Zionist Organization. Weizmann went on to become the first President of Israel. Smuts is so loved and honoured in Israel that even today a kibbutz in Ramat Yohanan is named in his honour.

It is however difficult to say if Smuts would have interned Maritz again for his Nazi sympathies along with the other strong proponents of Nazism during the 2nd World War as Maritz’ life ended tragically and very early on in the war, he died in a car accident in Pretoria on the 20th December 1940. Probably, had he lived, Smuts and Maritz would have been at extreme loggerheads and Maritz back on the warpath with the Union – and very possibly back in jail.

A completely differing outlook

So, back to the image of Smuts and Maritz on Commando during the South African War (1899-1902) a.k.a. The 2nd Boer War on the masthead. It is hard to think how Smuts and Maritz could find anything in common, and to think they are fighting side by side in common cause against the British, living hard in the bush on horseback and up to their necks in the blood and gore of war – brothers in arms in effect.

Both saw South Africa – from the “Limpopo to the Cape” – even incorporating all the surrounding British protectorates and German South West Africa in addition. Both saw ‘white civilization’ as the steward to develop the region – this was the era of ‘Empire’ after all. Both put their ‘Afrikanerdom’ front and centre and both believe sincerely that only an Afrikaner hegemony in Southern Africa would successfully unlock the region’s potential, and both were prepared to fight for it.

That’s where the similarity ends. Smuts believed the ‘Afrikaner’ led hegemony would only work with an outward, embracing and reconciliatory disposition – and with all the British protectorates, British colonies and British subjects living in ‘Greater South Africa’ in partnership … so, he saw that the future lay only with the co-operation of the British super-power as a steward protecting the region as part of Britain’s family of nations. Progress for Smuts would only lie in establishing peace and co-operation with Britain.

Maritz on the other hand believed in a similar hegemony, only he believed that South Africa would fall under the stewardship of white Afrikaners with Germany as the super-power providing the glue to keep the region stable and prosperous. He believed that the only way the troublesome ‘British’ subjects in the colonies and protectorates would be brought into line was with jack-boot authority – and Germany would provide the Afrikaners with the protection, money, military backing and arms to do so. 

Maritz’s political disposition had its roots in “Krugerism” – a philosophy whereby White Afrikaners were ‘pure’ with an orthodox Calvinist ‘dopper’s’ approach to religion, through God and a theocracy styled republic they had an ordained right to rule over non-Afrikaners and Africans alike – they would have limited or no basic suffrage rights whatsoever in Kruger’s Republic. Maritz’ view so inwardly directed that he demonstrated a deep seated racist and violent response to anything “non-Aryan” (non pure). By 1939 Maritz’ Afrikaner cabal consisted of far-right wing Afrikaner nationalists with Nazi leanings – all of whom adopted or supported Nazism prior to, including and some even after the war – the likes of H.F Verwoerd, F.C Erasmus, Jaap Marais, B.J. Vorster, F.C. Erasmus, Oswald Pirow, Hendrik van den Bergh, Johannes von Moltke, P.O. Sauer, C.R. Swart, P.W. Botha, Eric Louw, Louis Weichardt, Rev. Koot Vorster, Henning Klopper, Albert Hertzog, Dr Nico Diedericks, Piet Meyer, Dr Eben Dönges, Dr Hans van Rensberg etc., etc. All of whom were infusing Afrikanerdom with a heady mix of Christian Nationalism, Oligarchy Republicanism and National Socialism (Nazism).

Smuts’ political disposition on the on the other hand had it roots in “Holism” – a philosophy whereby White Afrikaners lived in an interdependent state with all the cultures and societies surrounding it, he cherished the Cape Franchise, acknowledged Black South African medieval history and although a segregationist for much of his early life, his political philosophy would focus on consolidation, reconciliation and mutual recognition. By 1939 Smuts had abandoned segregationist thinking altogether famously stating that “segregation had fallen on evil days” in 1941 – his thinking had turned to universal suffrage and human rights and his Afrikaner cabal consisted of ‘left’-leaning Afrikaners with liberal suffrage and democratic leanings in the main – they were known as “Smuts-men” and they consisted of people like Deneys Reitz , Kmdt Dolf ‘Oom’ de la Rey, Group Captain ‘Sailor’ Malan, General Dan Pienaar, Group Captain ‘Dutch’ Hugo, Uys Krige, General Kenneth van der Spuy, General George Brink, Jacob Pretorius, Jan Steytler, Captain De Villiers-Graaff, Pieter van der Byl, Dr Ernst Malherbe, Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr etc., etc.

A more vastly different and polarising view of Afrikanerdom you could not find – one inward and one outward.

In conclusion 

So how does it all work out for these two vastly different views of Afrikanerdom? Well, unfortunately we all know the history, and after Smuts’ shock electoral defeat of the Nationalist Afrikaners in 1948, these Afrikaners had a free-reign with complete control of education channels and media channels coupled with ‘gagging’ powers over opposition voices – for 40 long years – in which they also took the opportunity to resurrect Manie Maritz and the ‘Boer Rebels of 1914’  as the true Afrikaner ‘heroes’ of Afrikanerdom and paint Smuts and his Smuts-men as the ‘traitors’. 

The net result, sad to say, is Maritz’ view won out, Maritz would be directly responsible in his rebellion in creating a schism that would break the Afrikaner camp into two distinctive groups and continue to drive a schism through it all the way to the on-set of World War 2 and then Apartheid and beyond.

Thanks largely to leaders like Maritz and advent of the Broederbond’s ‘Centenary Trek’ in 1938 the modern Afrikaner is still seen in South Africa by most other societies in the context of a whites-only ‘Voortrekker’ (pioneer), ‘Boer’ (farmer) hegemony, sometimes with conservative and ‘racist’ leanings – which, as it happened in Maritz’ beloved Nazi Germany put the Afrikaner on the same footing as Nazi Germans in many people’s eyes after the Afrikaner nationalists formally gazetted their eugenically driven ideology of Apartheid in 1948.

The small difference, modern Germany goes to great extent to re-dress, re-educate, reconcile and consolidate their military history and political ideologies from both the 1st World War and the 2nd World War … so as to overcome the tremendous impact of propaganda and conditioning initiated by the National Socialists and ‘open’ minds to the truth. Whereas in South Africa no real deep-seated action of reconciliation, re-education and understanding has taken place to counteract the old Christian Nationalism conditioning and propaganda initiated by the Nationalists, and in many circles the likes of General Christiaan de Wet, General Christian Beyers, Major Jan Kemp, Captain Jopie Fourie, Lt. Col Manie Maritz in active sedition with Germany and eventually the likes of the other Afrikaners flirting with Germany and its ideologies, D.F. Malan, H.F. Verwoerd, B.J. Vorster and P.W. Botha are still held up fervently and sometimes illogically by some as the ‘true’ heroes of Afrikanerdom – as certainly is the case with Maritz.

In all honesty, the challenge for ‘white’ South Africans especially in reviewing, redressing, and balancing their history – and this massively different outlook initiated by the likes of Maritz and Smuts – is to better resurrect the ‘redeemable’ Afrikaners – the iconoclasts, the ones who held the opposing view to Apartheid, the ones who went to war against Imperial Germany and then again against Nazi Germany – Smuts and his ‘Smuts-men’ – NOT the ones who joined hands with Germany and its ideologies. Hold up the true ‘heroes’ to account Afrikanerdom, the ones who demanded suffrage and fought against racist oppression – and believe it or not, there is a very big pool to choose from. Their histories and ‘differing’ views where savagely repressed by the Nationalists and literally scrubbed from our national consciousness – and they need to come to light in order to affect a more balanced outlook on Afrikanerdom – as in truth when we look at it with the hindsight of history, they are really the true ‘ysters’ (heroes) and not the ‘veraaiers’ (traitors). Krugerism, National Socialism, Christian Nationalism, Apartheid and a ‘keep South Africa white’ Verwoerd Republicanism are an abhorrent testament to Afrikaner nationalism as an ideology and an anathema to Afrikanerdom itself.


Written and researched by Peter Dickens 

References: 

Eben Nel; ‘Kaapse rebelle van die Hantam-karoo’

Dr David Katz; ‘General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa 1914 -1917’

Sandra Swart; ‘Desperate Men: The 1914 Rebellion and the Polities of Poverty’ 

John Bottomly; ‘The Orange Free State and the Rebellion of 1914: the influence of industrialisation, poverty and poor whitism’

André Wessels; Afrikaner (Boer) Rebellion (Union of South Africa) 2018.

Brian Bunting; ‘The Rise of the Afrikaner Reich’

John C.G. Röhl: ‘The Kaiser and England during the Boer War’

Plaatje: Chapter XXIII The Boer Rebellion

Colourised images with greatest thanks and appreciation to Jennifer Bosch – Jenny B Colourised on line:

Related Work:

Union to Republic: From Union to Banana Republic!

Boer War Myths: Debunking the myth that the British invented the ‘concentration camp’ and Stealing Republics, gold, diamonds and other myths!

Jan Smuts and Israeli: 200 Jewish orphans saved, the story of Jan Smuts and Issac Ochberg 

Jan Smuts and Balfour: A Kibbutz called Jan Smuts

Blood Oaths on the Führer principle

The National Socialist Rebels and the Ossewabrandwag

Not frequently referred to in the Nazification of the Afrikaner right is Robey Leibbrandt’s own organisation for even more radicalised Afrikaners seeking more militant action than that offered by the Ossewabrandwag – the National Socialist Rebels.

Robey Leibbrandt

So how did that come about? Simply put, when Robey Leibbrandt was put ashore in South Africa by the Nazi German state for ‘Operation Weissdorn’ he was under the impression that he was to meet with the Ossewabrandwag leadership and inform them that he was now the only legitimate leader of the Afrikaner nation and take over control of the Ossewabrandwag.

Such was his megalomania, thuggery and aggression that even the radio operator who was earmarked to come ashore with him refused to do so, citing fear for his life and remained on-board the yacht instead (the Captain and crew were also relieved to get rid of Leibbrandt such an annoyance he had become). Naturally when Leibbrandt was finally able to get to the leader of the Ossewabrandwag to inform him of the leadership change as specified by his German handlers, Dr Johannes (Hans) van Rensburg, the leader and Kommandant General of the Ossewabrandwag would have none of it and refused to recognise Robey Leibbrandt outright, a row broke out and the two became irreconcilable. 

So, no matter, Robey Leibbrandt would find within the Ossewabrandwag supporters who staunchly followed National Socialism, start his own organisation and he would overcome the leadership crisis by getting them to swear alliance to him in person – in blood. Taking a leaf out of his hero’s book, Adolf Hitler who used a similar oath to get the German military establishment to swear sole allegiance to him as the sole and legitimate leader of the German Volk by name, so too did Robey Leibbrandt get his followers to swear allegiance to him as the only legitimate Afrikaner leader, by name.

The blood signature oath read as follows:

“I stand before God and swear this sacred oath that I, as an Afrikaner, will faithfully serve my Volk and Vaderland with my whole heart, body, soul and mind, along the lines indicated to me by the leader of the National Socialist Rebels in the person of Robey Leibbrandt and no one else, from now until death. The deep seriousness with which I recognise myself as a National Socialist Rebel finds expression in the blood with which I forever bind my person through the medium of my signature. I am nothing. My Volk is all. God be with us. The Vierkleur on High.”

Ossewabrandwag on parade holding old ZAR Republic VierKleur flags

Not to miss out on the legitimacy of Adolf Hitler as the supreme leader (can’t usurp the Führer), the blood oath also partly read as follows:

“All my fight and striving is for the freedom and independence of the Afrikaner people of South Africa and for the building up of a National Socialist State in accordance with the ideas of Adolf Hitler.”

Hans van Rensberg

The enemy of my enemy is my friend

Posing a significant threat to the Ossewabrandwag – both in terms of drawing members, ideology and in leadership and overall control of the Afrikaner right-wing, the Ossewabrandwag would engage the tried old philosophy of the ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’ and sell out the National Socialist Rebels and Robey Leibbrandt to the British. Yup, they used the British, their stated enemy, to get rid of them, and given the oath they only need to get rid of the leader.

According to Dr Garth Benneyworth, British Intelligence documents he uncovered in the British National Archives, whilst in the UK in 2005, revealed that Hans van Rensburg sold out Robey Leibbrandt’s base of operations to the British SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) who in turn tipped off General Jan Smuts, which in turn led to Leibbrandt’s capture by the Union of South Africa’s security forces on Christmas Eve, 1941.

Charged and found guilty of High Treason, Robey Leibbrandt was sentenced to death. His sentence was commuted to life in prison by General Jan Smuts, the South African premier, some sources say it was because Smuts and Leibbrandt’s father served together during the South African War (1899-1902) and Smuts had a high regard for Leibbrand’s Dad, other sources point to Smuts not wanting the blood of yet another Jopie Fourie martyr on his hands. In any event, when the National Party government came to power in 1948, Leibbrandt was officially pardoned and walked out a free man – much to the disgust of the hundreds of thousands of South African’s who had fought against Nazism during the war.

In conclusion

Now, for those out there who still believe the Ossewabrandwag was just a ‘cultural’ organisation, anti-British only, think of it this way – what if Johannes van Rensburg had abided the Nazi German requirement that Robey Leibbrandt, a pure Nazi thug, take control of the Ossewabrandwag and ultimately leadership of the Afrikaner right. What if he stepped aside? Could have happened, only it did not – but why?

The answer simply is both Robey Leibbrandt and Johannes van Rensburg where equally megalomanic – both admired Adolf Hitler, both admired National Socialism and both abided the ‘Blut und Boden’ principle and the ‘Führer’ principle, both had Stormjaers (Stormtroopers) as followers, both were Afrikaner Christian Nationalists, both were anti-Semitic, both were fierce anti-Communists, both were anti-British/Judaeo Capital, both had secret oaths and ceremonies and both were wired into the Nazi spy network directly supporting the Nazi war effort. The only difference; Leibbrandt was a thug and Dr Hans van Rensburg was a skilled politician.

It was always going to be bloody power struggle for sole dictatorship such is the nature of the National Socialist ideology (like Adolf Hitler – the ‘skilled politician’ exterminated Ernst Röhm – the ‘thug’) – and that’s exactly what happened – the Ossewabrandwag wanted Robey Leibbrandt dead (the inner circle of the Ossewabrandwag even issued the instruction for his ‘liquidation’) and no doubt Leibbrandt and the National Socialist Rebels wanted Dr Hans van Rensburg dead.


Written and researched by Peter Dickens 

For more on the South African organisations flirting with Nazism, here are some easy links to previous Observation Posts;

The Ossewabrandwag “Mein Kampf shows the way to greatness for South Africa” – The Ossewabrandwag

Robey Leibbrand: Treason! Robey Leibbrandt

The New Order: South Africa’s Nazi ‘Neuordnung’ and Oswald Pirow

The South African Christian National Socialist Movement (SANP) Greyshirts; South Africa’s Nazi Party; The ‘Gryshemde’

The Broederbond; Education Whiteout! The Broederbond

Primary References:

Dr Evert Kleynhans – Hitler’s Spies, Secret agents and the intelligence war in South Africa, 1939-1945. Published 2021

Dr Garth Benneyworth – Sol Plaatje University – Correspondence 16/2/2023

Winning Afrikaner Hearts and Minds

Ox Wagons to Steel Commandos

So what does the 1938 Great Trek Centenary have in common with Sailor Malan’s returning war veterans anti-apartheid movement – The Torch Commando?

Well, it’s all in the name – ‘Steel Commando’ – so what is a Steel Commando and what the heck does it have to do with the famous 1938 Great Trek Centenary defining Afrikanerdom and Sailor Malan’s later ’Torch Commando’ in 1951.

So here’s the backdrop:

The 1938 Great Trek Centenary 

In 1938, the Broederbond under the directive of its Chairman, Henning Klopper sought to use the centenary of Great Trek to unite the ‘Cape Afrikaners’ and the ‘Boere Afrikaners’ under the symbology of the Great trek. In this endeavour artificially creating a shared heritage. He started a Great Trek re-enactment with two Ox-Wagons in Cape Town and addressed the large crowd of 20,000 spectators by saying;

“We ask the entire Afrikanerdom to take part in the festival celebration in this spirit. We long that nothing shall hinder the Afrikaner people as a whole from taking part. This movement is born from the People; may the People carry it in their hearts all the way to Pretoria and Blood River. Let us build up a monument for Afrikaner hearts. May this simple trek bind together in love those Afrikaner hearts which do not yet beat together. We dedicate these wagons to our People and to our God.”

By that he hoped to combine the ‘Cape white Afrikaners’ with the ‘Boer white Afrikaners’ in the symbology of the Great Trek under a fabricated Nationalist ideal of Christian Nationalism – and only meant ‘White’ Afrikaners in the Broederbond’s definition of what constituted ‘Afrikanerdom’ and not really the Afrikaans speaking peoples as a ‘whole’ – certainly not the Coloured and Black Afrikaners. The Trek celebration would be pitched as an assertion of Afrikaner white power in South Africa and the Trek as the true path to a overall South African nationhood and identity and ignore the histories of everyone else – black and white – in creating a future South African identity. 

In any event the trek re-enactment was very successful in re-aligning white Afrikaner identity under the Christian Nationalist ideal.  In the end eight wagons from all around the country threaded their way to Pretoria to lay the cornerstone of the Voortrekker monument – in front of a crowd of 200,000 people. Whilst at the same time, four ox-wagons went to the site of the battle at Blood River for a commemoration service on the 16th December. The wagons stopping in countless towns and villages all around the country along the way to re-name street after street after one or another Voortrekker hero, and laying imprints of the wagons wheels in freshly laid cement at many halts (there are still ‘imprints’ at my hometown in Hermanus).

Images: Henning Klopper’s Ox-Wagons named – The ‘Piet Retief’ and the ‘Andries Pretorius, leave Cape Town from the foot of Jan van Riebeeck’s statue to commence the 1938 Centenary of The Great Trek.

The Broederbond had staggered onto the ideal way to ‘unify’ the Afrikaner – a round the country travelling carnival  – from the cities to the platteland, on to far flung corners and everything in between. Henning Klopper himself amazed at the reaction and the success of it all – so much so he turned to divine intervention and called it a “sacred happening”

The Ossewabrandwag

A mere two short years after the Centenary Trek, South Africa was at war with Nazi Germany. Leading up to the war, the South African government was a ‘Fusion’ coalition party between the National Party under Prime Minister Barry Hertzog and General Jan Smuts’ South African Party as his deputy – in an entity called The United Party. The decision to go to war was won by Smuts and a majority vote. Hertzog, whose National Party was already splitting along more radical right lines with the advent of the ‘Pure’ National Party resigned and Smuts became the wartime Prime Minister.

Another one of the primary reasons for the National Party gravitating to radical right-wing lines was the Ox-wagon Great Trek Centennial of 1938.  One of the wagon group’s leaders during the trek was Dr Johannes Van Rensburg, a lawyer who had served previously as National Party ‘Secretary of Justice’ in 1933 and was a part-time Union Defence Force officer – he had been to Germany in his capacity as Secretary and met both Hitler and Göring as well as other Nazi officials, he was deeply impressed with both the leadership and discipline offered by Nazism and became an admirer.  

So, from the Centenary event in celebration of this coming together of Afrikaner identity under a white-only Afrikaner Nationalism came a cultural movement called the Ossewabrandwag (meaning Ox Wagon Sentinel or ‘Fire Watch’) – abbreviated OB – eventually led by Dr Johannes van Rensberg. Formed in 1938, the ‘Fire’ part of the OB name referred to the rapidly spreading “wildfire” of Christian Nationalism and ‘white’ Afrikanerdom set off by the 1938 Ox-Wagon Centenary Trek, eventually gaining about 250,000 – 300,000 members in total.

The Ossewabrandwag at the on-set was loosely associated to Dr D.F. Malan’s ‘Pure’ National Party. However so as not to tread on one another’s feet, the relationship between the Ossewabrandwag and National Party needed to be formalised. So Dr D.F. Malan met with OB leaders on the 29th October 1940 which resulted in declaration known as the ‘Cradock Protocol’. It specified the two operating spheres of the two respective organisations. They undertook not to meddle in each others affairs and the National Party endeavoured to work for white Afrikanerdom and Christian Nationalism in the “political” sphere while the OB would operate on the “cultural” front. 

Images: Ossewabrandwag members on parade and taking a Nazi styled salute

Resigning from the Union Defence Force, when war was declared, Dr Johannes Van Rensburg moved to promote the edicts of Nazism in the OB and even directly support the Nazi Germany war effort-ordinating espionage activities for German submarines, the OB under his leadership also evolved away from being a mere ‘cultural movement’ forwarding Nationalist Afrikaner identity, to an active domestic para-military movement with strong Nazi convictions.

Dr Van Rensburg, having resigned as an officer in the Union Defence Force at the start of the war, had always professed been a National Socialist, and as an open admirer of Nazi Germany and Adolph Hitler, the ideas and rituals of membership of the OB had a distinctive Nazi leaning as a result.

Officially, the National Party – when under Hertzog and then under Dr D.F. Malan took the position of ‘neutrality’ as to South Africa’s wartime involvement, but in reality hundreds of thousands of Afrikaner Nationalists were joining openly pro-Nazi Germany movements like the Ossewabrandwag (OB) and its ‘Stormjaers’ (Storm Troopers) military wing, the Nazi Party of South Africa – the South African Christian National Socialist Movement (SANP), the National Socialist Rebels under Robey Leibbrandt, a Nazi Germany insurgent and the Nazi world expansionist order in South Africa – The New Order (NO) under Oswald Pirow who had served as a National Party Defence Minister under Hertzog.

The Steel Commando

The recruitment of white Afrikaners to volunteer for war service became paramount to Union’s Defence Force wartime objectives. On the other side of the Afrikaner coin stood Afrikaners like General Jan Smuts and Dr Ernest Malherbe, who had also been swept up in the enthusiasm of 1938 Great Trek Centenary and the establishment of a unified Afrikaner identity, but not buying into its underpinning Christian Nationalism ideology. 

The Malherbe family, for example, being descendants of a French Huguenot and Afrikaners to their core had nothing in common with the Broederbond but had been caught up with all the Afrikanerdom of the 1938 Centenary Trek. At Blood River on 15 December, in the shade of one of the Centenary trek wagons, Dr Ernie Malherbe’s father-in-law, Dominee Paul Nel, baptised their daughter Betty-Jane with water from the Blood River. 

When South Africa declared war, Dr Ernie Malherbe and a group of academics, notably Alfred Hoernle and Leo Marquard, persuaded General Smuts to set up, under Malherbe, a corps of information officers to counter subversion in the armed forces generated by the likes of the Ossewabrandwag and the Broederbond and to stimulate the Afrikaner troops and potential white Afrikaner recruits to consider what they were fighting for. Smuts then made Malherbe Director of Military Intelligence with the rank of Colonel. Henceforward South African propaganda which had just been focused on countering Nazi propaganda became much more positive and more South African in its orientation.

Images; World War 2 recruitment posters targeted at white Afrikaners – note the poster drawing on the ‘the road to South Africa’ commencing from The Battle of Blood River to the Boer War Commandos to the South African Union Army – the title “Still loyal to the path of South Africa” is a direct play on the 1938 Centennial Trek which the Broederbond pitched as “Die Pad van Suid-Afrika,” a symbolic ‘path’ to South Africa’s nationhood taken by the Voortrekkers. This poster attests that joining the Smuts appeal to war is the true path to nationhood.

Critical to Smuts’ call for volunteers to serve in combat regiments was the white Afrikaner nation (as ‘whites’ and ‘coloureds’ were only deemed eligible to carry firearms in the military per segregationist policies and not ‘blacks’). The Union’s Defence Force at the beginning of the war was woefully under strength. Simply put, without the white Afrikaners volunteering for war-time service, South Africa’s wartime commitments for combatants would be ineffectual.

Colonel Malherbe would take a leaf out of the Broederbond’s 1938 Centenary Trek used to ‘unify’ the Afrikaner – a round the country travelling carnival covering just about every town and village in the remotest areas. Only this time Colonel Malherbe intended that the travelling carnival ‘unify’ the Afrikaner behind Smuts’ call to arms to fight with Britain and France on the side of the Allies. He would use armoured cars instead of ox-wagons and his message was almost diametrically opposite to that of the Broederbonds’.

Colonel Malherbe would call his countrywide travelling carnival – The Steel Commando, added to this would be a propaganda and recruitment pamphlet dropping campaign from SAAF aircraft called the Air Commando.  The Steel Commando would consist of vehicle to carry a full military band, various armoured cars and a truck converted into a mobile recruitment station. Critical to the Steel Commando would be a contingent of old Republican Boer War veterans (South African War 1899-1902) to give it a sense of ‘Afrikanerdom’ and ‘duty’ to South Africa. The term ‘Commando’ would be given to the convoy – solely because it resonated with old Republics ‘Kommandos’ of the Boer war and as a result had Afrikaner appeal. Isie Smuts (called ‘Ouma’), Jan Smuts’ wife and very popular amongst Afrikaners, young and old, was also positioned as a volksmoeder (people’s mother) a term originated in the Boer War and was initially drawn upon by Afrikaner nationalists to represent ‘the mother of the nation’ connected to the concentration camps – Isie Smuts would become a volksmoeder for the Union’s wartime cause comforting the Afrikaner men and women in uniform and the country’s ‘First Lady.’

This convoy would enter small rural and farming towns with the fanfare of the marching band ahead of it, flanked by the Boer War Republican veterans and the recruiting station behind.

Was it effective in capturing the Afrikaner hearts and minds as the Centenary Trek had been?  The truthful answer is – yes. In all the South African standing forces in WW2 comprised 334,000 full-time and voluntary service personnel, 211,000 were White, 77,000 were Blacks and 46,000 were Coloureds and Indians. Of the 211,000 whites, 60% were estimated by Malherbe as being white ‘Afrikaners’ – 126,600 – the majority ethnic group in the South African Union’s Defence Force during World War 2. 

To see the effect of a Steel Commando parade, this video outlines one addressed by Smuts as a demonstration of the achievements of recruitment is very telling – note the extensive use of Boer Commando veterans.

What the Steel Commando and Colonel Malherbe’s recruitment drive also did was literally spit the Afrikaner ‘hearts and minds’ in two, one half supporting the National Party’s call to neutrality or the Ossewabrandwag’s call to directly support Nazi Germany – and the other half of white ‘Afrikanerdom’ – supporting the ideals of Union between English and Afrikaans, General Smuts’ policies and the Allied war against Nazi Germany. 

Post 1948

The dynamics behind the National Party’s accent to power without a majority vote in 1948 have been vastly researched but suffice it to say that for returning War Veterans from WW2, fighting against Nazism, the advent of a political party with numerous leaders who had been directly and/or indirectly flirting with Nazism during the war as a net result of organisations like the Ox Wagon Sentinel (Ossewabrandwag) and other Neo Nazi factions merging with The National Party was an abhorrent idea and an insult to the sacrifice of their comrades in arms.

The War Veteran’s Action Committee

The outrage to this and the implementation of the first Acts and Bills that would become ‘Apartheid’ would result in a merger of war veteran members of the Springbok Legion veteran’s association and war veterans predominant in the United Party’s political structures in April 1951 – the ‘War Veteran’s Action Committee WVAC (the WVAC was to eventually evolve into The Torch Commando) under the leadership of the charismatic war-time fighter ace – Sailor Malan, a veteran with Afrikaans heritage. Pains were taken to ensure the make-up of the WVAC was 50/50 English/Afrikaans.  

The WVAC kicked off their mission with a protest at the Johannesburg Cenotaph on 21st April 1951 during a commemoration service – laying a coffin draped in the national flag as a symbol to depict the death of the Constitution. They ramped their protests up with three torchlight protests in Port Elizabeth, Johannesburg and Durban. At these protests, comprising over 30,000 people in total, a set of resolutions were ratified to take to Cape Town and present to Parliament. The resolutions basically were a warning to the government that the military veteran community would embark on a political struggle unless the National Party government resigns.

Steel Commando (version 2)

But how to whip up support for their cause, and how to whip up the planned mega-torchlight rally in Cape Town to hand over the demands? Here the WVAC took a leaf out of Colonel Malherbe’s Union Defence Force ‘Steel Commando’ recruitment drive. They would not even change the name, the WVAC’s ‘Steel Commando’ would be run along the same lines with military precision. All around the country from far flung places vehicles would converge with the Steel Commando and the Commando itself would drive through multiple towns and villages whipping up publicity and support. 

The Steel Commando of the WVAC (Torch Commando) would, as a primary objective also look to recruit, all the Afrikaans war veterans who in their minds may have erroneously voted for the National Party in 1948 and call them back to Smuts’ more moderate politics. To this end, as Colonel Malherbe had done using Republican Boer War veterans, the WVAC would do exactly the same with their version of the Steel Commando and use the old Boer War Veterans. Kommandant Dolf de la Rey, a Boer War veteran whose Commando had been involved in capturing Winston Churchill and national hero was appointed to lead The Steel Commando with Sailor Malan as his 2nd in Command – two Afrikaner war heroes leading the convoy. They would also keep the term Commando when the WVAC formed ‘The Torch Commando’ later as a nod to Afrikaner heritage. Kommandant de la Rey was also affectionally given the term ‘Oom’ by the publicity machine to conjure up respect from the Afrikaner community.  This sentiment can be seen in the newspaper reporting outlined as follows:

Of the Steel Commando trip to Cape Town, wrote one newspaper correspondent: “Cape Town staged a fantastic welcome” for Kmdt de la Rey and Group Captain Malan, he related the enthusiasm of the crowd to the same that liberation armies received in Europe. The Johannesburg Star said: “The Commando formed the most democratic contingent ever to march together in the Union. Civil servants found themselves alongside the colored men who swept the streets they were marching so proudly upon.”

“In the front jeep rode Oom Dolf de la Rey, a white-haired old Boer of seventy-four, who looked so startlingly like the late General Jan Smuts that people looked twice at him and then cheered wildly. Oom (Uncle Dolf) was the man who, as a young burgher on commando fifty years before, had captured Winston Churchill, then a war correspondent with the Imperial forces in South Africa.In the second jeep stood a younger man with tousled brown hair, his hazel eyes cold and angry, the man who had been the most famed fighter pilot in all the RAF — Adolph Gysbert Malan, known all over the world as Sailor. He was the real hero of the hour. The people tried to mob him. Men and women, white as well as brown, crowded round his jeep and stretched out their hands to touch him.”

Video: The Steel Commando on-route to Cape Town – note the use of Boer War Kommando veterans.

The ‘Steel Commando’ convoy gathered media attention and grew in size as it converged on Cape Town on the 28th May, a crowd of 4,000 greeted it as it converged in Somerset West before heading to Cape Town that evening. In Cape Town, the Steel Commando arrived to a packed crowd of protesters on The Grand Parade outside the City Hall of between 55,000 to 65,000 people – consisting of whites and coloureds, supporters and veterans alike (veterans were estimated at 10,000). Many holding burning torches as had now become the trademark of the movement. Spooked by it all the National Party were convinced that a military coup was on and as a precautionary measure placed manned machine gun positions around the rooftop of the nearby Houses of Parliament.

Sailor Malan was literally carried on shoulders by cheering crowds to give his speech. Joined by Dolf de la Rey and even future Afrikaner anti-apartheid activist and fellow war veteran Mattheus Uys Krige as well as the English speaking South African war-time soprano and heroine who led them in song – Perla Gibson. In Sailor Malan’s speech to the crowd famously accused the national party government at this rally of;

 “Depriving us of our freedom, with a fascist arrogance that we have not experienced since Hitler and Mussolini met their fate”.

Images: Kommandant Dolf de la Rey and Group Captain Sailor Malan addressing crowds at the Steel Commando in Cape Town

Buoyed by the success of The Steel Commando, The Torch Commando would officially form and would in the course of time rise to 250,000 plus members – so if one asks – was The Steel Commando as successful as its original concept – the pre-war 1938 Ox-Wagon centennial staged by the Broederbond, and whose idea was drawn on by Colonel Malherbe for the Defence Forces’ Steel Commando’ wartime recruitment drive, the answer is yes, and here’s why;

In Conclusion

The white population voting base in 1951 was estimated about 1,000,000 whites. 250,000 whites had polarised to Ossewabrandwag radically politically right on the back of the 1938 Great Trek ‘Ox Wagon’ Centennial .. and 250,000 whites had gravitated radically politically left on the back of The Torch Commando. Literally driving a dividing line between the white voting base (English and Afrikaans) – half in support of Apartheid and half against Apartheid.

It would also splinter the white Afrikaner voter base and the Broederbond’s attempt at a shared Afrikaner National identity, the majority would be swayed by Christian Nationalism as an ideology and keep the National Party in government on a slim margin, becoming more entrenched as the National Party engaged gerrymandering and jack-boot totalitarian politics going into the future – however a significant portion of white Afrikaners would remain ‘Smuts-men’ and resist Christian Nationalism for many years to come – they simply would not buy into the Broederbond’s initial tenants of bringing ‘Afrikanerdom’ under the singular banner of ‘white’ Afrikaner Nationalism and saw it for what it was – a corruption of Afrikaner history, exclusive, hateful and divisive.

The irony, all this fracturing would be caused by the same vehicle to ‘unify’ the white Afrikaner – a travelling carnival appealing directly to the hearts and minds of far flung rural white Afrikaners, initially conceived by the Broederbond to drive an Apartheid agenda starting in Cape Town and picked up in the end, a tad over a decade later, by the Torch Commando to drive an anti-Apartheid agenda – to the same far flung rural white Afrikaners and in a twist of fate ending up back where it all started – Cape Town.


Written and Researched by Peter Dickens

Flying Cheetahs over Korea

By Derrick Dickens

Memories are at best times short and for most South Africans knowledge of the part played by pilots of No. 2 Squadron SAAF in the Korean conflict which started many years ago, are at best sketchy.

But the bottom line is these magnificent, unsung heroes in their flying machines carved a distinguished record in the history of the country’s armed forces.

In the closing stages of WWII and once the Soviet Union had agreed to declare war on Japan early in 1945, it was decided that the Soviets could occupy North Korea and the Americans the South. The dividing line ws the 38th parallel.

In 1947, the UN resolved to create an independent Korea. This resolution led to the planting of the seeds of discontent which would lead to the Korean conflict starting on June 25, 1950, and ending on July 27, 1953. Thus Korea became the first theatre of combat between the Western and Communist worlds, and signalled a major upsurge of the “Cold War.”

In response to a UN resolution, both US and Russian forces were withdrawn from Korea in 1949. With the advent of the Cold War, Korea suddenly assumed vital strategic importance, positioned as it was bordering on the Soviet Union, China and Japan.

Korea became the flashpoint of the Cold War when North Korea, with the backing of China and the Soviets, invaded the South. Within four days, the North Korean army had overrun the southern capital of Seoul and was moving rapidly southward. US troops were committed to the Puscan perimeter, where they were joined by reinforcements from the US, Britian and the Commonwealth in July and August.

After bitter fighting, the thrust south was halted and the final offensive of North Korea was repulsed in September, after which the UN forces started their offensive which pushed the Communist forces back over the 38th parallel.

An amphibious landing of UN troops at Inchon leap-frogged the North Koreans and cut off their supply routes, causing a disorderly retreat. By October, the UN forces had passed the 38th parallel and were heading for the Yalu River, the frontier with Red China. The Chinese then entered the war quite unexpectedly and drove the UN forces back over the 38th parallel.

By the end of January, the Chinese had overextended their supply lines and were forced to a halt. They were then once again driven back norht by a massive concentration of UN firepower to the 38th parallel, where fighting settled down to a vicious stalemate.

Armistice talks were launched and continued intermittently for the next two years, while the war of attrition continued unabated. The war in the air resulted in UN air supremacy ove the battlefields bringing it to conclusion, with the armistice signed at Panmunjom on July 27, 1953.

The SAAF goes to war.

The SA Government announced on August 4, 1950, that a fighter squadron had been offered to the UN for deployment in Korea, and three weeks later it was confirmed that the offer had been accepted, and No. 2 Squadron was been chosen for this formidable task.

Just over 200 officers and men were needed to supplement the existing nucleus of the squadron, and when volunteers were called for 332 officers and 1 094 other ranks came forward. On August 27, key posts were allocated to 18 officers plus 32 additional pilots and 157 other ranks. The officers, under Commanding Officer Commandant Van Breda Theron, DSO, DFC, AFC and Deputy Commanding Officer Major Blaauw, DFC, were experienced in their own special fields, and the combat leaders were all pilots who had distinguished themselves during WWII. Flying operations were to be controlled by the 18th USAF fighter-bomber wing.

Pilots of 2 SAAF Squadron, the ‘Flying Cheetahs’ underwent concentrated training on Spitfire Mk IXs

Before they were placed at the disposal of the UN. They converted to the F-51D Mustang at Johnson Air Force Base, Tokyo, and were attached to the USAF 18th fighter bomber wing at K-9, Pusan and K-24 Pyongyang.

Images: 2 SAAF Korea Paintings – by Derrick Dickens (copyright Peter Dickens)

The squadron flew into action to stem the Communist hordes swarming from the North, the head-long advance forcing it to fall back to K-10 near Chinhae, which remained its permanent base for the next two years.

In this war the SAAF received its baptism of fire from Russian MiG jets and moved from a piston-engined air force into the jet age from flying P-51 Mustangs to F-86 Sabres. In operations using the Mustangs, the SAAF carried out 10 373 sorties, and lost 74 of its 95 aircraft.

During the three years of conflict, The SAAF fielded 243 officers, 545 ground personnel and 38 army officers and men. The ‘Flying Cheetahs’ lost 34 pilots in action, almost a hundred percent attrition rate, which attested to the viciousness of the fighting.

The squadron mainly carried out interdiction and close air support missions, sealing off supplies from the Communist troops and disrupting communications. These tasks were invariably performed in the face of heavy anti-aircraft fire and counter attacks by MiG 15s.

Early 1953, the ‘Flying Cheetahs’ converted from their F-51 Mustangs to the jet-powered F-86 Sabre operating from K-55 at Osan, south of Seoul. They did conversion training in T-33 Shooting Stars and a week later their first Sabres arrived. Cmdt. Gerneke flew the first operational sortie on February 22. The same day they sighted numerous MiG, but no combat resulted.

By March 12, they were fully operational and flew four counter-air patrolsalong the Yalu River in an attempt to lure MiGs across the border to engage in combat. It was during one of these air alerts when, on March 18, Col. ‘Kalfie’ Martin and Eddie Pinaar intercepted two MiGs. Both pilots attacked and one MiG was seen to explode when it entered some cloud. The kill was credited to Col. Martin.

Images: 2 SAAF Korea Paintings – by Derrick Dickens (copyright Peter Dickens)

During the last months of the war, missions were equally distributed between interdiction, close support and counter-air, with an occasional rescue patrol.

The Sabres were returned to the USAF and the last SAAF officers left Korea on October 29, 1953, thus ending South Africa’s involvement in the Korean conflict.

By the time the armistice was signed, July 27,1953, the squadron had flown 11 843 sorties carrying out fighter sweeps along the Yalu and Chong Chong Rivers, and concentrating mainly on ground attack operations against enemy airfields.

Decorations earned included three Legions of Merit, two Silver Stars, 50 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 40 Bronze Stars and 176 Air Medals. 152 clusters to the Air Medal, one Soldier’s medal and 797 Korean War Medals.

The USA presented No. 2 Squadron with a Presidential Unit Citation, awarded for extra ordinary heroism in action against the armed enemy of the UN.

Korea presented the SAAF with the order of Military Merit Taeguk with Gold Star, to the unknown dead of the armed forces of the Union of South Africa, as well as a Presidential Unit Citation for exceptional meritorious service and heroism.

By the time the ‘Flying Cheetahs’ left Korea, they had established a record which compared favourably with the best of the UN Forces. They lost 34 pilots in flying nearly 3,5% of all fighter bomber sorties, destroying rolling stock, railway lines, tunnels, bridges and locomotives, military equipment, trucks, artillery pieces, and tanks, and accounting for hundreds of enemy troops.

The 826 South Africans who served in Korea all contributed to a combat record unequalled by a force of similar size in previous conflicts.

In honour of the ‘Flying Cheetahs’, 18th USAF Fighter-Bomber Wing issued this policy order:

“In memory of our gallant South African comrades, at all retreat ceremonies,the playing of the American National Anthem shall be preceded by playing the introductory bars of the South African National Anthem and that all personnel of the Wing will render the same honours to this Anthem as to our own.”

Editors Note:

This history on 2 Squadron, SAAF in Korea was written by father, who grew up in the 1950’s watching these magnificent Spitfires, Mustangs and Sabre Jets coming in and out of Pretoria, it formed the basis for his love of military aircraft and his lifelong passion as a fine artist painting them. It is with great honour and privilege that I can post images of his Korean War paintings and his written account of the history.

Note, over the years and changes and amalgamations, the 18th USAF Fighter-Bomber Wing is now the 18th Wing – a Composite Wing – at Kadena Air Force base in Japan, it is no longer believed that their band plays the opening bars of ‘Die Stem’ before the American National Anthem. I’m happy to be proved otherwise as its a great pity.

Peter Dickens

This was a presentation to the President of South Korea on the 60th Annivesary of the Korean war by the South African Veterans Association of the Koeran War at the celebratory banquet in Johannesburg. The painting by Derrick Dickens (and used on this story’s masthead) is being presented by Piet Visser Chairman of the Veterans Association, who flew Sabres in Korea, the painting depicts the two types of aircraft flown by the SAAF “Flying Cheetahs” in Korea. Sabre and Mustang.